Statements

Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main, Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften, Institut für Politikwissenschaft

“Germany's Europe. The Renaissance and Obsolescence of National Interests”

When united Germany celebrated unification 21 years ago it combined the reiteration of a promise with a plea. Paraphrasing Thomas Mann, German elites promised that united Germany would continue to build a "European Germany, not a German Europe". However, this mantra was soon accompanied by the plea that Germany should also "grow up" and become a "normal" European power.

The promise and the plea did not match semantically. In the early 1990s a "European Germany" essentially meant that Germany would continue to stick to the line of its post war chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl. For them German unity and ever deeper European integration had to be complemented by German reticence. Normality and the metaphor of growing up, in contrast, implied that Germany should "self-confidently" emulate those European partners for whom the pursuit of the "national interest" was the normal thing to do. Former chancellor Gerhard Schröder personified the grown-up generation of the Berlin Republic.

Many Greeks, Italians and even, increasingly, French may be forgiven for believing that German Europeanness nowadays boils down to unreticent national interest normality. To be sure, Berlin's political class is not spending sleepless nights in designing German hegemony over Europe. Most are reluctant to assume the leadership role which others are calling for. Nor is the German public keen at deploying German tax collectors to other European capitals as a modern-day equivalent of the German Panzer. Germans envy Switzerland. Retreat from the troubles of the world, not domination is on their mind.

Europeans may nevertheless be well advised to prepare for a less benign German Europe. Mann's vision of a German Europe today translates into German demands for redesigning European institutions in the image of Germany's fiscal and budgetary preferences. Rumors about plans by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy for a "Schengen"-type new treaty among a select group of "hard core" states clearly point in this direction. Even if the details are yet to be spelled out, there is a broadening consensus in Germany that drastic fiscal and budgetary reforms are needed both at the national level of individual EU member countries as well as the level of the Union. Popular sentiment in Germany, increasingly grudging parliamentary support for ever larger financial support facilities and ever more narrowly circumscribed rulings on the limits of EU integration from Germany's constitutional court leave little room for maneuvering. The age-old justification is that whoever pays calls the shots.

It seems as if German Europeanness has finally leveled out with European normality in other EU member states. After all the decision-making elites in most national capitals still seem to believe that the rhetoric of maximizing national interests "in Brussels" can easily be reconciled with a prospering, or even merely sustainable, Union. In this light the current crisis is not only, and possibly not even primarily, a financial crisis. It is a normative crisis about how to relate the European nation state to the Union. What is more, the successful re-socialization of united Germany back into normal European national interest politics is threatening to become a key factor in undermining the very foundation of the EU.

Given the institutional density of the EU polity it is difficult to overstate the point of how much it has become a community of common fate not unlike the nation-state. Such a community needs to adjust its discourse of interests in similar ways as the nation-states of prior centuries have taught themselves the language of national interests. The example of Germany's post war chancellors from Adenauer to Kohl is instructive. Their experience had taught them to speak German and European at the same time. Rather than construing a difference between national interests and European interests they insisted in framing them as being mutually dependent.

To be sure, even in the old days of the Bonn Republic Germany's European interests were as much a reflection of a particular German perspective as the French European rhetoric reflected French designs for reshaping Europe in its own image. Yet European talk was never cheap. Just as the invocation of national interests marks a claim which invites competing interpretations of what presumably is in a nation's interest, so does the invocation of European interests force interlocutors to engage in an exchange of what is best for the EU.

This is a crucial switch because the justificatory point of reference for legitimizing political decisions is changing. German chancellor Angela Merkel will never convince equally grudging German and European publics in pleading for support of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and drastic institutional reforms by merely referring to the maximization of Germany's interest. As a matter of fact, as the financial crisis has deepened she began to remember the language of Adenauer and Kohl claiming to act as "Europe's trustee".

Other European leaders should emulate the example. If ever more politicians start to justify their competing claims in the name of Europe this will help to lift the discourse of interests from the level of the nation state to the level of the Union. It will take a while until new habits of thinking and speaking in European interests terms become as deeply ingrained as the vocabulary of national interests currently still is. However, you can bet on it that the EU will have little to celebrate on its 60th anniversary in 2017 if national interest normality continues to reign.

operates the Global Europe website (www.globeurope.com) and publishes the newsletter Global Europe Morning Brief. He is also a foreign policy columnist for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

“Germany's foreign policy from a European perspective”

The dispute surrounding the Libya operation demonstrated that German foreign policy continues to be characterised by restraint, in contrast to French and British foreign policy. This is due to differences in tradition, but also to the different weights of the three European centres of power. France and Britain want to remain active in global politics. As nuclear powers with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and equipped with battled-tested armies, they have global political heft – they can threaten or entice with "hard power". The populations support such muscular foreign policy. Germany, on the other hand, sees its political heft dwindling further (unlike its economic heft, which is growing). Following geostrategically dubious approaches to international power politics under Gerhard Schröder, Germany has once again united under the flag of the primacy of domestic policy. Internationally, Germany wants to join in, but less to realise clearly defined interests than to be involved. The population sees its pacifist instincts confirmed, and exporting industry is happy when foreign policy exhausts itself in the creation of a good mood, ideally without considering the character of the regime. These differences between the expansive foreign policy of France and Britain and the provincial character of German foreign policy make it difficult to bring the institutions of EU foreign policy to bear. Berlin admonishes, warns and restricts, and joins in only if everyone else is on board, certainly Washington, also Moscow if possible and ideally Peking as well. This often has a paralysing effect, and it forces Paris and London to go it alone and to enter into a bilateral brotherhood in arms. Only if Berlin develops a consistent, less erratic foreign policy which is also not entirely averse to the military is there a chance of a shared representation of European interests in the world through a genuine European foreign policy.

holds an MSc in International Relations from London School of Economics & BA (hons) History from Oxford University. His research focuses on the relationship between national identity and German Foreign Policy in Europe. He currently works as an Editor for Europe & Me and has previously worked for Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Mathew is originally from the UK.

“European perspectives on Germany´s foreign policy”

Two interrelated thoughts guide European perspectives on German Foreign Policy at the moment. Firstly, the idea that Germany is finally comfortable in asserting itself through a more traditional, independent, and ‘realist’ Foreign Policy has gained more traction than any time since 1990. Consequently, the interests of German Foreign Policy are increasingly being interpreted as diverging from its partners and, in unilaterally pursuing its own economic and political interests, it is seen as a potential threat to its European partners. The perspective of a ‘tamed’ multilateral Germany embedded in Europe, has been replaced with a Germany like any other state, independent and to be potentially feared.

Far from it though, the interesting questions lie less in whether or not German Foreign Policy is now more unilateral, than in whether it still perceives its interests as best pursued through a Foreign Policy that promotes the development of the European Union. And, if this is true, does Germany’s image of the future of the EU still correlate with other European perspectives? If so, can even a more independent and assertive Germany also be understood to further multilateral, mutually beneficial, European ends?

“I've recently completed an MSc in International Relations at London School of Economics researching the relationship between German Foreign Policy and European integration. I' m hoping to bring not only my own ideas but that of thousands of young Europeans to the debate with leading politicians. As an Editor of Europe & Me I'm expecting that we can get a real engagement in these issues across the continent and it'll be extremely interesting to see whether we see a clear consensus across borders as to what the future of European Foreign Policy should look like.”

is a member of the Foreign Service. He currently works as a foreign and security policy advisor in the German Bundestag. This piece renders his personal opinion only.

“Germany's foreign policy from a European perspective”

The European perspective provides a formula for success in foreign policy: 6-8-1 – six basic values, eight foreign policy objectives and one strategic consensus. German foreign policy, however, has so far failed to discover it.
The name of the exercise is: read the EU Treaty. Learn the six basic values (Article 2) and the eight foreign policy objectives (Article 21) by heart. Then make the foreign policy objective a compulsory statement in every guideline of the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Service, and the Defence and Development Ministries: “Which goal does this proposal pursue?”
And the strategic consensus? Germany is making a substantial contribution to this in the revision of the European Security Strategy 2013: on the basis of the European values and objectives which determine its actions across departments – and a national strategy which determines its standpoint.

Editor-in-chief, International Politics, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

"How can Europe help the democrats in the Arab world?"

We have already known for some time that the "Arab Spring" is no longer spring. In Egypt, the National Security Council has had hundreds of opposition members arrested. In the forthcoming parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood can expect to receive a large majority – like the Ennahda in Tunisia previously.

However, pessimism is not called for because Islamic or Islamist parties will gain greater influence – but because none of the main political powers shows any sign of providing solutions to the far-reaching problems to be found in many Arab states: high youth unemployment, a reform of the miserable educational system and genuine competitiveness.

Europe, which should have extremely considerable strategic interest in a transformation into reliable, transparent political system enabling citizens to participate, has failed so far. Pointing out the political foundations that operate there cannot be sufficient. In order to facilitate a peaceful transformation and to prevent the emergence of new and possibly more aggressive regimes it is high time that far more resources were mobilised: to effectively help the pluralist forces, which were pivotal in bringing down the Mubarak regime, to organise themselves. Or to set up programmes which make economic investments and the education and training of young people possible, to name just two possibilities. It is essential to find a bridge that respects the desire for self-determination without outside interference while at the same time acknowledging the great strategic importance of a peaceful and democratic transformation in the immediate neighbourhood.

Ambassador Dr. Heinrich Kreft is responsible for the dialogue between the cultures in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and coordinator for the education and science-related projects of the transformation partnership with the Arab Spring states. The views expressed here reflect his personal opinion only.

"How can Europe help the democrats in the Arab world?"

Germany and Europe have a fundamental interest in successful democratic and socio-economic reforms in the Arab world as a basis for the lasting stabilisation of the southern neighbouring region. For the Arab Spring to blossom, more jobs, more education and more democracy are needed. In view of the difficult initial situation it is hard to imagine that the transitional government can be successful in all three areas simultaneously and over a longer period with extensive support from the international community. The Arab Spring states need massive support from Europe. Germany already initiated support measures in the spring and set up detailed transformation partnerships with Egypt and Tunisia in the summer, for which substantial funds will be provided over the next two years. This support cannot guarantee the success of the transition to democracy – but without substantial international support, democratisation in Egypt and Tunisia and – as is also hoped – in the entire Arab world is highly unlikely to succeed.

More about the Arab sea change at www.bpb.de

freelance consultant and journalist

“How can Europe help the democrats in the Arab world?”

Europe must become aware of the limited nature of its influence: neither the spontaneous promise of funds nor sound advice from the outside can contribute decisively to the internal development of the region. However, this does not mean that we should do nothing: it not short-term actionism but the offer of a long-term Euro-Mediterranean partnership that will really help the democrats. This involves, for example, strengthening the work of German political foundations for the advancement of democracies as well as the networking of Arab and European elites. The EU should also – in its own interests – assist with economic stabilization and adopt a more open approach with regard to visas.

The dialogue with the Islamist powers must be conducted critically as it is by no means clear that they are willing or able to achieve democracy.

is Observer at the Kommersant Publishing House in Moscow. He participated in the Munich Young Leaders Round Table on Security Policy 2011, a young-leaders network bringing together future leaders in the field of foreign and security policy.

“Friends or Strangers? The BRIC States and the New Coordinates of Globalization”

Bare numbers tell us that the BRIC countries are emerging as a new powerhouse in a world that is becoming more globalized and more multipolar at the same time. The politicians of the “gang of four” like to speak about BRIC's shared global vision more than anybody else. But are the four countries really forming a unified pole in international politics? The answer seems to be “no”. BRIC countries are very vocal on topics like reform of international financial institutions or building a more representative system of global governance - that means giving them more votes in IMF and World Bank or promoting their currencies. At the same time their common goals are limited to having a bigger say in global affairs at the expense of the West (most notably the US). When it comes to formulate a positive agenda BRIC turns out to be a very messy combination of big powers with deep-sited rivalry and mistrust (most notably in China-India and Russia-China sides of the rectangle). Right now BRICs are more united by their shared ambitions and Jim O'Neill's methaphor than anything else. So the best approach for EU would be not formulating a single BRIC-policy but good old bilateral relations approach toward each of the BRICs.

Warwick University, UK. Journalist, Europe&Me and MSc student in Economics and Behavioural Science

“Friends or strangers? The BRIC states and new coordinates of globalization”

With the emergence of transitional and developing countries, and in particular the BRIC countries, European states are feeling a change in their foreign policy focus. This shift is initiating heated global debates around a series of very important questions such as the reform of international organisations, of shifts in the global balances of power and to the need to cooperate across borders, continents and cultural as well as political barriers. States that before found themselves labelled as 'development economies' now face their European and American counterparts on equal terms. I am looking forward to the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum as a stage where the question of the new coordinates of globalisation will be debated, and I am happy that the Forum also acts as a medium in which new and established perspectives can come together and challenge one another.

Advisor on foreign and European politics, office of Roderich Kiesewetter MdB (Member of the German Bundestag)

"What business do German soldiers have around the world?"

Easy to answer, but often difficult to understand: The mission of German soldiers around the world is to enforce the political will of the Federal Government as mandated by parliament – in its various connections to NATO, the EU and the UN. Depending on their mandate, size and intensity, in their entirety the completed and ongoing missions reflect individual political decisions, the aim of which is to fulfil Germany's responsibility as a medium-sized power. By implication, however, this serving function of the armed forces under civilian primacy requires political clarity and analytical openness. In this sense, the question should actually be: "Which objective is the Federal Government pursuing in a given case with the use of military means? And above all: When is this objective achieved and which indicators serve a corresponding assessment?"

military and security policy advisor for the parliamentary party 'Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen' in the Bundestag

“What business do German soldiers have around the world?”

To this day, we Germans have ducked out of openly discussing this question (What business do German soldiers have around the world?) and the dilemmas of military (non-) action. Undeniably, the Bundeswehr does an outstanding job under extremely difficult conditions within the framework of UN-mandated missions. This is a sign of our increased readiness to stand up, also militarily as a last resort, for the protection of global order based on peace. But after nearly two decades of foreign missions it is now high time for the question of German security policy actions to be imbued with life both strategically and conceptually, far removed from the empty words of alliance solidarity and international responsibility. Without a fixed strategic basis, soldiers otherwise run the risk of becoming the scapegoats of a politics devoid of language, strategy or concept.

is a member of the Körber Foreign Policy Network and works in the office of the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. He is the publisher of the book "Litmus tests of a nation. Deploying the Bundeswehr abroad.

“What business do German soldiers have around the world?”

The world is not as peaceful a place as we would like it to be. The preservation of our security is therefore closely linked to the promotion of peace and stability and the enforcement of justice. The protection of the weak is another of our country's aspirations. If this necessitates the use of military means, the deployment of the Bundeswehr within the framework of NATO, the EU and the UN can be the consequence. Our soldiers are attempting, by order of the government and parliament, to create conditions which make political solutions possible.

Olaf Böhnke is the head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the first pan-European think-tank to provide analyses on European foreign policy topics and one which has set itself the goal of advocating a more coherent and stronger European foreign and security policy.

"Must everything possible be done to stop the Iranian nuclear programme?"

The clear answer is Yes and No! As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran formally has a right to the civilian use of nuclear energy, a position on which Tehran has been adamant since the beginning of its nuclear programme in 1959. However, as Iran has refused since 2003 to ratify the Additional Protocol which allows unannounced inspections of any nuclear facility by the IAEA, and as the country has been proven several times not to have declared substantial activities within the framework of its nuclear programme, it was rightly subjected to a number of sanctions by the UN Security Council. In doing so, the international community showed Iran a clear yellow card and demanded the discontinuation of its nuclear activities in the meantime.

Yet Iran continues to play according to its own rules because it considers itself to be in the right. What is missing is trust and respect on both sides; the list of mutual accusations is long. After a ten-month lull in talks between the EU 3 + 3 Group and Iran, a new opportunity for a meeting now presents itself with the publication of the next IAEA report in the middle of November. To increase the threat of force significantly, the sound of sabres rattling loudly can be heard throughout the Persian Gulf. However, against the background of Europe's existential crisis, the presidential election looming in the USA, the ongoing reorientation between Israel and its neighbours in times of the Arab Spring, as well as the growing conflicts within the Iranian regime, a massive military operation against Iran appears fraught with so many incalculable risks that all the powers involved will in all probability give preference to an approach based on negotiation. When this happens, no options must be ruled out. But the real question is not whether everything possible must be done to stop the Iranian nuclear programme, but whether it can be stopped at all. Providing a clear answer to this question is a far more complicated matter!

is chairman of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin.

“Is Turkey turning away from the West?”

An unprecedented period of economic growth, a billion euro surge in FDI, growing respect among the populations in the Arab world and rising respect for Turkey’s achievements in the Western press (with prime minister Erdogan making the cover of major US weeklies): all this suggests that these are intoxicating times for Turkish policy makers. But what does all this mean for Turkey’s foreign policy orientation?

Some in Turkey argue that recent growth – in 2010 Turkey's GDP is estimated to grow by 8 percent, the fastest in Europe – shows that Turkey "no longer needs the EU." This is grandstanding. Turkey is still one of the poorest countries in Europe (and the poorest member of the OECD in per capita terms). Most importantly, it has had periods of high growth before (in the 1950s, in the 1960s, and in the mid 1980s), only to see its efforts to catch up with Europe brought to a halt by instability. The pattern of boom-bust development since World War II is too recent for a suspension in accession talks not to unnerve serious investors.

Last month a country survey in The Economist celebrated Turkey's transformation. Yet an October 2002 Economist survey of Greece, entitled "Prometheus Unbound", was similarly optimistic. In uncertain times a credible anchor is welcome. Political factors aside, for Turkey to create uncertainty by walking away from EU negotiations would be foolish – and thus very unlikely. Turkey has benefitted enormously from both the customs union with the EU and from its growing regulatory approximation.

Nor is it in Turkey’s interest to weaken its traditional alliances given the uncertainties and turmoil in its neighbourhood. The US has recognised Turkey’s growing importance. It was not a coincidence that president Obama went to Turkey for a longer bilateral visit so early in his presidency in 2009. Nor is it accidental that president Obama has spoken more often with prime minister Erdogan than with any other Western leader other than David Cameron. Turkey’s recent support of US defence policy towards Iran is only one result of this. Some European leaders have not been as farsighted, however, as the humiliating five hour trip by French president Nicholas Sarkozy to Ankara earlier this year (the first such visit of a French president since 1991, almost designed to irritate Ankara) made obvious.French-Turkish relations in particular are in need of a reset button.

In fact, even Turkey’s accession process, though no new chapters have been opened for a while, remains far more resilient than meets the eye. Today's relationship between Turkey and the EU is like a Catholic marriage where divorce is simply not an option. The real question is whether the couple can be a happy one. An attitude of mutual respect (which includes honest criticism, whether of Turkey's record of freedom of speech or of Islamophobic political forces in some EU countries) and a realisation of common interests in the common neighbourhood, against a background of deepening social and economic links, is the best way forward. This has also been the consistent message by Turkey’s leading politicians on recent trips to Berlin and London. It is not likely to change.In the end the only "special relationship" that is acceptable to Turkey and to the majority of EU members is one they have today – an open-ended accession process. And as long as this is the case, Turkey will not seek to go either East or West but up.

from Belgium and living in Amsterdam, journalist-editor.

“Is Turkey turning its back on the West?”

Turkey has indeed always been a reliable partner for both the Western as the Middle Eastern countries. Yet Turkey is also plagued by internal conflicts and persistent accusations of violations of the rights of women (honour killings). Just recently, Kurdish separatist violence flared up again in the south-east of the country. EU member countries see these long-standing issues as a reason to keep the giant Muslim country with its 77 million inhabitants from joining the Union. Since Turkey has become a candidate-member state in 1999, the status of member country has always been a carrot and stick used by the EU. Several modernized laws have been the result. But growing frustrations and resentment over the European attitude can in the long run make some Turks turn their back to the 'unwelcoming' West.

Chairman, Middle East Technical University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Department of International Relations, Ankara

“No turn back to the West”

The turkish foreign policy is getting more interesting ever before! Then, the debate about whether Turkey is turning her back to the West dominates the debate in the last two years in particular. Turkey did not leave any western institution nor it will do it in future also.There is no “No turn back to the West” as the Libyan case and now Syrian case proves. Turkey since the Arab Spring is a perfect partner of the West and there was not so much closeness in recent years as it is now. Turkish government realised without West (EU and USA) Turkey’s power is limited. The western linkage makes Turkey stronger. As a result, Turkey remained in the western political value and economic system and has no reason to leave the west. Not only disappoint the west but mostly not disappoint herself!! There is no alternative for Turkey . So nothing new in the west and the debate on Turkey’s “turning its back on the west” is only a fairy tale and nobody believes it!

Michael Thumann is the Middle East bureau chief for Die Zeit in Istanbul and writes on the Arab world, Turkey and Central Asia. Up to the end of 2007 he coordinated foreign policy reporting at Die Zeit.

"Is Turkey turning away from the West?"

A country that often talks to Arab Islamists, a country that wants no quarrel with Iran. Is Turkey turning away from the West? No, but its foreign policy has changed. Back in the Cold War, diplomatic relations were the domain of bureaucrats. Today, foreign policy is the extended stage of domestic policy. Moods impact foreign relations, so as those with Israel. Economic interests call for new friendships, see Russia, Iran and Iraq. Ankara offers the Arab world a democratic example with a devout head of government. In the course of globalisation, Turkey has discovered the world. This includes Europe in the West, but only as one of the four points of the compass.

Director of the Berthold Beitz Centre for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia in the DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations)

“Does Russia belong in NATO?”

Anyone who wants sustainable order for Europe based on peace must accept Russia into NATO. Anyone who believes that NATO should keep Russia at bay is thinking in antiquated terms. The new function of NATO lies in consolidating the security of all Europeans. Russia must also feel secure on the shared continent and not be allowed to see the expansion of NATO, including American missile defence, as a form of encirclement. As part of NATO, Moscow will assume more responsibility for Europe, no longer flirt with Peking and become Europe's second guardian alongside the USA.

Head of Research Group EU Foreign Relations, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

"Will there be a common European foreign policy?"

In the spring of 2011, an EU-wide crime was committed.
Corpus delicti: Systematic violation of voting obligations during the Arab Spring
Offenders: Member states of the EU
Motive: Assertion of national interests outside the EU framework
Victims: Uniform EU position, reforms of the Lisbon Treaty

Possibilities for prevention: None, as long as EU states are not prepared to transfer sovereignty and do not recognise that they can only survive together against the weight of aspiring (major) powers when it comes to outlining the world.

Director of Research, Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

"Is the rise of China a threat?"

From a European perspective, the rise of China to (possibly) the new superpower of the 21st century should be seen as a challenge to develop the EU into a global actor that is comprehensively willing and able to act. The degree of the influence of China on the EU or the USA (and vice versa) depends crucially on the extent to which actors in international politics are seen from a Chinese perspective as being relevant in terms of power politics. As long as this is the case with regard to Sino-American relations, the EU is becoming an increasingly weaker actor for China. The supposed strength of China can also be attributed to the weakness of Europe. The latter results in particular from an incoherent EU foreign policy and from competition for China, both between European states and between the EU and the USA. The development of threat scenarios would appear to be the least sensible approach to locating China in the shifting power constellations of international politics in the 21st century.

International correspondent, DIE ZEIT

“Is the rise of China a threat?”

China's rise is a challenge. It is not a threat, at least not for Europeans and Americans. Chinese state capitalism challenges the West because it makes quicker and more resolute decisions in the bank and debt crisis. Do we need to rescue capitalism from democracy? This is the polemically pointed question asked in Peking. The Chinese leadership has no doubts when it comes to the gradual decline of the United States. At the same time, Peking is not prepared to assume more responsibility in world politics. China has shown itself to be deeply disappointed by Europe's inability to act. This also applies to the leadership skills of Angela Merkel, on whom China had previously relied – in marked contrast to Nicolas Sarkozy, who is said not to keep his promises.

In Asia, however, China's rise is perceived very much as a threat. Here, a boastful Peking has succeeded in driving nearly all of its neighbours – from Japan to Vietnam – into the arms of the Americans. Following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington is determined to direct its focus anew towards the strategically more important region in the Far East. However, China will be unperturbed by the orientation of its neighbours to the USA: economically, they remain dependent on the People's Republic. This sets limits to alliances with the Americans.

In view of the change of leadership due to take place in the coming autumn, for China's leaders inner stability takes priority over everything else – especially as growth is slowing down and inflation is rising. This is no time for foreign policy escapades, and certainly not for adventures of a military nature.

currently working as an European volunteer in Berlin to raise awareness of European issues among young Europeans.

“Does the rise of China constitute a threat?”

The West, and that includes Europe, assumes that the rapid economic growth of China, and its consequential influence in the global world, will make the rest of the world financially dependent and hence vulnerable to the control of the mad dragon's. But this fear towards a new rising (Asian) power is nothing new; Japan was the target 30 years ago. Yet, look at what a strong collaboration in many aspects between Japan, Europe and the rest of the world exists now. Is China going to be like Japan? Maybe, or maybe not.

One thing I know is: China is not perfect, but neither is any country. The media-encouraged fear towards an unfamiliar rising economic power is irrational and detrimental. While many predict China's political influence on European nations to grow ruthlessly, they forget to encourage Europe's influence on China, in areas of business, politics and civil society.

The Chinese word “crisis” is composed of two characters: Danger and Opportunity. Where pessimists see danger, Europe should see opportunities; opportunities to collaborate with this Middle Kingdom and create something good for the world.

Head of USA/Transatlantic Relations Program, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

"Assume responsibility"

In view of the prolonged conflicts in Transatlantic relations one is inclined to believe that both sides are pulling together, but at different ends.

There are indeed structural differences. The USA wants to keep its position as a superpower, but has recognised that, in a multipolar world, there are also others calling the tune. In its ambivalent partnership with China, the USA is aiming to secure peace and preserve power. Europe, on the other hand, does not think of global positioning, but is more focussed on the stability of the neighbourhood.

Economic imbalances make a cooperative approach to the financial and debt crisis difficult. America is annoyed because the Europeans no longer import from the USA, which would alleviate the USA's foreign trade deficit. But Europe wants to export, and this is an important driving force.

In most international matters, however, Americans and Europeans are closer to each other than other partners. The climate, energy, protection of the seaways and the Internet – in all the major upcoming issues, both sides now have overlapping perceptions or accept each other's idiosyncrasies. Iran and Afghanistan are also no longer substantial bones of contention.

What must be done to ensure that the strong democracies in North America and Europe pull together? The USA must see that ties to Europe bring advantages. Europe should build on its military capabilities, but in particular take on burdens and executive tasks. Also in the Arab Spring, for example, Europe is called upon to support stabilisation with intelligent tools, market development and more money. If Europe plays a strong role here and with its eastern neighbours, it will also become a reliable partner for the USA.

Executive Director, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), Johns Hopkins University

“Do America and Europe still see eye to eye?”

The United States and the EU are challenged to think and act as global players. Just as globalization is changing the nature and implementation of national power and influence, the United States and Europe can bring unique combinations of resources to deal with the need for a security framework in which both sides have a stake and shared capabilities. For more than sixty years, that point has been defined by NATO. But as the EU has been working to enhance its ability to make viable decisions ranging from the economic to the political and military, the challenges of meshing the two institutions remain significant. They have been aggravated by the economic recessions and the domestic arguments on both sides of the Atlantic over priorities at home and abroad. This comes at a time when there is a problem in generating a defining mission for mobilizing the power and resources of the transatlantic community. During the Cold War, that mission was defined as the defense of freedom through common security. During the past two decades, with a transformed global landscape, that mission has become a more complicated process in the face of a diffusion of threats, challenges, and power itself. Europe became more immersed in its own process of deepening and expansion while the United States, particularly after the September 11 attacks, became more immersed in its own struggles to develop a new understanding of both vulnerability and global capacities to respond to a changing equation of American power, purpose, and influence.

Two in depth comments on this topic were recently published by Dr. Jackson Janes and can be found here:
www.carnegieeurope.eu
www.huffingtonpost.com

The Transatlantic Academy, Washington, D.C.

“Do Europe and America still see eye to eye?”

America and Europe are not even looking at each other but rather are focused on themselves. To America, Europe today is a problem. President Obama’s fate lies depends more on Angela Merkel than with anyone in Washington. America sees Europe now not as a partner but as a problem. There is a fear of contagion and worries over Europe’s incapacities rather than its capacities. Beyond that America is totally focused on itself and the massive economic and social problems it seems unable to master. Foreign policy will be an afterthought in the upcoming Presidential campaign. The mood in Europe is no better. Europe is facing not simply a financial or even an economic crisis but a crisis of the European project. It is hardly a time to look to America or anywhere else. A transatlantic parting of ways or simply a temporary distraction?

editor of Europe&Me, PhD student, London

“Do America and Europe still see eye to eye?”

America and Europe do not see eye to eye, instead, they face the same problems and they face, not just each other, but a multilateral policy setting. Both need to try harder to speak with a unified and credible voice. Both face high costs of finding internal agreements on which they could base their foreign policies. Both have rather stern economic perspectives. In the end, in both cases, their internal and their external challenges are often the same.
Vita: Johannes divides his time between journalism and academic work. He is an editor of Europe&Me since 2009 and writes as a freelance journalist. He studied Philosophy, Economics and Public Policy in Bayreuth, Leuven, and London and is now a PhD student in Philosophy at the London School of Economics.

Coordinator on “International Integration and Cooperation”, Economic Reforms Coordination Centre mandated by the President of Ukraine

“Does the EU need a new Eastern policy?”

While this comment being written in the middle of Tymoshenko-saga of Ukraine, the EU faces huge dilemma how to respond to it: would it be worthwhile to punish Ukrainian leadership with no perspective of the Association Agreement or to proceed further effectively destroying Russia’s grand-idee on Euro-Asian Union formed with former USSR republics.

It is quite paradoxically, however, that limiting the scope of Ukraine’s strategic rapprochement with the EU on the grounds of former being not compliant with the European norms and standards of democracy, the EU deprives Ukraine from the very perspective to build a European model of democracy ever in the future. Respective provisions on political dialogue of the Association Agreement deliver most effective guarantees of Ukraine to adhere to its obligations of democratic freedoms, with the EU having a supervisory function over the issue.

And vice versa, steadily but surely drifting into warm embraces of the Euro-Asian Union Ukraine may find one day herself as a country with doubtful Euro-Asian type of democracy.

To my view, while drafting a policy, we need to think far in advance what key performance indicators of that policy should be and only than to design an exclusive list of all possible alternative tools capable to deliver the desired. Then – to assess them from the point of immediate and long-term sustainable deliverables. One would argue that by applying this approach, the EU would not have had a dilemma of how to react onto Tymoshenko’s case, but to go on with further firmer grounding Ukraine into European democratic standards on the basis of the Association Agreement.