

123RD BERGEDORF ROUND TABLE



The Future of
Southeast Europe –
Towards
European Integration

13th and 14th April 2002 at the Hyatt Regency in Belgrad

This Round Table was organized in cooperation with the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin/Belgrade. Our special thanks go to Gerald Knaus and Minna Järvenpää for their comprehensive support. We would also like to thank the German Embassy in Belgrade, especially Ambassador Joachim Schmidt and Official Councillor Jürgen Pengel, for their help in Belgrade.

Please note that the full text of the Bergedorf Protocols is also available in German and that both versions can be searched at www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de.

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.ddb.de> abrufbar

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2003

Responsible:	Dr. Levin von Trott zu Solz
Editors:	Horst Rödinger (Protocol) Katharina Knaus, Julia Steets (Annexes)
Translations:	Nicolas Kumanoff
Pictures:	Marc Darchinger
Picture Design:	Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten, Hamburg
Cover Design:	Kraiker/Simson, Design Hamburg Berlin
Typesetting:	Das Herstellungsbüro, Hamburg
Printed in Germany by	Fuldaer Verlagsagentur
All rights reserved	
ISBN 3-89684-352-4	

CONTENT

Participants	5
Picture Documentation	6
Summary	15
Protocol	
I. Paths Toward Political Stabilization	17
II. The Economic Dimension: Will Southeast Europe Catch Up?	61
III. What Kind of Social Structures Does the Region Need?	99
Annex	
Speakers	129
Previous Participants	134
Previous Subjects	145
List of Abbreviations	159
Historical-Political Chronology	160
Map	163
Glossary	164
Index of Cited Persons	168
Subject Index	170
Recommended Literature	173
The Körber Foundation	175
Bergedorf Round Table	176

Initiator

Dr. Kurt A. Körber

Chair

Ahtisaari, Martti, President of Finland (ret), Helsinki
Busek, Dr. Erhard, Spec. Coordinator of the Stability Pact f. Southeastern Europe,
Brussels

Participants

Ahrens, Dr. Geert-Hinrich, OSCE Presence in Tirana
Altmann, Dr. Lothar, German Inst. f. International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Anastasijević, Dušanka, Vreme Magazine, Belgrade
Bearpark, Andy, Dep. Spec. Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo,
Pristina
Bender, Kristof, European Stability Initiative, Berlin/Belgrade
Bulović, Dr. Irinej, Bishop, Novi Sad
Čović, Nebojša, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade
Daianu, Prof. Dr. Daniel, Romanian Center for Economic Policies, Bucharest
Djelić, Božidar, Minister of Finance and Economics of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade
Eiff, Dr. Hansjoerg, Ambassador (ret), Bonn
Fetahu, Agim, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Skopje
Jacev, Zoran, Forum-Center for Strategic Research & Documentation, Skopje
Järvenpää, Minna, Strategy Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, Pristina
Jovičević, Dr. Alexandra, Deputy Minister of Education and the Arts of the Republic of
Serbia, Belgrade
Kempf, Dr. Herwig, Goethe Institute, Belgrade
Knaus, Gerald, European Stability Initiative, Berlin/Belgrade
Lutz, Prof. Dr. Dr. Dieter S. (†), Inst. f. Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg
Medish, Mark C., Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Washington D.C.
Pajević, Milan, G17PLUS Expert Network, Belgrade
Petrtsch, Dr. Wolfgang, High Rep. of the United Nations for Bosnia and Herzegovina
(ret), Sarajevo
Primatarova, Antoinette, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Reljić, Dr. Dušan, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Rödinger, Horst, Körber Foundation, Hamburg
Rüb, Dr. Matthias, Southeast Europe Correspondent, FAZ, Budapest
Schaefer, Dr. Michael, German Foreign Office, Berlin
Schmidt, Joachim, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgrade
Schwarz-Schilling, Dr. Christian, Minister (ret), International Mediator for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Berlin
Sorić, Miodrag, Deutsche Welle, Cologne
Stuth, Reinhard, State Secretary, Hamburg
Svilanović, Goran, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade
Teokarević, Dr. Jovan, Institute for European Studies, Belgrade
von Trott zu Solz, Dr. Levin, Körber Foundation, Hamburg
Wehmeier, Dr. Klaus, Körber Foundation, Hamburg
von Weizsäcker, Dr. Richard, President of Germany (ret), Berlin
Wriedt, Christian, Körber Foundation, Hamburg
Wright, Robert K., Financial Times, Budapest

Summary

The herein documented 123rd Bergedorf Round Table on the future of Southeastern Europe took place in Belgrade in April 2002, one and a half years after the end of the Milošević regime and in the midst of a continuing state of transformation in the entire Balkan region. In collaboration with the European Stability Initiative (Berlin/Belgrade), the Round Table succeeded in assembling politicians, members of the academic community, and journalists from the entire Balkan region, as well as representatives of the international community active in the field, for a constructive dialogue on political, economic, and sociocultural challenges and perspectives.

The discussion concentrated initially on the political situation. The challenges explored ranged from constructing and reforming institutions and enabling the return of refugees to reducing friction among various ethnic groups. The participants agreed that establishing structures that guarantee the rule of law as well as fighting corruption and organized crime were particularly urgent matters. The participants also agreed that the support of the international community was essential for stabilizing the region's politics, especially in the form of a concrete perspective for the integration of Southeastern Europe in the stable Euro-Atlantic zone. Despite all improvements since the period of violent conflict, however, the participants saw the continued danger of renewed destabilization in the region.

Following this political debate, the second part of the Round Table was devoted to the region's economic situation. Years of warfare left much of its infrastructure in ruins, and it was also noted that the legacy of centralized economies in the Balkans had resulted in the collapse of industrial production there, causing high unemployment, low GDPs, and emigration among qualified workers. Further difficulties that were identified included the inadequate planning and implementation of many external aid programs, and low investment, precipitated by unstable judicial systems and high crime levels. All agreed that stronger integration of regional economic structures, a process making only sluggish progress, is essential to establish functioning social market economies there.

The discussion became more hopeful when the Round Table's third session turned to the emergence of civil society in Southeast Europe. A vibrant and diverse cultural scene was presented and described as a pioneering force in strengthening a sense of togetherness during the difficult trials of this period of transformation. Yet here, too, the participants discussed obstacles that had yet to be overcome: restrictive visa regimes are blocking artistic and cultural exchanges, and the emotional charge affecting intellectual debate since the wars would take a long time to overcome. It was noted that respective views of history were still strongly tainted by nationalism and that school textbooks were in urgent need of revision. There were other, encouraging signs of coming to terms with the past, however. Regional sporting events were playing a positive role and churches were exhibiting a great deal of cooperation where there was once alienation.

The leading principle of the 123rd Bergedorf Round Table was the general conviction that gradually reconciling and finally integrating the region in the European Union was the

sine qua non for successfully mastering the current situation. It became clear that both the Round Table's participants and the continent in general were demanding that Europe progressively integrate its southeastern part, so as to live up to its claim as a Greater European zone of peace, freedom, and stability.

Protocol

Von Weizsäcker

I warmly welcome you all to the Bergedorf Round Table here in Belgrade. I would like to begin by emphasizing that this is a private and completely independent forum that chooses its own topics and invites participants to conduct an open discussion. I also wish to express my particular delight in convening this 123rd conference in Belgrade. This is, in our opinion, above all a sign of respect towards the courage and vigor that this land has displayed in the last year and a half, both in coming to terms with a difficult past and in shaping the future in an equally ambitious and legitimate manner. I might add that this meeting should make clear to all of us that Southeast Europe is just as much a part of Europe as the continent's other regions.

This forum's initiators regard it as their principal task that those of us gathered at this table listen to each other so as to learn from one another. To do so with complete candor, we have assembled in a sheltered room, meaning that no one need fear that what he or she says might be publicly quoted tomorrow. Each of you will receive your contribution to our discussion, to be authorized for publication in the Bergedorf Protocols, and will have the opportunity to make any changes in your texts, if you decide that certain passages should not reach the outside world. For forty years, this has been our forum's successful policy, one we consider a vital prerequisite for frank dialogue on sensitive political issues.

My special thanks also to former Finnish President Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, for his willingness to chair today's discussion. He has often shown us the way when it was time for Europe to act on its responsibilities, especially regarding Southeast Europe. I would also like to thank the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for providing an introduction to the subject matter before us.

I. Paths Toward Political Stabilization

Ahtisaari

I think that we often forget that the radical change in this country actually took place only one and a half years ago. Many of us feel that it has been far longer than that since those events took place here. Six months ago I was at a seminar here, where we discussed the actual development in this region. When I look at the present situation in this country, I can see that many of the things that we were discussing and expressing our concern about have had a positive outcome. So I want to put this into some sort of perspective so that we realize what sort of time-scale we are talking about.

Our first topic will be "Paths Toward Political Stabilization". I am extremely pleased that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Svilanović,

*Southeastern Europe
belongs to Europe*

Sheltered room

Radical change

who has just returned from a trip, will speak to us. I think his presence here says a great deal about his cooperation with the international community and about his persistent efforts to implement the change in his country in practice.

Speakers

Svilanović

Hot spots in the region

There are several hot spots in the region in which we live. The integrity of Bosnia, for example, is obviously one of the main regional problems. But the developments there are moving forward, judging by the recent Constitutional Court's decision, which is in the process of implementation. This process is a very sound indicator proving the sustainability of an integrated Bosnia in its present form.

Macedonia also presents a very difficult situation that we have been facing for more than two years now. We shall have to follow closely and carefully the situation there in order to avoid any further spill-over effects such as those occurring previously and involving Kosovo and Macedonia.

The third important problem is the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, and the fourth is the status of Kosovo.

EU membership?

I would refer to these four points as being very important for the whole process of stabilization in the Balkans. But, of course, the process also involves Europe, because it would be very difficult to distinguish between a European perspective for this region and the "enlargement" as such, as far as the EU is concerned. Unfortunately, most of our voters, if not most of our politicians, believe that future membership of the EU will solve most of these problems. I take a slightly different view. I think that none of the countries I referred to will ever achieve membership of the EU unless these problems are solved first and are settled to an extent that really provides for a European perspective in each of them.

Serbia and Montenegro

Let me say a few words on something which I, and many other politicians, together with the EU, regard as significant, namely the recently reached agreement between Serbia and Montenegro.

I would like you to be aware that it was not easy to persuade all sides involved to adopt the political decision to agree on the principle which we finally did agree on. I would also like to remind you that it resulted in different and mixed feelings in Montenegro, as well as here in Serbia. And those who are not very happy with what was agreed are not always the "bad guys". Be simply aware that this is still a political process.

The reason why I and, I think, most of my colleagues in the government, supported this kind of agreement was that we believe it allowed us to achieve some goals which we wanted to achieve. The first was that it prevented the possibility of organizing a referendum, not because a referendum was something wrong or bad but because it might then have served as a European precedent to be applied in other cases regionwide, if not throughout Europe. At this point, we have achieved that. We have overcome this problem by agreeing basically on a state union that will provide a high level of self-responsibility for both Serbia and Montenegro, and we have also preserved a common state framework.

We are now in the process of implementing what we have agreed on. The national assemblies of the two republics have already adopted it and the Federal Assembly will do the same, hopefully, next week. After that, we shall have a commission that will draft a constitutional charter and then, by the end of this year, we shall have formed new bodies for the implementation of the new constitutional charter. I hope, of course, that all the responsible politicians, not only in Serbia but also in Montenegro, will implement what they have signed and committed themselves to.

As for Kosovo, my position and the position of our government is that it would be too early to discuss its status now. There we have a very much devastated society. And the rest of Serbia is also devastated. You should know because all of you have been involved for the last ten or more years in following very closely what has been happening here and you are aware of what the difficulties of this society are. I know, however, that it is even more complex when it comes to Kosovo. I therefore think that Europe and the EU, for one, but also the rest of the international community, should reckon with a long-term presence, financial and military.

If I were to give advice, I would suggest that you consider helping the economic recovery but also try investing in the civic sector in Kosovo. That would include NGOs, universities, education, the health system, etc., and, in particular, the political parties. My idea is that the existing hatred, frustration, and anger should be transformed into political competition instead of into pure violence, which, unfortunately, is what we have at the moment.

Therefore, what we see as the main problem under the circumstances is the lack of security for everyone living here. My general suggestion would be to tackle the “real life” issues. What I expect to happen in time is a growing dialogue between the Serbs and the Albanians within the provincial parliament, among MPs. I also believe there will be more dialogue between Kosovo-Albanian politicians and the politicians from the rest of our country. But that will take some time, and as Mr. Ahtisaari mentioned it has been only a little more than a year since the changes took place in Serbia.

Now a few words on how I see further developments in this region and on future links with the EU. In Yugoslavia, EU membership is one of the main goals, or rather, it is the main goal of our foreign policy in the medium term. We are aware that this is likely to take another ten to fifteen years. The discussion presently taking place within the European Commission on the future of Europe is, therefore, extremely important. I would hope that the most serious and prominent intellectuals in Europe would focus their attention on enlargement because it is sure to bring many problems and call for solutions – perhaps not immediately, but in the ensuing process.

Europe will be changed within two years or so, and it will take some time until Europe is able to digest the first wave of enlargement. Therefore, when it comes to the next step, it is going to be another Europe, another Union and not the one that we see now. I look forward to seeing what direction these changes will take.

As for this region, bearing in mind that we currently have the honor of presiding over the South East European Cooperation Process, we believe that for the last ten or fifteen months we have endeavored to create an awareness among our neighbors that we share

Status of Kosovo

Dialogue between Serbs and Albanians

Main goal: EU membership

Cooperation within the region

the same desire to join the EU and the same conviction that we shall do it one day. However, until that day comes, we have to do something with ourselves and among ourselves. That has been my main personal message for these fifteen or sixteen months. Yes, we will join the EU. But in the meantime, we have to improve our political communication and our economic integration among ourselves – not because we are to join the EU collectively, but because the right way to get there is through more cooperation in helping each other make maximum use of our own resources in order to achieve that ultimate goal – our membership in the EU.

Not everyone in the region was aware and not everyone in the region was willing to look at things that way. A year and a half ago some people were still saying: “Things are going well. We don’t have visas, we don’t have problems. Why should we care what is going on in Macedonia? We don’t care.” I think that in the meantime the lesson has been learnt. Now everybody in the region is aware that as long as there is instability in the neighborhood none of our countries will join the EU. There will be no substantial progress and I think that now all my colleagues, all the ministers in the region, are very much aware of how important it is to work closely with each other and to help each other. Sometimes the steps may be small, but they do carry weight in our relationship. With this process we can look forward to an improved situation in the Balkans.

Process of stabilization

Although I have referred to some of the “hot spots”, I am more of an optimist than some others here may be. Therefore I believe that although the situation is complex in the Balkans, I don’t expect very serious instability, clashes etc. Now we are already in the political process of solving, or at least stabilizing the situation. And that goes not only for Macedonia but also for Serbia and Montenegro and for Kosovo. It certainly goes for Bosnia, which has really improved, particularly in the last two or three months. It is, therefore, my impression that there is now a new awareness that Bosnia will stay together.

Role of the EU in the region

So, to summarize, I would say that there is a new role for the EU in the region. The responsible politicians, the leaders of the Union, will have to recognize that the 11th of September created more room for the EU to play a role in the region. This responsibility has to be undertaken very seriously, very cautiously. What we in the region expect is a more determined Europe. It has not been particularly decisive over the last ten or fifteen years and we expect to see this decisiveness now.

EU policy

In conversations with Commissioner Patten and with High Representative Solana and others, I have said that I have to be aware of what their policy for the region is. I don’t have to like this policy, but as a minister in the region, I have to be aware of what their policy is. And they, the EU ministers, should try to organize themselves within the group of fifteen so that they can agree on a policy and then implement it coherently. If this is to be the future approach of the EU, I would highly appreciate it. I may not agree with every step but I will certainly appreciate a coherently defined and implemented policy of the EU, both as far as the issues which I have raised are concerned, and as far as some other issues nationwide are involved.

Economic and institutional reforms

Concerning our society and those societies around us, we have to focus on several more general issues such as institution-building. We have done something, but not very much, during this year and a half in Yugoslavia. We shall also have to focus on economic

recovery and, finally, we must try to build a state based on the rule of law, intent on fighting crime and corruption. We here are proud of what we have achieved in the sphere of human rights, particularly as far as minority rights are concerned, and that goes for economic reforms too. But we also know for sure that we are still lagging behind when it comes to reform of the judiciary, constitutional institutions, the military and the police.

In the coming year we will focus on these issues because we see that on the long road to EU membership, which is all about values and standards to be achieved in time, these are the sectors in which we have to improve in order to match the level that has already been achieved by the Central European countries. Then we will really be able to discuss full-fledged membership.

Ahtisaari

I am sure, Mr. Svilanović, that your presentation has inspired many of us to participate in the discussion. But before opening the discussion I would ask Dr. Petritsch to take the floor.

Petritsch

I would like to continue where Mr. Svilanović left off. This attests to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the country I am going to concentrate on, is, so to speak, blending more and more into the region. The problems or, to put it in a more positive way, the challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina are more and more like those problems and issues and challenges in the whole region.

Mr. Svilanović has mentioned institution-building, the rule of law, the judiciary, the military and the police. These are the issues that we in Bosnia and Herzegovina are now concentrating on. This also is a clear indication of the necessity to emphasize these issues in a regional context. By this I not only mean that Europe or those countries which assist and contribute to the development and to the stabilization of this region should act in this fashion. I mean that, above all, the countries in the region have to find a new way of cooperating and establish a new means of “constructive interdependence”. They have to move away from this go-it-alone approach to a new form of cooperation which is not based on Yugo-nostalgia but which should orient itself basically around what is happening in the European Union.

This integration philosophy, I believe, is very important for Southeast Europe as well. But do not make the mistake of taking this and trying to transplant it or imitate it. Try and use the European elements in a creative way.

Mr. Svilanović mentioned 9/11. Of course this has had a great influence in many ways on Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am not speaking of terrorism, which is just one aspect and one which is sometimes overemphasized when you speak about Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am talking more about the consequences of weak or failed states. It is not just a problem for the international community. It is much more a regional problem when we talk about the regional risks in connection with weak states.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

*A new way of cooperating
in the region*

Weak states

Bosnia and Herzegovina is of course still an example of a weak state. New Bosnia and Herzegovina actually started with a war which, to add to the challenge, was a very specific war. Clearly it was external aggression on a sovereign state and UN-member. But at the same time there are very solid aspects of a civil war, which make postwar recoveries so much more complex and so much more difficult. Bosnia does not have a significant track record of modern statehood, so the political elites, the intellectual elites, the political class as such have yet to agree and define what they understand by a “state” of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dayton Accords

To end the war, Dayton produced a highly decentralized and fragmented institutional framework with too many layers of government. In many ways these shortcomings are contributing to the continuing dysfunctional daily political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*From a communist system
to democracy
and market economics*

What I would call a double transition in Bosnia Herzegovina – not just from war to peace but also from a communist system to democracy and market economics – started at the same time, basically at the beginning of 1996. The first years saw a concentration on rebuilding the infrastructure and all that was needed to rebuild the basic “life functions”. At the same time there was clear emphasis on military stabilization. We know that life in a modern state is much more complex and therefore postwar intervention must focus on state-building. I deliberately do not use the American phrase “nation-building” because “nation” does have a different meaning in this region.

Institution-building

Military solutions of course are important but they are only temporary. They freeze a situation, as the Cyprus conflict demonstrates. Now the international community is again at the center of global political attention; this has been much clearer since 9/11. Therefore some government agencies and conservative senators in Washington have argued strongly that institution- and state-building is something that the international community should not do. Granted, the international community might not always meet the highest standards of quality, but in my opinion this is only an indication that our civilian efforts in institution-building need to be improved; they need to be professionalized.

Time factor

Mr. Svilanović has mentioned the time factor. From my experience of five years in the Balkans and almost three years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rule number one is: Don’t expect too much too soon! Do concentrate on the institution-building, rule of law and economic recovery but do not expect it to happen overnight. We are talking about long-term efforts, nothing can be achieved in a few years. When it comes to counting the years in helping and assisting this region, single digits will not do the trick.

Process of stabilization

Of course, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the first example of comprehensive international intervention, has generated a wealth of experience. Maybe we have not really concentrated enough on learning lessons from it. I believe much more needs to be done – much more analysis and assessment and also many more comparative studies of conflicts in order to see, in terms of intervention and stabilization, where the similarities and the differences lie.

Stabilization is a twofold process. Firstly it involves the military capacity to prevent a return to fighting, and secondly it involves the civilian aspect or what one could almost

call civil engineering in the most literal sense. While that may be rather unspectacular, it includes all the issues with which we as the so-called civilian implementers have to deal. This task is far less exciting than anything the military does, but that does not mean that it is less important. On the contrary, long-term improvements can only be achieved by a clear commitment to civil elements of state and institution building.

Stabilization means establishing a framework for a functioning state through institution-building. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is the concept of “ownership” which is so important. Unless local elites identify the issues and take on the challenges, it is not going to work. We, the international community, can only assist. We cannot be the ones who forever rule the country. This is definitely something which we need to keep in mind and which has to be impressed above all on our local partners. When we enter into such a venture, it is all about partnership.

Let me briefly address the issue of where Bosnia and Herzegovina stands today more than six years after Dayton. Let me start with the constitutional changes, an issue which does not attract the attention of CNN but which is all the more important. For the first time since Dayton something has been achieved which the architects of Dayton were unable to achieve.

Over the past couple of months there have been intensive discussions about a decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the so-called “constituent peoples case”. In Dayton, the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian-Croat Federation were established with two different levels of collective and individual rights. In the Republic Srpska, only Serbs were constituent whereas in the Federation, the other half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs were non-constituent peoples. This was challenged in the Sarajevo-based Constitutional Court about two years ago and the decision was such that the two entity constitutions have to be amended accordingly.

With the help of the international community we are now very close to achieving this. At the end of March a political agreement between the leading parties was signed. The three Alliance parties signed up to it in full whereas the Republika Srpska parties signed it with two minor reservations. This is now in front of the two entity parliaments in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. Some progress has been achieved in the Serb Entity and although it is not yet fully in line with the Agreement, lawmakers are engaged with it. The Muslim-Croat Federation Parliament in Sarajevo is going to deal with it in less than a week’s time.

What is so significant about the outcome is that the nationalistic parties, the SDA, the former leading party, did not sign to the Agreement and neither did the Croat hard-line HDZ. This is something we should also see as a clear indication that they are, from their ethnic viewpoint, quite unhappy about these developments. The establishment of equal rights throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina naturally disfavors ethno-nationalistic parties and gives more opportunities to multi-ethnic parties. But this is what we all want to achieve.

It is significant that the last round of these negotiations alone involved over one hundred hours of talks between the local leaders under the tutelage or with the assistance of my

“Ownership”

Constitutional reform

“Constituent peoples”

Ethno-centric parties

*Equal rights in the whole of
Bosnia and Herzegovina*

office. And it must be stressed that what was achieved was the result of genuine cooperation between the local political representatives who took responsibility for tackling the challenges and demonstrated their sense of ownership of the issues. My role was that of a mediator or facilitator.

Republika Srpska

What was actually achieved in the negotiations? We have now in this agreement clearly established equal rights throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the first time, a citizen has the same rights, be he or she in the Federation or in the Serb Republic. This has robust and quite dramatic consequences for the institutional set-up. There is a two-chamber system now in the Serb Republic as well. There is the same symmetry of structure in the governments of the Serb Entity and the Federation with only fifty percent of representatives from the predominant ethnic group and the other fifty percent from the two next largest groups.

In concrete terms, this means that of the sixteen members of government in the Republika Srpska, after the October elections 2002 there will be eight Serbs, five Bosniaks and three Croats. In the Federation in turn there will be eight Bosniaks, five Croats and three Serbs. This means there will be Serb representatives in the Federation for the first time as well as Bosniak and Croat representatives in the Serb Republic for the first time. Not more than two of the top six positions can be held by one ethnic group. There is equal representation in the Constitutional Court, in the whole court system, in the public service sector and so on. This is in fact a minor revolution and by Bosnian standards probably even quite a considerable revolution. Now it is all about implementation and, as I say, the concept of ownership has come a long way. It is really the first time that political parties from all three peoples have managed to become engaged in such a constructive dialogue and have produced concrete results.

Reform of the judiciary

This is a very important cornerstone of the new Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in a way, it is only now that the Dayton process has been completed. Now, a new, more democratic process in Bosnia and Herzegovina can begin which will involve building upon these new achievements and making the necessary improvements. First and foremost this will include a restructuring of the whole judiciary system. We have now entered a new, and hopefully, final phase of a very thorough restructuring of the judiciary. We have initiated a comprehensive police reform and the European Union is going to take over the lead from the UN – another important step in the process of Europeanization.

Military downsizing

“Military” is another keyword. Military downsizing is now underway for the first time in both Entities. It is quite interesting how long it takes to realize that a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina does not need thirty thousand military personnel and that the contingent should be reduced to closer to ten thousand.

*Reform of
the civil service*

We have also established a program of reform of the civil service, a cornerstone of every modern state. These are issues that are important for the rest of Europe as well, when talking about the challenges of international crime, migration and all the other pressing issues of our time.

Public broadcasting

Let me also mention that one of the key instruments in kicking off this war was television. Within the next couple of weeks we are going to see the re-establishment of a statewide

public broadcaster in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Statewide radio has already been on air for exactly a year. So, as you can see, there is tangible progress in Bosnia.

We need to mention the economy as the driving force. If you want to see real changes, the country needs the engine for change and that is economic reform. I believe some inroads have been made, not enough, however. Again the time factor will play a decisive role. Following the idea of a functional state and following the creation of a regulatory system, redefining the role of the state in the economy is a very important issue in this context.

What is the perspective? I can only repeat what Mr. Svilanović has said. I believe – and this is not just a belief, this is a fact – in this region, Europe is the perspective and European integration is the role model. We need European leadership in order for the countries in the region to know what this Europe is really about and to identify a regional role for Southeast Europe.

Let me end by again stressing the fact that it is only within the region that you will be able to create the necessary preconditions for moving towards the European Union. This is one lesson that needs to be learnt in the region itself and this is where we in turn have to give as much support as possible.

Ahtisaari

The last speaker on the first topic was supposed to have been Dr. Čović. He has sent his text because he was unable to come. I suggest publishing his text in the protocols.

Čović

The thesis stated in the material provided for this Round Table is quite true: the starting position of the areas worst affected by violent conflicts from the past decade remains unfavorable in the transition period.

Truly, Serbia is facing a whole sequence of inherited problems. It has to cope with poor economic conditions, and is yet to undertake the tasks ahead: the building and consolidation of a common state union with Montenegro and solving the status of Kosovo and Metohija.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a weak and divided state. This weakness is largely a result of war efforts, and, in the end of the war, the division turned out to be an unavoidable outcome which needs to be preserved by the arms of the international troops.

In Macedonia, I see a young multi-ethnic democracy that has recently found itself on the very verge of a civil war.

Allow me now to focus on Kosovo and Metohija, for the most dangerous sources of instability lie in this very province.

Since long ago Serbs and Albanians have been strained by their past. What we call the Balkan keg today, at the beginning of the 21st century, had been largely prepared and fused

*Necessity of
economic reform*

*The model of
European integration*

Kosovo and Metohija

Tito's heritage

during the rule of Josip Broz Tito. This great manipulator, a bon vivant and a ruling master, continuously fueled quarrels of one nation against the other, or of one minority against other nations, while he himself assumed the role of a sacrosanct arbitrator and reconciliator. Let me use a single drastic example: In the end of World War II Tito forbade Serbs, who had been expelled from Kosovo and Metohija by the occupying administration, to return back to their homes. Thus he carried out a sort of ethnic cleansing of the Serbs favoring the Albanian community. When Tito did this, he certainly could not have hoped that he would contribute to a mutual love and tolerance among Serbs and Albanians.

Broz promoted a policy of closing nations and minorities into, figuratively speaking, national paddocks and pens. The notorious cadres lists were accessible only through a national-rotation principle, while espousal of the Yugoslav cause as an idea was pushed aside and almost forgotten. Those who declared themselves Yugoslavs during Tito's time were committing a political suicide.

Nationalism

What would happen in the United States if none of its citizens, for practical reasons, dared to declare himself an American, but had to say instead: "I am a Texan" or "I am a New Yorker", or "I am from Wyoming". Probably the same as what happened in Yugoslavia: the interest of the whole would be neglected, dissatisfaction of the parts growing and disuniting forces intensifying. Turning Yugoslavs into some pestilent and forbidden category, Broz gave impetus to nationalism that had been smoldering for decades by many promoters of culture and artists. The ultimate result was a state where all were blaming each other. There was much rattle over the Serb cause, Croatian cause, Macedonian cause, and Albanian cause.

It is often said today that, after Broz's death, some of the peoples of former Yugoslavia were not lucky enough to have leaders of a democratic orientation, balanced and reasonable national representatives. Instead, they ended up with leaders who were hysterical nationalists and chauvinists, politicians of gaping possessiveness, men of a meager knowledge but strong doggedness, unready to listen to other arguments and respect other opinions.

Yes, I assure you, this is not a matter of luck. What has happened to us is not a matter of coincidence or fate. The war we had to go through, the civil war on the ruins of Tito's state, was just a bad result of his bad, autocratic rule.

"National saviors"

A state where all blamed each other could not have dismembered peacefully and painlessly. In the early nineties, in the three largest republics, the most valued representatives were national "saviors" who offered a shortcut and a fulfillment of the old conquering aspirations, howlers who were promising a settling of bloody debts from the past. In Southeast Europe, a battle for rights was therefore completely forgotten, giving way to a battle for territories. That is why the ICTY now has so much work to do. Is it possible today, after all the blood shed, after all the harm that former Yugoslav nations have done to each other, for the Balkans to become an area of stability, of citizens' and peoples' peace and tranquility, mutual tolerance and good-neighborly communication and understanding? I must not and shall not say it is not, though we are all aware of how much efforts and positive endeavors it shall take to reach this fine goal.

Some efforts have already proved fruitful, some good ideas were actualized in a good way. Battle for territories has been curbed everywhere but in Kosovo and Metohija. Extremism from Kosovo and Metohija, and dreams of a greater Albania are spilling over across the Macedonian border as well. Albanian politicians and national champions of the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija had a very good excuse for their insurgency in the non-democratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Yet today, it turns out that they are not ready for cooperation with the democratic authorities in post-Milosevic Serbia either.

Extremism: Kosovo and Metohija

Yesterday, speaking at the meeting organized by the Foundation for Peace and Crisis Management, I said that the idea of a greater Serbia has been suppressed and defeated, much the same as the idea of a greater Croatia, while the idea of a greater Albania further persists. Forced to raise their voice because of the miserable conditions under which they are living, because of their existential fears, because of their property and legal insecurity, Serbs are condemned to be seen as an element of disorder in Kosovo and Metohija. Some would say that in Kosovo and Metohija problems are found only there where Serbs are found. I am afraid that this very often reiterated untruth shall become a truth and that one day the international community, tired of the Balkan conflicts, will conclude that all problems in Kosovo and Metohija will be solved once the last Serb leaves the province.

Serbs as an element of disorder?

Because of these very circumstances, I said before the UN Security Council recently that the position of ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina was much better than in Kosovo and Metohija. Serbs in Kosmet, I emphasized, have been given no guarantees that their language, their culture and religion would persist and be further developed.

What to do?

I would say that in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina certain individuals have confronted their responsibility and guilt from war-time conflicts. The Federal Law on Cooperation with the ICTY that was passed in Belgrade shall undoubtedly contribute to a catharsis needed by individuals and peoples.

You will ask me what I expect following the charges brought in the ICTY against certain war leaders of Kosovo-Metohija Albanians and following a catharsis that the Albanian people in Kosovo and Metohija will surely undergo.

From the Serbian viewpoint, the international community has exerted strong pressure to deliver Bosnian Serbs and Montenegrins whose names are on the ICTY indictment list. We look forward to the day when the investigation procedures are completed against those Albanians who have committed crimes against Serbs, and do believe that the international community shall apply the same approach in their case as well.

Speaking yesterday about the ways of promoting peace and stability in the Balkans, I have formulated a sequence of preconditions for a sustainable regional stability. Today I shall quote those most important ones:

Preconditions for sustainable stability

First: None of the Balkan conflicts should be viewed separately, but as part of regional processes and problems. Without a comprehensive solution for the stability of the entire

region, an alleviation of tensions in one part shall produce no more than temporary benefits.

Status of Kosovo

Second: The status of Kosovo cannot be addressed without continuous consideration of the impact of any resolution on the preservation of an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on peace in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

Finding compromises

Third: Solutions to all regional problems should be looked for in compromises, in self-sustainable stability. Therefore all parties to the conflict should renounce their maximum objectives. No party to the disputes should gain all and no party should lose all. Meeting all requests of one party to the conflict would only result in long-term confrontations with the other parties.

In the end I shall say this: We must not allow ourselves to pile up problems because we have failed to address them in a timely manner. Hesitation and putting problems aside may lead to serious problems, because Europe itself cannot count on its own stable development if the Balkans remain its hotbed.

Discussion

Ahtisaari

After having heard the three speakers, the floor is open for discussion.

Eiff

Progress in Serbia

Those who have followed events in former Yugoslavia over the years can only be cheered by Serbia's attainments in the past year and a half. These include, for example, having settled the status of Vojvodina, which is not, however, as vexing a problem as regulating the status of Kosovo. Yet one and a half years ago, reaching agreement on the former issue still seemed out of reach. This shows that policymakers and society here are able to tackle difficult questions in a short space of time.

Status of Kosovo

The preceding speakers have traced the process towards achieving greater stability in the region. One of the most formidable problems facing this process is without a doubt the continuing uncertainty over the future of Kosovo. Certainly, Kosovo's status cannot be definitively resolved in the shorter term, but as long as this issue remains open, it will continue to promote instability in Kosovo and the surrounding region.

Serbian refugees

I have been to Macedonia several times recently and have gained the impression that the problems referred to by Mr. Svilanović are closely tied to the unresolved status of Kosovo. Finding an acceptable solution to the fate of the Serb refugees is an exceedingly important part of reviving trust between the two sides and a condition for regulating the future of Kosovo, because ultimately, only those involved can settle these problems among themselves.

Role of Europe

We have heard expectations voiced here that Europe play a decisive role in this process. Europe has been doing so for some time in the region in many ways. A supporting European role will also be conceivable in due time in resolving the question of Kosovo, just as the European Union's High Representative proved helpful in reaching a preliminary

settlement of the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro. Such assistance, however, cannot replace agreement among the parties themselves. Launching a process of dialogue between Serbs and ethnic Albanians should not be put off. It may not be easy for Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to speak to each other, but the earlier this takes place, the better it will be for all.

Concerning the process of integrating the region's states in European and Euro-Atlantic structures, we are seeing a widening divergence, both sides of which have their justifications, but which could easily be perceived by countries that are not at the front of the line as unfair discrimination.

When NATO foreign ministers gather in Reykjavik next month, we will know which countries in the region will soon be offered membership in the alliance and which will not. The European Union is also currently negotiating membership with three of the region's states, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, while others remain in the waiting room for closer association. An excessively large gap between these two preeminent organizations regarding the status of the Balkan countries could impede the healing process so vital to the region. This points out a special European responsibility to work with the Balkans so as to prevent this gap from expanding further.

NATO accession

Ahtisaari

I think it is most appropriate if Mr. Ahrens would now say something about the Albanian dimension.

Ahrens

The significance of the Albanian question has not always been appreciated during the international community's mediation in Yugoslavia. I would like to point out that I was involved in the negotiating process from 1991 to 1996. We were trying to find solutions to the problems facing Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia, and Montenegro. Also, for the last three years I have been directing the OSCE's Albania mission, which plays an important role there. In Tirana itself I am also chairman of the "Friends of Albania" group, which is due to hold an international conference in Vienna next week under the auspices of the EU and OSCE. As we now generally realize, the problems of Albanians in the above-mentioned areas are related. Yet in 1996, some still hoped that the signing of the Dayton Treaty would resolve most of the Balkan's problems.

The Albanian question

When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1990–1991, very roughly sixty percent of all ethnic Albanians lived in Albania and forty percent in Yugoslavia. Of the sixty percent in Albania, about twenty percent have already left their homeland. A report by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting reads as follows: "According to the Immigration Office at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in Tirana roughly 67 percent of educated Albanians have left the country in the last decade. About two thirds of that figure are university professors and researchers from scientific institutes". Today, these Albanian emigrants live, frequently unwelcome, in various other countries. Far too many of these people are involved in organized crime, which creates problems within the diaspora that are then blamed on Albanians in general.

Emigration

Closed borders

The forty percent of Albanians previously living in Yugoslavia are now divided into three or four different regions. Disregarding the problems of sovereignty over Kosovo, the borders between these regions have all been practically closed off. The border between Macedonia and Kosovo, for instance, separates many ethnic Albanian families, a painful fact experienced daily by Albanians on both sides. To be sure, there are other ethnicities in Europe divided among several countries – Hungary is just one example – but for Yugoslavia’s ethnic Albanians this condition emerged as an immediate consequence of the country’s disintegration. It goes without saying that we all oppose the establishment of a Greater Albania, something that no Albanian politician publicly demands today either.

For this very reason, two things seem very important to me. Firstly, Albanians living in any of these areas should be enabled to work together. The countries concerned fear – and certainly not without reason – that the Albanians within their borders will cause difficulties. As a consequence, regional cooperation as a whole is hindered, since any cohesion between Kosovo Albanians and those in the homeland often encounters the mistrust of others who suspect they are witnessing expansionist tendencies. On the other hand, trying to keep Albanians permanently segregated from one another only makes the Albanian powder keg even more unstable.

“Turn toward Europe”

The second concern is the “turn toward Europe” which was propagated eight years ago by our German Foreign Minister at that time, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. It means trying to lift the barriers separating the Albanians by encouraging the entire southeast European region to orient itself more strongly toward Europe. Not only Albanians but also Macedonians are frustrated by the isolation enforced by strict visa requirements. For example, some Macedonians go to the Bulgarian embassy in Skopje claiming to be Bulgarians because this would free them from having to obtain a Schengen visa. In Albania, ethnic Albanians call themselves Greeks. This was also the reason why the Albanian government did not include ethnic origins in the last national census. The government fears that many Albanians in the south of the country would declare themselves Greek in the hope of gaining material advantages.

Albania as an EU member?

Should countries such as Albania become EU members? I can understand reservations about some members of the Albanian political elite who we would not want to think of as, say, a commissioner for regional development in Brussels or a judge in Luxembourg. On the other hand, one would do a great service to the issue of regional security by helping all countries in the region to form closer ties with Europe. “Gray zones” or “black holes” on the map would only promote the further expansion of organized crime. Therefore we can only welcome Europe’s political efforts, driven though they may be by American pressure, to strengthen the bonds between Southeast Europe and the continent’s institutions. Our motto at the OSCE mission in Albania is, “Make Albania fit for the Stabilization and Association Process”. Without a doubt, Albania is the country that has the greatest distance to make up, even in comparison to its immediate neighbors. You only have to drive your car from Albania to Macedonia to notice that roads suddenly improve on the Macedonian side of the border – while in Albania, by contrast, expensive Western-made cars dominate. A very great deal, therefore, remains to be done.

Corruption and organized crime

The region’s main problem, rightly pointed out at every opportunity, is the association between corruption and organized crime. If we fail to solve this problem, we can pump as

much money as we want into the region without making real progress. Unfortunately, the international community has been far from vigorous in this respect. Politicians in the region claim that their legislation is more than adequate for the task. One is likely to hear statements such as “our prosecutor just had three individuals put behind bars.” Yet this happens very infrequently and never affects the ringleaders. I must point out, however, that Albania has made progress in many respects. And I stress that it is in our own interest as Europeans to help this country to keep moving forward, even if few people are currently willing to sully their hands with Albania. When I try to recruit new staff members for my mission in Albania, for instance, I have a much more difficult time of it than do the OSCE missions in Yugoslavia and even Kosovo. This is a shortsighted attitude, in my opinion, especially given the breadth of the Albanians’ regional networks. And there is certainly collaboration between Serbs and Albanians in organized crime. It would be a welcome development if cooperation could function at the legal and law-enforcement levels as well.

Ahtisaari

Mr. Ahrens and I worked together in the Yugoslavia Conference in the early nineties. I am delighted to see that he is as engaged in the region as before.

Schaefer

I share the general optimism as far as the present stage of affairs in the Balkans is concerned. I think one can safely say, compared to summer 1999, that the glass is half full. But it is only half full, and it is very important to reflect on how to meet the future challenges. I think we need an international and regional consensus on the steps necessary to bring about this kind of process.

I would highlight three important elements for a regional approach. At the core of it is clearly – Mr. Svilanović has touched on it – how to tackle the hot spots. I think there are a number of core principles, which we ought to take into consideration when looking at these hot spots.

The first one, and maybe the most important one, is the rule of law. I detect in every one of the crisis areas that the absence of an effective legal system, a justice system, consisting of independent and neutral police forces, prosecution and judges is one of the main deficiencies in the process of building up a society. A lack in establishing effective legal institutions would jeopardize our endeavors in other fields.

The second principle is decentralization. Mr. Petritsch referred to Dayton and the very difficult process leading to the implementation of the recent constitutional court decision. It would argue that the very concept which underlies the Dayton Accords does not propose a perspective for the societies in the medium and longer term.

The principle of constituent peoples is leading in a wrong direction. In the longer-term perspective Bosnia and Herzegovina ought to concentrate on the protection of individual human rights and eventually must get away from the concept of constituent peoples who define their very interests only as group interests, as collective interests. It might be neces-

Rule of law

Decentralization

Protection of individual human rights

sity for Bosnia and Herzegovina to go through the nineteenth century for a short period of time in order to arrive at the twenty-first century, but this period must be limited. At the end of the day, the constitutional framework should converge with what we have built in the European Convention and in our liberal constitutions.

Multi-ethnic societies

My third point as far as the hot spots are concerned is the integrative aspect. For me, it remains unacceptable to look at proposals for ethnically clean entities in Southeast Europe. I am convinced that this would eventually be a dead-end street, because most of the societies in the region, even after the four Balkan wars, have remained societies consisting of a host of different ethnicities. Those who are politically responsible in the various parts of the region, particularly in Macedonia and Kosovo, ought to accept sooner than later that the only prospect of driving towards Europe will be multi-ethnic societies. If we do not succeed in bringing this message home, we will face major difficulties in trying to pacify and stabilize the region with a sustainable effect.

I have been listening to proposals on the return of Serb refugees to Kosovo which would limit the return to certain areas such as the northern Mitrovica area and some of the other enclaves. I think that is a wrong concept. The only way of offering Serbs a future in Kosovo, a stable future based on a concept of sustainable coexistence, will be to build a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo which will not be a threat to its neighborhood, but rather a stabilizing factor on the inside and the outside.

Regional integration

The second element is regional integration. As Mr. Svilanović has emphasized, this is the most decisive process the region will undergo. This is a new phase. We have had legitimate governments being installed in all countries since December last year. The challenge now is to see that borders increasingly become administrative lines without becoming international or ethnic or psychological barriers.

If the European perspective is to be a real perspective, the region will have to integrate. And this must not simply be a slogan. That is why Germany and other partners in the EU are very much focused at this point in supporting Mr. Svilanović and others trying to start a regional process of dialogue and cooperation. We must bring the countries of the region together around the table, not in order to first solve the big political issues, in particular the outstanding status issues, but to concentrate on very practical matters which are burning issues for everyone: energy, trans-boundary infrastructure, the fight against organized crime.

Regional approach to fighting organized crime

I agree with Geert Ahrens that organized crime is the cancer of the region. I think a political agreement between all governments in the region is necessary to provide the framework for fighting organized crime through a regional approach. The countries of the region must take the lead in this, but the Europeans will have to offer their complementary assistance.

I believe that if we get the countries of the sub-region to start working on such concrete issues, there will be a new attitude of slowly but steadily developing a sense of mutual dependence which will reduce the importance of borders. The Helsinki process has given us good examples of how this can work.

The region does not need more big conferences. Proposals for comprehensive Balkan conferences are not helpful. The Berlin Congress era is over. What we need are “bottom-up” approaches in which the countries in the region take responsibility and start identifying and solving their own problems. The international community can make an effort to help.

“Bottom-up” approaches

Allow me a remark on the European perspective of Southeast Europe. Last year Zagreb was offered not only the long-term prospect of membership in the EU. It was also provided two very concrete instruments.

European perspective

The Stabilization and Association Process is a bilateral instrument aimed at putting every country on track, identifying concrete benchmarks that everyone has to meet. The Stability Pact, on the other hand, is a complementary instrument helping every country to get started on that Stabilization and Association Process.

Stability Pact

The Stability Pact has to be used more than before as a political tool. The regional political process, which I have been talking about, should therefore be under the roof of the Stability Pact. The six or seven countries concerned should try to sit down with a view to reaching agreements on very concrete problem-solving concepts. The three tables of the Stability Pact should focus their work much more on implementing the political will generated by the region as a result of that process.

Kosovo as well as Montenegro have to be included in this process, irrespective of major constitutional issues to be solved. Kosovo in particular is part of the regional problem; it has to be part of the solution. Irrespective of problems of protocol, which I foresee, i.e. who should sit at the negotiation table and what kind of status to accord to the participants, Kosovo and Montenegro have to be part of this regional process. The European perspective can become reality the sooner the countries concerned see fit to start moving on regional cooperation.

Kosovo and Montenegro as part of regional cooperation

Ahtisaari

The role of the international organizations has been mentioned here. We have available for you copies of a major study, which the Institute for Democracy and Election Administration (IDEA) in Stockholm has conducted in all the Balkan countries on the attitudes of the political parties and their leaders towards the international institutions.

IDEA

Altmann

I have ambivalent feelings about the European perspective that we have heard mentioned several times. On the one hand, this really is the only positive option for the region today. Mr. Svilanović, on the other hand, has rightly pointed out that it will be a long and difficult process, as well as a different European Union that could take in the region’s countries in one form or another in the next ten or fifteen years.

European perspective

The question is, what form will it take? We have to assume that not only Southeast Europe regards the EU as a lifeline but that Ukraine, Moldova, the trans-Caucasian region do as well. Also, let us not forget that the Mediterranean’s southern rim will develop similar

Different kinds of membership?

ambitions. This means that the process will not end in Southeast Europe with the six or seven countries generally expected to become EU members. I ask myself, then, whether the EU will be capable of taking in so many countries in the end.

Mr. Svilanović has rightly expressed his concern that the EU will have a hard enough time digesting its imminent expansion by ten to twelve states. One can easily imagine, then, how difficult the debate over the subsequent wave of enlargement will be. Consequently, we cannot dismiss the idea of establishing various kinds of membership. This would mean, however, that we would also be creating a different EU. This prospect should not be rejected out of hand, and neither should the region's countries feel deterred by it.

Serbia and Montenegro

Mr. Svilanović went on to paint a very positive image of Serbian-Montenegrin relations. This also gives rise to ambivalence in me. To be sure, we have gained three years' time and can pause to catch our breath. Yet it cannot be discounted that when those three years are up, the very referendum will take place that Mr. Svilanović would so keenly prefer to avoid. Judging by the current situation in Montenegro, we can certainly expect the population there to demand a referendum in three years, with the consequence of a possible split after all in rump Yugoslavia or the current federation between Serbia and Montenegro.

In my opinion, we cannot be sure that something positive will really come of all this. Perhaps people will come to the sane conclusion that the new union is entirely satisfactory after all. The opposite outcome, however, is just as likely.

*Kosovo as part of
Serbia and Montenegro?*

This is also the point where another connection can be made to Kosovo. It is not yet clear to me, for example, what position Kosovo, which according to UN resolution 1244 still belongs to Yugoslavia, would have in the new union, which will not be called Yugoslavia but Serbia and Montenegro. One plausible possibility would be that Serbia and Montenegro would be considered a successor state and therefore assume former Yugoslavia's commitments, including sovereignty over Kosovo. I would assume, however, that that would require an appropriate legal framework. One could also consider whether Kosovo should not be made a third entity in this new union. I believe this would be acceptable to Serbia and that Montenegro would not have any reservations of its own. And it must be possible to convince the Kosovo Albanians that a quasi-autonomous Kosovo – like Serbia and Montenegro – would be a component of a state in which the union would assume the form of a weak bond, allowing Kosovo a great degree of autonomy.

If, however, we cannot rule out that this union will fall apart in three years – if, indeed, it ever comes into being – we could once again be facing the problem of what to do with Kosovo. Handing it to Serbia is not an option. Resolution 1244 and the Rambouillet Agreements stipulate that Kosovo is not a part of Serbia, but of Yugoslavia. Should Serbia finally part ways with Montenegro, then giving Belgrade the status of successor to rump Yugoslavia would be, in my opinion, a simplistic and, in the case of Kosovo, unfeasible solution. A return to Serbian authority would be utterly unacceptable for the Kosovo Albanians, particularly since the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 provoked the ethnic Albanians' initially peaceful and subsequently armed resistance. What we are facing, then, is a highly nebulous legal situation. For this reason one can only hope that the new union really does come into existence, that Kosovo finds its (third) place within it, and that the union will prove a durable one.

A very important point that was raised here is the time factor. Talks took place a week ago in Pristina between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Ambassador Schaefer was also present. In the working group I moderated we heard the Albanians say for the first time that they should not insist on immediate independence for Kosovo. They said there were more pressing tasks in coming to grips with daily problems in the province. The Serb side – with Mr. Sivilanović taking part – had already been arguing along these lines. I was certainly surprised, but above all delighted by the fact that Albanians had taken this position for the first time.

Järvenpää

Mr. Sivilanović said that we need to know where this thing is going and that the European Union actually does need to be able to articulate a vision in order for the regional actors to be able to set their strategies. But do we have a concrete perspective for a strategy of Europeanization for the Balkans?

When you tell European Commission officials that there is a lack of strategy, they get highly irritated and they cite the Stability Pact, the Stabilization and Association Process and all the various set-ups and benchmarks that have been created. But is not the road map which is often spoken about still a little bit fictional? I have not yet been able to see where the Balkans actually are on that map. There is a vision that the Balkan countries should somehow be linked into Europe. There is a feeling that we know where we are going, but I am not sure that we really know which paths are the ones leading to that road which will finally take us to the European Union.

That is where I am a little puzzled and I wonder about these Solana guarantees that there will be no “lagging behind” for Serbia and for the Belgrade government. Lagging behind what? What was the original plan which we are now going to forfeit because of this Serbia-Montenegro union? What is the role of Kosovo in all of this? How can one talk about a European area which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would somehow enter if there are three different customs areas within that unit? How do we deal with the pre-conditions which Bosnia still has to fulfill, when Dr. Petritsch is actually undertaking many of them through the “Bonn powers”? How do we deal with a Macedonia where there was fighting last spring at the same time it was negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement, discussing detailed issues such as intellectual property rights? It just seems as though there is still a bit of a disconnection between what we claim to be the goal and the strategy and the resources at our disposal, which will allow us to get onto that road map.

I think that there is a vision but I wonder whether there is a strategy. It just seems it is a game of “smoke and mirrors”. Do we actually believe in this? Europe needs a strategy for the Balkans and not just for bringing the Balkans into Europe. It is about somehow getting a commitment that we remain here, bringing Europe into the Balkans. Having the police in Bosnia taken over by the European Union, perhaps having the military presence in Macedonia gradually handed over to the European Union – is that how we are entering? What will we follow up with? What other things will we put on the table if we get serious about this whole thing?

Status of Kosovo

*European strategy
for the Balkans*

“Bonn powers”

*Europe needs a strategy
for the Balkans*

Ahtisaari

Minna, I think, we agree that you made that statement as a member of the Board of the Crisis Management Initiative in Helsinki of which we are both founders and members.

Reljić

“The hour of Europe”

Listening to Mr. Svilanović express his wish for a more decisive policy on the part of the European Union, I was reminded of the situation in 1991, when a very small plane landed at Ljubljana airport carrying three European Union ministers, the so-called EU Troika. One of them, Foreign Minister Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, who at the time was taking his turn at the EU Presidency, uttered the memorable and historic sentence, “This is the hour of Europe”. Now, twelve years later, we can look back at events since then and determine what kind of role the European Union has played.

Changed framework

An even more important question, perhaps, is whether the framework has changed in the meantime and to what extent these different conditions may only now be heralding the arrival of the real hour of Europe. I am convinced that the European Union’s leaders have acted with the best of intentions during the past twelve years, but have failed to ensure due diligence and caution. Today, as the preceding contributors have made clear in their deliberations on what form the EU might take after accepting the states of Southeast Europe, excessive caution seems to be the dominating factor. It would doubtless be a different European Union, even though integration can be the only solution, not only for the region but for Europe as a whole. This integration, however, would be based on different principles and take place differently than the process of European integration has over the past twenty years.

*Process of
disintegration*

Why is there no alternative to integration? In 1991 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed with seven neighboring states. Today, one finds no fewer than seventeen political entities on the territory of former Yugoslavia. This process of disintegration has resulted in the emergence of ever-smaller political authorities that cannot survive without financial support, political controls, and military and law enforcement training from the West. The European Union contributed to this process when it accepted the primacy of ethnic self-determination over individual human rights as a means of resolving conflicts. The recognition of this kind of law, which permits ethnic groups to constitute their own states or organize autonomous political entities, has helped turn the region into something like a Russian matryoshka doll, which successively opens up to reveal multiple other dolls inside.

*Serbia and Montenegro:
“Solania”*

By having helped establish this admittedly odd confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, the EU has reached a turning point. The Union’s chief diplomat, Javier Solana, guaranteed the possibility of EU membership for Serbia and Montenegro, two countries that were not even being considered for candidacy a short time before. Serbia and Montenegro is a product of the European Union par excellence. The Dayton Accords and the treaty on East Slavonia, on the other hand, were reached under the aegis of the Pax Americana. In the latter cases the Europeans played only an insignificant role as Washington decided in what direction the Balkans should be steered at the time. This new state of Serbia and Montenegro has already been dubbed “Solania” in local parlance. Moreover, the Kosovo-

Macedonia-Albania triangle constitutes a veritable playground for criminal activity of all kinds. And finally we have two protectorates, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with “proconsuls” at the helm and without any immediate prospect of self-determination.

This has now reached a degree of absurdity that makes clear that the EU will have to change its approach to Southeast Europe, but also that local politicians will have to adapt to a new reality. I think a process of reintegration is essential. I do not mean resurrecting Yugoslavia. Something new has to be established to enable the countries involved to reintegrate, because continuously creating new states is costly and ultimately absurd. The results are “Solania”, criminal playgrounds, and countries like Albania that will probably not succeed in standing on their own legs for ten or fifteen years.

How can the conditions for integrating Southeast Europe into the European Union be established? My contribution to the discussion could be called political science fiction, since I am referring to a future that is thoroughly uncertain. For the past twelve years, nationalism has been the predominant doctrine in the region, a nationalism that strove to create analogous ethnic and political borders. I point out once again that Germany lent this nationalism a great deal of legitimacy by recognizing ethnic self-determination in 1991.

This is why I am especially encouraged by the new dimension that Germany has now introduced to problem-solving in the region, not only in its support for the Balkans Stability Pact but in the statements of leading diplomats such as Mr. Schaefer as well. There is a new emphasis today on the individual’s human rights as well as on assisting reintegration. I might add that the European Union would do well to abandon its prejudice against the Balkans as “alien” and “different”, as the Bulgarian historian Maria Todorova has brilliantly analyzed.

As long as Europe refuses to accept the Balkans as part of itself, and the Balkan elites adhere to their parochial and nationalist attitudes, there will be only mini-states, political autonomies, and the like, in place of real progress.

What is important for a process of reintegration, in my opinion, is not the primacy of economics, but the primacy of politics. Economic ties can only flourish where political relations already exist. The responsibility of the EU is precisely in developing a clear vision with exact dates and mechanisms for accepting Southeast Europe into the EU.

Allow me in conclusion to quote the former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, who recently wrote in a German publication that it was high time for the European Union to give up its “stinginess”. Southeast Europe needs a new Marshall Plan; promises alone will no longer suffice. The same goes for politicians in the lands of Southeast Europe and their protestations of wanting to become good Europeans. Instead, they should start putting European values into practice.

Schwarz-Schilling

As my intensive involvement with this region dates back to 1993, I would like to begin by pointing out that Western Europe’s attitude toward the Balkans has undergone a transformation in the last ten years. An early phase characterized by irresponsibility has

Necessity of reintegration

Nationalism and ethnic self-determination

Individual human rights and reintegration

Primacy of politics

Marshall-Plan for Southeastern Europe

Europe’s responsibility

gradually given way to the awareness that Europe must play a responsible role in the region. Big and small steps have been taken, and some mistakes have been made, but the general direction is now clear. Whether we like it or not, the fate of the Balkans is much more closely tied with that of Europe than we may earlier have thought. The people of the Balkans, in any case, have had to pay a very high price in blood before coming to this realization.

Decisive move of the US

Ultimately it was the United States that made the decisive move after recognizing that Europe was unable or unwilling to solve its own problems – and the Balkans are surely a European concern. Europe, for its part, learned in the Balkans that, after the end of the Cold War, military intervention is sometimes unavoidable. For a long time we deluded ourselves by thinking that the United Nations could assume this military task with UNPROFOR and spare us having to soil our own hands. The result was an utterly unclear mandate that was partly responsible for disasters such as Srebrenica. When the armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia defied the will of the international community by liberating the Bihac Pocket on their own, they managed to prevent a second Srebrenica. This, too, was hardly a success story for Europe.

Rule of law

Since then we have comprehended that if we are going to pacify this region, we have to give the rule of law – as Mr. Schaefer has said – the highest priority, because only justice and the law can assure security. This means that the people of this region have to learn the meaning of the separation of powers, democratic principles, human rights, and the like. Just think of how much time passed before the theories of Montesquieu had taken root throughout Europe. In light of this it seems to me irresponsible when Europeans express an impatience with this region that is completely misplaced and historically insensitive.

Regional cooperation

Without a doubt, regional cooperation is essential here. This is the reason for the great importance attached to the Stability Pact, even if it still needs to be invigorated in a whole new way. And regarding Mr. Schaefer's vivid reference to the glass being half full, I must say I fully agree with him, but also point out that the other half will be frustratingly difficult to fill.

Ownership and legal system

Since 1995 I have been working as a mediator in Bosnia-Herzegovina and have helped conclude more than 90 agreements with cities and communities. During this time I repeatedly saw in practice the enormous significance of the High Representative's success in regulating the question of ownership and establishing the foundations for a legal system. These accomplishments had immediate effects on the populace. Some people who wanted to reclaim their apartments used to live in tents in front of their old houses because they did not know whether the authorities would take steps to evict the current occupants. Decisive change only came with the introduction of new property laws.

Return of minorities

Most "minorities" returned to their homes in 2000 and 2001 after the legal framework had been established. This is a success that has hardly been brought to the attention of the outside world. Other achievements that played a part in this story include the consolidation of police forces, the ombudsmen's tireless activity, and the protection of human rights.

As for the economy, the situation continues to be exceedingly grim. Official unemploy-

ment levels remain at more than 50 percent; unofficially they are considerably higher. When the refugees came back to their homelands, they were urged to join the reconstruction effort. Today I see young people, some of whom had become perfectly integrated in Germany, sitting around in cafés, dealing drugs, smoking and drinking, without any prospects for the future whatsoever. Well over 60 percent of Bosnia's young people say they would emigrate if they could. This poses an enormous threat for the future.

For years we kept speaking of an exit strategy, one that was, in any case, historically and politically misguided. Today we have given that up. Even the Americans have largely parted company with the idea of an exit strategy, and now, instead of simply pulling up stakes and leaving, they say instead that the international community will have to transfer responsibility back to local authorities.

And what about prospects for joining the European Union? Are we not leading most of these countries astray with the illusion that this could take place in the coming years? What are we going to do if the situation in some of these countries deteriorates further? Can we then still plausibly say that their best hope is with the European Union? On this point I would advocate more honesty.

What we need is a strategy to bridge the time before a possible EU candidacy. For most of these countries, that will mean ten to twenty years at least. We have to use the intervening time effectively and not waste all our opportunities. Without making a considerable effort we will hardly be able to persuade these people to remain patient.

Mr. Eiff raised the issue of the status of Kosovo, a problem that we must undoubtedly tackle within the next two or three years. Otherwise political and economic development will be significantly restricted. Guaranteeing the protection of minorities will be the chief task in this process and a requirement we absolutely must fulfill.

Associating Kosovo with Serbia and Montenegro, as Mr. Altmann has suggested, is an idea that has simply come too late. It might have still been possible five years ago. The Montenegrins might still have agreed at the time, but that is certainly no longer the case. With the addition of Kosovo, Montenegro would cease to play any part in the Federation, even purely in terms of population. Seven or eight hundred thousand people could still have a certain weight vis-à-vis Serbia, but that would be severely diminished with Kosovo as a third republic in the union.

I would warn us Europeans against continuing to place our faith in strong regulations and protectorates, instead of, as Mr. Petritsch has recommended, concentrating more on mediation. My experience at the local level has been that people expect representatives of the international community to be willing to listen rather than presenting some rigid opinion right at the outset. Yet mediation also means insisting on complete respect for principles. Deciding what form the eventual solution to any given problem might take will fall more and more into the hands of people on the ground – just as the High Representative demonstrated in dealing with the constitutional question.

I must make one critical comment. If, from now on, we support equal rights for all ethnicities in the Bosnian Republika Srpska, I fear that legislation will be undermined as

Misguided exit strategy

Prospects of joining the EU

Status of Kosovo

Kosovo not associated with Serbia and Montenegro

Warning against regulations and protectorates

Equal rights for all ethnicities?

it has been in the Federation, basically until the present day. How two conflicting principles – that of democracy and majority rule on the one hand, and equal rights for ethnic groups on the other – can be reconciled during a conflict remains an open question. I also do not think that the changes to the constitution have resolved this issue. These mechanisms must be developed further.

What concrete steps need to be taken?

Privatization

Firstly, in the economic sphere major infrastructure-related industries such as the energy sector have to be privatized. We know through our own experience in Germany how difficult this can be. It would require a great deal of time but is also a major prerequisite for regional cooperation.

Cutting red tape

Secondly, the red tape has to be cut out of the entire system of administration that has made existence difficult for small and mid-sized companies. This point is often underestimated. Institutions such as the German Associations for Industry and Trade would have to provide assistance or consultation in the form of older, experienced specialists active in the Senior Expert Service, who could show the authorities what laws are crippling all activity. There would be no need for new civil servants from the European Union.

Infrastructure

Thirdly, we have to continue to provide support with specific programs. In this respect I am mostly disappointed with the European effort. We told the people to clear up issues of ownership and to integrate refugees. Cities and communities took on most of these tasks. What is still missing, however, is a halfway intact infrastructure of schools, streets, access to electricity and much more. Far too much time is wasted before our projects actually get underway. We have to approach the problem more pragmatically and specifically support those towns and communities that respect democratic institutions and/or set up round tables and are willing to resolve problems. This should take place quickly and without red tape on our side, however, and not after one and a half years with projects on some list. “Conditionality”, as it has become known, has to be felt clearly and unmistakably by Bosnian politicians and people on the ground, through the quick reaction of the international community’s development aid organizations, both in the form of prompt assistance projects and immediate sanctions and aid freezes when the country’s or towns’ good will toward material and spiritual reconstruction is lacking.

Ahtisaari

Mr. Svilanović spoke about EU accession in ten to fifteen years. I think it is a realistic timeframe. But what happens next and how will one survive that long time period politically – these are very important issues.

Lutz

Rule of law

Mr. Schwarz-Schilling has rightly emphasized the significance of the rule of law. An architecture of peace that must be our common goal, whether for Europe or worldwide, is nothing else than an architecture of law. The rule of law must constitute the guiding principle of all our efforts, whether theoretical or of a practical nature. The rule of law is, after all, the basis for all good policy.

However, I see two problems that we should not disregard. This first has to do with credibility, which in a certain sense is another word for legal certainty. This is a precious thing. At first glance it appears to be merely formal, but in fact its roots are material. Credibility is called into question when we stand up for the rule of law in certain states but not in others. The argument to the contrary maintains that one should not refrain from taking action in one case only because one cannot equal that action in every other case. Yet credibility always depends on the question of how one deals with political and economic interests. Supporting the rule of law only selectively cannot but be detrimental to one's credibility as a basic principle.

Credibility

The second problem with the rule of law is that it is only effective if the stronger party also submits to it. In a certain way the rule of law is an instrument of the weak that must incorporate the strong if it is to remain functional. That means the stronger party, whether in society as an ethnic majority or a superpower at the international level, must respect this principle in the same way and obey it.

No law of the stronger

In the Balkans we saw how Milosevic finally had to be forced by military means to respect the law. Yet I repeat: the rule of law does not mean the law of the strongest. And my impression at the moment is that this principle is not being globally obeyed. On the contrary, the progress of civilization that we believed ascendant for decades now seems to be in retreat. The mission of the rule of law in Kosovo, therefore, will have repercussions far beyond the Balkans.

Mr. Eiff underscored the need to resolve the status of Kosovo on the one hand and the situation of Serb refugees on the other.

Concerning the status of Kosovo, I wholeheartedly agree with the statement that the issue will have to be settled by those directly concerned, without whom there can indeed be no solution.

This does not apply, however, to the situation of Serb refugees. According to UNHCR figures, there are still 230 000 Serbs and other minorities who fled or were expelled from Kosovo. This is an enormous number that we hardly take notice of. Three years after the NATO air strikes began, indeed mainly in response to the Serbian expulsions of Kosovo Albanians, I find it intolerable that we continue to practically ignore the situation of the Serb refugees. My earlier comments on credibility also apply here.

Serb refugees

Mr. Schaefer advocated the need to maintain multi-ethnic societies in the Balkan region, while Mr. Ahrens recommended encouraging cross-border Albanian cooperation. I see the sense in the latter argument, but wonder whether we would not be promoting a resurgent nationalism, as Mr. Reljić fears, as well as endangering the multi-ethnic composition of the region's societies.

Multi-ethnic societies?

Mr. Schaefer then expressed some criticism of the division of labor between the Europeans and the USA. He said he would regret an American withdrawal from the Balkans and made the case for a continued US military presence there.

*Division of labor
Europe/US*

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is, of course, anything but stable, as soldiers who

have returned from their tours of duty there have reported. According to them, fighting there would immediately break out again once our troops had departed. Nevertheless, for reasons of efficiency I support a certain division of labor with the United States.

I think there are good reasons for the states of Europe, including Germany, to basically restrict their commitments to the European continent. Division of labor, in this case, would mean that power would be concentrated geographically, with Europe mainly fulfilling its commitments in nearby countries. In doing so I would not wish to narrowly define our sphere of influence but include the Soviet Union's successor states, for example. This includes neither Afghanistan nor Somalia. Basically we have no reason to be there as long as so much remains to be accomplished within Europe.

Ahtisaari

Crisis management

I would like to add, Mr. Lutz, that I do not believe that it is possible to increase the military expenditure in Europe to the extent that would be required to bridge the technological gap to America. However, the mere fact that the European Union is establishing its crisis management capability to my mind provides the possibility of having well-run operations, which are better equipped and perhaps better prepared than the traditional UN exercises are. So when we in the European Union are ready with our crisis management capability, perhaps we can be of assistance to the UN at least in our own region. That is my comment on the division of labor.

Ahrens

Regional cooperation

We are all in favor of regional cooperation in the Balkans, something that should not exclude cooperation that extends across borders that have Albanians living on both sides. That was what I meant, Mr. Lutz.

There is, for instance, a project for regional cooperation between the Greek town of Florina, the Albanian town Korca, and Ohrid in Macedonia, funded in part by the OSCE. Ethnically, Ohrid is a town strongly dominated by ethnic Macedonians. There are not many Albanians there. Cooperation between Peshkopia in Albania and Debar in Macedonia, on the other hand, is considered more problematical because both are predominantly ethnic Albanian towns.

Problems at borders

There are also problems in some areas near the border with Kosovo. The farmers in villages on the Albanian side that I visited told me they would be able to sell large amounts of their produce in the nearby city of Prizren in Kosovo, but were unable to cross the border. Goods on the market in Prizren have traditionally come from Macedonia and Montenegro. Yet it must also be acknowledged and appreciated that, given the recent history of Macedonia, its government is not particularly eager to open its borders without certain guarantees.

In any case, the borders are not waterproof now either. I have seen maps of the mountainous country in these sensitive areas. There are numerous mountain paths there. Sometimes, mules follow these paths alone, without any people accompanying them, carrying weapons and ammunition. There would be no danger involved if farmers want to cross an

officially open border to sell their potatoes in Prizren, or if a group of youngsters wants to go from Peshkopia to Debar to meet other young people, even if all of them are Albanians. The more fighting flares up, however, and the more tensions rise, the more difficult the situation will become. Originally, in any case, there was no intention of excluding areas with the same ethnic makeup from regional cooperation.

Eiff

A basic requirement for normal coexistence among nationalities separated by borders is the development of cooperation across these borders so that, at some point, they cease to present an obstacle. We have learned this in Southern Tyrol, among other places. It should also be a vision for the future among ethnic Albanians living in Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and Kosovo. It is not a matter of shifting national borders, but of rendering them irrelevant. That might sound a bit futuristic, especially given the remaining tensions in the area. Macedonia's insistence of monitoring its borders with Kosovo and Albania as closely as possible for fear of cross-border crime and terrorism, for example, is entirely understandable.

Yet without wanting to over-stretch the topic of Kosovo, it must be recognized that as long as the future of Kosovo remains uncertain, a regime of borders that exist only formally is all but bound to fail.

Jacev

One of the main problems and the main challenge for Europe in the area of European integration was and remains organized crime and its influence on the integration processes in the region. Considerable efforts have been made in this respect in the region by the international community, by the domestic political elites, and by the governments in the region, but the results are still weak and there are many shortcomings. Huge amount of funds and efforts which were invested in the reforms in the region are bringing results, but these results are slow in coming when we compare them with those achieved in the Baltic and Central European States.

Despite the efforts mentioned, the present situation in the region is as follows: instead of stability in the region, we still have tendencies which are creating instability; instead of reducing the significance of the borders, there are still tendencies to create new ones. Instead of building civic societies based on individual citizens, we have a strong desire for national states – this is not pronounced but it is certainly present. Instead of orientation towards the free market, there is still a high degree of state involvement in the economy – and so on and so forth.

The reason for all of this lies, in my view, in the absence of tangible results and in the difference between the official statements of our political elites and the situation on the ground. There is a large discrepancy between what our political elites, our parties and our governments say to the international community and what they actually do on the ground in our own countries. The main reason for this is the present and kind of endemic absence of rule of law – corruption, money laundering and all the other illegal activities, which can be put under one umbrella: organized crime.

Overcoming borders

*Main problem:
organized crime*

Contrary developments

*Absence of
the rule of law*

*Political party
financing*

One could say that there is organized crime in all or most of the countries in the world – but its influence is not the same as it is here in the Balkans. The difference is that in the Balkan situation, most of the political elites are hostage to two factors. Firstly, they are hostages with regard to the financing of their own political parties and secondly, they are hostage to their own (both personally and as a political party) desire to become as rich as possible as soon as possible. These two factors provide a fast track on which anti-reform and organized crime processes are influencing the political agenda in our countries in the region.

The first factor – financing of the political parties – is related to the sources of funding and how the political elites are making repayments. Of course, every political party in the world needs funding for their functioning and the sources of financing of the political parties are similar. The difference between developed countries and our region is that here, in the region there is no transparent path for all of their financing. On the basis of their official and legal incomes, most of the political parties in the region would have problems paying their basic costs, such as telephone bills or the rent of their premises – never mind anything else. It is obvious that they are managing much more funds than they can “cover” by the legitimate and registered incomes, which is visible especially during the electoral campaigns. The funds given to the political parties, in order not to be made public, most often are coming in cash and the problem is even heavier if we consider who is in possession of the large amounts of cash.

Money laundering

The funds from the financers of the political parties are not coming because they are in love with our politicians, but as a kind of investment for the times when and if that particular political party came into power. The only way to repay the “favor” is to provide the financers with a privileged position in public procurement and privatization, as well as turning a blind eye at tax evasion and evasion of custom duties. This is the perfect situation for money laundering, since there is an input of cash of unknown origin into our countries and output of clean money. All this directly influences reform processes, which are basically oriented towards the rule of law, because in that case this repayment would not be possible.

Personal benefits

The second factor – the desire to become rich – is closely related to the first one. The individuals who are in a position to skirt the law and procedures in order to repay the financers of their political party instantly realize that they are in a position to do the same thing for their personal benefit. That opens a vicious circle of corruption of the full range and erosion of the whole system of reforms, since the officials who are in a position to change things for the better in our countries are not interested in that.

*Enforcing
EU standards*

So, one of the biggest problems for EU integration is organized crime, corruption and money laundering. The standards for EU integration and reforms are the absolute opposite of that which our political parties are doing in order to finance themselves and their own bank accounts – and this applies to some of the political leaders too. EU integration means standards of transparency, the rule of law, democratization, access to information and whatever else is necessary to have a democratic society.

What should be done? I think it is time for the international community to take the diplomatic gloves off and to challenge our governments to do something about organized

crime, money-laundering and corruption – not only for the sake of our own countries in the region, but for the sake of the Western countries as well. The international community should be interested in the developments in organized crime, at least because we are exporting it to the developed countries.

Just for illustration, here is some information I have seen which suggests that many branches of organized crime are spreading the “business” even to the countries which are not traditional destination for the “Gastarbeiter”, like Poland. If this information is correct then, for the sake of stability in the Western countries as well as for that in the countries of the Balkan region, there is an urgent need to take the diplomatic gloves off and to press our governments for a firm declaration of their political will to curb organized crime, money-laundering, corruption and illegal activities.

This is why I strongly support the initiative started by the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovsky, two weeks ago at the conference of the Balkan Political Club Skopje. In order to curb organized crime in the region, he proposed closer and more efficient cooperation among the Balkan countries, because none of us can do something substantial against it only within the limits of our own countries; organized crime can only be challenged on a regional basis.

What we need is a clear political will. There is a need for an extensive exchange of information and experience on what is to be done. Without that, some of the countries in our region are going to become black holes for foreign direct investments, without fresh money and without the know-how which comes with them.

Finally, I fear that at some point in the future, Europe might lose interest in reforming our region and our countries if we don’t show the matching desire for the same processes. Therefore I think that it is about high time to unify the efforts of the countries in the region and the European Union in fighting against organized crime. Otherwise, the international community would proceed to pay the bills for the irresponsible governance of our political elites.

Sorić

The issue of refugees that has been raised several times is indeed tremendously important. Reaching a settlement to this problem would be strong evidence that the situation in the Balkans has stabilized. Yet for the time being there can be no question of the Serb refugees returning to Kosovo. Incidentally, the international community has also failed to effect the return of thousands of ethnic Serbs to Croatia. The West could naturally put more pressure on Zagreb to allow these refugees to finally return to their homeland. Yet nothing of the kind is taking place, and I ask myself why. It undermines the West’s credibility, which Mr. Lutz has rightly pointed out. And Belgrade can continue to accuse the West of bias in its conduct.

If we discuss and demand independence for Kosovo, we must have no illusions regarding the consequences – that there will not be a return of Serb refugees to Kosovo. What Albanian militia members, after all, would be willing to guarantee the security of Serb civilians? Those policemen, perhaps, who used to fight for the KLA?

*Organized crime
throughout Europe*

*Closer regional
cooperation*

Return of Serb refugees

Independent Kosovo?

I am very interested in what the economic specialists have to say on whether an independent Kosovo would be at all economically viable. Mr. Jacev has spoken about the unchecked power of organized crime in Kosovo. If things are as bad as he says they are, then are we not facing the threat of Kosovo becoming some kind of mafia state after Western troops withdraw someday? Would not such a mafia state affect the West in some ways?

*Regional cooperation
in organized crime*

Isn't it interesting that those highly-touted efforts at regional cooperation in the Balkans function only poorly or not at all, while regional cooperation in organized crime, on the other hand, seems to work extremely well? It matters not at all whether we refer to Albanians, Serbs, Macedonians, or Russians from Transnistria. The Russians, for instance, work very closely with the Albanians in transporting drugs and weapons. The thing that unifies them all is their common interest in earning money any way they can.

Economic perspective

The political situation can only stabilize once the economy revives. If there is no economic upswing, demagogues and extremists will fill the vacuum, in Serbia and all the former Yugoslav republics. The EU must succeed in giving the people of this region decent economic prospects or it will face a resurgence of radical organizations.

Investing in education

Encouraging political stability in Southeast Europe also means investing in the minds of the young generation. Education costs money, and the West is doing very little in this field. This is a mistake. The mind-set left behind by Communist rule is still virulent in the post-socialist societies of Southeast Europe. Titoism may be dead, but the Titoists live on. Many young people have no intellectual orientation and are susceptible to the "nationalist contagion".

Emigration of elites

Mr. Ahrens has mentioned that the Albanian educated class is abandoning its homeland. The same is true, as Mr. Schwarz-Schilling pointed out, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the trend is also evident in Serbia and other Yugoslav successor states. Elites speak volumes by leaving their homelands. These people have apparently lost hope of seeing the situation improve in the foreseeable future. Their countries are lagging behind other European states in political, economic, and cultural development.

*Investing in the future
of the media*

I would also like to say a few words about the media. In the past in the Balkans, it had a disastrous effect, as we all know. The media was often an arm of the government that was in power at the moment, and its task was to disseminate propaganda. The professionalism of some young journalists is modest, to put it politely. I would suggest that the West assist in the training and further qualification of young journalists. There is some activity in this field, but not enough by far.

Together with an Albanian friend, I am currently working on a textbook for Albanian and Serbian journalists that explains the basics of western journalism, such as keeping news and opinion separate. The media plays a bigger role in shaping people's awareness than any other instrument. Making an investment here would be more than worthwhile. We should also keep in mind that much of the media legislation in these countries is actually very good. The problem is enforcing the rules.

*EU: Perspective for
"the day after tomorrow"*

Otherwise I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Schwarz-Schilling's demand that we refrain from promising these countries quick accession to the EU, because we all know that very

little in this respect is going to happen in the coming years. The EU is an important prospect for “the day after tomorrow”. But we still have to keep in mind that encouraging false hopes only results in disappointments. The region’s problems have to be solved before the EU can offer them any prospect of association.

Bender

It is consensus that weak public administrations, which are not able to deliver basic public services, are one of the key problems in the region. Ms. Järvenpää raised this problem of the “macro-level”: While the proclaimed European goal is to move the region towards the European Union, we don’t really have a strategy on how to achieve that or how to assist that process.

The same is true for this more micro-level exercise of trying to reform institutions. How, for example, does one bring a judiciary to the level of an efficient and trusted institution functioning according to Western standards? Here we are still very much groping in the dark.

Let me illustrate that with one example. The European Commission has now published reports on the Stabilization and Association Process. There is a general report and reports of about 25 to 40 pages for each of the countries. Let us take the one for Macedonia, the first country to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. There are three sections, each outlining priority areas to be addressed over the next twelve months. In the section on the political environment, the first point is: “Implement the Framework Agreement respecting its timetable for adoption of legislation and ensure smooth implementation of the decentralization process through offering the appropriate means to the central state bodies to manage the process and developing the capacity of local self-government bodies to undertake the transferred responsibility.”

This is a tremendously big institutional undertaking and the timeframe of twelve months is extremely unrealistic. Before this process can really start, there needs to be a new law on local financing and a new territorial division on the shape of municipalities, which are both major challenges. Furthermore, about eighty laws have to be amended in order to implement the new law on local governance.

Now, what are the Europeans doing to support this very challenging process? Firstly, they basically have a group of consultants in the Ministry for Local Governance who arrived in February. These consultants assist a very weak ministry, which was set up in 1998, with twenty people, and the consultants make up for about a third of the total staff of the ministry. There was a European consultant before this, but then there was a gap of six months and the new team started – in essence – from scratch.

The second European contribution is an offer of the European Agency for Reconstruction which arrived in February and was charged with the task of developing infrastructure projects in the municipalities and which, while starting basically from scratch, had the job of developing a clear picture after only six weeks.

These tools of assistance are not likely to have a significant impact, especially when we

Institutional reform?

EU report on Stabilization and Association

Unrealistic timeframe

European consultants

Preconditions for reforms

look at the background of this reform project. One of the main problems is that there are 123 municipalities in Macedonia of which two-thirds or even more are underdeveloped rural areas composed only of villages. These municipalities have been in existence only for five years. They have extremely low administrative and economic capacities. Very little attention has been paid to the question of how such an ambitious reform process can be implemented.

*Reduction of staff
in public
administration*

Against this background it is very instructing to read the priority suggestions of the mentioned SAP report for the economic sphere. The first point mentioned is the reduction of staff in public administration as foreseen by the IMF. Now, if the main point in the first section, the implementation of the Framework Agreement, foresees bringing the level of minority representation in the public service to a representative level – which means hiring Albanians, Turks and Roma – while the first point in the economic section demands reductions in the state service, then it is extremely difficult to see how this could work. Reductions in the number of public servants are unpopular for any government. It does not matter if it is Germany or Britain or Macedonia. However, especially in view of the situation following the conflict of last year, it is very unrealistic to expect the Macedonian government to decrease significantly the number of public employees, who are mainly ethnic Macedonian, and then purge even more ethnic Macedonians in order to hire Albanians and other minorities.

*Complex processes
of reform*

If we want to assist institutional reforms in Southeastern Europe, we have to recognize the complexities of these reform efforts and we have to devote more efforts and resources to design effective and comprehensive assistance strategies, starting by developing a better understanding of the current functioning of the state institutions in the region and the implications of the envisaged reforms.

Jacev

The fact is that, unfortunately or otherwise, only our governments, or rather the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, can put our countries on course toward Europe. That will only work, however, if those branches are prepared and correspondingly equipped. That is the domestic angle of the story. Anyway, our governments are the international community's sole, or at least prime, negotiating partners because only they can effectively implement and monitor the international community's demands.

*Obsolete bureaucratic
structures*

What is the condition of the administrative bureaucracy in our countries and what role might it play? Based on my experience of having worked in four ministries in the Republic of Macedonia and my contacts with administrations in every country in the region, I can say that all bureaucracies are organized very similarly and operate according to the "top down" method. This is a relic from the days of Communism that consisted of the daily morning directive from the Central Committee: What needs to be done today? Who is to blame? Who is right? Who will be supported? Who will be allowed to fall? The ministers in attendance then pass it on to their ministries and instruct their employees down to the lowest level. And while, figuratively speaking, the hungry little birds in the nest are being fed with information from above, some ministers are pushing for change and expect information from below. These obsolete structures are, in my opinion, the chief reason for the sluggish progress of reform in the countries of the region.

Another part of the problem is the great influence that political parties exert on state organs. A change in government can result in a complete exchange of personnel within the ministries. This stops or at least delays planned reforms as well-coordinated teams are replaced by new people who first have to be initiated. This delays reforms even more. Another difficulty is that differing political stances are represented within the ministries themselves, which obstructs both reforms and the process of adapting to European standards.

*Influence of
political parties*

Also, the countries in the region do not have a system of evaluating performance. That means that no ministry employee can be certain that he or she will not be transferred or replaced from one day to the next. One problem is the rampant nepotism known all too well in the region and the ministries, although I do not wish to make a general condemnation of all administrative bureaucracies in the region.

*No performance
evaluation*

In addition, the administrative services are often overburdened with demands and conditions connected with the transitional situation and the process towards European integration. The economic aspects alone of the EU's Acquis Communautaire, or legal framework, encompass 80 000 pages that first have to be translated, a job that takes at least half a year. Then they have to be politically implemented and enforced, which is an enormously difficult task. In light of all the above I appeal to the international community to assist us in reforming our administrative bureaucracies; it is a fundamental problem shared by all countries in the region.

*Overburdened
administrations*

What we unquestionably need is a professional, independent, and competent administrative bureaucracy that is not prone to the vagaries of day-to-day politics. The criteria should be changed to "bottom up", meaning that experts should play a decisive part in implementing policy, leaving politicians free to lay down the strategic guidelines. If this does not happen, we will be facing a situation that is already well known to us in the region.

Expressed metaphorically, a country's society is the engine of the process, while the state represents the vehicle. The problem is that as long as the clutch pedal is not pushed and a gear put in, the gas pedal can be pressed as much as one wants, but the vehicle will remain stationary. This means that the clutch and the transmission are the decisive components on the road toward Europe. We will not get very far without properly adjusting these two components. And this is the reason that the civil sector in our countries has to gain control of the administrative apparatus.

Still, the international community should also take note that our state authorities will only take action under simultaneous pressure from domestic public opinion and foreign powers. Otherwise we will not get very far. The international community should recognize these aspects of the problem.

*Pressure on
administrations*

Busek

There is a whole series of European Union programs – especially the stabilization and association process – that are supposed to help support domestic and judicial policy-making in the region's countries. One can probably never do enough, but in this respect

Civil society

a great deal has already been accomplished, especially in promoting the emergence of civil societies. Yet we have to keep in mind that civil societies have to exist before we can expect to make any progress.

Pajević

Leading role of Serbia

I would like to turn first to Serbia, not only because I live there and intend to continue doing so, but also because I am convinced that a stable yet democratic Serbia with an organized civil society would both act as a guarantor for stability and take a leading presence in the region. I think that in the aftermath of Serbia's political upheavals, the country's people expect nothing less. Yet as a consequence of disunity, or perhaps of a lack of sincere effort, many expectations, both at home and abroad, have been realized only insufficiently.

Local problem-solving

I consider it unrealistic of the EU to expect that its detailed, if not obsessively detailed strategy can impose order upon our situation. I mean both Serbia and the future joint state of Serbia and Montenegro, which, in light of the treaty by which it was born and the events of the past year and a half, is only remotely comprehensible even with a large dose of optimism. We should instead harness our own energies, because the potential is there, at the state level as well. However, because of the badly fragmented political scene, we are incapable of defining a consistent strategy and developing it in detail. In my opinion it is naive to think that anyone outside of Serbia and the region could settle our affairs for us. From the perspective of Brussels or any other European capital it would be very difficult to really appreciate our problems and find a practical solution to them.

I would then like to discuss two processes that I think are exceedingly important, but that have either not begun at all or only hesitantly in the form of cosmetic changes, but certainly not with the required determination, in Serbia and probably other countries as well. Both topics have already been mentioned here.

Radical institutional change

The first aspect is change in the institutions – radical change, if one considers that we have to change the complete political system, the state apparatus and organizations linked to the state, not only after ten years of total anarchy and a dictatorial regime, but after sixty years during which we lived in an admittedly moderate Communist system, yet one with neither a market economy or parliamentary democracy as its two most important pillars.

So now we are finally beginning – much too slowly, in my opinion – to establish new institutions that are supposed to radically reform our whole society. The political changes at the top did actually take place on the fifth of October. What, however, has really changed? We have twenty or thirty new ministers and their advisers, and perhaps their deputies or employees in addition. Thousands of people from the old system, however, still remain, shaped and defined by their lives in the late 1950s, 60s, and 70s. These mechanisms are known well enough, particularly, of course, in Serbia and Yugoslavia. We will certainly not make much progress alone in making changes to the institutions, because otherwise we would have probably advanced the process further in the last year and a half, even if no great transformations can be expected in such a short time span. The goals for the future, however, could certainly have been defined. The fact that we have neither a real strategy nor a set of future goals disturbs me the most.

The second process I would like to designate as that of “enlightenment” or “education”. I do not mean only the regular education system, meaning universities, secondary-, and elementary schools – since that is a very lengthy undertaking – but all kinds of alternative education. I mean primarily the electronic media, new technologies and everything that can relatively quickly bridge our educational system’s gap that emerged as a result of the past sixty years. If we are to take seriously the notion of a Marshall Plan for Southeast Europe, then it must be first and foremost one for education. That is why I recommended incorporating education in the terms of the Stability Pact, of which I was until recently national coordinator.

*Enlightenment
and education*

We have been excessively concerned in the past with infrastructure – streets, rail networks, and bridges. Without wishing to belittle the progress that has already been made in this area, I would still like to remind everyone that Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, enjoyed a solid infrastructure in terms of streets, rail links, and communications systems. Yet these amenities did not prevent a horribly brutal war and huge loss of life. We have to pave the way for a democratic civil society, in Serbia and the entire region. This process must be initiated promptly and vigorously. To accomplish this we will require the support of the European Union as a multilateral organization as well as that of all leading European countries on a bilateral level.

Democratic civil society

Primatarova

Bulgaria and Romania are involved in negotiations with the European Union, their own target date for accession being January 1st 2007. The best way to make the European policy of the European Union towards the region credible would be to admit Bulgaria and Rumania as full members of the European Union in 2007. This would really make the process irreversible for the whole region.

Bulgaria and Romania

A distant European integration perspective, even if it is less than ten, fifteen years from now, creates a lot of problems for governments. Let me draw on some of the conclusions of a study on democracies in Southeast Europe, which has been prepared by Ivan Krastev, the chairman of the organization which I represent, the Centre for Liberal Strategies.

We really have democracies since last year in all the countries of the region, but these are rather weak. We have to see where the problems lie. In this respect, Bulgaria is a very interesting case. On the one hand, for the last four years, between 1997 and 2001, Bulgaria has been the most stable and successful country in implementing reforms in accordance with the requirement of the European Union. On the other hand, last year we had two elections, the general elections and the presidential elections. In both elections Bulgarian voters voted out this most successful government and this most successful President. This raises, of course, a lot of questions.

Weak democracies

We are still in the process of analyzing why this happened. The results of this analysis should be taken into account in the process of creating a strategy for the EU integration of the countries involved in the Stabilization and Association process. The question is: amidst the constant discussion about long-term perspectives, where is any consideration given to shorter and medium-term perspectives? And this is where the element with the citizens comes in.

Citizens' perspective

Until now, in all the statements, the perspectives have largely been discussed in terms of governments and of relations with the European Union but not in terms of the citizens. The biggest problem, and this is proven by the case of Bulgaria, is that it is actually difficult to take the people on board in a situation like that. Even if you are very successful in your reforms, and we as Bulgarians wish the Serbian Government every success in its reform agenda, what happens if this government is very successful with its agenda and in two years time, it is voted out because the citizens do not understand what it is all about?

Democratic deficit

Some parallels can be drawn here with the problems that the European Union is facing itself. In a way we get a kind of projection of the democratic deficit problem that the European Union faces. To put it concisely, in our countries in a way we have democracy without politics because politics are more or less imposed by the European Union. On the one hand it is a good thing. This is again demonstrated by the Bulgarian case. The Bulgarian voters voted out the government and now we have a new one with an ex-king as the prime minister but, more or less, this government is sticking to the same policy because it has to conclude an agreement with the IMF and to continue the relationship with the European Union.

Disappointed electorate

There is already a big disappointment with the present government because it seems that many of the policies which it is pursuing are the same ones as the ones of the previous government. This creates a lot of frustration among the voters because they get the impression that regardless of whom they vote for, policies do not change. This makes people cynical and desperate and angry. That is why long-term strategies should always take into account the citizens and not only the governments. I am very much aware that I am raising questions rather than providing answers but if we do not ask the right questions, of course we will never get the right answer.

Implementation of reforms in Bulgaria

So, Bulgaria might be a case example for the countries in the Stabilization and Association process. On the one hand Bulgaria is a country committed to European Union membership by the year 2007. On the other hand the Bulgarian experience in strictly implementing reform policies in accordance with European Union policies, shows that it is difficult to keep citizens on board for such a long time. In our case, we are talking about five or six years, but with the Stabilization and Association countries it will be about ten, fifteen or even twenty years and this will be a much more difficult exercise.

European Convention

My second point is related to the discussion on the future of Europe. Mr. Svilanović mentioned the Convention on the future of the European Union. Of course, we do not yet know what the outcome of the Convention will be but what is striking me is that on the one hand we have a convention with a very ambitious chairman, Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who, in his introductory speech, suggested that the participants should consider Europe in fifty years time from now – in a very long-term perspective. On the other hand, in the Convention we have the present member states and the thirteen candidate countries, the twelve negotiating countries plus Turkey. But there is no kind of participation for the countries involved in the Stabilization and Association process. So, if the Convention really wanted to live up to its ambitions to prepare a document based on this “fifty-years-from-now” perspective, the Stabilization and Association countries should have been involved as well.

As regards the NGO which I represent, we intend to launch a project which will involve in the discussion, at the NGO level, the Stabilization and Association countries because we believe that we have to take the views of the countries in the region into account when discussing the future of Europe. In this way we could, at least within the framework of the civil forum attached to the Convention, become some kind of speaker for the countries in the region.

Ahtisaari

I would strongly recommend that those who have not read Ivan Krastev's study should do so as I think it is a most fascinating study because it ponders the problem of why it is that the ruling elites are falling out of favor of the voters in the case of Bulgaria and in many other cases.

Elites are losing voters' favor

You mentioned the EU laws and the whole process including the IMF. It actually leaves very little leeway on the political level or on the national level for any original thinking. The parliaments there are not doing what they have traditionally done, namely to look for consensus in law-making and other aspects of their functions. In this case, they are basically given an agenda on what to do.

I wonder whether one should try to introduce more direct democracy on the local government level, in decentralization, in order to get people involved in those issues that are closest to them. Perhaps most of the officials should be chosen in direct elections because somewhere you have to give the people a chance to express their concerns. If you ask them to participate and there is no way they can do this through elections to national parliaments, then there is very little leeway.

More direct democracy

I would like to discuss with Ivan Krastev his last recommendation in the study because that is the only area where he has to think a bit more about the matter. In our governments too, we are also constrained at the parliamentary level. To a very large extent, EU membership demands that you run a certain type of economic policy and there is common acceptance of what constitutes good policy. That does not allow much leeway any more for the politicians.

Speaking from my own experience of it in Finland, the EU is no longer in the era when it was in the business of distributing additional moneys. This has created a new situation. So, Ivan Krastev's study is very valid in my country as well. We all have to try to understand why we are facing these problems between the citizens and the elites.

Stuth

We have heard expectations voiced and even demands made in this circle that the European Union should extend the list of accession candidates to include Southeast Europe and incorporate the Southeast European states into the European Convention. I find such expectations a little irritating. One could get the impression by now that people are making demands without having a clear idea of what they themselves could contribute. This also applies, by the way, to the international community, which is very quick to convey expectations for Southeast European countries to implement promptly.

Irritating expectations and demands for the EU

*Progress in
Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The EU is faced with a profusion of demands that stretch from the Mediterranean to Kaliningrad. Moreover, the EU has declared a policy of catching up to the United States technologically and economically within the next ten years. Europe is currently drawing up a constitution for itself and organizing a European army. Actually, one can be amazed at all the things people believe are within the EU's reach.

I think that Southeast Europe's relationship with the European Union should not be restricted to the issue of membership without having considered any other alternatives. Perhaps more imagination is needed, including from the countries of the region.

In the last few days I made the latest of many visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Every time I am there, I see encouraging progress: readiness to assume greater responsibility, going beyond the ethnic mindset, and more pragmatic behavior. Yet the road ahead is still a long one.

The international community's High Representative, on the other hand, continues to play a decisive role in the constitutional commissions of the Republika Srpska and the Federation. I often wonder whether it would not be preferable for us to let those directly concerned handle such matters and be satisfied when, say eighty percent of our wishes are fulfilled rather than trying to force complete, one hundred percent complicity.

I would also like to recall that Bosnia-Herzegovina was kept out of the European Council for an unjustly long time. Precisely those enlightened, non-ethnic thinking people there considered this an insult.

Own effort of the region

We demand that the region's countries make their own effort, also as a test of their suitability for taking part in European structures. In my opinion those efforts should include establishing a regional market to promote trade and economic growth. In my opinion we should think more about these things than speculating over possible EU membership for Southeast European countries. That would be better left for the more distant future.

Reljić

*Clear EU commitment
to Southeastern Europe*

Mr. Stuth, your words simply confirm a basic misunderstanding between the Western European countries and Southeast Europe. To put it plainly, the reintegration of Southeast Europe and the prevention of further conflicts will only be possible when the EU has issued a clear promise to the countries of the region that they can soon become members of this community. Otherwise, ever-smaller political entities will continue to emerge, dependent on political alliances within and beyond Europe and "welfare payments" from the EU. The time has come to arrest Southeast Europe's process of decline and turn it around. That will be possible, however, only when these countries are guaranteed EU membership – perhaps not in five, but at least in ten years, and certainly not in twenty.

Knaus

The central issue of concern as we discuss what the European Union could do or is doing in the region is in my view the quality of the implementation programs of the European Union and other international organizations in the region.

Some efforts over the last few years have shown phenomenal results. I think that the refugee-return process in Bosnia and the property-return process in Bosnia are not yet given the credit they deserve, either in public opinion or by external analysts. Compare the situation here to almost any other conflict area worldwide that the international community has been involved in. Where do you have, six years after the end of the war, almost no serious inter-ethnic violence anymore? Look at Bosnia today and you will remember that there was a riot in Trebinje where somebody was injured. There was a riot in Banja Luka where somebody was killed. But this is an area where people from the different ethnic groups are constantly moving all over the country.

*Impressive results
in Bosnia*

From roughly 200 000 claims for property, we have a realistic chance that well over 100 000 households are going to get back the property from which they were evicted during the war. Where else has that kind of process been administered so quickly by local housing authorities under international supervision?

Return of property

We have been extremely effective, together with The Hague Tribunal, in discrediting the justification for ethnic cleansing in the villages. It is good to have reconciliation conferences in the capitals but reconciliation takes on a whole new dimension if it happens in the villages when the refugees return and are given their houses and shops back by a Serb housing official who, by signing the documents, says, "We committed a crime in taking the property from the Bosniaks." This is happening across the country. Why did it not happen in Croatia and, perhaps more relevantly, why is it not happening in Kosovo? I do not have the answers. I can simply make a few suggestions.

The Hague Tribunal

If, in Bosnia, we had left this matter in the hands of the international organization that has a worldwide mandate to deal with refugee issues and to implement programs worldwide, namely UNHCR, we would not have had refugee-return. It is the fault of that organization that it didn't recognize that the standard instruments it uses everywhere were simply not sufficient and that they need to be adapted.

In the Balkans we have a lot of standardized international programs, which cost a lot of money but which are not adapted to suit the local context. And they fail simply because they are often carried out unprofessionally. This is rarely discussed. We would much rather discuss issues such as lack of political will, local obstruction or lack of money. What is not often discussed is the degree to which managing and designing a program badly and a lack of accountabilities prevent us from both seeing the real successes and seeing where we have completely misallocated our resources.

*Badly managed
international programs*

In this respect, we also have the problem of European public opinion. Three or four years ago, when peace implementation was not going so well in Bosnia, there were lots of journalists in Sarajevo. Today, there are no international journalists any more. Unless there is a riot, journalists rarely come, but there is very little serious reporting. If you go to a country like Bosnia for three or four days, there is only so much you can discover so you end up writing about the same old issues that people are already familiar with.

Lack of serious reporting

European academics are doing very little field research. I do not say that they should only be doing field research on the Balkans. But they should be doing field research on what happens with international money and with our programs in the region so that we can

Lack of field research

learn from it. This is not to denigrate what is being achieved. Sometimes it can lead us to discover things, which are working extremely well and from which we can learn. But without this kind of dialogue, the discussion on what Europe can do rings hollow.

Failing European strategies

Europe may designate local government as its top priority but then we need to ask who, in concrete terms, is working on it, what do these people know about local government, how are they accountable and how do we measure, two years later, what has happened? If all of this is left out, you can be sure that the European strategies will fail, not only because there is not enough money or because there is a lack of political will and so on, but because they are not professionally carried out.

Fetahu

Completing the circle of disintegration

A lot has been said on the necessity of the integration processes in achieving stability in the region. However, before we start the process of integration, the circle of disintegration needs to be complete and there needs to be a clear-cut situation with regard to the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and the final status of Kosovo. Until we have a clear situation on these issues, this part of the region is not going to be able to embark on fully-fledged integration processes. I would also like to explore further the situation which was created as a direct result of the disintegration process.

Power transfer?

In Kosovo today, for example, the UNMIK administration is required by the UN resolution and by its own mandate to transfer some powers to the local government that was recently elected. The problem is that actually there are no qualified people to whom they could transfer these powers. As a result, there is a discrepancy between the mandate and the reality. For example, in the present government, Kosovo does not have a foreign ministry. I do not think, therefore, that UNMIK is thinking in terms of involving Kosovars in the creation of a foreign policy, who could continue that policy after UNMIK has left.

On other issues, for example the issues of defense, the police, fiscal policies or in the Finance Ministry, we do not have any Albanians or any local Kosovars involved in the process.

Party financing in Macedonia

As to Macedonia I totally agree with Mr. Jacev in regard to the way the political parties are doing business in terms of fund-raising and so on because you do not have a notion of how political fund-raising in the Balkans works. To make it clear to you on a humorous level: A political party in this part of the world also needs to have a gas station or some other kind of business which will support your political party and its activities. In the Macedonian case, the ruling government, which basically represents two political parties, one Macedonian and one Albanian, is going beyond that. They do not only use corruption and kickbacks and so on as a means to raise funds for their political parties and for their political activities. You have a situation today in which the two political parties have been turned into very successful businesses while the country in general and the welfare of the general population is taking a nosedive.

So, how do you reconcile the two situations and how can you talk about possible regional integration processes in both Kosovo and Macedonia without addressing these key issues?

Ahtisaari

I want to ask Mr. Pajević how much a judge in Serbia earns on average today in Deutschmarks.

Pajević

I think around 200 German Marks, I am not quite sure.

Anastasijević

The goal is 500 DM, but this has not yet been reached and the judges are complaining. It is something like 450 DM for a judge.

Petritsch

Everything that has been said here comes from people who are dealing with the Balkans and it all makes sense. However, it simply does not add up to what we might call a “Grand Theory” of the Balkans. This is not something that we will be able to deliver. In fact it is not something that we should even aim for. Our goals in my opinion should be pretty much as Gerald Knaus said: to be concrete and to see where progress is being made without losing a vision for Southeast Europe.

I would like to comment on a few of the issues that were mentioned with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina; constitutional reform is obviously a very important one but, perhaps because of its complexity, it does not get the deserved attention.

First of all, at the center is indeed as Michael Schaefer pointed out, the idea of the “constituent peoples”. This is a particularly Yugoslavian idea which is rooted in Tito-Communist history and which has now been adopted in some of the ex-Yugoslav states without a lot of reflection. This is particularly the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which represents in many ways a kind of “mini-Yugoslavia” with all the challenges, problems and issues that are being discussed here.

One has to see the concept against the backdrop of a non-democratic history and society here. “Minority” is something akin to minor, something that does not have the same relevance as being a “Staatsvolk”, as we would say in German. To be constituent somehow provides you with what is lacking in non-democratic societies like minority rights, but it misses out on the developments in Western Europe, particularly in the case of individual human rights.

Therefore, for the time being at least, we have to accept this old/new concept as a given but we must not regard it as being the end of the story. We need to see the evolving democratic process. Mr. Schwarz-Schilling, who is in favor of these reforms, has mentioned one important caveat, namely that the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a rather convoluted one with too many layers of government.

Throughout the negotiations on the constitutional reform I saw to it that this absolute veto-

*No “Grand Theory”
of the Balkans*

*Constitutional reform in
Bosnia and Herzegovina*

“Constituent peoples”

*Too many levels of
government*

Veto-mechanism

mechanism, which exists in the Federation, is not introduced now for all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This, by the way, was the reason why the HDZ left and did not sign because they insisted on retaining it. However, even inside the Croat community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which always bemoans the fact that they do not have their own entity, change is taking place. Mr. Zubak, the Croat representative in the negotiations, whom even Franjo Tudjman could not cajole into signing Dayton, actually signed this Agreement, because it indeed means progress for the country in general and for the Croat community in particular.

*Ethnic definition
of state and society*

What we are talking about here is a society, which is still very deeply defined by ethnicity. We have to move on from this ethnic definition of state and society to a civic definition. But again, we have to take into consideration that what we witness in Bosnia is an ongoing process. Even in Banja Luka, even in the Republika Srpska you see progress. It is slow progress but significant.

*Mutually agreed
compromise*

However, when it comes to this agreement, which was reached with the leading Serb parties, one needs to keep in mind that this is already a mutually agreed compromise between all the relevant parties of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a historic first. Therefore, the Serbs too have to appreciate that it is only by buying into one hundred percent of this compromise that they will indeed also get what the Serbs get in the Federation. They are a constituent people now in the Federation with the very same rights that non-Serbs will now have in the Republika Srpska.

It is indeed a win-win situation – one of the rare occasions when this occurs. Therefore, we have to see a clear and total commitment to the Agreement. Anything short of that would mean a total collapse of this historic achievement. We need to keep its fragility in mind when speaking about this Mrakovica-Sarajevo process.

*Civilian implementation
of the peace process*

Now, let me comment on some of the other issues. On the military issue to which Mr. Lutz referred: Yes, it is true, SFOR is still needed but a substantial change has now taken place with regard to the active participation of the military in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the past two years there has been a dramatic shift away from military implementation to civilian implementation. The international peace-keepers are still relevant but their role has become more and more of a passive nature, symbolic but nevertheless relevant.

*Increasing sense
of security*

When I assumed my office in Bosnia in mid-99 there were around 30 000 SFOR troops there. We are now down to 17 000 and it will go even further down to 12 000. But the overall feeling of security, of safety, has not lessened. On the contrary, it has effectively improved and I can personally attest to this. Just the other day I went to Stolac, one of the hard-line towns of Croat nationalism. For security reasons, for two years I could not pay an official visit there. Now I walked around in an emerging multi-ethnic, multi-religious environment with the Mufti, the orthodox priest, the representative from the Jewish community and with the Mayor. Unfortunately, the Catholic Church, which is a special case in Herzegovina, was not represented. They even protested against my visit there. However, this attitude is now becoming more and more isolated.

Organized crime

Mr. Jacev spoke about organized crime. This is indeed one of the big issues that we have

to be concerned about. I fully agree with him that it must really be impressed upon the local governments to act urgently. I am very much aware of how much still needs to be done in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Party financing was regulated and made transparent only around one and a half years ago and from the experience of my own country, Austria, I know that it takes a long time before the satisfactory status can be achieved where economy and politics are strictly apart. Nevertheless, we do indeed have to pay a lot of attention to the continuing reform of the social and economic framework.

A wholly different challenge is the status of Kosovo. I believe that as long as the refugee-return issue is not resolved, as long as there are separatist and isolationist tendencies there and as long as this kind of mono-ethnic philosophy prevails, there should not be a serious discussion about the final status of Kosovo. If we were to push now for the settlement of a final status, that would mean cementing the current thinking and current general consciousness in the Kosovo-Albanian population and the political elites.

On the other hand it also means that we will have to live for quite some time with some certain uncertainties; the situation in Kosovo will remain in flux for quite some time to come. This is what politics needs to manage after all. It is about post-conflict management. This is probably a rather novel concept for us Europeans. We have to concentrate more, both in terms of research and in terms of providing the necessary capacities, on dealing in a forward-looking and pro-active way with challenges like Kosovo. We must not believe that sustainable military solutions are possible and we must not give in to this ethnic notion that new borders provide for security and prosperity. This would lead to the atomization of the Balkans.

There is no structure around any longer so therefore the only way is – and there is no alternative to this – for the European Union to try to assist wherever we can in order to establish responsible partnerships where the responsibility lies with both sides, not just with the Europeans. I still hear almost every day in Bosnia-Herzegovina about what it is that I have to do. But it is only very rare that one hears even journalists, who claim to be so European, questioning the elected and paid politicians about what those politicians need to do.

On the European perspective: Yes, we need to move first of all from a vision to a strategy and here we have to ask whether there is a vision around at all. It is true that we need to work much harder on a strategy which is more regional and comprehensive to replace the current reactive mode.

With regard to the European Convention, I beg to disagree with Mr. Stuth. I believe that what Mr. Relic and others have said here is important indeed. Several weeks ago I asked a member of the Convention whether they had actually ever thought of inviting non-EU members or EU-candidates like the countries of Ex-Yugoslavia to the Convention. We are talking about the Eastern borders of Europe; is Ukraine “European”, what about Russia? Difficult questions. But when it comes to the Balkans it is very clear that this region is definitely an integral part of Europe and therefore we had better deal with it and invite them to participate. I do not believe that it is only we who have the best ideas when it comes to defining the future of Europe.

Status of Kosovo

Post-conflict management

Responsible partnership

European perspective

European Convention

I said earlier that there is no “General Theory” of the Balkans but Maria Todorova’s book “Imagining the Balkans” comes closest to it. It should be required reading for all students of Southeast Europe. Of course the European Union ought to be the principal partner of the countries of SEE. But the mere fact that Mr. Patten is in charge of “external” relations, which includes the Balkans, is, I believe, a problem in itself.

Bosnia’s accession to the Council of Europe

When it comes to the Council of Europe, I was one of those who said the government in Bosnia-Herzegovina has agreed to the Council of Europe’s conditions. Now it had better fulfill these conditions and then the country has a right to join. Responsibility and “ownership” are the keywords. As an Austrian I consider my country very much part of the Balkans. So I hope that my remarks do not sound arrogant as they are made in a positive and caring attitude.

It is very clear that partnership between the countries of Ex-Yugoslavia and Europe can only work if both sides act responsibly and if both sides agree to stick to what has been agreed. I think this is a very important lesson that we need to convey to our friends. If they have fulfilled the agreed conditions they are going to enter. To speak of Bosnia, two years ago there was no state government there to speak of. Now there is a Council of Ministers with six Ministries; when I first arrived there were only three. Today it is remotely reminiscent of a modern government. I therefore believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina should now become a member of the Council of Europe in order to progressively move on to become more and more a part of this common European project.

More cooperation and coordination

Many of today’s issues and challenges are not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many more commonalities are now becoming visible in the countries of the region and it is my view that it should be the short-term goal of all the countries in the region to build on these developments. More cooperation, more coordination, more regular meetings and more of the sort of routine that happens in Brussels when the member countries of the European Union meet. But let me stress at the end that we must also be willing to learn from past mistakes so that we will be smarter and better prepared for the challenges ahead.

Ahtisaari

Rule of law

I would like to pose a few points for discussion. Firstly, everyone agrees that it is important to have the rule of law. There has been enough research on what it is that ordinary people want. In the first instance they want fair treatment from the police and the judiciary. But how can we create those conditions? That is why I asked the question about the salaries. I think we have to face those practical issues.

Financing of political parties

A second point relates to party finances and how one can get them out of this dilemma, if they are exposed to organized crime or criminal elements in society.

European perspective

Thirdly, I think it is also important that we agree and that we cannot bring stability to this region without having a clear European perspective, whether it takes ten or fifteen years.

Partnership

Finally, I agree with those who said that it is not a matter of lack of money, but of doing the right things in partnership and sharing the experiences and the lessons learned from successful undertakings.

II. The Economic Dimension: Will Southeast Europe Catch Up?

Ahtissaari

The topic of our second session is: “The Economic Dimension. Will Southeast Europe Catch Up?”

The first speaker is Božidar Djelić, the Minister of Finance and Economics of the Republic of Serbia.

Djelić

I think this event is one further step in the right direction of us meeting and discussing the regional issues with regard to what could remain the black hole of Europe, on the one hand, or what, on the other hand, could become the region of highest growth over the next ten years.

I would like to talk here about the fact that Southeast Europe is really in the next year or two going to decide on its own, but hopefully with some help from the European Union and others, whether it is going to become what the Visegrad countries have been in the past decade, namely the success story of Europe. When I say that, usually people roll their eyes and raise a polite smile; but then again we should remember that in 1988/89 there were breadlines in Warsaw. I worked for Mr. Balcerovic, former Minister of Finance, in 1991 and I remember how desperate the people were, how gray the streets were and how far from the mainstream of Europe Warsaw felt at that time.

In a post-conflict situation, which is certainly the general situation of many of the countries in the region, we start from an even lower point. But then again, as an investment banker will tell you, we have great turn-around value. What I would like to do, on the basis of two key questions, is to show how this can be made a real success that we can all be proud of in about ten years.

For our topic as to whether Southeast Europe can catch up, the first question is: Why catch up? And the second is how to catch up. The answer to “Why catch up?” is quite obvious. Look at the figures and you will not need a very smart econometrician to see how important catching up is for Southeast Europe.

People talk about Slovenia being at the top of the food chain in the region. But the top of the food chain of transition is no higher than seventy percent of the EU average. And then everything from there is downhill. I hope that by 2004 Serbia will border on the European Union, if Hungary and the rest of the first wave are integrated by that date – countries that are hovering around forty to fifty percent of the EU average. On purchasing power parity things look much better. Life in the region is better than the statistics might show because for public services, for education, for health and for all the infrastructure you pay much less than you would in Western Europe so that when you look at wages or GDP alone you don't quite get the full picture.

Speakers

A European success story?

Standards of living in the region compared to the EU

*Destruction of the
civilian infrastructure
in Serbia*

When you look at Southeast Europe, no statistical adjustment will do because here we are talking of countries where GDP per capita is between eight and 25 percent of the EU average. Now talk about the need to catch up if you want to become a “lite” integration issue for the EU and also something which will not be forever the Mezzogiorno of Europe.

Serbia has had nine years of economic sanctions and three months of severe bombing of the civilian infrastructure. I say civilian infrastructure because when you talk in terms of tanks, for example, the NATO bombing destroyed a grand total of seven tanks. But then again, all major regions were destroyed. The energy system has been reduced to tatters, many elements of the railways have been annihilated. Now we have to finance that ourselves with some soft and some less soft loans from the EIB and others. The overall effect of all of that plus, of course, the effects of the destruction which the former regime imposed on our neighbors and then on its own people, is a GDP which has been divided by three in ten years.

Serbia's GDP

So where the GDP of Serbia was 20 billion US dollars in 1989, by 2000 when we took over, it had dropped to 10 billion US dollars. There is no equivalent in modern economic history in the northern hemisphere. I have looked and I have not found a country which has fallen so steeply so fast. That is Serbia's inheritance and that is what we have to build on.

On current linear rates, if you let the IMF specialists, the World Bank specialists and the EU experts look at it and you just take your Excel spreadsheets and you add your three to five percent real GDP growth per year, you see that you cannot talk about catching up. Not in my lifetime – and I am 37.

Increasing productivity

So, catching up is a big issue. But nobody said that Southeast Europe has to enjoy the same living standards as Germany. Why is Germany so rich? Because the Germans work so hard and their productivity is so high. So the first question for people living in Southeast Europe is: How is your and our productivity of labor going to increase radically? Now, at least when you look at the Serbian Government, and this is the message we are sending to our people, catching-up is an issue of primary importance for us.

External help

But then again, remember the forties. Remember how Germany, France, Italy and other countries looked at that time. Even look at Bosnia in 1995. You will see that catching up is impossible without external help. Without the Marshall Plan I am afraid that Germany would have never caught up so fast. I am afraid that had the same policies and even some sanctions been imposed on Germany after World War II, things might have developed differently. I am not drawing any bold parallels which should not be drawn. After World War II, things were much better than after World War I.

At times, however, I cannot escape the feeling that when you look at Serbia, fifteen months down the road we are still far removed from the warm embrace that, I think, we deserve. Of course, nothing is perfect in the things we are doing but I think that the EU above all and the major partners within the EU would be well-advised to take up the opportunity to provide this warm embrace without reservations.

It is the same story for the whole of Southeast Europe. We need a big push. The Stability Pact certainly has been of some great help and there is a range of programs but all of that is frankly subscale. In the second part of my presentation here I am not going to extend the begging hand but I would still like to emphasize the historical view, which is sometimes forgotten.

One cannot see a single region in the world being able to catch up with its neighbors without some significant assistance. “Significant” does not mean the one percent of GDP that the EU wants to extend to the rest of the continent it plans to integrate with it. It means, frankly, closer to the five to ten percent of GDP that the USA provided after World War II and that the EU has provided to Ireland which today is the “raging tiger”. Mind you, how upset the French were when they realized that they were below Ireland!

So, how do we catch up? I would now like to mention just four areas to illustrate how Southeast Europe can indeed catch up.

The first area is one which we have to tackle immediately and it involves pursuing economic and social policies over the longer term. Here, the region has one big asset: Today, for the first time ever in history, all the Southeast European countries are led by democrats – people who enjoy the freely expressed will of their people. The other big asset is that we all share the last remaining peaceful utopian ideal, which is to belong to the “Rich Persons Club”, the EU.

This does not mean simply an aspiration to wealth. That is, of course, a big motivation but there is also something which underlies it more deeply. For the first time in history, thanks to the EU, we have the reality of a situation in which it is impossible to imagine that another conflict could erupt between France and Germany or others. So, for Southeast Europe and for us in Serbia, being part of the European Union is some kind of megagigantic insurance policy that means that the Balkans will never again be drawn into a conflict. The stakes would be too high.

As one of those who spend a lot of time talking figures, I am aware that we sometimes lose sight of the real reason why it is so important to integrate those countries into the European Union. Nevertheless, when I look at the things we need to do to achieve it, then certainly, pursuing responsible policies is the prime requirement. The performance of Southeast Europe in the nineties has not been up to scratch in this respect. Serbia may be an extreme case because of the trauma which it has undergone but in Romania and Bulgaria too, we have shown a tendency to pursue stop-and-go policies.

Responsible policies involve social tensions. Responsible policies mean no more printing of money. They mean that you have to tell the people the truth, i.e. that real wages and real pensions will not increase faster than the productivity of labor. And that hurts. It means only a few percentage points a year. And in the next political cycle, new people come along and proclaim that those amateurs, their predecessors, didn’t get it and that of course it is possible to have 1000 Deutschmarks. (We will probably be the last corner of Europe counting in Deutschmarks. The currency may not be in circulation but it will be in everyone’s heads). And it is easy. Just vote for me! Then, of course, the promises are not fulfilled, inflation climbs to forty, fifty, a hundred percent. People are disappointed, there

Common goal: joining the “Rich Persons Club”

European perspective as insurance against conflict

Stop-and-go policies

Promises and disappointments

is turmoil – and off we go again. The responsible people are returned to government – they are a bit more boring but they seem to know how to do it.

*GDP per capita
in relation to the EU*

If you carry on like that, as most of the region has done, you do get some real growth in the medium term, but in relative terms you do not only catch up but you fall behind. The frightening thing is that, expressed in percentages of GDP per capita, Southeast Europe has actually declined as a percentage of the EU over the last ten years. That is the tough message. You do not get the same figures for the Visegrad countries or for Slovenia.

*Polity of
Southeast Europe*

So why do these things happen? I am not going to talk about deep historical roots or the religious divide and so on. That would only get us bogged down in some sort of “civilization shock” rubbish that I do not want to get into. On that level, there were enough books written in the seventies which explained why the Irish people would always remain poor – nobody has yet explained to me how Ireland evaded that “destiny”. There are, of course, valid elements in all of that but behind it there is something that we have to focus on and that is the polity of Southeast Europe.

*The pro-reform
third of the population*

Perhaps I am twisting reality a little when I say that overall in our countries there is something called a “swing third” of the population which is very important and which the EU and our government would be well-advised to focus on. This is the third of the population which creates the cycles. In Serbia today you have one third which is staunchly pro-reform. It is no surprise that they tend to be young, well-educated, and that they tend to live in cities. In Belgrade the Serbian reformist government is scoring extraordinarily high.

Anti-reform third

On the other hand, you have one third which is staunchly against reform. Again, it is no surprise that they tend to be old, less well-educated and that they tend to live in rural areas. This third is against reform despite the fact that for the first time in twelve years, pensions are being paid on time in Serbia. In real terms, since we took power, pensions have risen by about thirty percent and there have been no shortages of essential goods. Furthermore, thanks to foreign help, we have been able to provide exceptional payments several times to the third of the pensioners who are least well-off. None of that seems to matter – forty percent of them still want to vote for Milosevic.

This one third represents a hard core, which it will be difficult to win over to the general movement of integration toward Europe. These are people who are typically about fifty years old. They have lived through a difficult ten to fifteen years. They have kids who are now grown up and who had difficulties themselves. And they have another ten to fifteen years of career ahead of them. Many of them work in socially owned companies. Many of them are in small towns. These people are the heart that needs to be won over by reform and they are the heart of the country, which needs to be brought into the European mainstream.

*Demand for
consumer goods*

I think it is the key to avoiding stop-and-go policies for the next ten years. I am not sure whether the Serbian Government will have done enough, but we must focus on this group in order to make sure that there is a stable majority here which will be pushing for further European integration rather than pushing us into stop-and-go policies. If we can achieve that, there is a big prize. We saw this prize at a recent meeting of finance ministers in

Belgrade. According to our tables, if we keep on going we will all have something like five to six percent real GDP growth over the next three to five years. It is achievable. There is enormous pent-up demand here for durables. There is enormous pent-up demand for housing and there is an enormous desire to consume and to live like the rest of Europe.

If you look at the rise in GDP per capita, the elasticity for all those goods is going to kick in and we can have what happened in the fifties in Western Europe and to some extent in the Visegrad countries in the nineties. That prize is achievable provided that we can prevent the political process from endangering these general trends too much.

So, our first task is to win over that third of our people and to make sure that we keep on with responsible policies, which we can develop consistently for more than two or three years in order to break the cycle of repeated collapse and rebuilding. Southeast Europe should not be Latin America.

The second way in which we can catch up is definitely through regional cooperation. I have already scratched the surface of this issue. There was much talk at the beginning of the nineties and where the geopolitics were real, the money came. I worked in Poland and it was quite easy to set up a one billion US dollar zloty fund to stabilize that currency. It was possible because the Soviet Union had just fallen, because everyone was talking “nukes” and because Europe wanted to stabilize that part of the world.

Of course, the Poles saw that as a historic chance to get back into the European mainstream after three or four centuries of what had been a very difficult situation for them. Today however, I cannot avoid recognizing how difficult the situation is for us. I intend no offence here but we are left with a ladder of ‘n’ minus sixteen people to conduct discussions with and each of them has their own incentives and views. It is very difficult to get a few million US dollars or euros to build anything today.

The Stability Pact was a good idea but when we meet policy makers we want to know where the money is. It is not difficult for people to see that even though the EU had its stated regional policy, all of the most important elements such as conditionality, technical assistance programs, credits and the Stability and Association Program itself, are definitely bilateral. So, the Stability Pact is an idea which needs to be reinforced, and without money that is not possible.

The EU would be well advised to put at least some of its funds into regional projects with regional conditionality. I think that makes a lot of sense. Every single businessperson who comes to Belgrade is interested in our market but frankly, they are more interested in accessing the 55 million people in the region and above all, they are interested in being able to export into the European Union without too much trouble. We therefore need to make sure that we have enough regional programs that we can do together. If the EU does not provide the impetus, then we need to kick-start ourselves in the region.

Two weeks ago I convened the first ever meeting of finance ministers of the region. Not one failed to show up. Only those who were sick or those who were in discussions with the IMF did not attend. They all came and there was so much which we had to do together, starting with fighting money-laundering, fighting smuggling and so on. Those discus-

Breaking the cycle of collapse and rebuilding

Regional cooperation

Stability Pact funds?

Minimizing risks in the region

sions will continue in Kosovo in a few weeks. We will have to discuss how we can ensure that the difference between the perceived risk and the real risk in our region can be reduced. It is up to us to show that this big gap is really too big today and to show that investing in Southeast Europe is a good idea. I think we have to imitate what the Visegrad countries did by competing against each other while at the same time collaborating in our own mutual interest.

Bilateral free-trade agreements

Regional collaboration is therefore vital to this process of catching up. How can it work? When the EU told us that we could not proceed with the SAA until all the countries in the region had signed bilateral free-trade agreements, we got on with it. We have a deadline, which is 31st December of this year. Serbia has signed a string of bilateral free-trade agreements and we will continue to do so.

Free-trade zone

Of course, logically, a big round of multilateral talks would have been optimal but that would have been politically difficult to stomach for some countries such as Croatia and others because they might have perceived it as the “vampire” of Yugoslavia rearing its ugly head. Nevertheless, I think that once we all have bilateral agreements, it is going to be a matter of technicalities to create this free-trade zone in Southeast Europe. So, regional collaboration can be achieved too.

De-Balkanization of the region

The third way in which we can catch up is to say it is in the strategic interests of the European Union above all, and of the international community, for this region to be de-Balkanized and to become part of mainstream Europe. That is worth two or three GDP percentage points over the next five years. I am not proposing a stale Marshall Plan after all is said and done, after twelve years of this transition. I am not suggesting a Marshall Plan but I am suggesting that we talk about a few very visible and important projects. Let me give you two classes of examples.

Infrastructure

The first class of examples has to do with infrastructure. Western Europe kick-started its economy by investing in infrastructure. We need concrete, we need bridges, we need energy, we need roads, we need broadband. If we get together and talk about roads, energy, railways, telecommunications and broadband and if we concentrate our attention around two very visible albeit expensive but very, very motivating and ambitious projects, you will see enormous pent-up energy in these regions which wishes to participate. We do not have enough big national or regional projects which we can look forward to.

Raising living standards

The second class of examples involves raising standards of living. Living standards are part of the Serbian dream or the Romanian dream, which centers on durables and housing. Look at the percentage of people in the region who do not have a roof over their head. If, in addition to infrastructure initiatives, we can focus on housing and perhaps enable more people to access a few consumer durables, then for that third of the population which we have been discussing, in three to five years we could facilitate a very big jump in the way they live. Certainly, for Serbia, our goal is to ensure that in three to five years, a very large proportion of the population – certainly not the majority, which would be unrealistic – will actually enjoy some of the fruits of our growth. They will be able to show off their new fridge. They will know someone who has bought a house or a flat. And all this will have a mimetic effect and will give people the confidence to keep on going.

The fourth way has everything to do with peer pressure. I can tell you that since the Serbian Government came to power fifteen months ago, or at least so my colleagues from the Croatian Government tell me, we have finally created some positive peer pressure. To take these two countries as an example, the relationship between Belgrade and Zagreb is very important, and we do compete. We compete for investment. We watch how they are performing in the banking sector. I look at what our Romanian friends are doing. We need to be competitive.

Peer pressure

When you talk about catching up, we need to find non-linear processes. I have mentioned a few which are classic examples, but every country has to find its own answer. It has not been lost on us in Serbia that the only countries that have truly caught up are those which have found a new “mousetrap”, a new trick. And typically, the new mousetrap for small countries, and most of the countries in the region are small, has nothing to do with finding your own little domestic thing. It is about finding the next heavyweight gorilla on the world market.

Catching up

For Singapore in the seventies, read Intel. For Ireland in the eighties, read Apple. So, today in Serbia, we are looking for the new Apple and the new Intel. We are not strong enough to create one but certainly we are busy looking at the “Inc”. list of fast-growing companies in America. We certainly are looking at the Neue Markt in Germany. We are certainly looking at the Fortune 2000 – but rather in the 1000 to 2000 range – and we are making great use of our diaspora because that is one of Serbia’s big assets. We have 300 000 young, educated, urban Serbs who left Milosevic and a war that they don’t want to wage and who are living today in Silicon Valley or London or Berlin and many of them are helping us today to find this new “mousetrap”.

Asset: diaspora

To sum up: we need to catch up. It is not going to be easy because we are starting from a very low position. There are four ways we can do it. The first is to make sure that we include this one third of the electorate, which can ensure that we get away from stop-and-go policies. The second way is through regional collaboration and encouraging the EU to give the Stability Pact some teeth. The third way is to secure money from the EIB and the EBRD, which, together with private money and our own money, can be used to develop infrastructure and other types of projects successfully in the next three to five years. And finally, it is up to every country to compete in finding the best “mousetrap” to make sure that at least a part of our economy is not growing at six or seven percent, although that is a good average which we should aim for, but actually at twenty to forty percent a year.

Ways to catch up

I hope that I have been able to provide a few ideas today. One of my models is Jean Monnet because he tried to infect others with his ideas irrespective of who might later claim credit for them. So, I finish by saying that I hope we will find an infectious idea. We need peace to return to the region and, of course, one great symbol of peace is the Olympic Games. I can think of no better single, concrete, regional project we could undertake together which has nothing to do with forced political integration and which could promote growth, collaboration and understanding while also providing work for many people in the years to come. Why should we not adopt that ideal and aim to stage the 2012 Summer Olympics in the region?

Model: Jean Monnet

Ahtisaari

Now, Mr. Bearpark, the Deputy of the United Nations administration in Kosovo, has the floor.

Bearpark

Minister Djelić, it was a little bit difficult to follow you in one issue. I am tempted to say that we have found a mousetrap in Kosovo. The problem is that it is called the mafia and that is perhaps not quite what we wanted. I agree with an enormous amount of what Minister Djelić has just said but rather than just saying I agree, I am still going to explain why I agree because I am looking at it from a different perspective, from the perspective of my paymasters in Brussels and from my international community perspective.

Progress in Kosovo

Before I go on to the question I just want to briefly run through the economy of Kosovo because a number of people mentioned it this morning and it did strike me that people were being a bit too pessimistic. I am not saying everything is great and wonderful but there is progress in Kosovo. Mr. Sivilanović remarked upon the assassination of the LDK Assembly member a few weeks ago. It was indeed tragic and awful. But I have been sitting in Pristina for eighteen months and the number of instances of ethnic violence has been decreasing week by week by week. It is an awful lot better now than it was even six months ago, which is not to say it is good enough but it is to say that it is on the right path.

Even in economic terms, things are moving forward. The infrastructure has been largely repaired. The roads are busy, the phone system is over-busy. We now have seven licensed banks. That is nothing compared to most countries but for us it is six more than we had at the beginning of last year. And confidence, economic confidence, in Kosovo is generally fairly high. That is the good side of the story.

Lack of capital inflow

What I must not do is hide the bad side of the story, which is that the economy is based on reconstruction. It is an economy that is based on money from the diaspora, and it is an economy that is based on trading. The donor money is running out and, in my view, quite rightly running out. The problem we have is that it is not replaced with assistance from the international financial institutions and private sector capital. This is mainly due to the fact that the status of Kosovo is unresolved. I heard all the arguments and I understand the argument that Kosovo's status is too difficult, so we should park it for ten years. If that is what people say, whether they be around this table or in various capitals, so be it. But I have to warn people then that they are going to pay a high price during those ten years because you will not actually see that economic development.

*Corruption,
economic crime and
organized crime*

I would like to return briefly to our "mousetrap". We have serious problems of corruption, we have serious problems of economic crime and of organized crime and anybody from UNMIK or from Kosovo who denies that is lying. We have got those problems. What I do not understand, however, is why nobody in the capitals really wants to do anything about it because it is not a difficult subject. We do have a lack of understanding, for example, of how the socially-owned enterprises work. It is lost in the mists of time, it is lost in the mist of legal wrangling, it is hard to understand. But we have an enormous understanding of how organized crime works because of its impact on Western Europe.

We know how the cigarette smuggling works in Kosovo. People can tell me to within the hour which truck has passed which point, which men with black masks have leapt out of which four-wheel-drive vehicle and run down the path. We have all this knowledge. In the capitals of Europe we have the ability to deal with these things. But I honestly do not know why we do not do more in Kosovo. We say more! I can get Brownie points at any international conference, any meeting of the Contact Group, any meeting of the European Union by saying that we must do more on economic crime. They all clap and cheer but they do not do anything for me and I honestly do not understand why not.

Is it catching up? The answer is, no. If I look at the Balkans generally and amalgamate the analogies made by Michael Schaefer and Christian Schwarz-Schilling and deal with them together: Yes, the glass is half full and yes, it is going to be a lot harder to move the glass from being half full to being totally full. Even worse than that, however, is the fact that the other guy is getting a bigger glass every day and so you are not catching up at all. But do we really know that? I am delighted that that corresponds with what Mr. Djelić was saying because I do worry that despite the pervasive international community presence in the Balkans over the last six or seven years, we often know an awful lot less than we think we know.

There are institutional reasons to do with that. Take, for example, the consultant who comes in for one week to advise me on tariff structures in the power system of Kosovo and on day seven flies out, not even having realized that we use coal-fired plants instead of nuclear. I could give you infinite examples.

There is general consensus that the Southeast Europe states (and that is a phrase we cannot live with any more – it is the Balkans and I am proud of being in the Balkans!) are not catching up at the moment. Part of the misunderstanding has been an institutional misunderstanding on the part of the international community. In Kosovo, when people went in after the bombing they thought they were there to deal with reconstruction caused by some sort of war. That is nonsense. There had not been a war in Kosovo in that sense. It was not like Bosnia with the shifting front lines and the destruction of property. There was virtually no destruction worthy of the name. You could have reconstructed the war damage in Kosovo in two weeks if you had wanted to. What we are actually dealing with is ten years of neglect, ten years of lack of maintenance and that is the philosophy that they have been looking at for the last year or so. That is not actually true either. That is just another part of the story. What the professionals, the experts and the people who I really trust tell me is that Kosovo has been in economic decline for something like 43 years. We are trying to reverse that sort of decline and it is not a short-term phenomenon.

There are good signs in the Balkans but overall we have got economic problems. I would argue that the primary cause of the problems is one of political development. One of the papers I saw recently argued that it was incontestable that economic development was required before there could be political stability. I am going to contest that. I would say that generally speaking you need that political development first or, at the very last, you have to accept that the two are inextricably combined and interdependent. You cannot use economic development to produce some magical political effect.

Catching up?

Consultants

War damage in Kosovo

Political stability first

*Comparative perspective:
economic success
and good governance*

I would like to know the view at this conference. Last week in Kosovo I tried to see whether there was any more rigorous evidence I could provide which would support that assertion. I asked my team of economic support people, the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD to tell me which were the five most successful economies over the last five to fifteen years and which were the five least successful economies. The composite list that we finally got out of them five minutes before I came to Belgrade was that the five winners are Botswana, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and China and the five losers are Kuwait, the UAE, Libya, Iraq and the Congo. Now, it would be very tempting analyzing the governance structures in those places. But I want to stick with my argument and say that in that list of the five losers there are four places with an incredible supply of natural resources in the form of oil. The fifth one, the Congo, has some of the best diamond fields in the world. Despite all the theoretical economic advantages, those five have failed miserably.

When we look at the five winners, to be quite honest, I am not quite sure. I have been to Botswana but I did not see many economic advantages there. They have a nice game park and that is about it. I have been to Singapore lots of times. It is a tiny little place. It has taken over the financial markets and has found its mousetrap. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that there are no substantive economic reasons why those five countries should be the winners. The reasons have actually to do with their forms of governance and their political success.

You can play around with things like that forever and you can do the same for the transition countries but simplistically, this exercise tells me two things. First: Good government, true democracy and real local ownership and vision go hand-in-hand with economic growth. Second: In the absence of these things, all of the oil or the diamonds are not going to help you.

Many experts do not accept this and insist that economic development must come first. This is the approach of a lot of visitors to Pristina who come into my office and honestly believe that in the cupboard behind my desk there are cardboard boxes marked "Economic Development". The military get very cross with me and ask why I do not hand them out. And if I could hand them out they would ask why I was not handing them out a bit quicker. They really believe that is the way the economic development process works. Of course, it is not.

*Development aid programs
for the Balkans?*

What tools do we use? I am going to argue that the tools we are using are not very successful ones. In the case of the Balkans, the first tool we are using is "Development Aid Programs". But what relevance do development aid programs designed to help Third World countries reduce mortality rates over a period of twenty, thirty or forty years have for rapid economic development and political stabilization in the Balkans? It does not work that way. These development aid programs have a place but they cannot do the job by themselves. If nothing else, they lead us straight down the path of the false comparisons in money. Whenever I ask Chris Patten, my boss, for more money for Kosovo, he says I cannot have any more and that Kosovo is already getting more than India. That is not the type of equation I am working with. But quite rightly, Chris Patten is, of course, doing that trade-off because every penny he gives to the Balkans from that development aid budget is not going to cure or help with the problems of poverty in Africa, Latin America or wherever else it might have gone.

As long as that equation exists we are not going to see success. We did not use that equation for the Baltic states. The Baltic states, the current accession and enlargement countries are not being funded from a development aid budget. They are being funded from elsewhere.

The second thing we are doing is that we are lying about the money. Because it is development aid money, it is the sort of money that you use in pledging conferences. Pledging aid money. It is the sort of money that you use in pledging conferences. Pledging conference money is not real money. It cannot be spent. There has been many an occasion when I was working with Wolfgang Petritsch in Bosnia when he would read the paper and say that we were in trouble again because we in Bosnia were being accused of corruption because nobody could find the five billion dollars. Well, I will tell you why nobody could find the five billion dollars. It never ever existed. It was pledge money. It was money that you made up for conferences because it sounded good. It was not money that moved from one bank account to another and could be spent on rebuilding a house. There are lots of more examples like that but the simple message here is that while development aid money is necessary, it is not sufficient for economic transformation.

The other tool we use is the Stabilization and Association Process. Those three words just about say it all. The pointless words you can imagine. Where is the vision in “Stabilization and Association Process”? This “process”, again, is something that is just not going to induce the political change, the democratic change that we expect.

I would like to finish by choosing just five examples of what could be done to make things better.

The first thing we can do is to actually mean it when we say that we want to work with true local partnership. We usually say it but the constraints back home are such that we do not actually do it. We prefer to fly out a consultant for a week, let him get it wrong and then he can produce a nice report and at least the money has been disbursed and that is very important. So let us have true local ownership and true local partnership.

The second thing, I would argue, is that we do need more money. That will not be a welcome message to the taxpayers of Europe. I understand that. I do not like giving it. We need more money but we do not need aid money as such. We need different forms of money – we need money in creative forms that will create this economic change.

The third thing that we need is the regional approach which Minister Djelić was talking about. This is an important issue, indeed. We need the Stability Pact. We want it to keep on working because without it we are doomed.

The fourth thing is seriously boring but seriously important. We need mechanisms to deliver what it is we think we want to deliver. Gerald Knaus and others have talked about the property legislation implementation program in Bosnia. I will not go into the details but what you should know is that it was a mechanism that delivered a result. Without those mechanisms, all we have is words, which are not going to make any difference.

Pledges are not real money

Stabilization and Association Process

True local partnership

More money

Regional approach

Mechanisms for implementation

*Real vision
in Europe*

My fifth point is that on the part of Europe we need real vision as to what we want to be happening in the Balkans. Too much is left to the bureaucrats, and I include myself there. We need political vision. I will give you just one example. Within the next couple of weeks I am going to be expected to start working on and launching an enormous power station in Kosovo that will provide power throughout the Balkans, that will bind everybody in through agreements and that will make everybody in Kosovo rich and everybody in the Balkans happy. That may even be true for all I know. What I know for sure, however, is that I will be expected to do so with a publicity budget of probably between fifty and one hundred euros.

I do not recollect that the Channel Tunnel was built by some part-time bureaucrat saying: "Oh, I think this might be a good idea and I have got a World Bank study on it somewhere". No, it was done because of political vision from the leaders of the two countries at the time. It is that sort of political vision that we are missing in Europe for the Balkans.

Ahtisaari

Botswana

Why is Botswana doing so well? Firstly, it has diamonds. Secondly, it has one of the most modest governments that I have ever seen in my lifetime. They have very few foreign missions for example. Every time I talked to somebody from that country I said, "Don't open a new embassy if you do not need it".

Botswana also fosters the democratic spirit. They have even put money into keeping the opposition alive because it has always been in danger of disappearing in the country. The government had to give money in order to keep the multiparty system alive. So I think many other countries can learn from Botswana.

Knaus

ESI study

Recently, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) carried out a major study focusing on the economies of the southern Balkans. We took as our case study one of the bigger towns in Kosovo, the city of Pec. We examined the former industrial companies that were built there during the final three decades of Yugoslav socialism in order to see what had happened to them. We found that the companies currently producing in Pec are just about the same as those that existed there in the 1930s – before communism, before World War II. The total number of workers in socially-owned enterprises in Pec now is about 3500 – with 500 of them in a brewery. The remainder are employed in small retail shops. Some observers may claim that this example applies only to Kosovo, but I would underscore that we found a very similar pattern in Bosnia. In short, this means that a profound process of de-industrialization has been going on in the southern Balkans. And the evidence that we have suggests that parts of Serbia are facing the same problems.

De-industrialization

A far-reaching de-industrialization of the old socialist industries has broad social and economic consequences. It is obvious that the source must be the result of the growth of a new private sector. On the positive side, in Pec ninety percent of tax revenues are paid by the private sector. This de-industrialization is a process that started in the middle of the 1980s when federal investment in these industries stopped. The onset of this process preceded Milosevic and the end of Yugoslav socialism. As of 1987 basically no more

money was invested in these socially-owned enterprises. The decline of these enterprises has been longer than the period in which these factories were built, between 1965 and 1980.

While the people in the region are all aware of de-industrialization – they live it – this process has not been intellectually fully grasped. I argue that many of the problems of the southern Balkans have much in common with the problems of the poorer countries of southern Europe – and I specifically use the European example here.

If we now go back and read about the Sardinian economy, the Sicilian economy, the northern Greek economy or the economies of Spain and Portugal in the 1950s, we find that neither Kosovo nor Macedonia are so extraordinary. The problems faced at that time were similar to the problems that Kosovo or Bosnia face today. Of course, the assumption is that the poorer part of southern Europe has continued to develop since then, albeit with great difficulties – the Mezzogiorno is still the Mezzogiorno – but it is a far cry from the reality of two generations ago. So, the question is how to be sure that the trends in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania or Serbia will go in the same direction. Until now, the trend has been in the opposite direction.

Let us take an example from Bosnia. Three things are going to happen simultaneously in the next two or three years. There will be quite a sharp reduction in aid money that will have an immediate effect on the few industries that have grown fastest over the last five years, such as construction. Secondly, a sharp reduction in aid money from the major donors, including the European Union, in the next two years will coincide with a sharp rise in the funds needed to service Bosnia's foreign debt which is rising sharply to about \$ 120 million a year. And thirdly, this will coincide with the liquidation of many companies which has been put off until now. DFID, the British development agency, has estimated that another 70 000 people will have to lose their jobs in these socially-owned companies in the various urban centers of Bosnia. All this will happen at the same time in the next two years.

We must ask ourselves why the political situation of the region is so unstable: why governments are voted into office and then are ousted out again in the next elections, as happened in Bulgaria with a dramatic defeat for a government that everybody had been praising or as happened in Romania in the last elections.

The explanation, of course, is that it is extremely difficult for young institutions to gain the legitimacy they need by performing services for their citizens when all they can do is administer budget reductions. Moreover, they have no control whatsoever over aid and investment resources at hand because it is all foreign support. But these are the very institutions that need to carry out economic reforms. When we talk about de-industrialization or new economic growth it is not really economic reform but building a completely new society in which people live in different cities, live differently, and even build their houses differently.

Looking back at the Mezzogiorno, dramatic social change happened there in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. The one thing that Sardinia and Sicily have in common with the Balkans today is the massive number of migrants. In Italy, six million people left the south. One

Comparison to southern Europe

Examples from Bosnia

Unstable political situation

Institutions lack legitimacy

Social change through migration

third of all Sardinians left Sardinia. This was not unusual and it accounts for a traumatic part of these regions' histories.

*What can be done
by the EU?*

What can then be done if we look at post-reconstruction Bosnia or Macedonia or Kosovo? What can be done by the EU? In terms of the EU, at the moment we see two things. We see incredible amounts of resources deployed throughout the region not just by the European Union but by Europeans in different forms. There are thousands of international personnel in different institutions. There are soldiers, enormous reconstruction projects, and international administrations in Kosovo and Bosnia. But in each country they are different and each country has a different relationship to the European Union.

Decline in European aid

So, how will European aid develop? We cannot continue to offer reconstruction aid forever. But what alternative forms of European aid will help stabilize the region and reinforce positive tendencies rather than simply create dependency? This question is unanswered at the moment. Over the next few years there will be a sharp decline in aid to Kosovo and Bosnia from the European Union and other donors. Because Macedonia had a crisis, they received an extra injection of money at the donors' conference. The pattern is clear: when there is a crisis, money goes in. This stop-and-go European assistance undermines a consistent policy that could enable these governments to plan for the aid they will receive five years from now.

*Rethinking the form
of support*

In contrast, the European structural funds allow governments to do that. Governments know what aid they will get and that allows the donor to make more demands. So, following on what Finance Minister Djelić and Mr. Bearpark have been saying, I would suggest that Europe must rethink the way it supports the Balkans. We need to think about it in historical perspective. We need to look at the policies that benefited the poorer parts of southern Europe so greatly.

One should not forget that during this period of social transformation these countries were democracies, most already in the European Union. This obviously was the case for Italy. Greece, of course, with its dictatorship only emerged from political turmoil in the seventies and then joined the European Union quickly. Throughout this transition, many of these countries benefited from European support, whether it was for agriculture or in structural funds.

*Aid dependency
in Greece*

If you look at Greece today, ten percent of employment (thirty percent of the Greek construction industry), according to the European Commission, is linked to structural fund projects. This is aid dependency. And what is the justification for giving such structural funds to Greece? It is that Greece has to catch up and not fall further behind.

*European long-term
engagement*

We must make good on the promise to bring Southeast Europe into the European structures. Only then will its countries benefit as did the poorer parts of Europe who started out in a similar position a few decades ago. The discussion now must center on whether Europe is willing to do something that is very European. There must be a serious discussion as to whether Europe is willing to adopt this kind of long-term approach to the Balkans and to make good on this commitment.

Co-financing

I know that statistics are dangerous but they give a sense of dimension. Sicily, which has

many problems relating to the rule of law – something not dissimilar to parts of the Balkans – will receive for the period from 2000 to 2006 twenty billion euros in structural fund aid from the European Commission. For the Balkans it is not the sum of money but the seriousness of the principles involved which is vital. This means the co-financing of aid, not gifts. We should not go into Bosnia and Kosovo now and build municipal infrastructure that has no counterpart. The structural funds actually demand that local authorities come up with a lot of information and that they come up with co-financing. They are an incentive: if governance does not improve, the money does not flow. At the same time, because they are predictable and available, they provide an incentive that inspires reform.

Southeast Europe has not yet turned the economic corner. I would conclude by saying that it is absolutely in the European interest to show that Europe can stabilize this part of the world, a region where so many of our soldiers are and where so much political prestige has been invested. That will also help to build institutional credibility. One poll, conducted by an American political scientist, showed that in Germany where the new German federal states were created after World War II, it took until 1960 before a majority of the population in Germany was in favor of keeping them as opposed to abolishing them. By 1978, a vast majority of the German population agreed that the states were an important administrative structure.

My point is that over time institutions acquire legitimacy if they perform. The Bosnian State will acquire the trust of the Bosnian people if it performs. If it fails, obviously that will also have political consequences.

Jean Monnet was mentioned earlier. European integration, of course, started with something very concrete, with coal and steel. It started with something that was not incredibly ambitious. It failed when it tried to take on defense. The analogy that we see in Southeast Europe might be to take a strategic industry and to take the Stability Pact and to invest not just in a few projects but in the whole process of persuading constituencies. One might take something like energy, for example, and make a substantial European investment in helping the countries of the region to turn round their energy sectors in return for having these countries cooperate substantively on setting policies, setting priorities and working together on functional integration in the way Jean Monnet proposed for the first European Union. That, of course, would be much easier if it happened under the umbrella of the European Union so that it is not seen as an attempt to recreate Yugoslavia.

Busek

What has the Stability Pact achieved in terms of economic development, and what is still to be done?

First of all we should recognize that the Stability Pact is the first internationally coordinated initiative that has opened up a European perspective for all countries of the region. Such prospects were anything but assured before July 1999. Intensifying efforts in this direction in the form of expanding European integration will certainly require much lobbying among the member states of the European Union. But I must make clear that every crisis in this region has negative repercussions in our countries. Our politicians do not have an easy time explaining to voters that these countries are supposed to become

*Stabilization of
Southeast Europe*

Willingness to cooperate

Stability Pact

European Union members while pointing out the deficits that still exist in the region. I think we should not underestimate this problem, as we are all confronted in our countries with political opinions critical of the integration process. You all know that I have an utterly different opinion of the matter and fight to keep the integration process on track. Yet we cannot permit ourselves to ignore reality.

Unified economic zone

What we have to do is convince the region's countries that they should regard themselves as a unified economic zone that encompasses 55 million people. There can be no special path for any one country. I am well aware of how difficult that can be to communicate, given the region's current instability. The unsolved problems provoke the business community into thinking about why they should invest in a region that seems so unpromising.

Regional cooperation

In this context I would like to quote a recent statement by the departing Co-Chairman of the Stability pact's Business Advisory Council. He said, "If you ask me where to invest, I would recommend to everyone to go to China and not to Southeast Europe". He said this despite the fact that he was working for a company that had invested substantially in water supply- and sewage systems in the region. In my opinion, governments have to be more sensitive in the way they portray the region to outsiders. I can only express my support for all that has been said here about regional cooperation. Every avenue should be explored in this respect.

Establishing a common economic zone

I recently took part in a summit meeting of the Southeast European Cooperation Process in Tirana, and quite honestly, I was disappointed that so little progress had been made in establishing a common economic zone. The various countries of the region were simply fighting too hard to defend their own positions. In realistic terms, one can only sell this region as a whole to the business community. I hear this sentiment expressed clearly at every economic forum, from every chamber of commerce and industrial association. You will not succeed in convincing business leaders to the contrary, something that people do not always properly acknowledge.

An example: border controls

Before the Stability Pact, I worked for five years as Coordinator of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. One thing I learned was to not always ask about money. Very simple things can often be surprisingly important. One little example was that of the Bulgarian and Macedonian border police, who always take an hour off for their deserved lunch break. The problem was that, because they lived in two different time zones, the border between Bulgaria and Macedonia had to remain closed for two hours. I had to negotiate with both sides for months to set the break times so that they coincided.

Admittedly, this was no earth-shaking matter. But it illustrates how much effort is sometimes required to bring about even minor changes! Government declarations at summit meetings provide no help whatsoever for these kinds of matters. For the companies that have to get their trucks across the border, however, this was a significant consideration. Businesspeople wanted to know why their trucks were being held up at the border for two hours. Thank God we have managed to solve the problem by now. Yet if we waste so much time on the little troubles, we will have to wait a long time before economic development takes off in the right direction. These are issues that can only be resolved by the countries in the region.

Now to the Stability Pact. Disregarding the European perspective for the moment, it has enabled more cross-border cooperation than ever before. This is a positive result that, although not measurable in economic terms, is still a key prerequisite for the region's economic development, even if much remains to be done. For the past five years I have been working hard to make border controls smoother for businesses. Even identifying the border checkpoints is surprisingly difficult. Thanks to the changes in Yugoslavia we can now make progress in this issue through a very good program from the World Bank. Yet the political problems still take precedence over economic necessities.

If one is going to promote economic growth, one has to set economic priorities, which means setting down border crossings that transports actually cross, so as to avoid waiting times that last for hours. Customs procedures also have to be taken into consideration. Compared to the normal duration of transit, sixteen hours are lost on the road between Thessaloniki or Istanbul and the Austrian border because of customs procedures. The countries involved know well that only they can resolve this problem.

The Stability Pact is known primarily for its efforts at improving the economic climate, even though that is not its sole task. The Pact has also marked some successes in promoting democracy, respecting human rights, and improving security in the region. The fact that this broader approach has become somewhat lost to the public's attention might be related to the way the Stability Pact is portrayed in the media, and also to the hopes and desires of the region's people. Perhaps we have sown mistaken expectations among the people, who might think that if a project is in the planning stage today, it will be decided on next week, and in four weeks the bulldozers will arrive.

Some parties to the Stability Pact also fail to properly appreciate that each donor – as Gerald Knaus has already mentioned – provides its funding under very specific conditions. Accusations that some parts of the implementation process are excessively bureaucratic certainly have their justification. Yet the job can also be done differently, as the EU's Agency for Reconstruction based in Thessaloniki has shown. This agency has developed procedures that are significantly faster than those of the European Commission. This model's biggest asset is that control of all parts of the process are in the same hands.

I have recommended to the General Affairs Council of the European Union that we audit every project in progress to come to grips with the problems they are having, especially since the offices in charge often tend to deal with problems by typing into their computer "schedule postponed by three months". That kind of attitude is no help whatsoever. I have already employed people especially to keep tabs on each project, and request the same of the region's representatives, that their governments likewise hire people to competently oversee local projects. Until now this has not been the case because of a lack of competent people.

Coordination also plays an important role. The presidents of Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria told me, for example, that the Traffic Corridor Number Eight was of primary importance, while the foreign ministers of these countries said the primary concern was the rail connections. Which of these is actually true? The Stability Pact funds do not suffice for both projects. Reducing the dimensions of a project to its truly important aspects is essential.

The Stability Pact's broad approach

Donor conditions

Project audit

Coordination

Excessive requests

Understandably, the Serbians or Yugoslavs have a long list of project requests because they joined the Solidarity Pact later than did other states. At one point, then, I had sixty project applications on my desk, so I recently asked the Serbian Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, Goran Pitic, to reduce this number. Afterwards he forwarded three projects back to me. We lost much time as a result.

I would like to make clear in this context that rail projects have less of a chance because hardly any financial institution is prepared to fund them, since the return on the investment lies in the greatly distant future. The history of rail transport in Southeast Europe is punctuated by bankruptcies, so one must be realistic.

*Traffic Corridor
Number Ten*

What I warmly welcome is the European Investment Bank's participation in modernizing Traffic Corridor Number Ten with an eye to the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. This has two advantages. Firstly, something is being accomplished quickly, and secondly, people are being put to work. Yet building a new autobahn would mainly be a job for technologically advanced companies that are mostly Western. For the local population there would be little to do. This is another thing to keep in mind.

*Infrastructure
Steering Group*

I would also like to mention in this context the Infrastructure Steering Group, in which the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (IEB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are represented. We are currently negotiating with representatives from the region to clarify what projects are the most promising. Cross-border projects will certainly be given priority because these are the actual task of the Stability Pact.

Free-trade agreement

As for a common economic zone, the Stability Pact is attempting to conclude free-trade agreements with all the region's countries. Eighteen of the 21 required agreements have already been signed or are under negotiation, and I am confident that we will have concluded this process by the end of 2002. But then, what will the next step be? A substantial economic upswing cannot be expected from the free-trade pacts alone, because the countries involved do not have any investment resources of their own. What we have to pursue is comprehensive, tariff-free trade liberalization along the lines of CEFTA, EFTA, and the like.

At present, however, the region's partner states still have certain reservations, especially, as Gerald Knaus pointed out, since the economic situation differs widely among the individual states.

Lack of strategy

There is another problem I do not want to leave unmentioned. After the approaching EU expansion in 2004 and 2005, Romania and Bulgaria will continue to be candidate states. To these we must add the countries in the Stabilization- and Association Process, with each one having its own bilateral agreement. We will have to wait and see how this process unfolds. Yet we will certainly require a suitable strategy that does not yet exist. It will have to take into consideration the problems peculiar to each region that play a strong role and significantly obstruct the acceptance process.

*Under-developed
projects*

I understand very well why Mr. Djelić has asked where the money is. I must, however, ask in return: "How are the projects doing?" By this I mean that many of the submitted pro-

jects have been hardly developed in their content and as such cannot be sold to the business community. I think a learning process is needed in the region's individual countries to appropriately refine these projects.

Within the Stability Pact there was recently a project presentation conducted jointly with the Yugoslav government that included the communications, transport, and energy sectors. The region's representatives were repeatedly unable to answer the questions of potential investors who had expressed an interest. The questions included, what kind of return on investment could we expect, what legal considerations are there, and so on. Here, too, we need a learning process that has previously been somewhat neglected. The Stability Pact also has to do more in this respect. The Graz Process alone is not enough. The entire system of professional training is exceedingly important here.

Another problem is that the region's countries change their laws far too often to suit their political needs. This has serious consequences for the conditions that companies face. We need more continuity. I am enough of a politician to understand that a change in government also leads to new legislation. But this also exposes companies to incalculable risks.

Then there is the already-mentioned problem of corruption, which we cannot resolve by ourselves. We can only provide assistance. A related issue is that of civil service and management posts. I can cite one example from the utilities sector. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there are three private electricity providers, each with its own political affiliation. As a consequence, there is no common electricity market in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the country itself is politically fractured. There are similar problems in other countries.

Incidentally, that was also a big problem for a long time in Austria – and to some extent still is – because management posts are still allocated politically. I think this absolutely has to change so that appropriate personnel can be recruited. The European Commission, the Stability Pact, and a series of donor countries are more than willing to provide funding for such a project. Power cut-offs, as we saw last winter, also endanger the stability of governments. Politicians know this very well, but have as yet taken no steps to correct the situation.

Then there is the judicial system. Without the possibility of taking a lawsuit before a proper court, no company will be willing to risk an investment. I know, of course, that sitting judges cannot simply be fired. One solution would be to work together more with supporting institutions, such as arbitration courts, mediation procedures, and so on.

One special problem is that of sub-regional cooperation. Disregarding for a moment the region's political difficulties, we have to prevent holes or gaps from developing within the region. That means cooperating on issues of transport, utilities, law enforcement, and border management, no matter what the status of Kosovo might be. It is not my responsibility to resolve this political question. Yet if gaps develop in the other fields, they will impair economic development in the region as a whole. Some things can only be solved through collaboration.

Frequent changes of laws

Corruption and the staffing of public offices

Judicial system

Sub-regional cooperation

*Cooperative development
of programs*

Finally, I see a kind of osmosis regarding European Union expansion. I agree with you, Mr. Djelić, that Hungary's accession to the EU will have a positive effect on Serbia and Vojvodina. We must be prepared for this and have the appropriate steps ready to be carried out.

I have just returned from Thessaloniki, where the Greeks decided to invest • 550 million in the region, not in one year, but step by step. I think, however, that countries in the region should not have to compete for programs, but jointly develop some that would be of interest to Greek investors. To make that possible one would also need a joint management that could take into its own hands the region's institutional development. At the SEECP Summit in Tirana, that problem was solved by adding a passage to the final declaration that the region would have a representative. Since Yugoslavia currently occupies the chair for one year, the representative is a Yugoslav. Yet the preliminary negotiations have so far been difficult and should be accelerated out of common interest. The Stability Pact could provide a helping hand, but the partners in the region must have the bona fide will to work together instead of just saying so.

I also have a personal request, Mr. Djelić. Firstly, Yugoslavia has yet to become a member of the Bucharest-based Center for Fighting Organized Crime. The Yugoslav government has given its approval, but we are still waiting for ratification from the Federal Parliament. I think it would be a great help if this were to take place.

Also, I think it is very important to reconstruct the destroyed bridge at Novi Sad as soon as possible, because the present pontoon bridge obstructs shipping along the Danube in the area. I consider maritime transport on the Danube an urgent necessity.

Discussion

Pragmatism and visions

Daianu

I have mixed feelings after listening to Dr. Busek. He is very pragmatic and clearly he is a person with a vision. I think he is pretty persuasive in sending the clear message that people have to keep their feet on the ground and not aim for the moon. We need dreams but we also need to combine those dreams with pragmatism. On the other hand, albeit, I am probably the prisoner of my own prejudices and personal experience; I still believe that this part of Europe continues to be a very hard nut to crack. There are several reasons for this and I submit that there are dynamics that do not help in dealing with the Balkans.

Institutional change?

It is my impression that the Balkans are, currently, much more remote on the radar screens of the people at the very top in the West because of the tragedy of last September. This is something we should not be oblivious to because, at the end of the day, governments in the West are accountable to their own electorates when they come up with grandiose ideas about what to do in terms of foreign policy particularly when they have to pick up the bill. When it comes to footing the bill, it does not help the debate when one reaches the conclusion that the way to move ahead is to force through institutional change. That may not involve a lot of money but it is time-consuming and it is a very fuzzy concept. We may talk a lot about institutional change and the notion of good governance in both the public and the private sectors but when one has to define it concretely, you have great problems. It is not an easy concept to deal with.

Another issue which needs to be highlighted is that much of the attention is currently focused on how to digest the ten accession countries which are very likely to join the EU in a couple of years – so who is going to pay adequate attention to the Balkans? Simultaneously, one has to embark on reforms inside the EU, which are also going to be pretty painful. We have, therefore, a combination of circumstances which must be seen against the background of the war against terrorism, events in the Middle East and the slow-down in the world economy. This may be too broad a picture but nevertheless we have to look at such issues.

Reforms within the EU

I am also tempted to argue that there is a need for a grand vision. To a certain extent, we would be quite unfair if we said that our Western partners, the people in Brussels and in the major capitals of Europe, do not have a vision for the Balkans. The very fact that there are stabilization agreements with the countries in the western Balkans and that Rumania and Bulgaria are accession countries, shows that although some people may have doubts about the western Balkans eventually joining the EU, there is a learning process going on and that influential people think that there is a way ahead. Having said that, I share Mr. Djelić's opinion that catching up is a must and an extraordinary challenge for the region. But this challenge does not apply for the western Balkans only. Arguably, it is going to be an obsession for the accession countries as well.

Need for a grand vision

Catching up is a rare phenomenon in modern history. We do not have many inspiring examples in this respect. So I would be more modest when examining prospects for rapid, steady economic growth in the region. I would not talk in terms of 7% or 8% growth rates, which, in my view are not achievable unless a country benefits from exceptional circumstances. I would be happy to see the region growing steadily, with some minor fluctuations, at an average of 4% or 5%. Even that is pretty ambitious if we look at the hard data.

Economic growth

Economic growth hinges on solid institutions and resilient high savings (investment) rates, and where do we find them in the region? We may now have low inflation region-wide, but is this semblance of macroeconomic stability sustainable? One has to consider, too, a growing aid addiction on the part of much of the region. What if donors were to cut down aid considerably? Another question is how to use the money that is injected into the region in the cleverest way. This may be easy in theory but practically it is very tough.

Growing aid addiction

Let me say, also, that the need for high growth rates should be seen in the context of the huge unemployment in the region. With unemployment rates in the range of 30% to 40%, you can imagine what kind of societies are evolving in the region, why so many people are tempted to operate in the underground economy and why the criminalized portion of those economies is so large.

Unemployment

Steady growth rates are a must. Likewise, maybe we should not be so reluctant to accept migration over the longer term. If we believe that the EU has a problem with its labor market because of the aging process, then migration could be a way to alleviate the pains in both parts of the future Europe.

On infrastructure, I understand the reasons put forward as to why it has to be prioritized. Nevertheless, I would also say that if good infrastructure projects are undertaken that

Infrastructure

would be the clearest and best message which Brussels and the EU in general could send to show that Southeast Europe is going to be part of the Union, eventually. If that does not happen, people will be left with the feeling that all endeavors are more an exercise in damage control and that not much is taking place which is of any substance. People need hope.

Last but not least I would emphasize the issue of the political class. That is linked with responsible economic and social policies. The politicians of the region can be nudged, they can be admonished, they can be penalized – but in the end they are the ones who are accountable to their citizens and, in this respect, there is a need for policy ownership. The task here is how to achieve this in such a way that the heavy international presence in the region does not harm the ability of the local politicians, the local political class to operate in a responsible and effective way and to be accountable to their electorate. This will not be easy and I do not have any convenient solutions. I am simply expressing some of my concerns.

Threats for the region

I will conclude by highlighting some of the threats I see for the region. One I have already mentioned is aid addiction. The second is distress economies. Most of the parts of the region are made up of distress economies, survival economies. Another is failed states. We have symptoms of failed states. The governance problem is very difficult to tackle when you are dealing with failed states. Who are the interlocutors when you are dealing with failed states? It is not sufficient to say that we now have democratic elections or a democratic government. And then, of course, we have the problem of organized crime.

There is so much to deal with. I may be too gloomy about the region but I believe it is better to be subdued and undertake an exercise in public awareness than to be too optimistic.

Ahtisaari

The Finnish experience

Mr. Daianu mentioned immigration to the EU. As you know, the governments are reluctant on this issue. I know from my own experience in my own country in the early nineties when we had very high unemployment. Being a civil servant, I tried to get an answer from the government at that time as to whether they wanted our country to remain a country of 5 million. Everyone in the Cabinet said, yes that would be marvellous. However, when I mentioned that on the basis of the age structure of our society, it would mean that we would have to start allowing immigration of 15 000 from the year 2000 onwards, they left the room.

Europe needs immigrants

One should look at the whole needs of the European Union, and they are enormous when we come to 2020 or 2030. I know how very difficult it is to have a rational discussion on immigration. It would make enormous sense to see how we could combine our forces because there is excess labor in the region and there is a need for extra workers in the EU because of the aging population in the economy. I think that both interests would be served.

Busek

Without institutional reforms we will be unable to convince investors, Mr. Daianu. In Romania, for example, Coca-Cola has invested in a plant near the Hungarian border. Following the regulations of the local district authority or Judiciul, Romanian customs forced the investor to use a different border crossing than the nearest one for exports to Hungary. That entails an 80-kilometer detour. Upon which, the investor said no, I have already negotiated for months with all kinds of government officials and do not want to do so once again with a district authority. These are the real problems and they cannot be solved without institutional changes.

Take also, for example, the issue of retroactive changes to the law. You all know the Hotel Rogner in Tirana. Recently the Albanian government passed a new law. Now Rogner has to make a back payment of • 500 000. He says thank you and promptly sells the hotel. We have to make sure that incidents like this stop, once and for all.

Why is there a lack of private investors? I think people expected too much. Volkswagen invested in Bosnia. That only worked, however, because of a preferential contract with Turkey, by which VW exports the plant's entire production to Turkey. Exports to the EU were unwanted. That is one of the obstacles.

Moreover, one should not solicit big investments only. For instance, there is the possibility of manufacturing components for the car industry. We will have to open the market here for these goods. Representatives of industrial associations have told me in Brussels that they have set their sights on Southeast Europe because wages there are lower than in Poland or the Czech Republic. This plays a considerable role.

Another example: an Austrian and an Austrian-Bavarian bank acquire more money than the total requested for credits. So, the unused money goes back to Brussels. This is where entrepreneurial imagination is needed, and why this region is suited better to small- and medium sized companies that do not require a fund but a functional legislative branch, an intact banking system and independent courts. These are the criteria that the countries of the region should be judged by. Also, one would need something like an ombudsman. I am confronted every day with cases in which things are not moving forward. The governments are already overburdened and cannot help. It all depends on the local authorities, which are indeed a major problem.

Eiff

Minister Djelić has mentioned the precipitous decline in gross domestic product. I would like to pick up that thread and ask about the extent of the black market economy in Serbia and the region, which has been hardly or not at all statistically registered. Were that the case, the economic situation in these countries could probably be presented much more clearly.

To offer one example, United Nations unemployment statistics give Macedonia a 42 % jobless rate. That would be three times as many unemployed than in the other former Yugoslav republics or even Bulgaria and Romania. In reality, the black market economy

Institutional reforms

Retroactive changes to the law

Private investments

Small- and medium sized companies

Black market economy

For example: Macedonia

is much more extensive in Macedonia. A large part of Macedonia's ethnic Albanian population, particularly, has traditionally lived and worked outside the official system. That means that available statistics do not provide a realistic picture of the economic situation. My question to Mr. Djelić is whether measures are being considered to help reincorporate the black market economy into the legal economy. This would affect, for example, tax legislation.

Private foreign investors

I would like to turn now to private foreign investors, a topic that Mr. Bearpark referred to while using the term "real money". This means that what matters is not the money that is promised at major donor conferences, but perhaps is never actually donated. What is needed most are private investments like those that flowed freely into former Yugoslavia, and Serbia in particular, from Western Europe and the United States until 1991. One can imagine why foreign private investors remain hesitant, given the country's still-unresolved political problems. Yet what is being done to attract potential investors, despite all the area's problems?

De-industrialization

Mr. Knaus spoke of profound de-industrialization. This is a widespread phenomenon in post-socialist countries, when massive, unprofitable industrial plants have to shut down and privatizing of companies proves difficult. De-industrialization also took place, unfortunately, in Eastern Germany. I would be interested in knowing the problems specific to Serbia.

Busek

What we have to recognize, Mr. Eiff, is that the black market economy and money coming from emigrants are what secured the people's survival in the region.

Djelić

Privatization in Serbia

Mr. Eiff, your question is: What about foreign private investments? Indeed, investment is a key issue. Not long ago Serbia adopted a new privatization law. The first deal happened in December. Three cement factories were sold for 150 million US dollars. The first criterion is not so much money as strategic investors. Two companies from Greece won. We have 43 companies slated for privatization. The EBRD, in their transition report last year, described our privatization law as the best in the transition countries because it is very simple. It is straight. More than seventy percent of equity is sold to strategic investors.

Examples for strategic deals

In particular, during the last month and a half we have seen a strategic deal between our own steel making concern and US Steel. In addition, a leading German carpet company has signed a 50 million euro deal with a very good company here to produce for the region, Western Europe and Russia. Michelin, the leader in tire manufacturing, has invested 50 million euros here and the list goes on and on. To come back to the big picture, we expect half a billion US dollars this year in privatization and we hope that figure will rise to one billion in the years to come.

New labor law

In terms of the legislation needed to facilitate this, in addition to the privatization law, we insisted on adopting a new labor law as soon as possible. That was done last December. We think it gives us a competitive advantage as other countries still have communist or

socialist laws or are changing them bit by bit. Basically, we took the German law and adapted it to the local situation. It is very important for the companies to be able to operate that way.

Private investment is a major item for us and we try to be as pro-active as possible. When we plan to go to a country, we do not wait for people to call us first. We identify ten or fifteen companies per country and we go straight to the top. We usually meet the CEOs and explain the situation because otherwise if you work with the regional representatives, by the time they make it to the Board, the CEOs will say: “Oh, interesting – Serbia. But isn’t it a bit unstable?” Working through an intermediary can be dangerous so we go to the top as much as we can.

On the question of the black economy: About twenty to thirty percent of the Serbian GDP is in the black economy but that is the case in other countries as well. So I think we are comparable. I understand that in Western Europe, too, ten to twenty percent is in the black economy. In Germany it has been climbing because of the high taxes.

In the area of the gray economy we are working on the carrot and stick principle. On the “carrot” side, by the end of June we will have a package for investment that really involves legalization. We will provide two or three years free social contributions for people who register. We have decreased contributions on wages and we are going to further reduce some taxes. On the “stick” side, we have been strengthening our tax code, and the penalties for people who are discovered not registering or not reporting taxes are high.

We are the only country in transition which applies a “one-off” tax. It is a tax on Milosevic cronies. We are collecting from people who had extra privileges during the Milosevic era and up to now we have collected something like 50 million US dollars. This is a tax on people who got money for nothing or people who got the right to export things that nobody else could export.

Ahrens

Regional economic development in Southeast Europe will lead to more stability and a European perspective when there has been success in achieving what we call in Germany “the equalization of the standard of living”. In Germany this is assured by the compensation law among the federal states or “Länderausgleich”, which has particularly benefited the eastern states, or former East Germany, since reunification. Within the European Union, the Structural Fund promotes regional development by transferring money from Luxembourg to Portugal, for instance. Would something of the sort be plausible in Southeast Europe as well? It could not possibly entail Macedonia transferring money to Albania just because Albania is the poorer of the two. But in distributing help from outside, it would be prudent to follow the economic principle of converging the region’s standards of living.

I have been in Tirana for three years and have never tired of making clear that Albania cannot be forgotten. Mr. Busek raised my spirits when he said that holes could not be allowed to open up, but then he referred to Kosovo instead of Albania. Should you ever intend on driving from Bajram Curri in northern Albania to Kosovo, I would recommend

Negotiations with CEOs

Black economy

Carrot and stick

*One-off tax for
Milosevic cronies*

*Equalization of
the standard of living*

Don’t forget Albania!

that you take along a very rugged off-road vehicle and a police escort. You will not find any foreign projects in this area. What you will see are warning signs with a death's head on them and the words: "danger: mines". As soon as you cross the border to Kosovo, you see signs everywhere, reading "so-and-so is building here ... so-and-so is rebuilding ... so-and-so is helping ... so-and-so is cleaning ... mines ...". Also, you drive on very good asphalt roads, a legacy of Yugoslavia which provided Kosovo with a much better infrastructure.

De-industrialization

On the other side in Albania, you discover countless bunkers built by Enver Hoxha, and industrial ruins. Mr. Knaus and Mr. Eiff both touched upon this. I am referring to the gigantic chemical works at Lac or the steel plant in Elbasan, around which an entire city with tens of thousands of inhabitants was built. Everyone who worked there is now unemployed.

Energy crisis

As for the topic of electricity cuts, I would like to quote the Institute of War and Peace Reporting: "Albania's economy is grinding to a halt as the country confronts its most disastrous energy crisis in decades. The public was alerted to the state of the catastrophe on 10 January, when the government announced daily power cuts lasting up to 18 hours". It was the worst energy crisis in decades. We had even worse experiences there this winter. We were without electricity for up to 20 hours a day.

Economic refugees

The cleft between Albania and its neighbors is leading, for example, to the continued flow of economic refugees. One reads over and over in the press that Albanians drowned after trying to reach the Italian coast in a rubber dinghy. More than fifty people were recently rescued en route to Italy after getting into distress at sea. The Italians prefer to keep the numbers low, probably so as to counter accusations from Germany and elsewhere that Rome needs to redouble its efforts. This is indeed a very big problem. I would also like to add the well-known topics of car theft, narcotics-, weapons-, and people smuggling.

Even out regional disparities

These are the reasons why it is so important to even out regional disparities. At its core is still the old question: What is more important, promoting political stability first or economic stability? Of course the first thing we need in Albania is establishing the rule of law. Mr. Busek has rightly pointed out that nobody is going to invest in a place where there is no functioning judicial system.

Yet too little is being done in Albania on the international side as well. The OSCE's Kosovo Mission has over 500 international employees, while I have to make do with 45 workers, of whom twenty percent are supposed to be withdrawn soon. All the more reason for me to plead with you all not to forget Albania, for if a black hole were to emerge there it would foster instability throughout the region.

Albanians sometimes criticize me for portraying their country too negatively. My answer to them is that it is less dangerous to criticize constructively than to allow the world to forget Albania. The agenda of the Stability Pact includes collecting "information on people's attitudes, fears, and expectations on main issues that concern their ongoing life and their future to draw the conclusions relevant for policymaking". Albania is of interest in this context.

Busek

Mr. Ahrens, I am afraid that the train has already left the station, as far as Albania is concerned. My impression is that in its energy policy, the European Union has by now basically excluded Albania from its planning, which is something I find deeply regrettable. Many EU member states have the attitude that the Albanians are no longer a viable partner. I would encourage anybody to spell out to the Albanian government that as long as it does not take the initiative and work for real change in conditions, then nobody is going to approach it. This is also a question of behavior.

“Albanians are no longer a viable partner”

Medish

Listening to these very thought-provoking presentations, particularly from our colleagues in the region, I have been wondering what my memo to the US President would look like if I were still at the White House and had to summarize the basic themes of this discussion on the regional outlook, looking both at the Yugoslav successor states and the other countries of Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, the entire region. There is differentiation of course, but at the same time the entire region is paying a price in the form of a high-risk premium for being united in fate and geography.

The regional outlook

I have three scenarios, two dimensions of internal risk, and each dimension has four hot spots, and then I have one conclusion.

Scenarios

The three integrated regional scenarios of risk and opportunity for the medium term in my view, having listened to these presentations, are the following. First, there is a high case, which you might call “break through”. Second, there is a middle case which you might call “muddle through” and third, there is a low case – “fall through”. Subjectively, I would assign probabilities of about ten percent to the high case, sixty percent to the middle case and thirty percent to the low case.

The “break through” has to do with what Minister Djelić was talking about: the creation of Balkan tigers, rapid adjustment, dynamism, integration, political maturation of institutions. In the middle case, the baseline is the cycle half-measures and populism, subsistence, delay, weak institutions, corruption and managed instability at best. The low case, “falling through”, is the black hole. Backsliding on reform, disintegration, instability, violence, failing states, the dominance of organized crime.

Drawing together what we have discussed, I also see two dimensions of internal risk. First, on the political security dimension, there are four interrelated hot spots, which were already mentioned here. The first concerns Serbia and Montenegro. It has to do with the federal dimension of the two and whether the Solana Plan can really work. The second hot spot is Kosovo and final status and refugee returns. The third is Bosnia and Herzegovina and the deepening of Dayton. And the fourth, which I actually think could be perhaps the most important, is Macedonia and whether we can achieve a modus vivendi for the communities there.

Hot spots

The key lesson that I would point to with respect to this matrix of four challenges is not to squander the very rare opportunity that Božidar Djelić mentioned which has to do with

the fact that we have democratically elected leadership in all of these places. We have to make the best use of that legitimacy.

*Active engagement
and patience*

For the outside actors, the EU and the US – if the US is the junior partner – what is crucial is that we maintain our normative vision based on values but also that we maintain realistic expectations with respect to timing. And here I may disagree with some of the previous speakers. I think we need sustained active engagement but we also need patience with respect to timing on these political security issues. Both active engagement and patience are rare commodities – at least they are in Washington these days. Timing is very important because the local leaderships have very limited political resources and they have a lot of challenges to deal with at the same time. I get the feeling that a lot is being expected of Belgrade all at once. For example, the sanctions approach favored by some in Washington to influence conduct in Belgrade is beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns.

Economic hot spots

Let me turn to the economic dimension. Again, I see four interrelated hot spots. The first, which applies to all of the countries, is macro-stabilization, the mix of monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate strategy and external debt policy. The second is structural reforms involving the whole cluster of measures from privatization through to liberalization, competitiveness, cutting red tape and deregulation. The third, critically, is institution building, the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts which will have a decisive impact on the investment climate. The fourth vulnerability is the need for sustained, robust, outside support including balance of payments support, technical assistance, trade access to Western markets, stimulation of capital flows for infrastructure and the other areas that were mentioned. We can debate what the right tools and right structures are but one thing I know is that we need more of it, not less.

*Transition economies:
fast reforms – fast growth*

Let me just point to one lesson in the political economic sphere from the experience of all the transition economies across Eurasia. That is that the faster reformers have been the faster performers on growth. That correlation is extremely strong and the gap is widening and the need to catch up is only growing. In this area I would urge utter impatience – the opposite of what I urged on the political security side. By the way, Yugoslavia is a perfect example of trying to move quickly with reforms and not succumbing to the idea of gradualism because too often in these economies, slow reform has meant no reform.

Risk factors

Finally, my one conclusion, which actually ties together the three external risk factors, is this: The probability of achieving the high case scenario, the best case, the ten percent probability scenario is so low because, collectively, we on the outside and you on the inside have to get all eight of these things right. We may have a fighting chance to do that but the odds are actually turning somewhat against us if you look at the external risks. However, I am also convinced of another thing. We cannot actually afford the middle case, “muddling through”, because it is fundamentally unstable. The “muddling through” case actually carries a rather high risk of falling down into the lower case.

Donor fatigue

I would repeat the three external risk factors, which Dr. Daianu mentioned, because I think they are not just abstract, they are very real. The first is donor fatigue and donor scepticism. It is fatigue with the Balkans, it is fatigue with nation-building or state-

building overall and it is scepticism that we really know what we are doing, as Mr. Bearpark suggested.

The second external risk exists in the shifts in strategic attention, which are occurring both in the US and the EU, which must not be underestimated. They are occurring for different reasons but they are fundamental in my view. In the US, the Bush Administration is very torn about international activism. Ideologically, it is not inclined toward international activism. It has been dragged into the world because of the war on terrorism. But that war in itself is involving the exhaustion of political resources and it is getting tougher not easier, obviously, because of what is happening in the Middle East. With the EU, I am encouraged by some of the rhetoric I have heard and by many of the efforts which have been made but I worry that the EU's internal problems will ultimately distract the sense of commitment.

Shifts in strategic attention

The third external risk factor is the global economic environment. It could be that the roaring 1990s are really over which were an aberrational period of global growth. That is a risk factor for all emerging-markets regions. In other words, it could be that Poland's success story took place in an aberrational international environment where capital flows were larger and faster. Put differently, the investor risk premium is getting higher in this region precisely at a time when investor risk appetite is falling.

Global economic environment

In this context, just look at what is happening in the US economy, in the EU economy and in Japan. It is we in the G3 who need the new mousetrap. My conclusion, therefore, is this: We may not be able to do anything about the overall global economic situation, but we can do something about donor fatigue and strategic attention. All of us have to counteract those trends actively and we have to devote one hundred percent of our effort to achieving the ten percent best case.

Busek

Regarding donor fatigue, Mr. Medish, by now I am inclined to say that the donors' growing weariness has its positive side as well. This is because we see that the receiver countries are depending more and more on the donors' money. In Bosnia, recently I was told bluntly: "We watch the international community at work while we sit in the café". That may be exaggerated, but it shows the dangers of an unmitigated receiver mentality. I think we have to encourage a willingness in the area to assume responsibility. Otherwise we will be unable to come to grips with the problems here. The situation was the same in Germany and Austria after World War II. One has to take matters into one's own hands or donor's fatigue will quickly set in, and we are not very far removed from it in the region.

Donor fatigue

Sorić

"Muddling through" is not something that appeared in the Balkans in the last ten years, but was present before then as well. This is why I think that a continuation of this pattern is the most likely scenario.

Mr. Bearpark has called for more money for Kosovo. I can only warn people against

giving in to the illusion that the EU is going to pump even more money into Kosovo. I think it is going to be rather less in the future.

“We should not set our expectations too high”

Earlier this week I took part in the German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue in Weimar. I learned there that Weimar, a relatively small city in eastern Germany, has received one and a half billion deutschmarks for renovation work. To be sure, very many facades in the town center are freshly painted, but not all by far. I do not even want to think about how much money it would cost to paint all the facades in the Balkans. In other words, we should not set our expectations so high.

The “wailing wall” is especially popular in the Balkans. Instead of wailing, however, one should rather devote one’s energies to reducing bureaucratic obstacles and fighting corruption, as Mr. Busek and others have already demanded. What can be done to revive industrial production? Creating jobs, after all, is one of the highest priorities.

Framework conditions for investors

I would like to cite a small example of the problems surrounding efforts to create jobs. In our hotel I watched a report on television about a group of wealthy Serbs from the diaspora who had gathered in Belgrade several days ago with the intention of investing in Serbia. They left again in disappointment because they did not find the necessary framework conditions. If, then, not even emigrant Serbs are willing to invest in Serbia, imagine how much harder a time others will have.

Black-and-white portrayals of Serbia

Mr. Busek has spoken of the need to “sell” one’s country, to make it attractive to investors. This is especially important for Serbia, since the country has not exactly been portrayed appealingly by the Western media, to put it mildly. The world’s image of the area continues to be black and white, and the Serbs count as a “nation of culprits”, to quote a major conservative German newspaper. The Serbs are often the “bad guys” in the Western public eye, and no one invests in bad guys. All of us at this table know that such black-and-white portrayals are nonsense. Yet the fact remains that a region can acquire a bad reputation and that this will have consequences.

Humiliation

I would also like to say to our American friends that there is no positive side to humiliating entire nations. Many Serbians feel humiliated when the US government tells them: If you do not fulfill our requirements, your funding will be cut off. That message translates into: Behave yourselves or you will feel the punishment. I very much welcome Mr. Schaefer’s plea for more sensitivity on the part of the West.

Economic dependence on aid

I would like to add one more word to the economics issue. Constantly pumping more money into the Balkans does not necessarily encourage self-reliance among the people there. Above all Bosnia and Kosovo are economically dependent on “transfusions” from the West. People grow accustomed to living from handouts. I think this is a dangerous development.

An independent Kosovo?

From an economic perspective, an independent Kosovo would be the best outcome for Serbia. Clearly put, Serbia’s economy would definitely benefit, were Kosovo to become independent. Yet the Kosovo issue is ultimately a political one.

Altmann

You asked about investors, Mr. Sorić, particularly for industrial production. In November last year, EURO-Money held a regional conference in Dubrovnik. Among those invited were entrepreneurs looking to invest in Southeast Europe and who reiterated the mantra-like complaint over the problems that investors are confronted with in the region.

One important subject is that of legal security, of which much has been said already. New laws are fine, but what good are they if they cannot be applied in court? A lawyer friend of mine from Munich who mainly handles disputes with Croatia said at the conference that years ago he secured for his clients legal titles that he still cannot implement. This is although Croatia belongs to the more advanced countries in the region.

Taking another example, fund managers seeking objects worth investing in have an unbelievably hard time in the region. Serious projects that could be financed with a calculable risk are practically impossible to find. As a result, the region's new pension funds receive no foreign private capital and have to accept relatively expensive and unsecured government debt bonds. Meanwhile, private fund managers run themselves ragged looking for promising investment opportunities.

Another subject discussed at the conference concerned the image of the entrepreneur in the Balkans, which, it turned out, was not entirely positive. Especially foreign investors are uncertain whether they can cooperate with companies from the region. Major corporations do not express this amount of uncertainty. They have a longer endurance and are capable of sitting out even protracted conflicts until these are decided in court.

Much more significant are the small and mid-sized companies that might wish to get involved here. They require the appropriate, professional partners in the region, and these appear to be very thin on the ground indeed. Conference participants questioned the accuracy of the accounting or the fact that companies did not pay taxes, employed people off the books, and so on. Many also have difficulties finding feasibility studies that are competent in form and content. When prospective investors are given this kind of picture of local companies, of course they are scared away.

Another aspect that Mr. Busek mentioned was also discussed at the conference. Every entrepreneur considers the size of a market in deciding where to make his or her investment. Until now, talk of free-trade zones has only covered the initial steps, meaning that there can as yet be no question of a functioning greater market. This is another reason investor interest has been so muted.

I would like to finally say a few words about agriculture, which until now has not been mentioned at all. Yet processing agricultural goods could certainly be an area where progress could be made quickly and with relatively little investment. Jobs would also be created. I was struck, during my stays in Podgorica and Pristina, at the nearly complete absence of domestic wares in the stores. The shelves were filled with foreign imported goods. This is certainly a development in the wrong direction, which I think, however, could be reversed if local production were more oriented toward the market rather than pure subsistence.

Legal security

Serious financial projects?

Image of the entrepreneur

*Professional partners
in the region*

A functioning market?

Agriculture

*Agriculture:
the EU's own trauma*

Busek

I welcome and agree with you, Mr. Altmann, for referring to agriculture. The problem is that the EU does not want to have anything to do with agriculture in the region because agriculture has become the EU's own trauma. You are certainly right in saying the countries of the region are quite capable of some accomplishments in this area. Bosnia was once a leading agrarian land that now imports almost everything from the European Union. But when these countries try to export their goods to the EU, there is always trouble because we block out competition.

Ahtisaari

Perhaps those countries that are engaged in the agricultural market have to start looking somewhere else because they don't have access to the EU.

*"Virtual membership"
in the EU*

Teokarević

Dr. Altmann mentioned various different types of EU membership. Romano Prodi coined the famous term "virtual membership". Although nobody from Russia or other parts of the region which are still not part of the EU are present here, I think it is something we should all think about, something which might perhaps be institutionalized in the years to come.

Romania and Bulgaria

Good examples for this in the eastern Balkans are Romania and Bulgaria. These are countries whose past may repeat itself in the western Balkans, at least as far as Serbia is concerned. For example, the long awaited visa regime was introduced there on the eve of the elections when it was already known or widely predicted that the reform governments in those two countries would lose. And they lost anyway – perhaps because this measure was taken too late.

*Vision and strategy
for the EU's Balkan policy*

Mr. Busek spoke about the vision and the strategy for the EU's Balkan policy. I am happy to say that, with the beginning of the mandate of Mr. Busek we are beginning to see some elements of the mosaic fall into place. I refer to his speech in the European Union a month or so ago where he expressed very bluntly and very well the idea that the Stability Pact should back up the SAA process and that it should guarantee that aid goes to the Balkans in exchange for political reforms and regional cooperation. Many of us in the Balkans think that it might be more productive, more efficient and better for both the EU and the Balkans, if the Stability Pact were to become an integral part of the European Union structure.

Linking the EU and NATO

A second option might be to create a link between the European Union and NATO. NATO has not been mentioned here so far, despite the fact that the Balkans are primarily a security concern for the world and the EU. Even if NATO will not exist in the same form from September on, it is still very important in the Balkans and in similar regions. When relations between the European Union and NATO begin to become institutionalized, maybe as in the case of the common foreign and security policy, it is the Balkan area that could connect these things and make them work, perhaps through the Stability Pact.

Mr. Djelić has wisely avoided saying anything about the new state we got from Brussels. Of course, after we in Serbia and Montenegro had been unable to agree on anything, the EU has to jump in even though that had not been its original plan. Nevertheless, from the functional perspective, what we got is very difficult to implement particularly with regard to the relationship between this new state and Brussels. I would therefore be interested, Mr. Djelić, to hear how you foresee this future cooperation.

*Serbia and Montenegro:
a mandated new state*

The way in which the state has been imposed will backfire, I am sure, in future in the attitudes of the Serbian and Montenegrin populations towards the EU. The only thing that might improve this will be if it actually functions. By the way, I will finish by mentioning that the English version of this framework document mentions the term “state” for this new creature, while the Serbian text speaks of a so-called “state community”, a term not known so far in law and state theory.

Järvenpää

On the issue of donor fatigue and donor scepticism, which Mr. Medish raised, I think that we often talk within a circle of Balkan enthusiasts and we forget about the people who actually are sceptical. It was good therefore that there have been a few reality checks in today’s discussions. Nevertheless, there are also some things that make me feel that these people are so-called realists. I would challenge the notion that we should be happy with a reduction of donor funding and that we should try to come up with other types of funding and to structure funding in a different way. There are two reasons for that.

*Reduction of
donor funding?*

Firstly, if you look at the level of grant money in the Balkans as opposed to the grant money in the Visegrad countries in the last ten years, the Balkans have received one third per capita of what the Visegrad countries have received in grant money. And the Visegrad countries have not gone through destruction, civil wars, infrastructure rebuilding and so on.

*Level of grant money
in the Balkans*

The second point is that in Greece, as I understand it, roughly thirty percent of industrial jobs are paid by EU subsidies and I have not heard anyone describe Greece as being aid-dependent. I wonder, therefore, whether we should not question some of these notions of what is too much aid. It would be more to the point to look at how we structure aid programs and how we make sure that that money starts delivering on the ground.

Structuring aid programs

The other thing is that we need to start getting it through to the citizens of the European Union that basically everyone will gain. There will be more stability, there will be more economic growth if we can include the Balkans as part of that overall economic and stability space that we have created for the western part of Europe.

Structuring aid programs

This is perhaps something where the citizens in the Balkans need to be energized. They need to be given a vision and to have their imagination stimulated about what European integration might mean for them in a concrete form. But in the same way, we have to ensure that the European Union citizens understand that the Balkans can contribute something and that getting the Balkans on this train is an exciting prospect.

Migration

Finally, a small footnote on the immigration debate. At present, about seventy percent of Kosovo's population is younger than 30 years old. That is quite a resource if we know how to use it. If we can get education, proper IT training and produce technical professionals that could be a major factor in achieving the necessary immigration and getting new labor into Western Europe.

Primatarova

Mr. Busek mentioned establishing an economic zone that might encompass the entire Southeast European region, including Romania and Bulgaria. From the viewpoint of the Stability Pact, but also with reference to the fact that Bulgaria and Romania will not be EU members by 2004, Mr. Busek said there was no appropriate strategy yet. In fact, no such strategy has ever existed.

Bilateral agreements

Bulgaria even responded cautiously to the bilateral agreements because we see a contradiction between the policy of the Stability Pact in regard to our regional cooperation and our negotiations with the European Union. Bulgaria already had a free-trade agreement with Macedonia before the stabilization- and association process ever began. In negotiations over foreign relations, we took the position that we might apply for a transition period to keep our relations with Macedonia intact. By the time the negotiations were finished, the stabilization- and association process was already underway. For this reason we thought our reluctance had become superfluous because we believed that when we joined the EU, the stabilization- and association process would resolve our bilateral problems. Therefore we dropped our request for transition periods.

Transition period?

Then, however, the European Commission insisted that Bulgaria explicitly declare that it would not demand any transition period for our agreement with Macedonia. We argued against this; it was a politically sensitive point, since why should we provide this kind of declaration if we waive any transition period whatsoever? We are willing to accept the Acquis on January 1, 2007, in its present form.

Political insensitivity

This kind of political insensitivity on the part of the European Commission leads to bilateral regional cooperation being regarded as a handicap. If no strategy is developed in this matter, then problems are likely to crop up in the future. This is also partly because everyone here is speaking of an economic zone cut off from the European Common Market. We refer solely to 55 million people while overlooking that this zone would grow to 130 million if one includes Greece and Turkey.

Trade zone in Southeast Europe

Why not, then, discuss a trade zone that includes Greece, Turkey, or even Slovenia? I see a substantial problem in this respect, for which we will have to develop a suitable strategy to soothe the fears of some countries. The market that is supposed to come into existence here should not only be accessible from the outside; it should be permitted to export into the EU as well.

Djelić

I would like to focus on four of the questions which were addressed directly to me or which concern the Serbian Government in general.

The first concerns Serbia and Montenegro, the new state. The second is the issue of aid versus investment. The third centers around private investment and priorities in terms of sectors and ways of dealing with various classes of investors including the diaspora. And the fourth is about people because increasingly, the economy revolves around just one word: people. Most of what we are discussing here has to do with people being able to develop a business plan or to produce a project.

On Serbia and Montenegro, what I hear from Mr. Teokarević and other people here is, to a certain extent, old thinking. Certainly, a pure solution would have been better. That would mean either a clear federation, a recognizable state, or, if this not achievable, then a separation with an independent Serbia and an independent Montenegro. But I believe that what was signed on 14th March is an indication that the Balkans are improving. It was one of the first things in the last twelve years where people acted with the consequences of their acts in mind. We had some help but this time it was positive help with more carrots than sticks on the part of the EU. People were prepared to accept separation but they also asked what message that would send to the investment community. Would it mean that Balkanization of the Balkans had simply stopped for a few years and that there would be a new round? What about Macedonia, what about Kosovo and Bosnia and then Serbia itself. What about Sanjak and Vojvodina and then Montenegro – what about the eastern part of Montenegro where the Albanian population forms a majority?

The agreement of 14th March, although it introduces a few constitutional, legal and economic innovations which one can well live with, is precisely what is going to avoid all that. If you look at the political trends now, with the exception of course of the extremist fringe elements, everyone is gravitating towards that agreement. That includes, in Montenegro, the parties which were staunchly for independence before.

Look at Mr. Zhivkovic, the leader of an important party there who has been trying to achieve independence for Montenegro for years. He was really devastated by the fact that it was not achieved. He was in Brussels two days ago with Mr. Solana and he came out in favor of the agreement, for working with the EU and then seeing, in three years, whether Montenegro should be independent or not. So this is great news. I think we should not whine the whole time about what could have been. Let us look instead at the realistic options; and of those on the table, this was the best one.

How will it work? The good news for the investors is that problems of the kind that Mr. Busek has had in working with our people will be obviated. Previously, we would send people from the Federation who would have no clue about what the republics were doing in terms of projects. Or investors would talk to a Federal minister of economy or of finance and then discover that it was a Serbian minister of economy or finance who seemed to have more weight. And this would obviously puzzle them a little.

The good news is that there will be no more Federal minister of economy and no more Federal minister of finance. The only shared costs will be for diplomacy and for defense and there will be a unit to integrate with Europe because that is the one thing on which both Montenegro and Serbia agree one hundred percent.

We will see how it evolves. Obviously, it will save a lot of money in a situation where the

The new state Serbia and Montenegro

Montenegro's independence

Security for investors

Ensuring stability

bureaucracy is already struggling hard to survive. But the basic reason why I believe this agreement will have a chance is that it allows Serbs and Montenegrins to deal with their own affairs in the economic sphere and to share in terms of security what is important not only for us but also for the region. That allows us to ensure the stability of this space. All of that is good and I actually think that it is going to work well.

Donor fatigue

The second point has to do with donor fatigue, with “Marshall Plan-type” injections versus private investment. In particular, some American visitors to Belgrade will listen to our views on how the entire aid program of the United States is 0.1 % of US-GDP whilst the OECD countries are talking about 0.7 %, i. e. seven times more, and then they will say that what really matters is private investment.

Hurdles for private investment

Of course private investment matters but what about private investment in countries where there are power outages and you have no electricity? What about countries where you have to travel on roads which are mined? How about private investment in places where the hospitals have not been repaired and, as is the case unfortunately in Belgrade today, you have almost no functioning cancer treatment machines? No private investor would bring his family to such countries. Then, of course, there is the aspect of corruption, organized crime, abductions and so on.

Aid programs

One cannot rely on private investors for everything. They will not come if you do not have a functioning country. And one should not expect everything from aid programs. They are far too small and there are shocking figures to show that sometimes countries starting from a better position get three times as much and so on. All this makes me think that really Europe is, at times, penny wise and pound foolish. So, what should we do? We can make appeals and perhaps work the system. In particular, we can take into account the political cycles and constraints to which heads of state are subject in order to decide when to ask for what. I think we are getting better at that, particularly in Belgrade.

Reconstruction in Kosovo

We have to adopt a combination of strategies but it is too easy an answer to say: “Introduce better laws and find small entrepreneurs.” We need to open the Danube. We need to clear the mines. I do not agree that money for Kosovo should be reduced. We have to find a way for Kosovo to receive international financial institution money. The issue here is the statutes. How can we make sure that Kosovo gets loans from the World Bank, the EIB and the EBRD? I spoke with a person from the EBRD who simply said it was all too complicated for him to deal with. That is not good enough.

Serbia has an interest in seeing that the people who live in the province of Kosovo do better in every way so that they can readily talk about economic development or, in more limited circles, so that they can appreciate demographics and the need to keep people where they are and so forth. We might use the same line that the EU gives us in our dealings with some of our neighbors around here.

Investments: influence of the diaspora

The third issue concerns investments. As long as we get the right level of infrastructure and public finance, of course, the primary issue is investment. I was recently invited to a diaspora event where the three economics ministers who had been invited were all in meetings in different capitals with foreign investors. I would like to say that our diaspora does include some leaders who are not going to invest a dime here. They would like to be

prime minister of Serbia and when you hear Mike Djorjevic, who was the author of that great press release, or others, you know that they have a different agenda.

When I think about diaspora, which I often do, I think more about the 75 people we met in New York in our Consulate. We asked the Consul to gather the people who would like to come. Seventy-five of them came and they were all between twenty-five and forty and they all had business cards such as Commerzbank, Goldman Sachs, Chance Manhattan and Morgan Stanley. Of the 75, ten have already come back, including the one who is going to be the first head of the treasury of Serbia and who is an executive director of Morgan Stanley in London.

In America, when you have a party, the invitations say: BYOB – bring your own beer. Our diaspora invitations should say: BYOI – bring your own investor. The best thing is that when the people who used to work in this type of company or bank or industrial concern come back, they represent teams that those institutions trust. They are the absolute best link for people to come and work here.

Mr. Busek mentioned Coca-Cola. The head of Coca-Cola in Yugoslavia when it reopened used to be the head of the CIS region for Coca-Cola and he assembled a team of people half of whom were local and half of whom were from the diaspora. The representative from Hypo Vereinsbank told me that first he got a licence in three weeks here and then he was able to assemble a good team in two months because of the relatively greater depth of managerial talent that we have here. I think this is a critical competitive advantage. So, in terms of investment, I would not agree that heavy manufacturing is all-important. That is a crypto-communistic view of the economy. The traders of today are the investors in any place which makes more money tomorrow.

On this point, I am reminded of Poland in the nineties where traders were called speculators. Trading is a business with thin margins when it is really competitive and they have to move in places where you have a competitive advantage and some barriers to entry. So I do not mind that we have traders here and, when you look at manufacturing, I am very happy to see that there is a French private equity firm that has invested in a software company in Belgrade which now works for the company in Paris.

The next question, agriculture, is an issue that we still have not cracked. It is complicated with the EU. They do not want to provide even technical assistance on agriculture – for reasons that people understand well. This percolates through to the World Bank. That will not provide advisors for agribusiness. It is very hard to get good advice on agriculture because there are simply too many problems in that area in the West. Nevertheless, agriculture accounts for twenty-six percent of Serbia's GDP, primarily because the service sector is too small and manufacturing is declining.

There are still opportunities here although they are more likely to come for organizations such as the Serbian juice drink producer "Fresh & Co.", which recently got two million euros from Sidel, a machinery supplier, as well as 26 million euros from the IFC for expansion. We also have an Israeli company which wants to invest 80 million dollars in a drip-feed system for winter tomato production.

*Investments
by large companies*

Agriculture

Investment in people

Of course, these projects will only work if higher-level infrastructure schemes such as securing an efficient water supply grid are in place. But here again, in New York we worked with our Prime Minister to do everything possible to meet the CEO of Nestlé, which will be bidding for some assets here in the next few months. In the same vein, Unilever, which started a joint venture with an ice-cream manufacturer here in 1974, might well now be interested in buying it.

My fourth point is about people, and one investment that is never lost is the investment in people and their knowledge. To a large extent, I think we should focus on the two ends of the spectrum. You have the hardest end of all, which is infrastructure, and then you have the softest end, people and their knowledge.

In Serbia, we have had ten years in the doldrums, ten years of isolation. It is a sad comment that this isolation even involved prohibiting the circulation of professional papers and journals. Engineers, architects and scientists were really isolated. Fortunately, the advent of the Internet allowed them to keep in touch with abroad.

We have to be a business plan oriented country and there is an enormous amount to do. The good thing here is that there is a much better than average “elite” here but the problem is how to reach deeper into the ranks of the administration, deeper into the ranks of management and deeper into the ranks of the political spectrum because without that, a return to the “stop-go” cycle is all too likely.

I am not at all concerned about Bucharest or even Tirana, where I have never been, and I am certainly not worried about Belgrade. However, we must do something about actively promoting regional development and providing education opportunities for people living in the small cities, who are in their fifties, who do not speak English and who have never used a computer. We have to work on these people because the twenty-five to thirty-year-olds will do very nicely by themselves.

*Perspectives
for the region*

I would conclude by saying that I think we can catch up. We are still very much under the terrible shadow which the last ten years have cast over most of the countries of the region. The impression that this period has left indicates a need, in some international circles too, for new hands to take over with renewed enthusiasm. I do not agree with my friend, Marc Medish. I put the probability of success at much higher than ten percent for the region and I am confident that the chances for my own country, Serbia, are far greater still.

Ahtisaari

*We all want
the Balkans to succeed*

I think it is important to realize, when one looks at a group of so many individuals like ours, that there is one common feature, namely that we all want the Balkans to succeed. We all understand that if we do not succeed in the Balkans, we will nevertheless have to live with the Balkans for the rest of our lives and perhaps the next generation as well. I hope that we have learned one thing during the nineties: That it is better to do what needs to be done quickly and in partnership with the countries and people instead of not doing things in time. It will be much costlier if we fail in our cooperative efforts.

I believe that a true friend is someone who will tell you the things which it may be unpleasant to hear and who will spur you on when things are not moving as they should. As I said earlier, I was comparing my notes from a meeting we had here six months ago and since then many things have happened in the field of legislation in Belgrade. That is a good sign. Nevertheless, we will keep on reminding you when particular items of legislation have been neglected because that will help to ensure the flow of foreign investment.

I have to fly now to Washington to another gathering but I will definitely pass on your greetings to my many friends from different parts of the world at the meetings I am going to attend both in Washington and in New York.

Wehmeier

On behalf of the Körber Foundation I would like to express our heartfelt thanks to Mr. Ahtisaari, a man in great demand who told me that he was away from home for 208 days last year to help shape the future of Europe.

Mr. Ahtisaari, we thank you for your committed chairmanship of our conference. We also hope that you will continue following the work of our foundation with interest. I think we have made a good new friend in you, which is something that makes me particularly happy. We all wish you a good journey to the United States and continued success in your future endeavors.

III. What Kind of Social Structures Does the Region Need?

Busek

So far we have discussed issues of political stabilization, institution-building, and the economic situation, as well as exploring the international context in which Southeast Europe finds itself at present. Problems relating to strengthening institutions and infrastructure are mainly technical in nature. I believe, on the other hand, that problems of stability and improving the condition of crisis areas are much more closely associated with societal development. For this reason we would now like to turn our attention to the topic of what social structures the region will require.

I consider this subject very important, yet my experience has shown that it is very often neglected. As the Stability Pact was being organized, a heated discussion took place on whether or not the field of education should be incorporated. Practical considerations and time constraints eventually compelled the organizers to omit this topic. It was not a sensible thing to have done, since real transformation is only possible if investments are also made in education.

One cannot sensibly approach questions relating to multi-ethnic societies and improved understanding without addressing their cultural dimension. If we look back at the time

Education

Cultural dimension

before 1989, we see that the vanguard of actual change in early Communist societies was made up of artists, intellectuals, writers, and academics. This is why I think we should now concentrate on this aspect.

I would first like to ask Mr. Kempf, the Director of the Goethe Institute in Belgrade, to provide an introduction to the subject.

Speakers

Requirement for visas

Kempf

I would first like to take up some issues from the previous discussion that are also relevant to the topic at hand. One of these is the requirement for visas that we at the Goethe Institute have to contend with every day. We are constantly writing to the German Consulate, asking it not to keep our Serbian partners waiting two, three, or even four hours in front of the Consulate when they apply for a German or an EU-Schengen visa.

I ask myself whether the region's visa requirements are at all necessary. Serbians have to apply for a visa for Croatia that costs \$ 60. The result is that most people traveling from Serbia, or Serbia and Montenegro, to Slovenia – cultural exchanges have blossomed between the two countries recently – cannot take the direct route through Croatia, but have to accept the detour through Hungary.

I would advocate lifting visa requirements, especially since recent studies have shown that legal migration is dropping while illegal migration is on the increase. That means that people without permission to leave their country and later re-enter legally have more of an incentive to remain abroad.

Schedule for EU membership

Then I return to the issue of eventual EU membership. I would warmly welcome a kind of schedule for Southeast Europe, to be formulated by the EU. Of course it would not be possible to accept all the countries in the region at once, but we should at least give them the prospect of membership. This would stabilize the region as a whole and, above all, encourage the business community to invest there. In this context I need only to mention the assurance that Germany's state-guaranteed Hermes credits would bring.

Exchange programs

In the meantime, we should intensify exchanges, particularly in the cultural sphere, between schools and among universities, for example. City partnerships would be another possible avenue. In other words, we need to establish structures that tie these countries so closely with Western Europe that there can be no going back.

A vibrant cultural life

I can now proceed to my actual subject, that of culture. This region exhibits as a whole a remarkable cultural creativity and dynamism that we in Western Europe take far too little notice of. Indeed, multi-ethnic societies are, in and of themselves, prodigiously dynamic and creative in a cultural respect.

This applies particularly to Serbia, which has an uncommonly vibrant cultural life. For example, two theater productions premiered yesterday, and a fantastic exhibition opened of Yugoslav art from 1900 to 1991, featuring masterpieces from the Museum of Contemporary Art. Among those in attendance were curators and experts from Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia – proving that on a cultural level, a certain regional cooperation does exist.

I think three factors are of supreme importance in improving cultural activity. Firstly, local structures have to be reinforced. Through the Belgrade Goethe Institute, which is responsible for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; and the Goethe Institute in Zagreb, which covers Croatia and Slovenia, we have been working on supporting this process. Also, for two or three years now a small Goethe Institute has been establishing itself in Sarajevo.

*Reinforcing
local structures*

In working together with cultural institutions and culture ministries, our first tasks are to better equip local cultural establishments, which of course costs money. One example is the beautiful National Theater in Belgrade, which is presently ripe for mothballing and needs to be renovated from the ground up. Cities with 50 000 or 100 000 people do not even have enough money for a real movie theater. We hear similar reports coming out of Bosnia.

The second factor is finding less cash-intensive ways of promoting interregional cooperation. The key to success here is using the networks of personal contacts that are still mainly intact in the cultural sphere, which was something I learned to my surprise when I began my present job. This is true chiefly regarding the older generation that established its contacts during the days of Yugoslavia. The intermediate generation has been largely excluded, while the younger people, the twenty- to thirty-year-olds, have generated their own intensive contacts, especially through email and the Internet. I also think these young people are interested in not limiting their exchanges to these media alone, and would leap at the opportunity to meet each other in person. This is something we should definitely encourage.

*Promoting interregional
cooperation*

Thanks to funding from the Stability Pact, we are now able to sponsor events that bring people of this region together. Only in Kosovo has this approach not yet succeeded, and there are still substantial difficulties with Croatia. While creative artists from Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and of course Bulgaria and Romania are able to take advantage of our invitations without any trouble – incidentally, those from Albania have begun coming recently as well – it has proven difficult to attract representatives from Croatia.

The third point concerns opening up corridors for this region toward Western Europe. I do not mean the already-mentioned aspect of visa restrictions so much as the lack of funding. Many theater- and music groups, not to mention individual artists, would gladly visit Western Europe. Making that dream possible is something I would consider an important task, one that has not been taken seriously enough by far.

*Opening toward
Western Europe*

There are highly qualified experts and outstanding artists active in all areas of culture in this region. No one can say that this region is culturally underdeveloped. Take the example of language. Topics such as guilt, reconciliation, and responsibility were already being discussed here during the darkest days of the Milosevic regime, as I found out in February and March 2000 at a seminar in Serbia. At the time, participants were invited by telephone because events like these could be perilous for the people involved. Despite this, there were experts attending from Argentina, South Africa, and, if memory serves, from Indonesia and other countries as well.

*Highly qualified experts
and artists*

Such debates continue to take place today, even if primarily among specialists. A broad

public debate has yet to emerge, but then, it also took Germany a long time to reach that stage after World War II.

In this context I would like to cite a recent history seminar in which it was revealed that only ten percent of German war criminals were actually convicted during the Nuremberg Trials, while all other convictions were handed down by German courts in subsequent years. This is something that we should keep in mind in our dealings with the region.

Culture management

I would also like to mention culture management as a factor. We should not forget that a country like Serbia not only endured ten years of the Milosevic regime. Fifty years of rigid Communist structures have also left their mark on the countries of this region. This legacy cannot be erased from the minds of people from one day to the next. In culture management, in particular, there remains much work to be done.

Education

There is also the complex of regional and urban planning, urban renewal, preservation of the cultural heritage, of churches, monasteries, historic buildings, and so forth. Education is a gigantic field where city partnerships should play an important role. The European Union recently dispatched a commission to the region to evaluate the educational systems and then draw up new syllabi and curricula. History lessons are particularly important, meaning that history textbooks dealing with the history of the Balkans will have to be revised.

Media and cinematic arts

Another very important field is that of media- and cinematic arts. Film was once particularly concentrated in the region. Many Western European production companies used production facilities here, all of which have, by now, fallen into disrepair. Media arts are an important specialty here and include work of a European caliber.

Theater in Belgrade

Theater is also a grand center of activity, particularly in Belgrade. There are six to eight professional theater groups here and well over twenty amateur groups. Last year, forty premieres took place in Belgrade alone. Theater groups here are also vigorously cooperating with other troupes from the region, especially in Slovenia. This activity is facilitated because there are no language problems in all of former Yugoslavia. One can communicate everywhere in Serbo-Croatian, even if, officially, four different languages are now spoken.

Music

As for music, if there is one thing that holds this area together, this is it, especially the so-called gypsy music that is popular throughout the region. The Belgrade Philharmonic was considered one of the great European orchestras until well into the 1980s. All the famous conductors, including Herbert von Karajan, gave guest performances. Folklore is also a very important source. One example of its influence is in “turbofolk”, a musical style that was already highly popular under Milosevic – authoritarian regimes often tend to use music as a way of stimulating the people. Music is also well suited to interregional exchanges that can reach broader sections of the population.

Graphic arts

Finally, the graphic arts must also be mentioned. This is an exceedingly dynamic scene that is likewise amenable to exchanges. Interregional exhibitions have already opened. A major exhibition of this kind is being organized in Thessaloniki. And in June of this year, we are planning a large billboard exhibit with funding from the Stability Pact, featuring

36 artists from nine countries in the region, with four artists from each country. We hope the city authorities will agree to our plans to decorate Belgrade for two weeks with 36 large-format posters. It would be a wonderful chance to put interregional cultural cooperation on display.

Of course, there are also problems in the cultural world here. I will mention three. The first, which I consider a true plague in the Balkans, I call “festivalitis”. Every village wants to have its own festival. At least ten film- and several jazz festivals take place in Belgrade each year, and they all plead with the culture ministry here and foreign cultural institutes for funding, which, given the sheer number of events, is completely out of the question.

Another problem I see is in the degree of individuality here, which I think has reached exorbitant proportions. Everyone wants to re-invent the wheel. About 1500 NGOs are currently active in Belgrade, and at least 200 of them are in the cultural sector. Often these organizations work on closely related subjects without communicating with one other.

By the way, this is likewise evident in the political world. Two years ago there were some 250 political parties here, today there are about 150. As you know, the DOS coalition consists of eighteen parties. This exaggerated individuality must also restrict intensive collaboration.

Another complaint to be made is that translating words into deeds is often a long and arduous process. It would often be better to take a small step toward accomplishing something than making grandiose statements.

Permit me in conclusion to deliver an appeal, especially as the Coordinator of the Stability Pact is among us. The cultural world here gratefully acknowledges the not-insubstantial amounts of support it has received from the Stability Pact. Regrettably, this funding will be substantially cut in 2002.

My urgent request to you is to continue providing Stability Pact funding, because culture, as I hope I have made clear in my presentation, is essential for the future of this region and contributes significantly towards a stable environment.

Busek

Mr. Kempf began by referring to the issue of visas. May I ask you to describe the problem of visas for the region’s artists in a letter? A working group at the Stability Pact is currently trying to alleviate the visa regime for truck drivers, and I see no reason why their work should not help artists as well. I recall in this context the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe that took place in 1975 in Helsinki and addressed cultural issues in its so-called Basket 3. I think there is no sense in further complicating the issue of visas for the region.

It is furthermore my opinion that we should establish a forum within the Stability Pact that deals with concrete proposals for cultural development. Interest is growing in various European Union member states to accomplish more in this field. In this respect, perhaps

“Festivalitis”

Exaggerated degree of individuality

Stability Pact funding

Visas for artists

Forum for cultural development

we should avoid taking the issues to the Union level, so as to avoid arguments over the fundamentals. Concrete steps have to be taken instead.

I would now like to invite Ms. Alexandra Jovičević, the Deputy Serbian Minister of Culture, to present her views.

Jovičević

“Husband with an EU passport”

First, I would like to address the visa regime, too. One of our leading artists, Tatjana Ostojic, has staged a whole performance that ran over two or three years and part of her work was presented at the Venice Biennial last year. It was called “I am looking for a husband with an EU passport”. A woman created a site on the Internet where she was looking for this husband and she found him. There was even a wedding a few weeks ago in Belgrade. The whole thing was an ongoing performance in which she tried to demonstrate the troubles we have to go through when we try to get a visa to anywhere.

War tourism

On your tour of Belgrade you may have noticed that we take a pride in war tourism. You can see the buildings destroyed by NATO and those destroyed by the Milosevic regime. You can see the negligence and devastation as well as about a “zillion” kiosks which are definitely going to be the trademark of the Milosevic regime. But there is also something you probably did not notice. There are huge queues in front of the embassies of Austria, Germany, Italy and the other European Union countries. Those queues form during the evening for the next morning. It is an incredible thing and another artist who worked with the Center for Cultural Decontamination also produced a performance on this theme.

I would say that we all know what to do in theory but in practice it is a different matter. Working as a deputy minister for the last year, I have learned to look for possibilities of raising the status of culture in non-typical places. I know that culture is ‘the arts’ but it is also many other things.

Rights of ethnic communities

Here I want to stress something that is very important. A month or so ago a federal law was passed on ethnic communities and their rights. It is one of the most important laws in this country in the last year. This law has drawn attention to the fact that in this country forty percent of the people are non-Serbs. When we are embarking on this kind of education process, I think it is of great importance to say to people that they are not Serbian people but they are citizens of Serbia. In this process the role of the NGOs – Mr. Kempf mentioned 1500 NGOs, 200 of those are active in the cultural sphere – is very important.

Culture as a means to achieve civil rights

With regard to the Stability Pact, as Mr. Pajević well knows, we have been pressing hard for culture to be included in the first round of issues dealing with human rights, minority rights and education and so on. Here we used a “trick”. For example, we told some of the non-governmental organizations to make their applications citing culture as a means of achieving the civil rights, education, and various regional cooperation goals. This worked well in education because about sixty projects were done in that area, some of which dealt with extremely interesting issues such as “Truth and Reconciliation”.

Cultural memory

My colleagues and I are tackling this concept of cultural memory, which has been mentioned here. We have to teach people how to face the recent past but we must also come

to terms with the last fifty years when many atrocities were perpetrated under the guise of ideological correctness. We all know what has gone on in this region. During World War II, for example, the Germans were blamed for everything but, at the same time, a civil war went on in our country, and the four or five wars we have had over the last ten years were probably the legacy of that civil war.

We have to work on these areas before we get into working on the arts but, on the other hand, the arts are a vital force and as has been mentioned several times, in various ex-communist countries artists and intellectuals instigated the revolutions. This was certainly the case here.

Tito was very interested in the arts and whenever you have politicians who are interested in the arts you also have a very high rate of censorship. Between 1945 and 1989 about seventy performances as well as many films and many books were banned. That is strange because there was no official censorship law here. Everything was done by word of mouth, also in the Milosevic era. There are no documents. We are a nation with an oral epic tradition. We avoid written documents and if we have them, we usually destroy them. You can see that from the pitiful state of our archives and libraries, which are really shameful.

Milosevic's influence on our cultural heritage is clear. He was hardly an artistic man. In fact he had no interest at all in anything connected with the arts. He never opened an art exhibition. He never went to a theatre. But that was good for people in the theatre and the arts because they could do whatever they wanted to do. No performance was banned, no exhibition was sanctioned, no book was prohibited. So that was really a fertile era.

Of course, only a few thousand people were involved because in the meantime, we had a huge brain drain when many people left. Nevertheless, because Milosevic and his regime paid no attention to what was going on, we were able to use para-theatrical means and carnival means and artistic means to reach our goals. I believe, therefore, that it was through the work of these intellectuals and artists and others who work in the cultural field that we achieved at least the beginnings of a civil society. I think we should continue to work on this heritage because it may prove to be the most important legacy of this period.

Finally, I would like to mention the wonderful exhibition, which opened yesterday. Its importance reaches far beyond the artistic. It is called "Yugoslav Artistic Space from 1900 until 1991", and it covers the period from the beginning of the 20th century to the downfall of Yugoslavia in 1991. It is important because it is the only space that has been left intact. During all the wars and all the devastation, destruction, and killings, no one has dared to touch this collection. And that is because it was done legally. All these paintings were bought by the museum itself; it is the most wonderful collection set in the context of a dialogue between different "ex-nations" and new nations.

On the question of language we now have a Serbo-Croat, a Bosnian and a Montenegrin language and we all avoid defining it specifically by saying: "Let us speak in our own language – whatever it is." And it is wonderful to hear all these regional dialects in our language. When it comes to defining our priorities for the Minister of Finance and the government, the regional aspect and regional cooperation are always first on my list because they are of primary importance.

Censorship under Tito

Milosevic and the arts

*Beginnings
of a civil society*

*"Yugoslav Artistic Space
from 1900 until 1991"*

Regional languages

*Breaking down
cultural prejudices*

The Slovenians visited our theatres a month ago and this was one of our most important cultural events. So, as you can see, the most important cultural events in Belgrade and the surrounding cities have a regional connection. People are going to see them and are experiencing those connections.

We are beginning to break down cultural barriers and prejudices. The law on ethnic minorities is proving to be very important here. The Ministry of Culture, for example, is working with B 92, which used to be an independent radio station during the Milosevic era. We now have several projects running with them such as the one on Roma music. Roma music is Gypsy music, it is the best in the world. This project gives us the chance to recognize the Gypsy people and all that they have to offer. Several friends of mine took their children along and they said that this was the first time they had been able to see Gypsies in a different context – as wonderful people with great artistic traditions and not just as degraded citizens of this country.

“Silver curtain”

I would conclude by repeating what Mr. Busek said at a recent conference about the danger of an invisible “silver curtain” being constructed between the developed European countries and the less developed countries of Southeast Europe. This is an important matter on which we should focus more and about which we should think very seriously. We need to find more practical, more pragmatic ways of moving forward. Perhaps they might involve fewer conferences, less talking and more practical work.

Discussion

*Making Balkan art
reach Western Europe*

Busek

I have two comments on Ms. Jovičević’s remarks. Firstly, it is certainly a good thing that art exhibitions are taking place in this region. Yet we should also simultaneously make sure this art also reaches Western Europe. I have urged the Museum of Modern Art in Vienna to begin collecting the region’s artwork, some of which is more impressive than art from our regions. Its political and historical background lends it an additional expressive power. As a result of the wars, ethnic cleansing, and all the other events in the region, artists there work in a completely different context.

There are also some misunderstandings stemming from artists from Western countries. They often maintain that artists from the Balkans have not developed in the same way as in the West and are straggling behind in some respects. Yet artists here are working under completely different conditions. I think we have to support the dissemination of their work and the people who are willing to do so. It is not the European Commission’s job to do this, but I think it could provide funding, because I believe it is very important that people elsewhere get a sense of what is happening here.

Competition for writers

Secondly I would like to note that one of the “off-Broadway” theaters has sponsored a competition for writers from the region. Seventy authors took part, of which seven received awards for their work. I experienced two of these events and can only say that they were highly impressive. Therefore I think it is important to help spread their work.

Translations

I have also looked at translations of authors’ work in the region. A series of translations exist from the time when Ivo Andric won the Nobel Prize. Then there comes a huge lapse, during which practically nothing was translated. Since then, matters have improved, and

not only in Serbo-Croatian, which has been almost completely untranslated until now, but also from Albanian and other languages.

Unquestionably, however, something must be done, both here in the region and beyond. I am attempting to assemble the education- and culture ministers of various countries, and intend to ask them to put more pressure on wealthier countries to take action in this field, because there is a lack of information on all the impressive activities in the region, especially in the field of art.

Fetahu

When I returned to Kosovo in 1999 after twelve years in the United States, there was a total breakdown of everything. The destruction was beyond belief. There were mass graves. Refugees were just starting to come back. In that situation there was not too much interest in culture and cultural things. In the meantime, as people have returned and tried to pick up and move on with their lives, the focus of the international community has been on reconstruction and trying to set up some kind of administration, with security issues at the top of the list.

So culture did not make it in anyone's priority list even though UNMIK had a department for culture that was supposed to address some of the issues. The EU, for example, moved into the building of the only museum in Pristina and I understand now that Mr. Rugova is going to take it over as the Presidential Office.

I am, however, proud to say that three years later, there is one cinema operating in Kosovo with brand new projectors. It is totally renovated and it has been very nicely done. It was only after the renovation that they actually remembered they did not have a license to show movies. So that took some time as well because this strange regional agreement involved a certain amount of political correctness in dealings with Serbia or Belgrade. In the end, they did it through Albania, which was much easier for them.

Then there is a theater. Not many shows are actually staged there but nevertheless the building is there. A lack of funds means that most of the actors are trying to get jobs as interpreters because the international presence means there is a need for interpreters and translators. Some of them are actually going even further and are trying to find jobs as drivers – which is pretty good in comparison with doing nothing in the theatre.

There is an art gallery as well and this is one thing that is functioning a little better than the theatre and the cinema. They have exhibitions of Kosovar artists and there is some international cooperation. The last internationally organized event was an exhibition of photography late last year.

Music is almost non-existent in terms of events. We have some private production companies producing rubbish, basically. It is mostly folk and nationalistic music but that is what the market is about – you cannot sell real art in terms of music and so on.

That was the situation after 12th June. But the problems that Kosovo is facing today in terms of culture are also related to the period of discrimination against the Albanians

during the Milosevic years. There was no radio or TV after 1990. The only daily newspaper was also shut down in 1990. Cultural events did not take place or, at least, Albanians were not part of them. We are talking about a gap of a good fifteen to twenty years when there was a lack of cultural events, and there was no cultural development.

Now, we are making some progress, also in the publishing field. There are one or two publishing companies who are bringing out mostly translations of the works of different international authors. In terms of local publishing, the program mostly covers war-related events, folk hero stories, or battles. There is nothing in terms of novels or poetry and since these are not being published, there are no events because you do not go to a book promotion event unless you have a book.

Visa

On the visa issue: A visa is great, if you have a passport. Recent history meant that people who had a Yugoslav passport traveled on that. In the meantime, Yugoslavia has changed its passport. It used to be big and red and now it is small and blue. It looks like a US passport. But in order for Albanians to get a Yugoslav passport, they have to go to an office in Pristina and pay a bribe or a fee. Some people are lucky enough to get one. However, for some reason, this office has also issued twenty thousand fake passports and some people have been caught using them to try to cross different borders.

In the meantime the UN is about to issue a passport for Kosovars or citizens of Kosovo but the problem is that unless there is some kind of regional agreement, the passport will not be any good because you cannot even use it to cross to Macedonia, let alone Serbia or Montenegro. Basically, the only place that Albanians from Kosovo could travel to would be Albania and that, in all fairness, is not much.

Media

With regard to the media: It is very important to stress the role of the media in trying to promote cultural events. I am a little better informed on this issue because I was involved through the OSCE with projects on restructuring public radio and TV in Kosovo right after the war. However, as I said, recent history and the events of the war meant that there was a very intense situation in which media organizations were making great efforts to start broadcasting or publishing or whatever. Therefore you had a boom of radio or TV stations and newspapers.

Some of the media outlets are actually trying to do something in this area but there is still a problem because, as I said, you do not really have any local production of books, music or CDs and so on, thus there is very little to be reported on the local cultural scene. What is being reported is mostly international events like Oscars, Golden Globes, Emmy Awards and international literature.

To sum up, in terms of culture, I do not think much has happened. There have been some conferences and workshops and there were a couple of productions at the National Theatre by a British director. And that's about it. There have been no theatre groups from Belgrade, Montenegro, Bosnia or Macedonia. And there have been no theatre groups going out from Pristina either. So basically, the situation is rather grim.

Busek

There has been quite a bit of activity regarding travel documents for Kosovo. Switzerland is opening a consulate, the Americans are also organizing an office, and several countries of the European Union are likewise working in this direction. This is a serious problem, because at the moment, Podgorica is the only city to which Kosovars can travel directly. This is no real solution because there are problems on the other side as well. Yet UNMIK and the EU know this very well.

I think it is important for us to discuss cultural issues here, but in doing so we should also incorporate social structures, because in some parts of the region, though not all, we are seeing a gradually aging population and problems of social cohesion. The Stability Pact has set up a special group to address the latter problem, but we are making only slow progress in this field. For example, trade unions are lacking in organizational possibilities. In these and other social questions we are dealing with specific problems that require urgent attention.

Ahrens

Once again, our deliberations on culture have failed to mention Tirana, even though Albania has a very interesting culture. This includes not only the internationally recognized writer Ismail Kadare, but a long list of others as well. At present one can ascertain a certain split within society in Tirana. On the one side we have the political class that seems to have only a scant interest in cultural activity in the country, and on the other there is the intellectual elite, which several months ago decided to publish a manifesto signed by many intellectuals that condemned politicians for being concerned mainly with their own careers and self-aggrandizement while practically ignoring the nation's needs.

An interesting aspect of this is that the scientific academies are not always part of the more progressive intellectual elite. I am sure you are all familiar with the notorious memorandum of the Serbian Academy. There is also a memorandum of the Bulgarian Academy. In 1998, the Albanian Academy adopted a manifesto that bears the unmistakable traits of expansionist, Greater-Albanian thinking. That, in turn, produced a corresponding reply from the Macedonian Academy. These academies, it seems, are questionable and their leaders do not necessarily represent their countries' progressive intellectual elites.

Now, the Communist legacy continues to weigh heavily on these countries, but just how heavily is not clear to everyone. In this context I would like to point out two commendable Albanian films. One is titled "Colonel Bunker". It tells the story of an army colonel ordered by the national leader, Enver Hoxha, to build a huge complex of bunkers. Once these bunkers are finished, the entire politburo assembles atop a commanding hill. The colonel is ordered to occupy one of the bunkers, upon which he is bombarded with heavy artillery to see whether the bunker can withstand the barrage. Afterwards, the colonel stumbles out of the bunker, covered in dust and half dead, and is then supposed to be declared a great socialist hero. Yet he refuses to accept the honor, upon which he is incarcerated in an Albanian gulag and subjected to unspeakable abuse. The film is based on a true story.

New consulates

Social cohesion

Culture in Albania

Academia

*Two Albanian films:
"Colonel Bunker"*

<i>“Slogans”</i>	The other film is named “Slogans” and examines the political rallying cries that had to be put up in villages all over the country in honor of Enver Hoxha. This film has just been awarded a prize. These filmmakers are extremely interesting people, as I found out during a recent meeting with Serbian and Albanian journalists and writers. Mr. Reljić was also present. I think the possibilities of developing a productive collaboration with Serbia are very good indeed.
<i>School-books</i>	I would also like to touch upon school texts. Albanian pupils are taught that Aristotle and Alexander the Great were Albanian. Macedonian schools teach that Alexander the Great was Macedonian, in the sense of present-day Macedonia. Greek children, of course, are taught that Alexander and Aristotle were Greeks. I think that much remains to be accomplished in this field.
<i>Civil society</i>	The topic of civil society has also been raised here. Together with a Dutch development aid organization, we have opened five so-called civil society development centers in Albania that are intended to start working together with Albanian NGOs. Yet there is a widespread lack of experience and many are concerned solely with securing funding. This requires intensive separation of the wheat from the chaff. By the way, the trade unions you mentioned, Mr. Busek, hardly play any role at all in Albania. They are merely the extended arms of political parties and do not accomplish much.
<i>Equal rights for women</i>	Another topic in Albania is that of equal rights for women. We have learned, for instance, that Albanian women are much less influenced by the past than are men. Also, the continuing phenomenon of blood feuds and other male rituals affect women far less, indicating that many things could be brought forward more quickly by incorporating women.
<i>Commonalities across the Balkans</i>	<p>I have been traveling throughout the Balkans for half a century now, and have found out that there are a great many things that bind together the people of the region. Examples include cuisine and music and dances, which display many similarities. The shared Communist past has also produced shared experiences. A film such as “Slogans” must also awaken memories among other Southeast European peoples, even if matters were worse in Albania than elsewhere. And I would like to say one more thing about Kosovo. A certain rivalry exists between Tirana and Pristina, and judging by what Mr. Fetahu has said about intellectual life in Pristina, I think Tirana might win the upper hand, because there is a great deal of activity there. What I cannot understand is why Albanians in Pristina do not have more of an interest in the cultural scene in Tirana.</p> <p>In sum, I assert that all peoples of this region are eager to be recognized as Europeans. They all want to develop normal relations with us. That is why I think they will realize sooner, rather than later, that they can only achieve this goal by cooperating with each other. Yet this, too, will only succeed if they all make progress together and nobody is left behind.</p>
<i>Role of intellectuals</i>	<p>Daianu</p> <p>Dr. Jovičević highlighted the important role that intellectuals throughout the region have to play. Intellectuals indeed have a significant impact on the collective psychology of</p>

people. Then intellectuals, who explore the frontiers of moral issues, should be able to influence the political elites in the various countries and to make a contribution toward fostering regional cooperation. What strikes me is that this appears to be scarcely the case in the region.

It may be that there is a big cleavage between cultural life, which involves intellectuals who have clearly made a major contribution to political regime-change in the region, and the rest of what is going on in society. It may be that we will end up with intellectuals who merely export culture. But I have grave reservations that culture is a big export product for the region, as Mr. Busek said.

Culture is a social product in the sense that it comes out of the way society functions as a whole. Culture cannot completely remove itself from the overall functioning of society. Are different processes going on in the average citizen's psychology, on one hand, and in the psychology of the intellectual, on the other hand? This is something which intrigues me because if there is a big difference, then we have a major problem. You cannot just police society. There is a lot of intellectual arrogance here. It is like saying that intellectuals are the guardians of truth and moral rectitude in society and the stupid people in the streets have no idea about these things.

I am just asking myself what should be done because we may have to deal with two different perceptions of history here. People may not be willing to accept what their history books, or intellectuals' narratives, tell them. Two weeks ago on CNN, I watched two movies each of which presented a totally different interpretation of the role of Serbia and the role of Croatia in the events of the last twelve years. The movies were made by highly regarded producers and artists but they presented totally different interpretations of recent years.

We cannot simply accept that intellectuals are a special breed who know how society should be molded. It is much more complicated. Intellectuals, like anyone else, have their own prejudices and their own different interpretations of history and they frequently use a double language. They may use a certain sort of language at international conferences but they may talk differently when they are at home.

On the question of visas, I would be cautious and one should not run the risk of discriminating. We are more lenient toward certain citizens because they are intellectuals or artists but the rest of the people first have to "grow up". I think one could cause a lot of frustration among people at large.

Finally, I think we need to look at sports and how it could be used to foster regional cooperation and I am not necessarily talking about large-scale projects such as the international "Balkan Games" event here. The Olympics have already been mentioned but, unfortunately, that project would prove difficult because Athens is now going to hold the Olympics in 2004 and Greece is also a Balkan country. Nevertheless, we should take a closer look at sports as a means of linking people in the region.

*Culture is
a social product*

Perceptions of history

Sports

*Dialogue among
intellectuals*

Busek

I would like to ask you two more questions, Mr. Daianu. First of all, how well are the intellectuals of this region communicating with intellectuals from the EU and the United States? My impression is that any dialogue that might exist must be a limited one, because mostly it consists of the same people meeting each other. People go from one conference to another, only the hotels are different, while the individuals remain unchanged. I think we should try to intensify the dialogue. Otherwise we would be facing the danger of always holding the same discussions where each participant knows in advance what the other is going to say.

Regarding sports, most soccer players, for example, are already signed on to Western clubs. Not many Austrians play in the Austrian first league any more. This, I think, is a healthy exchange, and the migration aspect of it functions very well.

Altmann

*“Marathon for peace
and tolerance”*

Mr. Daianu mentioned sports, a field that, in many countries, is under the supervision of the culture or education ministry. Keeping that in mind, I would like to draw your attention to an event that took place last Sunday in Pristina, an international marathon held under the motto “marathon for peace and tolerance”. About 700 runners from the region took part, from Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia – as well as some Germans. It was an impressive, peaceful event that displayed the contacts that have developed in the region.

Yet athletes are also a highly prized export. Just think of all the well-paid Yugoslav basketball players who can be found throughout the European teams.

Anastasijević

The winner of the marathon in Pristina was an Albanian. He was reported to be an Albanian from Macedonia in the Pristina media. It turned out that he was actually born in Belgrade and was a member of the Belgrade athletics association. That bit of news did not make it to the newspaper in Pristina, unfortunately.

Reljić

Mr. Busek and I are members of the board of curators of the Thessaloniki-based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Eastern Europe. This institute, which is currently under the direction of Robert Shifter, the former Vice-President of the US National Security Council, has carried out some projects that I think are particularly important.

*Nationalism
in history textbooks*

These include a comparative study of history textbooks in Southeast Europe. The findings of this study, which were presented in early 2002 at a conference in Athens that included historians from Slovenia and Turkey, confirm everything that Mr. Ahrens has said. Nationalism is alive and well in the region and is being institutionally reproduced, for example in schools and textbooks. The next phase of the project is not supposed to work out any uniform standards for history textbooks, but at least indicate how to get rid of

fundamental historical absurdities that are still found in history texts and contribute to perpetuating a nationalist consciousness in the individual countries.

I would like to make two further points. The first has to do with the freedom of movement for people, goods, and ideas in Southeast Europe. The other one asks how this region can become its own subject vis-à-vis the EU.

Concerning the freedom of movement for people, goods, and ideas, I cannot endorse Mr. Kempf's remarks strongly enough. Visa requirements are more than a technical problem; they are also a political and, if you will, even an ideological problem. Germany could and should take the lead in helping abolish the visa requirements for Serbia, Montenegro, and other countries in the region, and not only because of its weight within the EU. This issue cannot be resolved by the EU bureaucracy alone, because there are, after all, member states with greater or lesser influence, and without a doubt, Germany carries a good deal of influence in this respect.

We should keep in mind that, between 1968 and 1991, no visa requirements existed between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and most European Union countries. It was introduced between 1989 and 1992, mostly through German pressure. The initial reason was the growing number of asylum-seekers, who in 1989 constituted about 3500 applications per month. The conservative-liberal government in Bonn at the time gradually imposed travel restrictions, and in 1991, without initially seeking changes in existing agreements, introduced de facto visa requirements, because other border crossings were treating citizens of the Yugoslav Federation accordingly.

In the course of 1992 and 1993, Yugoslavia – or now Serbia and Montenegro – was subjected to international sanctions against Belgrade and, according to the Schengen Agreement, was placed on a list of states whose citizens would be required to apply for visas. In my opinion, abolishing these requirements, for example with the signing of the Stability- and Association Pact, would be an important symbolic gesture, making clear that the EU acknowledges the European identity of this region. In other words, we are dealing here with a political issue of great symbolic significance instead of a purely technical problem.

Incidentally, the number of asylum seekers from Serbia and Montenegro now hovers at around 400 per month, of which 0.2 percent are actually approved. Let us also keep in mind that about 700 000 people from Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, are currently living in Germany. Many of them still hold passports issued by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is the largest cohort of such people within the EU, and it has become exceedingly difficult for them to maintain family contacts, for example to invite grandmothers, mothers, or fathers to Germany. I therefore add my endorsement to Mr. Kempf's appeal.

The question of an institutional subject vis-à-vis the EU was also raised. You all remember Henry Kissinger's sarcastic question, "When I want to contact the European Union, what number do I call?" For a long time the EU did indeed not have any telephone number for its foreign policy. Today it is the number of Javier Solana. The countries of Southeast Europe currently communicate with the EU on a bilateral basis. I wonder, then,

*Abolishing
visa requirements*

Asylum seekers

*An institutional identity
for Southeast Europe*

whether establishing another institutional subject that could concentrate the region's common interests would succeed.

An old saying has it that the Balkans begin at Vienna's Rennweg, because there coffee is served with a glass of water. Yet Mr. Busek, even if he is an Austrian, is hardly the right person to represent the region's interests as a whole in the context of the Stability Pact. On the other hand it might be an illusion to immediately create a new institution, perhaps a kind of Southeast European OSCE, a wing of NATO, or a subdivision of the EU for Southeast Europe.

*Bilateral talks
are not sufficient*

Yet it is also clear that bilateral talks with the EU alone are not sufficient. When the EU negotiates with accession candidates or with candidates in the second or third round, it imposes demands, as Ms. Primatarova has shown us. These states, including Bulgaria, Romania, and so forth, have to fulfill a series of conditions without being able to vigorously represent their joint interests. As a result, these interests often fall by the wayside.

*Increasing communication
between the EU
and Southeast Europe*

All of us should consider whether there is a possibility of establishing one or more new institutions in the longer term, or more rapidly equipping existing institutions such as the Stability Pact to heighten the flow of communication between the EU and Southeast Europe. In this way we could bridge the ten to twenty years that will probably be needed before these countries can join the European Union or NATO. If everything remains at the level of bilateral communication, then I fear that individual alliances will emerge that correspond to the historical ties among some Central- and Southeast European countries. This would be counterproductive, in my opinion. I think we need a "grand plan", a courageous draft that would make possible a qualitative leap in relations between the EU and the countries of Southeast Europe.

Anastasijević

Mr. Reljić, let me just mention that it was France which first introduced visas for Yugoslavia in 1988 or 1989.

Busek

I think, Mr. Reljić, that we are moving in precisely this direction. It has not been easy, but it is part of the Stability Pact. Yet we have to make further progress along the way. Establishing new institutions might not be of much help. The Greeks would want the secretariat in Thessaloniki, others would demand it be based in Bucharest, and so on. Mr. Schaefer and I, however, are working specifically on this topic.

*No alternative
to EU membership*

By now the countries in the region are getting the impression that, if we push them in this direction, then we are giving them a mere alternative to possible EU membership. This temptation really does exist within the EU, and I think we should avoid it. Just think of the European Economic Area, which was supposed to function as a kind of intermediate step to the accession of Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Austria. This is not the direction I think the matter should be moving in.

I also have one comment on the Kissinger story with the telephone number. At a con-

ference sponsored by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Javier Solana said in Kissinger's presence, "Henry, we have a telephone number now". Kissinger, who had dozed off a bit, immediately woke up and rejoined, "I know, but what area code should I use?"

Eiff

I also agree with Mr. Kempf's and Mr. Reljić's remarks concerning the lifting of visa restrictions. Yet since the Schengen Agreement came into effect, the decision is no longer up to Germany alone, which makes abolishing the requirements all the more difficult.

It is true that there were no visa requirements for Yugoslav citizens in Germany between 1968 and 1991. The German cabinet did decide to reintroduce them in 1989. The reason was that Germany saw itself subjected to a growing influx of ethnic Albanian asylum seekers, mainly from Kosovo but also from other parts of Yugoslavia, that was threatening to get out of control. Yet the decree was not immediately implemented out of consideration for Yugoslavia. After the country began to disintegrate, Slovenia and Croatia remained visa-free countries, whereas visa obligations were introduced for the remaining successor states. The original reason for the requirements' introduction no longer exists today to the same extent as it did earlier.

Today, the main reason given by EU countries for holding onto visa requirements is the difficult situation in their respective labor markets.

For those people in Yugoslav successor states affected by visa requirements, especially if they were accustomed earlier to unrestricted travel, the new rules are difficult to accept. It is difficult to explain to the holder of a Serbian or Macedonian passport why he or she should be treated differently than a Croatian. The possibility that a Serbian or Macedonian might be able to help who, by chance, also holds another passport, cannot be considered a solution.

On the subject of differing views of history, which has been a cause and consequence of conflicts in more places than just in the Balkans, one can refer to the experience of Germany after World War II with its neighbors France and Poland. A protracted but finally successful dialogue took place over aligning the portrayal of recent history in schoolbooks. Not too long ago, however, one was still ridiculed as naïve if one came forward with suggestions like this. By now such projects are also underway in the Balkans, which is a development that should be warmly welcomed.

With this in mind I would like to discuss briefly the differences in cultural self-images among the neighboring countries here. By manipulating these differences to influence public opinion, politicians and other individuals contributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia and to the wars that followed.

Please allow me to cite three quotations that came to my attention, courtesy of a 1996 conference paper by the Serbian ethnologist Ivan Colovic.

First, the late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in a *Spiegel* interview: "All the republics of Yugoslavia have special cultural traditions, either in a Western or a Byzantine context".

Visa restrictions

Differing views of history

In 1991, a member of the Slovenian government expressed this even more clearly. He referred to a “violent and degenerate Byzantine legacy”, contrasted this with the “Western Catholic tradition of modesty and diligence”, and concluded that “both cannot exist together within one state”. Finally, a Serb priest said in 1993: “The West has been overrun and captured by the worldly. This is why the West does not believe in heaven. And this is why it is our enemy. You, the people of the West, have been forsaken by God and the kingdom of heaven.” These words could have been uttered by an Islamic fundamentalist.

One can only hope that, after the wars and through the efforts of a younger generation of political leaders, such opinions will be given only marginal attention. Yet we should not simply disregard these standpoints. This is why I would be interested in knowing how people in Serbia regard this “East-West” problem.

Busek

As a devout Catholic I can assure you, Mr. Eiff: the possibilities for heresy are unlimited. Theology, unfortunately, is full of examples of this.

*Visa restrictions
within the region*

I would just like to make one comment on the visa issue. The European Union and the Schengen regime are not the only considerations. Visa restrictions also exist within the region. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have recently introduced new visa requirements for countries in the region that the people affected consider painful. The Turks have also complained bitterly that they suddenly need a visa for Bulgaria, something that greatly damages economic ties. This is a result of Schengen.

Schaefer

Stability Pact funds

In his contribution, Mr. Kempf addressed both the Stability Pact and the German government with a mixture of praise and criticism. I would like to make one main point. The German government’s performance in quickly and effectively funding the Stability Pact has been unparalleled: 300 million deutschmarks annually over a period of four years. I am quite confident that we will be able to extend this commitment at a similar level.

I would also like to turn our attention to one problem. Our first priority after establishing the Stability Pact has been to support democratic transformation in Serbia. That means the funding in Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact has essentially been earmarked for Serbia. Support went into independent cities, the media, and, as Mr. Kempf pointed out, a series of important cultural projects. We can say that, since mid-2000, the situation in Serbia has stabilized significantly. Since then we have targeted the money at our disposal at all the countries of Southeast Europe. This means we were forced to correspondingly cut funding for Serbia. Countries such as Bosnia, Macedonia, or Albania also have a right to see their projects financed. We have to jointly decide where to set our priorities.

*Stability Pact
as a catalyst and
coordinating mechanism*

I turn now to the occasionally heard accusation that the Stability Pact does not do enough. It is often said that only the Germans and the Americans, and in some cases the Dutch and Swedes are active, but not the Stability Pact. At the core of this judgment lies a misunderstanding. It may not have been made clear enough to the people of the region – including the political elite – that the Stability Pact has no money of its own. Rather, it is meant as

a catalyst, a coordinating mechanism put in place to assure that bilateral funding is used effectively. This, however, is where the Stability Pact plays the decisive role. The funding comes ultimately from EU member states, with Germany in first place. In the absence of the Security Pact, which was established to promote the stability of the region as a whole, Germany would certainly not have provided funding of this magnitude. I think this should be taken into account when criticizing the Security Pact.

As for the topic of visa regulations, I also think that improvements are needed, but I also think they will not be easy to implement. The visa question is a joint EU affair. This means that the individual member states do not exercise any direct unilateral influence on individual issues, despite demands to the contrary. This is the responsibility of the European Commission, for example regarding agricultural subsidies. Of course, the governments can apply political pressure toward such decisions as long as there is a consensus within the country, but here, too, contrasting interests compete with one another. The interior authorities generally differ in their stance on these issues from their respective foreign ministries. I agree with the Special Coordinator Mr. Busek when he says that this question regarding the Stability Pact has to be taken to the European Commission.

Mr. Busek also mentioned in this context the visa requirements within the region itself. I think we should work through the Stability Pact to dismantle these obstacles in the region as quickly as possible. Facilitated travel conditions within the region are an important prerequisite for heightened regional cooperation.

I also have something to say about the International War Crimes Tribunal. This is a matter of guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation. It is a matter that has to be taken up within Serbia and the neighboring states in the region. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch or the Helsinki Committee could assist in making it easier for the affected populations to take a more objective view of both the recent and more distant past. I explicitly cite in this respect the ongoing efforts to establish truth commissions. Much remains to be done in this field if we are to register progress in coming to grips with the past. All countries in the region must take part.

The International War Crimes Court for Former Yugoslavia takes on a special significance here. I have noticed with some concern that since the beginning of the Milosevic trial, a kind of legend-building has been taking place in Serbia and in parts of the international community. Through tendentious reporting of the trial, this process has led to falsifications of reality within public opinion here.

I wish to emphasize once again that the Hague tribunal does not exist to pass judgment on the Serbian people. We have fought for decades for the establishment of a permanent international criminal jurisdiction; two days ago the Rome Statute for the standing International Criminal Court went into effect. This is a quantum leap for international law. We can now systematically – and globally – come to grips with the massive problem of people who committed the most heinous crimes remaining immune from prosecution.

The permanent International Criminal Court will still require some time before it can become effectively active. Until then, the ad hoc courts set up by the UN Security Council will retain their significance. As long as there is no national court in Serbia capable and

Visa regulations

*International War Crimes
Tribunal*

willing to take up the matter of prosecuting those who fall under the status of this court, we will need an international criminal court that hands down verdicts on the basis of incontrovertible evidence. And again I stress: not only Serb suspects but also Croatians and Bosnians stand before the Hague tribunal; and I am certain that Albanian war criminals will also be held responsible there for their actions, as soon as the appropriate evidence becomes available.

Finally I would like to share two remarks on a European vision for this region, especially on how the time before a possible EU accession can be bridged.

Euro-Atlantic structures

Firstly, it is not a matter of integration in the European Union, but also in Euro-Atlantic structures. These include the Council of Europe and membership in the “Partnership for Peace” in the field of security policy, then membership in the stabilization and association process with the EU. These are a multitude of concrete steps that will gradually lead the countries of this region toward mature European structures.

Visions

Secondly, there is no lack of visions out there. What matters is bringing all these visions for the region, including ones we hold, into alignment with one another. When I ask people here about their political goals, they say, “We want to join Europe”. Yet what demands on Europe are they bringing with them? First and foremost, they want to join a “rich men’s club”, to use the words of Mr. Reljić. However, the EU is not primarily an economic zone as it was during the time of the European Community, but a community of laws and values. This point is appreciated far too little. This is why aligning oneself with the European Union means much more than becoming integrated in its economic structures. It primarily means accepting its system of values that gradually took hold in the states of Central Europe only during a lengthy and difficult process. Much will depend on instilling this consciousness in the region’s people and politicians. If they want to go with Europe, they will be able to do so only by accepting this “acquis”.

Busek

I agree particularly with Mr. Schaefer’s last point. Understanding that going with Europe means establishing the rule of law is the real challenge for this region’s countries.

Altmann

Binding schedule for Europe?

I think the steps toward the EU have been clearly marked out, but this does not mean that we can speak yet of a binding schedule. Much will depend on how these countries deal with their individual problems. However, the further development of the EU will also greatly influence the process. This is why I think any talk of a timetable at this point would be premature and hardly credible.

Adriatic-Ionian Initiative

For two years now there has existed the so-called Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, to which Yugoslavia has belonged since November 2000. This initiative seeks mainly to strengthen cultural relations, such as cooperation in the tourism sector. A declaration was approved in Ravenna that aims at improving cooperation among universities in the Adriatic-Ionian region. This includes establishing a virtual university called UNIADRION, consisting solely of a network. Most of this project, however, still exists only on paper.

One could also mention the field of nature and the environment, in which the countries of the region want to open a dialogue with Greece and Italy.

My question is whether there are signs of closer regional cooperation in cultural matters.

Anastasijević

I think we have to take very seriously into account what Mr. Djelić mentioned and I think we need to repeat that we do have an unprecedented situation for this region in that all the governments, while fragile, are still democratic. This should be used to promote the whole region and to help us catch up in economic and in political terms. Certainly, we know that this is going to be very hard without external help and we know that our partner will be the European Union rather than the United States, especially after the events of 11th September.

We have heard the word “vision” frequently here. I believe that there is no lack of vision either on the regional side or on the European Union’s side. The region wants membership in the EU as quickly as possible, it wants access to El Dorado, and the EU wants to have this region pacified because, when it comes down to it, we all agree that the costs of prevention are much lower than the costs of repairing damage, as the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show.

However, whether we are talking about the regional governments or the European Union I would like to see the strategy. We have the vision – it is a great, big flashing EU sign – but there is still very little understanding of what the EU is all about and what integration is all about.

On the question of visas, we should not forget that this issue has great symbolic significance. It is not going to provide a fast track for promoting the movement of people and goods and ideas but it could be vital in removing the stigma that one is not quite acceptable. Travel in the region does present a huge problem, however, and it is not only a visa problem. I think that anyone who did not fly here could tell you an anecdote about how they reached Belgrade. Mr. Ahrens, for example, had to travel to Podgorica by car, and that is a journey of around five hours, before taking a plane to Belgrade.

It is very hard to travel within the region and hearing these stories reminded me of how we all focus on the European Union while still having very little knowledge about our neighbors. We do not care about the elections in Hungary which have just taken place. We do not know who the prime minister of Bulgaria is and most of us do not know who the Romanian president is. But we do know who Solana is and we know about Condoleezza Rice and so on. This is an aspect where culture can help to facilitate our relationships within the region in a relatively short time but, of course, we have to do something about the travel situation here because it is sometimes extremely painful.

I recently visited Tirana with a group of Serbian journalists. There we met the Mayor who is also a well-known conceptual artist and a very interesting character. He is famous, for example, for painting bunkers pink and red. He was extremely frank with us and he said he had not liked Serbs much at all because of what he had heard about the wars in Bosnia

Visions

*Traveling
in the region*

and Kosovo and relations with Kosovars and so on. But then, in Stockholm, he met a conceptual artist from Belgrade and he totally changed his mind. He said that he was now ashamed for being so full of prejudices because he had discovered that there is a whole different dimension involved.

Situation of minorities

I mention this story because the situation of minorities here is still not good. We need some mechanism to ensure the de-securitization of minorities. Throughout the region, and especially in my country, minorities are still treated as a security risk, and this is extremely bad. We do happen to be a multi-ethnic society even if we are not yet a multi-cultural society, but culture can, at least in the initial phase, help us to tear down the preconceived images and prejudices we have about each other.

When we got back to Belgrade from Tirana, I discovered just how little we know about them – nothing at all, in fact. People asked me the most ridiculous questions about Albania, about what kind of clothes they wear and so on. I might just as well have been on a visit to Mars.

“Vergangenheitsbewältigung”

I must now touch on the issue of coming to terms with our past. “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” is one of the very few words I know in German. The Hague Tribunal is just one aspect of the whole story and neither we, as a society, nor the international community should expect that some sort of catharsis will be achieved through the Tribunal. Nuremberg did not do it in Germany. It is just one element in the process. It will prosecute a very limited number of people and, if I want to stay in this country, then I will always have to bear in mind that many people who have a lot of blood on their hands will never go to the Hague Tribunal because there is no capacity to prosecute all the war criminals. This is primarily an issue for our own society.

Rule of law

Civil society is trying to tackle the issue with certain projects. There are certain organizations that are working on it. Nevertheless, we do need political support from the establishment in order to open this issue in a more profound way. For that we need the rule of law because there is nothing in our constitution or our law which prohibits us from prosecuting our own war criminals who will not give themselves up. We need a fresh approach to the debate in the interest of our society.

Negative image of the Balkans

We have a responsibility not only toward neighbors such as Bosnia and Croatia but also toward Bulgaria and Romania because they have also been tainted by this Balkan image of general instability. Romania is not so unstable – it was Yugoslavia which disintegrated. So, we need the rule of law and strong legal institutions in this country if we are to pursue our goals. Of course, the rest will have to be done through a much longer process, which will probably take decades but this would be a start.

Busek

Regional airlines

Freedom of travel is indeed a decisive problem. Currently I am fighting for the establishment of a regional airline. The problem is, however, that each airline in the region is convinced that it already is the regional carrier. Today everyone who wants to travel among the region’s capitals has to fly via Munich or Vienna. This is very expensive nonsense.

I should also explicitly mention that Yugoslav airspace is still closed. I do not think it would be possible at the moment for an Austrian airline to open up a route between Vienna and Podgorica. When one uses a private airplane, one has to fly around Yugoslav airspace. This is not the fault of NATO. The leading figures of the business community and multinational corporations want to use their own planes, and there is no more war that could serve as an excuse to prevent them from doing so. So let us return to normality!

Knaus

Not long ago, one of our employees who was in Bosnia researching the land reform in towns and villages – a very topical subject there – went to the Bosnian National Archive to borrow some documents. Her first impression was what a sleepy institution it was. She was told that hardly anyone came there. She was also told that she would need special permission from the Bosnian Presidency for most of the books she wanted to borrow. These were books from the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. I think this vividly illustrates what the situation there is like.

While the region often speaks of history, above all ancient history, discussion of more recent history takes place on a very low level, even if there are some remarkable exceptions, including a group of outstanding institutes in the region. In general, however, very little is known about how people in the region really live today. One can be easily distracted by the achievements of higher culture in Belgrade, because what Mr. Fetahu told us about Kosovo is also true for other parts of the Balkans.

How can we find out more about societies where in some places practically everything has changed, where countless people have left their homelands? Completely new societies have emerged in these cities, and we know little about them. This is one of the biggest problems for the political class, which has difficulties including the population in its reform programs. Also difficult to explain is the discussion over Europe with all the associated concepts. This is also a problem in our societies, but is much more severe in the Balkans.

I now visit Kosovo quite frequently, and Bosnia has many similar difficulties. After the war many cultural events were held in Kosovo. Many artists went down there, in a kind of humanitarian gesture. This trend has been waning recently, however, which could give the impression that Kosovo has no culture. This kind of impression, in turn, reinforces exactly those prejudices already present within and beyond the Balkans. There is no national theater, no exhibitions take place, so there is no culture, so the argument goes. Very little is being done to research how Kosovars in central Kosovo live, or Albanians in northern Albania, or Bosnians in Zenica, or how Serbians live in the smaller cities of Serbia, what they think, or what their incredibly moving lives have been like. All this is being hardly researched and discussed very little.

By the way, this is not something that happened recently. It was also the case under Communism, just as during earlier eras. The contrasts between the cities and the land, between a European elite and a relatively backward countryside that is regarded patronizingly is of course a major problem for democracy here as well as in Western Europe. We discuss the Balkans very little in Western Europe. The East European Institute of

Dealing with history

Lack of knowledge

Prejudices

*Contrast cities –
countryside*

*Partnerships
between cities?*

Berlin's Free University is fighting for survival. What little research there is deals mainly with the distant past, and with the present situation in the Balkans hardly at all.

Sorić

Mr. Kempf spoke of intensifying partnerships, for instance those between cities in Serbia and the West. Achieving this could prove to be difficult at present because of Serbia's disastrous image in the Western media, especially in Germany and Austria. I think that will have to change because for the time being, no German mayor would even think of entering into a partnership with a Serbian city. Yet, exceptions do prove the rule, as the example Dortmund – Novi Sad shows.

Role of intellectuals

We should not have any illusions regarding the role of intellectuals. Many of them all over the Balkans share the culpability for what happened in the 1990s. Myths dating from the Middle Ages still color the thinking of many intellectuals, including ethnic Croats, Serbs, and Albanians equally. People have to stand up and fight these myths.

Recently I joined Zoran Jacev and a group of young leaders from all Balkan countries, Turkey, and Greece, to consider how to counteract the perpetuation of such myths. All the projects we thought of might cost money, but it would be money very well invested. For example, one could assemble young people from various countries to revise the legends in history books as a group. This may be arduous, but enormously important.

Busek

Intellectuals in the Balkans did indeed contribute to nationalism, Mr. Sorić. I experienced for myself in Belgrade how people demanded of a remarkable democratic movement: First Kosovo and then democracy! – a tragically false conclusion, as we know today. Yet to be fair, we must remember that without the commitment of intellectuals – for example at the independent radio station B92 – the transformation in Belgrade would hardly have been possible. That means that a learning process has taken place.

Intellectuals were a key element in all transformation processes behind the Iron Curtain, for example Solidarnosc in Poland or Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia. Other examples could be cited for other countries. Investigating these roles more closely would be, in my opinion, an important task for contemporary historians.

Wehmeier

*Körber Foundation
projects promoting
understanding
among peoples*

The Körber Foundation considers the initiation of projects promoting understanding among peoples to be one of its most important missions. This is especially true for the historical and political dialogue in Europe. For thirty years now, the Foundation has been sponsoring a school competition in Germany for pupils between ten and twenty years old. These youngsters are given a nationally standardized theme to research and write about in the context of their local environment. This is exactly what is missing here in the region. Mr. Knaus rightly pointed out that people here do not really know their recent history. This is an excellent way of coming to grips with one's past.

Three years ago the Körber Foundation began building up a Europe-wide network under the name “Eustory”, which combines both “Europe” and “History”. By now, fourteen countries have joined this network, including Belarus, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, and some Western countries. In these countries, the Körber Foundation is working together with local organizations – mostly NGOs and educational institutions – to establish other competitions modeled on the Foundation’s competition in Germany.

“Eustory”

I can offer to the representatives of Southeast European Countries that the Körber Foundation would organize information drives about this initiative in their countries. This kind of project would give young people in the region the chance to research their own history, especially after the events of recent years. Our concept would also invite the winners of the individual competitions to an international campus, to enable them to share their experiences and learn about other people’s problems and points of view.

Mr. Sorić, if one of your concerns is that the projects you devised with others are too costly, let me assure you that our fourteen-country Eustory competition is a relative bargain. Another advantage is that it can be initiated quickly.

Busek

I think, Mr. Wehmeier, that this Eustory project could be interesting for the Graz Process within the framework of the Stability Pact. Contacts could also be made easily with Thessaloniki’s Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.

Bulović

Everyone here probably knows well that the churches and religious communities in former Yugoslavia greatly influenced the people’s culture and consciousness. Expressed more drastically, religious affiliation has decisively marked the people’s identities. In many areas of Greater Yugoslavia one can meet people who seem practically identical until it emerges that certain people are Serbs and belong unanimously to the Serbian Orthodox Church, or are of Croatian heritage, and are therefore definitely Catholic. A special problem in this respect are the mixed marriages, in which the influences of two religions compete with each other and cause a variety of difficulties.

Role of churches and religious communities

On the other hand I would like to stress that the churches are not the cause of antagonism, estrangement, and division within these societies, and can in their own way, in fact, contribute much more toward integration and reconciliation among people than they have in the past. And when I speak of churches, I also mean the other religions present in the area, in particular the Jewish and Muslim communities. The important thing to make people understand is that integration and living together do not mean that their own identities, cultures, histories and self-images are being called into question, let alone attacked.

Of course, I am well aware of how many misunderstandings and prejudices some church representatives harbor, in Serbia just as in other countries, and that some remarks coming from church circles are completely unacceptable, even reprehensible. Such things run

Prejudices of religions

contrary to our Christian sensibilities as well as our common cultural heritage as Europeans.

Unfortunately, however, I also have to acknowledge that biased and unjustified attitudes also exist in Western countries, as I have learned again and again from my many visits there. For example, one hears that the Orthodox Church is not part of the European tradition because it represents a completely different culture. Another common utterance is that so-called Byzantinism or obscurantism was one of the major causes of the conflicts in the Balkans, and so on.

*Human rights
and human love*

These misunderstandings are mainly directed at the Serbian Orthodox Church. I would like to share with you a personal experience of mine from a conference dealing with the dialogue of Christian churches on the subject of human rights. I argued there that the emphasis on human rights would lead to a kind of intellectual trap if one did not keep in mind the teachings of the Gospels and the Apostle Paul's Hymn to Love. I merely wanted to point out that when we Christians omit brotherly love from our ideals and speak only about human rights, which lie much lower in importance, then we have already fallen a good deal. This is because human rights demand only superficial tolerance, while love of one's neighbor signifies an acceptance of others to the extent that one cannot live without those who think otherwise. What do the Western journalists write the next day in their newspapers? The Serbian bishop has publicly denounced human rights. In this way, my attempt to understand human rights within the spirit of love was misinterpreted.

Of course, I also recently heard about a retired Orthodox priest who made stupid and reprehensible comments about Jews on the day of the Jewish Passover holiday. Yet these are isolated cases that reflect neither the official position of the Orthodox Church in the region nor those of other churches and religious communities.

*Contact
between the churches
never broke off*

I would only like to point out that even during the war years, during the ghastly conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and elsewhere, contact was never broken off between the churches and other religious congregations. Few in Western Europe know that we have always worked together. The region's media also largely declined to publicize this fact and seldom reported on it. There are standing official commissions that maintain the dialogue between the bishops' conferences in Croatia and Bosnia and the Episcopal Assembly of Serbia and Yugoslavia. I should also mention the Vlatadon Initiative, as it is known, which keeps church leaders, imams, muftis, and rabbis in constant communication, so as to be able to jointly act in the name of reconciliation. This, too, is hardly known.

A few months ago, representatives of this initiative were received in Brussels by the European Commission, and a Rabbi used the occasion to express gratitude, in the name of the entire Yugoslav delegation, that this meeting had come to pass. For us, such occurrences are quite normal and hardly the exception in trying to improve the image of the churches.

Close relations also exist with the churches of Western Europe. In this context I would like to mention Bishop Homeyer, who is active with the European Union. The same goes for other bishops, the German Lutheran Church, as well as the Norwegian, Swiss, and other churches.

My purpose here is to say that we need support to help the churches once again assume their real and authentic places in the societies of Southeast Europe and help reanimate their people through their aura of tradition and culture. Above all we must prevent our churches from being abused for nationalist or other political ends.

Permit me, in conclusion, to tell you a small anecdote. At a meeting of church representatives from the greater region, a bishop from Macedonia spoke about Alexander the Great and said that he felt not only the blood of our Slav ancestors but of Alexander the Great in his veins. At that point I had to reply, and said that I felt even more ancient and more important blood in my veins, namely that of Adam and Eve. We very often forget this important truth.

Who or what we are will always be a puzzle. In any case, there is very much more that binds this region, even with Western Europe, than what divides it. If the churches and religious communities in our region receive the proper support from our friends in Western Europe, we will succeed in bringing Southeast Europe along the path toward European integration. I think the churches and religious communities could and should play a very helpful part in this process.

Busek

To conclude this intensive discussion, permit me to identify some concrete objectives that we should pursue further.

Firstly, we should address visa requirements within the framework of the Stability Pact. This is directed less toward the European Union than the region's countries. We have also put forward several proposals on how this aim can be realized.

Secondly, I would like to urge that cultural exchanges be expanded. We have already taken the first steps, but some EU and regional governments still have to be reminded to commit themselves more vigorously in this respect and to support existing initiatives.

Thirdly, we have to concentrate more on education. In this context I regard the Graz Process and the revision of history textbooks as exceedingly important.

Fourthly, I refer to the meeting of regional initiatives on April 23, 2002. These initiatives have to be coordinated to eliminate redundancies and to ensure that problems we have discussed here are addressed more efficiently. For instance, the Central European Initiative (CEI) concentrates on the subjects of culture and universities within the framework of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, which has been mentioned in this circle.

Fifthly, we should pay more attention to the question of social cohesion. I consider this field hugely important and believe that we should incorporate both the role of trade unions and issues surrounding the aging population.

To support our efforts at reaching these goals, I would very much welcome the Bergedorf Round Table's continued commitment to the region. We need events at an informal level like this because they make discussion of delicate issues easier and more frank than at

*More binding
than dividing elements*

Objectives:

Visa regulations

Cultural exchanges

Education

*Coordinating
regional initiatives*

Social cohesion

Informal events

official meetings. That is, after all, the nature of politics and international institutions. This is a major asset of informal conferences that produce new insights while allowing the participants to make each other's acquaintance more easily.

von Weizsäcker

In concluding I would like to emphasize once again that the Bergedorf Round Table is a private initiative that does not seek to instruct anyone, yet regards itself as committed to what could be termed a culture of learning, so as to promote and improve the processes of understanding in our growing Europe.

Early in the 1990s, the member states of the European Community had highly diverse attitudes toward, and relations with, the countries of the Balkans. Not least in Germany, people harbored prejudices against this region that certainly have not yet been sufficiently dissipated. This was also a reason why we considered it so important to hold this conference in Belgrade, to hone our powers of discernment regarding this country and rectify prejudice. I think that the representatives of the government here have provided important contributions and I express my deep gratitude to them for their candid and detailed additions to our discussion.

We also owe a debt of gratitude for many new insights in this discussion to the experts and those carrying responsibility within the European Union and other Western institutions who are active in the region and make an effort to alleviate the difficult situation in the Balkans after the collapse of the multiethnic Yugoslav state by promoting more regional cooperation. They, too, do not always have an easy time within their organizations in overcoming existing bias and pursuing policies suited to the conditions on the ground.

This also applies not least to the moderator of our deliberations, Mr. Busek, who hails from Austria, a country that has special experience with the Southeast European region and knows the meaning of coexistence in a multiethnic and multicultural setting. Your deep personal commitment to the Balkans, Mr. Busek, distinguishes you all the more. Your equally sensitive and succinct leadership of our meeting has proven this once again.

In the name of all participants, I would also like to thank Mr. Ahtisaari again, who chaired our meetings yesterday with much eloquence and spirit.

Explanatory note:

This Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants' oral contributions.

ANNEX

Speakers

Dr. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens

born 1934

Head of OSCE Presence in Tirana; 1999 Special Envoy of the European Presidency to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 1996–1999 Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bogotá, Colombia; 1996 Director for Asian Affairs, German Foreign Office, Bonn; 1992–1996 Ambassador at Large at the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia; 1991 Head of the German contingent of the EC Monitor Mission in Croatia.

Page: 29, 42, 85, 109

Martti Ahtisaari

born 1937

1994–2000 President of the Republic of Finland; Chairman of the International Crisis Group, Brussels; Co-Chairman of the EastWest Institute, New York; Chairman of the Balkan Children and Youth Foundation; Member of the Board of Directors of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA); Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Finnish Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries; Head of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI); 2000 Co-author of the “Three Wise Men” Report on Austria; 1999 EU Special Envoy to Kosovo; 1992–1993 Chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Working Group of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

Page: 17, 21, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 40, 42, 53, 57, 60, 61, 68, 72, 82, 92, 98

Dr. Franz-Lothar Altmann

born 1942

Head of research unit for Southeast Europe at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin; Director of the Board of the German Association for East European Studies (Osteuropakunde e.V.); Member of the Board of the Southeast Europe Association; Editor-in-Chief of “Osteuropa-Wirtschaft” and of “Südosteuropa”.

Page: 33, 91, 112, 118

Dužanka Anastasijević

Journalist, translator and editor of the weekly magazine “Vreme”, Belgrade; Adviser to the Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Centre; 1999–2001 Reporter for the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights; 1998 Conference Coordinator of the International Conferences “Media for a Democratic Europe” and “Truth, Responsibility and Reconciliation”; since 1997 Contributing Writer for “Time Magazine” and “Die Woche”; 1991–1999 Interpreter and Advisor for the international press, including “The New York Times”, “Time Magazine”, “Chicago Tribune”, “BBC World Affairs”, “Dagbladet”.

Page: 57, 112, 114, 119

Andy Bearpark

Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for reconstruction in Kosovo (EU/UNMIK); 1998 Deputy High Representative for the Reconstruction and Return Task Force, Sarajevo; 1991–1997 Head of Information and Emergency Aid Departments of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA); 1991–1995 Press Secretary to the ODA Minister Baroness Chalker; 1990 Chief of Staff to Lady Thatcher.

Page: 68

Kristof Bender

born 1971

Senior Analyst at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin/Belgrade, leading research projects in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia; former Manager of higher education projects in Bosnia for the World University Service; former Consultant for the Austrian Federal Chancellery; former Researcher for the International Centre for Migration Policy Development; former Attaché for Humanitarian Affairs in the Austrian Embassy, Belgrade.

Page: 47

Dr. Irinej Bulović

born 1947

Bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Novi Sad; Professor at the Theological Faculty, Belgrade; Publisher of the theological magazine "Beseda"; Member inter alia of the Association of Writers in Serbia, the Central Committee of the Conference of European Churches, the Panorthodox Commissions for dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church and with the Lutherans, the Yugoslav Committee in the movement for Unity and Cooperation among spiritually related Christian People in the East, the Yugoslav delegation to UNESCO and the Commission of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church for dialogue with the analogous Commission of the Bishops-Conference of Croatia and with the Commission of the Bishops Conferences of the European Community.

Page: 123

Dr. Erhard Busek

born 1941

Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Brussels; Coordinator of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI); Editor of the monthly newspaper "Wiener Journal"; Chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe; Member of the Reflections Group on Education in the EU; 2000–2001 Special Representative of the Austrian government on EU Enlargement; 1991–1995 Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Austria and Leader of the Austrian People's Party; 1994–1995 Minister for Education and Cultural Affairs; 1989–1994 Minister for Science and Research.

Page: 49, 75, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 99, 103, 106, 109, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125

Dr. Nebojša Čović

Born 1958

Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, with responsibility for finances and the economy; President of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija; Founder and Chairman of the Democratic Alternative; 1993–1997 Member of the Serbian Parliament; 1994–1997 Mayor of Belgrade.

Page: 25

Prof. Dr. Daniel Daianu

Professor at the Romanian Center for Economic Policies, Bucharest, and Visiting Professor at the Anderson School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA); 2001 Chairman of the OSCE Economic Forum; 1998 Finance Minister of Romania; 1992–1998 Chief Economist of the National Bank of Romania; President of the Romanian Institute for Free Enterprise.

Page: 80, 110

Božidar Djelić

born 1965

Minister of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade; 2000 Serbia's Lead Negotiator with international financial institutions; 1993–2000 Partner McKinsey & Co; Economic Adviser to the Polish and Russian governments in the transition period.

Page: 61, 84, 94

Dr. Hansjoerg Eiff

born 1933

Ambassador (ret.); 1999–2001 Senior Civilian Representative of NATO, Macedonia; 1998 Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania on behalf of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany; Head of a technical assessment mission on behalf of the OSCE, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 1995–1998 Head of the German representation at the OSCE, Vienna; 1994–1995 Head of the mission of the OSCE in Georgia; 1992–1994 Envoy of the Federal Republic of Germany for humanitarian aid; 1988–1992 German Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Belgrade.

Page: 28, 43, 83, 115

Agim Fetahu

Project Director at the Institute For War and Peace Reporting, Skopje; 2001 Media Consultant and Special Projects Editor at the Institute For War and Peace Reporting, London and Pristina; 2000 Election Editor of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) at TV Kosova, Pristina; 1999–2000 Director of Radio Kosova, Pristina; 1990–1999 International Radio Broadcaster at the Voice of America, Washington D.C.; 1989–1990 Overseas Correspondent, TV and Radio Pristina

and Albanian Daily Rilindja, in charge of reporting on the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

Page: 56, 107

Zoran Jacev

born 1964

Executive Director of the Forum-Center for Strategic Research & Documentation, Skopje; 1997–1998 Chief of the Cabinet and Counselor to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia; 1996–1997 Chief of the Cabinet and Counselor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia; 1995–1996 Chief of the Cabinet and Assistant to the Minister of Education and Sports of the Republic of Macedonia; 1989–1995 Analyst, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia.

Page: 43, 48

Minna Järvenpää

Born 1971

Strategy Advisor to Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo and head of UNMIK, Pristina; Vice-President of the European Stability Initiative (ESI); former ESI Analyst covering FRY and Macedonia; former Political and Refugee Affairs Advisor to the High Representative in Sarajevo and Senior Advisor to former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.

Page: 35, 93

Dr. Alexandra Jovičević

Deputy Minister of Education and the Arts of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade; Associate Professor at the University of Arts, Belgrade, and the Alternative Educational Network, Belgrade; Visiting Professor at the International Theatre Academy, Bochum (1999), and at the La Sapienza University, Rome (1998); 1997–1999 Director of the Institute for the Performance Arts, FDU, Belgrade; Co-founder and member of the Association of Independent Writers, Belgrade.

Page: 104

Dr. Herwig Kempf

born 1943

Director of the Goethe-Institute Inter Naciones, Belgrade; 1994–1999 Director of the Goethe-Institute, Peking; former engagements for the Goethe-Institute include Germany, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Osaka, Japan; former Lecturer at the University of Munich and the University of Sapporo, Japan.

Page: 100

Gerald Knaus

Born 1970

President and founding analyst of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin/Belgrade; Director of the Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit (LLA) of the European Union Pillar of UNMIK in Kosovo; Former Analyst with the International Crisis Group and Political Adviser to the High Representative and the International Mediator for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling; former Lecturer for economic studies in Ukraine; Country Director of the Civic Education Project in Bulgaria.

Page: 54, 72, 121

Prof. Dr. Dr. Dieter S. Lutz

1949–2003

Scientific Director and Head of the Board of Trustees of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; Head of the Board of Trustees and of the Executive Directors of the German Foundation for Peace Research; 2000 Founder of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE); 1976–1994 Deputy and Executive Director of the IFSH; Lecturer in political science at the University of Hamburg since 1993.

Page: 40

Mark C. Medish

Partner of the international law firm Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., Washington D.C.; Financial and Strategic Adviser to several governments in the Balkans region including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 2000–2001 Special Assistant to the President at the White House and Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs on

the National Security Council, Washington DC; 1997–2000 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs under Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers; 1996 Senior Adviser to the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York; 1994–1996 Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development; 1990–1991 Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo.

Page: 87

Milan Pajević

born 1965

President of the Executive Board, G17 PLUS Expert Network, Belgrade; 2000 Ambassador at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 2000–2002 National Coordinator of the Stability Pact of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 1994 Vice-President of the European Movement in Serbia.

Page: 50, 57

Dr. Wolfgang Petritsch

born 1947

Former High Representative of the United Nations for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; 1999 Chief Negotiator of the EU for the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris; 1998–1999 Special Envoy of the EU for Kosovo; 1997–1999 Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade; 1995–1997 Head of City Council Department for International Relations of the City of Vienna; 1994 Head of department for “Europa-Information” at the Federal Chancellor’s Office; 1984–1992 Head of the Austrian news agency service in New York; 1983–1984 Austrian representation at the OECD, Paris; 1977–1983 Secretary and Official Spokesman of the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Page: 21, 57

Antoinette Primatarova

born 1954

Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; 1999–2001 Ambassador of Bulgaria to the European Union;

1997–1999 Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria; 1993–1997 Bulgarian Ambassador to Sweden, Norway and Iceland.

Page: 51, 94

Dušan Reljić

born 1956

Curator of the Michael-Zinic-Foundation; since 1996 Scientific Adviser at the European Institute for the Media, Düsseldorf; former Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin; Co-founder and Member of the press agency BETA, Belgrade; Member of the Foundation Board of the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, Thessaloniki; former Editor at Radio Free Europe, Munich, at the news magazine “Vreme”, Belgrade, and at the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug, Belgrade.

Page: 36, 54, 112

Dr. Michael Schaefer

born 1949

Head of the Political Directorate-General, German Foreign Office, Berlin; former Envoy for the Management of the Economy of Southeast Europe; 1999–2001 Head of the Western Balkans department at the Foreign Office; 1995–1999 Head of the Political Department, Permanent Representation, Geneva; 1991–1995 Head of Training for Senior Civil Servants, Foreign Office; 1987–1991 Permanent Representative at the Embassy in Singapore; 1984–1987 Adviser at the Foreign Office, Position Paper on United Nations.

Page: 31, 116

Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling

born 1930

1982-1992 Federal Minister for Post and Telecommunications; since 1995 International Mediator for Bosnia-Herzegovina; former Vice-Chairman of the Human Rights Council of the Bundestag; Founding Member of the Board of Trustees “Aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina”; Member of the Advisory Board of the European Stability Initiative; Advisory Committee Member of the European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans; Board of Trustees of the International Crises Group; Member of the Initiative against Genocide in Bosnia-Her-

zegovina and Croatia; since 1993 Managing Partner of Dr. Schwarz Schilling & Partner GmbH, Büdingen.

Page: 37

Miodrag Sorić

Born 1960

Editor-in-Chief of “Deutsche Welle” Radio for Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia; Head of the Central and Eastern Europe Department at DW Cologne, Germany; 1999 Head of the Eastern Europe Department and 1995–1999 Head of the Russian Department at DW; 1993–1995 Programming Assistant to Dieter Weirich, Deutsche Welle Director-General.

Page: 45, 89, 122

Reinhard Stuth

born 1956

State Secretary in charge of the section Europe and the representation of Hamburg in the German Federation; mainly active in matters of European and security policy in Bonn, Brussels, Prague and Berlin for the Federal Presidential Office, the European Commission, the Federal Chancellery, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the CDU/CSU party in the Bundestag.

Page: 53

Goran Svilanović

born 1963

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrade; President of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS); 1993–1997 SOS telephone hotline for victims of ethnic, religious, political and trade union discrimination with the Centre for Anti-War Action; 1996–1998 President of the Council for Human Rights, Belgrade; 1989–1998 Assistant Professor at Belgrade Law School; 1989 Research Fellow of the Yugoslav Human Rights Forum.

Page: 18

Dr. Jovan Teokarević

born 1957

Research Fellow at the Institute for European Studies, Belgrade; Coordinator of the International Summer School in European Studies, Belgrade; Yugoslav Coordinator of an international project on democratic control of the security sector; Co-director of the post-graduate programme “Transition and Reconstruction” at the Alternative Academic Educational Network (AAEN), Belgrade.

Page: 92

Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker

born 1920

1984–1994 President of the Federal Republic of Germany; 1981–1984 Mayor of West Berlin; 1969–1981 Member of the German Bundestag; 1979–1981 Vice-President of the German Bundestag; former Member of the Federal Executive Board of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); former President of the German Lutheran Church Council; Winner of the Heinrich-Heine (1991) and Leo-Baeck (1994) Awards; Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table of the Körber Foundation.

Page: 17, 126

Previous Participants (1st – 123rd Bergedorf Round Table)

Abdul Hadi, Dr. M., Ost-Jerusalem/Jordanien
 Abramowitz, Morton, Washington/USA
 Achamsjan, Prof. Dr. A., Moskau/UdSSR
 Aćimović, Dr. L., Belgrad/Jugoslawien
 Ackermann, Dr. Ulrike, Frankfurt a.M.
 Adam, Dr. Konrad, Berlin
 Adam, Dipl.-Ing. M., Prag/ČSFR
 Adam, Dr. R., Berlin
 Adamischin, A., Moskau/Russland
 Adams, Dr. T. D., London/England
 Adams, Prof. Dr. W. P., Berlin
 Adomeit, Dr. H., Boston/USA
 Afheldt, Dr. H., München
 Afshar, Dr. F., Bern/Schweiz
 Ahlers, Conrad, Staatss. a.D., Bonn
 Ahrens, Dr. Geert-Hinrich, Tirana/Albanien
 Ahtisaari, Martti, StaatsPräs. a. D., Finnland
 Aich, Dr. P., Kalkutta/Indien
 Akinci, Halil, Ankara/Türkei
 Aksilenko, Prof. V., Moskau/UdSSR
 Aksiouchits, V., Moskau/Russland
 Alaton, Ishak, Istanbul/Türkei
 Alber, Dr. J., Florenz/Italien
 Albers, Prof. Dr. G., München
 Albert, Prof. Dr. H., Mannheim
 Albrecht, Dr. K., Düsseldorf
 Alexandrow, S. K., Moskau/UdSSR
 d'Aligny, Baron François-Xavier, Paris
 Alkazaz, Dipl.-Volkswirt A., Hamburg
 Allemann, Fritz René, Kleinrinderfeld
 Allison, Dr. R., London/England
 Al-Qaq, Dr. A., Gaza-Remal
 Altendorf, Hans, Hamburg
 Altenpohl, Dr. D., Zürich/Schweiz
 Altmann, Dr. Franz-Lothar, Berlin
 Altmann, Dr. R., Bonn
 Altwegg, Jürg, Genf/Schweiz
 Ammon, Dr. P., Bonn
 Amwrosow, I., Moskau/Russland
 Anastasijević, Dušanka, Belgrad/Serbien
 Anderle, Prof. Dr. O., Salzburg/Österreich
 Anders, Karl, Götzenhain
 Andersen, Leonall C., St. Louis, Miss./USA
 Anderson, Prof. D., Berlin
 Andreae, Prof. Dr. C. A., Innsbruck/Österr.
 Andréani, Gilles, Paris/Frankreich
 Androsch, Dr. H., BM. a. D., Wien/Österr.
 Antz, Dipl.-Ing. H. M., Reinbek
 Anweiler, Prof. Dr. O., Bochum
 Apel, Günter, Senator a. D., Hamburg
 Apelt, Dr. H.-P., Kabul/Afghanistan
 Appleyard, Leonard, Botsch., Budapest/GB
 Arbatow, Prof. G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Ardenne, Prof. Dr. M. von, Dresden
 Arlt, Dr. F., Köln
 Arnaud, Claude, Gesandter, Paris/Frankreich
 Arndt, Prof. Dr. C., Hamburg
 Arndt, Prof. Dr. H., Waldems
 Arndt, Prof. Dr. H. J., Heidelberg
 Arndt, Rudi, Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Arnim, Joachim von, Bonn
 Arning, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Aron, Prof. Dr. R., Paris/Frankreich
 Ascherson, Neal, London/England
 Aschinger, Dr. F., Zürich/Schweiz
 Ashraff, Dr. A., Karachi/Pakistan
 Asimov, A., Baku/Aserbaidshan
 Atonen, Meelis, Tallinn/Estland
 Atzenroth, Dr. K., Koblenz
 Auch, Dr. E., Wackerow
 Augstein, Dr. Franziska, München
 Augstein, Rudolf, Hamburg
 Autexier, Senator Jean-Yves, Paris/Frankreich
 Avineri, Prof. Dr. S., Jerusalem/Israel
 Baade, Prof. Dr. Dr. F., Kiel
 Baag, R., Köln
 Baburin, Sergej, Moskau/Russland
 Bachem, Dipl.-Volkswirt H., Mainz
 Bäcker, Prof. Dr. G., Mönchengladbach
 Bär, Friedrich, Ehingen
 Bärsch, Dr. H. G., Essen
 Bağcı, Prof. Dr. H., Ankara/Türkei
 Bahners, Patrick, Frankfurt a. M.
 Bahr, Prof. E., Hamburg
 Baier, Prof. Dr. H., Konstanz
 Baitsch, Prof. Dr. Dr. H., Ulm
 Bajohr, Ulrike, Köln
 Baldzens, Egils, Riga/Lettland
 Barbier, Dr. H. D., Frankfurt a. M.
 Baram, Prof. A., Haifa/Israel
 Baring, Prof. Dr. A., Berlin
 Barnick, Johannes, Warmbronn
 Bar-On, Hanan, Rehovot/Israel
 Baron, Dipl.-Volkswirt S., Düsseldorf
 Barraclough, Prof. Dr. G., Cambridge/Engl.
 Bartholomäi, Reinhart, Staatss., Wiesbaden
 Bartoszewski, Prof. W., Warschau/Polen
 Basonova, Frau Prof. N., Alma Ata/UdSSR
 Batenin, G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Bauch, Johannes, Botsch., Warschau/Polen
 Baudissin, Wolf Graf von, Hamburg
 Bauer, Prof. Dr. F. L., München
 Bauer, Leo, Bonn
 Bauer, Prof. Dr. P. T., London/England
 Baumann, Dr. W., Köln
 Baumgartner, Prof. Dr. A., München
 Bearpark, Andy, Prishtina
 Bechtle, Otto W., Esslingen
 Becker, Frajo, Moers
 Becker, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin
 Becker, Dr. J., Pforzheim
 Becker, Pfr. Dr. K. F., St. Blasien
 Beckurts, Prof. Dr. K. H., München
 Beelitz, Dr., Köln
 Beer, Fritz, London/England
 Beheim-Schwarzbach, Martin, Hamburg
 Behrends, Wolfgang, MinDir., Bonn
 Behrendt, Prof. Dr. R. F., Berlin
 Beier, Peter, Düsseldorf
 Belitschenko, Anatolij M., Moskau/UdSSR
 Bellut, Dr. T., Mainz
 Beloff, The Lord, London/England
 Below, Dr. W. B., Moskau/Russland
 Bempt, Dipl.-Volksw. P. v. d., Brüssel/Belgien
 Bender, Kristof, Berlin
 Bender, Dr. P., Berlin
 Benedix, Ursula, Bonn
 Benningsen-Foerder, Rudolf v., Düsseldorf
 Benyi, Dr. J., Vizeaußenmin., Budapest/Ungarn
 Benz, Georg, Frankfurt a. M.
 Berenberg-Gossler, Dr. G. v., Hamburg
 Bereshkow, Dr. V., Moskau/UdSSR
 Berg, Dr. D. v., Bonn
 Bergener, Prof. Dr. M., Köln
 Berghofer, W., OberBgm. a. D., Dresden
 Bergius, Prof. Dr. R., Gilching
 Bertaux, Prof. Dr. P., Paris/Frankreich
 Bertele, Dr. F., Botschafter, Tel Aviv/Israel
 Bertram, Dr. Ch., Ebenhausen
 Bertsch, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin/DDR
 Besser, Dr. A., Frankfurt a. M.
 Besymenski, Dr. L., Moskau/UdSSR
 Bettiza, Dr. E., Mailand/Italien
 Bezold, Oskar, Hamburg
 Biedenkopf, Prof. Dr. K., MinPräs., Dresden
 Bierzanek, Prof. Dr. R., Warschau/Polen
 Bildt, Carl, MinPräs. a. D., Stockholm/Schw.
 Bilke, Dipl.-Volkswirt K. H., Bonn
 Billing, Dr. H., München
 Billington, Dr. J. H., Washington, D.C./USA
 Binder, Dr. P., Stuttgart
 Binder, Sepp, Wiesbaden
 Bindschedler, Prof. Dr. R., Bern/Schweiz
 Binswanger, Prof. Dr. H. C., St. Gallen/Schw.
 Birand, Mehmet Ali, Istanbul/Türkei
 Birckholtz, Joh., Staatssekretär a. D., Bonn
 Birg, Prof. Dr. H., Bielefeld
 Birkhofer, Prof. Dr. A., München
 Birnbaum, Prof. Dr. K. E., Laxenburg/Österr.
 Birnbaum, Prof. N., Oxford/England
 Bisky, Prof. Dr. L., MdL, Berlin
 Bismarck, Prof. Dr. K. von, Hamburg
 Bitterli, Prof. Dr. U., Zürich/Schweiz
 Bitterlich, Joachim, MinDir., Bonn
 Bittermann, Rainer, Köln
 Björck, Anders, Stockholm/Schweden
 Blackwill, Prof. R., Cambridge, Mass./USA
 Blagovolin, Sergej, Moskau/UdSSR
 Blanck, Ulrich, Köln
 Blaszczyk, Dr. P., Warschau/Polen
 Blech, Dr. K., Botschafter a. D., Bonn
 Bloch, Prof. Dr. H., Basel/Schweiz
 Bloemer, Dr. K., Oslo/Norwegen
 Blomeyer-Bartenstein, H. H., Bonn
 Bloss, Prof. Dr.-Ing. W. H., Stuttgart
 Blüm, Dr. N., Bundesminister, MdB, Bonn
 Blum, Prof. F. H., Oxon/England
 Blume, Prof. Dr. O., Köln
 Blumenfeld, Erik, Hamburg
 Boarmann, Prof. Dr. M., Genf/Schweiz
 Bock, Prof. em. Dr. G., Darmstadt
 Böckenförde, Prof. Dr. E.-W., Bielefeld
 Böddeker, Günter, Hamburg
 Böge, Dr. U., MinDirig., Bonn
 Böhme, Dr. G., Hamburg
 Böhmer, Dr. Maria, MdB, Bonn
 Böhr, Christoph, Mainz
 Bölke, Joachim, Berlin
 Böll, Winfried, Bonn
 Bölling, Klaus, Staatssekretär a. D., Berlin
 Boetticher, Dipl.-Volkswirt K. W., Gießen

Bogdanow, Prof. Dr. R., Moskau/UdSSR
 Bognár, Prof. Dr. J., Budapest/Ungarn
 Bogomolow, Prof. Dr. O., Moskau/UdSSR
 Boidevaix, Serge, Botsch. a. D., Paris/Frankr.
 Boikowa, Anna P., Leningrad/UdSSR
 Bok, Prof. Dr. S. T., Naarden/Niederlande
 Bolesch, Cornelia, Brüssel
 Boldizsár, Iván, Budapest/Ungarn
 Bolkestein, Frits, Den Haag/NL
 Bombach, Prof. Dr. G., Basel/Schweiz
 Bondy, François, Zürich/Schweiz
 Borissow, Boris A., Moskau/UdSSR
 Borner, Prof. Dr. S., Basel/Schweiz
 Borowik, Genrich, Moskau/UdSSR
 Bossel, Prof. Dr. H., Hannover
 Boveri, Dr. Margret, Berlin
 Bowin, Alexander, Moskau/UdSSR
 Boyer, Miguel, Minister a. D., Madrid/Spanien
 Bracher, Prof. Dr. K. D., Bonn
 Bradley, Bill, Senator, Washington, D. C./USA
 Bräunig, Klaus, Köln
 Braitenberg, Prof. Dr. V., Tübingen
 Braithwaite, Sir Rodric, London/England
 Brand, Dr. G., Köln
 Brands, Prof. M. C., Amsterdam/NL
 Brandt, Willy, Bundeskanzler a. D., Bonn
 Bratanov, Dimiter, Sofia/Bulgarien
 Brattschikow, Igor, Moskau/Russland
 Brawand, Leo, Hamburg
 Brechling, B. A., Frank, London/England
 Bredebeck, Prof. Dr. H., Stuttgart
 Bree, Rudolf, Stuttgart
 Bremer, Dr. J., Jerusalem/Israel
 Brendel, Prof. Dr. W., München
 Brenken, Dr.-Ing. G., Frankfurt a. M.
 Bresson, Henri de, Paris
 Breuel, Birgit, Hamburg
 Brezinka, Prof. Dr. W., Konstanz
 Brie, Dr. André, Berlin
 Brinkhorst, Dr. L. J., 's-Gravenhage/NL
 Brockhues, Frederik, Ronco-Ascona/Schweiz
 Broda, Dr. H. Ch., Wien/Österreich
 Brüder, Dr. E.-G., Aachen
 Brogan III, John A., Gks. a. D., Hamburg
 Brok, Elmar, MdEP, Brüssel/Bielefeld
 Broomfield, Sir Nigel, London/England
 Brunet, J. P., Botsch. a. D., Paris/Frankreich
 Brunner, Dr. G., Botsch. a. D., Madrid/Spanien
 Brunner, Prof. Dr. K., Rochester/USA
 Brunnstein, Prof. Dr. K., Hamburg
 Bubba, Dr. E., Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Bucerius, Dr. G., Hamburg
 Buch, Dr. G., Hamburg
 Buch, Wolfgang von, Freiburg
 Buchholz, Dr. A., Köln
 Buchholz, Walter, Brüssel/Belgien
 Bude, Prof. Dr. Heinz, Hamburg/Berlin
 Bürger-Prinz, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg/Berlin
 Büscher, Hans Werner, München
 Bütler, Dr. H., Zürich/Schweiz
 Bütow, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Buhr, Prof. Dr. M., Berlin/DDR
 Buhrow, J. S., MinRat, Bonn
 Bullard, Sir Julian, Botsch. a. D., Oxford/GB
 Bulović, Dr. Irinej, Bischof, Novi Sad/Serbien
 Bunkina, Prof. Margarita, Moskau/UdSSR
 Burchard, Dr. H.-J., Seevetal
 Burg, Dr. P. J. van der, Eindhoven/NL
 Burgard, Dr. H., Brüssel/Belgien
 Burghardt, Dr. G., Brüssel/Belgien
 Burke, Richard, Brüssel/Belgien
 Burt, Richard, Botsch. a. D., Washington/USA
 Buschbeck, Malte, München
 Busche, Dr. J., München
 Busek, Dr. Erhard, Brüssel/Belgien
 Bush, Dr. K., Washington, D. C./USA
 Bushati, Kurt, Dipl.-Ing., Wien/Österreich
 Bussche, Axel Frhr. v. dem, Bad Godesberg
 Bussiek, Hendrik, Berlin
 Bustarret, M., Paris/Frankreich
 Butenschön, Dr. Marianna, Hamburg
 Cagiati, Andrea, Botschafter a. D., Rom/Italien
 Cairncross, Sir Alec, Oxford/England
 Calleo, Prof. D. P., Washington/USA
 Camartin, Prof. Dr. I., Zürich/Schweiz
 Cameron, F., Brüssel/B. Wash., D.C./USA
 Cantzler, Dr. K., Ludwigshafen
 Carr, Jonathan C., London/England
 Carrington, The Lord, London/England
 Carstens, Prof. Dr. K., Altbundespräs., Bonn
 Cartellieri, Dr. U., Frankfurt a. M.
 Carter, Andrew, Botschafter, London/England
 Casanova, Prof. J.-C., Paris/Frankreich
 Casaroli, Agostino, Kardinalstaats., Rom/Ital.
 Casimir, Prof. Dr. H. B. G., Eindhoven/NL
 Caspari, Prof. Dr. F., MinDir., Bonn
 Caspari, Dr. M., Brüssel/Belgien
 Cavanaugh, Carey, Washington/USA/Bern/CH
 Cattepoel, Dr. D., Bad Homburg
 Caysa, Dr. Volker, Leipzig
 Celio, Dr. N., Altbundespräs., Bern/Schweiz
 Češka, Prof. Dr. Z., Prag/ČSFR
 Çetin, Hikmet, Ankara/Türkei
 Chacon, Prof. Dr. V., Recife/Brasilien
 Chamidulin, Raschid, Moskau/Russland
 Charchardin, O. S., Moskau/UdSSR
 Chen Peirao, Shanghai/China
 Chesnais, Jean-Claude, Paris/Frankreich
 Cheysson, Claude, Brüssel/Frankreich
 Chimelli, Rudolph, Paris/Frankreich
 Chiti-Batelli, Andreas, Rom/Italien
 Cholewiak, Dr. St., Warschau/Polen
 Christians, Dr. F. W., Düsseldorf
 Chudolej, Prof. K., St. Petersburg/Russland
 Chwostow, Prof. W., Moskau/UdSSR
 Cisař, Dr. C., Prag/ČSFR
 Citron, Dr. K. J., Botsch. a. D., Den Haag/NL
 Claassen, Prof. Dr. E.-M., Paris/Frankreich
 Claessens, Prof. Dr. D., Berlin
 Clausen, Prof. Dr. L., Kiel
 Clough, Patricia, London/England
 Cohen, Dr. R., Brüssel/Belgien
 Colitt, Leslie, London/England
 Conrad, Bernt, Bonn
 Conradi, Peter, MdB, Bonn
 Cossiga, Prof. Dr. F., Staatspräs. a. D., Rom/I
 Cotula, Dr. F., Rom/Italien
 Coulmas, Dr. P., Köln
 Čović, N., Stellv. MinPräs., Belgrad/Serbien
 Craig, Prof. G. A., Stanford/USA
 Cramer, Prof. Dr. F., Göttingen
 Cramer, H., Brig.-Gen., Mönchengladbach
 Cremer, Prof. Dr. H. D., Gießen
 Cybulski, Prof. Dr. Z., Warschau/Polen
 Czakainski, Dr. M., Düsseldorf
 Czempel, Prof. Dr. E.-O., Frankfurt a. M.
 Czernetz, Prof. K., Straßburg/Frankreich
 Czyrek, Józef, Min. a. D., Warschau/Polen
 Däniker, Dr. G., Bern/Schweiz
 Dahn, Daniela, Berlin
 Dahrendorf, Frank, Berlin
 Dahrendorf, The Lord, London/England
 Daianu, Prof. Dr. D., Bukarest/Rumänien
 Daillet, Jean-Marie, Paris/Frankreich
 Damm, Carl, Bonn
 Dams, Prof. Dr. Th., Freiburg i. Br.
 Danckwortt, Dr. D., Bonn
 Dangschat, Prof. Dr. Jens, Hamburg
 Daschtschew, Prof. Dr. W., Moskau/UdSSR
 Daume, Dr. W., München
 Davies, M. B. E., M. P., John, London/England
 Davis, Dr. Joan S., Dübendorf/Schweiz
 Davy, Richard, London/England
 Dawydow, Michail A., Moskau/Russland
 Daxner, Prof. Dr. M., Oldenburg
 Dechamps, Dr. B., Frankfurt a. M.
 Decken, Dr. H. v. d., Freiburg
 Decker, Dr. Franz, Hamburg
 Deckers, Dr. H., Weinheim
 Dehmkamp, Willy, Bürgermeister i. R., Bremen
 Delcour, Roland, Paris/Frankreich
 Delors, Jacques, Präs. a. D., Paris/Frankreich
 Demcsák, Dr. S., Budapest/Ungarn
 Demus, Dr. L., Budapest/Ungarn
 Denninger, Prof. Dr. E., Frankfurt a. M.
 Dessloch, Dr. H., RegDir., Bonn
 Determann, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Dettling, Dr. W., MinDir. a. D., München
 Deubel, Dr. Klaus, Dresden
 Dichgans, Dr. H., Düsseldorf
 Dieck, Dr. Margret, Berlin
 Digel, Prof. Dr. Helmut, Darmstadt
 Dijk, Dr. K. van, Groningen/Niederlande
 Dingwort-Nusseck, Dr. Julia, Hamburg
 Ditfurth, Prof. Dr. H. v., Staufen
 Dittmar, Dr. R., Hamburg
 Djelić, Božidar, Min., Belgrad/Serbien
 Dobrosielski, Prof. Dr. M., Warschau/Polen
 Dobrovský, Lubos, Botsch., Moskau/Russland
 Doehring, Dr. J., Düsseldorf
 Dönhoff, Dr. Marion Gräfin, Hamburg
 Döring, Paul, MinDir. a. D., Bonn
 Dörling, Prof. Dr. E., Hamburg
 Doernberg, Prof. Dr. S., Berlin/DDR
 Dohnanyi, Dr. K. v., Bgm. a. D., Hamburg
 Dohrn, Dr. K., Zürich/Schweiz
 Domsch, Dr. K., Neustadt in Sachsen/DDR
 Dondelinger, Dr. A., Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Dondelinger, Jean, Brüssel/Belgien
 Dongs, Prof. Dr. J. B., Köln
 Donsbach, Prof. Dr. W., Dresden
 Donskich, A., Moskau/Russland
 Doty, Prof. P., Cambridge, Mass./USA
 Dräger, Dr. H., Grünwald
 Drath, Prof. Dr. M., Karlsruhe
 Drewe, Prof. Dr. P., Delft/Niederlande
 Dreyer, Dr. H. P., New York/USA
 Drowosjekow, W. A., Moskau/UdSSR
 Dubiel, Prof. Dr. H., Gießen

Düren, Dr. A., Bad Honnef
Dürr, Prof. Dr. E., Nürnberg
Dürr, Heinz, Frankfurt a. M.
Dürrenmatt, Prof. Dr. P., Bern/Schweiz
Düvel, Hasso, Dresden
Dumitrescu, Vasile C., München
Dungern, F. Frhr. v., Wien/Österreich
Dumphorn, Prof. Dr. K., Kiel
Duračinský, Ján, Bratislava/ČSFR
Duve, Freimut, Wien/Österreich

Eagleburger, L., Außenmin. a. D., Wash./USA
Ebert, Prof. Dr. Th., Berlin
Eckstein, Prof. O., Lexington, Mass./USA
Edding, Prof. Dr. F., Berlin
Edinger, Prof. L. J., New York/USA
Eekelen, Dr. W. F. van, Den Haag/Niederlande
Effimoff, I., Baku/Aserbajdschan
Ehlermann, Prof. Dr. C.-D., Florenz
Ehmke, Prof. Dr. H., MdB, Bonn
Ehrenberg, Dr. H., BMin. a. D., Bonn
Ehrenstein, Prof. Dr. D. v., Bremen
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Prof. Dr. I., Seewiesen
Eichborn, Reinhart v., Düsseldorf
Eichwede, Prof. Dr. W., Bremen
Eickhoff, Dr. E., Botschafter, Bonn
Eiermann, Dr. R., Frankfurt a. M.
Eiff, Dr. H., Botsch. a. D., Bonn
Eisenbart, Dr. Constanze, Heidelberg
Eklund, Dr. S., Stockholm/Schweden
Elbe, Frank, Botschafter a. D., Bonn
Eliasmöller, Dr. H., Brüssel/Belgien
Ellemann-Jensen, U., Min. a. D., Kopenh./DK
Ellsworth, Robert F., Washington, D.C./USA
Elon, Amos, Jerusalem/Israel
Emminger, Dr. O., Frankfurt a. M.
Ende, Prof. Dr. W., Freiburg i. Br.
Engel, Ernst, MinRat a. D., Kiel
Engelhardt, Prof. Dr. W., Bonn
Engels, Prof. Dr. W., Frankfurt a. M.
Engert, Jürgen, Berlin
Engholm, Björn, MinPräsident a. D., Kiel
Eppler, Dr. E., BMin. a. D., Schwäbisch Hall
Erb, Dieter, Bonn
Erb, Dr. G., Hungen
Erbslöh, Prof. Dr. F., Gießen
Ergüder, Prof. Dr. Ü., Istanbul/Türkei
Erlor, G., MdB, Berlin
Esbroeck, SJ, Prof. Dr. M. van, Brüssel/Belg.
Escher, Klaus, Bonn
Eschenburg, Prof. em. Dr. Th., Tübingen
Esser, Otto, Köln

Fabian, Prof. Dr. W., Köln
Fabra, Paul, Paris/Frankreich
Fack, Dr. F. U., Frankfurt a. M.
Fagernäs, Leif Richard, Helsinki/Finnland
Fahning, Dr. H., Hamburg
Fakstorp, Jörgen, Kopenhagen/Dänemark
Falaturi, Prof. Dr. A., Köln
Falin, V. M., Botschafter a. D., Moskau/UdSSR
Fan Gang, Prof. Dr., Beijing/China
Farkas, Dr. L., Budapest/Ungarn
Feddersen, Jens, Essen
Fedorow, Dr. Andrej, Moskau/Russland
Feldstein, Prof. M., Cambridge, Mass./USA
Felgentraeger, Prof. Dr. W., Hamburg

Fels, Prof. Dr. G., Köln
Ferraris, Prof. L. V., Botsch. a. D., Rom/Italien
Ferri, Dr. L. B., Mailand/Italien
Fest, Alexander, Berlin
Fest, Prof. Dr. J., Frankfurt a. M.
Fetahu, Agim, Skopje/Mazedonien
Fetscher, Prof. Dr. I., Frankfurt a. M.
Feyler, Gabriele, Meißen
Filin, Igor, Moskau/UdSSR
Filipec, Prof. Dr. J., Prag/ČSFR
Filmer, Werner, Köln
Fink, Ulf, Senator a. D., Bonn
Finkelburg, Prof. Dr. W., Erlangen
Fintelman, Dr. H. J., Wanne-Eickel
Fischer, Dr. A., Hamburg
Fischer, Brigitte B., Frankfurt a. M.
Fischer, Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
Fischer, Prof. H., München
Fischer, Leni, MdB, Bonn/Straßburg
Fischer, Thomas, Gütersloh
Fischer, Prof. Drs. W., Berlin
Fischer-Appelt, Dr. P., Hamburg
Fischer-Barnicol, Prof. Dr. H. A., Heidelberg
Fischer-Menshausen, Dr. H., Hamburg
Fischer-Solms, Herbert, Köln
Fjodorow, Prof. Dr. V., Bonn/UdSSR
Flassbeck, Dr. Heiner, Staatssek. a. D., Berlin
Fleckenstein, Dr. K., Bonn
Fleischhauer, Prof. Dr. I., St. Petersburg/Russl.
Flimm, Prof. J., Hamburg
Flowers, Sir Brian, London/England
Fohrbeck, Dr. Karla, Neudrossenfeld
Foighel, Dr. I., Min., Kopenhagen/Dänemark
Foncillas, Eduardo, Bots. a. D., Madrid/Spain.
Forsberg, Dr. Tuomas, Helsinki/Finnland
Forster, Jürgen, Bonn
Forster, Dr. K., München
Forsthoff, Prof. Dr. E., Heidelberg
Fraenkel, Prof. Dr. E., Berlin
François-Poncet, Jean, Senator, Paris/F
Frank, Prof. Dr. H., Paderborn
Frank-Planitz, Ulrich, Stuttgart
Franz, Dr. Hermann, München
Freund, Prof. Dr. J., Straßburg/Frankreich
Freund, Prof. Dr. W. S., Baden-Baden
Freundlich, Prof. Dr. R., Hannover
Friderichs, Dr. H., BMin. a. D., Frankfurt a. M.
Fried, Erich, London/England
Friedeburg, Prof. Dr. L. v., Min. a. D., Frankf.
Friedrichs, Dr. G., Frankfurt a. M.
Friedrichs, Dipl.-Volkswirt K. H., Frankf.
Frisch, Alfred, Paris/Frankreich
Frischeisen, Dipl.-Ing. A., München
Frister, Erich, Frankfurt a. M.
Fritsch, Prof. Dr. B., Herrliberg/Schweiz
Fritz, Dr. G., MinDir., Bonn
Fritzen, Dr. M., Frankfurt a. M.
Fröhlich, Dr. S., Bonn
Froment Meurice, Henri, Botsch. a. D., Paris/F
Frühau, Manfred, MinRat, Bonn
Fuchs, Anke, Bundesmin. a. D., MdB, Bonn
Fugmann-Heesing, Dr. Annette, Berlin
Fuller, Graham, Washington/USA
Funcke, Liselotte, Staatsminister a. D., Bonn
Fursenko, Andrej, St. Petersburg/Russland
Fyvel, T. R., London/England

Gablentz, Otto v. d., Botsch. a. D., Brügge/B
Gabor, Prof. Dr. D., London/England
Gaddum, J. W., Staatsminister a. D., Frankfurt
Gadolin, Dr. A. von, Helsinki/Finnland
Gäfgen, Prof. Dr. G., Konstanz
Galkin, Alexander, Moskau/UdSSR
Galliner, Peter, London/England
Galtung, Prof. J., Berlin/Norwegen
Gambke, Dr.-Ing. G., Hannover
Gamzin, Michail, Moskau/Russland
Gandenberger, Prof. Dr. O., München
Gansel, Norbert, Kiel
Gantman, Prof. W. I., Moskau/UdSSR
Gantzel, Prof. Dr. K. J., Hamburg
Garai, Róbert, Budapest/Ungarn
Garton Ash, Timothy, Oxford/England
Garzón Valdés, Prof. Dr. E., Buenos Aires/Arg.
Gassen, Prof. Dr. H.-G., Darmstadt
Gasteyer, Prof. Dr. C., Genf/Schweiz
Gathen, Heinz von zur, Generalmajor, Hamb.
Gather, Dr. G., Oberursel
Gatz, Prof. Dr. E., Rom/Italien
Gauer, Dr. Christoph, München
Gauly, Dr. T. M., Bad Homburg v. d. H.
Gecse, Dr. A., Budapest/Ungarn
Gehlen, Prof. Dr. A., Aachen
Gehrels, Prof. F., Bloomington/USA
Geiger, Dr. H., Köln
Geiger, Prof. Dr. W., Karlsruhe
Geißler, Dr. H., Bundesmin. a. D., MdB, Bonn
Geißler-Kuß, Chr., GenKs., Istanbul/Türkei
Gerassimow, Sergei, Moskau/UdSSR
Geremek, Prof. B., Warschau/Polen
Gergely, Prof. Dr. A., Budapest/Ungarn
Giersch, Prof. Dr. H., Kiel
Giesel, Dr. H. B., Essen
Gillies, Peter, Bonn
Ginsburg, Dr. T., Zürich/Schweiz
Gizycki, Prof. Dr. H. v., Kassel
Glaser, Dr. H., Nürnberg
Glastetter, Prof. Dr. W., Bielefeld
Glastra van Loon, Prof. Dr. J. F., Den Haag/NL
Glees, Dr. A., Uxbridge/England
Gleich, Dr. A. von, Hamburg
Glotz, Prof. Dr. P., Senator a. D., Erfurt
Glubrecht, Prof. Dr., Hannover
Glück, Alois, Staatssekretär a. D., München
Goebbels, Dr. G., São Paulo/Brasilien
Göhner, Dr. R., Parl. Staatss. a. D., Bonn
Goerges, Dr. H., Berlin
Goester, Jean-Luc, Paris/Frankreich
Götz, Dr. H. H., Berlin
Goldschmidt, Prof. Dr. D., Berlin
Goldsmith, Prof. R. W., Paris/Frankreich
Gollwitzer, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin
Golowin, Alexander, Moskau/Russland
Goltermann, Prof. Dr. H. L., Arles/Frankreich
Gordey, Michel, Paris/Frankreich
Goriely, Prof. Dr. G., Brüssel/Belgien
Gorschenek, Dr. G., Hamburg
Gottstein, Prof. Dr. K., München
Goulard, Sylvie, Paris/Frankreich
Goulizade, V., Botsch., Baku/Aserbajdschan
Grande, Prof. Dr. Edgar, München
Grass, Günter, Hamburg
Greffrath, Matthias, Berlin
Gresmann, Hans, Hamburg

Gretz, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
 Gretz, Joachim, Ispra/Italien
 Greussing, Kurt, Dornbirn/Österreich
 Gries, Dr. W., Hannover
 Griffith, Prof. Dr. W., Attaché, Washington/USA
 Grigorjew, A. N., Moskau/UdSSR
 Grigorjew, Eugenij, Moskau/UdSSR
 Grimm, Prof. Dr. D., Berlin
 Groebel, Prof. Dr. J., Düsseldorf
 Groeben, Dr. H. von der, Bonn
 Groeger, Dr. H., Frankfurt a.M.
 Gröttrup, Dipl.-Ing. H., Pforzheim
 Gróf, Ferenc, Budapest/Ungarn
 Groner-Weber, Dr. Sabine, Stuttgart
 Gross, Prof. Dr. H., München
 Gross, Johannes, Hamburg
 Grosser, Prof. A., Paris/Frankreich
 Großer, Dipl.-Volksw. G., Hamburg
 Grossner, Claus, Hamburg
 Grottian, Ass. Prof. Dr. P., Berlin
 Grubbe, Peter, Hamburg
 Grümm, Prof. Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
 Grüner, Martin, Staatss. a. D., MdB, Bonn
 Grünsteidl, Dr. W. E., Brüssel/Belgien
 Grunenberg, Prof. Dr. Antonia, Berlin
 Grunert, Prof. Dr. H., Botsch., Potsdam
 Gubarew, Dr. S., Moskau/Russland
 Güngör, Bahaeddin, Ankara/Türkei
 Günthardt, Dr. W., Zürich/Schweiz
 Günther, Dr. E., Berlin
 Güntzel, Dr. W., Hamburg
 Guggenberger, Prof. Dr. B., Bielefeld
 Gumpel, Prof. Dr. W., München
 Gusseinow, Wagif A., Moskau/Russland
 Gutowski, Prof. Dr. A., Hamburg
 Guttenberg, K. T. Fhr. zu, Bonn
 Gysi, Dr. Gregor, MdB, Berlin
 Gysin, Dr. H., Basel/Schweiz

Haagerup, Niels Jørgen, Kopenhagen/Dän.
 Haarder, Bertel, MdEP, Brüssel/Belgien
 Haaren, Gerhard van, Stuttgart
 Haas, Pfr. Harry, Brunssum/Niederlande
 Haas, Prof. Dr. R., Hamburg
 Haas, Dr. Volker, Stuttgart
 Haber, Prof. Dr. W., München
 Haberler, Prof. Dr. G., Washington/USA
 Hacke, Prof. Dr. Ch., Hamburg
 Hacker, Prof. Dr. F., Beverly Hills/USA
 Hackforth, Prof. Dr. Josef, Köln
 Häfele, Dr. H., Parl. Staatss. a. D., Bonn
 Häfele, Prof. Dr. W., Dresden
 Häfner, Prof. Dr. H., Heidelberg
 Händel, Thomas, Fürth
 Hänsch, Prof. Dr. Klaus, Brüssel
 Haenschke, Dr. Barbara, Wismar
 Härtl, Dr. H., Stuttgart
 Haffner, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
 Haffner, Sebastian, Berlin
 Haftendorn, Prof. Dr. Helga, Berlin
 Haga, A. M., Staatssekr., Oslo/Norwegen
 Hagner, Gerhard W., Essen
 Hahn, Prof. Dr. G., Berlin/DDR
 Hahn, Holger, München
 Hahn, Prof. Dr. O., Botsch., Moskau/Russland
 Haidekker, Dr. A., Hamburg
 Hajdu, Dr. V., Prag/ČSFR

Halbach, Prof. Dr. H., Prien
 Halberstadt, Prof. Dr. V., Leyden/NL
 Hamilton, Daniel, Washington/USA
 Hamm-Brücher, Dr. Hildegard, München
 Hank, Dr. Rainer, Berlin
 Hankel, Prof. Dr. W., Frankfurt a.M.
 Hansen, Dr. B., Hamburg
 Hanssler, Bernhard, Bad Godesberg
 Harbs, Dr. R., Hamburg
 Harenberg, Werner, Hamburg
 Hartmann, Grit, Leipzig
 Hartwich, Prof. Dr. H.-H., Hamburg
 Haseldonckx, P., Essen
 Haseloff, Prof. Dr. O. W., Berlin
 Hasenclever, Wolf-Dieter, Dahlem
 Hassenstein, Prof. Dr. B., Freiburg i.Br.
 Hassner, Prof. P., Paris/Frankreich
 Hauck, Dr. Ch. W., Mannheim
 Hauenschild, Karl, Hannover
 Hauenschild, Manfred O. von, Hamburg
 Hauff, Dr. V., Bundesmin. a. D., Frankfurt a.M.
 Haus, Dr. W., Berlin
 Hausman, Prof. L., Cambridge, Mass./USA
 Hausmann, Prof. Dr. G., Hamburg
 Hauss, Prof. Dr. W. H., Münster i. W.
 Havemann, Prof. Dr.-Ing. H., Aachen
 Hayter, Sir William G., Oxford/England
 Hebebrand, Prof. Dr. W., Regensburg
 Heck, Prof. Dr. A., Prälät, Rom/Italien
 Heck, Dipl.-Volkswirt H., Bonn
 Heer, Prof. Dr. F., Wien/Österreich
 Heerwegen, Dr. F., Düsseldorf
 Heiberg, Dr. Marianne, Oslo/Norwegen
 Heidhues, Prof. Dr. Th., Göttingen
 Heigert, Dr. H., München
 Heilmann, Prof. Dr. Sebastian, Trier
 Heimsoeth, Dr. H.-J., Botsch., Berlin
 Heinemann, Dr. G., Altlandesprä., Essen
 Heinemann, Hilda, Essen
 Heinrichs, Dr. J., Starnberg
 Heinrichs, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin/DDR
 Heintzeler, Dr. W., Ludwigshafen
 Heisbourg, François, Paris/Frankreich
 Heitmeyer, Prof. Dr. Wilhelm, Bielefeld
 Heitz, Dipl.-Ing. W., Bad Godesberg
 Helbig, Prof. Dr. L. F., Tucson/USA
 Hellström, Mats, Botsch., Bonn
 Helminger, Paul, Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Hemmer, Prof. Dr. H.-R., Gießen
 Hempel, Dr. J., Bischof, Dresden
 Hendriks, Dr. A. J., Rotterdam/Niederlande
 Hennings, Helmut D., Hamburg
 Henningsen, Prof. Dr. Bernd, Berlin
 Hennis, Prof. Dr. Wilhelm, Freiburg i.Br.
 Hensche, Detlef, Stuttgart
 Henschel, Rudolf, Düsseldorf
 Hentig, Prof. Dr. H. von, Berlin
 Henze, Dr. E., Ulm
 Henzler, Dr. H., Düsseldorf
 Heppe, Dr. H. von, Staatssekr. a. D., Hamburg
 Herder-Dorneich, Prof. Dr. Ph., Köln
 Hereth, Prof. Dr. M., Hamburg
 Herion, Claude, Pfaffenhofen/Ilm
 Herles, Dr. W., München
 Herlt, Dr. R., Hamburg
 Hermes, Prof. Dr. H., Freiburg i.Br.
 Hermes, Dr. P., Botschafter a. D., Rom/Italien

Hermann, Ludolf, Bonn
 Herrmann, Frank, Berlin/DDR
 Herrmann, Prof. Dr. W., Köln
 Hersch, Prof. Dr. Jeanne, Genf/Schweiz
 Hertel, Prof. Dr.-Ing. H., Berlin
 Herz, Prof. Dr. Dietmar, Erfurt
 Herzog, Prof. Dr. R., Bundespräsident, Berlin
 Hess, Günter, Brügge/Belgien
 Hesse, Prof. Dr. H., Göttingen
 Hessel, Stéphane, Paris/Frankreich
 Heukelum, Horst van, Frankfurt a.M.
 Heuven, Marten van, Washington/USA
 Heydemann, Prof. Dr. B., Minister a. D., Kiel
 Hickel, Prof. Dr. R., Bremen
 Hildenbrand, Dr. G., Erlangen
 Hill, Prof. Dr. H., Staatsmin. a. D., Speyer
 Hillier-Fry, Norman, Gks. a. D., London/Engl.
 Hilligen, Prof. Dr. W., Gießen
 Hinteregger, Dr. G., Gesandter, Wien/Österr.
 Hirche, Walter, Minister a. D., Hannover
 Hirsch, Dr. Burkhard, Düsseldorf
 Hirschfeld, Dr. Y., Tel Aviv/Israel
 Hirschman, Prof. Dr. O. A., Princeton/USA
 Hiß, Dr. D., Berlin
 Hitpaß, Prof. Dr. J., Köln
 Hoagland, Jim, Washington/USA
 Hobohm, M. A. H., Bonn
 Hobsbawm, Prof. E., London/England
 Hochkeppel, Dr. W., München
 Höfer, Werner, Köln
 Hoefnagels, Prof. Dr. H., Nijmegen/Niederl.
 Höllerer, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
 Hoepfner, Rolf-Roger, Hamburg
 Hörz, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin/DDR
 Höynck, Dr. W., Genf/Schweiz
 Hoffmann, Prof. Dr. L., Berlin
 Hoffmann, Prof. Dr. St., Cambridge/USA
 Hoffmann-Riem, Prof. Dr. W., Sen. a. D., HH
 Hofmann, Prof. Dr. W., Marburg
 Hofstätter, Prof. Dr. P. R., Hamburg
 Hoge, James F., Jr., New York/USA
 Hohlfeld, Dipl.-Math. D., Hamburg
 Holme, Christopher, London/England
 Holmqvist, Dr. B., Stockholm/Schweden
 Holste, Prof. Dr.-Ing. W., Mühlheim
 Holzer, Werner, Bad Homburg
 Hoppe, Hans-Günter, Berlin
 Horchem, Dr. H. J., Hamburg
 Hornhues, Prof. Dr. K.-H., MdB, Bonn
 Horstmann, Hans-Henning, Bonn
 Horváth, Dr. I., Botsch. a. D., Budapest/Ungarn
 Hottinger, Dr. A., Madrid/Spanien
 Hoyer, Dr. Werner, MdB, Berlin
 Hu Angang, Prof. Dr., Beijing/China
 Huber, Dr. J., Berlin
 Huber, Prof. Dr. Mária, Leipzig
 Huber, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang, Berlin
 Hübner, Klaus, Berlin
 Hübner, Prof. Dr. K., Kiel
 Hüfner, Dr. W., MinDirig., Wiesbaden
 Hufen, Dr. F., Mainz
 Hunke, Dr. Sigrid, Bonn
 Hunold, Dr. A., Zürich/Schweiz
 Huppert, Dr. W., Bad Homburg
 Husseini, Faisal, Jerusalem
 Hutton, Will, London/England

Ibler, Prof. Dr. V., Zagreb/Jugoslawien
Ignatavicius, Evaldas, Min., Vilnius/Litauen
Iloniemi, Dr. Jaako, Min., Helsinki/Finnland
Ilves, Toomas H., Minister, Tallinn/Estland
Imelmann, Ehrhardt, Köln
Ipsen, Prof. Dr. H. P., Hamburg
Ischinger, W., Staatssekretär, Berlin
Italiaander, Prof. R., Hamburg
Iwanow, A. G., Moskau/Russland
Iwanow, I. D., Moskau/UdSSR
Izik-Hedri, Prof. Dr. G., Budapest/Ungarn

Jacev, Zoran, Skopje/Mazedonien
Jachontow, J. A., Moskau/UdSSR
Jackson, Robert, MP, London/England
Jacobus, Hans, Berlin/DDR
Jäckel, Prof. Dr. E., Stuttgart
Järvenpää, Minna, Prishtina
Jagja, Prof. V., St. Petersburg/Russland
Jagoda, Bernhard, Nürnberg
Jakobson, Max, Min., Helsinki/Finnland
Janes, Dr. J., Washington/USA
Jankowitsch, Dr. P., Staats., Wien/Österreich
Jann, Prof. Dr. W., Potsdam
Janning, Josef, München
Jantsch, Dr. E., Paris/Frankreich
Jastrschembkskij, Sergej W., Moskau/Russland
Jemeljanow, Prof. W. S., Moskau/UdSSR
Jenkins, Peter, London/England
Jepsen, Maria, Bischöfin, Hamburg
Jesse, Jean-Paul, Tel Aviv/Israel
Jičínský, Prof. Dr. Z., Prag/ČSFR
Jochimsen, Prof. Dr. R., Min. a. D., Düsseldorf
Jönck, Dr. U., Hamburg
Joetze, Dr. G., Bonn
Joffe, Dr. Josef, Hamburg
John, Dipl.-Pol., Barbara, Berlin
Johnson, Prof. H. G., London/England
Jonas, Prof. Dr. F., Mainz
Jorswieck, Prof. Dr. E., Berlin
Jovičević, Dr. Alexandra, Belgrad/Serbien
Juda, Prof. Dr. J., Warschau/Polen
Jürgensen, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
Jung, Dr. E. F., Botsch. a. D., Bonn
Jungblut, Michael, Mainz
Jungbluth, Prof. A., Wolfenbüttel
Jungk, Prof. Dr. R., Salzburg/Österreich

Kádár, Prof. B., Budapest/Ungarn
Kadow, Eberhard, Herzogenrath
Kaestner, Dr. U., MinDirig., Bonn
Kahl, Dr. Heike, Berlin
Kahlweit, Cathrin, München
Kahn-Ackermann, Georg, Straßburg/Frankr.
Kaiser, Prof. Dr. J. H., Freiburg i. Br.
Kaiser, Prof. Dr. Karl, Berlin
Kaltefleiter, Prof. Dr. W., Kiel
Kaltenbach, Helmut, Berlin
Kaminskij, Jewgenij, Kiew/Ukraine
Kannengießer, Walter, Bonn
Karaganow, Dr. S., Moskau/Russland
Karagesjan, Kares, Moskau/UdSSR
Karasek, Dr. F., Wien/Österreich
Karpow, Wiktor, Moskau/UdSSR
Kartte, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
Kasmin, Dr. A. I., Minister, Moskau/Russland
Kastl, Jörg, Botschafter a. D., Bonn

Kastrup, Dr. D., Staats. a. D., Bonn
Katterle, Prof. Dr. S., Bielefeld
Kauffmann, Michel, Straßburg/Frankreich
Kaufmann, Prof. Dr. F.-X., Bielefeld
Kaufmann, Dr. H., München
Kaufmann, Richard, Stuttgart
Kayser, Hans-Jürgen v., Buxtehude
Kelleher, Dr. C. McArdle, Berlin
Kempf, Dr. E., Klagenfurt/Österreich
Kempf, Dr. Herwig, Belgrad/Serbien
Kerber, Prof. Dr. W., München
Kern, Helmut, Senator a. D., Hamburg
Kerner, Prof. Dr. H.-J., Tübingen
Kernig, Prof. Dr. C. D., Freiburg i. Br.
Kerschner, Prof. L., Fullerton/USA
Kertész, György, Budapest/Ungarn
Kesting, Prof. Dr. H., Bochum
Kettig, Alma, Witten/Ruhr
Kewenig, Prof. Dr. W., Sen. a. D., Frankfurt
Khalid, Dr. D., Hamburg
Khol, Dr. A., Wien/Österreich
Kieffer, Dipl.-Ing. K. W., Bad Dürkheim
Kielinger, Thomas, Bonn
Kielmansegg, Prof. Dr. P. Graf, Mannheim
Kienbaum, Gerhard, Minister a. D., Düsseld.
Kienzl, Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
Kiep, Walther Leisler, Frankfurt a. M.
Kiesau, Dr. Gisela, Düsseldorf
Killick, Sir John, London/England
Kind, Dr. C., Zürich/Schweiz
Kindsmüller, Werner, Staats., Düsseldorf
King, Hilary, Generalkons. a. D., London/Engl.
Kirsch, Prof. Dr. Guy, Fribourg/Schweiz
Kirchschläger, Dr. R., BPräs. a. D., Wien/A
Kirk, Peter, London/England
Kirsch, Prof. Dr. Guy, Fribourg
Kirst, Dipl.-Volkswirt V., Hamburg
Kirt, Romain, Luxemburg
Kis, Vasile, Bukarest/Rumänien
Kiss, Prof. Dr. L. J., Budapest/Ungarn
Kitzinger, Prof. U. W., Brüssel/England
Klaassen, Prof. Dr. L. H., Rotterdam/NL
Klaeden, Eckart von, Bonn
Klages, Dörte, Heidelberg
Klages, Prof. Dr. H., Speyer
Klasen, Dr. K., Hamburg
Klau, Dr. F., Paris/Frankreich
Klein, PD. Dr. Gabriele, Hamburg
Klein, Hans, MdB, Bundesmin. a. D., Bonn
Klein, Prof. Dr. H., Bonn
Kleine-Brockhoff, Moritz, Köln
Kleinert, Hubert, Bonn
Kleinewefers, Jan, Krefeld
Klett, Bettina, Stuttgart
Kliefoth, Prof. Dr. W., Kiel
Klose, Dr. A., Wien/Österreich
Klose, Hans-Ulrich, MdB, Berlin
Kloss, Hans-Dieter, Stuttgart
Kloten, Prof. Dr. N., Stuttgart
Klug, Prof. Dr. O., Hamburg, Berlin
Kluge, Dr.-Ing. M., Stuttgart
Kluncker, Heinz, Stuttgart
Kluth, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
Knapp, Prof. H., Wien/Österreich
Knauff, Dr. H. W., Leverkusen
Knaus, Gerald, Berlin/Belgrad
Knoche, Prof. Dr.-Ing. K.-F., Aachen

Knoeringen, W. v., München
Knoop, Dr. A. von, Moskau/Russland
Knospe, Gerd, Hamburg
Knudsen, Prof. Dr. Olav, Huddinge/Norwegen
Knüpffer, Dr. R. v., Hilden
Kob, Prof. Dr. J., Hamburg
Kobaladze, Jurij G., Moskau/Russland
Kobler, Martin, Bonn
Kobysch, Vitaly, Moskau/UdSSR
Koch, Claus H., Berlin
Koch, Dr. H., Dortmund
Koch, Thilo, Hamburg
Kochalski, Horst, Hamburg
Köcher, Dipl.-Volkswirt Renate, Allensbach
Köhler, Prof. Dr. C., Frankfurt a. M.
Köhler, Gerd, Frankfurt a. M.
Köhler, Dr. H. W., Bonn
König, Dr. F., Kardinal, Wien/Österreich
Köpke, Dipl.-Volkswirt G., Brüssel/Belgien
Körber, Dr. K. A., Hamburg
Körmendy, Dr. I., Budapest/Ungarn
Koeßler, Thilo, Köln
Koestler, Arthur, London/England
Kogon, Prof. em. Dr. E., Falkenstein i. Ts.
Kohl, Dr. H., Bundeskanzler, MdB, Bonn
Köhler, Dr. G., München
Kohlhase, Dr. N., Chernes/Schweiz
Kohlschütter, Andreas, Ronco/Schweiz
Kohnstamm, Max, Houyet/Belgien
Koivisto, Mauno, Staatspräs. a. D., Helsinki/Fin
Kokoschin, Andrej A., Moskau/Russland
Kollmann, Prof. Dr. F., München
Komárek, Dr. V., Prag/ČSFR
Kondaurov, Alexej P., Moskau/Russland
Konecny, Dr. C., Prag/ČSFR
Konrad, György, Budapest/Ungarn
Kopka, Fritz-Jochen, Berlin
Korablew, Jurij W., Moskau/Russland
Korn, Dr. K., Bad Homburg
Kornblum, John C., Botsch., Bonn
Korte, Prof. Dr. Hermann-A., Rheda
Korte, PD Dr. Karl-Rudolf, Köln
Kortzfleisch, Prof. Dr. G. v., Mannheim
Koschnick, H., Bürgermeister a. D., Bremen
Koschokin, Dr. Jewgenij, Moskau/Russland
Koselleck, Prof. Dr. Reinhart, Bielefeld
Koshewnikow, W. M., Moskau/UdSSR
Kosto, Aad, Staats., Den Haag/Niederlande
Kotalík, Prof. Dr. J., Prag/ČSFR
Kotow, Michail J., Moskau/UdSSR
Kottulinsky, Dr. K. Graf, Wien/Österreich
Kotyk, Dr. V., Prag/ČSFR
Kovalchuk, Prof. Dr. Yuri V., St. Petersburg
Kowalew, Nikolaj D., Moskau/Russland
Krackow, Dr. J. H., München
Krämer, Prof. Dr. Gudrun, Berlin
Krämer, Dr. H., Hannover
Kramer, Dr. H., Ebenhausen
Kraminow, Daniil, Moskau/UdSSR
Kranenberg, Adolf, Düsseldorf
Kranz, Dr. Jerzy, Warschau/Polen
Krasnow, Dr. J., Moskau/UdSSR
Krastew, Stoine, Sofia/Bulgarien
Krauch, Prof. Dr. H., Kassel
Krause, Peter, Bonn
Krause-Brewer, Fides, Bonn
Krawczynski, Franciszek, Warschau/Polen

Kreft, Dr. Heinrich, Berlin
 Kreisky, Dr. B., Bundeskanzler a. D., Wien/A
 Krelle, Prof. Dr. W., Bonn
 Kremer, Prof. I. S., Moskau/UdSSR
 Krenzel, Prof. Dr. R., Berlin
 Krenzler, Dr. H.-G., Brüssel/Belgien
 Kreye, Otto, Starnberg
 Kriele, Prof. Dr. M., Köln
 Krings, Prof. Dr. H., München
 Krippendorff, Prof. Dr. E., Berlin
 Krippner, Reiner, Bayreuth
 Kritzler, Dipl.-Ing. W., Hamburg
 Krockow, Prof. Dr. Chr. Graf v., Göttingen
 Kroebel, Gerhard, Brüssel/Belgien
 Krolikowski, Herb., Staatss. a. D., Berlin/DDR
 Krüger, Kurt, Darmstadt
 Krüger, Dr. M., Hannover
 Krupp, Prof. Dr. H.-J., Sen. a. D., Hamburg
 Krzemiński, Adam, Warschau/Polen
 Kuby, Erich, Hamburg
 Kuby, Heinz, Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Kučera, Dr. B., Prag/ČSFR
 Kuczynski, Prof. Dr. J., Berlin/DDR
 Kudrin, Dr. A., Moskau/Russland
 Kühnau, Prof. Dr. J., Hamburg
 Kühne, Dr. K., Brüssel/Belgien
 Kühne, Dipl.-Ing. W., Frankfurt a. M.
 Kühnhardt, Prof. Dr. L., Bonn
 Küng, Prof. Dr. E., St. Gallen/Schweiz
 Künstle, Dipl.-Ing. K., Erlangen
 Kuentler, Peter, Genf/Schweiz
 Küntzel, Dr. W., Bad Oeynhausen
 Küpfmüller, Prof. Dr.-Ing. K., Darmstadt
 Küppers, Dr. B., Moskau/UdSSR
 Küppers, Dr. H., Düsseldorf
 Kuhlo, Dr. K. Chr., München
 Kuhlwein, Eckart, MdB, Bonn
 Kuhn, Prof. Dr. H., München
 Kulikow, Oleg, Moskau/UdSSR
 Kundler, Herbert, Berlin
 Kuntner, Wilhelm, General, Wien/Österreich
 Kunze, Dr. H. H., Erlangen
 Kuppermann, Dr. R. H., Washington/USA
 Kusnetzow, Georgi, Moskau/UdSSR
 Kuznetsov, A. J., Botsch., Kaliningrad/Russl.
 Kwizinskij, Julij, Botsch. a. D., Moskau/UdSSR

Laar, Mart, Tallinn/Estland
 Lämmert, Prof. Dr. E. Berlin
 Lahn, Dr. L., Botschafter a. D., Bonn
 Lake, Michael, Ankara/Türkei
 Lambsdorff, Hagen Graf, Brüssel
 Lambsdorff, Dr. O. Graf, MdB, Bonn
 Landgraf, Prof. Dr.-Ing. G., Dresden
 Lange, Prof. Dr. B.-P., Düsseldorf
 Lange, Dr. H., Frankfurt a. M.
 Lange, Dr. Peer H., Thaining
 Langendorfer, Pater Dr. Hans, Bonn
 Lange-Prollius, Prof. H., Bonn
 Langer, Jaroslav, Bonn
 Langer, Dr. W., Staatssek. a. D., Wiesbaden
 Langfeld, Uwe, Hamburg
 Langguth, Dr. G., Sankt Augustin
 Lankes, Dr. H. Chr., Bonn
 Lantzke, Dr. U., MinDir. a. D., Paris/F
 Laqueur, Prof. W., Washington/USA
 Larsen, Terje Rod, Gaza

Lasky, Melvin, London/England
 Lauristin, Marju, Tallinn/Estland
 Lauritzen, Dr. L., Bundesmin. a. D., Bonn
 Lautenschlager, Dr. H.-W., Staats. a. D., Bonn
 Layton, Christopher, London/England
 Lebahn, Dr. A., Ratingen
 Lebed, Alexander, Moskau/Russland
 Lebedew, Juri, Moskau/UdSSR
 Lebedew, Dr. W., Moskau/Russland
 Leber, Georg, Bundesmin. a. D., Bonn
 Lefringhausen, Dr. K., Mettmann
 Le Gloannec, Dr. A., Paris/Frankreich
 Lehmann-Grube, Dr. Hinrich, Leipzig
 Lehnecke, Julian, Düsseldorf
 Lehner, Gunthar, München
 Lehr, Prof. Dr. Ursula, BM a. D., Bonn
 Lehr, Wolfgang, Frankfurt a. M.
 Leibfritz, Dr. W., München
 Leicht, Prof. Robert, Hamburg/Berlin
 Leinen, Josef M., Minister a. D., Saarbrücken
 Leysen, Dr. A., Mortsel/Belgien
 Leist, Dr. E., Hamburg
 Leister, Dr. K.-D., Staatss. a. D., Bonn
 Leminsky, Dr. G., Düsseldorf
 Lendvai, Prof. P., Wien/Österreich
 Lenk, Prof. Dr. Hans, Karlsruhe
 Lenk, Maximilian, Hamburg
 Lennep, Emile van, Paris/Frankreich
 Lenz, Reimar, Berlin
 Leonard, Dr. J. A., Cambridge/England
 Leonhard, Prof. W., New Haven/USA
 Lepenies, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
 Lersner, Dr. H. Frhr. von, Berlin
 Lessing, Heinz A., Hamburg
 Letzelter, Dr. F., MinDir., Bonn
 Leussink, Prof. Dr. H., BM a. D., Karlsruhe
 Leutheusser, Helmut, Gmund
 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, S., BM a. D., Berl.
 Leutiger, Dr. H., Hofgeismar
 Levi, Prof. Dr. H. W., München
 Levite, Ariel, Tel Aviv/Israel
 Levy, Jean, Paris/Frankreich
 Levy, Dr. W. J., New York/USA
 Lewis, Flora, Paris/Frankreich
 Lichtschew, Prof. W., Moskau/Russland
 Lichey, Werner, Hamburg
 Liebermann, Prof. R., Paris/Frankreich
 Liefmann-Keil, Prof. Dr. E., Saarbrücken
 Liel, Dr. A., Jerusalem/Israel
 Lieven, Anatol, London/England
 Light, Dr. Margot, London/England
 Lill, Joe, Wien/Österreich
 Limbach, Prof. Dr. J., Präs. BVG, Karlsruhe
 Limon, Didier L., Billancourt/Frankreich
 Lindemann, Dr. Beate, Bonn
 Lindemann, Dr. H., München
 Lindemann, Wilhelm, Hamburg
 Linder, Dr. W., Zürich/Schweiz
 Linfert, Dr. C., Köln
 Linke, Dipl.-Pol. H., Köln
 Linke, Prof. K., Oberursel/Ts.
 Lipowicz, Dr. I., Warschau/Polen
 Liska, Dr. L., Prag/ČSFR
 Litten, Dr. J., Hamburg
 Littmann, Prof. Dr. K., Speyer
 Livingston, Dr. R. G., Washington, D.C./USA
 Ljapina, Alla, Moskau/UdSSR

Ljungloef, Lennart, Stockholm/Schweden
 Lobkowicz, Prof. Dr. N., München
 Loch, Harald, Berlin
 Löbsack, Dr. T., Unteruhldingen
 Loesch, Dr. A. von, Frankfurt a. M.
 Löwenthal, Gerhard, Mainz
 Löwenthal, Prof. em. Dr. R., Berlin
 Lohff, Prof. Dr. W., Hamburg
 Lohmar, Prof. Dr. U., Paderborn
 Lohs, Prof. Dr. K.-H., Leipzig
 Lombardo-Radice, Prof. Dr. L., Rom/Italien
 Lomejko, Wladimir, Moskau/UdSSR
 Lompe, Prof. Dr. K., Braunschweig
 Lopatin, N. Wladimir, Moskau/Russland
 Lopes, Prof. Dr. E. R., Lissabon/Portugal
 Lorenzer, Prof. Dr. A., Frankfurt a. M.
 Loy, Frank E., Washington, D.C./USA
 Lucas, Dr. H.-D., Bonn
 Ludlow, Prof. P., Brüssel/Belgien
 Ludwig, Prof. Dr. G., Marburg
 Ludz, Prof. Dr. P. C., München
 Lübbe, Prof. Dr. H., Staatss. a. D., Harixbeck
 Lüst, Prof. Dr. R., Hamburg
 Lüthy, Prof. H., Zürich/Schweiz
 Lüttmer, Hendrik, Hamburg
 Lukaszewski, Dr. J., Brügg/Belgien
 Lukovenko, Dr. A., Moskau/Russland
 Lukow, W. B., Botschafter, Moskau/Russland
 Lundberg, Prof. E., Stockholm/Schweden
 Lutz, Prof. Dr. B., München
 Lutz, Dr. C., Zürich/Schweiz
 Lutz, Claus A., MinDirig., Bonn
 Lutz, Prof. Dr. Dr. Dieter S., Hamburg

Mackensen, Prof. Dr. R., Berlin
 Maclay, Michael, London/England
 Mäkinen, Jussi, Botschafter, Wien/Österr.
 Mahrenholz, Dr. E. G., Min. a. D., Hannover
 Maier, Prof. Dr. H., Minister a. D., München
 Maier, Prof. Dr. H., Flensburg
 Maier, Dr. Willfried, Senator, Hamburg
 Maier-Leibnitz, Prof. Dr. H., Bonn
 Maihofer, Prof. Dr. W., BM a. D., Fiesole/I
 Maizière, Lothar de, MinPräs. a. D., Berlin
 Maizière, Staatsmin. Dr. Th. de, Dresden
 Makarczyk, Prof. J., Straßburg/F; Warschau/PL
 Malaschenko, Igor, Moskau/Russland
 Malaviya, Dipl.-Kfm. R. R., Frankfurt a. M.
 Mallaby, Sir Chr., Botsch. a. D., London/England
 Mander, John, London/England
 Mangoldt, Dr. Hans von, Tübingen
 Manitski, Jaan, Außenmin., Tallinn/Estland
 Margerie, Sophie-Caroline de, Paris/F
 Marienfeld, Prof. Dr. W., Hannover
 Markiewicz, Dr. R., Warschau/Polen
 Markiewicz, Prof. Dr. W., Warschau/Polen
 Markmann, Dr. H., Düsseldorf
 Markow, Wladimir, Moskau/Russland
 Marks, Leonard H., Washington, D.C./USA
 Maróth, Prof. Dr. M., Budapest/Ungarn
 Marquard, Prof. Dr. O., Gießen
 Marquardt, Regine, Ministerin, Schwerin
 Marschall v. Bieberstein, Dr. M. Frhr., Straßbg.
 Marsh, David, London/England
 Martini, Winfried, München
 Martiny, Dr. Anke, Rudelzhausen
 Marx, Eli, London/England

Maseberg, Eberhard, Hamburg
Masera, Prof. Dr. F., Rom/Italien
Masny, Prof. Dr. V., Washington, D.C./USA
Máté, Georges, Budapest/Ungarn
Mates, Prof. L., Belgrad/Jugoslawien
Mathiopoulos, Dr. Margarita, Berlin
Matthes, Karlgeorg, Hamburg
Matthiesen, Dr. H., Hamburg
Matuschke, Dr. W., Hamburg
Matussek, Prof. Dr. P., München
Matwejew, W. A., Moskau/UdSSR
Matz, Dr. U., Köln
Matzke, Dr. O., Rom/Italien
Maull, Dr. H. W., München
Maximowa, Prof. Dr. M., Moskau/UdSSR
Mayer, Prof. em. Dr. H., Tübingen
Mayer-Amery, Christian, München
Mayhew, Dr. A., Brüssel/Belgien
Mayntz, Prof. Dr. Renate, Köln
Mazowiecki, T., MinPräs. a.D., Warschau/PL
McGregor, Peter, London/England
Meckel, Markus, MdB, Berlin/Bonn
Medalinskas, Alvydas, Vilnius/Litauen
Medish, Marc C., Washington, D.C./USA
Mei Zhaorong, Botsch. a. D., Beijing/China
Meiner, Richard, Hamburg
Meinhold, Prof. Dr. H., Heidelberg
Meissner, Hans-Ulrich, Hamburg
Meißner, Prof. Dr. W., Frankfurt a.M.
Melchers, Prof. Dr. G., Tübingen
Melnikow, Prof. Dr. D., Moskau/UdSSR
Melnikow, I., Moskau/Russland
Melnikow, Viktor N., Moskau/UdSSR
Melville, Dr. A. Y., Moskau/UdSSR
Menke-Glückert, Peter, MinDir. a.D., Bonn
Ménudier, Prof. H., Paris/Frankreich
Menzel, Prof. Dr. E., Kiel
Meri, Lennart, Präsident, Tallinn/Estland
Merklein, Dr. Renate, Hamburg
Meroz, Yohanan, Botsch. a. D., Jerusalem/Israel
Mertens, Dr. D., Nürnberg
Mertes, Dr. A., Staatsminister a.D., Bonn
Mertes, Michael, Bonn
Mertin, Arthur, Bonn
Merzyn, Gerhard, Hamburg
Meschalkin, Prof. E., Nowosibirsk/UdSSR
Meschkowski, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin
Mestmäcker, Prof. Dr. E. J., Hamburg
Metz-Göckel, Prof. Dr. Sigrid, Dortmund
Meunier, Lutz, Berlin
Meyer, Fritjof, Hamburg
Meyer, Prof. Dr. K., Berlin
Meyer, Dr. M., Zürich/Schweiz
Meyer-Abich, Prof. em. Dr. A., Hamburg
Meyer-Abich, Prof. Dr. K., Sen. a.D., Essen
Meyer-Landrut, Dr. A., Moskau/Russland
Mezger, Dr. Erika, Düsseldorf
Michailow, Alexej, Moskau/UdSSR
Michalski, Prof. Dr. K., Wien/Österreich
Michalski, Prof. Dr. W., Paris/Frankreich
Michel, Prof. Dr. D., München
Middendorff, Prof. Dr. W., Freiburg i.Br.
Miegel, Dr. M., Bonn
Milner, Prof. B. S., Moskau/UdSSR
Milstein, Prof. M., Moskau/UdSSR
Mironenkow, Ewgeni, Moskau/UdSSR
Mitscherlich, Prof. Dr. A., Frankfurt a.M.
Mittendorff, Dr. H., Hamburg
Mlynar, Prof. Dr. Z., Innsbruck/Österreich
Mochalski, Dr. H., Frankfurt a.M.
Modorf, Siegm, MdB, Berlin
Modrow, Dr. H., MinPräs. a.D., Berlin
Moersch, Karl, Staatsmin. a.D., Ludwigsburg
Mohler, Dr. A., München
Moisi, Dr. D., Paris/Frankreich
Moldenhauer, Dr. Hans-Georg, Magdeburg
Moltke, Gebhardt von, Botsch., Brüssel/Belgien
Moltke, Dr. R. H. von, Brüssel/Belgien
Mommsen, Prof. Dr. W., Düsseldorf
Moneta, Jakob, Frankfurt a.M.
Moniac, Rüdiger, Bonn
Montbrial, Prof. T. de, Paris/Frankreich
Moore, Charles, London/England
Morel, Pierre, Botsch., Moskau/Russland
Morgan, Prof. R., San Domenico di Fiesole/I
Morgenstern, Prof. Dr. O., Princeton/USA
Morishita, K., Baku/Aserbaidshan
Moroni, Dr.-Ing. R., Hersel
Morosow, Igor N., Moskau/Russland
Morosow, Oleg, Moskau/Russland
Mortimer, Edward, London/England
Mosbacher, Robert, Houston, Texas/USA
Moshes, Dr. Arkady I., Moskau/Russl.
Motschaln, Dmitrij, Wien/UdSSR
Mozer, Alfred, Hoog Keppel/Niederlande
Mühlfenzl-Schneider, Dr. Isabel, München
Müller, Bastian, Köln
Müller, Dr. F., Ebenhausen
Müller, Prof. Dr. G., Heidelberg
Müller, Hans Dieter, Freiburg i.Br.
Müller, Prof. Dr. J. H., Freiburg i.Br.
Müller, Prof. Dr. K., Staatss. a.D., Bad Hombg.
Müller, Prof. Dr. K. V., Nürnberg
Müller-Groeling, Prof. Dr. H., Kiel
Müller-Marein, Josef, Paris/Frankreich
Müller-Michaelis, Dr. W., Tangstedt
Müller-Schwefe, Prof. Dr. H. R., Hamburg
Müller-Trimbusch, Gabriele, Stuttgart
Mundt, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin/DDR
Muraschow, Arkadij, Moskau/Russland
Muskins, Dr. G., Wien/Österreich
Musulin, Janko v., Frankfurt a.M.
Nagel, Prof. I., Berlin
Nagy, Dr. G., Budapest/Ungarn
Narjes, Dr. K. H., Minister a.D., Brüssel/B
Naudé, Prof. Dr. S. M., Pretoria/Rep. Südaf.
Naumann, Klaus, General, Bonn
Naumkin, Prof. V., Moskau/Russland
Nazarow, Wjatscheslaw M., Moskau/Russland
Necker, Dipl.-Volkswirt T., Köln
Nedoroslew, Sergej G., Moskau/Russland
Neesen, Bernhard, Duisburg
Nefiodow, Dipl.-Ing. L. A., Sankt Augustin
Nenning, Dr. G., Wien/Österreich
Nerling, Pfr. Dr. M., Hannover
Nestler, Peter, Köln
Neth, Prof. Dr. R., Hamburg
Neubauer, Franz, Minister a.D., München
Neuhäsel, Dr. R., Prag/CSFR
Neuhauser, Prof. Dr. Gertrud, Salzburg/Österr.
Neusel, Hans, Staatssekretär a.D., Bonn
Neuweiler, Dr. G., Tübingen
Neuwirth, Prof. Dr. Angelika, Beirut/Libanon
Nevermann, Dr. K., Staatsrat a.D., Hamburg
Neville-Jones, Pauline, London/England
Ni Yijn, Beijing/China
Nicholls, Anthony, Oxford/England
Niehans, Prof. Dr. J., Zürich/Schweiz
Niemöller, Dr. Martin, Wiesbaden
Nienhaus, Dr. V., Bochum
Niens, Prof. Dr. W., Frankfurt a.M.
Niethammer, Dr. F., Frankfurt a.M.
Nikiforow, W. J., Moskau/UdSSR
Nikonow, Juri, Gesandter, Wien/UdSSR
Nikonow, Wjatscheslaw A., Moskau/Russland
Noack, Prof. Dr. P., München
Noé, Dr. C., Staatsrat a.D., Hamburg
Noelle-Neumann, Prof. Dr. E., Allensbach
Nölling, Dr. W., Senator a. D., Hamburg
Nonnenmacher, Dr. G., Frankfurt a.M.
Noll, Prof. Dr. P., Zürich/Schweiz
Novak, Prof. M., Washington, D.C./USA
Novik, Prof. Faina, Moskau/UdSSR
Nowotny, Prof. Dr. E., Wien/Österreich
Nusseibeh, Dr. S., Jerusalem
Nyberg, René, Botschafter, Moskau/Finnland
Oberdieck, Michael, Düsseldorf
Oberdoerfer, Prof. Dr. D., Freiburg i.Br.
O'Brien, Conor Cruise, Senator, London/Engl.
O'Donnell, James P., Washington/USA
Öymen, Altan, Istanbul/Türkei
Öymen, Dr. O. B., Ankara/Türkei
Örn, Torsten, Botschafter, Bonn/Schweden
Oertel, Dr. R., Hamburg
Oetker, Dr. A., Köln
Oevermann, Dr. U., Frankfurt a.M.
Ohr, Dr. P. F., Bonn
Oksaar, Prof. Dr. Els, Hamburg
Olljum, Alar J. Rudolf, Tallinn/Estland
Olschowy, Prof. Dr. G., Bonn
Olsson, Hans, Stockholm/Schweden
O'Neill, Sir Con, London/England
Onyszkiewicz, Dr. J., Minist. a.D., Warschau/Pol.
Opit, Dr. M., Prag/CSFR
Oppenheimer, Prof. Dr. P., Oxford/England
Oppenländer, Dr. K. H., München
Orjol, Wladimir, Moskau/UdSSR
Ortleb, Prof. Dr. R., BM a.D., Bonn
Otto, Prof. Dr. F., Berlin
Ouchterlony, Thomas, Brüssel/Belgien
Owtschinnikow, W. W., Moskau/UdSSR
Owtschinskij, Wladimir S. Moskau/Russland
Paelinck, Prof. J. H. P., Brüssel/Belgien
Pain, Prof. E., Moskau/Russland
Pajević, Milan, Belgrad/Serbien
Paleckis, Justas, Botsch., Vilnius/Litauen
Palm, Prof. Dr. Jürgen, Heusenstamm
Papalekas, Prof. Dr. J., Bochum
Paqué, Prof. Dr. K.-H., Magdeburg
Partikel, Heinz, Frankfurt a.M.
Pasch, Dr. H., Botschafter a.D., Rom/Italien
Paton, Prof. Dr. B., Kiew/Ukraine
Paus, Dr. W., Kilafors/Schweden
Paulig, Oswald, Hamburg
Pauls, Dr. R. F., Botschafter a.D., Bonn
Paulsen, Bruno, Lübeck
Paulsen, Dr. H. C., Konstanz
Pavlova-Silvanskaja, Dr. M., Moskau/Russl.

Pawelczyk, Alfons, Senator a.D., Hamburg
 Peacock, Prof. A. T., York/England
 Peine, Dr. H. G., Neustadt-Hambach
 Pekschew, W. A., Moskau/UdSSR
 Pentzlin, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Pentzlin, Dr. K., Hannover
 Perger, Dr. Werner A., Hamburg
 Pestel, Prof. Dr.-Ing. E., Hannover
 Peters, H., Kapitän zur See a.D., Hamburg
 Petersen, Helveg, Min. a.D., Kopenhagen/DK
 Petritsch, Dr. W., Sarajewo/Bosnien-Herzeg.
 Pfaff, Prof. Dr. Anita, Augsburg
 Pfaff, Dieter, Essen
 Pfaff, Prof. Dr. M., Augsburg
 Pfeiffer, Prof. Dr. Ch., Hannover
 Pfleiderer, Prof. Dr. O., Stuttgart
 Pflüger, Dr. F., MdB, Berlin
 Philips, Dr. F., Eindhoven/Niederlande
 Picht, Prof. Dr. R., Ludwigsburg
 Pick, Hella, London/England
 Pieroth, Elmar, Senator, Berlin
 Piper, Nikolaus, München
 Pirker, Prof. Dr. Th., Berlin
 Pirogow, Valery I., Moskau/Russland
 Pistor, Dr. H.-H., Essen
 Pitowranow, E. P., Moskau/UdSSR
 Pitz, Dr. K. H., Frankfurt a.M.
 Pjadyschew, Boris P., Moskau/Russland
 Plack, Dr. A., Landshut
 Plaschka, Prof. Dr. R., Wien/Österreich
 Platt, Prof. Dr. D., Gießen
 Plochmann, Prof. Dr. R., Freising
 Ploetz, Dr. H.-F. v., Staatssekr., Bonn
 Plog, Karsten, Hamburg
 Pöhl, Karl Otto, Präs. a.D., Frankfurt a.M.
 Poensgen, Gisbert, Botschafter, Brüssel/B
 Poettering, Dr. H.-G., MEP, Straßburg/F
 Pohl, Prof. Dr. R., Halle
 Pohmer, Prof. Dr. D., Tübingen
 Pokrowskij, Prof. A. N., Moskau/UdSSR
 Polak, Prof. Dr. F., Wassenaar/Niederlande
 Polenz, Ruprecht, MdB, Berlin
 Polewoi, Boris N., Moskau/UdSSR
 Poljanow, Nikolai E., Moskau/UdSSR
 Poll, Bert, Den Haag/Niederlande
 Poll, Dr. F. von, München
 Pollack, Dr. D., Leipzig
 Pommer, Prof. Dr. H., Ludwigshafen
 Ponomarjow, Prof. Lew A., Moskau/Russland
 Ponto, Jürgen, Frankfurt a.M.
 Popitz, Prof. Dr. H., Freiburg i.Br.
 Popowa, Ljudmila, Moskau/UdSSR
 Poppe, Prof. Dr. E., Leipzig/DDR
 Pornschlegel, Prof. Dr. H., Dortmund
 Portmann, Prof. Dr. A., Basel/Schweiz
 Portugalow, Nikolai, Moskau/UdSSR
 Posth, Dr. Martin, Berlin
 Prack, Herbert, Wien/Österreich
 Prager, Dr. Th., Wien/Österreich
 Prantl, Dr. H., München
 Preiser, Prof. Dr. E., München
 Preuss, Prof. Dr. U. K., Bremen
 Prichodow, Jurij, Moskau/UdSSR
 Priddat, Prof. Dr. Birger, Witten/Herdecke
 Primatarova, A., Botsch. a.D., Sofia/Bulgarien
 Prinzenstein, Josef, Vaduz/Liechtenstein
 Prittie, Terence, London/England
 Proebster, Prof. Dr. W. E., München
 Proektor, Prof. Dr. D., Moskau/UdSSR
 Pronovost, Prof. G., Trois-Rivières/Kanada
 Propper, Dan, Tel Aviv/Israel
 Pross, Prof. Dr. H., Weiler
 Pross, Prof. Dr. Helge, Siegen
 Pross-Weerth, Dr. H., Bremen
 Pudlák, Dr. J., Prag/ČSFR
 Pütz, Prof. Dr. Th., Wien/Österreich
 Pufendorf, Ulrich von, Frankfurt a.M.
 Puls, Dr. E., Hamburg
 Puschkow, Alexei K., Moskau/Russland
 Putin, Wladimir W., St. Petersburg/Russland
 Puttkamer, E. v., Botsch., Den Haag/NL
 Puttkammer, Jescov, Botsch. a.D., Belgrad/Jug.
 Pyadyschew, Boris, Moskau/Russland
 Pyroschkow, Prof. S., Kiew/Ukraine
 Quinlan, Sir Michael, Enstone/England
 Rabehl, Dr. B., Berlin
 Rabels, Dr. R., Hamburg
 Raddatz, Dr. F., Hamburg
 Radermacher, Prof. Dr. F. J., Ulm
 Radke, Olaf, Frankfurt a.M.
 Räuker, Friedrich Wilhelm, Hamburg
 Rahr, Alexander G., Berlin
 Raiser, Prof. Dr. Th., Gießen
 Rajewski, Prof. Dr. B., Frankfurt a.M.
 Rajh, Dr. Z., Belgrad/Jugoslawien
 Rakowski, Dr. M., Warschau/Polen
 Randow, Dr. Th. v., Hamburg
 Ranft, Dietrich, München
 Rasch, Prof. Dr. H., Frankfurt a.M.
 Raschert, Prof. Dr. J., Berlin
 Ratiani, Dr. G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Rau, Dr. W., Bonn
 Raupach, Prof. Dr. H., München
 Raven, Wolfram v., Bonn
 Ravens, Karl, Bundesmin. a.D., Bonn
 Rehn, Prof. G., Stockholm/Schweden
 Reich, Richard, Zürich/Schweiz
 Reinfried, Dr. D., Dresden
 Reiser, Hans, München
 Reissner, Dr. J., Ebenhausen
 Reiter, Prof. Dr. H., Gmund
 Reiter, Janusz, Botsch. a.D., Warschau/Polen
 Reljić, Dr. Dušan, Berlin
 Remmers, Dr. W., Minister a.D., Berlin
 Renaud, Jean-Claude, Brüssel/Belgien
 Rendtorff, Prof. Dr. T., München
 Renouard, Isabelle, Paris/Frankreich
 Resch, Dr. I., Gräfelting
 Reschke, Dr. H., Mannheim
 Rest, Prof. Dr. W., Münster i.W.
 Réti, Ervin, Budapest/Ungarn
 Reuther, Eberhard, Hamburg
 Revel, Jean-François, Paris/Frankreich
 Reverdin, Prof. O., Genf/Schweiz
 Richebächer, Dr. K., Frankfurt a.M.
 Richter, Prof. Dr. H.-E., Gießen
 Richter, Johannes, Leipzig
 Richter, Stephan-Götz, Washington/USA
 Richthofen, Dr. H. Frhr. v., Botsch., Brüssel/B
 Ridder, Prof. Dr. H., Gießen
 Riedmiller, Josef, München
 Riedmüller, Prof. Dr. Barbara, Berlin
 Rieger, Dr. W., Hamburg
 Rieger, Dipl.-Ing. U., Hamburg
 Riehle, Dr. W., Burgenhausen
 Riehl-Heysse, Herbert, München
 Riese, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin
 Riesenhuber, Dr. H., BMin. a.D., MdB, Bonn
 Riesner, Prof. Dr. W., Zittau
 Ringstorff, Dr. H., Schwerin
 Risler, Thorwald, Bonn
 Ritscher, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
 Ritter, Prof. Dr. G., München
 Ritter, Prof. Dr. K., Ebenhausen
 Robbins, Lord L. Ch., London/England
 Robins, Dr. P., Oxford/England
 Rocard, Michel, Premiermin. a.D., Paris/F
 Rödinger, Horst, Hamburg
 Roellecke, Prof. Dr. G., Karlsruhe
 Röling, Prof. Dr. B. V. A., Groningen/NL
 Roer, Dipl.-Volksw. E.-M., Bad Bocklet
 Roeseler, Dr. A., München
 Rogiers, Dr. F., Brüssel/Belgien
 Rogosin, Dr. D., Moskau/Russland
 Rogow, Prof. S., Moskau/Russland
 Rohmoser, Prof. Dr. G., Stuttgart
 Rollet, Henry, Generalkonsul a.D., Paris/F
 Rollmann, Dietrich, Hamburg
 Ronchey, Dr. A., Rom/Italien
 Ronneberger, Prof. Dr. F., Nürnberg
 Roper, John, London/England
 Rosanow, Prof. Dr. G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Rosen, Dr. R. von, Frankfurt a.M.
 Rosenmayr, Univ.-Prof. Dr. L., Wien/Österr.
 Rosenstiel, Dr. F., Straßburg/Frankreich
 Roß, Jan, Hamburg/Berlin
 Rossbach, Gerhard, Hamburg
 Rotfeld, Dr. A., Stockholm/Schweden
 Roth, Dipl.-Volksw. W., MdB, Bonn
 Rothschild, Prof. Dr. K. W., Linz/Österreich
 Rotta, Hans, Stuttgart
 Rouleau, Eric, Botsch. a.D., Paris/Frankreich
 Rován, Prof. J., Paris/Frankreich
 Rowold, Dr. M., Moskau/UdSSR
 Rubinski, Prof. J. I., Moskau/UdSSR
 Rudenko, Prof. Y. N., Moskau/Russland
 Rudolph, Dr. H., Berlin
 Rüb, Dr. Matthias, Budapest/Ungarn
 Rüegg, Prof. Dr. W., Bern/Schweiz
 Rühle, Volker, Bundesminister, MdB, Bonn
 Rühl, Prof. Dr. G., Berlin
 Rühl, Dr. L., Staatssekr. a.D., Bonn
 Rühmkorf, Dipl.-Psych. E., Minister a.D., Kiel
 Rüstow, Prof. Dr. H. J., München
 Rüttgers, Dr. J., Bundesminister, MdB, Bonn
 Ruffmann, Prof. Dr. K.-H., Erlangen
 Ruhfus, Dr. J., Botschafter a.D., Bonn
 Ruhnauf, Prof. Heinz, Staatss. a.D., Bonn
 Rumer, E. B., Washington, D.C./USA
 Rumpf, Prof. Dr.-Ing. H., Karlsruhe
 Rupert, Dr. A., Kapstadt/Rep. Südafrika
 Rupnik, Prof. J., Paris/Frankreich
 Rusconi, Prof. G. E., Turin/Italien
 Rykin, Dr. W., Moskau/UdSSR
 Ryschkow, Wladimir A., Moskau/Russland
 Sänger, Fritz, München
 Sagladin, Wadim, Moskau/UdSSR
 Sahn, Prof. Dr. A., München

Salimgerei, A., Almaty/Kasachstan
 Salin, Prof. Dr. E., Basel/Schweiz
 Salin, Prof. P., Paris/Frankreich
 Sames, Dr. W., RegDir., Bonn
 Sanakojew, Schalwa, Moskau/UdSSR
 Sand, Dr. M., Straßburg/Frankreich
 Sandschneider, Prof. Dr. Eberhard, Berlin
 Sannwald, Dr. R., Brüssel/Belgien
 Sassin, Dr.-Ing. W., Laxenburg/Österreich
 Sauzay-Stoffaas, Brigitte, Berlin
 Saxer, Prof. Dr. U., Zürich/Schweiz
 Scardigli, Victor, Paris/Frankreich
 Schachtschabel, Prof. Dr. H., Mannheim
 Schäfer, Harald B., Offenburg
 Schäfer, Helmut, MdB, Staatsminister, Bonn
 Schaefer, Prof. Dr.-Ing. H., München
 Schäfer, Prof. Dr. K. H., Hamburg
 Schäfer, Dr. M., Minister a.D., Saarbrücken
 Schaefer, Dr. Michael, Berlin
 Schaeffler, Dr. W., Herzogenaurach
 Schäuble, Dr. W., MdB, Bonn
 Schaffhauser, Prof. Dr. Jean-Luc, Straßburg/F
 Schaffrath, Klaus-Uwe, Peking/China
 Schardt, Alois, München
 Scharf, Prof. A., München
 Scharpf, Prof. Dr. F., Berlin
 Scharwächter, Prof. Dr. R., Stuttgart
 Schavan, Dr. A., Ministerin, Stuttgart
 Scheel, Walter, BundesPräs. a.D., München
 Scheffold, Horst, Berlin
 Scheid, Prof. Dr. R., Frankfurt a.M.
 Schejnis, Viktor, Moskau/Russland
 Schelsky, Prof. em. Dr. H., Münster i. W.
 Schenajew, Prof. Dr. W., Moskau/UdSSR
 Scherf, Dr. Henning, Bürgermeister, Bremen
 Scheuch, Prof. Dr. E., Köln
 Schewzowa, Dr. Lilija, Moskau/Russland
 Schidlowskij, Dr. A. K., Kiew/Ukraine
 Schieferdecker, Dr. H., Berlin/DDR
 Schierwater, Dr. H.-V., Wedel
 Schill, Dr. H. J., MinDirig., Bonn
 Schiller, Prof. Dr. K., BM a.D., Hamburg
 Schiller, Dr. U., Bethesda/USA
 Schily, Otto, MdB, Bonn
 Schlant-Bradley, Prof. Dr. E., Washington/USA
 Schlauch, Rezzo, MdB, Bonn
 Schlecht, Prof. Dr. O., Staats. a.D., Bonn
 Schlegelberger, Dr. H., Minister a.D., Kiel
 Schleiminger, Dr. G., Basel/Schweiz
 Schleyer, Hanns-Eberhard, Bonn
 Schlie, Dr. U., Berlin
 Schlögel, Prof. Dr. Karl, Frankfurt/Oder
 Schlömann, H., Regierungsrat, Bonn
 Schloten, Dieter, MdB, Bonn
 Schmähl, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
 Schmelzer, Dr. H., Köln
 Schmid, Dr. G., M. A., München
 Schmidbauer, Bernd, Staatsminister, Bonn
 Schmid-Burgk, Dr. K., Hamburg
 Schmidla, Ulrich, Warschau/Polen
 Schmidt, Christian, MdB, Bonn
 Schmidt, Helmut, Bundeskanzler i.R., Hamburg
 Schmidt, Dr. H. B., Bonn
 Schmidt, Joachim, Botsch., Belgrad/Serbien
 Schmidt, Prof. Dr. M., Berlin/DDR
 Schmidt, Renate, MdL, München
 Schmidt, Dr. V., Bonn

Schmidt-Häuer, Christian, Moskau/UdSSR
 Schmidt-Tiedemann, Dr. K. J., Hamburg
 Schmiegelow, Henrik, Bonn
 Schmölz, Prof. Dr. F. M., Salzburg/Österreich
 Schmückle, Gerd, General a.D., München
 Schneider, Dr. F., München
 Schneider, Prof. Dr. H. K., Köln
 Schneider, Prof. Dr. H.-P., Hannover
 Schneider, Manfred, Berlin
 Schneider, Manfred, Berlin
 Schneider, Dr. O., BundesMin. a.D., Bonn
 Schneider, Dr. W., Düsseldorf
 Schnelle, Eberhard, Quickborn
 Schnitker, Paul, Bonn
 Schnoor, Dr. H., Minister, Düsseldorf
 Schnusenberg, Josef, Gelsenkirchen
 Schobert, M. A., Prof. Dr. F. W., Nürnberg
 Schockenhoff, Dr. Andreas, MdB, Berlin
 Schönbohm, Dr. W., Stuttgart
 Schoenwaldt, Peter, GKs, Lyon/Frankreich
 Schötter, Heinrich Wilhelm, Hamburg
 Scholle, Dr. Manfred, Münster
 Schomerus, Dr. L., Bonn
 Schotte, Jan P., Bischof, Rom/Italien
 Schouten, Prof. Dr. D. B. J., Tilburg/Niederl.
 Schouten, Prof. Dr. J. F., Eindhoven/Niederl.
 Schramm, Prof. Dr. G., Tübingen
 Schreiber, Dr. M., MinDir., Bonn
 Schreiner, Hanns, MinDirig., Mainz
 Schreiner, Ottmar, MdB, Bonn
 Schrenck-Notzing, Caspar Baron v., München
 Schröder, Dr. D., Basel/Schweiz
 Schröder, Dieter, Berlin
 Schröder, Prof. Dr. Richard, Berlin
 Schroers, Rolf, Gummersbach
 Schubert, Dr. H., MinDir. a.D., Wiesbaden
 Schubert, Prof. Dr. K. von, Heidelberg
 Schubert, Prof. Dr. R., Nürnberg
 Schüler, Dr. J., Brüssel/Belgien
 Schürch, Fritz, Neuchâtel/Schweiz
 Schütterle, Dr. P., Brüssel/Belgien
 Schütze, Dr. Ch., München
 Schütze, Dr. W., Paris/Frankreich
 Schulmann, Dr.H.,Staats. a.D., Frankfurt a.M.
 Schulte, Prof. Dr. H., Bonn
 Schulte-Hillen, Gerd, Hamburg
 Schulten, Prof. Dr. R., Jülich
 Schultz, Fritz R., Gau-Bischofsheim
 Schulz, Prof. Dr. E., Bonn
 Schulz, Prof. Dr. W., Tübingen
 Schulze, Franz-Joseph, General a.D., Bonn
 Schulze, Prof. Dr. G., Bamberg
 Schulze, Martin, Bonn
 Schulze-Vorberg, Dr. M., Kitzingen
 Schulz-Hardt, Dr. J., Bonn
 Schumacher, Dr. E. F., London/England
 Schumacher, Dr. H., Paris/Frankreich
 Schumilin, Alexander I., Moskau/Russland
 Schunck, Dr. A., Frankfurt a.M.
 Schunter-Kleemann, Prof. Dr. Susanne, Bremen
 Schur, Gustav-Adolf, MdB, Bonn
 Schuster, Prof. Dr. E., Heidelberg
 Schuster, Dr. G., Bonn
 Schuster, Dr. H., München
 Schwätzer, Dr. Irmgard, BMin. a.D., Bonn
 Schwalbach, Hans, Kiel
 Schwamm, Prof. H., Genf/Schweiz

Schwarz, Prof. Dr. H. P., Bonn
 Schwarzenbach, Cyrill E., Zürich/Schweiz
 Schwarzenberg, Karl Fürst von, Prag/ČSFR
 Schwarzkopf, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Schwarz-Schilling, Dr. Chr., Min. a.D., Berlin
 Schweitzer, Pierre Paul, Paris/Frankreich
 Schweppe, Dr. Reinhard, Berlin
 Schwerte, Prof. Dr. H., Aachen
 Seebacher-Brandt, Dr. Brigitte, Bonn
 Seefin, Dr. L. L., Alexandria/Ägypten
 Seeger, Dr. J., Staatssekretär, Düsseldorf
 Seehofer, Horst, Bundesminister, MdB, Bonn
 Seelmaecker, Joachim, Hamburg
 Seewald, Dr. H., Stuttgart
 Segbers, Prof. Dr. Klaus, Berlin
 Segre, Sergio, Rom/Italien
 Seidel, Prof. Dr. B., Göttingen
 Seidel, Prof. Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
 Seifert, Prof. Dr. J., Hannover
 Seitz, Dr. K. Botschafter a.D., Bonn
 Selbach, Prof. Dr. H., Berlin
 Selbmann, Eugen, Bonn
 Senghaas, Prof. Dr. D., Bremen
 Sengling, Prof. Dr. D., Frankfurt a.M.
 Sethe, Dr. P., Hamburg
 Seton, Dr. F., Oxford/England
 Seydak, Pawel, Oberst, Warschau/Polen
 Shedrovitzky, Prof. Dr. P., St. Petersburg/Russl.
 Shen Juereen, Beijing/China
 Shi Mingde, Beijing/China
 Shi Ze, Beijing/China
 Shils, Prof. E., Chicago/USA
 Shoval, Zalman, Tel Aviv/Israel
 Shpak, Prof. P. F., Kiew/Ukraine
 Shukow, Juri, Moskau/UdSSR
 Shulman, Prof. M. D., New York/USA
 Shurkin, Prof. V., Moskau/UdSSR
 Sidorow, W. S., Botsch., Moskau/Russland
 Siebert, Dipl.-Volksw. H.-A., Washingt./USA
 Siebker, Manfred, Gänserndorf/Österreich
 Siedler, Wolf Jobst, Berlin
 Sieverts, Prof. Dr. R., Hamburg
 Sigmond, Dr. A., Rom/Italien
 Silin, Eugeni, Moskau/UdSSR
 Siller, Peter, Berlin
 Simon, Dr. H., Karlsruhe
 Simon, Michel-François, Paris/Frankreich
 Simon, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
 Simson, Prof. Dr. W. von, Freiburg i.Br.
 Sisow, Nicolai, Moskau/UdSSR
 Sivers, Prof. Dr. E. von, Stuttgart
 Sjuganow, Dr. G., Moskau/Russland
 Skalski, Ernest, Warschau/Polen
 Skierka, Volker, Hamburg
 Skljarow, Witalij, Minister, Kiew/Ukraine
 Skrypczak-Spak, Dr. M., Posen/Polen
 Skubiszewski, Prof. Dr. K., Den Haag/NL
 Slotosch, Dr. W., München
 Smirnow, Prof. W. S., Leningrad/UdSSR
 Smolar, Prof. Aleksander, Warschau/Polen
 Smoydzin, Werner, MinDir., Bonn
 Smyser, Dr. W. R., Washington/USA
 Sobtschak, Prof. A. A., Bgm., St.Petersbg./Russl.
 Soell, Prof. Dr. H., MdB, Bonn
 Solzbacher, Prof. Dr. Claudia, Osnabrück
 Söring, Eduard, Hamburg
 Sohmen, Prof. Dr. E., Heidelberg

Sohn, Prof. Dr. K. H., Staatssekr. a.D., Köln
 Sokolow, Prof. Dr. B., Moskau/UdSSR
 Solms, Prof. Dr. H., Genf/Schweiz
 Sombart, Dr. N., Straßburg/Frankreich
 Sommer, Dr. Th., Hamburg
 Song Jian, Beijing/China
 Sonnenfeldt, Prof. H., Washington, D.C./USA
 Sontheimer, Prof. Dr. K., München
 Schaefer, Dr. Michael, Berlin
 Sorić, Miodrag, Köln
 Sorin, Prof. V., Moskau/UdSSR
 Spáčil, Dr. D., Prag/ČSFR
 Späth, Dr. L., MinPräs. a.D., Jena
 Späth, Dr. M., Köln
 Speranza, Dr. G., Brüssel/Belgien
 Sperber, Manès, Paris/Frankreich
 Spernert, Prof. Dr. E., Sulzburg-Laufen
 Spethmann, Dr. D., Duisburg
 Spiegelhalter, Dr. F., Freiburg i. Br.
 Spindler, Gert P., Hilden
 Spinelli, Prof. A., Rom/Italien
 Spitzer, Dipl.-Ing. H., Düsseldorf
 Stackelberg, Dr. K. G. Frhr. v., Bielefeld
 Stahl, Erwin, Parl. Staatss. a.D., Bonn
 Stalev, Dr. S., Botsch. a.D., Sofia/Bulgarien
 Stålvant, Carl-Einer, Stockholm/Schweden
 Stammler, Eberhard, Stuttgart
 Standfest, Dr. E., Düsseldorf
 Standke, Dr. K. H., Berlin
 Starke, Dr. K. H., Bonn
 Starlinger, Prof. Dr. P., Köln
 Staudt, Erwin, Stuttgart
 Stebelski, Stanislaw, Botsch., Helsinki/Polen
 Steeg, Helga, Wachtberg
 Steffani, Prof. Dr. W., Hamburg
 Steffe, Dr. H.-O., Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Steger, Dr. H. A., Botsch. a.D., Budapest/Ung.
 Stehle, Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
 Stehlin, Paul, General, Paris/Frankreich
 Steinbach, Thilo, Paris/Frankreich
 Steinbach, Dr. U., Hamburg
 Steinel, Helmut, Brüssel/Belgien
 Steinert-Dalmer, Prof. Dr. Marlis, Genf/CH
 Steinhaus, Rolf, Flottillenadmiral, Bonn
 Steinkühler, Franz, Oberursel
 Stephan, Dr. Cora, Frankfurt a.M.
 Steppacher, Dr. R., Basel/Schweiz
 Stern, Carola, Köln
 Stern, Prof. Dr. F., New York/USA
 Stern, Prof. Dr. K., Köln
 Steves, Kurt, Köln
 Stich, Dr. H., München
 Stierlin, Prof. Dr. H., Heidelberg
 Stiller, Günter, Hamburg
 Stock, Prof. Dr. Günther, Berlin
 Stohler, Prof. Dr. J., Basel/Schweiz
 Stolpe, Dr. M., MinPräs., Potsdam
 Stolze, Diether, Staatssekretär a.D., München
 Stone, Prof. Dr. S., Washington/USA
 Stordel, Dr. H., Genf/Schweiz
 Strasser, Prof. Dr. J., Berg
 Streeck, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang, Köln
 Streeten, Prof. P., Boston/USA
 Streicher, Dr. H., Hamburg
 Streissler, Prof. Dr. E., Wien/Österreich
 Ströcker, Prof. Dr. Elisabeth, Köln
 Stroetmann, Clemens, Staatss., Bonn

Strümpel, Prof. Dr. B., Berlin
 Stucken, Dr. Bernd-Uwe, Shanghai/China
 Studer, Norbert, St.-Etienne/Frankreich
 Studnitz, Dr. E.-J. von, Botsch., Moskau
 Stüdemann, Dietmar, Berlin
 Stürmer, Prof. Dr. Michael, Berlin
 Stützle, Dr. W., MinDir. a.D., Bonn
 Stuth, Reinhard, Staatsrat, Hamburg
 Sudhoff, Dr. J., Botschafter a.D., Paris/F
 Summa, Timo, Brüssel/Belgien
 Sund, Olaf, Senator a.D., Düsseldorf
 Šundić, Milika, Belgrad/Jugoslawien
 Supek, Prof. Dr. R., Zagreb/Jugoslawien
 Svilanović, Goran, Min., Belgrad/Serbien
 Swerew, Sergej, Moskau/UdSSR
 Szeemann, Dr. H., Zürich/Schweiz
 Szürös, Dr. M., Budapest/Ungarn

Tacke, Bernhard, Düsseldorf
 Tarassow, Pawel, Moskau/UdSSR
 Tashan, Seyfi, Ankara/Türkei
 Tashmukhamedova, N., Taschkent/Usbekistan
 Tatsi, Sergej G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Tatu, Michel, Paris/Frankreich
 Taubes, Prof. Dr. J., Berlin
 Taus, Dr. J., Wien/Österreich
 Tedeschi, Dr. B., Rom/Italien
 Tedstrom, J. E., Washington, D.C./USA
 Tegtmeier, Dr. W., Staatss., Bonn
 Teichert, Manfred, Brüssel/Belgien
 Teltschik, Dr. H., München
 Tenter, Dieter, Hamburg
 Tenter, Hermann, Hamburg
 Teokarević, Dr. J., Belgrad/Serbien
 Terechow, Wladislaw, Botschafter a.D., Bonn
 Teske, Knut, Hamburg
 Thadden, Prof. Dr. R. v., Göttingen
 Theobald, Dipl.-Kaufmann A., Köln
 Thiemann, Dr. E., Salzhause
 Thiemann, Dr. H., Vesenaz/Schweiz
 Thierse, Wolfgang, MdB, Bonn
 Thoben, Dipl.-Vw. Christa, Staatss., Bonn
 Thönnies, Franz, MdB, Berlin
 Thönnies, Dr. W., Genf/Schweiz
 Thoma, Dr. F., München
 Thomae, Prof. Dr. H., Bonn
 Thomas, Prof. Dr. J., Paris/Frankreich
 Thomas, Dr.-Ing. U., Min. a.D., Wachtberg
 Thomasius, Prof. Dr. H., Dresden
 Thomsen, Dr. D., Wolfsburg
 Thorn, Gaston, MinPräs. a.D., Luxemburg/L
 Thurn, Dr. M., Wien/Österreich
 Tibi, Prof. Dr. B., Göttingen
 Tichwinski, Prof. Dr. S., Moskau/UdSSR
 Timoshenko, J. V., Kiew/Ukraine
 Tinbergen, Prof. em. Dr. J., Den Haag/NL
 Tindemans, Prof. L., Min. a.D., Edegen/B
 Tobin, Prof. J., New Haven/USA
 Todenhöfer, Dr. J. G., Bonn
 Tokarevsky, Prof. Dr. V. V., Kiew/Ukraine
 Tolkmitt, Dr. H. B., Hamburg
 Tolkunow, Lew, Moskau/UdSSR
 Tomala, Dr. M., Warschau/Polen
 Topf, Dr. E., Hamburg
 Tornetta, Vincenzo, Botsch. a.D., Rom/Italien
 Trefilow, Prof. Dr. W. I., Kiew/Ukraine
 Treiber, Dr.-Ing. H., Leverkusen

Treuner, Prof. Dr. P., Stuttgart
 Trier, Prof. Dr. Ir. van, Eindhoven/NL
 Triesch, Günter, Siegburg
 Troeger, Dr. H., Staatsmin. a.D., Frankf. a.M.
 Trott zu Solz, Dr. Levin von, Hamburg
 Truchanowski, Prof. W. G., Moskau/UdSSR
 Trumpf, Dr. J., Staatssekretär a.D., Bonn
 Tschierow, Nikolai, Moskau/UdSSR
 Tschikwadse, Prof. V., Moskau/UdSSR
 Tschistow, W. W., Moskau/UdSSR
 Tuchel, Prof. Dr., Wuppertal
 Tudyka, Prof. Dr. K. P., Bonn
 Türkmén, Ilter, Minister a.D., Istanbul/Türkei
 Tugendhat, Sir Christopher, London/England
 Tuomioja, Dr. Erkki, Min., Helsinki/Finnland
 Tuppy, Prof. Dr. H., Wien/Österreich

Udgaard, Dr. N. M., Oslo/Norwegen
 Ueberhorst, Reinhard, Elmshorn
 Ueberschaer, Dr. Hans-Chr., Botsch., Peking
 Uexküll, Gösta Baron v., Hamburg
 Ullmann, Dr. W., MdB, Bonn
 Ulrich, Prof. Dr. B., Göttingen
 Ulriksson, Prof. Dr. V., Bad Godesberg
 Unsel, Dr. S., Frankfurt a.M.
 Uri, Prof. P. E., Paris/Frankreich
 Utkin, Prof. A., Moskau/Russland

Vaatz, Arnold, Minister, Dresden
 Väyrynen, Prof. Dr. R., Helsinki/Finnland
 Vaillaud, Michel, Montrouge/Frankreich
 Vanberg, Prof. Dr. V., Freiburg
 Vaner, Dr. S., Paris/Frankreich
 Vardi, Dr. J., Tel Aviv/Israel
 Varga, Prof. Dr. C., Budapest/Ungarn
 Vashakmadze, Dr. G., Tbilisi/Georgien
 Vater, Karlheinz, Düsseldorf
 Vaubel, Dr. L., Wuppertal
 Vehse, Dr. W., Berlin
 Verdoorn, Prof. Dr. P. J., Den Haag/Niederl.
 Veremis, Prof. T. M., Athen/Griechenland
 Verheugen, Günter, MdB, Bonn
 Verner, Jaroslav J., Konsul a.D., Hamburg
 Vernet, Daniel, Paris/Frankreich
 Vester, Dr. F., München
 Vester, Prof. Dr. Michael, Hannover
 Vetter, Heinz Oskar, Düsseldorf
 Vida Liebermann, Hélène, Paris/Frankreich
 Viermetz, Kurt F., New York/USA
 Visentini, Prof. B., Ivrea/Italien
 Vito, Prof. Dr. F., Mailand/Italien
 Vitt, Werner, Hannover
 Vogel, Friedrich, MdB, Staatsmin. a.D., Bonn
 Vogel, Dr. H., Rostock/DDR
 Vogel, Prof. Dr. H., Köln
 Vogel, Dr. H.-J., Bundesmin. a.D., München
 Vogel, Dr. O., Köln
 Vogt, Prof. J., Oslo/Norwegen
 Voigt, Prof. Dr. F., Bonn
 Voigt, Karsten D., MdB, Bonn
 Volkamer, Prof. Dr. Meinhard, Osnabrück
 Vollmer, Dr. Antje, MdB, Berlin
 Voorst, L. Bruce van, Brüssel/Belgien
 Voscheraus, Dr. H., Bgm. a.D., Hamburg
 Voslensky, Prof. Dr. Dr. M., Bonn
 Voswinckel, Dipl.-Vw. J., Hamburg
 Voswinckel, Ulrich, Hamburg

Vulfsons, Prof. M., Riga/Lettland
 Vydrin, Dr. D. I., Kiew/Ukraine

 Wätjen, Dr. E., Ascona/Schweiz
 Waganow, Boris, Moskau/UdSSR
 Wagner, Prof. Dr. R., München
 Wagner, Dr. T., Stadtpräsident, Zürich/CH
 Wagner, Dr. W., Hannover
 Wahl, Jürgen, Bonn
 Wahl, Stefanie, Bonn
 Waldhausen, Wolfgang von, Düsseldorf
 Wallraff, SJ, Prof. Dr. H. J., Frankfurt a. M.
 Walsum, A. Peter van, Botsch., Bonn
 Walter, Prof. Dr. E. J., St. Gallen/Schweiz
 Walter, Prof. Dr. Franz, Göttingen
 Walters, Alan A., London/England
 Walther, Prof. Dr. A., Darmstadt
 Walther, Dr. Maria, Frankfurt a. M.
 Wang Chunzheng, Minister, Beijing/China
 Wapnewski, Prof. Dr. P., Berlin
 Ward, Jr., George F., Ges., Washington/USA
 Warns, Dr.-Ing. O., Bois le Roi/Frankreich
 Wassermann, Rudolf, Braunschweig
 Wdowitschenko, Larisa N., Moskau/Russland
 Weber, Dr. G., Hamburg
 Weber, Raymond, Luxemburg/Luxemburg
 Wechmar, R. Frhr. v., Botsch. a. D., München
 Wegener, Dr. H., Botschafter, Madrid/Spanien
 Wegner, Christian, Hamburg
 Wegner, Jürgen, Dresden
 Wegner, Dr. M., München
 Wehmeier, Dr. Klaus, Hamburg
 Wehner, Prof. Dr.-Ing. B. B., Berlin
 Wehowsky, Dr. St., München
 Weichmann, Prof. Dr. H., Bgm. a. D., Hamburg
 Weidenfeld, Lord, London/England
 Weidenfeld, Prof. Dr. W., München
 Weinrich, Prof. Dr. H., Paris/Frankreich
 Weiss, Prof. Dr. A., München
 Weiss, Prof. Dr. C., Leipzig
 Weiss, Dr. F.-P., Dresden
 Weiß, Konrad, Berlin
 Weisser, Ulrich, Vizeadmiral, Bonn
 Weizsäcker, Prof. Dr. C. C. Frhr. v., Köln
 Weizsäcker, Prof. Dr. C.-F. Frhr. v., Starnberg

 Weizsäcker, Dipl.-Biol. Chr. v., Bonn
 Weizsäcker, Dr. E. U., Frhr. v., Wuppertal
 Weizsäcker, Dr. R. v., BundesPräs. a. D., Berlin
 Welbergen, Dipl.-Ing. J. C., Hamburg
 Welitschko, Wladimir S., Moskau/Russland
 Well, Günther van, Botsch. a. D., Washing./USA
 Welle, Klaus, Brüssel/Belgien
 Wells, Samuel F., Washington, D.C./USA
 Wendig, Dr. F., Bonn
 Wenger, Dr. K., Wien/Österreich
 Wenke, Prof. Dr. H., Hamburg
 Werner, Dr. A., Dortmund
 Werthern-Beichlingen, Thilo v., Mainz
 Werz, Prof. Dr. Nikolaus, Rostock
 West, Dr. Klaus-W., Freiburg
 Wessel, Dr. H., Berlin/DDR
 Westermann-Krieg, Liesel, Solingen
 Wettig, Dr. G., Köln
 Weyers, Helmut, Colombo/Sri Lanka
 Wiatr, Dr. S., Warschau/Polen
 Widgren, Jonas, Wien/Österreich
 Widmaier, Prof. Dr. H. P., Regensburg
 Wieck, Dr. H. G., Botschafter a. D., München
 Wieland, Prof. Dr. Josef, Konstanz
 Wieser, Prof. Dr. W., Berlin
 Wild, Prof. Dr. W., Staatsm. a. D., München
 Wildenmann, Prof. Dr. R., Mannheim
 Wiles, Prof. P., London/England
 Willet, John, London/England
 Willke, Prof. Dr. Helmut, Bielefeld
 Willms, Prof. Dr. M., Kiel
 Windsor, Philip, London/England
 Wingen, Prof. Dr. M., Bonn
 Winkler, Dr. A., Potsdam
 Winkler, Prof. Dr. H. A., Stegen
 Winogradow, Wladimir, Moskau/Russland
 Winter, Prof. Dr. E. F., Wien/Österreich
 Wistinghausen, H. v., Botsch., Helsinki/Fin
 Witte, Dr. B., MinDir. a. D., Bonn
 Wittebrood, Prof. Drs. C. F., Brüssel/Belgien
 Wladislawlew, Prof. A., Moskau/UdSSR
 Wocker, Dr. K.-H., London/England
 Wölber, D. Dr. H. O., Bischof, Hamburg
 Woelker, Dr. Chr., MinDirig., Bonn
 Wörner, Dr. M., BM a. D., Brüssel/Belgien

 Wojna, Ryszard, Warschau/Polen
 Wolf, Prof. Dr. E., Göttingen
 Wolff, Dr. G., Hamburg
 Wolff, Prof. Dr. P. de, Heemstede/Niederl.
 Woronenkowa, Prof. Galina, Moskau/Russland
 Wriedt, Christian, Hamburg
 Wright, Robert K., Budapest/Ungarn
 Wuttke, Jörg, Peking

 Xin Futan, Beijing/China
 Xu Jialu, Beijing/China

 Yagya, Prof. Dr. V. S., St. Petersburg/Russland
 Yang Qixian, Prof. Dr., Beijing/China
 Yang Bin, Shenyang/China
 Yigitgüden, Dr. H.Y, Staatssekr., Ankara/Türkei
 Yuan Ming, Prof. Dr., Beijing/China
 Yüksel, Süreyya, General a. D., Istanbul/Türkei

 Zagorski, Dr. A., Moskau/Russland
 Zahn, Dr. P. von, Hamburg
 Zander, Prof. Dr. E., Hamburg
 Zapewalow, Valentin, Moskau/UdSSR
 Zazirny, W., Moskau/Russland
 Zechlin, Dr. H.-J., Frankfurt a. M.
 Zechmeister, Prof. Dr. K., Bonn
 Zellentin, Prof. Dr. Gerda, Köln
 Zemanek, Prof. Dr. H., Wien/Österreich
 Zemanek, Prof. Dr. K., Wien/Österreich
 Zepter, Bernhard, Brüssel/Belgien
 Zhang Yuebang, Beijing/China
 Zheng Silin, Minister, Beijing/China
 Zhu Min, Direktor, Beijing/China
 Ziebur, Prof. em. Dr. Gilbert, Braunschweig
 Zimmer, Prof. Dr. Jochen, Duisburg
 Zinn, Dr. Christa, Wiesbaden
 Zinn, Dr. G. A., MinPräs. a. D., Wiesbaden
 Zinner, Prof. Dr. P. E., Davis/USA
 Zöpel, Dr. Christoph, Staatsminister, Berlin
 Zöllner, Prof. Dr. M., Bayreuth
 Zou Congwu, Beijing/China
 Zweig, Dr. G., Frankfurt a. M.
 Zweigert, Prof. Dr. K., Hamburg
 Zwingmann, Prof. Dr. Chr., Frankfurt a. M.

Previous Subjects

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1961/1	Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft	Prof. Dr. F. W. Schoberth, M. A. Universität Erlangen/Nürnberg	Dr. H. B. Tolkmitt Unilever Hamburg
2	Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft	Prof. Dr. Erik von Sivers Technische Hochschule Stuttgart	Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt Universität Bonn
3	Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe	Prof. Dr. Fritz Baade, MdB Universität Bonn	Dr. Günther Buch Hamburg
4	Welche Fragen stellt uns die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten?	Prof. D. Helmut Gollwitzer Freie Universität Berlin	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt
1962/5	Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik in unserer freien industriellen Gesellschaft	Dr. Rüdiger Altmann DIHT, Bonn	Josef Müller-Marein „Die Zeit“, Hamburg
6	Die Erziehung zum Europäer. Ein geschichtlicher Auftrag in der freien Welt	Stéphane Hessel Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, Paris	François Bondy „Preuves“, Paris
7	Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems und die Autonomie der Sozialpartner	Prof. Dr. Theodor Pütz Universität Wien	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel
8	Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland	Dr. Hans-Constantin Paulssen Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Köln	Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt Universität Bonn
1963/9	Maschine – Denkmaschine – Staatsmaschine Entwicklungstendenzen der modernen Industriegesellschaft	Prof. Dr. Pierre Bertaux Universität Lille	Prof. Dr. Arnold Gehlen TH Aachen
10	Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache Anwendungsbereiche, Leistungsformen und Folgen für die industrielle Gesellschaft	Prof. Dr. O. W. Haseloff PH Berlin	Dr. h. c. Frhr. v. Stackelberg EMNID-Institute GmbH Bielefeld
11	Die westliche Gesellschaft und die kommunistische Drohung Zur Psychologie der Aufweichung	Winfried Martini München	Prof. Dr. Th. Eschenburg Universität Tübingen
12	Wohin treibt die EWG? Europa mit oder ohne England?	U. W. Kitzinger, Oxford Roland Delcour, „Le Monde“ Paris-Bonn	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1964/13	Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft	Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Universität Basel	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel
14	Wohin Deutschland in Europa?	Prof. Alfred Grosser, Univ. Paris Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn	François Bondy „Preuves“, Paris
15	Entwicklungshilfe – Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls?	Dr. Walter Rau, BMZ, Bonn Dr. E. F. Schumacher National Coal Board, London	Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Universität Basel
16	Industrielle Gesellschaft – menschlich oder unmenschlich?	Prof. Dr. Raymond Aron Universität Paris	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Universität Konstanz
1965/17	Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand – ein revolutionäres oder evolutionäres Ziel?	Prof. Dr. Helmut Meinhold Universität Frankfurt a.M. Prof. Dr. H. J. Wallraff, SJ Philos.-Theolog. Hochschule Frankfurt a. M.	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt
18	Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft?	Prof. Dr. Alexander Mitscherlich Universität Heidelberg	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung Berlin
19	Automatisierung – eine gesellschaftliche Herausforderung? Soziale Konsequenzen aus Tatsachen und Ideologien	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel Dr. Günter Friedrichs IG Metall, Frankfurt a.M. Dr. Kurt Pentzlin, H. Bahlsens Keksfabrik KG, Hannover	Prof. Dr. Hans Wenke Universität Hamburg
20	Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien: Kurzfristige Soziallösungen contra langfristige Regionalpolitik – das europäische Koordinationsproblem	Prof. Dr. Leo H. Klaassen Nederlandsch Economisch Instituut, Rotterdam	Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Universität Basel
1966/21	Die „unterentwickelten“ hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften	Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heer Universität Wien	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung Berlin
22	Muß unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden?	Dr. Rüdiger Altmann DIHT, Bonn Joseph Rován „Peuple et Culture“, Paris	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt
23	Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis – Das Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie	Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky Universität Münster Dr. Ulrich Lohmar, MdB, Bonn	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung Berlin

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
24	Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich?	Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker, Uni Hamburg	Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Universität Basel
1967/25	Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung?	Prof. Dr. Helmut Arndt Freie Universität Berlin	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung, Berlin
26	Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform: Differenzierte Gesamthochschule – autonome Universität	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Ph. D., Universität Konstanz	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung, Berlin
27	Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft? Erfahrungen und Perspektiven	Alfred Mozer EWG-Kommission, Brüssel	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt
1968/28	Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer program- mierten Gesellschaft	Frau Prof. Dr. Jeanne Hersch Universität Genf	Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker, Uni Hamburg
29	Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicher- heit Europas?	Prof. Wladimir Chwostow Akademie der Pädagogischen Wissenschaften, Moskau	Prof. Alfred Grosser Fondation Nationale des Science Politiques, Paris
30	Haben wir im entstehenden Europa noch eine Chance für die freie Markt- wirtschaft?	Dr. Hans von der Groeben EWG-Kommission, Brüssel	Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Ipsen Universität Hamburg
31	Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte	Dr. Robert Jungk Zentrum Berlin für Zukunftsfor- schung, Berlin	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. für Bildungsforschung Berlin
1969/32	Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht	Prof. Dr. Adolf Portmann Universität Basel	Prof. Dr. Hoimar von Ditfurth Universität Heidelberg
33	Verstärken oder verringern sich die Be- dingungen für Aggressivität? Die Rolle der Gewalt in der modernen Gesellschaft	Prof. Dr. Friedrich Hacker Beverly Hills/USA	Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon TH Darmstadt
34	Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspan- nungspolitik? Eine Diskussion zwischen West- und Osteuropäern	Prof. Alfred Grosser Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris	Dr. Theo Sommer „Die Zeit“, Hamburg
1970/35	Zugänge zur Friedensforschung. Soziale und politische Perspektiven	Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker, Starnberg Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal Freie Universität Berlin	Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens Gesellschaft f. Auswärtige Politik, Bonn

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
36 Leningrad	Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit. Wege für einen stabilen Frieden und die Sicherheit in Europa	Prof. Alfred Grosser Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris Nikolai E. Poljanow „Istwestija“, Moskau	Nikolai E. Poljanow „Istwestija“, Moskau
37	Demokratisierung der Demokratie? Möglichkeiten und Schwierigkeiten stärkerer Teilnahme an den Entscheidungsprozessen	Prof. Joseph Rovin Universität Paris/Vincennes	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln
1971	Arbeitsgespräch: Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen einer internationalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit	none	Dr. Franz Karasek Wien
38	Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik – Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Prioritäten	Ministerpräsident Dr. Helmut Kohl, Mainz	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln
39	Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft – Illusion oder Realität?	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel	Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch Inst. für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel
40	Der bevollmächtigte Mensch – Kann sich die freie industrielle Gesellschaft zur Stabilität und Reife entwickeln?	Prof. Dr. Dennis Gabor London/Rom	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln
1972/41	Sprache und Politik. Können Begriffe die Gesellschaft verändern?	Kultusminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier München	Prof. Hellmut Becker Inst. f. Bildungsforschung Berlin
	Arbeitsgespräch: Demokratie und Nationalbewußtsein in der Bundesrepublik	Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal FU Berlin	François Bondy Zürich
42	Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken	Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf, Brüssel Jean-Pierre Brunet, Paris Sir Con O'Neill, London	Bundesaußenminister Dr. Rudolf Kirchschräger Wien
43	Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft? Interdisziplinäre Diskussion in der Gerontologie	Prof. Dr. Helge Pross Universität Gießen	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln
1973/44	Die „neue Mitte“: Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel?	Dr. Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker MdB, Bonn	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
45	Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft? Sollen Technik, Wirtschaft und Politik die wachsenden materiellen Ansprüche weiter befriedigen?	Bundesminister Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, Bonn Dr. Hugo Thiemann, Genf	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel
46 Wien	Neutralität – Wert oder Unwert für die europäische Sicherheit	Bundesaußenminister Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger, Wien Außenminister Gaston Thorn Luxemburg Vizeaußenminister Józef Czyrek, Warschau	Prof. Dr. Olivier Reverdin Genf
1974/47	Revolution der Gleichheit – Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit?	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Brüssel	D. Klaus von Bismarck WDR, Köln
48	Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung – Herausforderung der Industriegesellschaft?	Prof. Dr. H. B. G. Casimir Eindhoven Dr. Manfred Schäfer Saarbrücken	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Universität Basel
49	Entwicklungshilfe – eine Illusion?	Prof. Dr. Peter T. Bauer, London Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Sohn, Köln	Dr. Max Thurn, Wien
1975 Moskau	Arbeitsgespräch: Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London Dr. H. Ehrenberg, MdB, Bonn Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg Prof. Dr. C.-F. Frhr. v. Weizsäcker, Starnberg Prof. Dr. G. Arbatow, Moskau Prof. Dr. O. Bogomolow, Moskau Schalwa Sanakojew, Moskau Georgij Shukow, Moskau	Dr. Kurt A. Körber, Hamburg Lew Tolkunow, Moskau
50	Kooperation oder Konfrontation – Stürzt die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise?	Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt MdB, Bonn	Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn, Luxemburg
51 Bonn	Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Demokratie westlicher Prägung?	Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn, Luxemburg	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
52	Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf? Eine Strategie der Innenpolitik	Prof. Dr. Kurt H. Biedenkopf Bonn	Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg
1976/53	Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung. Bilanz und Ausblick	Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, München	Prof. Dr. Hellmut Becker Inst. für Bildungsforschung Berlin

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
54	Nach der Wahl '76: Welchen Spielraum hat die deutsche Innenpolitik?	ohne Referat	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
55	Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki – eine Zwischenbilanz	Prof. Dr. G. Arbatow, Moskau Leonard H. Marks, Washington Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg Ryszard Wojna, Warschau	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
1977/56 Bonn	Ein anderer „Way of Life“ – Ist der Fortschritt noch ein Fortschritt?	Dr. E. F. Schumacher, London	Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Köln
57 Luxemburg	Europa und die Weltwirtschaft – Politische und ökonomische Ansätze zur Lösung des Nord-Süd-Konfliktes	Claude Cheysson, Brüssel Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch, Kiel	Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn, Luxemburg
58	Energiekrise – Europa im Belagerungszustand? Politische Konsequenzen aus einer eskalierenden Entwicklung	Dr. Guido Brunner, Brüssel	Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Köln
1978/59	Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft	Prof. Walter Laqueur, London	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
	Arbeitsgespräch: Alternativenergien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sonnenenergie	Joachim Gretz, Ispra	Prof. Dr.-Ing. Werner H. Bloss Stuttgart
60	Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal – oder brauchen wir einen anderen Arbeitsmarkt?	Bundesminister Dr. Volker Hauff, MdB, Bonn Prof. Dr. Gerhard Fels, Kiel Prof. Dr. Erich Streissler, Wien	Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Basel
61	Wachstum und Lebenssinn – Alternative Rationalitäten?	Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker, Starnberg	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
1979/62 Moskau	UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland – wirtschaftliche und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren	Staatsminister Dr. Klaus von Dohnanyi, Bonn Alexander E. Bowin, Moskau	Dr. K. A. Körber, Hamburg Boris A. Borrisow, Moskau
63	Jugend und Gesellschaft. Chronischer Konflikt – neue Verbindlichkeiten?	Univ.-Prof. Dr. Leopold Rosenmayr, Wien	Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, München
64	Weltrezession 1980? Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen	Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch, Kiel Bundesbankpräsident Karl Otto Pöhl, Frankfurt a. M.	Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Köln

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1980/65	Der Westen und der Nahe Osten – Krise im Zeichen der islamischen Revolution? Kulturelle, wirtschaftliche, politische Aspekte	Dr. Arnold Hottinger, Madrid Prof. Dr. Hans A. Fischer-Bar-nicol, Heidelberg M. A. H. Hobohm, London	Dr. Udo Steinbach, Hamburg
66	Europas Sicherheit. Probleme der west-lichen Welt in den 80er Jahren	Dr. Christoph Bertram, London Dr. W. R. Smyser, Washington	Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg
67	Voraussetzungen und Ziele der Entspannung in den 80er Jahren – Der europäische Schauplatz	W. A. Matweew, Moskau Prof. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, Cambridge, Mass./USA	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn
1981/68	Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes – ein internationales Problem	Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf, London Parl. Staatssekretärin Anke Fuchs, Bonn	Prof. Dr. Armin Gutowski Hamburg
69 Washington	Europe and America facing the crises of the 80's – lastings foundations and new forms of cooperation	Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf, London Prof. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, Cambridge, Mass./USA	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn
70	Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens? Jugendprotest, Wert-wandel, Krise der politischen Kultur	Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, Berlin Prof. Dr. E. Noelle-Neumann Allensbach	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
1982/71	Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft?	Minister Dr. Werner Remmers Hannover Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal Berlin	Dr. Hans Heigert, München
72 Bonn	Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise? Zur Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland	Prof. J. Tobin, New Haven/USA Prof. M. Feldstein, Cambridge, Mass./USA Sir Alec Cairncross, Oxford A. A. Walters, London Prof. P. E. Uri, Paris Prof. P. Salin, Paris Prof. A. Gutowski, Hamburg Dr. H. Schulmann, Bonn	Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch Kiel
1983/73 Zürich	Die politisch-kulturelle Herausforde-rung Europas – Ein Weg zur Erneue-rung der Industriegesellschaft	Präsident Gaston Thorn, Brüssel	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf London
74 Berlin	Die deutsche Frage – neu gestellt	Regierender Bürgermeister Dr. Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker Berlin	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1984/75 Moskau	Zukunft Europas: Probleme der politischen und militärischen Entspannung. Perspektiven der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der UdSSR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland	Ministerialdirektor Horst Teltschik, Bonn Wadim W. Sagladin, Moskau	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn Juri Shukow, Moskau
76 Rom	Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort? Europa der Gegensätze auf dem Wege zu sich selbst	Franz Kardinal König, Wien Bundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt, Hamburg	S. E. Botschafter Prof. Luigi Vittorio Graf Ferraris, Bonn
1985/77	Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit? Der Sozialstaat an der Wende zum 21. Jahrhundert	Prof. Dr. Helmut Meinhold, Heidelberg; Senator Ulf Fink, Berlin; Senator a. D. Olaf Sund, Düsseldorf.	Fides Krause-Brewer, Bonn
78 Bonn	10 Jahre Helsinki – die Herausforderung bleibt	Botschafter R. Burt, Bonn (USA) Prof. Dr. S. Tichwinskij, Moskau Dr. M. Szürös, Budapest Botschafter Prof. L. V. Graf Ferraris, Bonn (Italien) Prof. Dr. M. Dobrosielski Warschau MinDir. H. Teltschik, Bonn	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Konstanz
1986/79 Brüssel	Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen?	Präsident Jacques Delors, Brüssel Gen.-Sekr. Lord Carrington Brüssel Bundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt, Hamburg	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn
80	Bürger und res publica – die Zukunft der Verantwortung	Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, München	Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Konstanz
1987/81 Moskau	Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine mittelfristige Perspektive	Volker Rühle, MdB, Bonn Wadim W. Sagladin, Moskau Egon Bahr, Hamburg	Valentin Falin, Moskau Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg
82 Genf	Die Modernität in der Industriegesellschaft – und danach?	Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, Zürich	Botschafter Prof. Luigi V. Ferraris, Bonn
83 Budapest	Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung. Die Zukunft der Ost-West-Beziehungen in Europa	Dr. M. Szürös, Budapest Bundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt, Hamburg Prof. Dr. R. Bogdanow, Moskau Prof. Dr. H. Sonnenfeldt Washington	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1988/84 Berlin	Systemöffnende Kooperation? Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West	Prof. W. Leonhard, New Haven Prof. Dr. Harry Maier, Flensburg	Jürgen Engert, Berlin
85 München	Die ökologische Wende – hat sie noch Chancen?	Dr. H. Frhr. v. Lersner, Berlin Staats. Alois Glück, München	Staatsmin. a.D. Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, München
86 Bonn	Das gemeinsame europäische Haus – aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland	Wadim W. Sagladin, Moskau MinDir. Horst Teltschik, Bonn	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn
1989/87 Dresden	Globale Umweltproblematik als gemein- same Überlebensfrage – neue Ko- operationsformen zwischen Ost und West	Prof. W. Mundt, Berlin/DDR Prof. Dr. W. Haber, München	Prof. Dr. Max Schmidt Berlin/DDR
88 Bonn	Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa? Perspektiven einer gemeinsamen westli- chen Ostpolitik	Stellvertr. Außenminister Lawrence Eagleburger, Washington, D. C. Bots. Sir Christopher Mallaby Bonn (Großbritannien) MinDir. Horst Teltschik, Bonn	Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, Oxford
89 Prag	Chancen für die europäische Kultur am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts – Gemein- samkeiten, Gegensätze, systemüber- greifende Kooperationen	Dr. Valtr Komárek, Prag Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf, Bonn	Dr. Hans Heigert, München
1990/90 Dresden	Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa?	Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy Brandt, Bonn Konsistorialpräsident Dr. Man- fred Stolpe, Berlin-Brandenburg Ministerpräsident Dr. Lothar Späth, Stuttgart	Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, Oxford
91 Moskau	Europa im Aufbruch – auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Friedensordnung	Wadim W. Sagladin, Moskau MinDir. Horst Teltschik, Bonn	Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Bonn
1991/92 Moskau	Perestrojka: Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende?	Prof. W. Wladislawlew, Moskau Dr. F. W. Christians, Düsseldorf	Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, Oxford
93 Berlin	Nach dem „Sozialismus“: Wie geht es weiter mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa?	Ministerpräsident a.D. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Warschau Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, Oxford	Prof. Dr. Hans Maier München
1992/94 Dresden	Wege zur inneren Einheit – was trennt die Deutschen nach der Überwindung der Mauer?	Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Dresden Wolfgang Thierse, MdB, Bonn	Dr. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt Bonn

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
95 Paris	Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf die neuen Einwanderungswellen? Politische Voraussetzungen, gesellschaftliche Folgen	Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy Brandt, Bonn Präsident Jacques Delors Brüssel	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Bonn
96 Tallinn	Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit: wie findet Europa zusammen?	Jim Hoagland, Washington Dr. Krenzler, Brüssel Präsident Lennart Meri, Tallinn Botschafter T. Örn, Bonn (Schweden) Staatsmin. B. Schmidbauer, Bonn	Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Bonn
97 Kiew	Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa? Technische Voraussetzungen – wirtschaftliche Bedingungen – politische Aufgaben	Dr. Hermann Krämer, Hannover Min. Prof. W. Skljarrow, Kiew Helga Steeg, Paris Prof. Dr. Y. Rudenko, Moskau	Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Bonn
1993/98 Berlin	Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft? Perspektiven der Demokratie an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert	Dr. Antje Vollmer Bielefeld Prof. Dr. Wolf Lepenies Berlin	Jürgen Engert Berlin
99 Ditchley Park	Wird der Westen den Zerfall des Ostens überleben? Politische und ökonomische Herausforderungen für Amerika und Europa	Senator Bill Bradley Washington, D.C. Dr. W. F. van Eekelen, Brüssel Dr. H.-G. Poettering, Straßburg	The Lord Dahrendorf Oxford
100 Dresden	Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft?	MinPräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf, Dresden Prof. Dr. Albert O. Hirschman Princeton/USA	Prof. Dr. Dieter Grimm Karlsruhe
1994/101 St. Petersburg	Rußland und der Westen: Internationale Sicherheit und Reformpolitik – Ziele und Mittel der Gestaltung	Min. A. A. Kokoschin, Moskau BMin. Volker Rühle, Bonn Bürgermeister Prof. A. A. Sobtschak, St. Petersburg	Staatssekretär Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Bonn
102 Friedrichs- roda bei Gotha	Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft	Dr. Lothar Späth, Jena Leo A. Nefiodow Sankt Augustin	Jürgen Engert Berlin
1995/103 Oxford	Die Verfassung Europas	Prof. Jean-Claude Casanova Paris Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, Bonn	The Lord Dahrendorf Oxford

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
104 Warschau	Europa – aber wo liegen seine Grenzen?	Prof. Bronislaw Geremek Warschau Anders Björck, Stockholm Senator J. François-Poncet, Paris	Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Bonn
105 München	Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag? Wirtschaftliche Dynamik versus sozialer Zusammenhalt	Bundesminister Horst Seehofer, Bonn Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller Berlin	Prof. Dr. Hermann Korte Hamburg
1996/106 Jerusalem	Europa und die Zukunft des Nahen Ostens – Frieden als Aufgabe	Dr. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi Jerusalem Hanan Bar-On, Rehovot Prof. Leonard Hausman Cambridge/Mass. Jean-Paul Jesse, Tel Aviv (EU) Staatsminister Helmut Schäfer Bonn	Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer Ebenhausen
107	Medien – Macht – Politik. Verantwortung in der Demokratie	Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Donsbach Dresden Senator Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Hamburg Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg	Thomas Kielinger Bonn
108 Moskau	Was bewegt Rußland? Der Westen auf der Suche nach einem Partner	Sergej Baburin, Moskau Sir Rodric Braithwaite, London	Staatssekretär a. D. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moskau
1997/109 Istanbul	Im Kreuzungspunkt der Kräfte – Die Türkei in einer veränderten politischen Umwelt	İlter Türkmen, Istanbul Morton Abramowitz, Washington Hans-Ulrich Klose, Bonn	Prof. Dr. Curt Gasteyger Genf
110 Berlin	Wege aus der blockierten Gesell- schaft – Perspektiven für die Gestaltung der Zukunft	Dr. h. c. André Leysen, Mortsel Bundesminister Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers, Bonn	The Lord Dahrendorf London
111 Amsterdam	Wie ist Europa zu sichern? Die Suche nach konzeptioneller Gestaltungskraft	Dr. Ulrich Cartellieri, Frankfurt Sir Christopher Mallaby, London Wolfgang Ischinger, Bonn Marten van Heuven, Washington Frits Bolkestein, Den Haag Prof. David P. Calleo Washington Max Kohnstamm, Brüssel Elmar Brok, Brüssel/Bielefeld	Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer Ebenhausen

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
1998/112 Leipzig	Wachsende Ungleichheiten – neue Spaltungen? Exklusion als Gefahr für die Bürgergesellschaft	Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Dresden Prof. Dr. Heinz Bude, Hbg. Institut für Sozialforschung, Hamburg Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Huber, Bischof der Evang. Kirche in Berlin-Brandenburg, Berlin	Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller Freie Universität Berlin
113 Baku/Aserbaidshanschan	Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum – Akteure, Interessen, Konfliktpotentiale	Dr. Terry D. Adams, Monument Oil and Gas plc, London Botschafter Vafa Goulizade, Republik Aserbaidshanschan, Baku Paul Haseldonckx, DEMINEX GmbH, Essen Staatssekretär Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn	Staatssekretär a.D. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Daimler-Benz AG, Moskau
1999/114 Magdeburg	Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport?	Prof. Dr. Hans Lenk, Universität Karlsruhe Herbert Riehl-Heyse, Süddeutsche Zeitung, München Prof. Dr. Jürgen Palm, Deutscher Sportbund, Heusenstamm	Prof. Dr. Hermann-Anders Korte Universität Hamburg
115 Berlin	Neue Dimensionen des Politischen? Herausforderungen für die repräsentative Demokratie	Prof. Dr. Antonia Grunenberg Berlin Bundesministerin a.D. Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, MdB, Berlin	Prof. Dr. Jutta Limbach Bundesverfassungsgericht Karlsruhe
116 Moskau	Russland in Europa: Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg – Politische und wirtschaftliche Herausforderungen	Wolfgang Ischinger, Staatssekr. AA, Berlin Oleg Morosow, Fraktion Russische Regionen, Staatsduma Moskau Dr. Ulrich Cartellieri, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt a.M. Andrej A. Kokoschin, Zentrum f. Probleme d. Nationalen Sicherheit Russlands Moskau	Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut DaimlerChrysler AG, Moskau

Protocol	Topic	Speakers	Chair
2000/117 Berlin	Modell Deutschland: Reif für die Globalisierung? Zum Verhältnis von Politik und Ökonomie	Dr. Henning Scherf, Präsident des Senats der Freien und Hansestadt Bremen Prof. Dr. Carl Christian v. Weizsäcker, Universität Köln	Dr. Klaus v. Dohnanyi Bürgermeister a. D. Hamburg
118 Berlin	Ein föderatives Europa? Das politische Gesicht Europas im Zuge der Erweiterung	Sylvie Goulard, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Paris Prof. Dr. Klaus Hänsch, MdEP, Brüssel Dr. Jerzy Kranz, Auswärtiges Amt, Warschau	Prof. Dr. Rudolf von Thadden Universität Göttingen
119 Peking	China: Partner in der Weltwirtschaft	Prof. Yang Qixian; Minister Zheng Silin; Minister Wang Chunzheng; Vizeminister Shen Jueren; Prof. Dr. Zhu Min; Shi Mingde; Song Jian; alle Beijing; Dr. Konrad Seitz, Bonn; Dr. Horst Teltschik, München; Dr. Martin Posth, Berlin	Präsident Mei Zhaorong, Beijing Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Berlin
2001/120 Berlin	Verhandlungsdemokratie? Politik des Möglichen – Möglichkeiten der Politik	Prof. Dr. Dieter Grimm, Berlin Dr. Annette Fugmann-Heesing, Berlin	Prof. Robert Leicht, Hamburg
121 Helsinki	Die Ostsee – ein Binnenmeer der Prosperität und Stabilität? Chancen und Grenzen einer regionalen Politik in Nordosteuropa	Minister a.D. Bertel Haarder, Brüssel; Botschafter Dr. Artur J. Kuznetsov, Kaliningrad; Alar J. Rudolf Olljum, Tallinn; Hans Olsson, Stockholm; Timo Summa, Brüssel; Außenminister Dr. Erkki Tuomioja, Helsinki; Staatsminister Dr. Christoph Zöpel, Berlin	Minister Dr. Jaako Iloniemi, Helsinki
122 Moskau	Russlands europäische Dimension und weltpolitische Herausforderungen	none	Sergej W. Jastrschembkij, Moskau Dr. Sergej A. Karaganow, Moskau

Unless otherwise stated, the meetings took place in Bergedorf or Hamburg.

Minutes 99, 106, 109, 121 and 122 are also available in English.

From now on all Protocols will be published in both languages as a book and in the internet (www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de).

List of Abbreviations

CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement	IMF	International Monetary Fund
CEI	Central European Initiative	LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
DFID	Department for International Development	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia	OHR	Office of The High Representative
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EFTA	European Free Trade Association	SDA	Stranka Demokratski Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
EIB	European Investment Bank	SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
EKD	Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (Lutheran Church of Germany)	SFOR	Stabilization Force
ESI	European Stability Initiative	UCK (KLA)	Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (Kosovo Liberation Army)
GDR	German Democratic Republic	UN	United Nations
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ICC	International Criminal Court	UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia	UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Election Administration		
IFC	International Finance Corporation		

Historical-Political Chronology

148	Establishment of the Roman Province of Macedonia (the provinces of Macedonia, Epirus and Achaia comprise the Balkan peninsula south of the Skardon and Pirin mountains)		donia remains under Ottoman rule; Austria-Hungary permitted to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina
from 539	Serbia, Albania, and Greece are part of the Byzantine Empire and experience increased Slav settlements in this originally predominantly Illyric region.	1881	Kingdom of Romania
ca. 1171	Consolidation of Serbia under Stephan Nemanja	1882	Kingdom of Serbia
1389	Battle of Kosovo Polje, Turkish victory over the Serbs; beginning of Ottoman hegemony in the region	1903	Anti-Turkish revolt in Macedonia
1830	After the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule (1821–1829), Greece becomes independent	1908	Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina
1830	Principality of Serbia	1912–1913	1 st and 2 nd Balkan Wars, Ottomans expelled from Europe; Macedonia partitioned among Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria
1852	Principality of Montenegro	1913	Independent Principality of Albania
1856	Ottoman Empire proclaims equal rights for Christians and Muslims within its borders	1914	Assassination of Austrian archduke in Sarajevo
1859/1861	United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia become Principality of Romania	1914–1918	World War I
1868	Hungarian-Croatian Compromise	1917	Declaration of Corfu: Union of the South Slavs under Serbian aegis
1876	Bulgarian revolt against the Ottomans	1918	Proclamation of the “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS)”
1877/1878	Russo-Turkish War; unimplemented Treaty of San Stefano	1919/1920	Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (recognition of the Hapsburg successor states); Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria; Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (Transylvania and Bessarabia to Romania)
1878	Congress of Berlin: Romania and Montenegro become independent; Serbian independence is confirmed; Bulgaria becomes autonomous principality; Mace-	1921	Centralized Serbian Vidovdan Constitution in SHS state
		1929	Royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia
		1938	Royal dictatorship in Romania
		1939–1945	World War II

1941	Establishment of the Croatian Ustaša State (until late 1944)	1990	Milošević becomes President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1944–1949	Greek Civil War	1991	Declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia; Yugoslavian Army attacks Slovenia, and later, Croatia
1945	Yalta Conference	1991	Macedonian Declaration of Independence
1946	People's Republic of Albania	1992	EC recognizes Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence and is recognized by the EC; escalation of war and genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1946	Federal Constitution of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia	1993	Gross violations of international human rights in former Yugoslavia lead to UN Resolution 827, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with its seat in the Hague
1947	Founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)	1995	Expulsion of Serbs from Krajina and East Slavonia
1947	People's Republic of Bulgaria	1995	Dayton Accords (Ohio, USA) end the war; UN Security Council establishes a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1948	People's Republic of Romania	late 1996	Opposition alliance "Zajedno" wins local elections against Milošević, who refuses to recognize their results; mass demonstrations in Belgrade; in February 1997 international pressure leads to official recognition of results, Milošević remains president
1948	Yugoslavia expelled from Cominform	1997–1998	Fighting between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian regime
1953	Balkan Pact of Yugoslavia with NATO members Greece and Turkey	June 1999	NATO air strikes against Serbia; withdrawal of the Serbian Army from Kosovo; KFOR troops are deployed; Kosovo administration (UNMIK) on the basis of UN Resolution 1244
1955	Warsaw Pact		
1961	First Conference of Unaligned States in Belgrade		
1963	EC Association with Turkey		
1963	Constitutional change: People's Republic renamed "Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRJ)		
1974	Tito becomes President for Life		
1980	Death of Yugoslav President Tito		
1981	Albanian revolt in Kosovo		
1985	Death of Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha		
from 1987	Nationalist-communist rise to power of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević		
1990	Free elections in Croatia bring Franjo Tudjman to power		

Sept. 2000 Vojislav Kostunica wins presidential elections, Milošević contests election results

Oct. 2000 Revolt of Kostunica supporters in Belgrade and fall of Milošević. Kostunica becomes president

Nov. 2000 EU summit in Zagreb; the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania are declared potential candidates for accession and commit themselves to regional co-operation

June 2001 Milošević is handed over in Belgrade to representatives of the UN War Crimes Tribunal

July 2001 Trial against Milošević begins at the Tribunal

Nov. 2001 Ibrahim Rugova wins the first democratic parliamentary elections in Kosovo



Glossary

“Bonn Powers”

Powers of the Office of the High Representative to promulgate laws, implement budgets per decree, and remove both officials and elected politicians from their positions. The Office of the High Representative was granted these far-reaching powers by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Bonn in December 1997. This council consists of government representatives from all states involved in Bosnia and meets semi-annually.

http://www.esiweb.org/reports/bosnia/showdocument.php?document_ID=8

Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)

CEFTA is an economic cooperation pact, facilitating trade among the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, establishing a market of 90 million people. The CEFTA Treaty was signed in 1992.

<http://www.cefta.org>

Central European Initiative (CEI)

CEI is an initiative for cooperation in the fields of economics, politics, research, and culture in Central- and Eastern Europe. CEI was founded in 1989. Its member states are Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

<http://www.ceinet.org>

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

CMI is an independent non-governmental initiative that issues recommendations for the conduct of international missions in crisis regions. It was founded by President Martti Ahtisaari and has its seat in Helsinki.

<http://www.ahtisaari.fi>

Department for International Development (DFID)

DFID is the British government's ministry for development aid, working to support international development and reduce poverty, improve access to medical treatment and availability of education. DFID supports projects in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central- and Eastern Europe.

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/>

EU Eastward Enlargement and the Copenhagen Criteria

The planned enlargement of the European Union in 2004 to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. The accession treaty is due to be signed at the Athens EU summit on April 16, 2003. A second group of accession candidates consists of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

To gain EU membership, candidates must fulfil the so-called Copenhagen Criteria: 1. institutional stability as a guarantee for democratic and legal order, to ensure human rights and respect for the protection of minorities; 2. a functioning market economy; the capacity to withstand the pressure of competition and market forces within the common market; 3. acceptance of the legal foundation (Acquis communautaire). The countries must embrace the goals of political union as well as economic and monetary union.

European Investment Bank (EIB)

The EIB grants long-term and discounted loans that are meant to promote balanced economic development and integration within the European Union and contribute to the achievement of EU objectives. In terms of credit volume, the EIB is the largest international financial institute in the world.

<http://www.eib.org>

European Stability Initiative (ESI)

ESI is a charitable scientific and political research institute based in Berlin that provides analyses of current political and economic issues concerning stability in Southeast Europe.

<http://www.esiweb.org>

European Convention

The Convention on the Future of Europe convened in Brussels on February 28, 2002, for its constitutive meeting. Its task is to formulate recommendations to secure the viability of the expanding European Union while reinforcing the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the European Union's conduct and that of its organs. Its explicit objective in this process is to produce a European constitution. It is scheduled to continue convening until the summer of 2003 and its results will largely decide the success of the subsequent intergovernmental conference. The President of the Convention is the former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/aktuelles/zukunft/konvent/konvent_html

Dayton Accords

(General Framework Agreement for Peace – GFAP)

Named after the city in the US state of Ohio which hosted the negotiations, this treaty ended the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreed on November 21, 1995 under the mediation of President Bill Clinton among the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, the treaty was signed in Paris on November 25, 1995, establishing a new constitution and a new state with two entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska, with the joint capital in Sarajevo.

<http://www.ohr.int>

Graz Process

The Graz Prozess was initiated by Austria to promote democratic and peaceful development in the region of Southeast Europe by supporting and coordinating regional educational projects. Its long-term objective is to integrate Southeast Europe with European educational standards.

http://www.kulturkontakt.or.at/new/_deutsch/see/taskforce.htm

Hermes Credit Guarantees

The Federal Republic of Germany uses Hermes Credit Guarantees to secure German companies' export trade and assist them in keeping a share of global markets. Export credit guarantees are used to minimize the risks faced by private companies investing in economically unstable countries.

International Criminal Court – ICC

Since July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court has been responsible for the global prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. According to its statutes, which were established in Rome on July 17, 1998, the ICC takes action if national courts fail to prosecute crimes under its jurisdiction, or if prosecutors or the United Nations Security Council determine a requirement for investigations. Fifteen judges belong to the ICC as of February 6, 2003.

<http://www.un.org/law/icc/>

International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

The ICTY was established on May 25, 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 827, in response to gross violations of international human rights since 1991 on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

<http://www.un.org/icty/>

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The IMF was founded in 1945 to promote international collaboration in the field of monetary policy. Its objectives are to assist growth in global trade, stability in exchange rates, the establishment of a multilateral system of payment, and to help member states experiencing difficulties in their balance of payments.

<http://www.imf.org/>

Kosovo Force (KFOR)

KFOR is the military mission conducted by NATO in Kosovo. The mission began on June 12, 1999, two days after Security Council Resolution 1244 was passed. The KFOR contingent was composed of troops from 30 countries. Its task is to keep the peace while supporting UNMIK.

<http://www.nato.int/kfor>

Kosovo Status

The future status of this current UN protectorate is still uncertain. Formally, the formerly Serbian province belongs to the Yugoslav successor state Serbia and Montenegro. How-

ever, much of the ethnic Albanian majority favors independence from Belgrade.

Mrakovica-Sarajevo Process

The Mrakovica-Sarajevo Agreement in March 2002 concerns reforms to the Bosnian constitution(s). It was negotiated among Bosnian parties and took effect in April 2002 by decree from the Office of the High Representative on the basis of the Bonn Powers. It enshrined an ethnic quota, based on the 1991 census, for the occupation of all significant political and administrative offices at the various levels of the Bosnian state.

http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=7483

Office of the High Representative – OHR

The OHR is the leading civil organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative is the country's paramount authority.

<http://www.ohr.int>

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE employs some 4000 people in 19 missions and in-field activities in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, with the purpose of helping to build up democracy, civil societies, and the rule of law. In the Balkans, the OSCE has missions in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, Kosovo, and bureaus in Albania and Macedonia.

<http://www.osce.org>

Concept of “ownership”

The concept of “ownership” helps policymakers decide how to effectively use development aid in a sovereign state. It posits that international development aid can only be successful over the longer term if the receiver country's national authorities are responsible for implementing the aid policy, willing to implement reforms, and set their own priorities. The donor supports the receiver's initiative and the principle of self-determination in development policy.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

PfP is a NATO initiative of the North Atlantic Council begun in January 1994 with the objective of reinforcing stability and security in Europe. It is open to all partner states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACCP) and other OSCE countries interested in participating. The initiative enables military cooperation in planning, training, and peace-keeping. Twenty-seven countries currently take part in the PfP.

http://www.shape.nato.int/natobook_en/pfp.htm

Serbia and Montenegro – Constitution for a new State

In March 2002, the Yugoslav president, the Serbian prime minister, and the Montenegrin head of government signed the Belgrade Agreement in the presence of the EU mediator, Javier Solana, to preserve and transform the state association of former Yugoslavia into “Serbia and Montenegro”. The agreement was negotiated to stop Montenegro from seceding completely from former Yugoslavia.

Stabilization and Association Agreement for Southeast Europe

Europe's heads of state and government have determined that the path toward stability in the Balkans region should include an association of these countries with the EU. Within the framework of the Stabilization- and Association Process, a comprehensive program of financial assistance (CARDS) promotes the establishment of favored political and economic relations with countries in the region, thus offering them the prospect of eventual EU accession.

Stability Pact for Southeast Europe

At the initiative of Germany, more than 40 states, international financial institutions, and international organizations founded the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe in June 1999, with the aim of cooperating to secure political, legal, and economic stability in Southeast Europe. The Stability Pact works to attain this by supporting governments in the region in their efforts to encourage peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity, and ultimately to achieve stability throughout the region.

<http://www.stabilitypact.org>

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

UNMIK was mandated in 1999 by United Nations Resolution 1244, which called for the establishment of a civil interim administration in the autonomous province of Kosovo. UNMIK is the first UN mission in which other organizations take part under UN leadership. Four “pillars” were established to help implement the mandate: 1. a police- and justice system under direct UN control; 2. a civil administration under direct UN control; 3. democratization and establishment of institutions under the aegis of the OSCE; 4. reconstruction and economic development under the leadership of the EU. The director of UNMIK is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo and is the highest authority in the province.

<http://www.unmikonline.org>

UN Resolution 1244

In 1999 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 as a political solution to stop the violence in Kosovo and secure the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and paramilitary units. The Security Council announced it would deploy an international mission under UN supervision.

<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>

Index of Cited Persons

Andric, Ivo

1892–1975

Yugoslav writer, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961. Known for his novels about Bosnia, especially “The Bridge on the Drina”.

Page: 106

Balcerowicz, Prof. Leszek

born 1947

President of the Polish National Bank. Deputy prime minister and finance minister of Poland 1989–1991 and 1997–2000.

Page: 61

Colovic, Ivan

born 1938

Ethnologist and scientific advisor of the Ethnographic Institute of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Belgrade.

Page: 115

Homeyer, Dr. Josef

born 1929

Bishop of Hildesheim, President of the Commission of the Bishops Conferences of the EU, member of the presidium of the Council of European Episcopal Conferences (CCEE), the contact group of the Polish and German Bishops Conference.

Page: 124

Hoxha, Enver

1908–1985

Communist head of state of Albania until 1985. Prime Minister 1944–1954.

Page: 86, 109f.

Kadaré, Ismail

born 1936

Albanian author. Known predominantly through his novel “The General of the Dead Army” (1964).

Page: 109

Kissinger, Henry

born 1923

United States Secretary of State 1973–1977, earlier national security advisor of President Richard Nixon.

Page: 113ff.

Krastev, Ivan

Director of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia.

Page: 51, 53

Milošević, Slobodan

born 1941

President of Yugoslavia until 1997, President of Serbia until 2000. Since February 2002 defendant at the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, charged with genocide and crimes against humanity.

Page: 27, 67, 72, 85, 101f., 104ff., 108, 117

Monnet, Jean

1888–1979

President of the Schuman-Plan Conference in Paris that led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). President of the ECSC High Authority 1952–1954. From 1955 to 1975, co-founder and Chairman of the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe”, an organization with the objective of achieving European political union. In 1976, first person to be named Honorary Citizen of Europe by the government heads of the European Community.

Page: 67, 75

Patten, Chris

born 1944

1990–1992 Chairman of the Conservative Party of Great Britain, 1992–1997 Governor of Hong Kong, 1998–1999 Chairman of the Independent Commission on Policing Northern Ireland. Since 1999 European Commissioner for External Affairs.

Page: 20, 60, 70

Pitic, Goran

born 1961

1995–2000 Director for Financial Consulting, Deloitte & Touche, Belgrade. Professor for Macroeconomics and Economic History at the University of Belgrade since 1986. Minister of International Economic Relations of the Republic of Serbia since 2000.

Page: 78

Poos, Jacques

1984–1999 Foreign Minister of Luxembourg from 1984 to 1999, European Council President in 1991.

Page: 36

Prodi, Romano

born 1939

Italian Minister of Industry 1978–1979. 1982–1989 and 1993–1994 President of the State Industrial Holding IRI (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction). 1996–1998 Prime Minister of Italy. President of the European Commission since 1999.

Page: 92

Rice, Condoleezza

born 1955

Professor of Political Science at Stanford University since 1981. 1989–1991 responsible for Soviet and East European Issues in the National Security Council. National Security Advisor to US President George W. Bush since January 2001.

Page: 119

Rugova, Ibrahim

born 1944

In 1989 co-founder of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Proclaimed President of the “Kosovo Republic” in 1992. Elected on March 4, 2002, as the first internationally recognized President of Kosovo. Awarded the Sakharov Prize in 1999 for his efforts toward a peaceful settlement in Kosovo.

Page: 107

Solana, Javier

born 1942

Member of the Spanish Socialist Party since 1964, member of

Parliament since 1977, Minister of Culture from 1982 to 1988, Minister of Science 1988–1992, Foreign Minister from 1992 to 1995, NATO Secretary General 1995–1999, Secretary General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for Common Foreign- and Security Policy since 1999.

Page: 20, 35f., 87, 95, 113, 115, 119

Tito, Josip Broz

1892–1980

1945–1980 Yugoslav Head of State.

Page: 26, 57, 105

Todorova, Maria

Bulgarian historian and author of “Imagining the Balkans”.

Page: 37, 60

Trajkovski, Boris

born 1957

1998–1999 Deputy Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. President of FYR Macedonia since December 1999.

Page: 45

Tudjman, Franjo

1922–1999

1989 Founder and Chairman of the nationalist party “Croatian Democratic Union” (HDZ). President of Croatia 1990–1999. Following Croatia’s declaration of independence and the Serbian-Croatian war in 1991, Tudjman mobilized the Croatian army and police in 1995 and reconquered Croatian territory (i.e. Krajina), prompting mass dislocation of the Serb minority.

Page: 58, 115

Vranitzky, Franz

born 1937

Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria from 1986 to 1997. SPÖ Chairman 1988–1997, OSCE Special Envoy for Albania in 1997.

Page: 37

Subject Index

- Acquis communautaire 49, 94
Adriatic-Ionian Initiative 118
Agriculture 74, 91f., 97
Aid, capital 19
Aid, development 43, 65, 70f., 93, 96
Aid, financial 73f., 93
Albania 29, 77, 85f., 109f.
Assembly of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 68
- “Bonn Powers” 35
Bosnian-Croat Federation 23f., 55, 58
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21f., 31f., 35, 37f., 41f., 54, 57f., 73, 121
Botswana 70, 72
Broadcasting, public 24f., 108
Bulgaria 29, 51f., 76, 81, 92, 94, 101, 116, 120
Business Advisory Council 76
- CEFTA 78
Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-eastern Europe 112
Center for Fighting Organized Crime 80
Central European Initiative (CEI) 125
Certainty, legal 41, 43, 88, 91f., 120
Churches 58, 134f.
Cleansing, ethnic 26, 32, 55, 106
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 103
Cooperation, regional 19f., 32f., 38, 42f., 45f., 65f., 76, 94
Cooperation, trans-border 21, 43, 77, 101
Corruption 21, 30, 43f., 56, 68, 71, 79, 87f., 90, 96
Council of Europe 54, 60, 118
Crime 21, 30f., 37, 43f., 58f., 68f., 81
Crime, economic 68f.
Crime, organized 30f., 43f., 58f., 68f., 82
Crisis Management Initiative 36
Croatia 27, 38, 45, 55, 66, 91, 100f., 111, 115, 120, 124
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 23, 56
Culture 27, 46, 100f., 119f., 123f. 125
- Dayton Accords 22f., 29, 31, 36, 58, 87
De-bureaucratization, of civil administration 40
Decentralization 31, 53
- Deindustrialization 72, 84, 86
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) 103
Department for International Development (DFID) 73
Development, institutional 80
Diaspora 29, 67f., 90, 96
Donor countries 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 88f., 93, 96
- Economy, black market 83f.
Economy, decentralization of 47
Economy, subsistence 91
Education 19, 46, 51, 61, 94, 98f., 102, 104, 125
EFTA 78
Energy 32, 40, 62, 66, 75, 79, 86, 87
Engineering, civil 23
Enlargement, European 18f., 34, 71, 75, 78
Entrepreneurs 83, 91, 96
Ethnic communities, rights of 23, 36, 39f., 104
EURO-Money 91
European Commission 19, 35, 47, 74f., 77f., 94, 106, 117, 124
European Agency for Reconstruction 47, 77
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 67, 70, 78, 84, 96
European Convention 32, 52f., 59
European Human Rights Convention 32
European Investment- and Development Bank (EIB) 62, 67, 78, 96
European Economic Zone 118
European Stability Initiative (ESI) 72
Eustory 123
- Finland 53, 82, 114
“Friends of Albania” 29
- Graz Process 79, 123, 125
Greece 43, 74, 84, 93f., 111, 119, 122
Gross domestic product (GDP) and gross social product (GSP) 61f., 65f., 85, 96f.
Growth, economic 54, 70, 73, 77, 81, 88, 93
- Helsinki Committee 117
Helsinki Process 32
Hermes Credit Guarantees 100
History, view of 102, 111f., 115, 121f.
Human Rights Watch 117

IFC 97
 Immigration 81f., 94, 112
 Infrastructure 22, 32, 40, 47, 51, 62, 66, 68, 78, 81, 88, 96f.
 Infrastructure Steering Group 78
 Institute for Democracy and Election Administration (IDEA) 33
 Institutional reforms 20, 48, 83
 Integration, regional 32, 36, 43, 56
 Intellectuals 100, 105f., 109f., 112, 122
 International Criminal Court (ICC) 117f.
 International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in the Hague (ICTY) 26f., 117
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 48, 52f., 62, 65, 70
 Investments 45, 83f., 96f.

 Judicial system 31, 79, 86

 Kosovo 25f., 29f., 32f., 41f., 56, 68f.
 Kosovo, status 19, 28, 35, 39, 56, 59, 68, 79

 Law, local governance 47
 Law, privatization 84f., 88
 Law, rule of 21, 31, 38, 40f., 43f., 60, 75, 86, 118, 120
 LDK 68

 Macedonia 18, 20, 25, 28f., 35, 42, 45f., 56f., 73f., 76f., 83f., 87, 94f., 100f.
 Marshall Plan 37, 51, 62, 66, 96
 Media 46, 51, 90, 102, 108, 122, 124
 Metohija 25f.
 Mezzogiorno 62, 73
 Migration 29, 81f., 94, 100, 112
 Military 21f., 24, 35, 38, 41f., 58
 Minorities 21, 26, 38, 48, 57, 106, 120
 Money laundering 43f., 65
 Montenegro 18f., 25, 30, 33f., 42, 50, 56, 87, 93f., 101
 Mrakovica-Sarajevo Process 58

 Nationalism 26, 37, 41, 46, 58, 112f., 122
 NATO 29, 41, 62, 92, 104, 114, 121
 Nepotism 49
 NGOs 19, 53, 103, 110, 122
 Nuremberg Trials 102, 120

 Olympic Games 67, 78, 111
 OSCE 29f., 42, 86, 108, 114
 Ownership 23, 38, 60

 Parliament, Muslim-Croat Federal 23
 Parties, financing of 44, 56, 59f.
 Parties, multi-ethnic 23
 Partnership for Peace 118
 Partnerships, city 100, 122
 Past, coming to terms with 120
 Peoples, constituent 23, 31, 57f.
 Perspective, European, for Southeast Europe 18, 32f., 59f., 63, 75, 85
 Petersburg Dialogue 90
 Poland 45, 65, 83, 89, 97, 115, 122f.
 Pristina 35, 68, 91, 107f., 110, 112
 Property 38, 55, 69, 71
 Protectorate 37, 39
 Purchasing power 61

 Rambouillet 34
 Reductions, troop 58
 Referendum (Montenegro) 18, 34
 Reform 20f., 23f., 44f., 47f., 64, 75, 81, 83, 88, 92, 121
 Reform, constitutional 23, 57
 Reform, economic 20f., 25, 73
 Reform, police 21, 24
 Refugees 28, 32, 39f., 45, 55
 Refugees, economic 86
 Religion 27, 123f.
 Republika Srpska 23f., 39, 54, 58
 Resolution 1244, UN 34
 Rights, human 21f., 31f., 36f., 57, 77, 104, 117, 124
 Romania 29, 51, 63, 66, 73, 78, 83, 92, 94, 101, 114, 116, 120, 123
 Russia 59, 84, 90, 92, 123f.

 Sanctions 40, 62, 88, 113
 Sanjak 95
 Schengen 30, 100, 113, 115f.
 SDA 23
 Security, regional 30
 Self-determination, ethnic right of 36f.
 Serbia and Montenegro 18f., 29, 34, 36, 39, 50, 56, 87, 93, 95, 100, 113
 Service, civil 24, 79
 SFOR 58

Skopje 30, 45
 Slovenia 29, 61, 64, 94, 100f., 106, 112, 115, 123
 Smuggling 65, 69, 86
 Society, civil 49f., 105, 110, 120
 Society, multiethnic 25, 32, 41, 58, 99f., 120
 "Solania" 36f.
 Southeast European Cooperation Process 76
 Sports 111f.
 Srebrenica 38
 State 21f., 34, 36f., 43, 49, 58, 82, 93
 Stabilization- and Association Process 78, 94
 Stability- and Association Pact with the EU 113
 Stability Pact 33, 37f., 51, 65, 71, 75f., 86, 92, 94, 99,
 101, 103f., 109, 116f., 125
 Stop-and-go policy 63f., 74
 Structural Fund 74f., 85

 Textbooks, school 102, 112, 125
 Thessaloniki 77, 80, 102, 112, 114, 123
 Tirana 29, 76, 80, 83, 85, 109f., 119f.
 Trade, drug 46, 86
 Trade, free 66, 91, 94
 Trade unions 109f., 125
 Transition period 25, 94
 Truth Commission 117

 Ukraine 33, 59, 123
 UNHCR 41, 55
 UNIADRION 118
 United Nations Security Council 27, 112, 117
 UNMIK 56, 68, 107, 109
 UNPROFOR 38
 Unemployment 81f.

 Veto mechanism 57f.
 Visa 30, 92, 100f., 103f., 108, 111, 113f., 119, 125
 Visegrad States 61, 64f., 93
 Vlatadon Initiative 124
 Vojvodina 28, 80

 World Bank 62, 72, 77, 96f.

 Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 19f., 29f., 34f., 80,
 97, 108, 113, 115, 118
 Yugoslavia, rump 34

 Zagreb 33, 45, 67, 101
 Zone, economic 76, 78, 94, 118

Recommended Literature

- Andric, Ivo, *The Bridge on the Drina* (trans. Lovett F. Edwards), Chicago 1945/1977
- Bildt, Carl, *Mission Peace*, Stockholm 1997
- Busek, Erhard, *Österreich und der Balkan – Vom Umgang mit dem Pulverfass Europas*, Vienna 1999
- Daalder, Ivo H./Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly – Nato’s War to Save Kosovo*, Washington 2000
- European Stability Initiative, *Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, Cohesion and the New Boundaries of Europe*, Berlin 2002
http://www.esiweb.org/westernbalkans/showdocument.php?document_ID=37
- Glenny, Misha, *Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, New York 1992
- Holbrooke, Richard, *To End a War*, New York 1998
- Hösch, Edgar, *The Balkans. A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day*, London 1972
- Kadaré, Ismail, *The General of the Dead Army*, London 1971
- Kaser, Karl/Robert Pichler/Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (eds.), *Die weite Welt und das Dorf – Albanische Emigration am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Vienna 2002
- Maas, Peter, *Die Sache mit dem Krieg, Bosnien von 1992 bis Dayton*, Munich 1997
- Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, London 1994;
Kosovo: A Short History, New York 1998
- Mazower, Mark, *The Balkans*, Toronto 2000
- Petritsch/Kasler/Pichler, *Kosovo – Kosova – Mythen, Daten, Fakten*, Klagenfurt 1999
- Petritsch, Wolfgang, *Bosnien und Herzegowina – 5 Jahre nach Dayton. Hat der Friede eine Chance?*, Klagenfurt 2001
- Poulton, Hugh, *Who are the Macedonians?*, London 1995
- Rathfelder, Erich, *Sarajevo und danach – Sechs Jahre Reporter in ehemaligen Jugoslawien*, München 1998
- Roux, Michel, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie: Minorité nationale territoire et développement*, Paris 1992
- Tanner, Marcus, *Croatia, A Nation Forged in War*, London 1997
- Thomas, Robert, *Serbia under Milosevic – Politics in the 1990s*, London 1999
- Tisma, Aleksandar, *The Book of Blam*, Orlando 1998
- Tisma, Aleksandar, *The Use of Man*, Orlando 1988
- West, Rebecca, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, New York and London 1941

The Koerber Foundation ...

... strengthens a living community.

With its work as an operational foundation, the Koerber Foundation wants to bring awareness to problems that face us, stimulate people's independent initiatives, and provide examples for solving societal questions.

The Koerber Foundation was founded in Bergedorf in 1959 by Dr. h.c. Kurt A. Koerber, entrepreneur, inventor, and "instigator". The foundation is independent of political and commercial interests and pursues goals for the common good exclusively and directly.

... contributes to international understanding.

Since 1961, the Bergedorf Round Table has conducted international conferences in different places both in Germany and abroad about the central problems of society and international politics.

With its German-Turkish projects, the foundation supports (since 1992) relations between Germany and Turkey with both a youth- and science exchange program and symposia on bilateral topics.

Since 1998 the "Transatlantic Idea Competition – USable" supports the exchange of practical ideas between the USA and Germany.

... stimulates communication between science and society.

Since 1985 the foundation has presented the Koerber European Science Award that supports, in particular, international cooperation in research in the fields of technology, natural science, and medicine.

In 1996 the foundation initiated an interdisciplinary contest for students in Germany and abroad from all college-level schools and in all subject areas called the German Students Award.

... supports historico-political culture.

Since 1973 the Federal President's History Competition has stimulated students to investigate and document aspects of their local history.

Under the auspices of Eustory – the Koerber Project for Historico-political Dialog in Europe – the Koerber Foundation supports initiatives, in particular those dealing with Eastern Europe, that inspire further critical analysis of history. The foundation thereby stimulates international understanding about diverse historical cultures.

... supports independent initiatives by young and old alike.

With the assistance of the States' School Theater, the Koerber Foundation makes space for teachers and students to test creativity and artistic dramatic art forms.

The foundation offers numerous educational and recreational activities to people older than 50 at the "Haus im Park" Citizen's Center that was founded in 1977.

The Koerber Foundation assumed the functions of both instigator and mentor for the Community Foundation Dresden. Additionally, the Koerber Foundation is supporting the Citizen Foundation in its initial development phases with the necessary material and personnel resources.

... is connected to Hamburg.

It offers a diverse cultural program at its "Haus Im Park" in Hamburg-Bergedorf.

It supports young artists in the Hanseatic city both through its involvement in the International Opera Studio, which is associated with the Hamburg State Opera, and with the Boy Gobert Prize, an honor for up-and-coming young thespians.

... cooperates with partners.

Koerber-Foundation cooperates with the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP, Berlin): Koerber Contact Center Russia/CIS, with the "Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Darstellendes Spiel": School Drama Festival, and with the Northern Institute of Technology Hamburg (NIT).

... publishes results.

Within the edition Koerber-Stiftung over 80 publications in fields such as "politics and society" or "education" show the result and impuls coming from the operative projects.

The catalog of publications and further information are available upon request: Tel: 040/7250-28-27, Fax: 040/7250-36-45, Email: edition@stiftung.koerber.de, www.koerber-stiftung.de

The assets of the Koerber Foundation amount to approximately 533 million Euros. Included is full ownership of Koerber AG, an international consortium of mechanical engineering firms with more than 8000 employees in Germany and abroad. About 12 million Euros are available annually for the foundation's work in the public interest. Along with the above named projects, numerous other activities are realized and supported.

**Bergedorf Round Table
of the
Körper Foundation**

Chairman: Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinators: Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors)
Dr. Levin von Trott zu Solz (Managing Director)

Program Assistant: Karen Pehla-Elsaesser, M. A.

Program Manager: Julia Steets

Address: Bergedorf Round Table
Berlin Office of the Körper Foundation
Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8
D-10117 Berlin
Telefon: 0049-30-20 62 67 60
Telefax: 0049-30-20 62 67 67
E-Mail: bg@stiftung.koerber.de
www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de

These minutes may be reproduced with permission of the publisher. Please send us a voucher copy.