

124th Bergedorf Round Table

**Contours of a “New World Order”? –  
American and European Perspectives**

June 14th–16th, 2002, AXICA Convention Center Berlin



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## SUMMARY

The 124th Bergedorf Round Table on “Contours of a New World Order” met in Berlin in June 2002. U.S.-Americans and Europeans of different nations and generations came together in what was once a hot spot of the Cold War. Politicians, academic experts and publicists discussed the impact of September 11th on the current state of and prospects for the transatlantic relationship. The three Round Table sessions—each started by introductory statements by American and European experts—offered the participants an open-minded forum to debate the similarities as well as the sometimes deep disparities between European and American worldviews and political behavior. The controversies that subsequently shaped transatlantic relations in the stages leading up to the war on Iraq visibly surfaced during the Berlin conference. Everyone agreed that achieving a positive turnaround in the U.S.-European relationship would entail a significant effort on both sides of the Atlantic.

To establish a basis for discussion, the first session focused on continuities and changes in transatlantic relations since September 11th. The debate opened with an intense discussion about the historic dimensions of this event and its potential effects on alliances and the international political system in general. The evolution of international relations during the 20th century as well as enlightening parallels to earlier periods, particularly the Pax Romana, received much attention. Following this reflection, the participants argued hard about the current policies pursued by both sides of the Atlantic. Fundamental differences in opinion became evident when considering a reasonable division of labor between the transatlantic partners. These divergences appeared not only between U.S. and European participants, but also within the European camp—mainly between East- and West-Europeans—and among Americans, depending on their position concerning the Bush-Administration.

During the second part of the Round Table, the participants discussed the impacts of globalization and the need for political regulation. The line separating globalization optimists from the skeptics ran across all camps on each side of the Atlantic. However, all insisted on the necessity of creating political structures that can halt and prevent the negative effects dividing the losers from the winners of globalization.

The question of “Common Roots—Common Future?” stood at the forefront of the last Round Table session. The participants agreed that common interests and values bind the transatlantic relationship. Due to changed parameters in the inter-

national system, they also conceded that reaching consensus in common policies is more difficult today than it was in Cold War times. Only the definition of new common goals could reinvigorate the transatlantic alliance. Naturally, a plethora of different proposals for and approaches to a new transatlantic agenda existed.

The clear message from this Round Table weekend is that the international frame of reference for the transatlantic relationship has fundamentally changed, putting this long-lasting friendship to a difficult test for the next several years. Some optimism nonetheless prevailed about the possibility for partnership in future political action, as common interests and values help to bridge the gap over the Atlantic. In light of the immense challenges that international politics face today, such partnership is more than necessary. All participants urged the Berge-dorf Round Table to continue offering a forum where innovative ideas about the contours of a just New World Order can be deliberated. (Note: three Round Tables related to this subject are being planned for the near future.)

## PROTOCOL

### Welcome



Ladies and Gentlemen, I extend a warm welcome to you all here in Berlin, in a room that is a manifestation of transatlantic relations. A German bank chose an exceedingly bold design by the architect Frank O. Gehry to house its Berlin offices. So I am very happy that we have all gathered in the center of the European continent, to continue a discourse on transatlantic relations and a “new world order,” to which the US President made a remarkable contribution several weeks ago in the German Bundestag, just a few steps away.


Most of you are already familiar with the Bergedorf Round Table and what it does. It is a completely private initiative with the particular advantage of offering a truly free, cooperative, contentious, and constructive forum for discussion. Let me thank Lord Dahrendorf for chairing this meeting. Whether he will understand this task in a British or rather in a German way remains to be seen.

**von Weizsäcker**

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Explanatory note: This Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.

## I. Continuities and Change after September 11th



**Dahrendorf** It is my task to moderate our conversation. The subject is “The Shape of a New World Order” or perhaps “Contours of the Shape of a New World Order,” and it is an attempt to bring together American and European perspectives. Continuities and changes after what in America is called “9/11”—continuities and changes after September 11th—are our first subject.

**Schroeder** I will follow Luther’s advice to Melanchthon: “Sin boldly and trust even more boldly in God’s grace,” and try to bring history to bear on three points: globalization, alliances and the war on terrorism.

globalization

First: globalization. Obviously, this economic process is not new or unprecedented. While scholars disagree about its starting date, there is a clear, recognizable parallel between the globalization we see today and the economic globalization which occurred prior to World War I and centered in Europe and North America. This “first globalization” was smaller than the current one in scale, somewhat narrower in scope and slower in pace. Nonetheless, it represented the same processes and exhibited many of the same features as today’s.

... and its connection  
to the political world order  
prior to 1914

My concern here is not to compare these two globalizations in general, but to discuss the connection between the first globalization and the political world order prior to 1914. Some have suggested that had this globalization with its integration and interdependence been allowed to proceed further without being perverted or arrested by power politics, World War I, which is still the seminal disaster of the twentieth century, might have been avoided or even rendered impossible.

I think this is a mistake. Any view that counterposes and contrasts a constructive, integrating peace-promoting process of economic globalization with the dangerous, destructive, imperialist, war-promoting power politics before 1914 and makes the former in a sense the casualty of the latter, misconceives the historical relation between the two processes.

... was intrinsically bound up  
with power politics

Economic globalization before 1914 was not a potential solution to the problems of power politics and war. It was intrinsically bound up with power politics and must be seen as one of the causes of war. The reasons for this are fairly plain: Globalization was intimately connected to world policy—Weltpolitik—the then dominant belief or ideology that national survival and prosperity depended upon achieving and holding the position of a world power.

This imperialist idea constantly raised the stakes of international politics

The more globalization and free market economies come to prevail in the world, the more we need politics, especially international politics, in order to detect, control, manage and if necessary correct their effects.

Schroeder

before 1914, making the competition on every level, economic and political, not merely more fierce but often more lawless. All the important players in globalization pursued their own interests, constantly broke agreements and manipulated the international system to their advantage.

More importantly, globalization, like the free market economics it promoted, inexorably created clear-cut economic and political winners and losers in the international arena. While in a market system, firms and even whole industries are theoretically fungible, i.e. failing entities are replaced by others, this sort of fungibility does not apply to international politics, or at least not to anything like the same degree. States, regimes and powerful elite groups are not replaceable, at least not without great resistance and destructive costs. States and regimes can resist prospective defeat or irreversible decline to the point of war, and this is what happened in the lead up to World War I.

globalization creates clear-cut winners and losers

But are we facing a similar situation today, or have things changed essentially because we learned from history? Let me suggest, though much less confidently, that there are similar, if less critical dangers connected with the globalization of today. Argentina might constitute a current example of those dangers.

dangers of globalization today

The answer is not to try to stop or reverse globalization. But neither is it to insist, as some do in America, that politicians should simply let this supposedly beneficent process of integration of the world economy proceed without interference. History indicates to me that globalization and the spreading of free market economies do not now, any more than earlier, represent a benign alternative to international politics or a way of avoiding its perils.

The more globalization and free market economies come to prevail in the world, the more we need politics, especially international politics, in order to detect, control, manage and if necessary correct their effects.

globalization needs politics

Second: Alliances. Currently, the crisis of the North Atlantic and Western Alliance is much debated. While this alliance remains by far the most durable and adaptable coalition in history, it today shows tensions and a loss of cohesion and direction.

This suggests a historical question: What has caused alliances, coalitions and the international systems connected to them to lose cohesion in the past and ultimately to fall apart? This is a huge question, of course, with many commonly cited answers—loss of a common enemy, disappearance of a mutually perceived threat, emergence of divergent interests and aims, perception of an unjust distri-

why do alliances fall apart?



defection of the leader

bution of benefits and costs within the alliance, the rise of new problems and dangers, and difficulties in allowing new members into the coalition. All these would seem to apply to the present situation.

Another central factor operative throughout early modern and modern European history, however, seems to me little noted or discussed. Alliances and coalitions tend to break down when the hegemon, the leader, defects—that is, when that leader either wrecks the alliance or fails to sustain it.

Such a defection by the coalition’s leader can take various forms: changing the purposes of the alliance from limited and mutually acceptable aims to aggressive or dangerous ones (Louis XIV), preventing the alliance from changing and adapting to the changing needs of its members (Prince Metternich), refusing to share responsibility and leadership with others, or refusing to redistribute burdens and benefits.

The form of defection which I consider most common of all, however, arises from a simpler cause: distraction, neglect, indifference, lack of attention on the part of the head of the coalition, often due to an assumption by the leading power that the alliance itself and the international system to which it was connected did not need its active support and management, but would sustain themselves and continue to operate through a kind of invisible hand. This, it seems to me, was the typical British approach to its role in the European system of states for most of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Great Britain: “maintaining  
the balance of power”

Time and again, Great Britain led in winning wars and establishing peace—often at major cost and exertion—and then defected from the alliance and the system it had itself led in establishing. It justified this policy of defection on grounds of necessity and expediency. Britain’s constitution, its domestic political system, and its world-wide political and economic interests, British leaders claimed, ruled out a policy of active British intervention to manage the alliance. Moreover, the international system ought to survive and function on its own or by means of the exertions of those most directly dependent on it. The codeword for this British policy was, “maintaining the balance of power.”

will the United States defect?

The United States was strongly attracted to and influenced by an even stronger version of this kind of hands-off policy as it succeeded John Bull as world leader in the first half of the twentieth century.

The question today, after the Cold War, is whether the United States will, like Britain in the past, allow the system it has helped to create and is still leading

Durable coalitions demand constant engagement,  
steady leadership and management.

Schroeder

to sink or swim essentially on its own. The early language of the Bush administration suggested that Washington might do so, but its most recent actions suggest the opposite. What policy will actually emerge is not yet clear. I can merely offer a few historical generalizations regarding alliances and alliance cohesion.

The first is that durable coalitions demand constant engagement, steady leadership and management, especially from their leaders.

lessons from history

Secondly, while balance-of-power politics might play an important role in the overall international system, it is less important for the internal workings of alliances and coalitions. Internally, alliances need to balance the interests, rights, responsibilities, obligations, performances and satisfactions of the various alliance members. Seeing to it that this balance is maintained is primarily the role of the hegemon.

The third generalization is that, if a coalition is threatened by a loss of the unifying vision and purpose, it becomes the prime responsibility of the hegemon to meet the problem. Ideas and visions come from everywhere, but they can only inspire and unify the coalition if the leader shares and promotes them.

This brings me to my last point: terrorism. The current American administration, with enthusiastic bipartisan and popular support, seems determined to make international terrorism the new unifying threat to the broad Western alliance. And it seems determined to make the war on terrorism the alliance's unifying purpose and activity, taking precedence over all other aims and goals. I do not believe that this could or should work over the long term.

terrorism

There are various reasons for doubting the suitability of this purpose as the basis for new unity and cohesion in the alliance. First, to make the war on terrorism a common goal for the alliance, it would have to be clearly defined. What this means is that in every concrete instance international terrorism has to be distinguished from ordinary crime, revolutionary activity or even the fight for rights, freedom, and resistance to oppression.

can the war on terrorism  
be a unifying purpose  
for the Western alliance?

There is the further danger that the alleged common purpose of fighting terrorism will be manipulated and exploited for ends not shared by the alliance and harmful to its solidarity.

More dangerous still is the high probability that actions undertaken as part of a joint war against terrorism, for example a pre-emptive war on Iraq, would impose greater dangers and costs on some, while promising disproportionate

You can do a great deal with bayonets,  
but you cannot sit on them.

Schroeder

rewards to other members of the alliance. Historically, nothing has undermined alliances more than this perception.

Let me finish my remarks with a more general comment on terrorism.

wars against terrorism in history

It is not the case, as one might suppose, that wars against terrorism cannot be won. The historical record indicates that campaigns against terrorism are often successful, in the sense that organized states, given sufficient determination and effort, can repress terrorist movements, if not wholly eradicate them. They can reduce terrorist activity at least for a time from a major threat to a minor problem for state and society.

Thus, terrorist movements were regularly brought under control in the main centres of terrorist activity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe: Russia, Spain and Ireland. I expect the current war on terrorism to achieve victory in this sense.

The case, however, becomes much more difficult when regarding the long-term consequences of those victories over terrorism, especially where the war was not followed by any positive measures.

This difficulty is compounded by the opportunity costs created by wars on terrorism: the costs of leaving other vital tasks undone in order to concentrate on defeating terrorism, the long-term results of this neglect and the ironic or tragic unintended consequences that emerged. I think we see this in all three cases, in Russia, Spain and Ireland.

joint war against terrorism  
cannot serve to unify the alliance

This is not moralistic sentimentality, I hope. I am not saying that terrorism is not evil, does not need to be fought or cannot be fought at all without first solving the social and political problems that supposedly breed it. This would be foolish. I am saying merely that a joint war against terrorism is too ill-defined, negative and limited a purpose in and of itself, and becomes too easily a cover for dangerous hidden agendas to serve, at least alone, to unify and revivify an alliance that needs a new direction. This is especially true at a time when other vital problems and goals also need attention.

Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, who led Austria in defeating the revolutions that nearly destroyed the empire in 1848/49, is supposed to have said about his triumph: "You can do a great deal with bayonets, but you cannot sit on them." We doubtless have to use bayonets against terrorism, though rationally and surgically, but this alliance cannot sit on them.

I would add to what Mr. Schroeder said by saying that I could at least give some sense of what we are thinking on the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. Essentially, no one there feels terrorism can be a defining or a guiding principle of US foreign policy. That is what Richard Haas believes and that is my sense of what Colin Powell believes. This should be cause for hope.

What we get in the media is indeed distracting. It is important to underscore that we sometimes get an impression from the general discussion that does not really match the reality within the administration.

It has been frequently asserted that the Europeans tend to see the world system in the terms of balance of power or interlocking balances of powers, which is a realist view. The Americans, since the founding of the United States, have tended to judge international relations against the yard-stick of universal democratic values, which is a more idealist approach.

The tension between the two approaches has largely structured transatlantic relations since at least the First World War and the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. And after September 11th we are experiencing the same kind of discussion. The Europeans, or many of them, do not like the “axis of evil” rhetoric of the American government and the Americans tend to see the Europeans once again as ineffectual appeasers, devoid of idealism.

This might give transatlantic discussions a very dangerous turn. But I think this is due to superficial views about what has characterized European and American international policies in the past; and I am sure that if we go deeper in trying to explain what those views are, we shall find common ground.

The so-called European balance has never been just about power. There was, of course, an element of balance-of-power politics, but there were also two other elements: The first can be described as “structures”—international law, treaties, international bodies and alliances. The second element was “values.” Even the Europeans have recognized since the beginning of the nineteenth century a modicum of values in their international system. To ascertain this you just have to read the Congress of Vienna treaty or the treaties which followed it down to the First World War. There are always some articles about minority rights and problems of this kind.

On the other side, American foreign policy has usually been quite open to real-

## **Shore**

position of the State Department

## **Soutou**

are Europeans realists  
and Americans idealists?

We share basically the same values  
on both sides of the Atlantic.

Soutou

common values

ist views about national interests and power politics. Even Wilson understood what power was about. And the actions taken by the United States against Hitler and against the Soviet Union demonstrate this understanding of power politics.

The real problem in transatlantic relations is not the balance-of-power. Nor is it “values,” because we share basically the same values on both sides of the Atlantic. I think the real problem pertains to “structures.” Historically the United States has had an aversion to any entangling structures and this, I think, goes to the heart of our discussion.

different attitudes to structures

There has been one fortunate exception to the United States’ rejection of international structures. It was the period after 1945 when the United Nations were set up. They failed at the time because of the Cold War. But then NATO was created, which was seen at the time as a sort of miniature United Nations. Its members shared the same values and they were willing to structure their co-operation in order to balance the Soviet Union and ultimately to reorganize the world after the end of communism.

This period proves that Americans and Europeans can agree on basic tendencies in international relations. The agreement has basically lasted until the end of the Cold War despite de Gaulle and despite, maybe, a growing American unilateralism since President Kennedy.

But now, with the end of the Cold War and with Russia coming back to the West, we face many more actors in a much more diverse world. And, of course, we have terrorism. In view of the failure of the new world order which was extolled by President George Bush, the father, in 1990, and in view of everything which was signaled by September 11th, we have to ask new questions. And there is once again a danger of misunderstandings and divergences between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Today, many Europeans see the Americans as returning to their pre-NATO policies with a mixture of world order idealism and hard-nosed unilateralism and without accepting binding commitments or international structures.

European responses:  
Atlanticists vs. Europeanists

What are the answers of the Europeans to this new situation? I think they are divided into two tendencies which have actually been present since the 60s. There are Atlanticists—Europeans who still believe today that the best solution will be an Atlantic system led by the United States and resting on NATO. They want to restore what worked until the end of the Cold War, but of course adapt it to the new circumstances.

Yet, there is also a second approach—the search for a more balanced relationship between the United States and stronger Europe. This second tendency might be gaining ground because the Europeans realize that America might not be able to achieve the “soft,” benevolent hegemony which is necessary if the so-called new world order is to succeed—an order resting on the victory of democracy and free market economics throughout the world.

If that new world order does not succeed, the last theoretical remaining possibility to prevent anarchy would be a world system resting on interlocking regional balances. Within this system, the United States would be involved at every point in any world region. Moreover, this system would require structures like the United Nations, NATO, international treaties, laws and, not least, shared core values. This may be a more modest agenda than the current American one, but it would still serve to counter dangerous developments such as the spread of terrorism.

This seems to be the emerging European agenda, even if it is still tentative and even if it is somewhat early to speak of Europe as a whole politically. In fact, these ideas are not so different from those Mr. Kissinger has put forward in his last book.

We have shown historically that we can agree on a compromise between American and European views, including at the same time balance-of-power politics, structures and values. This is why, in my opinion, we should and we can once again find common ground to come to terms with current problems.

Reflecting on the interesting comments made by the first two speakers, it seems to me that our current debate echoes arguments made throughout the last fifty years of transatlantic relations.

There have been several periods in which the obituaries of NATO have been written and in which it has been predicted that the Atlantic Alliance was being strained to its limits.

In the early 1980s, there were the disputes about Cruise and Pershing missiles, the Siberian pipeline and the new Cold War. In the early seventies, there were the debates about an enlarged Europe, Henry Kissinger’s Year of Europe, and the need for a new Atlantic Charter to redress the balance.

One can go back even further to the disputes about President de Gaulle’s policy of pulling France out of the unified command system of NATO. Ultimately, one can go back to the very beginnings of the Supreme Command in NATO when

alternative: interlocking regional balances

## **Reynolds**

previous crises in the transatlantic relationship



*Dahrendorf,  
Reynolds, Schroeder*

present challenges:  
NATO and EU enlargement

many Americans had the feeling that this was only going to be a temporary arrangement. In fact, in the early 1950s, Dwight Eisenhower's view was that if American troops remained in Europe for more than a decade, they would have failed to galvanize the Europeans to their own defense.

So there has always been a sense that the transatlantic relationship could be pulling apart. What concerns me at present is that the future of the two big institutions of contemporary Europe, NATO and the European Union, is on the agenda. And the overwhelming and almost, it seems to me, intractable issue we face is the question of enlarging those two institutions eastward.

Those are huge structural changes. They are in a sense part of the continuing legacy of overcoming the Cold War. They are part of bringing a huge part of Europe back into Europe after the divisions of Yalta.

Those tasks will place enormous strains on both the EU and NATO. They may well make both institutions inoperable in their present form. With a view to the European Union, for example, an increased number of members will affect the management of its key policies—the agricultural, regional and social policies. Those are the central questions for Europeans within the European Union, for Europe as a whole and for NATO.

United States  
has different concerns

The current American agenda seems to me to be very different. I do not have a sense that those questions matter nearly so much to the United States. And the war on terrorism, if it is pursued by the present administration in the form that it appears to be taking suggests to me that Washington has a very different set of concerns. These are concerns that of course reflect the new sense of insecurity in the United States, a country that went through the whole of the twentieth century without really having its continental integrity damaged or attacked. Whereas most Europeans have lived with insecurity, terror, violence and war, continental America, as distinct, say, from Hawaii, was never affected by war and nine-eleven therefore was a huge shock. This is an issue of large structural importance that we have to address.

**Dahrendorf**

I think, we will get to that issue when we talk about the contemporary scene. I was now wondering whether there are any comments on the lessons from history. Mr. Czempel, this is your territory, isn't it?

One can indeed learn much from history, but only if one asks the right questions. The problem is that we learn so few lessons from history because we are mostly informed too late. The noble craft of the historian rightly says that we can only really analyze what has happened at least fifty years ago, but by then the lessons come too late for today's and tomorrow's policymakers. Political science, especially that of international relations, seeks to fill this gap.

Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Souton have very rightly emphasized the many achievements of the Atlantic alliance during the last fifty years. These include victory in the Cold War and mastery of many problems that Mr. Reynolds referred to. But I think there is only a limited use to these lessons of history because relations between the United States and Western Europe have grown too complex to be handled at the level of NATO.

Since Mr. Schroeder cited the line that one cannot sit on bayonets, I would add that one cannot base the transatlantic relationship on them either. A defense alliance is simply too restrictive to shape the ties between North America and Western Europe, even if, in my opinion, its consolidation marks the most important historical advance of the last fifty years, and one that we must maintain under any circumstance.

What we really need to help continue invigorating US-Western European relations is a *political* organization, not just a military one. This was already a problem during the Cold War, when we tried to push the whole political discourse through the needle's eye of NATO just because there was no other organization to take its place. What the Atlantic community needs is a political organization where problems, especially terrorism, can be discussed and resolved *politically*.

Mr. Chairman, you invited me to provide a short sketch of the political dimension. In doing so, I would like to point out the difficulties that arise when we regard the problem of world order and concepts of world order from a German viewpoint.

It is important to remember, as Max Weber has demonstrated, that models of world order are a combination of ideas and interests interacting with each other. Concepts of world order can be interpreted on the one hand as imperial designs or as great ideas that guide civilization. The difference here from our Western friends in the 19th and 20th centuries was that the Americans and British have naturally defined their national interests very adroitly while embedding these

## **Czempiel**

need for a political organization  
to invigorate US-European relations

## **Hacke**

a German perspective  
on concepts of world order



in concepts of a global order. Britain's Westminster parliamentary system was culturally attractive, just as was the French Revolution and the anti-colonial founding tenets of the United States. In a three-way struggle with Communism on the one hand and fascism and Nazism on the other, Western civilization has emerged victorious as a concept of global order and manifests itself as international Liberalism.

Now, if we Germans have had a relatively difficult time finding our own position, then this has been due to our own recent history. We had our own imperial designs and racist concepts of a global order, but we had nothing attractive to offer in terms of civilization until the end of the first half of the 20th century. This shows why we have had such difficulty in coming to terms with concepts of global order, even though the 50 year history of the Federal Republic and its foreign policy achievements has finally helped us arrive in the realm of Western civilization. The process that began with Stresemann and was continued by Adenauer would ostensibly have left us prepared to confidently defend both global order concepts and our national interests in this multi-faceted game. Yet this is precisely what I cannot detect today.

special dependence on  
systems of collective security

What models of world order exist today in Germany regarding the structures that Mr. Schroeder has referred to? To a much greater extent than our Western neighbors, we depend on systems of collective security. Mr. Schroeder, on the other hand, clearly put forward the hegemonic model that includes a dominant power. I also subscribe to the realist school and I think that as long as a hegemonic power fails to support corresponding structures, then models of orders will not be viable either globally or regionally.

My colleague Mr. Czempiel might see the matter differently, but if we had not had a global power like the United States, what would the result of World War I have been? How would the Weimar Republic of the inter-war period have developed? How would World War II have ended? How would, especially for our country, the Cold War have been waged without the US as a guarantor of world order? There will be times when we are cross with each other, and there are times when we can be glad that we are being protected.

develop a willingness  
to stand up for ourselves

My summary then, is the following: We have to take more responsibility upon ourselves and we must develop a robust tradition, a willingness to stand up for ourselves, that stems from the concepts of civilization and world order that the Federal Republic's foreign policy helped define. Meanwhile, we have to make



Hacke, Frankenberger

clearer to our neighbors that we, too, have national interests that we will confidently represent and not shamefully hide.

Thank you very much, Mr. Hacke. In the meantime Germany can sleep peacefully, since Oliver Neuville scored the goal in the 88th minute that put the German side into the quarterfinals of the soccer World Cup.

Now back to our subject. I would suggest that we listen to Pierre Hassner and then go on to the other two papers. It is clear from our discussion that we are moving from history to the present scene.

My intervention will refer to the three concepts outlined by Mr. Schroeder. I will use a historical perspective to analyze the present.

On globalization, just a footnote. The comparisons with the first globalization at the beginning of the century are very enlightening but one comparison is particularly interesting; today, we have the movement of capital and goods as we had then, but we have a far smaller movement of people.

The huge migrations which occurred during the first globalization cannot be observed. But the reaction against them, which one saw in the twenties, is already re-emerging today. The problem of migration and of states closing themselves off to the masses that want to enter them, is one of the most explosive issues. Both at the European and the world level, it really has to be managed much more carefully than at present.

Next, I would like to turn to alliances. The problem of NATO and European enlargement is still conceived of in very classical terms. This also applies to the survival of NATO after the Cold War. I always found that an article by Professor Schroeder in the Knaur book which discusses historical dimensions of security, how alliances survive, how their instruments of control work, and how they integrate their former opponents, was perfectly explanatory.

Different conclusions have to be drawn, however, concerning the third problem—terrorism and its transformation today under the impact of technology and the changes in the world economy. Here, a fundamental transformation has occurred. On the one hand, ever fewer people are able to produce ever greater destruction at ever smaller cost.

On the other hand, the rising influence of fundamentalist forms of religion—itsself partly a reaction to globalization—leads to people willing to commit suicide.

**Dahrendorf**

**Hassner**

globalization and the problem of migration

terrorism requires a reassessment of the notion of alliance

Under these circumstances the notions we use, such as alliance, coalition against terrorism and so on, need to be reassessed in a way in which the past is only of limited use.

We can draw lessons from history about the role of a hegemon and the dangers of hubris, but the coalition against terrorism is not really a coalition or an alliance in the classical sense. In a situation in which a new doctrine of pre-emption has emerged regarding the use of force, where the concept of deterrence fails as people are willing to commit suicide and where we are faced with non-territorial entities, the whole notion of alliance needs to be reassessed.

It is precisely the nexus between the three notions globalization, terrorism and their consequences on alliances, that is producing fundamentally new problems as compared to the comparatively simple inter-state problems of transforming alliances after the Cold War.

**Dahrendorf**

Now, we shall hear the second two introductory papers.  
First the great realist, Egon Bahr.

**Bahr**

I would like to take up what Professor Soutou said, that the United States is freeing itself from the relics of the Cold War. Its capabilities permit it and its interests demand it. Two elements of US policy make this abundantly clear.

American foreign policy  
after the end of the Cold War

First, the United States has departed from the close bonds of NATO that were taken for granted during the Cold War. Despite NATO's invocation of Article 5 in the wake of 9/11, the US did not allow itself to be prevented from acting quickly and resolutely, and without being restricted by consultations.

Second, America has agreed with Russia to reduce both countries' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, albeit with a quantity of loopholes and open questions that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Had the two sides insisted on checks and verifications as in former times, this deal would have taken many months, even years to reach. In the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was the second superpower, America demanded painstaking regulations. It could take its time because the leadership in the Kremlin acted rationally and responsibly.

Today, on the other hand, the United States' own superiority and Russia's weakness guarantee a security that permits the omission of a lot of fine print. The still-present capability of mutual destruction is no longer as threatening because neither side wants nor is able to use it. This new situation establishes the founda-



tion for a new policy. It liberates policy to attempt replacing confrontation through cooperation. As a measure of security, the accord is valid for only ten years and can be annulled unilaterally by either side within 90 days. Essentially, is it a new kind of insurance policy, backed by trust.

A few of these agreements suffice to test mutual intentions. And I want to add that today only Russia and not China or India, let alone Europe, can conclude such a treaty. The deal gives Russia time to consolidate and the US time and resources to concentrate on its plans. It stabilizes the alliance against terrorism. This alliance without a treaty is also reinforced by an agreement that, should it prove durable, opens up a global perspective, namely deterrence through cooperation. That is how I, as a European, would characterize the opportunity presented by this new political process. An American might say, “as long as we can retain and expand our deterrent capability, we can afford to cooperate on our own terms.”

America’s isolationist withdrawal from Europe after World War I was transformed during World War II. Since then, the United States has remained a European power; indeed, it is now the most powerful of them all. No state in the continent wants or is able to do without it. America has twice experienced the shock of its own vulnerability, first, when the Soviets deployed nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles at the end of the 1950s, and again on September 11, when the images of its vulnerability were branded into the world’s psyche.

America has found that it can achieve the seemingly impossible—so why not the dream of its own invulnerability? The war on terrorism fits a deeply-ingrained element of the American soul, a genuine component of its self-image. For the world’s only remaining superpower, there can be no returning to its old isolationism, but “isolationism à la carte” seems feasible. Richard Haas, the State Department’s Director for Policy Planning, calls it “multilateralism à la carte,” which means the same, but sounds more considerate and soothing.

“isolationism à la carte”

European allegations of unilateralism are misguided in claiming that Washington’s basic orientation has changed. Rather, the US government has come to the conclusion that its responsibilities and technological and military unassailability permit as well as demand that America develop the political flexibility of the strongest—a free-hand policy. It enters into new commitments, for example with Moscow or the NATO-Russia Council, when its interests so require. It pulls out of treaties or commitments, or annuls signatures, to reinforce its technological supremacy and further its interests. If its free-hand policy so demands, Wash-

a strong America  
vs. a weak Europe

ington could pull out of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or even contravene the Vienna Convention on International Treaties and its stipulation that signed treaties have to be respected as if they were already ratified. All this is carried by the missionary conviction that what is good for America is good for the world.

The administration will follow this path, so we should prepare ourselves. Nobody can prevent it. For the United States, the political factor “Moscow” supersedes the military factor of NATO. Lamenting this would be pointless. “Europe should be self-confident enough to recognize the divergent responsibilities and capabilities on either side of the Atlantic.” It should be confident enough to acknowledge that these differences cannot be removed without also sacrificing one’s own identity and claim to sovereignty. Europe cannot follow America, either in social policy, environmental policy, or regarding the International Criminal Court. A yawning gap currently separates the strong and independently effective United States from Europe, which is militarily weak and still cannot speak or act with one political voice. Most differences of opinion in the contemporary transatlantic debate can be traced back to this disparity.

solution: division of labor

In this kind of situation, one obvious option is to pursue a policy of labor division. America’s emancipation from Europe does not threaten the foundations of transatlantic relations, which rest securely on mutual values and interests. This would be especially true, were a European emancipation from America to follow. Every young person who comes of age goes through an emancipation from his or her parents without necessarily becoming their enemy. A European emancipation would lead to political responsibility and global effectiveness, and furthermore, would not contradict the logic of its mutually determined and introduced common currency. Europe could count on the support of the world’s strongest alliance and turn its military weakness into political strength by negotiating non-violent solutions to crises. That would chiefly mean making sure, as far as possible, that rogue states do not behave as such. Succeeding in this endeavor could spare the United States from going to war. Failure, however, would not rob America of any of its military options.

example: war  
against Yugoslavia

We might recall that the war against Yugoslavia ended with a diplomatic agreement with Milosevic that had the blessings of Moscow, Beijing, and the UN, not to mention the United States. As everyone knows, this example of a European solution did not damage transatlantic relations. Europe can take on responsibility here by expanding and deepening its institutions. This would take the burden



*Bahr*

off the United States and free its resources for other tasks and commitments without European participation. Today's apparent threats—especially terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction—are, from a European standpoint, more manageable politically than militarily. And America is surely far-sighted enough to include Russia in its plans for a strategic missile shield. That would also be in Europe's interest.

European aspirations to catch up with America militarily and technologically would be mistaken and perhaps even ridiculous. Why should Europe seek to match America's unassailable superiority in the first place? We are no rivals, after all.

The free-hand policy that is defined by interests could not and still cannot be altered through weapons procurements. The most modern weapons are not on the market anyway. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently told the Bundestag that he considered it "simply illusory and politically inadvisable to regard NATO as capable of action only when the most important European member states are on a par within NATO with the globally active United States."

This, of course, has ramifications on defense issues. The European partners in this mightiest alliance in the world have to modernize their armed forces to deter any conventional attack, but not to be deployed beside American forces worldwide. Rather, European forces have to become an effective shield for Europe. We need a European army, but not one that would serve as America's sword. In this manner, Europe could concentrate more effort, politically and economically, on the great task facing it from the expansion of NATO and the European Union. I fully agree with Mr. Reynolds that this will become Europe's central challenge.

This will be a matter not only of incorporating national economies or integrating national armed forces into NATO structures, which would be relatively quick and easy, but of overcoming differences in mentality. Germany has gained a substantial amount of experience in this point in the aftermath of its reunification. NATO's enlargement will bring into the alliance 100 million more people who will be introducing the weight of their experiences, culture, history, and mentality into the alliance.

It is an irony of history that the successful redefinition of the continent westwards will now be replaced by a shift to the east. It will re-establish the continent's natural geographical balance. All Europe will be able to exist free from the threat of war among its component states. Yet the difference in responsibilities and a pos-

Europe should not try to catch up with America militarily and technologically

NATO and EU enlargement are Europe's central challenge

"partnership in leadership"

“Europe, really?  
I don’t think much about Europe anymore.”

Singer

sible division of labor between Europe and America will not keep President George W. Bush from seeking a world order guaranteed by American hegemony. This should not and must not prevent Europe, however, from seeking a world order that the senior Mr. Bush advocated ten years ago when he wanted to lead the world into an order through “partnership in leadership,” within which all constituents would be bound to the same rules, including the United States. We should not forsake this perspective.

**Singer**

It is a great honor to be here in Berlin and to join such a distinguished group of speakers. I hope to represent the younger generation well and in doing so, make some provocative comments.

myths and realities  
in transatlantic relations  
after September 11th

In my own work I do two things. I work on security issues, in particular on new actors in warfare. I also coordinate a project which analyzes US policy towards the Islamic world and seeks to improve it. Today, with that in mind, I would like to discuss what I see as some of the myths and realities that pervade the transatlantic partnership after September 11th.

myth I:  
“Europe is irrelevant”

Myth number one: “Europe is irrelevant.”

When I told my fiancée that I was going to Germany for a conference on the important US relationship with Europe, her response was: “Europe, really? I don’t think much about Europe anymore.” The concern for all of us should be that her response encapsulates not only the viewpoint of most average Americans, but it also reflects the feeling in much of the US political establishment.

This belief is driven by a number of factors, but from the vantage point of security its driving matter is pretty simple. For the last hundred years, the major security concerns of the US centered on events within Europe. Twice the US intervened in what started as a war on the European continent. Then, for the last fifty years, it stationed armed forces along the western European border to head off yet another conflict.

After the end of the Cold War, however, the major security threats that the US faces no longer appear to emanate from Europe. Russian tanks no longer stand ready to roll through the Fulda Gap and SS-20s no longer face off with Pershing missiles. The battle of ideology, which also had a European bent to it, is no longer at the centre of things, such that we can now have a Green foreign minister in Germany without worrying what this means for US nuclear security.

Instead, the focus of American concern has shifted further east. The sense of



Singer

threat comes from the Persian Gulf and from South and Central Asia. Specifically, we are threatened by a transnational network of radicals, who have already taken the lives of over three thousand Americans and by the potential of rogue states, such as Iraq, to provide these radicals with weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, there is a growing perception that Europe is no longer the core American ally that it once was. Rather than encouraging help in the campaign in Afghanistan, the US political and military leadership sought to limit what support the Europeans were able to provide, which appeared to be not very substantial at that.

Indeed, looking to the future, the vast majority of European states are spending significantly less on defence and falling ever more behind in technology. This could reach a point not only where European forces will not be interoperable with US forces, but also risk becoming, in the words of NATO Secretary General Robertson, “a military pygmy.”

The reality, however, is slightly different. However, it is different in ways that are not often discussed. First, the threat assessment. While the first strikes of al Qaida were on the US and the US responses were in Afghanistan, in reality the war on terrorism has an important front line within Europe. The United States is realizing that, in a globalizing world, the problems of our allies can quickly become our own.

Several factors have hopefully woken us up to the fact that Europe is important in the war on terrorism. The discovery that some of the September 11th hijackers had been operating in Hamburg, and that Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” emerged from Britain, the breakup of a number of al Qaida cells in Spain and Italy has hopefully awakened Americans to the importance of close cooperation with Europe in the war on terror.

I want to add two more comments on these issues. The first is that the population trends within Europe show a dilemma. The demographic trends, driven by birth rates and immigration, reveal that Muslim populations in Europe will rise dramatically within the next generation, but these groups have been poorly integrated into their respective societies. If current trends continue and young Muslims remain alienated, radical Islam will find fertile ground across the continent.

The second is that we live in an interconnected world where a youth from Brooklyn can become a dirty bomber just as easily as a youth from Birmingham can become a shoe bomber and just as easily as a petty millionaire from Saudi Ara-

reality: Europe is important in the war on terrorism due to

demography and Islam

interconnectedness



*Stelzenmüller, Singer,  
Melville, Wells*

European security  
contributions

bia can become an international threat. My essential point is that the support of America's European allies in the war on terror will be essential in checking the spread of future terrorism. America and its allies need to address the underlying problems of Islamic radicalism which not only has an appeal within Pakistan but also on their own home turf. The US has much to learn, both in what to do and in what not to do, from our allies' experiences in combatting terrorism and integrating immigrant communities.

The problem of growing Muslim communities within European societies also poses a crucial question for transatlantic relations: will the Europeans respond to this problem by becoming closer allies of the US because they perceive a common threat or by becoming more distant allies because they fear a domestic backlash?

At the same time, Europe can play a valuable role in the international war on terrorism. Americans should acknowledge the contributions of Europeans to the campaign against terrorism. In Afghanistan today, there are as many Europeans and Canadians as there are American troops and they are playing very active roles, be it by providing security in Kabul or by hunting down al Qaida members in caves within southern Afghanistan. As in many other areas, Europe has been leading in efforts of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. So while Europe does lag behind the US in key technologies—and it does need to address that gap—it is absurd to believe that Europeans have nothing to contribute in security just because they are spending 'only' 150 billion dollars per year on defence.

The Europeans can supplement the US, for example by deploying AWACS in American air space by focusing on certain niche areas of warfare such as the special training in mountain warfare that the British forces were able to provide.

The onus is on Americans to acknowledge that Europe is still important in responding to the new security threats. Yet, the onus is also on the Europeans to use their limited means to maximize and specialize instead of duplicating capabilities. Unless some changes are made, the transatlantic partnership will be unable to contribute either to European and Atlantic security or, I would argue, global security.

myth II:  
"the Cold War is over"

I now would like to turn to myth number two: "The Cold War is over."

Just a few weeks ago Russia and the US signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty. A few days later, President Bush and his new best friend, Vladimir Putin, met again in Rome to sign an agreement giving Russia a kind of junior partnership within NATO. National Security Adviser Rice stated that: "These steps will



(see) Russia firmly anchored in the West. That is really a dream of three hundred years, not just of the post-Cold War era.”

This optimism is wrong on a number of levels. The first is that the task of integrating Russia in the West is still a dream. It may be closer than ever to becoming a reality, but it is nowhere near a fact. Russia still has innumerable problems dealing with governance, the rule of law, and economic and demographic problems that almost defy understanding.

At the same time, it has massive problems in domestic politics. In particular, its troubled relations with Muslims in Chechnya and the nature of radical Islam in the Caucasus are far different from the problem of Islam within Europe. To put it bluntly, while we may wish for it, Russia is not ready for the West and the West is not ready for Russia.

The idea that the Cold War is over is also wrong on a second level—the idea that the nuclear threat is gone. In fact, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has probably been lowered. The most recent arms control treaty did nothing to end the threat of nuclear weapons being used. The treaty did not destroy nearly four thousand Russian nuclear weapons, but it dismantled them and moved them from relatively well-guarded military sites into non-inventoried, non-secure locations strewn about the country. I do not count this as an improvement by any measure.

Russia continues to be a virtual candy store for cash-rich terrorists and rogue states, both for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the scientists who know how to make them and are still living hand-to-mouth. The core challenge is to expand programs to help Russia either count or destroy these very materials that may come back to haunt us.

Finally, the idea that the Cold War is over is also wrong on a third level. If we look at the emerging geopolitical strategy of the US, it is very similar to the approach we took during the Cold War. Increasingly, the war on terrorism has become the all-encompassing paradigm through which we view the world. With assured domestic support, the war on terrorism has become the way to justify any and every foreign policy action and to discredit any challenge or opposition to that action.

The al Qaida threat is often described in terms very similar to the Soviet threat. This is understandable given the high numbers of what I call “ex-cold warriors” in the government right now. While this gives us an energy and focus that was lack-

Russia is not yet firmly anchored in the West

the nuclear threat is not gone

US has similar geopolitical strategy

The transatlantic love-affair  
quickly turned into intense disagreement.

Singer

ing in the last decade, it also carries certain risks. Warping the dangers of the world into one monolithic threat possibly opens doors to manipulation.

Following this definition of the threat, the US has deployed military forces around the world, from Yemen and Georgia to Nepal. It is questionable, though, whether all of these deployments are justifiable as part of the war against terrorism, specifically against al Qaida. The danger of this is that our emerging geopolitical strategy risks allowing broken local regimes to avoid making the hard choices in resolving their own problems, particularly in facing up to the challenges of building good governance and democracy. Instead US forces make themselves new enemies out of local adversaries, risk potentially expanding the conflict or seeing our aid used in a manner or direction that we would not support, and send an image of a creeping American imperialism across the Islamic world. An additional risk is that this strategy may have negative impacts on the quality of governance in allied countries. Therefore, our strategy must not only aim at winning the support of allies, but also at preventing them from using the war on terrorism as an excuse to crack down on local opponents.

The war on terrorism also presents new challenges for Europe regarding its role in the war and the question whether it will maintain a united front. Great Britain, in particular, could become the France of the 21st century, always part of Europe but always out of step with the rest of Europe. Another challenge is the American reaction to the European response. Will the alliance survive the European reluctance, given that it sees the war on terrorism as a war of good versus evil?

myth III:  
“we are all Americans”

Finally, I would like to address myth number three: “We are all Americans.”

The phrase “We are all Americans” was used in a front-page editorial of the newspaper *Le Monde* shortly after September 11th to express solidarity with the American people. The feeling was that the attacks in New York and Washington were an attack upon all of us and that we should stand united. This sentiment was shared across the continent.

solidarity was an impulse  
of the moment

While these emotions were felt strongly at the time, they were impulses of the moment, rendering our unity a myth. In a matter of weeks, solidarity was forgotten and both the leadership and the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic took very different positions on nearly every next step in this war: on Afghanistan, on Iraq and on Israel and Palestine. The transatlantic love-affair quickly turned into intense disagreement and even led to mutual “bashing.”

Thus, for example, the European Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, said that

Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus:  
They agree on little and they understand one another less and less.

Robert Kagan

the best way to get applause in the European Parliament was to stand up and denounce America. In turn, a senior US official recently said: “Our scorn for the Europeans is matched by their disdain for us.”

While there are definite policy differences, the root cause of the disagreement lies in the simple fact that the US and Europe currently occupy very different positions in the world. The US not only has much broader responsibilities, but also a different vision on how to carry them out.

Let me refer to Robert Kagan, probably the most influential writer on this issue in the US. He argues: “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world or even that they occupy the same world. On all the important questions of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European perspectives are diverging. To paraphrase a famous book on human relationships: Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. They agree on little and they understand one another less and less.”

Europe is entering what Robert Cooper defined as the post-modern state. Because it has been protected for the last fifty years, it was able to turn away from the use of force. Borders have lost relevance and relationships within Europe are governed by institutions and rules. The US, however, sees these developments as a privilege, a privilege that it would rather not want for itself.

In particular, while Europe champions international law, the US often sees it as a means to limit US actions. At the same time it perceives the threats in far starker terms than Europe. Indeed, bin Laden makes very little mention of our European allies and the terrorist cells training within Europe were primarily directed against American interests. Finally, America tends to believe that the international liberal order needs to be underscored by American military power in order to survive.

While many blame this antagonism on changes in the administrations in Europe and America, it really stems from the fact that both sides have changed over time. In addition, world politics is entering a new era of globalization, including the emergence of multi-layered states and relevant non-state actors, as well as new loyalties. Consequently, our age-old alliances will have to change.

In order to cope with these problems, we have to stop playing the “blame game.” Turbulence is inevitable when the foundations on which an alliance was built change. The transatlantic relationship must adapt to these changes. We need

the US and Europe occupy  
very different positions in the world

stop playing the “blame game”

more discussions like the one today about our new responsibilities and the new threats that we face.

An important part of this process will be to remove the sense of betrayal that has entered the discussions. Let us stop pretending that we are exactly alike. The fact that our relationship has changed does not mean we cannot be friends.

**Dahrendorf**

I must congratulate the hosts on having encouraged two outstanding historians to start us off, I hope we will not forget the ideas and categories which they introduced. I repeat that Professor Schroeder's ideas about the conditions under which alliances can hold or may fall apart and Professor Soutou's emphasis on values and structures may provide some useful concepts. We are now turning to that vexing issue of perceptions. We heard a European perception of American developments and an American perception of both American and European developments. Maybe a European perception of European issues will emerge in the course of our discussion, going beyond Singer's remark about the United Kingdom becoming the France of contemporary Europe—in it, but not of it, or of it, but not in it. But there are other issues and I am sure we will hear about them.

**Smyser**

transatlantic relations depend on policies concerning the rest of the world

I am worried that we have not yet really spoken about our topic, the "Contours of a New World Order." We have discussed European-American relations. But the reasons for problems in European-American relations don't lie in any policy we pursue toward each other, but in our policies concerning other parts of the world.

I agree with Professor Schroeder that alliances come and go, and that they depend on having an agenda. At one point the agenda—I am sorry to say this to Mr. Arbatov—was anti-Soviet. Now, we are lacking an agenda and during the discussion nobody, except for Egon Bahr, mentioned the rest of the world. I believe there is a European-American agenda waiting for us: to act together to integrate the rest of the world into one international system. By international system I do not necessarily mean globalization, but a common political system in which everybody has a voice.

terrorism is a symptom of our failure to integrate the rest of the world into a common political system

To illustrate the urgency of this agenda, take the example of terrorism. In my mind, terrorism is not the problem, but a symptom of our failure to integrate the rest of the world into a common political system. At the moment, we do not think about countries like China and India, except when they constitute an acute problem. And when we do think about them we often assume that these countries



Walter, Smyser,  
Melville

should play a slightly subservient role. Instead, we are preoccupied with ourselves, we worry about the transatlantic relationship.

Therefore, I believe that the new agenda between Europe and America should be to build a new world order.

We should work very hard, and together, to bring the rest of the world into a system in which we give them a fair sense that they also have a voice.

I would like to thank Mr. Singer for his provocative comments and to share my perception and assessment of recent developments in Russia's foreign policy.

Under Putin, we are currently witnessing the third serious turning point in recent Russian history. The first turning point was Gorbachev's decision to withdraw from Europe without delay. He took this decision despite allegations that he was betraying national interests and that neither Russia nor Europe were prepared for it. This step created a new reality for Europe.

The second decisive turning point was internal. It was the decision of liberals and democrats in Russia after the attempted coup d'état of 1993 to embark on a policy of rapid privatization. From an economic point of view this rapid move was absolutely wrong. It did not result in any increased efficiency in the Russian economy, nor did it result in better economic conditions for the majority of the population. But it did serve the political intentions of the liberals and democrats: to make a return to communism impossible.

Putin now is also trying to make something irreversible, namely to reintegrate Russia into the Western community in the broadest sense. Internal critics object that Putin is betraying national interests and advocate that we should negotiate and bargain harder.

If seen from the point of view of tactics and balance-of-power politics, one might judge some of Putin's policies as mistakes. But his decisions to ally with United States in the war on terrorism and to join the WTO quickly were politically motivated.

By doing so, I hope that Putin will contribute to realizing the dream mentioned earlier by Dr. Singer: the dream of integrating Russia into the West and of making this integration irreversible.

It is very well known in child psychology that adopted children never discuss the problems of the family. Similarly, nobody in Eastern Europe and especially in the

### **Averchev**

recent developments in  
Russia's foreign policy

Russia's reintegration  
into the Western community

### **Krastev**

The alliance is currently difficult to sustain because the Americans believe that they are at war, while the Europeans are trying to prevent a war.

Krastev

cause of the crisis:  
Europeans and Americans  
are living in different worlds

Balkans likes to talk about crises in transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, I would like to make three short points.

First, if a crisis in transatlantic relations exists, how new is it and what are the driving forces behind it?

After September 11th, many people have identified technology as a driving force of the growing gap between Europe and America. The argument is that different technological standards make working with the Europeans more difficult, for example in Afghanistan. Many Europeans, by contrast, have emphasized divergent interests as a cause. But I believe that there is a deeper problem, which pertains to basic perceptions. Reading the newspapers and talking to observers on both sides of the Atlantic, one gets the impression that Americans and Europeans are living in two totally different worlds and that this is the real cause of the crisis in transatlantic relations.

The alliance is currently difficult to sustain because the Americans believe that they are at war, while the Europeans are trying to prevent a war. Generally, the Americans tend to see the world as a tough neighborhood where it is very important to shoot first in order not to be shot. To the Europeans on the other hand, the world is much more like an international conference where it is most crucial to put every argument on the table.

From the perspective of the Balkans, the current crisis in transatlantic relations is therefore not due to interests, technology or even ideology. Rather, it is based on the radically different intuitions about the world which we have developed since September 11th.

it is problematic to use  
terrorism as the new  
unifying common enemy

This leads me to my second point: to what extent could terrorism be the new common enemy everybody has been dreaming of for the last ten years? I ally myself with those other speakers here who have emphasized how problematic it is to use terrorism as the new enemy.

One reason for this is the problem of defining terrorism. Because there is no agreed-upon definition of who is a terrorist, the concept can easily be abused. All too often, politicians frame their opponents using powerful anti-terrorist rhetoric instead of engaging in a debate about policy.

Let me give you an example. After seven Pakistani immigrants were killed at the Macedonian border, the Ministry of the Interior called them al Qaida members to justify what had happened.



*Krastev*

A second problem of the campaign against terrorism is that it strongly favors the status quo. In the late 1980s, the West had a strong appeal in Eastern Europe because it employed a rhetoric of change. This rhetoric appealed to certain publicly held values and thus helped to rally the public and bring about change.

The currently predominant anti-terrorist rhetoric, by contrast, is all in favor of the status quo. In the medium term this could turn into a major problem because there is a strong anti-elitist sentiment coupled with a large protest vote in many countries.

As my last point, I want to explore the new world order from the perspective of a region where the international community is engaged. What does the new world order from the Balkans look like where you have protectorates, semi-protectorates, non-state states and all these strange entities which you can name but cannot describe?

Here, we are facing a post-colonial dilemma. On the one hand, nobody wants to talk about nation-building projects for fear of colonial or other sensitivities. On the other hand, the international community does engage in nation- and institution-building in the Balkans and hides this fact behind a rhetoric of integration. To a certain extent, these countries are offered democracy without politics. This means that they can have elections and democratic institutions but they cannot have a genuine political process for a while for fear that they are going to make a mistake.

This topic relates to the problem of this conference. I believe that the crisis of political development in the periphery has impacts on the center. It might explain the confusion and unwillingness of some Eastern Europeans to talk about issues of terrorism and world order.

One of the differences today between the two sides of the Atlantic is that the United States feels it is fighting a war and Europeans don't. Paradoxically, however, the United States was not easily convinced that it was best to use NATO to help fight that war. NATO support was offered last September and October through the invocation of Article Five and not really used—an unsettling experience for many on the European side.

Even more unsettling are such expressions of American policy as have recently been heard in both houses of the US Congress with respect to the proposed International Criminal Court. The very idea that the US military would be authorized

the new world order from  
the perspective of the Balkans

**Ischinger**

is there a real crisis  
in transatlantic relations?



to liberate Americans in the custody of the court in the Hague has, let me put it diplomatically, led to intensified diplomatic activity among Europeans in Washington.

Now, if that were the true state of transatlantic relations, it would be appropriate to speak of a real crisis—as some have done. However, I do not really think that this is the case.

more agreement on  
substantial issues than ever

Looking at operational policy issues one could argue the opposite. During the last twenty or thirty years of the transatlantic relationship we rarely agreed on substantive issues as much as we do today. Both Russia and the Balkans used to be divisive issues. But we do not disagree anymore. Similarly the Middle East. We may disagree on what could be done today and tomorrow but we do not really disagree on the principles, especially on the desirability of a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I would like to introduce into this discussion the notion that while there are unsettling specific experiences that have very much to do with Robert Kagan's power and weakness thesis which Dr. Singer referred to, I think the operational reality of our relationship today is actually quite positive. We have problems but not a deep crisis.

**Hirsch**

I would like to add a few thoughts from the perspective of New York, that is from the perspective of the United Nations since I sit across from it with the International Peace Academy. Let me comment on structures and on an agenda beyond Europe and the United States, a global agenda.

the transatlantic  
relationship is very flexible

The real issue is not whether everybody agrees all the time, but rather to what extent the relationship is elastic and flexible as opposed to “a straitjacket,” as it was called earlier today. I believe that there is at present much more elasticity than rigidity in an alliance which had many phases of disagreement in its history.

Let me focus on three examples for this elasticity: First, on the role of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era, second, on the international response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and third, on the evolving relationship between the United States, Europe and the United Nations in Afghanistan and potentially elsewhere.

new role of the Security Council

The ability in New York to do something about terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. For at least the last ten or eleven years the Security Council has been

working much more effectively than was ever the case during the Cold War when Soviet-American rivalries rendered it impotent on many issues.

During the nineties we have seen very few vetoes and a lot of action: interventions into internal conflicts such as in Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone, complex mandates like Namibia, Cambodia and Mozambique, and actions on conflicts over control of natural resources and wealth in Angola, the Congo and Sierra Leone.

Chapter Seven of the UN Charter has been used to put mandatory economic sanctions in place and to authorize enforcement operations. Coalitions of the willing have been authorized in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor and transitional administrations have been created in Kosovo and East Timor. All of this has become possible because the Permanent Five have been willing to work together and put their differences aside.

At the same time, international humanitarian law has evolved. The United States supported the Hague and Rwanda tribunals even if it has not joined the International Criminal Court. I am aware of the problems you highlighted, Ambassador Ischinger—the court is such an enormously important step. But the US has changed its position on the Law of the Sea Convention twenty years after it was first adopted. Therefore, while I think it is out of the question that the Bush Administration would join the Court, I would say that nothing is forever.

These developments have made possible an international response to September 11th where the Security Council acted very quickly in passing resolutions 1368 and 1373. These resolutions not only condemn the terrorist attacks, but commit the international community to establishing a closer and more effective cooperation.

international response to September 11th

Since 1963 twelve international conventions were adopted regarding different aspects of terrorism. The UN, particularly the counter-terrorism committee chaired by the British Ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, has tried to assist member states to strengthen their legal regimes and to sign and ratify these conventions.

The goal of the UN is to dissuade disaffected groups from embracing terrorism and to deny them the means to carry out such acts by closing off their support networks and their financial sources. The Financial Action Task Force for example tries to establish a broad-based cooperation of the banking system against terrorism.

While this is not the same approach as the intelligence community, it is a very

European-American  
co-operation in the world

real and important effort in the war on terrorism. And crucially, it is an effort in which both the US and Europe participate.

Now let me turn to Afghanistan and the global agenda. The many conflicts outside of Europe create a dynamic which will require adjustment on the part of the UN, the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and other regional actors. There may be a new trend: the United States carries out major military operations with a coalition of the willing, the Europeans, often through NATO and maybe through the European Union, engage in peace-keeping operations and the UN organizes longer-term post-conflict peace-building efforts.

This flexible system of cooperation has emerged in the Dayton Accords and in Kosovo and it is unfolding in Afghanistan right now. While the United States had the primary role in the immediate action against al Qaida and the Taliban, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is basically a European force, in which thirteen of the EU's fifteen members participate. The UN is now ready to engage in peace-building through the UN assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

fundamental interests  
and values will keep us united

This is a chance for the United States, European security organizations and the UN to develop a new approach similar to the "Quartet" meetings between the US, Russia, the EU and the UN. Let me end by suggesting that despite all these tensions the overall dynamic is one of a more positive interaction and that there is less that divides us than there are fundamental interests and values that will keep us united.

**Stelzenmüller**

Lord Dahrendorf, you asked for a European critique of European policy and I will try to give you one. I will subdivide my critique into three points: principles, threat perception and response.

change in  
principles of US-policy

Europeans, including European journalists like me, have spent an awful lot of time in recent years in seminars wondering what the new paradigm of the post-Cold War era was going to be. We should realize that the paradigm is being shifted very energetically and very purposefully right before our eyes by a very small group of people in the American administration. But we do not only fail to perceive this. We are also unable to offer, both in policy and political terms, a principled response to statements such as Bush's speech on preventive strikes. Strangely, European politicians, including German politicians, have remained almost silent on this point.



*Hirsch, Stelzenmüller,  
Allin, Smyser*

My second point pertains to threat perception. It has been a hallmark of European policy to claim that the threat of terrorism and of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is either less urgent than portrayed by American politicians or that it should be addressed in different ways. At the same time, we have been energetically curtailing our political liberties in many countries including Britain and Germany in order to deal with potential threats.

differences in threat perception

We need to take a hard look at this issue. Countering the threat may require us to improve and change our approach to intelligence and intelligence coordination—something we are very bad at, particularly in Germany. At the same time, though, we have to preserve and continue to cherish our existing systems of constitutionally guaranteed liberties.

My third point concerns responses. European politicians like to promote the cliché that the Americans are responsible for military matters, while we take care of the Balkans and political diplomacy.

Europe needs to do  
more political diplomacy

Frankly, I think we are not doing enough in political diplomacy. It is for example a gigantic mistake to pretend that the American-Russian agreement on nuclear weapons disarmament does not concern us. I fully share the critique made here of that agreement and I think European and German politicians could have been a lot more vocal in their criticism.

The same applies to the highly dangerous situation in southern Asia where a nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan seems to have been avoided for the moment. The American administration does not really engage in any long-term policy aimed at reducing the tremendous risk there. That is something Europe should get involved in.

On the whole, we Europeans tend to err on the side of moralism. Take for example the talk about genocide during the Kosovo air campaign. As it turned out, there was no genocide in Kosovo, although there were many other good reasons for intervening.

We are also bad at defining our individual and common interests and at acting accordingly. We have tried to do so in the Middle East, but we have failed. There are many more fields that are now dominated by American policy-making where we should become active on our own and challenge American perceptions and policies.

**Allin**  
an emerging  
international system needs ...  
... balance of power

I want to address two of the many rich and fascinating issues that have come up this morning. First, I heartily endorse Professor Soutou's very pragmatic suggestion of how to look at a plausible emerging international system.

It is very important to take the three parts of this system together: balance of power, institutions and values. First, the interlocking regional balance of power depending on the US is important because it reflects the fact that the United States is exuberantly powerful. And power is power—you do not simply will it out of existence. This also addresses the fact that the United States does not believe—I think, rightly—that there are always institutional and legal solutions available for the most pressing security threats in the world.

A modest example and one that Constanze Stelzenmüller was just talking about, is Kosovo. Kosovo was not one of the most pressing security threats in the world by any means. Because it was not be dealt with in the UN Security Council, the intervention was not legitimate according to the rule-based view of the world.

What is rather ironic about Kosovo is that most European governments and, judging by the polls, most Europeans supported the intervention and accepted the necessity to go outside the international rule of law when necessary. To Americans it is not entirely clear why this necessity was accepted by the Europeans in the case of Kosovo, but not in the case of the far greater threat posed by Iraq.

While on this subject, I would like to respond to something that Constanze Stelzenmüller just said. It is true that it turned out not to be genocide in Kosovo but waiting until genocide is a proven, accomplished fact means, of course, not preventing it.

... institutional structures

The second part of Professor Soutou's model concerns institutional structures. The United States enthusiastically participated in developing these institutions at the end of World War II. And even Bob Kagan conceded that the United States has to maintain "a decent respect for the decent opinion of mankind," to quote Thomas Jefferson, perhaps inexactly, from the Declaration of Independence. The danger is that if the United States' sense of the use of power grows too far apart from the Europeans, then, as Kagan said, the United States could become detached from the West. We do not know exactly what that means, but it would be an unsettling prospect.

... values

And finally: values. Ironically, we keep talking about a divergence in values between the United States and Europe, but in fact I think that this is what we have



most in common and it is our strongest glue, while structural differences are driving us apart. The values are shared.

My second comment relates to Peter Singer's very interesting talk which I suspect many people found exaggerated in its pessimism. Yet I think Peter offered a very important insight.

That insight pertains to the emotional nature of built-up resentments. The comparison between an alliance and a marriage might be the most banal in the world, but I am going to use it now because I am married. In a marriage the substance of an argument very often does not justify its passion. The real problem is, rather, that I cannot believe and accept that my wife does not see the problem the same way I do. This seems to offend both of us. I think this is clearly true in the case of today's transatlantic relationship.

conflicts in alliances can be emotional

Ambassador Ischinger pointed out that on most issues of substance we do not really disagree. Maybe the most striking example here is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We have extreme emotional problems with each other over this conflict, but we agree on what its solution should be. It is a two-state-solution with some sort of divided sovereignty, divided control over Jerusalem, a dismantling of most of the Israeli settlements, and a protection of Israel in terms of demography which effectively excludes a significant right of return for Palestinian refugees.

While we Europeans agree on this, our emotional response is different whenever a car bomb goes off and whenever a suicide bomber strikes. We are furious because we somehow see the problem differently. As an American I am extremely furious that Europeans do not see the problem the way I do and I sense that many Europeans are furious that I do not see the problem the way they do.

I would like to point out some common European themes alluded to in many current debates here in Berlin. One such theme seems to be that there is a need to limit US power. Due to a discomfort with the growing transatlantic asymmetry, the objective is to find ways to bind or constrain the US. This is seen as a positive good and there is a sense that once it is achieved, one can argue about specific problems.

**Wolfson**

Another theme—one articulated by Mr. Bahr—is that “we cannot keep up with the US anyway, so why try? Our task is the construction of Europe, and we need to focus our energies on it. In the construction of Europe we need to develop our sense of identity and of uses of state power. While we are concerned about many

despite asymmetries, Europe and the US  
need to cooperate

other things in other parts of the world we conclude that this is basically somebody else's job."

The current US administration has said many things that have set off alarm bells in Europe. Much could have been said differently and much meant different things on both sides of the Atlantic. But President Bush's Bundestag speech resonated with both Americans and Europeans and seemed to be very well received. He said that there are great challenges out there that we need to face together as free and democratic allies. Nobody can master them all by themselves. We need to cooperate. This is our international agenda.

As a general principle, I find that rather unobjectionable and it was surprising how many other people agreed that that was what we needed to do. This cuts through a lot of the underbrush in current transatlantic arguments.

the legitimacy  
of military force

Let me pick up Constanze Stelzenmüller's point that Europeans are not doing enough in the way of political diplomacy. Now, this side-steps the issue of the military as an instrument of state power, of when it should be used and whether it is a legitimate instrument.

There are many reasons why this is a complicated question here in Europe, particularly in Germany. But leaving all that aside, Americans would certainly agree that Europe should engage more in political diplomacy and exercise its weight properly in certain areas in the world. This would require an evolution of Germany's and Europe's thinking about international problems in terms of global security. We would applaud such a development and see it as a goal of our policy.

However, I found the twist of Ms. Stelzenmüller's statement interesting when she said that Europe should get involved on its own and challenge American perceptions and policies. I would not regard that as a desirable goal. I think we are going to be much more effective if we attack global challenges together, as we are doing in the Middle East.

solidarity after  
September 11th was genuine

Let me comment on Dr. Singer's statement that the European solidarity after September 11th was an impulse of the moment. Having been here in Berlin during that incredible week, I think it is hard to have the same impression.

Our current US Ambassador, Daniel Coats, had arrived in Germany on September 7th, 2001. We had elaborate plans for how he should introduce himself to society here. But all of those went straight out the window that Tuesday afternoon. Several days later, we found ourselves standing in front of the Brandenburg Gate, in front of a crowd that the police estimated at 200,000, thanking Berlin and Ger-

many on behalf of the United States. That was quite a moment. And that was not just fleeting emotion.

It struck me during that week that the discussion about shared values and whether they still existed had been near the top of our political agenda for months. Suddenly all that seemed completely forgotten and outdated. I think that week demonstrated the core of shared values that really is unshakeable.

The last thing I would like to note is that although the US administration has clearly made the war on terrorism its single most important project and a prism through which many other international problems are seen, a fairly lively debate is going on in the United States about the implications for the way we live, for the way we have dealt with core issues up to now, and for the new challenges we face.

I would like to correct a misunderstanding. Of course, I certainly did not mean that it should be a goal for Europe or for Germany to challenge American policies across the board.

What I meant was that we pride ourselves on our principled foreign policy but when there are actually principles at stake we are silent in the strangest places. I think that there is much to be said about recent statements of principle by American politicians and I have not heard much in response from Europe.

It is not an empty phrase to say that 9/11 brought sustained changes to the global order. Within half a year of each other, President Bush and President Putin both declared the Cold War to be over, and did so within a hundred meters from this conference room, in the German Bundestag in Berlin. Forty years ago in this same city, John F. Kennedy called on the world to defend Western freedoms. Only fifteen years ago, Ronald Reagan came here to demand that Gorbachev tear down the Berlin Wall. And since last fall, we can speak of an expanded concept of the West. Economically, the European Union is still Europe's driving force, but in terms of security policy, Europe is extending eastward, onto post-Soviet territory, and now includes Russia.

Some in the West still regard Russia as a kind of potential rogue state that cannot be integrated. This has some truth to it. We cannot know where Russia is heading in the longer term. But the majority of Europeans have a different perception of the atmosphere than Mr. Singer's standpoint, which he has portrayed fascinat-

the core of shared values is unshakeable

**Stelzenmüller**

**Rahr**

September 11th changed the global order

relations between Russia and the West



Reiter, Weizsäcker

ingly, but also very provocatively. I believe that by now the United States has evolved into a protective force not only for Europe, but for Russia and Central Asia as well. Without America's intervention there, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan would probably be ruled today by the Taliban regime. A man like Putin understands this very well.

One might even go so far as to say that Russia and the US value each other today as much as they did during World War II. In an interesting article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* three months ago, Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger argued that we are witnessing the emergence of a US-Russian dualism in security over the heads of the Europeans. We West Europeans enjoy a comfortable security situation, but both Russia and the United States are working to establish a security architecture in Europe's East. In this process, the Americans are discovering Russia as an alternative to Saudi Arabian oil and say so openly. This could be called sensational, something that would have been unthinkable before Bush's trip to Russia. The US is building up an energy alliance with Russia after having always denied the Europeans the prospect of such an alliance.

NATO

Now, Putin is trying to integrate China more and more into this anti-terrorism pact through the Shanghai Cooperation Forum, also to head off a US-Chinese conflict in Central Asia. Moreover, we are dealing with a completely different NATO. I think that the Council of 20 will form NATO's new backbone in the coming years, though which countries such as Russia, but also Ukraine, Georgia, and the Central Asian states will be able to assume a greater role in NATO than many of the new East-Central European members. This would apply above all to peacekeeping missions, for which these states appear more suitable and can offer more possibilities than the older allies. Such new forms of cooperation could also help defuse the conflicts in the Middle East and, for example, in Kashmir. A war in Iraq and possible further terrorist attacks would in the long term rather reinforce this alliance. On the other hand, these would also enhance an already highly dangerous potential for conflict with the Islamic world.

the challenge of  
integrating the Islamic world

In conclusion I would like to point out that European societies—as Mr. Smyser and others have correctly recognized and said—will be endangered by integration problems with Islamic minorities. Russia could also acquire additional problems besides Chechnya, because the Islamic world feels excluded from globalization and recognizes that there are no Islamic states represented as a permanent member in the UN Security Council and the G8, where global policy is determined.



Obversely, the West is cooperating with Russia, the United States, and the EU more closely than ever against OPEC. This will give the Islamic world cause for concern, including in security matters. The future of the world order will crystallize primarily at the interface between the Western and Islamic worlds, with the latter growing demographically ever stronger.

That raises the issue of Turkey but perhaps discussing it in depth would lead us too far away from the central problems of our debate.

Mr. Hacke said that America has the capability to declare its interests and visions as generally applicable models for the world to accept. Europe and the Europeans, on the other hand, do not have this capability, he added. I agree as far as national visions are concerned. Perhaps France is the nation that is still self-confident enough to develop such models. But France tends to think egotistically and therefore hurts its own cause because other states cannot find their place in its designs. Germany would have the power, but lacks the confidence. So who could accomplish the job? I do not think any single country could; only Europe as a whole.

I am convinced this is so and would like to provide a few reasons. The first point concerns EU eastward enlargement. Here, successes have to be recognized as such and used to raise self-confidence. Unfortunately, the reality is often portrayed less favorably than it really is. Successful enlargement would result in internal EU reforms aimed at “deepening” the Union, which will, in turn, strengthen Europe.

The second reason to believe in Europe is our new partner Russia. Ten or twelve years ago, one could not even dream of this happening. I am elated that Russia has returned to Europe, even if, as Mr. Rahr mentioned, we cannot be sure whether we understand this new Russia and its new course. In any case it is both a big opportunity and a major challenge, because Russia might not have the strength to change the world, but it has the potential of exercising sustained influence on Europe. Russia needs a strong Europe as a partner, one that has power and courage to enter into a close relationship. If this should fail, European egotism and mistrust will again grow, and Russia will suffer as a consequence.

The third reason that I am optimistic about the future of Europe lies in our common interest on this continent not to fall again under the sway of bilateralism. Only by parting company with bilateral ties were we able to push European

**Dahrendorf**

**Reiter**

Europe as a whole can  
develop visions for the world



Wells, Soutou

but Europe shouldn't  
distance itself too much  
from the US

integration as far as it has come. The increasing tendency towards bilateralism emanating today from the United States is rejected by all Europeans without necessarily leading to estrangement from America. However, we Europeans have a different interest. America can afford estrangement, but we cannot.

Allow me to conclude my appeal for a strong and jointly active Europe with a warning against emancipating ourselves too much from America. Some larger West European nations might consider this a viable option for specific reasons, but we Eastern Europeans cannot identify with them. For me, this means that we cannot offer the USA any kind of division of labor that Egon Bahr said could turn Europe into a kind of civilian counterforce to the United States. This cannot work and would necessarily lead to a sense of moral superiority that would destroy the transatlantic partnership. Any partnership that depends on one side's feeling of moral superiority while leaving the other to do the dirty work is condemned to fail. There are enough reasons to make a stronger Europe without having to derive some kind of claim to moral authority against America. Rather, I would argue that Europe should change its attitude and relationship towards power.

We Europeans have all learned the hard way from the experiences of our modern history. America, meanwhile, has remained unscathed and therefore has a completely different attitude towards power. No European country could, on its own, develop such a realist attitude towards power—but Europe as a unified continent could do it!

**Dahrendorf**

Thank you very much indeed, Ambassador Reiter. Along with Ms. Stelzenmüller's comment you provided the European analysis of Europe which in some ways had been missing. There remains the vexing issue of power. When we talk about the world order and the world system, the word hegemon immediately appears. When we talk about Europe there is an assumption that by some mysterious process, pure statistical quantity will be translated into influence, strength and power. Perhaps Mr. Bahr will tell us, how that exactly happens.

**Soutou**

With a European rather than a Gallocentric outlook I would like to come back to two of your remarks because I certainly agree that we cannot always wait for structures to emerge in order to solve problems. But at least we should try not to discard these structures which do exist already.

After 1945 the United States considered it as its national interest—and for me

The art of international relations is to reconcile interests and values.

Soutou

this is not a bad word—to reconstruct Europe and form a very strong and entangling transatlantic alliance. I do not think that American leaders decided to forge the North Atlantic pact just to be good to mankind but because they saw that it exactly corresponded with their interests. Indeed, the art of international relations is to reconcile interests and values and to make them compatible among the partners.

We have talked a lot about Europe—or maybe not enough. Yet we cannot talk about Europe the way we talk about the United States. Europe is still not a fact but essentially a process. And I see three possible directions in which Europe can develop. It is possible that Europe may never develop a coherent international identity but rather remain part of a larger transatlantic community—a political, economic and military community led by the United States. This development is still quite likely, if only because of the very far-reaching interdependence of the economies on both sides of the Atlantic.

But Europe could also develop a true international identity. This could happen if the European Union developed not into a real federation—for this is unlikely—but into stronger institutional structures. It could also be the case if Europe, at least in international security affairs, developed a pragmatic system of ad hoc cooperation of core countries to meet urgent challenges.

Let me assume a French perspective and propose that the real question is whether the Europeans are willing to follow the French concept of “Europe puissance.” Admittedly, this is an unfortunate expression because it does not translate well into German—“puissance” means “Macht,” which has negative connotations.

Nevertheless, we need something akin to a “Europe puissance,” a European identity on the world stage. But we should avoid making grandiloquent speeches about it as the French have done repeatedly since de Gaulle, antagonizing other partners. Rather, we should build up such a European identity prudently but firmly.

My last point is that I fully agree with what Ambassador Reiter said about the necessity to avoid any impression that strengthening a European international identity would have to be antagonistic to a close transatlantic relationship. In addition to what you described, there is one further and fundamental reason for this: the magnitude of the problems we have to solve. These problems occur not only in Europe but also, and mostly, outside Europe, especially in the Middle East and Asia. China is still very relevant. And we have to engage and associate Russia

possible developments for Europe

we need a “Europe puissance” ...

... and transatlantic co-operation

Europeans and Americans clearly differ on both  
the legitimacy and the utility of force.

Litwak

more and more with our system. All of this requires a very strong transatlantic cooperation.

Even if they are very powerful today, Americans cannot build and maintain a successful world order or world system by themselves. To achieve this, they need partners—their European partners and partners in other regions of the world.

**Litwak**  
consequences of  
September 11th:

One American commentator stated that September 11th would henceforth be a demarcation point as sharp as BC and AD in American foreign policy. This statement requires substantial qualification. The September 11th terrorist attacks did not transform the structure of international relations. On the contrary, they reinforced it in significant ways as we saw a renewed American commitment to integrating Russia and China into the international system.

advent of mass-casualty  
terrorism

The major discontinuity lies in what Mr. Hassner referred to—the advent of mass-casualty terrorism. A new conjunction of capabilities and intentions distinguishes this era of terrorism from previous eras of terrorism. Earlier, there were challenges in Germany from the Baader-Meinhof group and in Britain from the IRA, but those terrorist organizations were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons to detonate in major European cities.

Osama bin Laden stated that obtaining nuclear weapons is a moral responsibility. After September 11th one must operate on the assumption, indeed certainty, that if he had those capabilities he would use them against the United States. If he could have killed a million New Yorkers on that date, he certainly would have done it.

This change has recast a traditional debate in US foreign policy—the tension between America’s dual identities, as portrayed in Raymond Aron’s book “The Imperial Republic.” On the one hand the United States is a hegemon with a crucial role in the maintenance of international order. At the same time it is a state like any other in the system with its own parochial national interests.

The tension between these roles was reflected in two recent speeches by President Bush, one in the Bundestag and the other at West Point. President Bush asserted that the United States will use all available policy instruments to fight terrorism—from diplomacy and financial controls all the way through to the use of force. But September 11th has altered the debate about the use of force in the United States because international law and international institutions such as the



*Arbatov,  
Averchev*

Security Council are viewed as having been inadequate in the past in addressing cardinal threats.

Osama bin Laden's statement that obtaining nuclear weapons is a moral duty has created a new context for the notion that the United States might be constrained in taking action against this threat because of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which forbids anticipatory self-defense. This trend should not be overstated. The United States does not play to its caricature of the gunslinger. But that option is now on the table in a way it has never been in the past. Here Europeans and Americans clearly differ on both the legitimacy and the utility of force.

This points to an issue raised before: the diverging perceptions of threat on the two sides of the Atlantic. The Economist quoted a poll from the Spiegel, according to which the majority of Europeans view September 11th not as an attack on the world system or the West, but rather as an attack on the United States.

An explanation for this perception can be found in the European press coverage, for example of the military campaign in Afghanistan. These press reports were significantly at odds with the reality on the ground.

Terms like carpet-bombing were used. This created the impression that air power was used as in World War II and included the bombing of civilians. In fact only 700 air sorties were flown in Afghanistan. The use of a high percentage of precision-guided weapons limited civilian casualties to approximately 1000. While terrorism has increased its lethality, new ways of conducting military operations reduced their lethality against civilians.

Dealing with threat perception is therefore a key condition for the maintenance of alliances after September 11th. We need to bridge the gap between elite perceptions, such as those expressed around this table, and the views of the wider public. Cohesion can only be created if we converge in recognizing the reality of the threat.

I agree completely with Vladimir Averchev that Putin really wants to make Russia's new policy of cooperation with the West, and particularly with the United States, irreversible. That is why he took the decision to support US antiterrorist policy right after September 11th against some opposition in Moscow.

This goal, however, has not yet been achieved and some problems persist. At first, Russia's support was maybe more important than the support of many NATO partners. The Northern Alliance in the war in Afghanistan, for instance, which did

Europeans and Americans differ on the legitimacy and utility of force

diverging threat-perceptions

#### **Arbatov**

Russia's improved relations with the West



Stütze, Voigt

persisting problems:  
Russia's foreign policy  
could fall hostage to  
domestic politics

most of the really hard and bloody work, could not have been so effective without Russia's steady encouragement of the fight against the Taliban regime.

Relations between Russia and the West have improved after September 11th. Take for example the Russo-American summit in Moscow in 2002. While I agree with the criticism about the agreement signed there, it is better than nothing. The summit could have ended in failure because President G. Bush at first insisted on having an absolutely free hand in dealing with the problem. Only Russia's resistance made him face up to the reality that in our present interdependent world even the United States could not pursue an absolutely independent course.

Despite these improvements, we also see some uncertainty in Russia's relations with the West. The main reason for this uncertainty is the risk that Putin's foreign policy may fall hostage to domestic politics, as has already happened a number of times. But this is partially because the Russians give their relatively new president the benefit of doubt—a benefit that might last for another year or two. At the same time, parts of the Russian military and political establishment disagree with or have serious doubts about his policies. There is a strong belief that Putin is surrendering, one after another, many core Russian positions and interests without receiving anything in exchange. To secure and retain his popular support, he will have to present visible achievements. These results do not have to be created in the relations with America and the West, or foreign policy generally. Maybe domestic improvements would be even more important, though even those partially depend on foreign policy.

This is not a plea for Western interference in our internal affairs. We had enough of that and sometimes with devastating results, as was the case with the shock-therapy imposed on us under the disguise of economic reform. Therefore both the West and Russia have to proceed more carefully in the future.

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a visible foreign threat make people more sensible to internal difficulties and unsolved problems. Together with "the enemy," the major scapegoat has disappeared on whom one could shift the blame for internal difficulties. The popular pressure on Putin to deliver concrete results therefore constitutes the main risk for his foreign policy.

**Schulze**  
changes after the end of the Cold War:  
re-emergence of Germany

It has not become sufficiently clear that Europe experienced a tectonic shift since the collapse of the Soviet Empire and Germany's reunification. Germany has re-emerged as a political force on the European continent, while the political

influence of Britain and France rests not least on their possession of nuclear weapons that no longer provide these countries with the same possibilities for influence they once did. Germany's growing heft, not only as Europe's leading economic power, is already resulting in disturbances with France and other European countries.

As for NATO, it would be the first alliance in history to remain in existence long after its own victory. Indeed, it is searching as hard as it can for new objectives. In relation to America, however, I think the Europeans would completely overreach their capabilities if they were to try to approach the United States as a military power. I think for the time being we have enough to do with bringing the European house in order, something Europe's nation-states are having enormous difficulties with, and which is already slowing the process of furthering European integration. I would counsel restraint.

NATO

Also, we are witnessing a dramatic political shift to the right in Europe, from Norway down to Sicily. The reason has plenty to do with the mainstream parties—not least in Germany—which have been busy moving opportunistically toward the political center without actually solving urgent problems. In doing so they are opening the political stage to other protagonists, as we have been witnessing in the Netherlands with Pim Fortuyn.

shift to the right in Europe

If the Europeans, and above all the Germans, are having difficulties recognizing their present role, it is perhaps because the politicians currently at the wheel all belong to the post-war generation. Up to and including Chancellor Kohl, every previous generation of politicians experienced the war firsthand. This is having many effects, including on the tenor of political discourse as reflected in the awareness of values, which is always influenced by mutually perceived external threats. Just as, in a sense, Stalin was one of the founding fathers of the European Community—since he and the Soviet Union represented an external threat to the people of the West—it could be that our difficulties and conflicts with America could become so intense as to be perceived by Europeans as an external threat. If that is the case, it will accelerate European integration.

In his introductory remarks, Lord Dahrendorf spoke of the divergent perceptions of transatlantic relations. With this in mind, allow me to cite one of the great proponents of these relations, Stanley Hoffmann, who at a Bergedorf Round Table in Washington in 1981 asked, "What is the greatest obstacle on the way to US-Euro-

**Stütze**

divergent perceptions  
as the main cause of  
transatlantic disagreements

A disagreement between democratic states only becomes a sore point in relations when it cannot be overcome through dialogue.

Stützle



disagreements can be overcome through dialogue

pean cooperation?” His answer was the development of public opinion. “In the United States at present one sees in the public at large and in the leadership a new mood of self-assertion, to some extent, of nationalism, which horribly conflicts with tendencies in European public opinion.” And he continues, “This is an administration which has made an increase in American power abroad priority of priorities. This is quite obvious when one looks at the defense budget.”

I think we should not waste our time with always rehashing the same old clichés of transatlantic relations that have always been around. A disagreement between democratic states only becomes a sore point in relations when it cannot be overcome through dialogue. In any case, strategic interests always outlast the caesuras of administrations and legislative sessions. Since we are all aware of this, we should stop occupying ourselves with the question. I see Europe’s greatest weakness in the Europeans’ constant craving for words of recognition from Washington. We do not need this recognition, besides the fact that we never get it anyway. It is only an expression of the inner insecurity of the Europeans, who never demand respect from the Americans. I would add that this kind of attitude is of no help to us at all, especially since Europe is certainly not as weak as Europeans constantly claim.

I suggest, therefore, that we discuss Europe’s very evident strengths, especially against the backdrop of the new constellation described by President Bush, including in his address to the German Parliament on May 23rd, 2002, that Europeans and Americans should drop their old scepticism of Russia—a sentence that, in light of all our mutual past experiences, one really has to savor for a while.

**Bahr**  
Europe should concentrate its political and economic strength

First of all I wish to underscore every sentence Mr. Stützle has spoken. If we want to talk about Europe’s strengths and weaknesses, then we should consider what the decisive factor has been for the past century. One might call it America’s emergence as the world’s sole superpower or, conversely, the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. But in my opinion that is not enough, because the really central point is that Europe has withdrawn as the world’s main military protagonist. I think this situation can neither be reversed nor should any attempt be made to do so. We shouldn’t even try to become more like America in this sense. Rather, Europe should focus, as it was forced to do after World War II, on concentrating its political and economic strength and distinguishing itself from America in these fields as an active international factor, as Mr. Reiter said.



When I speak of emancipating ourselves from the United States, I simultaneously emphasize that transatlantic relations would, in principle, remain untouched. They are an indestructible foundation that binds both sides. Yet when I hear Americans use terms like “defensive intervention,” it sounds to me as if an attack were being called defense. At that point I, as someone who went through the school of American re-education after the war, have to pause for a deep breath. Some of you might recall that Klaus Kinkel, a German liberal-conservative foreign minister in Helmut Kohl’s government, declared in October 1998 that if we are prepared to intervene in Yugoslavia without a UN Security Council mandate, then that would be a singular step that we Germans could not afford to take a second time. I think this statement still applies, including for the government of Gerhard Schroeder. That means that when the US conducts a military campaign against Iraq in the foreseeable future, with or without a UN mandate, then I hope that some European states, above all Germany, will take the following stance: You Americans have the power to do this. If you want to do it, we will not lament, but we will not take part either.

If the United States takes action without the mandate of the Security Council, then it would simultaneously mean that NATO would be excluded. Yet, Mr. Reiter, that would bolster precisely what you and I regret, namely the American tendency towards bilateralization, which is something that hurts European interests. In other words, the United States will act according to its own interests, its military power, and its global commitments, and search out one or the other European state ready to go along as a partner. That will lead to further erosion in NATO’s cohesion. So I am of the same opinion as Mr. Soutou, that our best option is to take the path of building up autonomous European power.

So far, we have not talked an awful lot about the new world order. Undoubtedly that is no accident. The picture of a world system, as Professor Soutou would prefer to call it, which has emerged from our discussion is one with a major, perhaps a historically unique hegemonic power, the United States. This power is involved in precarious alliances—precarious for all the reasons Professor Schroeder gave—also involved in a clash with a new version of the “empire of evil.” Yet this is no longer an empire but a multiplicity of evil state and non-state forces, namely terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, which cannot really be subsumed under one simple heading.

transatlantic relations are  
an indestructible foundation  
binding both sides

but we should build an  
autonomous European power

**Dahrendorf**  
a new world order

*Dahrendorf,  
Wehmeier*



examples of common projects

A number of other themes were brought up, which do not necessarily form one single fabric. I was very pleased that some highly specific and important examples of common projects and the reality of co-operation in multilateral contexts were given. These are a healthy antidote to the prevailing notion outside this forum that the United States has become entirely unilateral. That is clearly not the case.

perceptions

Undoubtedly, however, there are also different perceptions of the other and of the problems which we face today. It is hard to ignore what was said about attitudes to “the war” on the two sides of the Atlantic. Similarly, there are different perceptions of how we should organize our internal affairs. I will not dwell on that but the question of a European vs. an American model is an important subject in international debates, even if it is not necessarily a subject in foreign or strategic policy.

terrorism in Great Britain

Another example of different perceptions that struck me recently in Washington is the deliberate unwillingness to define terrorism. It is seen to include al Qaida and a whole array of some other undesirable forces, but not certain others.

And so as not to leave you with the impression that the United Kingdom is helplessly lost in the mid-Atlantic let me tell you that I overheard an interesting conversation between a recent attorney general of the United Kingdom and a present undersecretary in the US Department of Justice. In the course of it, my British friend said: “Well, don’t forget: there were 3000 dead in Northern Ireland over the years, and the money very largely came from the United States. How exactly do you want us to react to that in the light of your massive and almost secular concern with the 9/11 phenomenon?”

I am aware of the difficulties of comparing such different events, but it does point to differences in perception which run deep. In the United Kingdom we feel that, by and large, it has been possible to deal with the difficult Northern Irish question without severe restrictions on civil liberties and without a domination of the whole country by the issue of terrorism.

division of labor

Another interesting issue mentioned by Ms. Stelzenmüller and others is the question of a division of labor. Obviously, Europe does not have the capabilities to take effective military action in trouble spots around the world. But Europe has to deal with the consequences of such actions or at least engage in state-building, the creation of elements of the rule of law or in some cases even nation-building.



While this is happening in some cases, it is hard to contradict Ms. Stelzenmüller when she says that Europe has not grasped that nettle seriously yet and has not done enough to equip itself to do this extremely difficult and very long-term job.

For instance, one must still fear that the hopeful beginnings in some parts of the Balkans will come to grief. It is easy to say that Bosnia should be one country for Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, but the risk of a separation, a split or even new hostilities persist. Europeans therefore have to be prepared to remain engaged for a very long time. Europe has not yet faced up to this difficult job. Let me add a duly sceptical word on the subject of Europe.

Mr. Reiter both expressed a relative optimism about Europe's opportunities and illustrated the doubts and difficulties in creating the kind of Europe which could define a common interest and create the institutions that enable it to act upon it. In my view, however, there remains the difficulty of whether by pooling the contributions of different countries we are really creating power or whether Europe remains a collection of interests with countries opting out as soon as something they regard as essential occurs.

which kind of Europe?

We have seen a number of events, from the Falklands War to German unification, which could not have happened as they did if one had had to wait for a European consensus first. Europe is astonishingly weak when it comes to generating the power which makes common interests a real force in international politics. And I do not think that constitutional changes or the current European Convention will make the slightest difference here.

A much more serious, a much deeper issue for European co-operation is the process of enlargement. I strongly support enlargement because I think we have had a responsibility to accept new members since 1989. Widening, however, will not strengthen the European Union as a power immediately. In this context, I would not underrate the comment by Martin Schulze about changes in the European political texture which may or may not be lasting. My own view is that these shifts of political preferences in Europe were more episodic than tectonic changes. It is striking that a shift to the right—albeit not to the extreme right—includes a trend to a more detached view of European developments.

widening vs. deepening

In fact, I am sometimes puzzled. When the European Community started in the 1950s it was very much, if not the right, then certainly the Christian Democrats who promoted it and the Social Democrats who opposed it and indeed in some cases voted against the original treaties. Today, the reverse is the case: the



Hassner

left is more likely to be strongly pro-European and support a European constitution than the right. Of course, there are significant exceptions, including the fact that the Christian Democrats never fit this simple left-right description.

**Hassner**

My intervention is based on several of the previous comments. Its general thrust is that while the differences in perception among the majorities in Europe and in America are very real and striking, we should be very careful not to cast them in stone. We should not stifle the debate which is going on and which should be encouraged not only within Europe and America but also between the two sides.

common threats  
and interests: terrorism

I would like to use the excellent formula coined by Ivan Krastev who said that while the Americans think they are fighting a war, the Europeans want to prevent one. While both of these observations are true, it is even more true that everybody, Europeans and Americans, is in a war with al Qaida and with terrorism as such.

Terrorism is still a daily experience in Europe. Take the IRA in Britain or the case of Bologna, where the station was blown up during one of my visits and where a colleague in my office was killed a few months ago. The threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists is therefore an important one. In Europe, the perception is strong that we are at war with al Qaida and that they might strike here.

At the same time, the Americans should also try to prevent the war against terrorism from turning into a war of the “West against the rest,” against the Arab world or against the entire “Third World.” Likewise, we have no interest in turning it into the war of a “holy alliance” of all states against movements that could be called global terrorists like al Qaida, national liberation movements or gangsters—from Columbia to Chechnya, from Tibet to the Fatah.

war against terrorists  
and the source of terrorism

The crucial point is that there are two wars. In this three-cornered war, to use Michael Howard’s words, one fights the terrorists and the potential source of terrorism at the same time. The risk is to increase the reservoir of terrorism through repression or by striking states that harbour terrorists. The United States, being stronger in military terms and having been struck spectacularly and for the first time, is more aware of the first dimension, the open battle against the terrorists. But the two dimensions are complementary and have less to do with Kagan’s issue of power and weakness. We are involved in a basic conflict for which a “war against terrorism” is the right expression. But what war and terrorism means is highly complex. This war is not one which can finish with the liquida-

Everybody, Europeans and Americans, is in a war with al Qaida and with terrorism as such.

Hassner

tion of al Qaida. It is a permanent phenomenon as much as the Cold War. And it has to be fought by rules which still have to emerge, both in their consequences for our own societies and in their consequences for our relations with the rest of the world.

The issue of power and weakness relates precisely to what Joseph Nye has emphasized in his book on the paradox of American power where he distinguishes between hard and soft power. It is not obvious that the best way to fight terrorism is to have huge increases in military spending and that the litmus test of whether one is powerful or weak is the size of one's defense budget. Focusing on the contribution of the secret services to the fight against terrorism, the CIA and the FBI are not necessarily more efficient than other secret services, as Mr. Singer himself conceded.

hard and soft power

Let's return to the question of what power means. Is it the ability to arrest Mullah Omar and Bin Laden, to pacify Afghanistan or to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict? Power is something very complex of which military power and technology are only one aspect. Therefore, we should acknowledge the contributions of both sides, rather than taking the deterministic view that the Americans espouse a position because they are Americans and the Europeans another because they are Europeans.

Let me add just one point on the Middle East referring to the contrast between Wolfgang Ischinger's and Dana Allin's statements. I agree with both of them that the prevailing view among enlightened circles in America and in Europe concerning a possible solution is practically identical—both favour a two-state solution, an end to violence and the withdrawal of Jewish settlements from the Palestinian areas. At the same time, we have seen a turn-around in the gut reactions to the conflict. The Europeans used to side with the Israelis and the Americans were stopping them. Today, by contrast, Americans tend to adopt unconditional solidarity with Israel, including with Sharon's policies, whereas a sizeable fraction of the European public is expressing solidarity with the "oppressed Palestinians," in a continuation of earlier anti-colonial positions.

American and European positions on the Middle East

We all should espouse neither of these two positions but support the defence of Israel—which does not negate the possibility of a Palestinian state—and develop an understanding for the Palestinian case—which does not excuse murders and suicide attacks. This is a major challenge we still face—and we must face it together.



world order:  
no alternative to  
American hegemony

Finally, when looking at the question of world order I think there is simply no alternative to American hegemony. The two theoretical alternatives would be either the rule of law, the UN—and we know that there is no possibility of realizing it without the realities of power—or a multi-polar world. A few years ago, President Chirac, like de Gaulle, Kissinger and Nixon in their time, was speaking of a return to a five-power world. This is a utopian notion. The gap in power between the United States and all the other countries is much too wide for this.

But hegemony does not give America a license to develop an absolute conception of its own sovereignty, which would imply that no authority other than the American people could judge an American under all circumstances. Nor does it create an unlimited right to intervention to change undemocratic regimes which one day might provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. Intervention, and indeed pre-emption, can be necessary. But it is very dangerous to adopt a doctrine in which pre-emption takes the place of deterrence.

The silence of the Europeans on the important issue of pre-emption is no accident. Naturally, if your opponent cannot be deterred and has no territorial base, you have to strike first. But it would be very dangerous to make this the central notion of international relations and to apply it also to states that support terrorism.

### Reynolds

relations between  
France, Germany and Russia  
were addressed through  
the EU and NATO

As the token Brit here, I would like to take up the invitation to say something about Britain and the new Europe within a transatlantic framework.

It seems to me that as far as European history is concerned, the 20th century has not yet finished, because the defining issues of the 20th century are still central today. The first half of the century made clear that these issues were the relationships between France and Germany on the one hand and Germany and Russia on the other. Around that set of relationships, France-Germany-Russia, developed what is sometimes called a 30-years war, from 1914 to 1945, with two bouts of global conflict. Other issues such as the existence, status and location of a Polish state, were also at stake in these conflicts.

In the second half of the 20th century, the question of the relationship between France, Germany and Russia, was addressed through the creation of two major European institutions: the European Community and NATO. From its inception in the 1950s, the European Community had at its heart the goal to overcome the Franco-German antagonism.

The German relationship with France was the main reason why Adenauer forged the EC against the wishes of Ludwig Erhard, the economics minister, who would have preferred a free trade area that would have brought in Britain much more easily. Similarly in 1990-1991, the decision to proceed with monetary union was related to France's assent to German unification. Again the Franco-German relationship was addressed within the EU.

By contrast, the relationship between Germany and Russia was primarily defined through NATO, through the involvement of the United States in a new security system for Western Europe that protected it from a perceived enemy—the Soviet Union. As it was sometimes said in Britain, the function of NATO was to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out and to keep the Germans down.

Both the EU and NATO are now being redefined by the inclusion of Central- and Eastern European states. This is part of the long and difficult task of constructing a new Europe. Our Russian colleagues have reminded us of the magnitude of the post-Soviet transition in Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia and its neighbouring countries, and the uncertainty of the outcome. These factors should not be underestimated. Because these processes are of major importance to the definition of Europe, many Europeans are extremely concerned about them.

The process of eastern enlargement will transform NATO. The Atlantic Alliance may become marginalized or it may find a new role. For the European Union, enlargement is an absolutely fundamental challenge. It will require a complete recasting of the Union. Widening the membership from 15 to 25 makes existing methods of governance impossible. And admitting countries on a completely different level of economic development poses very real challenges. Integrating for example a country that has 15 percent of the per capita GDP of Germany, or a country like Poland with still about a fifth of its population in agriculture, requires enormous adaptability.

In other words, the new Europe has to address the problem of globalization within its own borders and reduce the huge gap between economic structures and living standards if the European Union is to enlarge successfully. And that is why for many Europeans the construction of a new European order takes precedence over issues pertaining to the new world order. However parochial this attitude may be, the reasons for it are not always understood, particularly across the Atlantic.

Enlargement redefines  
EU and NATO

Europe has to address  
problems of globalization  
within its borders

France and Germany will shake hands,  
and we will stand on the sidelines and cheer.

Reynolds

Great Britain  
joins European  
institutions reluctantly

Now where does Britain fit into the picture? There has been a pattern that Britain joins European institutions late. We joined the European Community 15 years after it was set up. We also joined the exchange rate mechanism only after it was set up. I assume we will in due course join monetary union, but again belated, reluctantly, and only after the essential features of the agreement have been formed. The sense that integration does not entirely suit Britain will continue to exist.

How can one account for this British reluctance? I believe there are several reasons. First, in the early stages of the European project of integration, this was largely seen as a deal between France and Germany. Winston Churchill said, using a sporting metaphor: “France and Germany will shake hands, and we will stand on the sidelines and cheer.” In other words, we welcomed their integration, but did not want to take part in it. Second, Britain was concerned that its global economic interest could be hurt by what they regarded as an inward-looking economic institution. British governments feared protectionism that cut them off from the larger currents of trade with the empire and the USA.

“special relationship”  
with the US

In addition, Britain was worried about “federalism.” While “federalism” has a different meaning in the United States or Germany, here it describes the fear that the political institutions of the EC would impose too many restrictions on national sovereignty. But the most important reservation stemmed from the feeling that European integration could prejudice the special relationship with America. “Special relationship” might appear to be a sentimental notion, especially because public rhetoric linked it to language, culture, and the Second World War.

In reality, however, most British prime ministers, from Churchill right up to Blair, had a more calculating notion of the “special relationship.” They saw it as the best way to conduct transatlantic dialogue. Given that the United States is the hegemonic power, the British view is that it is not wise to say “no” to Washington. Rather, one should say “yes, but”—in other words support the United States in public and use that public support to say in private: “Well, perhaps it might be better to do it this way or go that way.” You never criticize Washington overtly.

conducting transatlantic  
dialogue: “yes, but”

In their own view, the British conception is contrasted with the stereotypically Gaullist approach, namely to emphatically say “non” to the Americans. Successive British governments have believed that saying “yes, but” is the most helpful way of conducting transatlantic dialogue.

“Yes, but ...”

Reynolds

I would like to return to the “new world order” and, in this context, to terrorism. And I would like to comment on what the likely future and content of this world order could look like.

My forecast is that we will be experiencing a Pax Americana with selective, multipolar ingredients, although it remains to be seen who can contribute to this selective multipolarity. I hope it will be the Europeans. But given the current balance of power I presume it will be a mostly unilateral world order, determined by America and pushed through by US power.

More important than the form, however, is the content of a new world order. The emergence of terrorism on the scale of 9/11 is evidence of the world’s remarkable disorder. This means we have to deal more extensively and above all more subtly with terrorism and should not use the term as carelessly as is happening everywhere at the moment. We are still content to talk about terrorism and, in so doing, throw a whole series of phenomena into the same bag that do not belong there.

I would suggest differentiating at least three different forms of terrorism but to use the term in its more narrow sense.

First one can speak of terrorism regarding events like the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo cult’s attacks on the Tokyo subway or Timothy McVeigh’s in the United States, representing violence for its own sake.

Second, there are a great deal of occurrences that are classified as terrorism without, in truth, being so. I mean all kinds of political resistance within national liberation struggles with a clear agenda that are responding with violence against a certain policy perceived as oppressive. The spectrum reaches from Chechnya to Northern Ireland and Palestine. I consider the word terrorism inappropriate in all these cases. It is mostly used by the respective governments to discredit their opponents in the absence of any analysis of the origins of the violence.

A US newspaper recently pointed out that the attacks in Kashmir by Islamic fundamentalists, who were inserted into the Indian-administered part of the province from Pakistan, can be analyzed and opposed correctly if Indian policy were also incorporated into the analysis. I, in any case, consider the use of the term terrorism to cover all national liberation struggles inappropriate, and urge instead that the origins of the respective conflicts be researched, so as to get to the core of the use of violence and develop strategies for overcoming it.

The third category includes the group currently under discussion that carried out its operation on September 11, 2001. This was doubtless a terrorist act, but

**Czempiel**

the new world order:  
Pax Americana

we should differentiate different  
forms of terrorism

In practice there is no doubt about NATO's usefulness, its requirements and its role in the world.

Kaufmann

one without a declared political objective. In my opinion, the culpability of Al Qaeda, let alone of bin Laden, has hardly been proven. We have never made the effort to analyze it properly. Nobody ever claimed responsibility or put forward a political manifesto that could have shed light on political objectives. All major characteristics of national liberation movements are missing here.

What we have are the responses of various associated people and organizations from which we can deduce the hijackers' probable motives. We do know that the Mideast conflict, specifically the oppression of Arabs and especially of Palestinians, and the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, played a major role in their thinking.

Another and equal part of the problem is poverty, the inequitable distribution of goods in the globalized world. This, in turn, goes hand in hand with the perception and rejection of Western dominance. These people resist what they see as the West's claim—meaning both the United States and the European Union—to a right to force its interests upon the world without regard for those affected.

countering terrorism  
by showing respect for  
the rest of the world

I think a central challenge of countering global disorder would be for the West to modulate its dominance by showing greater respect for the rest of the world's concerns. This would seal off the main source of terrorism.

Former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel recently proposed an OSCE for the Middle East. This is an outstanding initiative that would enable the people of the region to take part in the decisions made to meet the region's problems. If we were to succeed in replacing the West's dominance with international organizations, we would be close to having blocked an important underlying source of terrorism.

In this context I'd like to quote the former Director of the CIA, Robert Gates, who said that one cannot fight terrorism, one can only seal off its sources and starve it in this manner. I share this opinion and would like to conclude with some criticism. The response to 9/11 has caused a shift in objectives in the fight against terrorism. Instead of trying to seal off the sources, we fight a war against Afghanistan and unilaterally pursue counter-proliferation policies that have nothing to do with the system of arms control leading to a cooperative world order.

We should acknowledge this because we cannot change it anyway, but redouble our efforts as Europeans to seal off the wellsprings of terrorism and help re-establish a global order.



*Soutou,  
Kaufmann*

Listening to the debate, I have been struck by the level of angst I have sensed today about the future of the transatlantic relationship. Having served in the US Army for twenty-seven years and having worked on our policy towards the Balkans in the Pentagon, I would like to offer a view of the transatlantic relationship that is more reassuring.

I suspect that the angst I hear in this forum may be a generational phenomenon. In a class with Robert Pfaltzgraff at the Fletcher School last year for example, class members of my generation in the military did not share those strong concerns about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. Our experience is that the political tensions with our allies in NATO and the Partnership for Peace program (PFP) do not exist at the level of “boots on the ground”—the operational, or tactical, level.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, for instance, we managed to integrate Russian troops into our missions and to create combined units operating under different national chains of command.

My colleague, Captain Melville, just reported similar experiences from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though this is not a NATO mission, NATO provides a common language, a common doctrine and a degree of interoperability despite the existing capability gap. I have heard mainly our air force officers worry about the capability gap. That stems from their experience of the Kosovo air campaign, where it was a significant issue. The army officers, by contrast, see no major problems. From the land formation perspective, especially, the cooperative exercises are important as they allow us to engage with our partners and to standardize procedures.

In practice, then, there is no doubt about NATO’s usefulness, its requirements and its role in the world.

This perhaps leads us back to the generational issue. Even my generation and friends in the Pentagon and NATO certainly do not evince a “NATO is dead, NATO has no value” attitude any more. Growing up with NATO and having NATO actually provide the kind of security that it did from the 50s up to the 80s was a very important and formative experience for my generation.

In sum, I absolutely agree with Ambassador Ischinger that there is no crisis in NATO.

### **Kaufmann**

there is no crisis in the transatlantic relationship:

no tensions in NATO at the operational level

America cooks the meal and  
Europe does the dishes.

Singer

**Singer**  
Americans don't distinguish  
different forms of terrorism

Europe's role in  
the new world order:  
doing the dishes?

for an independent role,  
Europe needs stronger  
defense and diplomacy

I hope that my comments will be taken not as “pessimistic,” but simply as frank.

First, I have to disagree with Professor Czempel and this might illustrate the fundamental perception gap mentioned earlier. Americans generally reject the idea that one can categorize different types of terrorism by their cause. What defines terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, aimed at non-combatant civilians, for the purpose of causing fear and terror. That is what unifies all the groups that are elsewhere described as being very different. These groups—from Kashmir to Palestine—have deliberately targeted civilians, including children, to accomplish their goals.

My second comment relates to the American and European confusion about the role Europe wants to play in the new global order. A European commentator used the metaphor that in facing global crises, “America cooks the meal and Europe does the dishes.” This metaphor is actually very illustrative. If Europe want to take charge in leading follow-up operations such as in Afghanistan, it fulfills an important function. If no one does the dishes, the party ends very poorly. At the same time, it is a very thankless role, and to be honest, America has not been very appreciative of Europe's role in this process.

If Europe wants to play a different part, however, it has to face up to other hard realities. If it wants to help prepare the meal, Americans would certainly agree that the overall product would turn out better. However, due to its power disparities, the reality is that Europe will not be an equal partner to the American chef, but the sous-chef. And, after the frustrating experience in Kosovo, America will no longer allow a European “no” to its military operations.

My belief is that Europe, rather than being an assistant to the United States, would prefer to cook its own meals. Personally, I would applaud an independent European role on the international scene. Europe could play an important part tackling issues that America has ignored. Take for example the AIDS crises in Africa. This is a major world issue that very soon, we will regret not having acted upon.

Nevertheless, if Europe is really trying to develop its own role and to “offer its own parties” in response to global crises, it will face two major challenges.

The first is that Europe has to acknowledge that to be a global player is a very expensive endeavour and that it needs to invest the time and effort to be equipped for it. This is the real crux of the defense budget debate between the US and Europe, that Europe back up its talk with its checkbook.

The second not only relates to military issues but also to broader political issues such as Europe's desire to play a stronger diplomatic role. Essentially, sometimes if Europe offers a party, no one may show up. This is what happened for example with recent EU diplomatic moves towards the Middle East. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians bothered to meet with them. Europe has to acknowledge that, even if it wants to play a major diplomatic role, there will be times when the rest of the world is not going to listen, simply because it lacks the power to back it up.

While Europe has not figured out yet what role it wants to play, the process of finding out will be interesting to watch.

One group of commentators here has insisted that, fundamentally, the transatlantic relationship is in order. The other side argues that in the last 6 months we have experienced something which Colonel Kaufmann correctly labeled as angst.

Let me take a stab at reconciling these two points of view by focusing on the undeniable moral importance of military power.

The gap between America and Europe in terms of conventional power was already suggested by the Gulf War and Kosovo and emerged clearly after September 11th. But budgets or technology, important as they may be, are not the main issue here. Rather, it is that the "war in our mind" is no longer in Europe.

So long as we were concerned about a possible war in Europe, European conventional forces counted for a great deal, and the Balkans may be the exception that proves the rule. This began to change when September 11th shifted our attention to a different region. As a result, Europeans feel more impotent and Americans feel more powerful than before.

I have expressed this phenomenon in psychological terms, but I think there is a fundamental realist point behind it. Realism suggests that a hegemon builds alliances when it needs them, and that it abandons them when they become too troublesome. At the same time, a realist view would expect Europe to build an army to match the United States.

The problem is that realist analysis recognizes only states as actors. Europe is not a state. But let me qualify this and make a few less Euro-sceptical remarks than have been made earlier.

Europe has some attributes of a state which are not noticed but which may be creeping up on us faster than we think. It has a common currency. And it has a common border, a fundamental attribute of a state. The Schengen information sys-

**Snyder**

the power gap between Europe and America is growing

can Europe be seen as a state?



*Reiter, Schulze, Wolfson  
at Pariser Platz*

the moral dilemma of  
the transatlantic imbalance

tem contains the longest list of names and the longest list of undesirable persons in the world. Americans are now associating exactly these elements with state power.

In addition to these emerging attributes of state, one could imagine a European army. Maybe a European military academy would be a beginning. On the other hand, I do not think any of us will live to see a European football team, which would be the sign that Europe had become one country. In that sense Britain is not a country. But we may live to see a European army just as there is a British army.

Let me close with a comment on the moral dilemma posed by the transatlantic imbalance. The proposal that Europe ought to exploit this imbalance came up in various forms. For example, it has been put forward that Europe should adopt a position of “yes, but” and thus play the moral guardian angel watchdog of the United States.

Such a development has three inherent difficulties. First, there is the intellectual risk for the Europeans to say that because something cannot be done it ought not to be done—with a view to Iraq, for example. Second, it is technically difficult to say, “we will negotiate while they use force,” when negotiation and force can be combined more effectively if the same entity employs both. Finally, it is psychologically difficult to rely on exploiting someone else’s military force.

**Ischinger**

we need more Europe  
in global politics

First of all I wish to firmly repudiate Mr. Czempiel’s assertions regarding the state of our knowledge of both the origins and the perpetrators of 9/11. Furthermore I think that claiming the 9/11 perpetrators were mainly motivated by frustration over the Mideast conflict is a specious argument. Nothing was and is more alien to Al Qaeda and bin Laden than the concrete issues of the Mideast conflict.

Something else is more important to me, however, namely Europe and its role in global politics. It might sound banal to German ears because it has already been said too often, but what we need is not less America, but more Europe. I have painfully experienced in recent years how Europe has needlessly struggled with asserting its interests and developing tangible power. Six years ago, for instance, I was present when the freshly rebuilt airport in Sarajevo was ceremoniously re-opened by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, even though the EU had financed 85% of the project.

I also have another, more recent example. Although we, the Germans and other EU partners constitute 95% of the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, the reports from Kabul sound as if the United States were on its home turf. I will not go into whether it was rather counterproductive from a US standpoint that the election of Hamid Karzai could have raised the impression that it had taken place in Washington instead of Kabul. Yet it is our problem that the European share of total action is hardly visible, and only we Europeans can change that.

Let us hope that the European Convention will manage to help us to do for foreign policy what we have already accomplished in trade policy. When Pascal Lamy or his colleague Mario Monti visit Washington as European representatives, they are taken seriously, while my friend Javier Solana, whose work I greatly respect, continues to be given less respect than he deserves.

Nothing, however, was as depressing as Europe's total absence as an active force after September 11th. I repeat that this is an accusation that we can direct not at the United States but exclusively at ourselves. For this reason the Convention should consider and later implement the combining of the offices of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative.

Europe did not act  
after September 11th

Let me begin by saying that I appreciate Ambassador Ischinger articulating what all of us in the United States understand to be the authoritative and well-documented version of the origins of the attacks of September 11th.

**Wells**

Then I want to comment on the concept of integration that was mentioned by Dr. Smyser this morning. In a recent speech Richard Haass enunciated that the Bush Administration adopted integration as a principal objective of foreign policy. So far, this policy is merely an aspiration, but let me identify a few serious structural problems with it.

integration as a principal  
objective of US foreign policy

Within the United States, we have great difficulty integrating our economic and political policies. We only have to look at the issue of China. The treasury, commerce, state and defense departments each have quite different ideas about how we should deal with China. Sometimes these differences are resolved. Far too often, they are not.

In Europe, the EU managed to integrate trade and aid, but not diplomacy or military affairs. So the pursuit of any integrated policy in Europe still requires finding common ground between Brussels and the national capitals!

The most serious gap in integration, however, is that between the United States and Europe. The most serious problem which has to be mentioned here is the lack of communication between the agencies of the US government and the European Union. While our trade and competition authorities communicate with each other, the other policy makers all too often pass like ships in the night.

In my view, this is the agenda we need to work on if transatlantic cooperation is to be improved.

**Cohrs**  
defining the ground  
rules of the new world order

Following up on Professor Wells' remarks, I would like to focus on what I see as a paramount requirement for both revitalizing the transatlantic partnership and creating a system approaching a "new world order" in the aftermath of September 11th. It is the need, and challenge, to reach common understandings of what the ground-rules of this partnership and world system should be—and of what roles and responsibilities each of the partners can and should have in sustaining these rules. Most of the new problems facing Americans and Europeans alike are undoubtedly global in scale. This applies to containing global terrorism and addressing its root causes, namely the inequities between the "Western" and the "developing world," as much as to the challenge of creating viable regional security systems beyond the north Atlantic hemisphere, for example in the Middle East—systems that provide a stable framework for development.

long-term challenges  
for the transatlantic  
relationship

Yet many older and long-term challenges remain on the transatlantic agenda as well—even if they have been somewhat relegated to the background. These are namely the challenge of expanding NATO and the EU's sphere of security and prosperity eastwards—possibly all the way towards integrating Russia. At the same time, as has been mentioned, the reality Americans and Europeans have to face is indeed marked by the fact that the world order of the post-cold war era has constituted itself as a hegemonic system dominated by the United States. There is thus a pronounced imbalance between an American hegemon probably more clearly pre-eminent than any other in modern history and a unique, evolving yet also as yet very heterogeneous union of European states. What is more, the latter is engaged in a process of defining its "identity" and managing enlargement, a process that will probably never be fully completed, and is unlikely ever to acquire any military capabilities matching US power.

Against this background, Europeans and Americans arguably face one underlying challenge: to agree on the terms of what could be called a new "burden-shar-



Caplan, Cohrs

ing” for the 21st century. They have to find ways and mechanisms beyond the current North Atlantic Alliance to decide how they, as indeed very different partners, can best combine and to what extent they can integrate their particular capabilities in approaching global problems.

Many Europeans claim to have drawn from their experience since 1945 valuable lessons about how to promote peace and stability through political and economic integration. And they have concluded that the evolution of international norms, an emphasis on diplomatic conflict resolution and concerted police work can prove more effective than too great a reliance on military capabilities and force. Yet European leaders also have to decide and show more clearly than before what capabilities they want to develop and what concrete contributions they can make in coming to terms with particular crises. And they have to find a common voice in communicating this to Washington. If they fail to do so, and if especially the middle powers Britain, France and Germany revert to their particular “national ways,” substantial progress towards a common European position will remain elusive. Even in the medium term, however, the European project will remain a process rather than evolve into a coherent centre of gravity and power in international affairs. Certain capabilities—such as a European army—may never be fully developed.


In view of this, it can only be counterproductive for European decision-makers to keep raising unrealistic expectations: to suggest that somehow sufficient energy and resources can be devoted to both fostering the European integration and enlargement process and at the same time developing a European world role. There are priorities to be set—and in the near future the main priorities will most likely remain internal restructuring and a completion of the EU expansion.

For the American side, quite different yet no less critical challenges pose themselves. Above all, there is the challenge of foregoing the temptations of hegemonic unilateralism—of working with the European partners and through existing international organizations and alliances even if this proves more cumbersome in the short term and may at times seem conflicting with overriding interests of national security. For this remains probably the only way of legitimating US power and making US predominance acceptable to the rest of the world in the long term. Ultimately, the establishment of any commonly acceptable standards and ground-rules for a viable world order largely hinges on American willingness to accept and promote them as well.

European approaches:  
international law and diplomacy

priority for Europe:  
EU enlargement

America’s challenge:  
resisting unilateralism



developing structures of  
cooperation between  
Europe and America

Overall, then, there is clearly a need for more integrated structures of coordination and cooperation between American and European policymakers in the post-September 11th era—within and beyond the NATO framework. Realistically, these will first have to focus on reinvigorating intergovernmental cooperation. Most pressing is, and will remain, cooperation on problems pertaining to the stabilization and development of areas “east and south of the EU”, particularly the Balkans, south central Asia and the Middle East. More concerted, practical cooperation on these issues should allow not only European but also American decision-makers to learn that it is in each side’s best interest to develop complementary strategies: to see what each partner can contribute, what diplomatic course should be pursued and if and when a reliance on military means is the only or best remaining option.

no strict division of labor!

Supporting Dr. Singer’s view, I would also warn of the danger of trying to separate military and diplomatic aspects and introduce too rigid a transatlantic role distribution from the beginning. For diplomacy can generally not be very effective unless it is backed up by power and the readiness to use force as a last resort. Conversely, denigrating political conflict resolution and tenets of international law, which some key members of the Bush Administration seem to favor, carries the obvious risk of precipitating the option for military “remedies” to problems, such as the Iraq question, which certainly cannot be solved that way. In sum, while potentially highly divisive, not only the immediate but also the more structural challenges involved in building a more sustainable world order after September 11th warrant all the more the call for a new transatlantic concert.

**Allin**  
defining and dealing  
with terrorists

Like Dr. Singer, I am somewhat frustrated by the suggestion that the definition of terrorism is so very difficult. To my mind, that definition is fairly clear and includes groups from the IRA to suicide bombers in Israel. I would contend, however, that the US administration got itself into a rhetorical dead-end when in response to September 11th it said, “Either you are with us or you are against us” to make clear that it would not deal with terrorists.

For in fact it is sometimes necessary to deal and to negotiate with terrorists. The IRA was undoubtedly a terrorist organization. But the British government decided that it was wise to bring its political arm Sinn Fein into politics.

I also strongly disagree with Professor Czempiel’s suggestion that al Qaeda and Bin Laden do not have a program or a “terrorist manifesto.” On the contrary,

Bin Laden announced very clearly before September 11th that devout Muslims have the duty to kill Americans wherever they can, whether civilian or military. In addition, he has made a series of religious and territorial demands which include the end of America's defilement of the Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia.

In the American view, terrorists cannot be appeased. In any case, even as US withdrawal from Saudi Arabia would not address the first part of the program: to kill Americans wherever possible. If we deny that the terrorists have a program, we simply ignore its enormity. As Professor Litwak said, if they had the possibility of killing a million Americans, they would do it. And that possibility might become real.

In keeping with my cantankerous American viewpoint, I would like to finish with a polemical question. It relates to the issue of pre-emption, specifically to the likely pre-emptory American strike against Iraq. While I recognize the unsettling and damaging consequences of American unilateral action, I would like to ask the opponents of pre-emptory military action what alternatives they propose.

alternatives to pre-emption?

Let me first respond to what Dr. Allin just said by underlining that human motivations are usually very complex. Religious and political agendas can exist simultaneously in an actor's mind. Therefore we have to answer the question of al Qaeda's underlying aim. Is it to kill as many Americans as possible or to kill as a means to some other end?

**Shore**

I would like to pose another question: Do we exaggerate the importance of September 11th? The average American certainly sees September 11th as the most significant event in the last years. But this is because of the shocking nature of the event and because Americans live very much in the present and do not think historically. But 20, 30 or 50 years from now historians will probably say that September 11th was of less historical significance in world affairs. By contrast, the introduction of the euro will then probably be looked at as one of the most significant events of the last years because it represents a critical break in a millennia-long struggle for mastery in Europe.

September 11th –  
exaggerated significance?

The last question I want to put forward relates to the reasons for launching a global war on terror. Why is the war continued after Afghanistan? Of course, combating a threat and trying to gain domestic support are reasons for the war.

does America need an enemy?

But we should also consider America's need for finding an enemy. America has some particular need for finding an enemy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union

this need for an enemy was illustrated by the debate whether pan-Islamic fundamentalism or aggressive Chinese nationalism would now rival Western democratic liberal capitalism.

We need to ask why America needs an enemy and what Europe's role should be in that context. Dr. Reynolds' suggestion that Europe should act as a "yes, but" force, i.e., as a restraining or guiding force for America seems to me very useful in this respect.

**Czempiel**  
the Mideast conflict  
is a source of terrorism

In response to Ambassador Ischinger let me make clear that he is fairly isolated with his opinion. That the Mideast conflict was one of the most important sources of terrorism was announced first by US Secretary of State Powell, then by German Foreign Minister Fischer, and afterwards by practically all European foreign ministers. This is why I think we should intensively analyze and focus politically on the sources for this kind of behavior.

Expanding on my earlier remarks I would like to point out that Al Qaeda is the first societal force to have appeared with global ambitions and global possibilities for action. We should regard this with deadly seriousness and make every effort to master this threat instead of contenting ourselves with facile arguments.

## II. Shaping Globalization— Economic and Political Challenges

We will now widen our debate on transatlantic relations to consider different perspectives on the issue of globalization—its chances and risks in economic as well as political terms, the possibilities and requirements for shaping the emerging new world order and not least the impact of globalization on the relation between Europe and America. Could the process of globalization constitute the new common task for the transatlantic community, whose importance was stressed many times in this forum?

Globalization is further advanced than common clichés would suggest. When I got off my flight in London on September 11 and my daughter called me in a taxi to tell me that an airplane had crashed into the World Trade Center, I worried about the safety of the 2000 employees of Deutsche Bank who worked in the immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center at 130 Liberty Street, a site that has remained inaccessible to the present day. One of the workers there, a native of Iserlohn, was standing in for an American colleague to visit a client on the Trade Center's 98th floor. After the attack he called his girlfriend, and nothing was heard from him again. I use this example to point out that we were not only shocked that our allies the Americans had been attacked, but that we were personally involved.

The events of September 11 were immediately recognizable as an act of terrorism against our Western, open, free-market system. If the response should threaten the foundations of the competitive system because protectionism and the desire to shield oneself has won the upper hand, because the emergence of perceived enemies splits the world into various groups, then the war against terrorism could complete the work of the terrorists themselves. This is precisely what we have to prevent.

Another, third reflection is the question of what role the images, commentaries, and news in the media play. If Europe plays a smaller role in this context than the American position conveyed by CNN, then language difficulties are part of the problem. There are 120 language pairs in our present European Parliament, and in tomorrow's, with 25 to 30 additional countries, that figure will rise to 400. If English is not soon taught in all European elementary schools as a common second language to help mold a pan-European public, then we can continue theorizing for ages on why Europe remains undervalued in the international concert. Our common currency marks progress made toward a stronger Europe, but it will not suffice.

**Dahrendorf**

**Walter**

globalization is very advanced

the war on terrorism  
must not threaten the  
free Western system

Europe needs English  
as a common language

European views on  
the socio-political order

After these preliminary remarks on the discussion up to now, let me progress to the political-economic sphere and, more precisely, to the European view. In the tradition of Adam Smith and other writers on political economy, the order could now be reversed. Without a social consensus, a market economic order would be impossible. Therefore we first have to talk about the socio-political order and ask whether the European view provides any concepts.

These European concepts on policy to maintain an economic order do indeed exist, with strong German and Austrian components, and it is always worthwhile to recall them. Unfortunately, the great political thinker Walter Eucken wrote in less-than-perfect German, and in contrast to Karl Marx we do not have any good English translations. Therefore, much of what is still today the foundation of a market economic order agreeable to the majority has not been taught at a national and even less at an international level.

I would also like to take up at this point the Austrian political economist von Hayek, who identified the triad of private property, family, and honesty as the essential foundation for a functioning and free social constitution. When we look at the United States on this basis, I would consider protection of private property there exemplary, all the way to shareholder value. Yet it seems equally clear to me that the West—meaning the Europeans and Americans alike—do not have much left to offer in terms of family. This is cause for reflection, especially in light of our naïve feelings of superiority over Islam. Our permissive lifestyle that is obsessed with the present is robbing us of our future. Concerning honesty, we would be ruined if we turned over all important functions to lawyers and accountants. We need ethical standards that have to be kept. We can learn all this from Hayek, of course, or we can learn it another way.

need to establish a  
global economic order

Walter Eucken's teachings on the importance of an effective pricing system and intact competition with safeguards on market entry and exit also belong in this context. All these factors I have listed are absolutely necessary as a regulatory framework for economic processes that can prosper within a society. And in an age of globalization, we must work both at a national level and internationally to establish an order for the global economy on this basis. That, of course, leads to the question, "How is that going to work?" Within a nation-state the answers were clear. The nation-state provides this framework. But what about the globalized world? A world government, as a theoretical answer, is so undesirable that we need not spend much time discussing it.



Walter, Stütze

Our discussion has focused on various aspects of the US-European relationship. To pick up on those aspects, we might ask whether the regulations currently existing in the United States might be adopted globally because of their exemplary nature. In practice, an alternative is presently not apparent. That could change, perhaps it even should change. In my analysis there is only one region that could change anything in this situation of US dominance within the next ten to fifteen years: Europe. Afterwards, but not earlier, Asia and especially China could pose a challenge and re-align the coordinates of the current geo-strategic system.

Before I sketch the answers that Europe should provide to help determine the global order, I would like to turn to the international challenges that have to be addressed. One of the most important is technological progress, which will render more and more obsolete the traditional means of regulating affairs at a local and national level. In the future the chains of net production by corporations will be hardly identifiable within national parameters. Those with a business idea do not care whether their cooperation partners are in the same country or even in the same time zone. Cooperation is determined by other criteria, and when the products are virtual, as is increasingly the case, the chain of net production can leapfrog time zones and national boundaries almost at will. This takes power away from hierarchies in business and politics.

The second important change has to do with demographics. Most Western countries have a lower birthrate than would be required to maintain the population at its current level. This includes such diverse countries, for example, as Russia, Denmark, and Germany. The sole significant exception is the United States, where the birth rate—at least for a considerable amount of time—will not replicate the falling populations of other countries. In developing countries, we can expect a limited continuation of the increasingly young median age of the population, even though birth rates have been falling here too. The reason is that improved access to health care has reduced infant mortality rates. I emphasize this because the demand sides of some markets grow as a result, while markets in the old world reach their natural limits. To cite one example, who are you going to sell your house to in Germany if, 40 forty years from now, only 55 million people live there instead of 80 million?

Much more important, however, is what happens on the supply side of the market. As the birth rate continues to drop, the work force will grow increasingly older. Older workers, however, find it harder to keep up with the increasing pace

international challenges:  
technological progress makes  
national regulation obsolete

demographics

migratory pressures

Only the managers of soccer clubs understand that the free movement of international labor is necessary to keep soccer attractive and the stadium full.

Walter

of technological change and remain receptive to innovation. They depend on their already-acquired knowledge. Readiness to take risks and attempt something new is therefore reduced. In other words, as a result of the aging process and population shrinkage, it will become increasingly risky economically to invest in Europe, while adjustment to modernity and the world's new challenges will grow easier where the young people are. This changing distribution will dramatically transform the challenges facing policymakers and us all in the old world. It will also lead to unimagined increases in worldwide migratory pressures. While we in Europe practically consider the free movement of capital around the globe and corresponding protection of private property to be fundamental rights, we reject the general free movement of labor. We think it should be up to us who we allow within our borders. Even though this is a false and completely illusory demand, it also happens to be politically opportune. Only the managers of soccer clubs understand that the free movement of international labor is necessary to keep soccer attractive and the stadium full.

unequal benefits  
from globalization

Consumers worldwide accept and support globalization as a given, while producers and work forces reject it because the resulting competition puts them under pressure. The latter demand that politicians protect their interests. The same people who demand consumer freedom are unwilling to permit a similar liberalization of the labor supply. Then they would namely also have to be prepared to adjust to the new challenges. This may be inconsistent, but those who pay the price are those countries that are politically weaker than America and Europe and cannot defend themselves against their predominance. This is what makes anti-globalization protest understandable.

conclusions: US should  
recognize the challenge

What are the conclusions of this analysis? First, the United States should recall its great age after World War II when it was willing to conceive and later establish the Bretton Woods system. At that time, the Pentagon and State Department regarded as one of their chief duties the conduct of nation-building in those countries where they were militarily engaged. I will never forget a history lesson that the 92-year-old John McCloy gave me when he vividly described the role of the Pentagon in reviving the German nation after World War II. I will mention here only the importance of RIAS Berlin in establishing a free and democratic Germany. I think America should understand the significance of recognizing this challenge in its present framework of globalization.

Europeans should make greater efforts

The second conclusion concerns the tasks facing Europeans on the road to a

unified Europe, as Janusz Reiter has presented them. We have to learn to see matters as the Americans do and make greater efforts instead of working only 35 hours a week, remaining in college at the age of 30, and then retiring at 57. Americans work 400 hours more, on average, than Germans do. We have to face this challenge.

Third, we need institutions in Europe that are not designed for a club of 6, or in reality, for a club of 2 plus some junior partners, but that would be appropriate for 30 nations in the more distant future, which would include the Yugoslav successor states. That means enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament and permitting the European Council to make majority decisions. We also have to make sure, in the absence of a European government, that the institution that is currently pushing Europe forward, the European Commission, retains its central position during the process of enlargement. In the course of the last 20 years, the consistently high quality of the EU's Commissioners has left its mark on Europe. Good examples are the last three Competition Commissioners who have safeguarded the functioning of Europe's market economy: Leon Brittan, Karel Van Miert, and Mario Monti. This is a European quality that America understands and respects, that benefits both sides, and improves the global order.

The American and European models are two variants that are under discussion worldwide for possible emulation. To incorporate other parts of the world, however, we of course have to do more to invigorate international organizations than we have been doing. All debatable criticism of the IMF and World Bank notwithstanding, if these two organizations did not exist, we would have to invent them both. When opponents of globalization protest against the World Trade Organization, they betray how blinded they have become. If there is one international organization that is relevant to the interests of the Developing World, it is the WTO. And if one of these organizations is relatively soundly legitimized democratically, this is the one. So we need these Bretton Woods institutions, albeit certainly with a new focus and stronger support.

We should supply two additional pillars that are essential to buttressing the global order. The first would be a global environmental office. Instead of a "Roaming Conference for the Environment," we need an institution with the stature and power of the World Trade Organization. And secondly, we urgently need a world financial regulatory authority, because what we have now is completely insuffi-

reform European institutions

invigorate Bretton Woods institutions

establish a global environmental office and a financial regulatory authority

Hirsch



cient and we need oversight very, very quickly. Maintaining that the markets would regulate themselves is complete nonsense. We also require a regulator and the cooperation of US and European authorities with explicit reference to the interests of third parties. The Global Stability Forum could serve as a role model for that.

**Hirsch**

My few reflections are offered from the vantage-point of New York and the broader UN community. I like the title, “Shaping globalization. Economic and political challenges,” and I want to be a little provocative by asking what the challenge is that globalization represents. My remarks are called “Reality or chimera?” to question whether globalization might not be a chimerical proposition.

the gap between the West and the developing world increases

Seen from a Western perspective, globalization is a success story. We understand by it the spread of consumerism with its well-known symbols McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, the Internet and mobile phones. We believe that this process improves the lives of people.

For the developing world, however, a much more bitter reality exists. What Barbara Ward predicted in her famous book of 1969, “The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations” has become reality. In the absence of fundamental global economic and political reforms, the gap between the developed and the developing nations has increased.

The growing gap has fundamental security as well as human implications for all of us. Narrowing the gap is the main challenge we face today. The main question we should ask is therefore which policies we, the developed world, should adopt regarding the developing world.

The developed and the developing world today often talk past each other. Even if undeliberately, the West often adopts a tone of paternalism. Take for example the suggestion made here that the countries of the developing world should imitate us and adopt our economic and political models.

People from the developing world on the other hand often offer a litany of complaints without many suggestions about what could be done on their side. While we are still far from this point, we should develop a conceptual and intellectual partnership between the developed and the developing world and translate this into tangible improvements in terms of political and economic policy.

World Bank and IMF have mixed development record

So where are we? Fifty-five years after the foundation of the Bretton Woods institutions the record of the World Bank and the IMF on development policies is

at best mixed. Even the Asian tigers, which were touted in the early 80s as the great achievement in the light of the economic booms in Korea, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, all experienced serious downturns toward the end of the 80s. This shows that the “Asian model” does not really exist and that the Bretton Woods institutions have not been able to develop a model. This is why James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, keeps talking about the need to re-evaluate the bank’s policies. And he is right in encouraging this.

The IMF has also been heavily criticized because its structural adjustment policies have imposed hardship, but largely failed to bring about economic reforms. The bread riots in Cairo in the 1990s, for example, showed how painful the policies were.

From the perspective of the developing world, an assessment of the more than 40 years since the beginning of de-colonization is not much more positive. The legacy of colonialism has been terrible. None of the colonial powers prepared their former “possessions” for independence in any meaningful way. It was perhaps a little better in the Francophone world than in the Anglophone world, but how many people were prepared to become ministers of finance or foreign affairs? For 30 or 35 years, almost all of these countries went down the terrible road of bad governance, one-party states and military dictatorships. Besides, until the early 90s many of them followed the socialist economic model. They looked to the Soviet Union for aid and protection and they tried to imitate the Soviet example. In some cases, like Nyerere’s Tanzania, they tried to develop an African version of socialism, but without success.

a terrible legacy  
of colonialism

All the money that the US, the Soviet Union and France poured into the developing world to maintain their colonial interests during the Cold War did absolutely nothing for development. It simply went to waste and financed innumerable wars. One of the problems we have focused on at the International Peace Academy in New York is that the economic resources of the developing world, diamonds, platinum and other minerals, have for the most part simply been at the center of war and conflict. Most developing countries have only seen these minerals or other resources such as oil exploited for the personal gain of a few people. They have not actually brought any tangible benefits for the people.

natural resources bring  
no development

A few years ago I read an article stating that Angola that year experienced the highest growth of per capita income in the world. This was attributable to Angola’s oil reserves. But of course not a single ordinary person in Angola has ben-



after the Cold War:  
democratization and liberalization

efited by 25 cents from this oil. The only beneficiaries were Caltex, the Luanda government and a few intermediaries.

A further structural problem of the developing world has always been its dependence on the world's commodity markets. Developing countries continued to rely on exporting raw materials and so when the markets for them went bust, they went bust too.

We are now 12, 13 years into the post-Cold War era and the official rhetoric of the United States and Europe is to encourage the countries of the developing world to espouse democratization and economic liberalization. When he became president, Bill Clinton adopted the position that countries should no longer receive US resources for opposition to communism, but for enacting what we judge as the right economic and political reforms. A lot of people in the developing world resent the West for assuming the right to tell them how to run their political and economic system.

From an American point of view, however, there were some real achievements in the Clinton Administration, particularly progress on NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. Clinton's Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, who was rightly hailed as a great intellect, made a great contribution to this. But these achievements remain limited.

The main impulse behind the globalization agenda is still perceived in the developing world as the West's interest in maintaining its economic and political hegemony. Lomé I-IV and the Doha negotiations are no more than slightly modified continuations of the trade and development relationship of the colonial era.

AGOA

In the United States it took years of negotiations to pass the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was fought bitterly by all congressmen in the American south despite the fact that it hardly threatens the American textile industry. The Clinton Administration portrayed this law as its major contribution to African economic development. In reality, it may bring some benefits for textile producers in Ghana and maybe Kenya but these are not likely to be significant.

HIPC

Another initiative touted as a major contribution to narrowing the gap is HIPC, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative. But HIPC has so many conditions attached to it that hardly any countries apart from Uganda and Senegal qualify. Even for the few countries that qualify, HIPC imposes many conditionalities. While I support conditionalities, I doubt that HIPC will make a big difference. Many argue that debt relief without conditions would be more effective.



This brings me to the role of the United Nations system. As many of you know, there was a UN-sponsored conference in Monterey in March on financing for development and there is about to be a big international summit in Johannesburg in August on sustainable development. The big news in Monterey was President Bush's announcement of a modest increase in US overseas development assistance. Again, I doubt that this will make much difference.

The latest initiative from the African side is NEPAD, the New Economic Policy for African Development. It is championed by the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt. Two weeks from now the Group of Eight will meet in Canada to discuss its response to NEPAD. This is supposed to be followed by a meeting on NEPAD at the level of foreign ministers at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September. It remains to be seen whether this initiative will promote a new partnership in which the African states will move towards good governance and democratization and the Group of Eight will commit itself to increased development aid and trade.

NEPAD

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, who was chairman of the Economic Commission for Africa for 20 years, has written a very sharp critique of the proposal that the G8 should launch a Marshall Plan for Africa or the developing world at large. He has pointed out that this was a false analogy because the European countries were already industrialized before World War II. After a hiatus of six years of destruction Europe was reconstructed from a given plateau. By contrast, the developing world finds itself "on the floor." For a variety of reasons, no such preconditions to build on exist.

Above all, however, Adedeji asks in his critique whether NEPAD and the G8 will set new realistic targets of partnership or whether it will just be a continuation of the same old game: The African countries have to meet the conditions imposed by the West in order to get the money, and if they do not, they will not get any money and everything will deteriorate further.

Western hypocrisy

To make things worse, there is no change in the critical area of Western agricultural subsidies. These subsidies of the United States, Western Europe and Canada amount to seven times more than total global development assistance. The West knows this and the developing world knows it, too. So they look askance at all of the western protestations under the heading "We really care for you and we want to close the gap."

To conclude, I would like to emphasize that the challenge for the West is to

spell out what it really desires to achieve through globalization. Do we simply want more of the same? More Coca-Cola sold in the world and therefore, also more AIDS, more refugees, more drugs and more arms sold by governments in turn fueling more civil wars? Or do we want to make an effort, first conceptually then operationally, to develop a real partnership with the developing world? I believe there are leaders in that part of the world who want something better than what we see at present. But they do not have the capacity to effect changes on their own. Essentially, I think it will require a different approach on both sides to build better bridges in the future.

**Litwak**

The contemporary globalized system is founded on international institutions such as the Bretton Woods system, in which the United States plays a key role. Georgetown University Professor John Ikenberry argues in his excellent book “After Victory” that no counter-coalition of states to balance America has emerged in the international system because American power is embedded in international institutions. This makes American power more acceptable and less threatening to other states.

globalization = Americanization?

The political challenge of globalization is that globalization is widely perceived as synonymous with Americanization. The disruption and inequities created by globalization that Ambassador Hirsch referred to are therefore a source of anti-American feeling. Recently, an expert on the Middle East speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center asked: “If the United States pursued, from the Arab-Muslim world’s perspective, absolutely perfect policies, would anti-Americanism disappear?” And his answer was “No, because every day people in the Arab world have to deal with Microsoft, McDonald’s and Hollywood.”

terrorism as a reaction  
to the dark side of globalization

This points to the fact that a crisis of modernity is unfolding in the Middle East in which globalization plays a central part. This links our current debate with our earlier discussion: The crisis of modernity in the Muslim world lies at the root of the phenomenon of terrorism.

In essence, the September 11th attacks pointed to the dark side of globalization. In other words, a terrorist group whose model of modernity is rooted in the 7th century used the instruments of globalization—of the 21st century satellite phones, the Internet etc.—to perpetrate the attack on the United States. One wonders what impact this new kind of terrorism will have on globalization if it persists and particularly if it makes the jump to mass casualty terrorism: If, for



example, a weapon of mass destruction were used in an American city, what would its effect be on the global flows of trade? Such a development could really undermine the international system.

I want to focus on some of the political dimensions of globalization as perceived from the European periphery. I will start with two statistics taken from surveys.

In the 1980s, the first “World Values” survey was conducted. It posed the famous question of how happy people were. In 1980, West Germans and Nigerians had exactly the same index of happiness. This means that there was a very weak correlation between income and happiness. When the same question was asked in 2000 it turned out that Nigerians were many times less happy than Germans as their GDP was lower than Germany’s. In 2000 then, there was a very high and strong correlation between happiness and income.

I stress this point because at least in the sphere of information the world is totally globalized. The paradox is that global media are producing the same desires and needs everywhere and it is up to the local governments to satisfy them. The impossibility to globalize the different spheres of life at the same pace creates fundamental tensions in the process of globalization.

The second statistic I would like to mention concerns Latin America. According to macro-economic data published in the “Economist”, Latin America experienced an average growth of around two per cent per year over the last decade. This growth resulted in a substantial reduction of poverty. But according to public opinion polls for Latin America as a whole, more than 70 percent of the people claimed that their standard of living was worse today than a decade ago. I mention this because from a political point of view perceptions are the only reality that matters, especially if you live in a democracy.

This points to a basic flaw in our current pro-globalization rhetoric. We use macro-economic figures to convince people that there are no losers in this process. These macro-economic figures may be correct, but in political terms they do not matter if the perception is different. If somebody perceives himself as a loser, he will vote as a loser, live like a loser and he might commit suicide, not least during a terrorist attack because he believes he is a loser.

In view of this, I believe that some of the current attempts to shape globalization are misguided because they are too focused on eradicating poverty whereas the basic problems we face have more to do with social inequality and social com-

## **Krastev**

needs are globalized,  
but not means

The road from traditional poverty to modern prosperity leads through a valley of tears.

Dahrendorf

we need redistribution and a global media policy

parisons. Reducing poverty in the Middle East by a factor of three, for example, would not necessarily reduce the number of people who are ready to attack Americans by the same factor.

In sum, then, a policy on globalization should not only address competitiveness and economic growth. Rather, we should envisage a totally new package, including redistribution as well as a new global media policy in order to make this world—and globalization—acceptable for those who perceive themselves as losers.

**Dahrendorf**  
the path to modernity leads through a valley of tears

Let me add a sociologist's comment to this contribution. A big problem in the process of modernization is that the road from traditional poverty to modern prosperity leads through a valley of tears. It seems to be a universal phenomenon that there will be a time when people have lost the traditional ties which they were used to without having found new structures in which to live a new kind of life. The rootlessness of people in the period when things went down for the majority before they went up was well depicted in Dickens' *Gin Houses*.

International organizations should pay more attention to this process, in which rootlessness, frustration, anger and envy blend into a dangerous mixture which makes people vulnerable to the appeal of demagogic leaders and fundamentalist ideologies.

**Hacke**

Lord Dahrendorf, your latest words show how difficult it is to discuss progress and pessimism because both lie in such close proximity to one another. Mr. Walter also made clear that, after the epochal changes of 1989-1990, we were at first enormously optimistic and thought that globalization could push the world out of its old Cold War stasis. It was a similar story, incidentally, before World War I, when people had a very optimistic outlook for the world during that era's globalization process.

nation-states continue to play a crucial role

I would like to discuss two developments in this context. First, the thesis that the significance of the nation-state is dwindling in the age of globalization, and second, the expectation that international organizations play a bigger role in the future. Mr. Walter, for example, has called for a world environmental office. And indeed, optimism regarding international institutions was very great for a certain time. As for the nation-state, there was a great deal of talk during the transitional period after the Cold War that they had increasingly served out their purpose, but



Hacke, Schulze,  
Czempiel

my experience is that they have adapted to the new environment more successfully than many would admit.

With the appearance of international terrorism, nation-states have proven that they continue to play an enormous role in securing the existence of their citizens as well as in shaping their people's identities. Walter Stützle just pointed out how important the nation-state was in the process of German reunification. Those who constantly sound the death knell for the nation-state are also disturbing the foundations of democracy and the rule of law, which now as before are guaranteed only in the nation-state.

Since Mr. Walter has raised the issue of selecting among market economy variants, the question that comes to my mind is: what variant will prevail in Europe? Capitalism or a market economy that is more closely related to the Scandinavian model? Or will it be the British-US model? This is without a doubt a central question if we are discussing whether our country is fit for globalization. In any case, the emergence of a regional European identity has nothing to do with anti-Americanism.

I might add that I have a great deal of empathy for the role of the United States as the world's policeman. Who else would have made the attempt, had not the Americans done so, to invigorate the process of globalization so as to spur economic growth on a global scale? Still, Europe and especially Germany could make important contributions to the makeup of a future world order.

This means, once again, that nation-states continue to hold foremost significance in our current world system. Germany is working harder than any other European country to promote the idea of community within EU thinking. This is not lost, by the way, on the Eastern Europeans, who see matters very much the same and have come to realize that they cannot prosper in isolation. In times of globalization and the struggle against terrorism, what we need is a policy combining the necessary self-assertion with understanding and sensitivity for those who have drawn the short end of the stick. If we can communicate to the people of the Developing World that we are serious about being a community, we might also succeed in tackling today's problems more effectively.

I would like to thank Mr. Walter because he touched on what I consider one of the most important issues facing international institutions in this period of accelerating globalization. One of the key consequences of this globalization is the ero-

the US as the world's policeman

**Averchev**  
globalization erodes  
sovereignty

Averchev,  
Schulze, Wolfson



global corporations and NGOs  
gain influence ...

sion of the nation-state's sovereignty. Nation-states are increasingly losing control not only over the democratic process but also over the global networks created by global corporations and NGOs. While all international institutions created after the Second World War are based on the assumption that the sovereign state is the basic element and only player on the international scene, this is no longer the case.

Often, global corporations play a more important role than many of the states now represented at the United Nations. The influence of global NGOs is also increasing. Take for example Greenpeace but also the new anti-globalization movement, or even al Qaeda, which represents a pathological type of NGO. We should regard the very appearance of these pathological cases as the result of a failure of the regulatory mechanisms created by the key players in the world after the Second World War.

Seen this way, we have to assume some part of the responsibility for what happened ourselves. This might give us a better perspective on the reform of our international institutions. Professor Walter mentioned a global environmental agency and a world agency regulating international finance as possible examples for such reforms.

... and should be represented  
in international institutions

However, we must address the question of how the new and increasingly important non-governmental players should be represented in these new international institutions. This is not even under discussion at present but it is an absolutely obvious requirement. Regardless of what is going on in international institutions, the global corporations are increasingly accepting responsibility and are aware of the global consequences of their actions.

I will give you an example. A company I have some knowledge of—BP—clearly understands that if they cause pollution in Angola they will lose markets in Europe because their European customers are increasingly aware of the importance of environmental protection and will punish BP by not buying their products. Therefore, BP has adopted a policy of exercising responsibility in all parts of the world.

In addition, BP's declared global policy is not to manipulate local politics in any country and not to bribe any politicians in order not to undermine the legitimacy of the governments in the eyes of their populations. It desires political stability and views democracy as creating the best conditions for its own business.

These examples of responsible non-governmental players, and BP is not alone,

Globalization, even as it erodes the power of nation-states, involves important decisions along the way.

Snyder

force us to think about how to integrate them into the new international institutions and how to give them a voice. This issue is absolutely new but it is not so easy to address given that traditional thinking only operates in terms of sovereign states.

Is there anybody here who could comment on another important pathological phenomenon of globalization: the whole world of drugs, all the way from farming through the various stages of its trade to consumption?

I have three brief remarks, but none about drugs, I am afraid.

First: a definition of globalization. I belong to that group of stubborn people who are not sure what globalization means. An elementary distinction is to be made at least among three kinds of globalization: the globalization of ideas, of goods and of people, by which I mean the free movement of people.

It strikes me that only those who have access to all three elements—ideas, goods and free movement—regard globalization as positive. Most people at this Round Table, except perhaps two, can take their personal free movement for granted. But most people in the world cannot actually move freely, and this makes it difficult for them to appreciate globalization.

Second, to repeat something Professor Schroeder said at the very beginning: Globalization, even as it erodes the power of nation-states, involves important decisions along the way. Globalization is sometimes used to avoid discussion about political choices. Oil dependency, for example, will in the long run be a challenge of globalization in both Europe and North America. But American dependence on Saudi oil is a choice, not a fact of nature. There are political reasons why there was little discussion about the link between Persian Gulf oil dependency, the Saudi regime, al Qaida and the attacks on New York. But the need for discussion exists and eventually it will take place.

Third, I want to express “cheers” for liberalism, to be more precise, “two cheers for liberalism as a norm.” The danger is to assume that globalization means the global spread of liberalism. But liberal principles are applied inconsistently and incompletely and this creates many of the injustices mentioned.

Take for example US protectionism vis-à-vis Latin America or EU policies towards its eastern neighbors in the early 90s. While we commonly speak of steel tariffs, their impact is really insignificant compared to our policies towards the

**Dahrendorf**

**Snyder**

globalization = movement of ideas, goods and people

political choices shape globalization

we should treat liberalism as a norm



south. Ultimately, liberalism is a norm as well as a fact. And many of these downsides of globalization might be remedied if we treated it as a norm.

**Dahrendorf**

Did I hear you say that all of us, except two, enjoy all the benefits of globalization? That will be a nice game!

**Bahr**

I listened to Mr. Walter's contribution with great enthusiasm and was in complete agreement with what Mr. Hirsch had to say. I would very much like to ask them both to comment on each other's ideas to see how the two fit together. That is my first point.

national governments have  
the task to shape globalization

The second is that we apparently all agree that the nation-state is on the one hand obsolete, yet on the other hand remains irreplaceable. Therefore I would like to ask both Mr. Walter and Mr. Hirsch to include the odd fact that the world's governments want to be re-elected in their thoughts on reconciling these points. In this respect governments are all the same. How are they supposed to justify relinquishing some of their authority if their people are not as mobile as their capital? Besides facing those developments that Mr. Walter and Mr. Hirsch have rightly called inevitable, national governments also have the legitimate task of shaping these processes so that they take place without too many complications and upheavals.

**Rahr**

mechanisms for  
shaping globalization?

I would like to endorse what Mr. Averchev has said and direct some questions at Mr. Walter and Mr. Hirsch on the institutions and mechanisms for shaping globalization. To what extent is globalization possible on all five continents? Is that imaginable? How will the global economy function when all the world's leading markets have joined the WTO? Would this kind of global economy function cooperatively, and will institutions for economic policy take the place of the old security-based institutions? Could the G8 completely replace the United Nations in the new, globalized world order and convene a kind of G8 Security Council for economic policy? Would international politics be then conducted by the foreign ministers of the leading countries or by international corporations?

We will have to consider the power of the Internet, that child of globalization par excellence, and to what extent it is unifying the world or making it harder to govern. The world could possibly be divided into three economic blocs over the longer term, NAFTA, the EU, and ASEAN. Yet other components of an institu-



tional order for globalization will develop in addition, for example a global security system that defends globalization from terrorism, and especially a transformed NATO in which Mexico, Russia, and Japan can take their places. Is this imaginable under the aegis of the hegemon America, which still determines almost singlehandedly whether countries like Russia or China can be permitted to join the WTO?

These are all, in my opinion, central issues that we will have to answer, and which I will now hand over to Mr. Walter and Mr. Hirsch.

Let me add to the long list of questions put to Ambassador Hirsch. I am not an economist, but I find it most discouraging that the past several decades seem only to have brought recognition that no successful model for development exists. There have, of course, been isolated cases of successful economic performance. But especially for the regions most severely affected by lack of development, no exemplary models stand out.

Take the World Bank. Every ten years or so it conducts a self-evaluation, admits that it relied on the wrong models and unveils a new model which it now proclaims will correct the errors and excesses of the previous decade. But then, ten years later, there is the familiar recognition that this model, too, was mistaken.

In addition, Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the Bank, has in his recent book (*Globalization and its Discontents*) demonstrated that the International Monetary Fund is no better. Maybe even more cynically than the World Bank, the IMF has been working with models which were considered from within the Fund to be unlikely to deliver the desired and indeed promised results. In view of this, while I recognize that sustainable development is an area that requires more attention, my question is: on what basis can we hope to make any progress? I think an answer to this question becomes much more difficult in the absence of a clear example of success.

I am now going to turn to our two introductory speakers in reverse order, and I am eager to learn from Ambassador Hirsch what he thought of Professor Walter's presentation.

Well, first I thought that there was no contradiction whatsoever between the two presentations. My own was an effort to open this up beyond the European-Ameri-

### **Caplan**

no successful model  
for development exists

### **Dahrendorf**

### **Hirsch**

coordinate international  
policies for development

can context but I think all of the issues of coming to grips with regulation in a more sustained and coherent way and so on, were very valid. So I do not see any contradiction between what Professor Walter said and my own remarks.

On the question what could be done about the absence of valid models for development raised by Mr. Bahr, Mr. Caplan and others: the World Bank and IMF are indeed struggling with this problem. One possible solution, and one recognized by the Secretary General of the UN, is to move the political-security and the development-trade agendas closer together. The World Bank, IMF and the UN are very compartmentalized. They have pursued separate, even contradictory policies and this has often proved very counterproductive.

The goal of development policies is not necessarily to level the playing field and bring everybody up to Western standards. Rather, it is to make life more viable on the ground in those countries that are in such dire straits. This involves also overcoming dictatorships and one-party states and providing people with access to basic services such as education. We have not even mentioned the gender issue here, for which education is so central. Minimal primary education, i.e. fundamental literacy, empowers women and will end much of the endless and terrible abuse which is one of the main underlying causes of AIDS.

encourage local  
development policies

In other words, much can be done and much more should be done at the local level. In development, less can be more. Smaller organizations operating on the ground like OXFAM are often much more successful than the big World Bank or USAID. Ideas to shift development work to the local level should therefore be encouraged.

Turning to the question whether the G8 will replace the UN, I do not think so. The phrase "forum shopping" is appropriate to describe the changing influence of different fora. That the G8 council does not have the last word was shown when Russia's opposition in the council did not stop NATO from acting in Kosovo.

To finish, let me come back to the issues of flexibility and openness, whose importance I stressed for the international system. What I said about the hubris to which Westerners often fall prey also applies to the economic side of globalization. Let me emphasize again that the West really needs to develop a partnership with those in the developing world who really want to change their dire status quo.

legitimate objections  
to globalization exist

The anti-globalization movement is, as Professor Litwak already mentioned, composed of a variety of groups with different interests. The protesters in the

streets of Seattle and Prague were certainly not all singing from the same hymn-sheet. And not all of them are equally serious. In fact, many of the more serious voices are not heard because they are blotted out by those who shout the loudest. But there are legitimate objections to globalization related to all the impediments to development that it has brought with it. The problem consists not only of immediate grievances, but also of a lack of perspective.

Let me add a comment on demographics because it pertains to the tensions between the “haves” and the “have-nots” I mentioned earlier. A demographer in New York recently drew a very stark picture: in 1900, one out of every four people was a European or Caucasian. In 2000, that ratio was one out of twelve and in 2050 it will be approximately one out of twenty.

These demographic developments have crucial security implications. The desire of young people in the developing world to move ahead in their lives will intensify pressures on the West to receive them. Unless living conditions improve in the developing world, no immigration restrictions and no border police will prevent people from seeking to come to the US and Europe.

Thirty or 40 years are a blip on the screen of history. In other words, we will face these demographic realities the day after tomorrow in historical terms. That is why we have to address them today.

demographics have  
security implications

Allow me to answer some of the questions that have been directed at me and simultaneously comment on a few statements we have heard. Mr. Litwak has maintained that, in many places, the Bretton Woods institutions are regarded not as legitimizing globalization, but the Americanization of the world, as its critics see it. This is partially accurate to be sure, but I think that intellectuals’ criticism of globalization’s effects should come as no surprise. Intellectuals looked with a degree of contempt at the commercial world even in ancient Greece. Yet we economists should be careful with our judgements.

I have derived some of my opinions from the work of the American economist Albert O. Hirschmann, who once said that in decision-making, the “vote by voice” is certainly important. For many processes, however, what counts in the final tally is what is decided in the “vote by purse.” Such “votes” are more reliable, one can base production plans on them, which is less true of surveys. Yet a person’s most important decision is the “vote by exit,” namely what he attaches himself to, a company or the country he lives in. This “voting with the feet” occurred—as we

**Walter**



could observe—for those that have opened their markets and built up a system of competition. The Chinese always retain a bond with China, but the Indian who leaves India never returns.

I think that we should not base our analysis on the West's sometimes dubious definitions of poverty, but on the existential decisions that people make. A country's vital statistics shed more light on the people's confidence and how they regard their own situations than does much other data. Here in Germany, for example, we could have gleaned much from how negatively people in the country's East regarded the future in the 1990s by examining the region's marriage- and birth rates.

changing people's attitudes  
toward globalization

How can we change people's often negative attitudes toward globalization? Mr. Krastev showed how badly experts are needed to explain the system of a global economy with an open division of labor in a manner that is comprehensible to the famous "man off the street." We make the mistake of talking mostly with people that have a background in macroeconomics as we do. This makes for a poor basis for the political process described by Mr. Bahr—how is one going to win elections with this kind of concept? There might be many causes, for instance inadequate educational and research facilities or the emphasis on professional instead of social competencies. But the media, too, fail to do their part in this respect.

Nobody should expect miracles, but with the limited resources available to us, we should at least make some facts clear to people, for example that those who fight against open markets wind up on the losing side. If you look at the last 50 years, you can see conclusively that people in countries that have cut themselves off from globalization are more disadvantaged than in those countries that have been more open.

compensation for those  
negatively affected

I must add, however, that, for example, closing down coal mines in England because it is better for the country's future can only gain political support if one compensates those immediately affected by this kind of structural change. Those disadvantaged by the construction of an airport should also be compensated. To make progress possible in an economic and democratic process, we cannot avoid making these compensations.

This means that, without a doubt, the nation-state loses some clout in the process, yet remains significant, for how else should trust be cultivated during all the changes that globalization brings in its wake? How the nation-state should operate in a new political and economic global order cannot be answered

We should only retain the nation-state in those respects where it is still capable of acting. Otherwise we should forget any illusions we have had about maintaining sovereignty and – in order to stay sovereign – play the European card.

Walter

abstractly. And the answer to this question is much different in a gigantic state like the United States than in small ones, which in comparison to the US do not even look like “states” but at best “countries.” This also applies to most European countries.

This means that our European nation-states have largely sacrificed their sovereignty in many ways and, for this reason, are forced by their own interests to delegate more tasks to a higher—European—authority. Which reminds me, for example, of the pseudo-debate over the European Central Bank and European monetary policy. European monetary policy was, in fact, already long in the hands of the German Bundesbank. The central banks of other member states had hardly any decision-making influence. Therefore it made political sense to institutionally enshrine the state of affairs that already existed as a fact. For reasons like this, we should only retain the nation-state in those respects where it is still actually capable of acting. Otherwise we should forget any illusions we have had about maintaining sovereignty and—in order to stay sovereign—play the European card.

There is no sense, for instance, in insisting on national immigration policies in Europe, even though we all know we have a common outer frontier and do not question the free movement of people within the Union. That means that Europe needs a pan-European immigration policy. And why does this Europe refuse to recognize an institution such as Europol that can enable police to cooperate effectively across Europe? Once again, I support having a strong nation-state where it is capable of acting and is needed.

Since we spoke earlier of competition between market economy variants, I would like to ask what variants are under discussion, the Swedish, English, German, French? I certainly regard many answers that continental Europe has to offer regarding present challenges as obsolete. There is no such thing as a “Rhineland market economy,” as it is so often deceptively called. Some of continental Europe’s states consume 50 percent or more of their respective financial resources. Perhaps “market economy” is no longer the right term to describe them. The consequence is that the individual is deprived of any incentive to take responsibility for securing his or her own existence. The state is handed that responsibility instead. This kind of system will sooner or later become untenable, in my opinion. I think Germany will not be able to avoid coming closer to the Anglo-American system. Now, this does not mean that we have to adopt the United States’ health insurance system. Neither could the social security net be organized along American lines.

retain the nation-state  
only where it can act

moving toward the  
American economic model

There, people have for centuries depended much more on private charity. If we try to copy this all at once, we would fail.

The advantages of the Anglo-American model are that it uses capital more rationally and provides incentives for individuals, besides steering the labor market better. On the other hand, the medical system in the USA is substantially more costly than those in European countries and will become untenably expensive as the population grows older. Yet we will not be able to hold onto the German model either, because it is far too regulated and does not encourage people enough to take responsibility upon themselves.

corporations should develop  
global standards

What role could corporations play in a globalized order? Some, like BP, have acknowledged that they have to develop internal standards to grow over the longer term and secure their future. Major internationally present and technologically advanced companies that have the necessary wherewithal also meet this demand. Yet Germany's shipyards and the French agricultural sector, for example, behave differently. Here, we need a framework for order and a global organization that helps to overcome structures that stubbornly stand in the way of globalization.

As for the buzzword "ethical investments," I think that anyone active in financial services who does not take this field into consideration will get into trouble. The story is different, however, regarding companies that are not subject to international competition and are closely associated with their respective national governments. Here, vested interests dominate and, as Mancur Olsen has said, can only be disrupted by war or revolution. In Europe, on the other hand, I see the possibility that the European Commission, or the challenge of permitting other countries into our markets, could break the old protectionist structures.

I have no solution to how we should come to grips with the problem of drug abuse. Yet the US policy of prohibition and the organized crime that it has begotten should be a lesson to us that excessive regulation obviously does not produce the desired results. Here, as in the health care system, many questions remain unanswered.

sustainable development?

What stances will nation-states take in the future? An example was mentioned earlier regarding the autonomy of oil. We will indeed have to face the question much more seriously of how the world is going to deal with non-renewable resources and environmental damage. The solutions we have so far are unsatisfactory to be sure, particularly the American ones. Yet condensing these issues into a format suitable for an article in the New York Times, for example, is extraordi-

narily difficult, as I myself have found out. I think it is incumbent on us academics to clarify also for American citizens the decisions that have to be made so that more people will accept the global order.

With these recommendations for adapting the global economic order, I have sought to make clear where I agree with Mr. Hirsch, Mr. Bahr. I would also like to say, however, in what respect my standpoint is not that of Mr. Hirsch, namely that of his critical remarks on “consumism.” In this field I accept the people’s choices. Not because I think they are good; I often think they are just as terrible, as does Mr. Hirsch, and I fail to understand, for example, how people could waste their time watching stupid television programs. And I cannot understand how all these homogenized products actually sell. I wish people had more taste. Yet I do not demand that society “educate” its people in this direction. That is the job of parents, the immediate environment, and the educational system. Any other method would be doomed to failure.

Whether all five continents could be incorporated into the process of globalization is a difficult question, Mr. Rahr. I think that for the coming 30 years, globalization will continue to be limited to America, Europe, and substantial parts of Asia, while Africa will remain outside for the time being. Only when the European population continues to shrink substantially will we see mass immigration from Africa. And only then will the integration of the continent get on the agenda.

At that point we will have to begin dealing constructively with Islam and comprehend that Islam is not synonymous with fundamentalism. Africa and the Middle East will be the two regions of the world that will provide Europe with gigantic resources of human capital in the future.

not all regions will participate  
in globalization

### III. Common Roots—Common Future? Transatlantic Partnership in the 21st Century



**Dahrendorf** Welcome back to the last round of our discussions about European and American perspectives on the new world order of the 21st century. This morning we have the great pleasure of welcoming Karsten Voigt who is professionally concerned with the difficult issues we have focused on since yesterday morning. I think it would be appropriate for us to listen to him and to Professor Wells and then enter into our concluding debate concerning the future of the transatlantic relationship and its position in the wider international context.

I would also like to hear about the so-called anti-globalization movement which Professor Walter quite plausibly dismissed as being incoherent, confused and of no particular interest but which nevertheless is there.

**Voigt** I would like to preface my remarks with a retrospective observation that during my career, people in transatlantic circles were concerned at my election to the Bundestag, just as that parliament worried about my comments that criticized America. You see where I stand today, and with this in mind we should not be overly concerned at transatlantic differences of opinion, but instead remain aware of the possibilities that an interactive learning process can provide.

transatlantic relations  
are stable, but ...

In my opinion, given our mutual interests and the conflicts we face, transatlantic relations are so stable that both sides have an interest in maintaining them. Governments that do not follow this course will sooner or later pay the price economically. This economic aspect of the situation is often underestimated. There are, in addition, significant differences, of which Mr. Ischinger probably knows more than I do, between the conduct of the Bush Administration and the US Congress, public opinion, and the debates going on in think-tanks.

news coverage is  
disquieting

I will begin with the US media's news coverage, where we can indeed see disquieting tendencies. "Euro-bashing" is on the rise in America. People talk about "EU eunuchs" and, as is always the case with prejudice, put individually accurate observations into a false context. The reappearance of rightist populism and anti-Semitic incidents in a series of European countries is regarded as the problems of the 1920s reincarnated. That France is more the focus this time of the US media's criticism than Germany should be no cause for relief, because the situation could change at any time. On the German side, the prejudice is exemplified by a recent "Spiegel" cover—about which I have spoken with the magazine's editors at length—of Rambos and cowboys. This image is entirely inaccurate. The Bush Administration's planning follows the logic of its strategies with extraordinary



consistency, and implements it with a cool head. This was also the case, incidentally, during Gulf War I and especially in Afghanistan, where the Americans by no means “shot from the hip.”

Yet there do exist some points of transatlantic contention that I will briefly describe here.

One important point is that, to put it somewhat drastically, many people in the US consider themselves at war, and not only formally. In formal terms, according to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, we are at war too, but Europeans do not regard the situation this way. Yesterday, a liberal friend of mine in the United States told me the current situation was comparable to the state of America in 1939–1940, when British visitors to the US could not comprehend how a peaceful daily routine could simply go on there while, at home, the country was waging war against Hitler. Today the situation is, in a certain way, reversed. The Americans are at war and the Europeans refuse to recognize it.

Americans are at war and  
Europeans refuse to recognize it

The second aspect is that many people believe that what we are currently hearing from the Bush Administration is mere rhetoric. That is wrong. The conflict with the ideologies behind the terrorists that have attacked the United States really is being compared with the historical conflicts with fascism-Nazism or Marxism-Leninism. The Administration regards this conflict, in contrast to the view held by many Europeans, as a long-term concern that has fundamental implications for the existence of the free world.

Third, I meet more and more Americans who question the European position towards Israel and see badly confused values behind it, not just differing assessments of interests and methods. Our impression, these observers say—their opinion is not what I encounter everywhere, and I purposely exaggerate the stance somewhat—that some Europeans are willing to question Israel’s long-term right to exist, just to keep their own Middle East relations stable and quiet. I am then confronted with the accusation that this kind of stance is similar to that which Britain and France held towards Czechoslovakia in 1938. And as I said, this is not the opinion of just a few lunatics or cult members, but of people who have to be taken seriously.

Americans question Europe’s  
stance towards Israel

I mention these points at the beginning because in discussing the transatlantic relationship we often talk only about multilateralism or unilateralism, meaning the Bush Administration’s conduct. This is, I think, misguided, because in reality the Americans have never renounced acting alone in the first place, and

Soutou,  
Smyser, Voigt



multilateralism is dictated by interests

second, there is always the question of the relative combination of multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateral action.

We Germans have not only practiced multilateralism as an ideology but out of our own interest as well. When the Two-Plus-Four negotiations got underway, we did not say either that we wanted all our former war enemies at the table. The Poles experienced for themselves during a certain phase of the talks how little they were welcome. When our national interests were at stake, we tried to have at the table those players we regarded as immediately relevant. Multilateralism springs both from differing perceptions of multilateralism and differing capacities for exercising influence. The Europeans, and especially the Germans, can only act multilaterally, while the Americans have multilateral and bilateral options, can build ad hoc coalitions, or, if needed, act alone.

America will be more multilateral  
if Europe grows stronger

Robert Kagan portrayed these facts in his excellent essay “Power and Weakness” (*Policy Review*, No. 113 June/July 2002) that was recently published. Interestingly, he describes multilateralism as the stance that the Americans took in the early 19th century, when they used this strategy against the British, whereas today the Europeans act multilaterally as an expression of their weakness relative to the United States and attempt to co-opt the Americans in the process. I believe that this is not inevitable, because Germany has also grown more multilateral after reunifying and becoming stronger. And finally, I also believe that multilateralism serves US interests. In any case we can assume that more multilateralism can be encouraged in America once we Europeans have grown stronger. We cannot solve the problem of European weakness, however, by criticizing the US, but only by expanding Europe’s scope for action, particularly in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Certainly, we should avoid overly theoretical discussions, as for example on the subject of “nation-building.” The same Republicans who rejected the idea of nation-building during the election are the same people conducting the same in Afghanistan. They also know that, in case of a war in Iraq, they would not be able to quickly enter and then exit the country, but would have to conduct nation-building there afterwards. Anyone who talks to specialists in the United States, and many such people are sitting around this table today, knows that these issues surrounding “the day after” are being discussed with the same high intensity in the United States as here in Europe.

It seems remarkable to me that both sides of the transatlantic alliance have

for the last 200 years defined themselves, on the one hand, as continents that are more closely aligned than any other parts of the world—something that was demonstrated in the reaction to 9/11—yet have also always defined themselves in opposition to one another. The majority of Americans are still descended from European immigrants and have therefore carried on certain attitudes and stereotypes regarding Europe.

Europe and the US define themselves in opposition to one another

The Europeans, on the other hand, have displayed various manifestations of rightist or leftist anti-Americanism in recent decades, although I must say that in Eastern Germany I often get the impression that the image there of the USA has less to do with the writings of Karl Marx—who had a thoroughly positive assessment of the United States, its capitalist potential, and was in favor of globalization—than by the popular 19th century German author Karl May, who portrayed most Americans in a completely different way, as greedy cowboys who were counterbalanced by Old Shatterhand and Old Surehand, wise heroes who had come from Europe. These are very stubborn stereotypes on both sides of the Atlantic that we have to live with.

Allow me in conclusion to turn to economic matters. If you look at the economic data, you will see that, despite all the talk about Asia, America is much more tightly bound economically to Europe. And not only the USA as a whole, each individual state except for one trades more with Europe than with Asia. Europe is by far the biggest source of investment, not Asia. And even in the one exceptional state I mentioned, Washington State, the net production in trade is bigger with Europe than with Asia.

When travelling through the American heartland, one will of course meet people who know nothing about Europe. These kinds of people, only in reverse, are also supposed to exist in Europe, I have occasionally been told. Yet when I am in the United States, I meet people again and again who work for European companies, and therefore it is wrong to just look at the constantly dwindling number of soldiers. The latter might be regrettable, but in the end it is also a sign of success because of a reduced military threat. Finally, one has to look at the growing economic interdependence of the two sides. European companies now provide more jobs in the United States than do American companies in Europe. This leads to an enormous quantity of links—and for this reason alone, because of mutual economic interests, any policy would fail that seeks to decouple Europe or Germany from the United States.

transatlantic economic cooperation is strong

The United States was much more deeply wounded by the terrorist attacks of September 11th than many people here in Europe realize.

Voigt

cultural and academic exchange possibilities

Also important is the number of cultural and academic exchange possibilities that are directly related to the points of economic contact. These numbers, incidentally, are rising, not shrinking. Unfortunately, those with a knowledge of German are becoming fewer, but the exchange opportunities are on the rise. This is what brings me to the conclusion that both sides, the United States and Europe, can only be successful together. Our solidarity is a precondition for global security and stability. In the economic field, this is utterly clear at the level of the WTO as well, and if we work against each other, the Europeans and finally the Americans will find out that most problems cannot be solved unilaterally at all or only with great difficulty. The Middle East is a typical example that, even during times of cooperation not all problems can be solved at once. Yet the vital point is that we have to try.

In closing, I would like to say that, based on many conversations I have had and places I have visited, the United States was much more deeply wounded by the terrorist attacks of September 11th than many people here in Europe realize. The comparison with Pearl Harbor is more of an understatement than an exaggeration. Had the towers of the World Trade Center been destroyed when they were fully occupied, the number of those killed would have approached that of the Korean War. The US capital was the scene of an enemy attack for the first time since British troops entered Washington in 1814. Europeans can only vaguely comprehend the wounds this has left behind for the Americans. At the same time, US self-confidence has grown enormously, which is something that many Europeans seem to have a hard time coping with.

after September 11th Americans think in terms of black and white

Even if I largely agree with the Americans that what they are fighting—whether it be terrorism or Saddam Hussein—is a manifestation of evil, I still have difficulties, as a socialist or social democrat marked by Lutheranism, with the pronouncements of a country saying it represents nothing but what is good and right. This categorization in good and evil, the tendency to ignore gray areas and think instead exclusively in terms of black and white is difficult to comprehend for many Europeans, including myself.

**Wells**  
improving transatlantic cooperation

I want to lay out a specific program for the improvement of transatlantic cooperation. My arguments may sound modest and axiomatic to a European audience, but believe me they would find numerous contestants and antagonists within the US administration, the research institutions of Washington and the United States more broadly.

My basic premises are the following: First, the United States needs allies to accomplish its goals in international affairs. Second, Europe is heavily committed to its internal construction and will not have significant additional funds for defense over the next decade. Third, in addition to the widely discussed social, economic, educational and health concerns, the world still has serious security problems. And finally, improved transatlantic cooperation is a necessary means to protect and advance our mutual interests.

As a precondition for taking specific steps to improve transatlantic cooperation, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must recognize the need for allies in the fight against terrorism and in addressing the opponents of globalization. As Karsten Voigt just indicated, this point needs no emphasis in Europe. But it needs a lot of emphasis in the United States. Several initiatives could be taken to facilitate the acknowledgement of our need for one another.

acknowledge our need  
for one another

To begin with, there need to be much more frequent consultations between the governments on both sides of the Atlantic. These have to be not just hurried meetings in times of crises but regular consultations about objectives and strategies. These are hard to organize and time is short, but they are very much needed.

consultations between governments  
and parliamentarians

More importantly, parliamentarians from both sides need to meet more often for open-ended dialogue. Some of the organizations represented here try to promote such exchanges. Among them the Körber Foundation tried very hard to get parliamentarians to attend this meeting. It is an indication of the basic problem that very few accepted the invitation.

Legislators need to understand that many solutions for the national problems they are preoccupied with reside in an improved international environment. Especially in the US Congress, they also have to be reminded very strongly that, in short, foreign policy matters.

To improve the environment of transatlantic relations, we also need to encourage exchanges between academics, NGO representatives and citizens. We need to prevent the erosion of the level of contact that served us well during the Cold War years, and we need to halt the trend of taking one another for granted.

exchanges between academics,  
NGO representatives and citizens

I would now like to turn to specific measures. In the area of defense and intelligence, the United States and Europe must acknowledge that a resource gap exists, that it matters and that it will not be narrowed for quite a long time. As no significant new funding for defense and intelligence seems to be forthcoming on

European division of  
labor in security affairs

the European side, Europe has to reform its security, police and defense establishments significantly to create capabilities for autonomous and for joint operations with the United States.

This can only be achieved through a sharply increased division of labor. Europe does not need fifteen or, heaven help us, twenty-five artillery divisions or fighter wings and it must stop funding separate specialized units.

This proposition is very simple, but it will be hard to implement. National leaders, politicians and defense establishments will resist giving up their autonomy. But if you wish to have a European defense partnership that can carry its weight in certain areas with the United States, there must be consolidation.

cooperative mechanisms  
against WMDs

In addition, we need new cooperative mechanisms to meet the threat of weapons of mass destruction. While political elites have failed to acknowledge the magnitude of the threat, globalization and the development of high technology have produced an extremely dangerous world. New communication technologies confront defense and intelligence analysts as well as policymakers with higher levels of unpredictability. They make strategic surprise, such as occurred on September 11th, much more likely.

Because of this, greater US-European cooperation is required, especially in the following three areas: First, we should develop much better techniques of threat assessment, including the analysis of strategic cultures and the development of threat scenarios across departments and services. In the bid to refine threat assessment, we could start with the numerous separate agencies within the US government, but we could also further the exchange with our European allies.

Secondly, we should reinforce the current non-proliferation regime. Next to improved anti-proliferation safeguards and inspections, this would school new members and provide windows into their strategic thinking. The US administration needs to change its attitude and policy significantly in this area.

In doing so, we need to devote special attention to biological warfare research and analysis. Unlike nuclear research, biotechnology is privatized and decentralized. Therefore, many specialists see biological weapons as the most likely and most dangerous source of follow-up attacks. In terms of weapons research, inventories of material, and response capability we are least well-prepared in this area. And there is a particular lack of intellectual infrastructure and awareness of these



problems among political leaders. Tackling them thus calls for a particularly high degree of joint research and policy formulation between Europe and the United States.

Thirdly, we should develop a new and invigorated division of labor to address the global issues of developmental assistance, epidemics and health crises, international economics and financial crises.

We discussed some of these issues yesterday afternoon and saw that Europe has taken the lead on a number of these problems. The United States, by contrast, could engage itself more forcefully, even though it has provided leadership in international financial crises, as Norbert Walter pointed out.

The United States and Europe need to provide cooperative global leadership in the areas of trade and financial policy. Common standards of accountancy and transparency as well as more thorough information sharing are needed most urgently. These objectives are hard to attain and will require much consultation with, or even education of, the US Congress.

Many opportunities for improving transatlantic cooperation and creating a productive partnership exist, of which I have only mentioned a small number. Many leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are prepared to seize these opportunities and those who share this aspiration must work to see that our leaders move in this direction rather than respond to the pressures of electoral politics and narrow national interests.

I want to thank both our speakers for their contributions on the future of transatlantic relations and their place in the evolving world system.

I fully support Professor Wells' statement concerning the need for more transatlantic exchange. This subject is very serious, because something has changed compared to the immediate post-World War II period and even the later stages of the Cold War, in which a regular transatlantic interchange took place.

Given how difficult it seems to be for congressmen and other policy-makers to travel to Europe, I am pleasantly surprised that so many Americans are attending this conference. But in general I suspect it will be easier to transport European fora for debate such as Ditchley, of which I am a governor, to the United States rather than get Americans to come to Europe.

Another point on the agenda for the future, which has emerged from our discussions, is the need to create a tangible European reality. For only then can

tackle the global questions of development, health and economics together

## **Dahrendorf**

need to create a tangible European reality

We should have a division of labor by design rather than by default.

Dahrendorf

Europe be recognized as a significant factor in a transatlantic relationship which may have had difficult patches before but is certainly going through a particularly difficult period now.

division of labor

When considering the question of common projects to be addressed by the transatlantic partners, Professor Wells emphasized again the issue of a division of labor. A key point here is that we should have a division of labor by design rather than by default. In other words, we should design a division of labor rather than just accept one dictated by the refusal of European parliaments to authorize more funds for defense. I hope we will have a fruitful discussion on these and other issues over the next few hours.

**Schroeder**

a more flexible definition of terrorism

I would like to add a historical footnote on terrorism in response to its means-focused definition. In historical terms, a definition of terrorism as the use of violence against non-combatants and the attempt to kill as many people as possible in order to destroy society does not make sense. It is both too narrow, leaving out many organizations that have undoubtedly been terrorist, and too broad, making terrorists of many organizations and people whom we would not want to designate as such.

Major terrorist organizations of the 19th century, like People's Will or the Combat Organization of the Social Revolutionary party in Imperial Russia, did not target what they considered to be civilians. They targeted the government and its officials, especially the higher ones. Yet they were undoubtedly terrorist in their methods and aims, principally assassinations and bombings designed to destabilize the regime; they caused a good deal of damage and havoc, and while unsuccessful themselves they clearly helped pave the way for ultimate outbreaks of revolution in Russia in 1905 and 1917. Much the same could be said of the FLN in Algeria or other terrorist groups in the world in more recent times.

At the same time, if we took literally this definition that terrorism consists in the deliberate targeting of civilian populations for the sake of destabilizing a society and destroying its capacity to resist, then the British and American air forces in World War II were two of the biggest terrorist organizations in the history of the world. The same would apply to many armies in other wars of the modern era. In my view, we should abandon this definition or at least apply it very carefully. Indeed, we may in some cases have to resort to a functional definition of terrorism or to a "Justice Potter Stewart" definition. Stewart was a Justice of the US

Terrorism — “I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it.”

Schroeder

Supreme Court who said of pornography: “I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it.”

I think that it would be better to remain flexible when trying to define who is or who is not a terrorist rather than attempt for the sake of a supposed moral clarity to reach a single clear-cut definition.

I would like to make only two brief points. First, I am more optimistic about the future of transatlantic relations than some of my colleagues here because I am pessimistic about the future with regard to the demographic trends mentioned by Ambassador Hirsch. The population growth in poorer countries will inevitably force the United States and Europe to cooperate in addressing the major problems caused by it. Beyond terrorism, both sides will have to act on, instead of just talking about, the growing gap between rich and poor. Whether we like it or not, this will mark the future of our cooperation. Essentially, however, neither Americans nor Europeans have yet come up with the strategies required for dealing with it.

Let me add another point on globalization. Many people dismiss the anti-globalization movement. While the movement is incoherent and a hodge-podge of disparate forces, we have to take it seriously as an expression of discontentment. The economist David Dollar makes a persuasive argument that open international trade not only decreases the prosperity divide between states, but also reduces poverty within states. “Yes, but”—we also need to see that even within the United States it becomes increasingly difficult for millions to survive as a result of globalization.

This fact has been compellingly described by the journalist Barbara Ehrenreich, who has looked at how difficult it is to “make it” in America on low-wage jobs in the wake of globalization. We should not neglect this aspect.

My comment relates to “The Contours of a New World Order.” To my great concern, our discussion yesterday focused on the question of “who cooks and who does the dishes,” with the Americans suggesting that they did the cooking and that the Europeans were left with the rest. In my opinion, diplomats do the cooking. When they do it well, as in Vienna in 1815, there is peace. When they do it badly, as they did at Versailles in 1919, there is war.

I believe that the attack of September 11th would not have happened if we had built a decent international system in the 1990s. We should therefore stop worry-

**Shore**

common interests require  
US-European cooperation

taking the anti-globalization  
movement seriously

**Smyser**

Europe and the US need to  
create a better world order  
to prevent terrorism



ing about “who does the dishes and who does the cooking.” Instead, we should try to cook together because creating a better international system is our only chance to prevent further attacks.

Let me be more specific on this point. If the United States and its allies had worked together to help Afghanistan after the Soviet departure, there would have never been any room for Taliban or for Al Qaeda to operate there. After the Afghan people had defeated their Soviet occupiers, we abandoned them. We may have thanked them a little bit for their help but then we cut our aid for the country and our political support for a new government. So the Taliban took over and invited Osama Bin Laden. The West, and especially the United States, must accept the responsibility for permitting Al Qaeda to have a base from which to attack us.

The Americans at present are not ready to build a new world order because they are too preoccupied with the war they are involved in. Interestingly enough, the Europeans are building this new world order, or are at least doing what is possible, by expanding the European Union. My conversations with Ambassador Reiter and Dr. Krastev showed to me the importance of this process, which nobody should underestimate. My hope is that the Americans will support this process and that we will regard the transatlantic relationship as an integral part of it. Building a new world has to become our first priority.

Europe needs to provide global  
diplomatic leadership

I am sorry to say this as an American, but the Europeans should start to take the initiative. My worry is less about the state of European military integration than about European readiness to provide diplomatic leadership across the world. For this is a role which the United States, for reasons that have very little to do with the ability of our people or even those in our government, is unable to fulfill at this point.

This conference leaves me very discouraged. We are arguing senselessly but very sharply about specific roles and policies when we should be working together to build a new world after the Cold War and after September 11, 2001. If we continue to argue, no new world can ever come about, and both Europe and the United States will be the losers.

economics: honesty is crucial

Let me add a comment about economics. Honesty is the key word mentioned by Norbert Walter yesterday. As a matter of fact the American market is falling and falling as people lose trust in the system. Jack Welch had used dishonest methods to boost the stock-market value of General Electric. The stock has now fallen by

If we continue to argue, no new world can ever come about,  
and both Europe and the United States will be the losers.

Smyser

half. IBM, another major company, has fallen by almost half. I am not even going to talk about ENRON or Andersen—you have all read about the scandals.

As people are beginning to lose trust in the system, capital is fleeing from productive purposes. If trust is wholly lost, we will witness an economic storm which will sweep away all efforts to build a new order. John Hirsch yesterday mentioned that we are ungenerous. But you have not seen real un-generosity until we have a global recession.

Time is running out. The message of this conference, and I hope that the planning staff of the State Department and the Auswärtiges Amt take note of this, is that we have to get to work. We should not worry about what little wars we fight and what little systems we change, but make sure that we build a new international system comparable to that of the Congress of Vienna before events take over that can sweep us away.

Let me make a brief point about an important aspect we did not discuss yesterday: the effect of September 11th on European domestic politics. There have been various studies about its effect on American domestic politics, but I believe that in at least three important ways it is also going to the core of European domestic politics.

It is too easy to say that September 11th caused the rise of right-wing parties in Europe. But it gave rise to a totally new type of sensitivity and it legitimized the sense of insecurity that was already there—not only in the United States but also in Europe. This has implications for the internal security agenda in most European countries. One result of the increased sense of insecurity will for example be that anti-immigrant sentiments will gain legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.

A second important development can best be observed in the Netherlands: the “Hollywood version” of liberalism, where values never conflict and you never have to choose between them, has lost its validity. If there was a conflict between people like Ronald Dworkin and Isaiah Berlin, then on September 11th Isaiah Berlin won the day.

Now, one has to accept that values sometimes have to be sacrificed. If tolerance was the primary value of a Dworkinian version of liberalism, many people will now say that some values might be more important than tolerance. It might be much more important to insist on what you believe in rather than just accept and tolerate what people around you believe in. This constitutes an important change in attitude.

we have to get to work

**Krastev**

effects of September 11th on  
European domestic politics:

shift to the right

decline in tolerance



common Western position  
no longer given

A third problem arises for the eastern European countries and the Balkans. This stems from the fact that now, for the first time since 1989, a common Western position is no longer given.

Right now, the seven prime ministers in the NATO accession countries have one common nightmare: what would happen if, on September 1st, there were an American strike on Iraq and the European Union decided not to follow? What position should they take? How would they present it vis-à-vis their own and western public opinion? They know very well that the NATO accession treaties will not be ratified by the US Senate if there is no clear sense of east European solidarity. But without a common European-American position this would be difficult for east European leaders especially for governments which have problems communicating with their own societies.

Let me end by saying that I absolutely agree with Professor Wells that it is extremely important to coordinate our development policies. The temptation for Europe is to refuse paying the price of anti-Americanism which quite obviously has to be paid, particularly in some Islamic countries. Europe could try to distance itself and play the good cop against the bad cop. This game can be successful if it results from coordinated policies. But if Europe's policy were perceived as a conscious way of capitalizing on anti-American sentiments which are rising in certain parts of the world, then that could be very damaging to transatlantic relations.

**Czempiel**  
transatlantic relations  
are close, but not stable

I essentially agree with all previous speakers regarding the solidarity of transatlantic relations; yet I am still sceptical because relations between Europe and the United States may be very close indeed, but that does not necessarily make them stable. Their markets are partially integrated, to a greater extent than under the terms of US-European economic relations, and we have a partial integration of military forces in NATO that has been remarkably successful. That means that a partial integration of security structures has also evolved, even though it consists of an asymmetrical distribution of power with the USA as the dominant power on the one side and a relatively large number of minor European powers on the other. In contrast to the economic sphere, a symmetry of relations is missing in military affairs, as well as the prerequisites for settling problems that crop up on either side without conflict.

We are trying—and here I can only underscore what Mr. Voigt has said—to rem-



edy this European weakness through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In other words, Europe has to catch up in security matters so that one day the United States and the European Union will be two roughly equal political entities that cooperate closely without being dependent on one another.

I have already pointed out that what we need in the Atlantic alliance is a *political* organization. What we see today could be described in the terminology of realism as a classic hegemonic rivalry. Europe is working to balance out America's preponderance, but Europe is behaving in a manner that could certainly be called a hegemonic rivalry.

I have no doubts that, in the medium term, Europe's efforts to counterbalance the United States will be successful and that it will achieve a state in security matters comparable to the one it already has in trade. Our close relations exhibit a high degree of interdependence. What we do not have is a facility that would coordinate the two sides, and that holds the danger of destabilizing our ties. For this reason, I urge once again that we consider how the transatlantic community, which is already so closely enmeshed in economic, political, and security matters, can establish a common organization that would permit difficulties to be discussed and solutions to be analyzed.

I would not be as alarmist as Professor Czempiel, but I do want to raise a question related to Karsten Voigt's remarks on Europe's problems.

Mr. Voigt rightly pointed out that Europe needed to be able to act more and more effectively. He also stressed that criticism would not help to overcome the problems. While I believe that this point is valid, it raises the question of how we should deal with our differences.

During the war in Kosovo for example—and I was an American living in Europe at the time—the constructive criticism voiced by Germany and others proved very valuable. This criticism did not impede effective action but nonetheless was heard by the US, who led the war and took it into account.

For instance, many Europeans emphasized the singularity of the campaign in Kosovo as well as the importance of the rule of law, including the importance of returning the matter to the UN Security Council, as indeed occurred with the adoption of Resolution 1244. This was a healthy antidote to the position of some Americans who argued that Kosovo should be seen as a precedent for future unilateral actions that would bypass the Security Council. At the same time, this form

the Atlantic alliance needs  
a political organization

## Caplan

how should the US and Europe  
deal with their differences?



Reiter,  
Stelzenmüller, Caplan

... through constructive criticism

of criticism did not constrain the United States and its allies to the point where they were unable to act effectively.

Through measured and constructive criticism, Europe can indeed make a contribution. There is no reason to think that allies cannot have their differences. It is a question not of sublimating these differences or of ignoring them but of learning how to turn them to mutual advantage by, for instance, adapting the purposes and modus operandi of multilateral organizations in a way that reflects changed circumstances (the end of the Cold War) and somewhat divergent orientations within a framework of common values. But that requires recognition of allies as partners—not necessarily equal partners but partners all the same.

**Wright**  
threats to NATO

I want to talk about institutions and specifically about the risks NATO as a military alliance is confronted with. In connection with Professor Soutou's thoughtful presentation on the circumstances in which institutions can fail, I would like to discuss three threats to NATO as a military alliance.

The first threat is the preference of the US for what are, at least from their perspective, more flexible and controllable coalition arrangements. Secondly: the expansion of NATO—which is to be welcomed for many reasons—makes its management more complex and provokes the danger that the alliance might degenerate to no more than a political talking shop and lose its principal focus in military planning. Thirdly: the desire of the Europeans to establish a security and defense identity linked to the EU. This needs to be underpinned by an effective military planning system to be meaningful. Obviously, a parallel European security system holds immense dangers for NATO and all three mentioned threats reinforce each other.

NATO's demise would be terrible, as:

Why should this be a concern? If NATO has accomplished what it was established to do, should we mourn its potential demise as a military alliance? You will not be surprised to hear from a British participant that I feel very strongly that we should mourn this potential demise.

NATO ensures effective  
dialogue on security

To begin with, NATO remains the principle mechanism for ensuring an effective dialogue in the area of security between the US and Europe. Europe's participation in NATO's practical military component allows it to speak with some authority to the Americans and ensures that they are at least to some extent prepared to listen. This avenue for dialogue could become endangered by the American reluctance to rely on NATO as opposed to ad hoc coalitions for the conduct of specific operations.

Through measured and constructive criticism,  
Europe can indeed make a contribution.

Caplan

As we have already recognized during this conference, Europe will not be able to find the resources to replace the critical military enabling capabilities that the US provides via NATO. Therefore, Europe has no alternative but to develop its desired security identity in a way that is wholly consistent and coherent with NATO.

Finally, even in other coalitions under US leadership, the military heart and muscle will be provided by those states that have constituted the Alliance. Without NATO's system for constantly reviewing and updating doctrine and operating practices, the military effectiveness of those coalitions would be dramatically reduced. At the same time, and I feel this is a very important consideration for elected politicians in both the US and Europe, the risks to our own military personnel during the conduct of those operations would grow considerably.

NATO ensures military effectiveness

I would like to add some comments on the need for a strong public relations policy to keep the publics on both sides of the Atlantic well informed. Mr. Voigt has alluded to this challenge in his opening statement.

**Kaufmann**  
need for a public relations policy

This is also a challenge to the organizers of this Round Table. During conferences like this one, a wide range of expertise and opinion about the way to go forward is exchanged. From a practical viewpoint, however, my question is: Where do you go from here? Once the opinions have been aired and the books have been published, the public relations aspect is often ignored. Two examples should underline the importance of this aspect.

In April, the cover of "Defense News," an American trade journal with international distribution, showed a big color-picture of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, sitting right next to the Taiwanese Defense Minister Tang. In fact, the two officials had only met in a closed bilateral session, and they had not been sitting next to each other during the conference. The picture had been morphed (that is, created) by computer manipulation to suggest that they were sitting next to each other. This manipulation had far-ranging implications for our relations with China: four ship visits to Hong Kong were cancelled as a result.

examples of manipulations  
by the press

My other example concerns the way the US administration is depicted in the press. In America and also in Europe, as Mr. Voigt has indicated, US government agencies are portrayed overwhelmingly as dysfunctional and dominated by hardliners. According to that picture, Secretary of State Powell is marginalized. As far as I can see, nothing of this is true. If Secretary Powell were marginalized to the



Schulze, Stütze

extent that the US press implies, the US would have taken very different steps in the wake of September 11th.

This is to show that the public relations aspect is extremely important. My experience from the last year is that many Americans are worried about their national leadership. This has only been heightened by the current debacles of the FBI and CIA and the revelations of the Congressional hearings. But all these public sentiments are heavily influenced by the depiction of these and other issues in the media.

“a question a day on terrorism”

I therefore challenge the organizers of the Round Table and all of us around this table to think about the question: How can we effectively use the tools of public relation in order to make known to a larger public some of the more balanced and nuanced ideas and interpretations we have discussed here? As a suggestion, I would like to point to the activities of the Council on Foreign Relations. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, they established a link on their web-site called “A question a day on terrorism.” Every day since September 11th, experts are given the opportunity to use their expertise and provide balanced analyses of the various issues related to terrorism at large.

In the wake of this Round Table, you might want to consider using a similar tool to make the expertise assembled here more widely available. If we do not take steps of this kind, we will always have a significant public perception that remains uninformed and unbalanced. And, as you know, perceptions are very strong and very real. They are what we have to deal with.

**Dahrendorf**

I learned a new word, the verb to “morph.” Now, there you are sitting between a Bulgarian and a German and we will make sure that Mr. Darchinger, who took many photographs yesterday, will not morph anyone else in their place.

**Soutou**

My remarks dovetail to a degree with what Colonel Kaufmann just said. I also think that we need to “sell” the message of transatlantic cooperation to the people. This is especially relevant nowadays because American and European public opinions diverge more than do the opinions of the so-called ruling elites. We need to address that situation even if, as a consequence, we have to take into account issues which may seem secondary or maybe even outmoded.

the European Union needs  
nation-building

This leads me to a broader problem. European citizens are losing many of their traditional bearings because the nation-state is becoming less important in polit-

“We stand by you!”

The crew of the Lütjens

ical terms. This is due to the influence of Brussels, to globalization and maybe immigration. But the European Union does not yet fill the void which has arisen from this situation. It is too technical, too abstract and it is not yet a fully-grown political body.

We have spoken of nation-building in a different context and I would like to suggest that this might be what Europe needs today. The current European Convention could be a step in that direction. In order to succeed, it should not focus on devising a European constitution because that is a tall and perhaps unrealistic order. Rather, it should seek to define the different levels of competence within Europe. European citizens need to know where they stand in relation to their region, nation-state, and to Europe. In my view, only when those issues are settled in a satisfactory manner will it be possible to revitalize the transatlantic relationship, not only among the elites, because that will not be so difficult, but also between the European and American peoples.

This means that we cannot content ourselves with solving technical problems. We have to address the wider political issues as the founding fathers of Europe and of the transatlantic relationship. For that was a time when we experienced the kind of transatlantic intimacy that some would wish to see once again. And it was a time when the United States was vastly more powerful in relation to Europe than it is today but when nevertheless true transatlantic dialogue and intimacy were quite possible and indeed achieved.

addressing the wider questions

I begin, prompted by a remark by Mr. Kaufmann, with a reference to a PR campaign that was remarkable for German-American public relations in the time after 9/11. It had to do with the German destroyer Lütjens and I suspect that only a few gathered at this table know the story.

**Ischinger**

the story of the destroyer Lütjens:  
a transatlantic PR campaign

In the days after September 11, this rather old ship was at sea off Plymouth, taking part in NATO military maneuvers. When orders were received that the Lütjens was to leave the flotilla, the US flag was raised on board, indeed up on the mast, where the national flag was supposed to be flying. Meanwhile the crew unfurled a clearly visible bed sheet with the words “We stand by you!” written on it. The entire crew of the Lütjens assembled on deck as they passed by the US warship Winston S. Churchill and bid farewell in this spectacular manner.

A young officer on the US ship photographed the scene and E-mailed the picture home. In his E-mail the young officer wrote to his father that he and many of

his comrades were moved to tears by this gesture of solidarity by the Germans, and remarked that such a degree of cooperation was actually incredible, given the history of the past hundred years.

This E-mail circulated so intensively throughout the United States that it wound up being sent to my laptop about 55 times from all possible sources. Without any participation by the Embassy at all, the message reached the floor of the US Congress, where it was read aloud in both the Senate and House of Representatives.

I tried to go one step further and do some more PR work by asking Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping to dispatch the Lütjens across the Atlantic to New York as soon as possible, so that the crew could be honored appropriately. That did not work out, but the captain was still sent to the United States with a small delegation. That same homemade banner with the sentence “we stand by you ...!” was officially handed over to the US Congress in a really touching ceremony with Senator Dick Lugar and several congresspeople. I can tell you that all the Chancellor’s speeches, those of the foreign minister, everything that we have officially done, had far less positive impact on the American public than this young American officer’s E-mail.

no real transatlantic crisis exists

Permit me to make one more comment. Mr. Smyser was right: While the Europeans are busy building their greater Europe, the United States tries to confront real or potential threats. I would not interpret this as signs of a crisis, as this has always been like that. I think we have experienced many more critical moments in transatlantic relations than at present.

What is clear is that, as I said before, we Europeans need to make greater efforts if we are to register on the radar screen of US policy as a politically active Europe. We may already be visible as an economic factor, but not as a political one, and in this point Europe has a bit of work down the road.

cooperation against WMDs needed

I would like to thank Sam Wells particularly because he raised the topic of the necessary cooperation in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons. I would like to mention as a footnote that the history of the protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Biological Weapons has not been a particularly happy one. Those who stave off efforts at establishing an effective verification regime because domestic industries do not like invasive inspections cannot credibly turn against multilaterally negotiated papers with the argument that they are not good enough.



I'd like to add one more word on NATO. For the first time since 1945, the Federal Republic of Germany has lost soldiers in action, admittedly not by enemy fire, but as the result of an accident near Kabul. These soldiers, however, were not taking part in a classic NATO mission, but were part of the ad hoc coalition assembled for Afghanistan. This is an important difference. When NATO goes into action as an alliance, the North Atlantic Council takes charge. In this case, after enlargement, all nineteen member states have to reach a common decision. In the present ad hoc coalition, the North Atlantic Council, which meets in Brussels or at SHAPE, plays no part at all. Instead, Germany and the other European participants sent liaison officers to Tampa, Florida. By now a great number of officers from around the world has gathered there. Obviously not all can give their input, and are mainly confined to listening.

We Europeans have to be interested in supporting the US interest in NATO, because we absolutely have to incorporate America through the decision-making body of the North Atlantic Council. The Americans, for their part, have an interest in using the Alliance—I would argue—because it has always been a useful instrument of their European policy, regardless of the Alliance's technical role in coordinating defense.

I would therefore like to say out of deep conviction that we Europeans would be making a great mistake if we failed to make much greater efforts in ensuring that the Alliance continues to be put to use. We cannot permit NATO to be replaced by ad hoc coalitions put together for specific occasions. That would both undermine the Alliance as an institution and rob us Europeans of our possibility of taking part in initiatives and decisions reached with the hegemonic USA.

I think it is time for us to recall the title of our conference, "Contours of a New Global Order." That means we should not restrict our deliberations exclusively on transatlantic relations, because this global order will not be shaped only by transatlantic ties.

If we look at China, India, Russia, or Indonesia, we see that every one of these countries faces staggering challenges that stem not least from the fact that they are orienting their economies toward global markets. Yet these countries also have their own ideas on how the global order should be constructed. Chief among these interests is the wish for a multipolar instead of a unipolar world.

Since we heard the Vienna Congress mentioned earlier, I would at least like to

mutual interest in supporting NATO exists

**von Weizsäcker**

many countries favor a multipolar world order



a new division of labor:  
Europe as the balancing power

question whether the European balance of power system from the year 1815 can really be applied to the entire world. What certainly is true, however, is that the aforementioned countries seeking a multipolar, balanced world are not looking least toward Europe. From China and India, we hear remarks such as, “You Europeans have a market of 340 million people, and when the difficult process of enlargement is completed, that figure will rise to 500 million. That gives you a weight that you have to make count in global policymaking.”

Given these kinds of comments from other parts of the world, and not only from the United States, I think the real question here is not whether Europe should emancipate itself from America, but whether we can establish a new division of labor across the Atlantic. That is typical NATO terminology which will be essential for maintaining relations between Europe and America in a new global order.

I am convinced that the great quantity of common ground that binds both sides of the Atlantic will endure. Its origins lie in the Enlightenment of the 18th century and its greatest fruit was the US Constitution, one of the key lessons of which is the necessity of checks and balances. Any power that acts in the absence of a counterbalancing force will succumb to temptations that will, in the longer run, work against its interests both nationally and internationally.

With these mutual roots in mind, we Europeans have the task of taking part in the counterbalancing of powers. Can we manage this? In our discussions, we could hear justified citations of the difficulties that Europe is facing today. Yet I still believe that Europe is making progress, for instance in regard to Asian expectations of Europe’s future role. When I consider, for example, the issue of a European common foreign and security policy, I see that the members of the European Union learned a hard but very useful lesson during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s. During this crisis, we were not only incapable of speaking with one voice, but the individual European countries also pursued completely different objectives. The Americans may have had to convince the Europeans against their will about the usefulness of the Kosovo war, but it was the Europeans and not the Americans who ended this war. This represented a step towards political union.

Europeans want to strengthen  
global institutions

A mutual recognition is spreading in Europe that global institutions and mechanisms can and have to be reinforced. We will strive continually to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations and other international institutions. We may not have gotten that far yet, but Lord Dahrendorf—himself a

member of the British House of Lords—has already hinted at the possibility that the two European permanent members of the Security Council could find a single voice. We are also facing similar tasks in votes for the IMF and World Bank, although these are not yet reality.

In the United Nations, we Europeans have to contribute above all to that organization's sustained effectiveness. I have never understood why the Germans always wanted to become a permanent Security Council member, something that would rather exacerbate than alleviate our problems. I am certainly not opposed to German policy toward the UN, but fear mainly that they are helping block the organization's urgently needed structural reform.

It seems much more important to me that power centers be established within the United Nations in addition to the Security Council, which is currently its exclusive center of power. These would also exert influence based on mutually agreed terms. For the Security Council thinks in military terms, but most burdens of the world's population cannot be alleviated through military means. The IMF and the World Bank occasionally condescend to providing UN offices with reports, but a functioning global community would require better institutional structures.

non-military institutions  
need to be strengthened

Enhancing international law would also be conceivable beyond the already substantial scope for action enjoyed by the WTO. The Environmental Council we have discussed could also be endowed with the appropriate authority. In a nutshell, the Europeans should use the power they have available now, especially in economic terms, to push much harder than they have been for a new world and legal order.

The subject of the developing world was occasionally raised in this context. I must criticize that there has been hardly any transatlantic dialogue on the objectives that the Johannesburg conference in August of this year should strive for. There has been no joint brainstorming between Europeans and Americans. Norbert Walter raised in this context the social ethics of the market economy found in Walter Eucken and F. A. von Hayek. And as we know, Adam Smith was as much a moralist as an economist. We have to concentrate more on applying this ethic and these policies to the issues of a just world order in its social and economic aspects. We all carry responsibility, in this respect, that long term interests take precedence over schemes for immediate gain. A transatlantic dialogue would make a good deal of sense and a more active Europe could help us make progress.

we should focus on a  
just world order



Europe has significant influence  
in economic matters

Mr. Walter rightly pointed out the significance EU Commissioners such as Pascal Lamy and Mario Monti have had on transatlantic relations. In general, Europeans enjoy a not-inconsiderable amount of influence over Americans. Ten years ago, in any case, it would have been unthinkable for an EU Commissioner to succeed in preventing a merger between General Electric and Honeywell, or that major US corporations would have to submit to European stock exchange rules—even if that might change in the future with the Enron laws. With reference to Mr. Smyser’s comments, that might even have a beneficial effect on the US economy.

Of course, we Europeans are not trying to lecture the Americans on how to set up their economic system. Yet we should not forget that Europe has much more to offer than we often think and has sometimes been stated here. We seem to almost fear that the euro’s value is climbing too rapidly after having long complained that the opposite was the case. There are, therefore, sufficient aspects and points of contact, both in the transatlantic relationship and in discussions of a new global order, that do not compel, but enable, us Europeans to take the initiative.

EU enlargement is  
a great progress

I am grateful to Mr. Reiter for having raised the positive aspects of EU enlargement, that it strengthens a sense of European togetherness and self-confidence, which is an encouraging sign for the future. We constantly talk only about the difficulties tied up with enlargement. The costs of integrating the Polish agricultural sector into the EU seem to be concerning the German government so greatly that one would think this was enlargement’s chief aspect. Yet these difficulties are merely an expression of the progress that we are making. We can see everywhere, after all, that we are moving forward.

On the subject of institutional structures, the British Prime Minister has proposed that the European Council appoint a president for a five-year term. This seems to me the wrong solution. Instead, I recommend we should encourage both the European Commission and the European Council to abolish the principle of unanimity. That having been said, I find the British government’s constructive participation in this issue that is occupying us very intensively during the European Convention’s deliberations tremendously gratifying. I am also optimistic regarding Britain joining the Eurozone. In the medium- to longer term, their objections will certainly give way.

pledge for a self-confident Europe

To conclude, I would like to suggest, once again taking up Mr. Reiter’s remarks, that Europe confidently go its own way politically, economically, ecologically, and

face the American position without being arrogant, but without excessive reservations either. Only in this way will Europe be able to contribute to a productive balance of power for the good of all humanity.

In the light of what President von Weizsäcker has just said, some of my comments might seem trivial. Nevertheless, as several people have talked about the need for Europe to show more diplomatic leadership around the world, I do want to note a certain tension we see from the American vantage-point. The European Union is faced with many internal challenges, which consume a lot of energy and have caused Europeans to be very inward-looking. This conflicts with the energy that would be necessary to generate and sustain a real outward engagement of the EU in the world.

Note for example how often EU consensus is prized over the merits of particular positions or issues, in an attempt to reduce opposition to the shift from inter-governmental to supra-national decision-making in the EU. It almost seems to be a guiding principle for European policy-makers to give EU decision priority over their own reasoning. This not only makes it occasionally difficult for the United States to deal with Europe. It also hinders the development of European influence around the world.

I would like to return for a moment to the subject of the special perspective that America now brings to world affairs.

Shortly after September 11th, John Ikenberry published an article in “Survival” in which he argued that the post-World War II pattern of American self-containment through embedding itself in restraining international institutions would be reinforced by the global complexities and transnational character of the war against terrorism. I regret that he cannot be here to give us a progress report on this and to say whether he still adheres to his thesis.

To defend his thesis, one would have to use Chou en-Lai’s famous comment about the French Revolution: “It’s too early to tell.” It certainly is too early to tell which course America will ultimately pursue in this context. Against Ikenberry’s arguments, however, you could make the case that two different trends, one of which clearly predates September 11th, are shaping America’s outlook in the short- and medium-term.

The United States has in some respects passed the high-water mark of inter-

### **Wolfson**

internal challenges consume too much European energy

### **Allin**

American self-containment through international institutions is decreasing

nationalism in its foreign policy. There was a faction of real neo-isolationists in the US Congress, even if it is not yet dominant. And, as Professor Wells noted earlier, there is indeed a lack of interest in international and, particularly, transatlantic exchange. But there is no question that this Bush administration has been from the start less internationalist than the last Bush administration, not necessarily in its policies but in its composition.

September 11th increases  
isolationist tendencies

Since September 11th this trend has been compounded by a certain disarming of liberal internationalism in the United States. This is a new although not a dominant reality.

The current touchiness you may have noticed about Americans stems from the perception, even of moderate leftists, that Europeans do not appreciate the reality of the war—and I take President von Weizsäcker’s strong refutation of that into account. This constitutes a greater concern for Americans than American unilateralists who do not appreciate the threat of global warming at the Kyoto Protocol.

But, to put this in the context of this morning’s debate, the fact that we are at war, or consider ourselves at war and insist on this somewhat dogmatically and almost unpleasantly, does not imply that we cannot be ambitious in our war aims.

I use ‘ambitious’ here in the sense that post-World War II planning was extremely ambitious as it led to tremendous nation-building projects in Germany and in Japan, to the Marshall Plan and the building of international institutions. I also use ambition in the Cold War sense of trying to prove the value and maybe even the superiority of the West against a rival system. When I was growing up in the 60s and 70s this was seen as a necessity, and it gave rise to developments as disparate as the race to the moon and the civil rights movement in the United States.

global disparities in wealth  
require transatlantic initiative

In defining the goal, I agree with Dr. Shore and others who identified global disparities in wealth as a really urgent problem calling for transatlantic initiative.

While I believe that the relationship between world misery and the present threat is not straightforward, I certainly would never deny, that over the next half century the vast disparity between the West’s incredible wealth and the developing world’s general misery will remain the dark side of globalization. As a consequence, the challenges we saw on September 11th will remain with us as well.

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair deserves a lot of credit for providing a model for transatlantic relations. He strongly rejected America-bashing, but at the same time tried to go beyond unqualified support for America’s short-term incli-

This could be Europe's task: to remind the Americans about what is necessary in building a new world order.

Allin

nations by appealing to our better nature and stressing the larger purposes of this war against terrorism. This could be Europe's task: to remind the Americans about what is really necessary in building a new world order.

Prompted by Professor Wells' helpfully pragmatic presentation I would like to make a few additional comments about alliances and slogans.

As for alliances: our discussion at times, particularly yesterday, assumed that at the basis of alliances had to be identity, but I think it is more a matter of complementarity. Yesterday, many assumed that America's attitude of "take it or leave it, but this is the agenda" conflicted with Europe's "you are on the wrong track, you must change." I believe that we should rather see our actions as complementary and thus appreciate, if not participate in, each other's projects.

This undoubtedly requires mutual recognition of each other's thinking and focus. Europeans should thus emphasize for example the magnitude of the project of European enlargement and explain that Americans also have an interest in it, if only because the 20th century has demonstrated the disastrous consequences of a fragmented and warring Europe.

At the same time people on this side of the Atlantic after 9/11 have to take seriously the American sense of being at war and the reasons why the United States feels that way. They have to accept and respect that this sense will inform the current definition of American foreign policy.

This leads me to my second point: slogans. Foreign policy is often communicated through slogans and buzz-words. While these slogans are mainly intended for domestic audiences, they also reach international publics in the era of mass communication. This regularly causes misunderstandings and makes it difficult to respect differences and recognize each other's standpoints.

In other words, Europeans have to recognize that their talk of European identity, the European project and its achievements deeply irritates many Americans who will follow Henry Kissinger in saying: "Okay, so Europe is great. But if I pick up the phone, who do I talk to in Europe?"

What Europeans see as historically significant looks pathetic to many Americans in terms of its practical results. Our debate has confirmed this impression on many occasions. The pooling of sovereignty and resources in Europe might constitute progress, but it is certainly not power. Europeans have to recognize the problems inherent in their integrationist slogans.

**Reynolds**

alliances are based on complementarity, not identity

the communication of foreign policy through slogans creates misunderstandings



Yet the Americans also have to recognize that for many Europeans words like “war” and “terrorism” are very problematic. It would be helpful to promote a dialogue to try to minimize the use of such slogans and to deconstruct them. If we talk about concrete, practical issues, it becomes easier to appreciate what is at stake. In the current situation, we are talking about issues like the fragmentation of states, the privatization of warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Let me translate this and the comments by Professor Wells and others into a practical suggestion for the future activities of the Körber Foundation. It would be useful to have a conference about the interrelations between biotechnology, developments in the biological sciences and their use for military purposes—a topic which is currently at the center of attention in the US.

Another topic for debate—and one hopefully pushed by the European side—is the deeper causes of terrorism. A possible conference could focus on the social tensions, the inequalities and problems of globalization that lie behind some of the manifestations of terrorism that concern Americans.

### Stützle

The goal of a global order is a lofty and ambitious one and is not made easier by the fact that it is relatively difficult to define. For this reason, I think some misunderstandings have cropped up during our discussion. Allow me to identify one present example that could possibly become an acute problem. Anyone who decides to pursue a global order within the terms of the United Nations Charter could soon find himself caught up in a huge conflict over the issue of Iraq with the most important partner in the Atlantic alliance. I do not want to spend more time on this, but merely wish to mention it, encouraged by Mr. Smyser’s comments.

politicians today have no time  
for conceptual thinking

The efforts we are putting into this discussion, however, have another, truly disturbing background. One of the great changes in our present political reality is that those with political authority have almost no time at all available any more for conceptual thinking and work. The evolution of democratic systems of government towards democracies of committees and processes is used as an alibi by some to completely dispense with conceptual work.

I ask myself in all seriousness whether it would still be possible today, under present political conditions, for the Federal Republic of Germany to implement as ambitious a policy as its *Ostpolitik* was in its time. The same applies to the relationship between Germany and the United States with regard to a topic as con-

ceptually demanding and sophisticated as NATO's deployment of NATO Pershing II missiles two decades ago.

When I compare these earlier strategic debates with the quality of post-9/11 conceptual thinking, the feeling I get is one of unease. It is certainly remarkable that we all reflect the attack's emotional impact, as Ambassador Ischinger's example of the Lütjens vividly showed. At the political leadership level, however, a conceptual orientation over the events of September 11th had hardly taken place at all. The challenges of 9/11 have not emerged from a vacuum. Neither in the European Union, nor within the Atlantic alliance, nor, if I can trust my own observations, in my own country is a substantial conceptual discourse underway on these issues.

This could perhaps be the subject of a future Bergedorf Round Table, to demonstrate to those with political authority that their capacity to help define the path to a new global order, whatever shape it might take, will slip out of their hands should they fail to pay attention to the conceptual questions. Otherwise we should not be surprised if day-to-day turbulence continues to hold sway. In that case, we could be certain of only one thing, that we will fail to properly handle the greater political issues.

The remarks by Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Stütze have given me an opportunity to be succinct. I very much support further thinking on the concept of a multipolar world. I am practically certain that the pending enlargement of NATO due to take place in the fall of this year will be followed by the next enlargement. I think it would make sense for the Bergedorf Round Table to turn, in the foreseeable future, to the subject of how far NATO should actually be extended. To the Chinese border? Or with the participation of the Soviet Union's successor states? Is there a joint European position on this? What are the European interests in this question? In any case, we Europeans will be compelled to devote attention to these regions that are only too obviously significant for strategic and security policy. The United States will likewise have to formulate a strategic policy for these regions.

I would like to take up the thread that you, Mr. von Weizsäcker, first laid down. One can derive a program for transatlantic relations from your presentation, a program to keep these ties relevant in the 21st century. If we do not concern ourselves with the problem fields that I am about to enumerate, then these relations will

**Bahr**

how far should NATO be expanded?

**Frankenberger**

key future concerns:  
Russia, China, WMDs, terrorism,  
regional conflicts



mutual stereotypes could  
endanger the transatlantic  
partnership

become autistic, pure self-occupational on both sides, which will then progressively lose interest in each other. The problems fields I wish to identify are: integrating Russia and China as responsible actors in the global community, coming to grips with overbearing issues of international security from weapons proliferation and terrorism to illegal financial transactions, the drug trade, and finally, major regional conflicts. That, in my opinion, is a convincing agenda for the coming decades. By the way, I share Mr. Czempiel's opinion that we will require a political navigation center to put this program into operation.

The second point I want to make is that of transatlantic sensitivities. Mr. Ischinger has told us the moving story of the ship *Lütjens*—it was indeed a grand gesture. Yet at the end of the day, I tend to agree with Mr. Voigt's report on the diverging stereotypes and perceptions on either side of the Atlantic. I can tell you that, beginning about two weeks after 9/11, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* received no more letters to the editors that displayed a sentiment expressing unrestricted solidarity. What we were getting was precisely the opposite: "It's their own fault," "That's what comes from supporting Israel," "That is American hubris," "This is punishment for the wrong global policies." Over and over, there was this element of linkage with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the impulse probably felt by older readers of "Now you see what it's like, all that we experienced in Dresden, Darmstadt, Hamburg, or in Baghdad."

This was of course translated into generalized images of public sentiment and the media—although not, I hasten to add, at the FAZ. In other outlets we saw a relatively quick mobilization of stereotypes taken from the leftist or rightist anti-American repertoire. I think these images of public sentiment are important indicators of transatlantic sensitivities, regardless of the solid economic and social ties that Mr. Voigt spoke of.

What worries me is that the aforementioned stereotypes, which certainly contain a kernel of truth, could become so powerful that they could derail level-headed efforts towards European unity into a kind of Gaullist separatist movement that sees Europe's future in an emancipation from America that simultaneously sets up barriers between the two sides. I think this would be dangerous because it would rob us of the necessary scope for activity on both sides of the Atlantic to jointly seek solutions to the pressing problems of international politics that we have heard about here.

Mr. Wells reminded us all this morning that the Europeans already have a

good deal on their plates and will have a hard time digesting it all. In other words, we will still be engrossed in the coming years in pushing forward our constitutional development, digesting EU expansion, and organizing future flows of capital so that we can maintain a grip on internal solidarity conflicts, and so on. I ask myself where all the political energy is going to come from, given all these internal structural tasks, for us to pay due attention to setting up the global order currently under discussion. In addition, we have the aforementioned stereotypes to contend with and the populist dangers they conceal. Mr. Schulze rightly reminded us yesterday that Europe is currently seeing regrettable examples of this and I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that this is merely a result of temporary economic stagnation. I think that the rightist and populist wind blowing through many European countries will continue for some time to come. An interesting combination of left-wing globalization criticism and far-rightist suspicions of European consolidation is making this trend more powerful. This combination is capable of fostering substantial mistrust of efforts to make progress in integrating Europe.

When I sum up all that we have been considering yesterday and today, I see that we need a strong Europe that has to be a global player even as the population, perhaps with a few exceptions, is harboring increasing doubts of this need for greater integration. I ask myself how policymakers are going to keep this discrepancy at bay. Frankly, I suspect we will be seeing continued progress in integration while ever fewer people are convinced that this is the right way forward.

With your permission, I am going to put my finger into the same wound that Mr. Frankenberger opened. I even think one can regard the situation a little more bleakly. It is no coincidence that Mr. Frankenberger and I are practically the only German representatives of the coming generation with a foreign policy profile. And we cannot really be described anymore as young, at least in the sense an American would use. This is a dramatic situation, in Germany both for the media as well as political parties and the parliament. Basically, Karsten Voigt is unique in the landscape of his party, and the Greens have recently refused to nominate two experienced younger politicians, Oswald Metzger and Angelika Beer, for the Bundestag. There are hardly any successors in my age group, and the same is true of the media. I hardly ever meet anyone with the opinion that we have a problem and that a new global order is needed to open a new discourse among nations. We have, as Zachary Shore rightly said, far too many of the same problems for us to

we need a strong Europe

### **Stelzenmüller**

Germany lacks a younger generation interested in foreign policy

Foreign policy begins at home.

Hacke

continue harping on all these transatlantic disturbances. I cannot find anyone of my age to talk to in Parliament, the parties, and not really in the universities either. I find this shocking.

When I began my current job at *Die Zeit* four years ago, I took over from Christoph Bertram, who was a legend in his field and of course still is. Wouldn't you think many people would want his job? Apparently, no. I was the sole applicant. Anyone wanting to make a career in the media these days writes about the reforms needed for the welfare state or in immigration policy, but not about problems in security policy. My colleagues thought I was crazy. I had a different opinion and do not believe, in retrospect, that I was completely wrong, but it is true that I am relatively alone in my field. This I find shocking as well. I think that our discussion here and the way the subject has been covered in the media have shown that we have forgotten how to understand America and place US statements in the right context. I am shocked at the ignorance we are displaying. Last year in November I had the privilege of spending a whole month to live and work in Washington. I must say that the internal debate that I experienced there over US foreign and security policy was of a breadth, depth, and subtlety that is not being matched anywhere in Germany or Europe. We have a lot of work ahead of us, to be accomplished here and now.

**Hacke**

The remarks by Mr. Frankenberger and Ms. Stelzenmüller remind me of the famous maxim that foreign policy begins at home. And I agree with them both. As long as we do not have an adequate foreign policy culture in our country, many of the issues with perception that we have will remain problems.

European foreign policy  
needs more realism

In taking up Mr. von Weizsäcker's and Walther Stützle's comments on conceptual weaknesses in daily politics nowadays, I would like to refer once more to the contrast I emphasized between idealist and realist approaches to foreign policy. Of course, both these approaches have their place in a wise and ethically responsible foreign policy, yet the impression I have is that there is not enough room being given to realism in many European foreign policy initiatives. Just as this discrepancy was delineated in Robert Kagan's observations, which have been often cited at this table, a contrast has likewise emerged between the realist power politics of the US in its analysis of threats, and a specific idealism that has established itself in Germany for obvious reasons during the past 50 years.

This is also why I agree with Mr. von Weizsäcker's belief that we cannot, given

the global scope of the challenges facing us, afford to continue the transatlantic family feud while excluding other cultural regions. Perhaps this Round Table would have benefited from having heard from representatives of other parts of the world.

Kindly permit me at this point to add a historical tangent that I believe would be productive for our present discussion of a global order. At the beginning of the 21st century, I see ourselves at a point in history comparable to the gradual emergence of the Pax Romana, which replaced the Greek system of equilibrium among city-states step for step as the antique world's system of order. Whether we Europeans will be in a position to add balancing elements to the emerging global Pax Americana, will depend primarily, in my opinion, on the efforts we are willing to make in the future.

If we look at the present dynamics of concepts of global order, then the new "symptom," as Mr. Smyser rightly identified it, is terrorism, in addition to the debate over globalization that we have been carrying on for years. It is a symptom of old, historical issues that are again becoming acute. If we look at the Middle East, for example, and especially at the situation between Israel and the Palestinians, I am tempted to introduce Johann Galtung's concept of structural violence into the discussion. The violence there is simply the result of a particularly convoluted political situation. Mr. Schroeder has already devoted extensive remarks to this subject, to which I would like to add that other examples of terrorism confused with liberation struggles include the FLN during the Algerian war of independence and, of course, the situation during the founding of the Israeli state.

How do we progress from here? The problem is an exceedingly difficult one. The United States was certainly wise to secure a coalition of partners for the war against global terrorism. One should not ignore, however, that some of the countries in this coalition use the slogan of terrorism to suppress democratic forces at home. This is a phenomenon that appears in many places all around the world, and that we have to confront. It also existed in the past. I refer only to the fact that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden used to be the beneficiaries of American support during a time of completely different political and strategic priorities in the world.

With the end of the Cold War and the associated "thaw," old historical alignments have been revived and with them new global challenges, of the kinds that

emergence of a Pax Americana

terrorism as the new challenge

new global institutional structures are needed



Mr. von Weizsäcker has described. If these issues are not dealt with jointly and embedded in stable, institutional structures, we are going to experience difficult times ahead.

On the transatlantic relationship, Mr. Czempiel's comments and those of others could be taken further. De Gaulle's three-way directory, perhaps a four-way directory of the leading powers of the Atlantic alliance could make sense in developing mechanisms for effective action. I do not believe, in any case, that present institutions could manage this kind of job alone.

Something we have not discussed sufficiently here is the role of Germany in European and world politics. Ten or twelve years ago, one US president spoke of "partnership in leadership" in this context. Whether for structural or personal reasons, today we have a country that no longer has the same position in the transatlantic relationship as it did then.

#### **Hirsch**

Let me add a few words to what President von Weizsäcker and Mr. Smyser said. The questions raised about the future of the transatlantic partnership concern areas beyond the United States and Europe, particularly the divisions between the rich and the poor in the world.

We used a phrase "new world order." This is an unfortunate expression as it reminds me of the "new world information order" and "new world economic order," promoted by the Third World at the UN a decade or so ago. Maybe the term "system" instead of order as suggested by Professor Soutou would be more appropriate.

a new world order will evolve,  
it cannot be created

But my main point is not about semantics, it is about the fundamental problem that it is not in the hands of any of us to create a new world order. Rather, it will evolve from a set of processes and relationships. We have not yet developed responsible ways to listen to the concerns of China or India or other key countries in the developing world.

This leads me to suggest that the Round Table could include people from the developing world in this discussion rather than limit it to the Europeans and Americans who are here today.

#### **Dahrendorf**

Europe's greatest challenge: closing the  
gap between aspirations and reality

I would like to add a footnote, which may be relevant to what President von Weizsäcker told us. Europe's problem with respect to its role in international relations and in the transatlantic relationship is the gap between the reality and

the aspirations of the European Union. As President von Weizsäcker has pointed out, these aspirations reflect a genuine need for a European voice in international relations.

Our greatest challenge therefore is to close this gap. Being perhaps more sceptical than some of you, I see Europe today as an extensively defined single market. I use “extensively defined” in Jacques Delors’, not Walter Hallstein’s sense. In other words, to me Europe is a single market with a number of additional features such as the Schengen agreement and monetary union. If this is the situation, will the current European developments contribute to closing the gap between aspiration and reality? Enlargement for example could contribute to creating a more effective European international “identity” or the opposite.

The European Convention will hopefully contribute to closing the gap. But it could also turn out to be an empty institutional debate which is not informed by an awareness of common European interests and policies. The danger is that the Convention will concentrate too much on minor questions such as where the Council should meet and whether one or three or five countries should at any one time be in the chair.

The euro is another crucial issue. We should not underrate the fact that by 2004 we may have a European Union in which half the members are not members of monetary union—and while some countries may wish to be members, they are not likely to be included for some time to come.

We have had left-wing idealists and right-wing extremists in our country for a long time and we will have them for a long time to come. We should of course not forget about those two extremes, but they are part of any democratic society. We have to live with them and we have survived their assaults quite a few times in history, not just in our own country but also among our neighbors.

Ms. Stelzenmüller, you have to talk to the younger generation in order to find people who respond positively to your challenges. I am lucky to have many twenty-five to thirty-five year-olds of German origin or education around me. They are very open-minded and do not need to be “converted” to a transatlantic orientation. They have it and demonstrate it by their actions, by how they choose the research labs they go to, the universities they study at, the companies they want to work for and the cities they want to live in.

As our chairman and a few others around the table have indicated, it is far

**Walter**

a younger generation of Atlanticists does exist

Americans are less interested in Europe



more difficult to win over Americans to be truly interested in Europe. It is not enough to have conferences in New York or Chicago on European issues. To further mutual understanding, we have to persuade Americans to come to Europe to see the Adlon in Berlin or to see Prague. Even if they understand our arguments, they only believe us if they have had first-hand experience of the momentous changes now under way in Europe.

Academics like Peter Kenen at Princeton or Benjamin Friedman at Harvard for example would have to work at the European Commission for a while to be able to communicate to their students in authentic terms how Europe works. If we want better integration of our ideal into the global fabric, our challenge is to win over American and international talent to come to Europe and truly understand it.

And as an aside: winning sympathy for European integration can be a dialectic process. Trying to convert people to something only engenders opposition. One should therefore allow the dialectic process to happen.

US unilateralism could promote  
European integration

Why was the second half of the 1970s such a good time for Europe? Because US president Jimmy Carter was weak and did not seem to solve anything. In this void, Europeans developed new institutions, which still hold today. For example, the ground for European monetary union was prepared in the late 1970s by Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt; Horst Schulmann was one of its important architects. Why could it not be the case that once again the perception of US unilateralism helps Europe to make similar advances? If this were to happen, we—the transatlanticists—should not be too worried about (short-term) US unilateralism.

My other footnote concerns the relations between the developed and the developing world that Mr. Shore addressed. I believe it is our duty to show convincingly to those who consider becoming part of the globalized world—the order that is based on our values and our methods, democracy and market economy—that in the past all those who were open to these concepts—including countries from the developing world—were eventually better off than those who were not. This does not alter the fact that we have to improve our system.

we have to maintain  
our tolerance

My last point is on tolerance. Mr. Krastev rightly observed that there is a tendency to reconsider the open and tolerant system of the West, with its acceptance of the alien—the “other.” I agree with Mr. Krastev that we are indeed moving away from such an attitude. But if this Round Table amounts to anything, it is very obvious that a new global order can only take shape if there is a global development of mutual trust, of tolerance, of openness and of curiosity.



We have to send this very important message to everybody—to businessmen, politicians and academics alike: We have a great responsibility to ensure that we do not allow the clash of civilizations to become reality.

Allow me to close with six brief remarks. First, although one can say that not enough parliamentary exchanges are taking place within the transatlantic relationship, the number of American congressional delegations has increased to a relevant degree since the seat of government was moved here to Berlin. I do not know the figures for Great Britain, but on the continent Germany takes first place in these kinds of exchanges as well.

Second, I prefer not to use the term Europe as a counterweight to America, in contrast to Mr. Weizsäcker. I do not know whether it is a conceptual or merely a verbal difference. I would prefer to use the term “partnership capability,” because a stronger Europe should act with, not against America, and in so doing enhance its influence. I would be just as circumspect with the choice between a multipolar and unipolar world. Europe should not strive to become equidistant between China and the United States, as this would both harm our interests and erode the process of finding solutions to problems at a global level.

Third, the impending global problems are of a nature that will compel both sides of the Atlantic to work together more closely. I do not just mean the Middle East conflict and terrorism but also, for example, the dispute over the Kyoto Agreement. The problem of environmental damage would be insoluble even if every country except the United States were to sign up, because the US is the main culprit.

For my fourth point I would like to raise the subject of institutions. I think trying to construct a global order exclusively around the United Nations would be neither realistic nor desirable. Rather, I believe that one would have to work toward the further development or evolution of other institutions such as the G8, the WTO, and, for instance, NATO in cooperation with Russia and others. I detect in this context a tendency by Germany to regard global order exclusively in relation to one institution, the UN. Yet global order can only emerge through overlapping institutions with differing functions that cover parts of each other’s authority. These are the points that have to be further developed.

Fifth, Europe must face the fact that it does not have to act globally always and everywhere. What is important is to think globally, so that it can remain at all relevant for policy. This question is much more acute for Germany than Britain or

## Voigt

Europe should create a partnership capability, not a counterweight

no exclusive institutional focus on the UN

selecting policy priorities

France, because we Germans were completely transfixed by the East-West conflict and now have to laboriously learn not only to think globally but to act so as well, where and when our interests are particularly affected. If, however, we are forced to act selectively because of limited capacity, then setting priorities will become even harder, because having fewer resources demands a clear setting of priorities. Despite all the progress that has been made, this is a problem in the German debate.

Sixth and finally, the key difference between our present situation and the last 50 years is the absence of the structuring element of the East-West conflict and the central position in world affairs that it lent to Germany, Berlin, and Europe. It is now over and we are now no longer as in demand per se as before, because the problems have been solved from the American point of view. In the future, the key issues will revolve around European contributions to problem-solving in the Asia-Pacific region or at a global level. For this reason, we cannot assume that the problems that crop up will automatically lead to converging attitudes among Americans and Europeans. Rather, this kind of consensus will only be possible to the extent that we are willing to jointly deal with problems that lie beyond the frontiers of our former commitments.

**Wells**

Two comments on the “new world order.” I agree with Dr. Smyser that the United States is not ready to engage fully in the project of building a “new world order” at this time. But it also has to be pointed out that the United States, more than Europe, is at the forefront of developing new relationships with Russia, China and India. Partly, this is due to the gap between the European Union’s rhetoric and its actual capabilities to engage internationally that has been mentioned by our chairman.

some Americans would benefit from a strong European CFSP

My final point: those of us who support an internationalist and multilateral role of the United States would very much welcome—and the sooner the better—the creation of a vigorous Common Foreign and Security Policy on the part of the European Union. It would, for example, be of great assistance to Colin Powell in his daily work if there were strong European pressure to do things he would like to do, but which he finds hard to accomplish against resistance in Washington.

**Dahrendorf**

That takes us to the end of what I thought was a concentrated, multifaceted and sophisticated debate.



Donald Rumsfeld recently replied to a question on transatlantic relations that he was travelling a lot both within the United States and the world and his main conclusion was that there was a wide range of views in the United States just as there is a wide range of views in Europe and elsewhere. We should not forget this helpful and important statement. A conference tends to focus on particularly critical points but what we have really experienced here is an open exchange about a wide range of subjects, views and interests.

I remain slightly disquieted by the comments made by Mr. Frankenberger and Ms. Stelzenmüller towards the end of our discussions. We have hardly touched upon the question whether the kind of debate we have had here is intrinsically an elite debate or whether it can be carried to a wider range of people, which surely it should be. But that is just one of the many open questions that our debate has raised.

It remains for me to thank you all for making the life of the moderator moderately easy and above all to thank our hosts for having had us here, brought us together and given us the wherewithal to conduct our discussion. The last task I have is to hand the conference back to its President, President von Weizsäcker.

I thank all of you for having joined so vigorously in our debate. This kind of intensive, committed participation has become the exception to the rule, particularly in transatlantic conferences. In spite of all our differences and disputes, our relations remain firmly rooted in the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Confucius may be older, yet nobody around this table would think about putting Europe equidistant between America and China—I certainly wouldn't.

**von Weizsäcker**

Above all, I would like to thank our moderator, Lord Dahrendorf, for his outstanding work. He may have claimed that we made his job relatively easy, but he belongs to that rare breed in Europe that has learned, not least in the United Kingdom, that the unmistakable authority of a chairman enables the participants to learn something from each other and return from a conference enriched. We have all been able to gain profound insights into the current state of transatlantic relations and the new world order that is about to emerge. I hope that you now see, as I do, some aspects with greater clarity than before.