125th Bergedorf Round Table

Reinventing Europe –
Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening

January 24th–26th, 2003, Elb Lounge Hamburg
Protocol

Welcome 21

I. History and Reality of European Culture 23
II. Tasks of Cultural Policy in the Context of Europe's Widening and Deepening 59
III. Europe’s Cultural Role in the World 89

Annex

Participants 125
“Völkertafel” 132
Recommended Literature 134
Glossary 135
Index 149
Previous Round Tables 154
The Körber-Foundation 173
Acknowledgements, Project Information, Imprint 174
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The 125th Bergedorf Round Table documented here, “Reinventing Europe—Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening,” took place in Hamburg from January 24th to 26th 2003. For a day and a half, a select group of politicians, working artists, patrons, academics, and journalists from many countries and every part of Europe explored a wide spectrum of issues dealing with the past, present, and future of European culture and its political significance. At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe has transcended its past divisions and, according to the conference’s working thesis, will be redefined, and indeed, reinvented. While the Round Table was convening, the European Convention was immersed in debating issues of cultural policy ranging from a reference to God in the future European constitution’s preamble to support and subsidies for culture, and the war of words in the forefront of the second Gulf conflict was at its height, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. Only a few days earlier, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had sparked international controversy by drawing a line between “old” and “new” Europe, thus lending the discussions in Hamburg an additional urgency.

The first part of the Round Table established an extensive definition of the foundations of European culture, and therefore of Europe’s image of its place in the world. Participants drew on their personal expertise to lay down both historical and philosophical parameters, as well as artistic and political aspects. Even before turning to what “European culture” is and means, participants were already hotly debating where there was such a thing at all in these times of cultural globalization. Is culture a comprehensive term for describing all lifestyles and -structures, therefore including politics and business, or is it the exclusive domain of the arts? How do the arts behave toward society, and vice-versa? What continuing significance do those traditions have that we associate with places such as Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome? Is Europe a definite space or is it an idea? A dazzling array of questions, facts, and opinions was put forward.

The Round Table’s second session built on these very basic foundations to identify the challenges facing cultural policy in the enlargement and consolidation of the European Union. There was broad agreement that EU enlargement represented an enormous chance, after decades of heavy emphasis on European political and economic union, to push forward Europe’s cultural dimension as well. Emerging from the disintegration of ideological divisions between East and West, the cultural Europeanization of Europe could prove to be the defining project of the coming decades, especially to remedy certain symptoms of crisis in contem-
porary societies. The discussion made clear that, in saturated western Europe, other priorities exist than in the continent’s (south)eastern part, where cultural objectives along national lines are being pursued to repair decades of ideological predominance. The participants examined the whole spectrum of challenges and options facing cultural policy at the “European” level (Article 125 of the EU Treaty, Programs such as Erasmus, etc.) as well as in a context connecting societies and overstepping borders. There was consensus that culture in the comprehensive sense of the word would play a central part in the process of European integration.

The concluding section of the 125th Bergedorf Round Table was devoted to Europe’s relation to the rest of the globe. Spurred by several “outsiders’” viewpoints, participants determined that seeking an exclusive definition of European identity was fraught with ambivalent factors. One unanimous conclusion reached was that Europe’s experience of diversity would be a valuable asset in helping foster stability and cultural enrichment in other regions of the world. Conversely, it was agreed that consolidating European integration in the cultural field was also essential, not least because this would permit a responsible European role in the newly emerging world order. Cultural aspects of Turkey’s possible future membership in the EU were discussed intensively and regarded as a test case for the question of how Europe’s self-conception could continue to develop. The Körber-Foundation’s attempt to use the conference’s structure, topics, and selection of participants to unify the traditionally fragmented discourse among working artists and policymakers, and thereby promoting a productive balance between the two sides, was roundly praised as one particularly fruitful aspect of this Round Table.
Welcome

The topic of “Reinventing Europe—Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening” is one I consider both thoroughly stimulating and increasingly important, both politically and historically. European culture is abundant, yet occasionally one gets the impression that it requires more effort to give the people of Europe a sense of European culture as a crucial aspect of identity: namely of cultural unity in great diversity, as it has always been the case. This is the subject we will be grappling with and I am pleased that Mr. von der Gablentz has consented to lead us through the discussion.

Explanatory note: This Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.
To begin with, I would like to explain why we chose the topic of “reinventing Europe.” We wanted to discuss three subject fields subsumed by this quite challenging title. The first of these is the history and reality of European culture; secondly, the role of culture in rebuilding Europe, a project we have launched for the 21st century, and the tasks of culture within this context. And finally, how do European culture and its consciousness present themselves in a rapidly changing world? Is culture part of Europe’s way of asserting itself?

Permit me to make some additional remarks on our title, “reinventing Europe.” The German word “begründen” (to invent / found) has a double meaning. It stands both for “establishing something new” as well as providing reasons for an action or development. I see both taking place in Europe today. In recent years, we have all, and I am glad to say this includes people at the political level, adopted the sense that we are in a process of building a new and different Europe that, from the current expansion round to a point in, let us say, ten years, will result in upwards of 30 member states, stretching into the Balkans and Turkey. This Europe will be different, as we are living in a different, rapidly evolving society that places new demands on Europe. Moreover, this Europe will find itself in a different world compared to that which saw the process of European integration germinate during the 1950s. As in the beginning of the integration process, questions about the purpose of this development have to be answered anew. The differences today are that a truly European debate is taking place on the subject and that Europe cannot continue to develop in the way it has been doing for far too long, namely in reaction to outside forces and challenges. One success of the European Convention that one can already ascertain is the emergence of a real Europe-wide debate that the national governments cannot afford to ignore. It is an encouraging sign that the foreign ministers who will later be directing the Intergovernmental Conference today consider appearing before the Convention appropriate. In this way, Europe will be doubly reinvented.

The big problem with all these fascinating and stimulating developments is that the debate is taking place at a level that does not touch on normal citizens and normal democratic discussions. In the Netherlands for example, where I currently live, we recently had a compressed election campaign that lasted only three weeks, during which the word “Europe” was not heard even once, despite these fascinating developments, even in a country that belongs to the pioneers of European integration. The starting point for our debate on “reinventing Europe” could be the challenge of recoupling the European level with the thoughts of people and
perhaps especially of intellectuals. That would represent a real contribution to democratization in Europe. Ms. Keller said in her presentation yesterday that European writers no longer come to grips with the subject of Europe. This prompts me to ask how we might redirect people’s thinking towards Europe. I think this is the basic question we should seek to answer.

Ms. Ahrweiler and Mr. Schlögel will open our first segment, the history and reality of European culture, with short presentations. These will express ideas from Western and Southern Europe, as well as from the continent’s eastern regions, which are Mr. Schlögel’s specialty.

Ahrweiler

I would like to begin with an observation that seems obvious to me. In Europe, culture is only on the agenda when we experience difficulties with other issues. Although the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam contain good provisions on culture, we have not really done anything practical about this important issue. Let me try to explain why.

First, on the definition of culture and its relation to history: Does culture only consist of past achievements or is it also a dynamic trend towards our future? We historians, who are concerned with the longue durée of history, recognize that there is a great difference between events and lasting phenomena. We often use the slogan “the past is never completely past.” We tend to see man as a creation of history, but history in turn as a creation of man. If we define culture as the combination of facts that make us what we are, then history is definitely the best mirror of culture.

Let’s turn to the question of whether there is something like a European culture or a European person. It is a Renaissance idea that Europe is an intellectual and moral unit. When Francis Bacon wrote “we Europeans,” he could assume that his readers knew what he meant and what they shared in spite of their national differences. However, a century later this popular Völkertafel1 was produced which replaced the vision of a common European consciousness with a description of the differences between Europe’s peoples. This rather upfront portrayal of the different characteristics of the French, the Germans and—interestingly enough—the “Greeks or Turks” might be a good representation of the popular idea of European culture. This goes to show that even in the 18th century two fundamentally different strands of thought on Europe co-existed. The readers of Bacon belong to

1 See pages 132 – 133
the intellectual elite, whose aspirations for building a European cultural model can be seen in all the artistic achievements in Europe. This European elite also shared a passion for Roman, Greek and Turkish culture. It is this way of thinking shared by the happy few that leads to a European idea. This elitist view stands in contrast to the popular one, which is more selfish, dictated by local interests and alien to the idea of sharing culture, goods and events with even the best neighbors.

I believe that these two ways of thinking continue to exist today. This means that the overwhelming participation of people in their national or local culture does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of others who in turn are proud of their own achievements. Culture used to be the basis of identity for European elites. But if culture is not open-minded, there is a danger that it could turn into a handicap for further integration of people with common interests—mostly economic and political—but with different national or local cultures.

So does the mystification of culture today render culture dangerous for politics? I see the devotion of each European to his own language in spite of the handicap this represents for integration as proof of a certain cultural isolationism. Let me stress that the language of elite communication at the origin of the European idea was not a national language but Latin. And don’t suppose that I speak in favor of English as our common language, even though I express these ideas in English. If that were the case, we would have to agree with Jean Monnet, who initiated the integration of our Europe not through culture but through economics. Because of the focus on local or national cultures, I don’t see culture as a main tool of European integration today.

But I would like to distinguish between culture and civilization, just as we speak for example about peasant or worker culture, but not peasant or worker civilization. The common elements that characterize each particular culture in Europe are at the basis of what we could call European civilization. Its common traits are often expressed by those outside of Europe, who speak about Europeans. Paul Valéry, in his study of the definition of the word “European,” recognizes three such common elements, symbolically represented by Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. Athens stands for the ancient Greek tradition of thought based on the rationality of the thinking mind. Rome’s heritage is that of local administration and, last but not least, Jerusalem symbolizes Judeo-Christian spirituality. These were and are the fundamentals of the European mind, which created the values on which European civilization stands even today. Let me also quote Voltaire in emphasizing culture can threaten integration.
European civilization: democracy, dialog, development and human rights

in this context: “The peoples of Europe possess principles of humanity which are not to be found in any other place of the world. Christian Europeans are now what ancient Greeks were in the past.”

That was the past. On this basis we will continue to build the future, adding elements of modern culture as we go along. To build our future, we have to rely on our capacity for critical thinking, which has always been a characteristic of European thought. This spirit aims to confirm for all citizens of Europe the values of democracy through dialog, a necessary condition for peace, human rights and development. This naturally also has to take into account the principle of sustainability, i.e. the requirement to protect the interests of future generations. In French, these pillars of European civilization can be called the “four Ds”: Democracy, Dialog, Development and Droits de l’homme, human rights. These “four Ds” will provide the foundations for the social structure of our new Europe, which will create a new common culture. Perhaps this culture can then be called European without alarming the peoples of Europe who wish to keep the integrity of their own cultural identity. The means to create the future common culture from the new social structure can only be education. We require less national and more European education, in particular with regard to history, arts and language.

As a consequence of this definition of European civilization, all peoples of the continent who respect the “four Ds” and are ready to share the fruits of their development and maintain peace must find their place in the European Union. The EU is a historically unique development because it is the first multinational economic and almost political entity that is not the result of military conquest. Let me stress that the European Union is not a multinational empire. Rather, it will be one specific area within a globalized world, but not the center of this world as it used to be. This will be the case despite the fact that many values of the globalized world, particularly concerning scientific culture and economic structures, are rooted in European thinking and its achievements.

I shall conclude with an allusion to Arthur Rimbaud who said already at the end of the 19th century that maybe we should not begin with Europe’s culture, which in an overdose might constitute a handicap to integration. Rather, we should perhaps start with education, hoping to finish with European culture.

Ms. Ahrweiler concludes with a clear mission for the European Union: Do more to educate the Europeans; otherwise, European culture will be unable to perform its central role for Europe.
In my opinion, we will not get very far by using this open-ended brainstorming session to conduct an essentialist discussion over the questions of “what is Europe” and “what is European culture.” These questions will be raised repeatedly during the discussion and we will see the various answers that emerge. My idea of Europe will probably meet with some resistance. For me, Europe is essentially a geographical area, a continent plus the narratives that have taken place there, and not primarily a catalog of principles. Therefore, my Europe includes the productive and fascinating stories of Europe’s wealth, but also the stories of its disasters. Europe, for me, is Immanuel Kant and Adolf Hitler, Chartres Cathedral, the Gulag Archipelago, the Hagia Sophia and the great master builder Sinan. San Francisco, Vladivostok, and Tokyo definitely belong to what one might call the world of European values, even if they are not part of Europe. For me, then, geography is not the only, but the decisive factor.

Permit me to lay down six points for the upcoming discussion.

First, rediscovering Europe. Since 1989, Europe has been for many an alien Europe that has opened up, that one can travel and discover and, above all, can rediscover itself in its incredible beauty and riches. We are in the midst of reconstructing the European cultural zone as a whole and in doing so are exiting the ruinous epoch of the World Wars and the Cold War. We are experiencing with our own eyes the Europeanization of the horizon and the attempt to find a new language for experiences that had previously been poised against one another. An enormous Babylonian confusion of languages is emerging over new stories in Europe that can finally find their way to one another. These are the reasons for the urgency of exploring and discovering Europe, at once old and new, its landscapes, its authors, and its cultures. This process of surveying Europe anew is not only economic and political, but also cultural.

Second, I would like to take up Mr. von der Gablentz’s remarks. I consider the very powerful expression “reinventing Europe” to be the sole appropriate one. The bureaucratic terminology we mostly use when we speak of Europe, namely “eastward enlargement” or “accession,” is completely inadequate, since it implies that some sort of machine or people would be the lords of the process. In reality it is a profound transformation in which everything is being put to the test and must be redefined. This process of reconstitution presents the question whether we really are up to the task and who the chief actors will be. I think it is a prejudice to think that those who take the lead have to be intellectuals or artists. In the final analysis, completely different people are pushing these transformations...
The Europe of leakage currents

Schrögel

...which manifests itself in leakage currents

forward. Sometimes one can learn far more from businesspeople who venture into Russia or Ukraine than from intellectuals or writers who never leave their libraries.

Third—leakage currents. We are witnesses to the fact that one can observe everywhere the emergence of a new Europe. This new Europe has a great deal of facets. There is, for example, the conference-Europe and Brussels-Europe. There is also a bazaar-Europe, meaning those men and women who trade between Riga, Minsk and Istanbul. There is an agricultural Europe and its subsidies, a gay Europe that is pioneering a new network of gay scenes, a newspaper-Europe and a celebrity-Europe. This newly emerging Europe—Americans would call it “Europe in the making”—expresses itself in what might be called “leakage currents.” This is a term borrowed from physics and electronics, and denotes those electrical currents that exist but remain unnoticed because they are statistically irrelevant, yet one day become evident. The Europe of leakage currents is an exceedingly stimulating scene, and anyone can follow its vital signs. For example, new cities are emerging within existing cities. In Berlin, we are experiencing the growth of a new city with 130,000 to 140,000 Russians and tens of thousands of Poles. Budapest is similarly witnessing the emergence of a “Chinatown” of 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. Other examples include the young Russians in Oxford who can no longer be differentiated from the other members of the scientific community, and the hundreds of thousands of truckers who drive week for week from Rotterdam to Astrakhan or from Barcelona to St. Petersburg, the famous women of the Eastern European bazaars, the car dealers of Mariampule on the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border, and the burgeoning tourism sector in Eastern Europe. Yet other people also come to mind, for example Wolf Lepenies, whose Institute for Advanced Studies has been copied all over Europe. My students are also part of the story. They return from their civilian service in Nizhni Novgorod or Gdansk with excellent language skills and begin their studies with abilities that our generation only learned during the time at university.

Fourth, what is the measure of the new Europe? The new Europe should compare itself to the Europe that preceded the destruction, meaning before 1939 and 1914. Recalling this time is not an exercise in nostalgia. It means recalling how great, strong, and rich our continent was before the 20th century, which, as we know, began in 1914. For me, the epitome of this powerful Europe was Sergei Diaghilev, the organizer and impresario of the Saison Russe from 1909 to 1929. This project allowed people to see Europe as an entity, with a staggering intensity that
we today have yet to match. The Europe of that time was one of networks, of “transnational communities,” free of inferiority complexes, yet skeptical and doubtful of itself. People, not institutions, characterized it because it was a Europe of private patrons instead of organizational structures. The core of this Europe was not the public conference but the salon, which grew out of private wealth and civil initiative. Many postmodern discourses appear so fresh and original today because they have forgotten everything that came before. In the cultural centers of the former poly-national empires, everything existed that seems so new and exciting today—multiple identities, multiethnic and multicultural societies, hybrid cultures, and so on. Only someone who knows nothing about the Europe of the Danube Monarchy, the Ottoman and Russian empires, or the metropolitan culture of the interwar years could think that these phenomena are something completely new. The transatlantic world that emerged after 1945 has a very short memory.

Fifth, the metropolitan corridor in Europe. The Europe that after 1914 went from an important continent to another province among many others in the world is irrevocably lost, just as Dipesh Chakrabarthy depicted it in his book “Provincializing Europe.” However, as a consequence of globalization, Europe is growing and prospering in a whole new way, even if the process is not moving ideally or completely according to plan. This is expressed both through the aforementioned “leakage currents” and the metropolitan corridor. By this I mean that since the fall of the border between East and West, Europe has been confronted with new fault-lines and frontiers that are emerging between zones of highly dynamic development and breakneck acceleration on the one hand, and zones of deceleration and separation from the global context on the other. In the area I call the metropolitan corridor, there exists something like simultaneity, the rhythm of the global cities: CNN, plastic money, E-mail, the Internet, and circulating financial flows. Whereas a real-time connection has been established among Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow, one could elsewhere find oneself in another century, particularly in Eastern Europe. Since 1989, the homogenized Eastern Bloc has dissolved, allowing us to observe day by day how Europe has also become a place of variable time. New simultaneities and new time lapses are emerging in Europe in this breathtaking and conflict-charged display. As Europe progresses towards unity in a political sense, it will increasingly become a fragmented, alienated place that has to be rediscovered and re-explored. In this sense, Marc Augé was right when he stated that the 21st century would be the century of anthropologists.
Sixth, we share a sense of the coming emergency, even if it has not yet affected everyone. The golden postwar age, as Eric Hobsbawm portrayed it, is over. I am convinced that the liquidation of the East will be followed, in another way, by the liquidation of the West, in which everything will be reassessed and those elements that are no longer supportable are discarded. We have to ask what part culture, the arts, and academia will play in this process of transformation. I believe that this process has two sides. On the one hand it will brutalize and foster barbarism as a Darwinian struggle for survival develops. Simultaneously, however, it also holds the chance of refocusing attention on the essentials, perhaps of separating the wheat from the chaff, or spurring a new love of realism.

In conclusion I would like to refer to the present political discussion. The conflicts that have been spawned by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s remark about “old” Europe are no coincidence. His statement merely reflects a real tension. For me it is a given that, after the end of the East-West configuration, the West and the transatlantic world can no longer exist in their old homogeneity, closed ranks, and unity of purpose, but that they must be reconfigured and balanced anew. Europe will of course become more independent, just as America is acting more independently. Instead of responding to Mr. Rumsfeld’s comments with retribution, as the major European newspapers have done, Europe’s writers and intellectuals should rather come to grips with what they would do to meet the new threat of international terrorism. I would have preferred that the intellectuals who are currently mocking Mr. Rumsfeld had discussed after 9/11 how to protect our vulnerable civilization, open societies, and great cities from this new kind of threat.

I think that we now have enough material on the table for our discussion.

Allow me to add a few comments from the perspective of the historian of the present. Our relation to the subject of culture comes not only because we are classified as writers by Austrian tax laws, but also because culture cannot be understood without history, especially within a European context. The “leakage currents” we have heard about also invite us to think about what contemporary history has contributed to European history and culture. If we look at Western European historiography of the present—and I think Mr. Schlögel would be able to confirm this for Central and East Europe—we find, at best, a leakage current towards more transnational, Europeanized history. But histories of the contemporary still
express national historical cultures and take place in the shadow of national paradigms, even if the national element in these accounts appears to be on the retreat. The dilemma of contemporary history is its increasing specialization, leading to more diversification but also to an arbitrariness of topics that prevents it from reaching broad-based and comprehensive conclusions. Remarkably, Western European historiographies of the present largely fail to take any interest in each other, despite the telephone, fax, E-mail, and the Internet.

Historians of the contemporary contribute a great deal within the context of national debates, more than even ten or fifteen years ago. They have shown this in their accounts of eroding national identities in Austria, Switzerland, Italy, France, Great Britain, and other states. By destroying national identities, contemporary historiography has also contributed indirectly to the process of Europeanization. Yet it remains grossly fixated on the Nazi era and World War II while neglecting other important dimensions of the postwar period. Overall, it has barely been Europeanized. Historians who deal with European integration and international relations are a minority. Histories of contemporary Western Europe are characterized by an intergovernmental, meaning a national and additive, not supranational, perspective. This resulted from a twofold nationalization of contemporary historiographical cultures, which are focused on the nation-state thematically, institutionally, and in their work methods. Therefore, “reinventing Europe” is also a challenge for contemporary historiography that can only be adequately met by a new generation of historians. Wolfgang Schmale, a German colleague who teaches in Vienna, recently advanced intriguing methodological recommendations in his primer on European history, even if his comparative approach is as old as history-writing itself. Another important requirement would be to focus more research on the transfer of culture, so that we learn to accept Europe as a history of give-and-take without omitting the dialectic between historical origins and the future of society.

Permit me to close with a further observation on the development of contemporary history. Such historians take more account of discourse theories today and therefore also regard Europe rather as an element of a discourse, as a construct of imagination and as the object of perceptions and discussion.

I believe that we are at a crossroads in the present European debate. Finally, we are once again taking up the subject of Europe with the intention of influencing political developments. For a long time we believed that we would make progress
in Europe by not talking about it. During the immediate postwar period, a robust discussion on Europe was conducted with great political ambitions. It included the European federalists, who failed in the end to have their way, and the Hague Europe Conference of 1948, in which also Turkey participated. Then, the process of European integration began to unfold differently. To put it in somewhat overstated terms, Western Europe united incrementally on the condition that no one should discuss Europe. Integration stealthily infiltrated the economies, while the big questions of European identity—who are we really? What role should we play?—were left untouched. The impression was that this was the only way to get the British on board and advance at all. This attitude no longer works. At least since 1989, Europe is once more explicitly on the agenda. We in Europe have to discuss things that have so far been ignored, even though this might not make many developments any easier. This would have to include the question of a culturally defined European identity, because it is not sufficient, Mr. Schlögel, to define Europe solely as a geographical space. Our historical experience is not the least of our cultural resources that have to become the foundation of a European identity.

Two experiences seem particularly important to me. First, provocatively said, the Europeans have committed all the major crimes and mistakes and have borne the consequences on their own backs. This is nothing to be especially proud of, but it is a useful trove of experience. It is this—and please spare me the accusations that I am anti-American—that distinguishes us from certain, more naïve ideas on the other side of the Atlantic of how to deal with the world. Secondly, we Europeans have been sitting at close quarters for some 2000 years, something that has prompted us to understand structural problems. Our means of solving problems cannot be to “go west!” to keep moving on when things get complicated. For a long time, we have had to tackle our problems locally and with the means at our disposal. This is valuable capital for the issue of how we intend to shape the world in future. In sum, we can mobilize specific European experiences as cultural capital for the future, just as Ms. Ahrweiler has said. Europe is defined by more than a geographical area, which would be very hard to demarcate, by the way.
that they had too much history, more than they could bear. Europe overwhelms groups and the individual endlessly through its capacity to digest and recall history while its amnesia leads back, over and over, to new traumas that themselves have to be digested and incorporated. The attitude towards remembrance and forgetting is, for me, Europe’s defining element. Winfried G. Sebald rendered this brilliantly in his book “Austerlitz,” in which the entire tragedy of forgetting, memory, and the impossibility of living with it is played out from the clock in the Antwerp train station. This is also the intent of Hans Magnus Enzensberger when he describes how much a sixteen-year-old barber’s apprentice girl knows about things that we sometimes do not understand well by sitting in our rooms. He also refutes the hoary cultural lament that young people know so little. The issue raised by Mr. von der Gablentz of how to make Europe relevant to young people is essentially a question of remembrance and reasonableness.

I would like to conclude with a personal example. When I began my position at the European Cultural Foundation, I asked my fourteen-year-old daughter what she thought about Europe. I didn’t get much of a response. “Europe? Forget it. I’m not that interested in it. I have a hard enough time knowing what it means to be Austrian.” But then came the follow-up questions. “Can you explain Northern Ireland to me? And Macedonia? Could we talk about Israel and Palestine?” This showed me how a 14-year-old deals with the issue of war and peace and Europe’s ability to cope with it. This really interested her and it just as truly interests young people today regarding our response to the Iraq conflict. Europe has a unique chance to take on these challenges constructively and enter into a new era of not forgetting and listening to history by giving our constructive answer to the monopolar global structure we are seeing today. In this respect I am proud of old Europe and its capacity to think in new ways.

This might be a good time to remind ourselves of Ms. Ahrweiler’s message that education is the framework for our efforts to transmit what we can back to European culture. If we want to involve young people in our new Europe, we have to think about a European dimension for our educational systems, which, to recall Mr. Gehler, have remained exclusively national in an environment that has changed in the last 50 years to a European one.

I agree with Prof. Schlögel that geography is crucial for defining Europe, for it is neither relevant nor possible to define Europe in cultural or philosophical terms.
journalists should promote
European unity more proactively
without reducing the complexity of reality. In the same vein, the small, but very
real developments on the ground described by Prof. Schlögel are central in defin-
ing Europe. Largely unregistered networks of all kinds exist, bringing people into
contact with each other. These networks don’t necessarily have much to do with
the European Union and can sometimes even oppose integration, as is the case
with the anti-globalization protest movement. But at the same time, these net-
wor ks de ne relationships across borders. Another example are immigrant com-
n unities in Europe, which define their identity not only in relation to their coun-
try of origin or the country where they are residing but also in relation to
immigrant communities in other European countries. For the contacts within
those groups, national borders play a minor role.

My main argument, however, refers to the role of journalism and the media
in Europe. For the moment, we are stuck with a rather conventional view of what
is really happening on this continent, which does not register the developments
described above. At the same time, we tend to presume that defining Europe is a
matter of defining the European Union. That is very dangerous. We should on the
contrary adopt a geographical definition of Europe, which includes everyone who
participates in those networks and discussions, be they from the Ukraine or wher-
ever. The media plays a crucial role in all this, because newspapers in particular
were principal agents in nation building in Europe. That was not only the case in
the 19th century, but also after the Second World War. In many European coun-
tries, especially in Germany, but also in France, newspapers were completely
newly-founded and restructured after the war. But the media structures are still
predominantly oriented along national borders, which lead to very little cross-bor-
der communication between different national public spheres. Agendas often
relate to national histories. For example news about the recent meeting in Ver-
sailles is understood in France and Germany as related to the symbolic struggle of
Napoleonic against German Romanticism in the 19th century. No similar inter-
pretation can be found in British newspapers, and perspectives like this are rarely
understood by anyone outside these countries.

To facilitate the building of Europe defined through networks and to create a
common European public sphere, the profession of journalism has to be rede-
defined. The media should be attacked for its extreme insularity and lack of com-
prehension of the importance of these developments. During the period of nation-
building, journalism played a central role in the struggle for freedom of
expression as a crucial aspect of democracy. Rather than just reporting news in a
supposedly objective manner, journalism was taking a stand in the fight for democracy. The profession should return to that role.

Thank you very much for this important statement concerning the role of the media in nation-building and in “Europe-building.” I agree that journalists have contributed little to the building of Europe, except for the small, but highly qualified corps of European journalists in Brussels, who provide top newspapers with excellent stories about what happens in Brussels. We should not forget their efforts, even though they rarely filter down to a broader process of “Europe-building.”

In his definition of Europe, Prof. Schlögel included not just space, but also history, mentioning the term “Katastrophengeschichte.” To me—and I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Wagner—our common responsibility for disaster is a fundamental aspect of European identity. But looking back to history cannot be enough. We also have to look forward to define our responsibility in the world. Two elements are lacking in the debates about Europe, its culture and identity: Which lessons we should derive from history and which ambitions we should define for the future.

Let me give you an example to make this clearer. After the Second World War there seems to have been a growing understanding of the events and our own responsibility. What we derived from this was the mantra of “never again.” But only a few years ago when it came to preventing genocide in the former Yugoslavia—where my own country, of course, had a particular responsibility for the defense of Srebrenica—we failed to act on this premise. To me the fundamental question is: Why did we not act? Why did the Europe of Kant and Diaghilev not only not prevent what happened in the middle of the last century, but also not act effectively in the former Yugoslavia?

Here, my comment ties in with Mr. Ruth’s conclusions. Newspapers could play an important role by providing a historical perspective on the present and the future. But a lot of reporting has a shallow time perspective and is rather focused on the here and now. Few long lines are drawn from history and few are projected into the future. But we should have a long perspective when we talk about European culture. We should debate what lessons to draw from history and how these lessons should affect our behavior today and in the future.
As a journalist, I consider myself very much at the receiving end of Mr. Ruth's remarks. His words exemplify a general trend in discussions on Europe that I find disturbing. Europe debates always revolve around what should happen. We often speak in a partly recriminating, partly lamenting undertone about what should happen but doesn’t, and who’s to blame. We complain that the people do not understand our motives and objectives and therefore we turn our thoughts to how to promote understanding for the project. I think this is an unproductive approach. Much more interesting to me is the Europe of what is, and finding out what the current conditions really are. Mr. Schlögel provided some food for thought here. Maybe we have to get used to the idea that ideas that generate little interest or that require a huge effort to make attractive might not be that good after all. With that said, I must warn people against expecting journalists to help advance even such a worthy project as the European one. Publishing with that kind of intent is propaganda, not journalism.

I would also like to urge caution in regard to Ms. Ahrweiler's remarks on European education. I don’t believe that one can inculcate an awareness of a European culture. It comes from being exposed to the various European cultures, because one cannot understand individual literatures and arts without putting them in their cultural context. One can achieve this only through exposure to the unique and special, and not by trying to create a European identity or culture or history as such.

To contribute to our debate whether the media fulfill their role in talking about questions of European culture, I’d like to make some concrete remarks about cultural programming on German television.

At first, a formidable picture presents itself: we have a total of twelve magazine shows on German TV concerned regularly and exclusively with culture. The ARD network’s Sunday evening “TTT”, “Kulturweltspiegel” and “Kulturreport” and “aspekte” from ZDF on Friday are watched by up to one and a half million people—and that late in the evening. These magazine shows focus mainly on supra-regional German issues, but regularly also on international, European and non-European topics. The eight cultural programs on the third German public network by contrast cover mainly regional cultural issues and attract between 100.000 and 150.000 spectators. They very consciously chose a more provincial perspective on culture—and this is not meant to sound derogatory at all. On the contrary, they make worthy contributions to the cultural life in our immediate neighborhoods.
“Kulturzeit,” the cultural magazine from 3sat, is designed as a supra-regional program, created in collaboration between Germany, Austria and Switzerland. “Kulturzeit” therefore already concentrates largely on European culture. It has a much more open approach to cultural events beyond the respective national borders. The structure of “metropolis,” the cultural magazine of “arte,” the common Franco-German network, is less well defined. The French issues deal predominantly with French topics. This is largely due to the fact that France hardly has any other cultural shows. But the positive effects are obvious: German viewers receive detailed information about their neighbor’s cultural scene. But when the German issues of “metropolis” are watched in France, viewers usually gain insights not only into German cultural issues, but also those of other European countries. Because “arte” conceives of itself as a European cultural network, the German editors of “metropolis” can use their leeway to turn their attention abroad, to Italy, Poland or other countries.

Despite this overall positive outlook, I must also say to my chagrin that certain topics are appearing ever more seldom on the German programs. Thus, contemporary visual arts and even important theater productions are usually ignored, unless they have something spectacular to offer. We have, in fact, a theater channel, but it is available only for those with digital equipment, which are not many. I am not among them, nor are many of my colleagues who enjoy going to the theater. A project as laudable as the theater channel is therefore barely accessible to the public.

In sum, Germany has a host of cultural magazines on TV that do look beyond national borders and focus on European issues. But the general trend toward entertainment prevents more analytical approaches. And the area of cultural features that used to thrive in our country barely exists anymore, bar a few exceptions such as the “Bayrischer Rundfunk.” It would therefore be in vein to expect the large national public networks to cover European cultural themes—except if finally there were pressure on the TV editorial boards to produce more difficult and challenging programs. That this does not have to be boring has by now been proven time and again.

I would first like to respond to Mr. de Vries. We did indeed act in Yugoslavia, but we did the wrong thing. We elevated a people’s right of self-determination to the highest principle, forgetting that individual human rights are an even higher imperative. German policy ignored fundamental facts on the ground, for

Strasser
instance, that there were about 1.2 million mixed marriages between Serbs and Croats with an average of three to four children that could not be allotted to the one or other ethnic group. If one grants primacy to the right to national self-determination without simultaneously assuring respect for minority and human rights, as we have done, swayed by multiculturalism, this can only go wrong.

Mr. Roß, you go too far for me. Everything that Mr. Schlögel said about networks and a European reality that is going unnoticed is certainly correct. Yet responsible policy is also part of building Europe. Networks and spontaneous developments should not be played out against the Europe that has been constituted, because this politically constituted Europe is also a very important aspect. Especially in Central and Eastern Europe, the prospect of joining the European Union has been crucial in strengthening other civil society developments. The same applies to education. Here, too, there are many spontaneous initiatives that do not need to be supported. Many young people study abroad in Europe on their own resources and travel back and forth, such as my children, who have been renovating Jewish cemeteries in Poland or done their research in France. Yet beyond that it would be sensible, as Ms. Ahrweiler has said, to emphasize more strongly the European dimension in our education systems. These two aspects reinforce each other and should not be played out against one another.

The gulf between Mr. Roß’ and my definition of journalism is smaller than it might appear on the surface. The problem I was trying to point out is that most journalists equate Europe with the EU and Brussels. This definition disregards many developments related to the construction of a European inter-communality, such as the networks and exchanges referred to earlier. To be relevant, journalism has to adapt to new realities and must try to discover what the real news is. But Mr. Roß and I might have different experiences of journalism in one particular respect. He works for “Die Zeit,” where individual journalists offer very personal analyses, almost essays treating various matters. This kind of newspaper exists in Germany, but is less frequent in some other European countries. In Sweden, as in all Nordic countries, the overriding concept is the American definition of journalism as objective, factual reporting. Whenever media attention turns to more complex events than fires and traffic accidents, this definition is problematic. In a period of flux, like the one we are facing after the breakdown of the Soviet Union
and the events of 9/11, a variety of personal interpretations of the issues are very necessary. Given the complexity of Europe, we need more writing like what is done in your paper, though perhaps with a less elitist approach.

You took the words right out of my mouth, Mr. Ruth, but allow me to return first to the issue of “reinventing Europe.” We do not need to justify why we are unifying Europe, or reuniting it, because we have known the reasons for a long time. We are in the process of making a reality of a vision that many intellectuals, politicians and artists have cherished for hundreds of years and now we seem to be getting frightened by our own courage. I do not think we need to redefine Europe, but to make it easier to comprehend and experience. At the same time, however, the identity and solidarity of Europe that was determined from the outside fell away in 1989–1990. This obliges us to think about ourselves and say what holds us together. Many political, academic and intellectual texts have been written on this subject. However, and here I would agree with Mr. Ruth, it would be easier had the media helped in founding this European public at large. We all know that after the Treaty of Nice, every head of government said “I worked out the best deal for our people.” This shows that the solidarity of the European Union often exists as a theory that is seldom applied to reality. On the other hand we have the constant admonition not to become stuck in petty details of the unification process, but to keep in mind that this is our greatest challenge in Europe, to successfully see this peace process through to its end. So where is the problem? It exists because Europe is neither comprehensible nor palpable, which brings me back to what I said at the outset.

What possibilities do we have to change this? One is history, and I agree with Ms. Ahrweiler that an awareness of European history will be vital for the leaders of tomorrow. We can already sense many small changes in this respect, such as within the universities. Yet this will not solve the problem for people of my generation and those who cannot even be given historical instruction. Therefore, we need the cultural sector and the media to help people understand and experience Europe. The difficulty is in using these wonderful options without becoming nationalist or propagandistic and without becoming ensnared in details while losing sight of the bigger picture in all its complexity. To succeed here we must cooperate across borders. My friend Doris Pack and I could sing operas of how difficult this is in the educational field. We have to work with countries that insist on their subsidiarity and defend their identity against others.
In the end, however, the Europeans’ shared traits are far more evident than that which divides us. We know what distinguishes us from the US and Latin America and the other great cultures in Asia and Africa, but we know far too little about what separates us from each other. Despite a common language, I as an Austrian sometimes have difficulty in expressing myself so that an associate from Germany understands my terms the way I do. We can only do this work of differentiation through culture. Yet culture is increasingly resulting from mass production, which in turn influences the directions in which culture is heading. These forces do not necessarily originate in Europe and I think this is a matter of some concern, without calling myself anti-American.

I would like to underscore Mercedes Echerer’s statement that we do not need to reinvent Europe but merely to reinforce what we have already founded and institutionalized so that we can get a grasp of these things. I was very happy to hear Ms. Ahrweiler bring up the subject of education because I am convinced that many goals can be reached only through education. Yet, although the Council of Ministers constantly talks about education, it doesn’t provide any more money, because education falls under the writ of subsidiarity. The re-nationalization that is increasingly taking place within the Council of Ministers is lethal for this Europe. We used to be far further toward political union when, in Maastricht’s chapters 127 and 128, culture and education were mentioned in a EU treaty for the first time. Today, ten years later, we have fallen back. While many good education reforms are being initiated at the intergovernmental level and the European Commission submits proposals, the European Parliament has no say on these issues. This is quite a sad development and should be more forcefully addressed in all the fields we work in.

This is a point on which I agree with Mr. Ruth. Journalists could assist in turning people into European citizens if they would report more on what makes up Europe and our identity. The media report about European decisions in various areas, but you will never get a sense of the soul of Europe from any normal newspaper, with the occasional exception of “Die Zeit.” We MEPs are helpless in matters of information policy. We try to convey information about Europe to the people so that they might build this Europe with us. But an artificial information policy is essentially propaganda. You cannot reach the people that way. As citizens of this Europe, however, journalists have the great responsibility of attempting to live this Europe and make it come alive for others.

Echerer | Pack 40
I think one can approach this problem from several different directions and I fear that many people are trying to burden cultural policy, which we do not actually even pursue at a European level because of subsidiarity, with the things that other policies have been unable to achieve. We have failings here in all fields, from agricultural policy to environmental policy, and expect cultural policy to change everything by concealing it under a sugar glaze. Instead of harboring unrealistic expectations, we should set our sights lower while making sure that our objectives are worthwhile ones.

I wish to take up the point of education, which has been rightly emphasized from all sides. I will refer to the important experiences of the politicians among us, be they in the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission. We have to be unequivocal that, on the one hand, we are all committed to democracy and want to, have to, and will stick to it under any circumstances. Yet we also have to acknowledge that democracy and the laws in which it is embedded are not always helpful in reaching the objectives we have sworn to achieve. According to German legal terminology, the European Union is a confederation of states. In practically every member state, one hears major complaints that this confederation is not subject to democratic controls and is therefore insufficiently accepted by its people. At the same time, however, the democracy we know is tied to a state and not to an alliance. If we are serious about letting democracy flourish in Europe, we should not have any great fear of steering towards a federation. And yet the same politicians who complain of the democratic deficit in this confederation of states vehemently oppose developing it along federal lines.

We live, moreover, in a system of representative democracy, which means that politicians have to receive a mandate and conduct an election campaign to do so. This is completely legitimate and inevitable. Yet as long as we resist approaching the prerequisites for democracy, meaning a federation, in the general political and historical development of Europe, we cannot expect persuasive and encouragingly European arguments to emerge when democratic mandates are allocated in the various nation-states. In Germany, our brand of federalism exacerbates this problem, in particular for education. Of course, federalism has many positive sides, but in Germany and beyond its borders even more so, it makes popularizing the idea of Europe or, put another way, awareness of a European identity that is honorable and worthwhile, so that Europe can become the master of its own fate, much more hard to come by.
the increase in tabloid journalism in problematic

To the interesting and useful discussion of the media I would like to add that the media does not make it easier for politicians to attain democratic mandates based on a European consciousness among voters. Additionally, most media outlets are private corporations, meaning they are out to make a profit, which is becoming increasingly difficult as advertising revenue drifts off into the Internet, for example. As a result, more than just the typefaces of the articles and advertisements resemble each other increasingly. We are seeing a resurgence of tabloid journalism, of superficiality and of personal attacks replacing discussion of issues. Of course Europe cannot grow together by talking about hair color, but it is precisely such topics that the media are harping on. Furthermore, anyone wanting to win an election in our country has to have access to the tabloids and the electronic media. By the way, privatized media is also one of the West’s main export articles to the venerable culture of Russia, and does not really contribute to improving the quality of public opinion there.

In the end we all agree on how important European culture is. This consensus is not derived from the corresponding experiences and expectations of every person here, but the enormous value of European culture, even if it is not used as such in the awareness of the people. A central question for us is, therefore, how we can use the media and above all our democratic processes, our parties and election campaigns, to draw attention to this capital and mobilize it for the legitimate process of seeking a democratic mandate.

I would like to further discuss the dilemma of the media raised by Mr. von Weizsäcker. The twofold nature of the media derives from the fact that these are businesses that simultaneously do journalistic work with its attendant journalistic freedoms. The media have seen a wave of new investment and now require a process of consolidation. Here we have the political responsibility of establishing a balance and helping make sure that the media remain financially independent and free from abuse. Without a free and independent media, without a guarantee for the diversity of sources, no European public debate can come about; no democracy, not even a supranational one can live without a free media.

I would like to emphasize at this point that it was the EU that permitted the situation in Italy to develop. This is not only an Italian, but also a European problem. In the process of enlargement, we cannot demand an independent media landscape in the new democracies if the rules there are different than in the rest
of the EU. It is a frightening example of irresponsible policymaking that we have not done anything against this situation. In addition, the European Union should not allow an individual who is at the same time a leading politician as well as an economic media tycoon to use national legislation in order to create advantage for himself at the European level. The relationship between politics and the media—
a liaison dangereuse—is not just a problem in Italy.

Ms. Echerer said earlier that Europe is a reality that we have to make comprehensible and palpable. I agree one hundred percent, Europe is a reality, but our problem is that this reality is not secure. As a consequence, we should pay more attention to Europe’s present. We tend to concern ourselves excessively with the past and assume that Europe’s legacy is so great and diverse and that its continued existence is secure, or we think too much about the future and lose ourselves in dreams that have nothing to do with reality. When I speak of the present, I do not mean this moment or any momentary relevance. That would be an overly postmodern expression and we have to look past this postmodern culture that lives only for the moment. We have to try to extend the present and transform it into something within which people would want to live.

In Europe we do not have much time to implement this process of change. If we miss this extraordinary chance then we will achieve nothing in the next 20 years. Of course it is difficult to find solutions, especially as our continent unites so many major differences in a relatively small space compared to America. Jean Baudrillard said that the United States could always push back its own frontiers, which helped it develop an ideology and policy that keeps incorporating new areas in the problem-solving process. In Europe, on the other hand, we have little space and therefore have to learn to deal with differences of opinion. Yet precisely this is our chance, because we have to establish something new that simultaneously incorporates unity and differences.

An important step would be to conclude a pact with the coming generation. Europe should pay more attention to the rights of the younger generation, meaning education in particular. Anyone who has worked at a university or has children knows the Erasmus Program, which may now be obsolete, but was once a big success. One can at least sense that today’s Europe presents opportunities that were unavailable earlier. At present the media are giving a picture of Europe that emphasizes the limits and regulations that Europe is imposing on its people. Moreover, our national governments like to make Europe a scapegoat for all the prob-
lems they cannot solve themselves. National leaders often justify difficult decisions by claiming that they were forced by Brussels, for example the regulation that budget deficits cannot exceed three percent of GDP. This kind of portrayal gives people negative connotations towards Europe. Instead, more emphasis should be placed on establishing new rights and helping people take advantage of them. That would be a piece of the extended present that we can comprehend as a chance for today and not only the future.

Officials in Brussels often say Europe is used as a scapegoat by politicians who cannot and do not want to see that we are living in a great European community that determines our lives and for which we share responsibility. This viewpoint is missing because people do not feel like European citizens. That great old European, Steve Davignon, said on the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Plan that the big difference between the Europe that was established in 1950 and the Europe we have to establish now is that, back then, a handful of politicians could decide without much questioning that “this is what we will do.” At the time, Robert Schuman called it *saut dans l’inconnu*. Today, on the other hand, we have to ask the permission of 500 million people—a mechanism that often brings Europe to stagnation. As Mr. von Weizsäcker has said, the progress of democracy in the last 50 years has been in itself a positive development accompanied by many major problems. We cannot avoid building a Europe of citizens if we want to progress further.

For me, one of the main characteristics of Europeans is that we live both in dreams and reality. Let me therefore focus on the reality for the moment. Of course, we are so much more conscious of problems than of solutions in Europe. But for younger people Europe nowadays constitutes a different reality. Whether through the “ticket to Europe” provided by the Erasmus Program or through other means, young people are at home in almost every European country. Let me remind you that we are all consumers of science, history and culture, but that scientific and cultural products are more often national than European. Only our history is a really European creation. When talking about history, I want to offer an aside to Mr. Schlögel’s comments on geography: In the end, it is history that defined the borders in geography.

I want to share with you an experience I had as the head of the historians of the world. We analyzed how history is taught in different countries, mainly in
Europe, and we organized a committee composed of forty colleagues to write a “history of Europe.” The first problem we encountered was names: should we for example say Istanbul or Constantinople? Then we wanted to write a chapter about modernity in Europe, which I assumed should begin with the French Revolution. When we said this, the British colleagues walked out because for them modern times start in 1815. For these reasons it seems almost impossible to write a European political, military or diplomatic history. But why does nobody try to write a history of European culture? Histories of European literature, European science and many similar things exist, but not of European culture because nobody knows exactly what we mean when we speak about culture. Beyond these problems, we found that every national history is usually determined by self-esteem. We continue to teach this history—of course not in universities, where we are very clever and try to teach objective history — but in schools. School textbooks usually offer a version of history that is silent on the achievements of the others and emphasizes one’s own successes. In another committee, we try to purify French history from everything that was not correct concerning the Arabic and the Muslim world. But when I pointed out all those historical distortions to the schoolbook editors, they replied that they could change that, but only if the same thing was done on the other side of the Mediterranean. Who will begin to break the circle? To me, this constitutes the main problem in history education.

While history might not be the one and only knowledge you need, I think that it might be useful for the young German who asked his father when he saw the Cathedral of Cologne, “Daddy, why have they built the big cathedral so close to the supermarket?” to know something about history in order to know something about the achievements of our neighbors. Therefore, as a historian and professor I have always asked my colleagues and myself how to cope with this problem. Today, everyone speaks about new technological means, which are important but also dangerous for nobody nowadays knows even how to read an image (we say in France that no one is illiterate inside a museum, but that no lady has ever heard more nonsense than the Mona Lisa in the Louvre). If we wish to introduce new technologies into our schools, we therefore really have to know how to use them to promote critical and open minds and to avoid giving young people the impression that they can find answers just by pressing a button.

I now want to comment on what Mr. Ruth said about the role of the media and in particular of newspapers. In order to understand the complicated reality of Europe’s civilization or culture, we need good intermediaries. The press is obvi-
learning languages to foster integration

Griefahn

creating a common culture requires a conscious political effort...

Pack

When Ms. Ahrweiler says that young people are at home in Europe today, that would be true of my children and, I assume, of hers as well. Yet we have to always keep in mind that this applies to only a certain class of youths. We have several outstanding programs in the European Union, for example the Erasmus Program, which has fortunately been incorporated into the Socrates Program. The Comenius Program finally allows those young adults who do not attend university to experience what Europe is after they leave school. And through the Grundwig Program, we promote life-long learning among the elderly, who also need our attention. When Portugal, Spain and Greece joined the European Union, nobody spoke of adult education. That changed only once the European Parliament included it in the program, despite considerable difficulties in the decision-making process. Another important innovation in Europe is the European Voluntary Service, through which young people eighteen or older can go abroad and work in the social or cultural field while learning the local language. Which brings me to a cardinal point. Without languages, Europe is going to move backwards. Our main argument should be that we would be unable to stabilize Europe without knowing a neighbor’s language and at least one other. In this respect, the European Union is on a productive path, but one that is constantly being obstructed by national egotisms hiding behind the term subsidiarity.

I would like to take up Ms. Pack’s remarks. Of course there is a mutual European culture among young people, but it is not the culture we think of. The mutual European culture consists of the kids of Prague, Paris, London and Moscow listening to Britney Spears, surfing the Internet, and playing Counterstrike. This medium contributes to international understanding, but has nothing to do with what we are discussing here. This is why I must take issue with Mr. Roß, who believes that a mutual European culture could simply arise from underneath. On the contrary, it will require an active effort. Allow me to clarify that point with an example. The Franco-German Youth Office nominally had the same funding in 1963 as it does today, with which it has, to its credit, enabled exchanges for seven million young people. Yet this funding has only 34% of its former purchasing
power. The Franco-German Youth Office socialized many people who today have a multiplying effect. It also opened my eyes and helped me think in European terms. Yet what possibilities do we have of bringing people together? Regulations handed down by some administration are too abstract for many people. Europe can only be learned and fostered as an identity when people meet, and not only within elite circles like here but at all levels. One good example is the city partnerships sponsored by the Elysée Treaty. They allow volunteer members of councils, sports clubs, choirs and many more organizations to make each other’s acquaintance.

This illustrates why language is so necessary, as Ms. Pack has shown. English is not sufficient because language also permits access to a culture and a greater context. It is not by chance that “translating” is called *interprêter* and not *traduire* in French, because one understands the background through the language. Jacques Lang once suggested that all children in Europe should be required to learn English and another foreign language and reach a certain level in them when finishing school. We should support this recommendation because it remains highly controversial, as the experiences of Baden-Württemberg and Alsace have shown. There, French was supposed to be introduced in the first grade, but parents reacted by protesting loudly, claiming that English fully sufficed.

This field, then, requires active efforts that include political resolutions. Ms. Pack is completely right in saying that culture and education are given far too little attention in the Charter and the debates within the European Convention and are treated as secondary concerns. The essential question is not whether political leaders learn, but—as Mr. von Weizsäcker has emphatically stated—whether and how the people identify themselves. However, a European identity can only emerge when people are given the chance to meet each other. The phenomenon of re-nationalization within a globalized world that Ms. Pack referred to has resulted, in my opinion, from the world’s growing complexity and incomprehensibility. When nobody knows anymore from where companies are governed, national identities become more important for people as a way of making the world understandable again. This is a fact that we must take account of.

For the Eastern European states, an additional complication is that national identity only became a factor after 1990, before which it was always co-opted and suppressed. Therefore we need an active program, supported by the appropriate financial resources, to help people meet and develop their identities. We have to...
A cultural definition of identity can become a refuge, because culture is something eternal.

Degot

...and special rules for culture in GATS

lobby intensively in every country against the assumption that the euro, common economic policy and international corporations would spark a common identity automatically.

It is also centrally important that we set down special regulations for culture and education in treaties such as GATS (General Agreement of Trade in Services), which is currently being negotiated. GATS would establish a free market not only for services, but also in principle for education or audiovisual media, and much more as well. To prevent these goods from being considered from an exclusively economic standpoint, we Europeans have to insist upon the “exception culturelle” that France has built into the WTO talks. Only then will we be able to continue designing audiovisual media and educational projects in a way that would help preserve our identities and languages. Much more would have to be done in this field as a joint European effort. This would also mean including culture as an aspect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as part of a coordinated prevention. Some fragile beginnings have been made in the joint schools and cultural centers we are establishing with England and France. Yet we have to do more at a European level, in the form of a European cultural institute in which individual identities are visible but appear together. Only in this way do we have a chance of standing up to a pure Britney Spears culture.

Degot

I will speak in English despite the fact that it is the language of globalization and some might say imperialism. This is the first time that I am taking part in a discussion about European identity, but I am used to debates about Russian identity and I am very surprised to see so many similarities. Russians often have the feeling that only we don’t know who we are, where we belong, and who needs us. I sometimes sense resentment and frustration about the assumption that nobody needs us underlying the debate about identity, both in Russia and Europe. It might be that Russians feel this way in relation to Europe, and Europe in relation to America. The perception is that “they” already have everything we could give them and therefore it is hard to see our purpose.

In this situation, a cultural definition of identity can become a refuge, because culture is something eternal. Apart from the frustration that I think underlies a cultural definition of identity, it is also has the negative consequence of creating ghettos. As a consequence, Russian artists for example are often expected to create something specifically Russian when they are invited, like I am probably expected to bring something Russian into this discussion. Because a cultural defi-
nition of national identity creates ghettos, I agree with Mr. Schlögel that we have
to define Europe geographically and I would add economically. We should adapt
to the new mobility of information and the economy by supporting the mobility
of researchers, artists, museum curators and others. We should also develop the
notion of a European internationalism, which might sound new because the
notion of internationalism is usually connected to America. This concept would
reach beyond the European Union and thus correspond to the political and eco-
nomic realities. We should not build an alternative to globalization by defending
local identities, but by creating another kind of globalization, which would be
even more global and therefore more real than American globalization.

Another point is that in arts and culture we should rehabilitate the big nar-
ratives that were first discredited by Jean-François Lyotard. Thus, and this is sad to
say, the tradition of communism is denied first by former communist countries
themselves, as well as by the rest of Europe. I believe that Europe has to integrate
the notion of communism into its history, as part of its own heritage, which has
been completely denied up to now.

Let me conclude with a comment about the media. Walter Benjamin came
to Moscow in 1926 as a journalist; he hoped to experiment with the idea of engage-
ment and belonging. Rather than being critical all the time, he wanted to try to
belong to something. But he wrote in his diary that it was so slippery on the streets
of Moscow that he could barely walk, that he couldn’t even think, that he could
only think about not falling. This comment has to be understood in the context
of Benjamin’s notion of a flaneur, by which he means a contemporary artist or
intellectual who walks through the streets, contemplating and then criticizing
things. In the extreme historical situation he found himself in, he was unable to
be a flaneur because all he was able to think about was not to fall down. Journal-
ists in Russia find themselves in a similar situation now. They probably believe
that it is better just to think how to avoid falling and therefore become unable to
criticize. I think that is a mistake, as it was a mistake for Benjamin, too. He left as
he found himself unable to belong and to be part of the situation. If it is possible
today for journalists to stay in Russia, it is crucial that they pre-serve this critical
ability even if the situation is so slippery that we are very afraid of it.

Walter Benjamin in Moscow is a very interesting case for us, because it exemplifies
the problem of the translatability of national cultures into each other. Benjamin
did not speak any Russian, the Cyrillic letters were only figures and nothing else

Smith
cultural exchange is contextual
to him and his interpreter Bernhard Reich introduced him to a very specific kind of Moscow. Benjamin also experienced Moscow at a very specifiable moment in history, when the influence of Trotskyism was receding. Symbolically, the very evening he arrived in Moscow, he met the writer Lebovic, a Neo-Trotskyite, head of a literary group, who was sent to Siberia the next day. What I miss in this discussion, although some people have alluded to it, is the reflection on the specificity and complexity of the kind of cultural interpenetration we are experiencing at this moment in history. As I am the American here, I could be said to represent Britney Spears as well as Arthur Miller, even Walter Benjamin, lionized in U.S. literary circles, as well as Wolfgang Peterson, who has become a major American film director. In this respect, the debate here has sometimes been too simplistic.

One remark about the current discussion: Following the German feuilleton in recent days, I find it telling just how much the intellectual world allows its themes to be dictated by the US defense secretary. Regrettably, much of what I read is historically uninformed of the subject of American foreign policy traditions in a very different way, then the neo-conservatives, who are rewriting their very history calling themselves Wilsonians.

Another point is that you cannot exclude questions of power and powerlessness from the discussion of European culture. It is both a mistake and dialectically correct to assume that the cultural identity of Europe must be defined from the outside, whether in relation to supercilious negative images of an American culture—defined by blue jeans and Britney Spears—or the exemplary images of American cultural diversity.

On the question of language, trans-cultural linguistic interpenetration is imperative. The predominance of English in the Internet, for example, points to a real problem. The State of California’s bilingual websites demonstrate just how a multi-linguistic Internet can serve to counter linguistic dominance.

I want to conclude by saying that we should focus more on the future of European culture than on its past. To invoke Europe’s rich cultural history with Immanuel Kant and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart is ironically to argue a-historically about what constitutes Europe, because it accords too little attention to what will certainly be more cosmopolitan national heritages in the future.

The sheer mass of questions and problems that have been raised here is enough to make one despair. But we have to know the full extent of the problems and issues involved before we can start working toward solutions.
Earlier, Mr. von Weizsäcker raised a fundamental dilemma for the European Union, that of the principle of economy and efficiency on the one hand and of legitimacy and transparency on the other. We no longer seem to be making substantial progress at the political and economic level. The internal market and common currency have been implemented to a large degree. The process of integration has reached a point at which its capacity to be steered and maneuvered is coming into question. This is why we are discussing culture today and our debate’s progress has made clear the difficulties we are having with this topic. We keep circling around the definition and condition of culture, because it is ill defined, and then suddenly dive into the subject only to drift off again. We are facing a large deficit of awareness of cultural history and cultural politics in the EU. One reason for this is that European integration itself was a detour. It was a technocratic, market-policy and monetary-policy detour, which included a top-down, government controlled cultural policy to support the Western European integration between Germany and France but failed to produce a pan-European cultural identity. If that had been attempted, people would have had to pose the question of who was actually responsible for having divided the continent. This responsibility lay not only with the Soviets or Americans, but—and this is the hot potato—with the Europeans, or more precisely the Western Europeans as well. That is why culture is being addressed only at the end of this detour, and attention will also have to be paid to the Central and Eastern Europeans and their historical experiences.

The point has rightfully been made that intellectuals and historians often sit in their studies with opened umbrellas, in the manner of Carl Spitzweg’s “Poor Academic,” and take no notice of reality. But it’s not so bad, if one takes the example of “cultural studies” within the historical profession, which have been pioneering research in our leakage currents, to quote Mr. Schlögel, for ten or fifteen years. These researchers have made clear that diplomatic, political, and economic history do not suffice, that we should also include cultural background in our investigations. We do not have to found anything new; we only have to embark on the search for ourselves. And we will find something too, because we have the enormous capital of our European cultural resources.

As for the media and the frequent lack of political responsibility, I would recommend that we should orient ourselves more along ethical principles, meaning the fundamental pillars of European identity and culture, such as Kant’s categorical imperative and Max Weber’s distinction between ethics of responsibility and
of conviction. As for the case of Italy, I agree with Ms. Echerer. Yet the fall from grace was not Italy with the election of Silvio Berlusconi in May 2001 and the EU’s failure to act, but Austria in the year 2000. In Austria, a hurried and thoughtless policy of isolation ruined what could have been applied legitimately in Italy in 2001. Now, the revised Article 7 of the EU Treaty has set the hurdle for sanctions so high in terms of procedure that putting it into effect as was done against Austria seems highly unlikely.

Finally, I would like to add a comment to Mr. Wagner’s justified contribution on the kind of history we expect our children to learn. Among publishers of history textbooks, which are going through a crisis not only in Germany, one can recognize a definite trend toward brief collections of essays that are produced at the expense of academic integrity. Academia should be more affirmative, free itself from traditional constraints and promote new forms of presentation. In addition, we historians are in danger not only of remaining too centered on nation-states, but also of becoming too Eurocentric. Europeanizing history is inadequate without taking into account the effects of globalization. We will never comprehend for example the massive protests by young people that took place at the EU’s Gothenburg summit if we fail to incorporate the anti-globalization movement that preceded them. We first have to pay attention to these reciprocal effects between global and European processes, and take them to heart as historians.

Regarding education first, I do not think that any dissent exists over the extraordinary importance of education, whereby we consider education not as propagandistic, artificial, or willful, but simply as a presentation of the cultural heritage. We have already made some progress in this respect. But in the historical profession we are still at the beginning, because disregarding the few exceptions cited, these histories consist of additives and are not European in scope. To be sure, the national narrative is too restricted and does not reflect the European experience, but it is very difficult to write European history. It entails finding a common language for completely different, even antagonistic experiences, as we can see from the central examples of the 20th century. First the Great War, the founding of national states in Eastern- and Central Europe, the crisis of democracy, totalitarian regimes, World War Two, genocide, and the ethnic expulsions within Europe that involved 60 to 80 million people. How can Germans, Poles, Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Hungarians, etc., find a common language here? Purposeful declarations will not help. Instead, the Europeans have to find a framework for
telling each other their contrary and sometimes antagonistic histories. Someday, although it cannot be decreed, this will give rise to a European narrative, a European history. This process of reconciliation and finding a common language may be difficult, but it is breathtakingly interesting.

To keep unnecessary fronts from being drawn, I would like to explain that “reinventing” does not mean rediscovering Europe in the sense of reaching the North Pole once again or reinventing the wheel. Rather, we have to again become certain of the strengths and aware of the fragility and sometimes the dubiousness of what exists. Reinvention means examining the present and is therefore the critical point against the habit of carrying on that was interrupted in 1989. It was said earlier that we couldn't send people off to school a second time—that much is true. However, anyone who does not open his or her eyes a second time and finally begin to look at Wroclaw, Krakow, Prague, Kaliningrad or Vilnius, is not capable of becoming European. In this sense we have to start from the beginning and communicate this whole new Europe.

I would once again like to emphasize that I see the current process as a re-accession into the complexity of Europe. We are growing back into the complexities as they already existed in 1913 before we destroyed them with ethnic and cultural cleansing and other horrific deeds. I think the question remains open of whether we are ready to meet this challenge a second time. We have to accept that Europe is not going to be a walk in the park. Politicians sometimes seem to think they could establish Europe behind the backs of its people. That would surely fail, because at some point, referenda will be held in which people will defend their interests. That is why we have to openly admit that the going will be tough and that new kinds of competition will result. We have to admit that the changes will bring uncertainty and renewed friction. The game of harmonizing and rhetorical soothing is inappropriate for this process.

Finally, I would like to add that the politicians have made great achievements in the past ten, fifteen years by implementing political transformations. Using all the arts of diplomacy, they have dissolved the boundaries between hemispheres and political blocs, won back sovereignty and even established a modicum of unity among peoples. But now something else completely is facing us, nothing less than the rearrangement of our lives. Take Moscow for example, that breathtaking boomtown, which is rediscovering itself and putting on a completely new face. Everywhere in Eastern and Central Europe, countless millions of people are trying to found a new lifestyle. That is actually the primary process here.
Cities play a central role in this process of rearranging people’s lives and establishing new routines. That is why I consider the Europe of mayors so important, perhaps more important than high-level Europe or the Europe of Brussels, even though these things should not be discussed in opposition to one another. I also believe that we have been blessed in the last ten years with a series of remarkable mayoral personalities who have displayed great abilities of crisis management. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, for example, might be a controversial figure, but his achievements have been enormous in preserving that maelstrom of 12 million people from the danger of civil war and turning Moscow from the Soviet capital that it was into a booming metropolis. The same could be said of the mayors of Budapest or Warsaw.

In concluding, I would like to pose a question. Why, during the 1990s, was there no real European discussion as those that took place after 1945 and during the 1980s? After 1945, Europe lay completely in ruins. It was a situation that called for new ways of seeing things. Europe’s founding fathers were guided by the vision of a European rebirth from the ruins, which meant that the European project after 1945 was not just an economic affair, but also a comprehensive one, including politics and culture. During the eighties, people began to feel the erosion of the old world, meaning divided Europe. The Central European discourse during this time had something singularly inspiring about it; it gave Europe a momentum that permitted it to shine in 1989. I think it is worrying that discussions over Europe are taken up only when either barbarians are at the gates, meaning when Europe has to redefine itself because of outside threats, or when an American defense secretary makes a remark about “old” Europe.

I would add the remark that today we have the chance of sparking a real, if belated, debate over Europe. The origins of this debate can be traced back to the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of the euro, and in the form of responses to the seismic shifts in Europe. Yet these beginnings progressed according to the methods of the 1950s. People waited to be overtaken by events, and then expanded the European Union’s authority. These developments took place detached from the people’s awareness. For me, then, the objective of our debate is to make a contribution to solving this fundamental problem.

I find it interesting that whenever we begin speaking about a concept of Europe, we always refer back to the time before World War One. As for “reinventing,” I
also think that we do not need to recreate Europe but found it again in the sense of comprehending it as an identity. This is a tempting job for museums, those transmitters of culture and presenters of traditions in general, even though they always exist in an area of conflict between regional, national, and European art- and cultural history. We should differentiate between various genres because they can be approached with greatly varying degrees of efficiency. The visual arts, for example, are much easier to present than genres using the written word. We should, then, regard the techniques of presenting culture in a more differentiated way than we have been doing.

To the metaphor of the leakage currents, I would like to add another metaphorical question: are they direct or rather alternating currents? I believe that the currents have been heading mostly in one direction, making them direct currents, and I believe that is part of the problem. In a nutshell, the Russian installation artist Ilya Kabakov did not arrive in Europe directly from Russia, but went first to the United States. My thesis, then, is that globalization today is overtaking Europeanization. We can counteract this only by establishing European cultural institutions. The idea of leakage currents would suggest that we have projects covering the whole of Europe. Until now, however, we have had only axial projects, with titles like “Berlin-Moscow.” The German Forum for Art History in Paris for example embodies a Paris-Berlin axis. These projects rise and fall with personalities, in this case that of Thomas Gaehtgens, and they are far from achieving total coverage. Another example is a research project of the Weimar museums, dealing with Henry van de Velde, which brings us back to pre-1914 Europe, to a time in which Europe actually functioned as a mental unity. Before then, an open Europe existed time and again, although with a continuity of ruptures. German artists studied in Paris, Belgian painters exhibited their work in Germany, German collectors bought French art, German artists entered a Danish academy etc. That is why we have to and can live with these breaks; they constitute the richness of European culture. The fluctuations of axial relationships give rise to the sine curve of history and we now seem, based on our discussion, to be on an ascending curve again. This is also confirmed by the fact that an ever-larger number of common international projects appear in museums and exhibitions.

I would like to take Mr. Schlögel’s presentation, in which he regrets the lack of discussion over Europe among intellectuals, as an opportunity to report on the liter-globlization is overtaking Europeanization

g-“Europe writes”—a literary symposium

Keller

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ary symposium “Europe Writes: What is European about the Literatures of Europe?” that we have organized in collaboration with the Körber-Foundation just for this occasion. Curiously, the intellectuals’ deafening silence regarding Europe set in at the moment when Europe really became the object of political debate, in the 1990s. Today, Europe seems to be having more problems than ever in regarding its present day as a European one.

If European awareness is, in fact, not on a par with its own reality, then one must ask oneself how this gap can be closed. What does Europe need in order to develop an identity that is not just understood in economic terms? How can Europe learn to understand itself and act in a self-assured way? For example from its own history: in his book on Europe, Ferdinand Seibt describes how essential the network of roads and natural corridors was for Europe’s dynamism and successes. This differentiated, enormously broad network of paths leading straight through Europe, along which the cities grew, made possible a staggering level of intra-European exchange of capabilities, crafts and information, unprecedented in the world. In addition, intellectuals like Erasmus and many others conducted debates about Europe with the greatest ease, ones that were heard beyond Europe’s borders. The exchanges of goods and knowledge also resulted in a process of communication and understanding about oneself. In the information age, this process of communication has been interrupted. Europe is currently dealing with its untapped historical and intellectual riches as ineptly as it deals with the stories that Mr. Schlögel has referred to as leakage currents, in which it could get to know itself.

Our symposium is a minor attempt at helping to close this gap. With it, we want to address two problems simultaneously, namely first to learn to come to grips creatively with our European differences and comprehend diversity as the enormous cultural potential they represent, and second, on the basis of these differences, to think about what we in Europe have in common and use that to revive the European discourse. The essays that were written for this symposium show a stunning awareness of the dilemma we are caught in.

The essays have also revealed a difference between the Western and Eastern European viewpoints. For Eastern Europeans, Europe has very strong cultural connotations and is a more ambivalent, complex and meaningful idea than for West Europeans. These already primarily regard Europe as largely identical with the construct of the European Union, meaning they have a pragmatic, political, and functional relationship to Europe. For them, Europe is a question of living stan-
dards and opportunities for communication and travel, but nothing more emphatic than that, no idea or utopia. Because of their tortured history, the Eastern Europeans are much more aware of the complexity of Europe. Strikingly, all their essays indicated what they had to contribute to Europe. And all of them offer their contributions as Europeans, not from their respective national viewpoints. Many East Europeans react in a really touchy manner when they are seen as mere representatives of their nations. The Croat Dubravka Ugresic, for instance, says she lives in Amsterdam, travels the world, and the last thing she considers herself to be is a Croatian writer. She says she has a keen interest in Europe and expresses regret that the apex of modern European consciousness today is the Grand Prix d’Eurovision pop music contest.

We have to ask, then, how to close the gap of consciousness. In contrast to Mr. Schlögel, I think that writers and intellectuals are playing a very great role. All the complex changes in this continent that he described are what literature is made of, they are reflected in thousands of stories. The real task, then, is to make people aware of the stories coming from other European countries. Concerning our curiosity toward each other, we face a large deficit in Europe. Our cultural curiosity is directed at the US, our attention is turned to the West. The East European essays distinctly criticize the continuing dominance of the Western perspective. Eastern European literature is judged by how interesting it is for the West and not by what the writers want to say about their realities or contribute to Europe.

Writers, then, are the ones to turn to if we want to develop a European narrative and find a mutual language for the European experience. To interpret these individual stories as European ones, we would also need, perhaps in a second phase, the intellectuals, who would tap this hidden mental wealth dispersed in all those individual stories and raise it into the European consciousness. The intellectuals and writers are the people to help us comprehend what is European about European literatures. Europe always built up its awareness of itself through literature, from Homer to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and in the present day. Literature is especially suited to shedding light on the complexity and obscurity of the present that politicians prefer to ignore. The idea of complexity, I might add, will be an essential one for discovering what Europe really is, and what it wants to be, can be and should be.

Let me explain what it means to be European from the perspective of an Eastern European.
To be European means to share the responsibility for Europe’s future.

Głondys

I share European history in its positive and negative aspects. For me, however, the best time for Europe was not 1914, but rather the Renaissance period. I am a part of the cultural heritage of Europe also because German, Italian, Russian and not only Polish artists contributed to the development of my home city, Krakow. My language has its roots in Latin and my spiritual values are based on Christian values. I don’t agree however that only Christianity constitutes the spiritual basis of European civilization, also because Polish society is composed of people of other than Christian background, e.g. Tartar.

To be European means to share the responsibility for Europe’s future. Therefore I am engaged in cultural projects which contribute to the creation of European identity. We teach human rights, dialog with other cultures and the values of ethnic and national minorities. In other projects, I encourage artists to create European projects and, for example to interpret Samuel Beckett from a different cultural background. These projects take place in the Villa Decius, a house which was built by the Alsatian Justus Decius, who was a secretary of the Polish King Sigismund the Old and a friend of Nicolaus Copernicus and of Erasmus of Rotterdam. The villa is a place of reflection and creation, an open free space for dialog between Eastern and Western Europe. Poland is now called Central Europe, which might indicate that we could play an intermediary role in the process of dialogue between cultures. All Europeans should share responsibility to care for and help those countries that will be left behind the Schengen borders so that they are not left alone as once we were. The European treaties make it clear that culture plays a very limited role in the European Union. This has to be changed and venues like the Villa Decius, which are independent of local politics and European in character and which cultivate the values of humanism and the Renaissance, should be supported.
II. Tasks of Cultural Policy in the Context of Europe’s Widening and Deepening

After our debate over the fundamental themes of the history and reality of European culture, I would now like to open our second session. Our present topic is called “the tasks of cultural policy in the context of Europe’s widening and deepening.” Our aim is now to determine what aspects of European culture are politically relevant and what instruments we have at our disposal at all levels to promote and shape European culture and put it to use in Europe’s process of integration.

Concerning the role and challenges facing cultural policy within the framework of enlarging and consolidating the EU, I would first like to concur with Mr. Schrögel and his rejection of the term “eastward expansion” in favor of “reunification.” During the process of this reunification we must remain aware that the Eastern European states have just won back their national identities and will defend them. The model of the sovereign national state as a counterpart to the former Soviet regime still constitutes the system of political coordinates there and it exists in a state of tension with the process of European integration. The fear of losing one’s national cultural identity provokes cultural policies throughout Europe into taking defensive postures, however. This expresses itself as an anti-Soviet reflex in Eastern European countries, and rather as an anti-American reflex in Western Europe, as evidenced by the present “old”-vs.-“new”-Europe debate. The challenge that we are facing is therefore to dovetail both mechanisms in a European understanding of culture instead of national frameworks. In addition, some politicians take advantage of the subsidiarity principle to re-nationalize or de-Europeanize their countries’ policies. Public discussions therefore tend to propagate cultural Europe as a Europe primarily of nations and their national cultures. For these reasons, unifying Europe successfully seems impossible without a proactive European cultural policy, because a reunified Europe will also be a qualitatively different Europe. Two distinct political cultures that emerged during the East-West confrontation have to grow together, something that would simultaneously lead to a renaissance of European culture. However, our community is unprepared for these developments, both institutionally and in terms of content, which is why cultural policy will become politically relevant for shaping enlargement.

The challenge is to establish a truly European cultural policy that recognizes the variety of cultures in Europe without abusing the subsidiarity principle for purposes antithetical to European unification. Until now there has been only an aggregate of individual national cultures, indeed, we have even more cultural poli-
The primary instruments that the European Union currently has available are based on Article 151, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the EU Treaty. Article 151.1 does not justify a cultural community but aims instead at a coordinated cultural policy among the member states and emphasizes the preservation and promotion of diversity in culture. The Clause on Cultural Cohesion in Article 151.4 of the EUT mandates tolerance for cultural considerations in other spheres of politics, which is currently interpreted as a commandment for respecting the cultural interests of the member states that does not establish any additional authority for the community. If we want to institutionalize cultural policy, we must urgently register a demand in the Convention that the Clause on Cultural Cohesion be strengthened along the lines of the Environmental Cohesion Clause and be applied for European interests. Moreover, we should, in my opinion, support a recommendation by cultural associations to amend Article 151 so as to introduce qualified majority voting instead of mandated unanimity in voting procedures. This would lead to a sustained enhancement in the status of cultural policy in the European Union’s web of treaties, which has until now been dominated by considerations of economic and political competition. The European Union’s representatives would automatically treat the GATS negotiations, for example, differently than if competition policy had stood at the center of negotiations.

My second demand is to establish a broad-based cultural exchange within the EU and a cultural policy that assures tolerance of other people’s cultural charac-
teristics. We require not only a policy that regulates exchanges and information in all of Europe, but also an enhanced cultural dialog with non-Europeans. Especially after 9/11, the questions of whether a clash of cultures really exists or whether we are able to establish a dialog of cultures have taken on central importance. However, Europe must remain critical in this dialog and show that diversity among cultures also entails differences. In concrete terms, this means that Europe must aggressively defend its cultural values of democracy, liberty, the rule of law, and respect for human rights without obscuring its own history, and can demand the same from its partners. In this way we can avoid the relativism of values that could pose the danger of a misunderstood dialog among cultures. We can thus find our way toward similarities instead of only pointing out differences, as is sometimes taking place in the debate with Iran. Together with Johano Strasser, I make a point of saying that human rights also throw light upon our own cultural historical background.

Finally, I urge that a European external cultural policy be established. Cultural factors play an increasingly important role in international politics, illustrated both in the conflicts accompanying the globalization process and in the many domestic conflicts that often have political but also ethnic and religious, i.e. cultural, causes. Hence, to avoid and remedy conflicts we require new strategies that take account of cultural factors. A Common European Foreign- and Security Policy cannot consist only of training police and coordinating arms systems. Its objective should be, as is the case with the CSCE/OSCE, to prevent conflict by promoting civil societies and readiness to engage in dialog. It is precisely in this field that Europe, as a community of diverse cultures, could present a real alternative concept to the United States. The decisive factor is that this cultural foreign policy must avoid taking advantage of art and culture for its own purposes. Countries in which Goethe Institutes continue to exist even after political relations have been severed prove that art and culture can create an autonomous level of communication also for reform movements even when the political levels are no longer in a position to maintain contact.

Making all this happen would require the European level to supplement the budget for such initiatives. In the year 2000, all of 0.1% of the EU budget was devoted to the field of culture and audiovisual media, discounting money from the structural fund and other EU interventions. If we are going to comprehend cultural policy as a truly European and not just national task, we will have to make the necessary funding available and go beyond programs such as Erasmus.
Let me return for a second to Professor Schlögel’s reference to the *Europe des Salons* rather than the Europe of conference rooms, where he preferred the Europe of enlightened citizens to the anonymous and bureaucratic cooperation of states. I think we all felt our hearts jump at this idea, because Europe is at its best when it is about the human dimension. But we also should bear in mind that the Europe of intellectuals was incapable of preventing the atrocities that have ravaged this continent on several occasions. The private Europe could not prevent the First World War, or the Second World War, or genocide in Yugoslavia. Therefore, we also need the public Europe, in which the work of the European Convention plays an important role. In its history, the European Union has developed largely according to the functionalist logic, which means that it has been integrating step-by-step and area-by-area. In many respects, this has been a tremendously successful process leading to the establishment of a common market and a common currency as well as the integration of other policy areas. In several countries environmental policies for example owe as much, if not more to the actions of the European Commission than of national governments and parliaments. While these achievements should not be underestimated, they fall short in one crucial respect. We may have European policies, but not a European polity. On the whole, we do not identify with a European government and we often don’t feel a sense of ownership. The key question for the European Convention is therefore how to create a more political Europe and how to create a *polis* from this diverse collection of national histories.

National politicians—and I speak, as a former member of the Dutch government—are partly responsible for this problem. Even though they cooperate with each other in Brussels, ministers often shy away from taking responsibility for these actions at home and from explaining them to the public. As a result, we are faced with a conspiracy of silence among national political elites about the relevance of European institutions to the solution of domestic problems. National politicians tend to minimize the importance of Europe because they believe that by acknowledging it they might end up reducing their national importance. Thus they neglect the crucial task of politicians to create democratic support for the policies that have been agreed. This does not help to establish a sense of citizenship.

How then can we strengthen citizenship in Europe? First, the processes used notably in the 19th century to create citizenship at the national level cannot be employed. During the 19th century process of nation building, as described for example in Eugen Weber's book “Peasants into Frenchmen,” citizenship was cre-
ated from above, through compulsory military service, national education and the
strengthening of a national language often at the expense of regional languages.
At the same time, Europe cannot use symbols similar to those available to nation
states. There are no monuments alluding to the historic battles that the European
Union has won. It hasn’t won battles because, fortunately, it hasn’t fought them.
Therefore, the symbols of European identity have to be different from the sym-
bols of the national lieux de mémoire that we are used to.

What are the alternatives to these 19th century strategies? Let me suggest at
least three elements of what will be a more complex response. First, it is absolutely
vital that we learn about each other, notably about each other’s history. It may
sound trite, but understanding among peoples depends on mutual learning,
which we need to support especially as the Union expands. We should invest in
learning the history and the way of life of other nations, a dimension that tends
to be neglected by our national educational systems. We should also learn about
our own histories, the way they have been manipulated for political reasons in the
19th century and the role of amnesia. In order to transcend prejudice among the
peoples of Europe we first have to face our prejudices with respect to our own past
and identity. This is crucial to create a sense of community in Europe.

Second, we have to address the question of the relationship between Europe
and Islam. Migration has made citizenship a very important component in our dia-
logue with Islam. To me, the most important development in this area is not what
Samuel P. Huntington referred to as the clash between civilizations. Rather, it is
the clash within civilizations, the clash between fundamentalist and modern
Islam, between intolerant and tolerant Europe. Do we want an inclusive citizen-
ship in Europe, one that includes Islam, or don’t we? This question will prove con-
troversial in Europe and will divide many political parties right down the line.

Third, as Europeans we should define our ambitions. Identity and citizenship
have a lot to do with the past and with what we think we are or have become. But
the other crucial question concerns the future and who we want to be. What are
our ambitions, what do we intend to stand for in the world? What common val-
ues do we want to embody both within the Union and in relation to the outside
world? Are we for example only paying lip service to human rights in our relations
with third countries or do we stand for them when times get difficult? Intellec-
tuals, politicians and journalists alike must address these questions.

Let me conclude with two recommendations, linked closely to Mrs. Griefahn’s
proposals. First, the European Convention has a tendency to debate citizenship
establish a European
mainly in terms of voting rights, i.e. in quite narrow institutional terms. I believe that we should widen the concept of national and European citizenship to include the right to partake of other cultures in Europe by learning other languages, spending time abroad and being part of exchange networks. Our ambition, both at the level of the Union and in the member states should be that each child in secondary school has the chance to spend some time in a family elsewhere in Europe to learn what it means to live in another country. Cultural policy often narrowly focuses on exchanges among cultural practitioners, such as sculptors or moviemakers. While these exchanges are necessary, we should reach out to the ordinary citizens of Europe and make them part of our cultural strategy. Second, we need what the French so elegantly call “une espace politique” or in German a “politischen Raum” and for which no good English expression exists. By this I mean public discourse at the European level, i.e. simultaneous debates in different countries about particular subjects. At the moment we discuss issues each in our national constituencies, not in a joint debate. The European Commission could play an important role in organizing common debates, lasting for a certain time simultaneously in the member states and leading to joint conclusions. Citizenship is more than voting. We need a debate across frontiers, like we are having at this Round Table. Next to journalists, institutions like this one can provide an important contribution to citizenship.

Thank you very much for this contribution from a member of the European Convention, which has become the center of a nascent debate about the new Europe we are about to create.

I would like to respond Mr. de Vries’ comments on Islam and its integration in Europe. Islamic communities within the European Union are often not well integrated into the societies they live in. From there stems the accusation that fundamentalist Islam is exported from Germany and other places to Turkey. Let me explain. It is a common sociological and cultural phenomenon that a population that is not integrated and feels left out clings to religion or to extreme political values. During the seventies and eighties, Germany bred Turkish Marxist organizations and exported them into Turkey. Today the same is the case with religious fundamentalism. Take September 11th as an example, which I see not only as a religious phenomenon, but also as an articulation of discontent as a result of being left out of the global system. It is through religion that this discontent is articulated.
On the subject of instruments and mechanisms of cultural policy, I’d like to provide a brief report on the situation of Germany’s fledgling Federal Cultural Foundation. With our annual budget of nearly 38 million euros, we have been striving for nearly a year now to construct an effective instrument. This instrument, which Germany has been later in developing than other European countries, should serve both remembrance and the future. Therefore, it must include both aspects Ms. Ahrweiler has described, those of legacies and dynamic innovation.

I think it is courageous that a woman from Argentina, whose background is squarely in the cultural sector and not in academia, has been asked here to determine forms in which artists and culture in a broader sense can develop, where working artists and academics can move about and make each others’ acquaintance, be productive, and tell their own stories. The focal points of this institution, a connective element between politics and the arts, include Europe, the cultural aftermath of 9/11, as well as cities and the eastern German states; in other words, the cultural dimension of unification. Through our projects in Argentina, China, and many other countries, we try to help correct the imbalance among perceptions that was spoken of earlier. Our projects in Skopje, Sarajevo, Mostar, Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, and many other places are striving to establish a base within which artists and intellectuals can discuss complex and subtle subjects and in doing so generate a public for these topics. This public is of central importance for the emergence of democratic communities.

One important experience of mine was seeing how eager many artists and academics in these cities were to contribute to this process. That means that the specific knowledge of culture has to find its place. Not only there, but also in Germany, where it has received far too little attention. Our specific contribution goes far beyond theater schedules or pretty exhibitions. This is precisely my main concern in helping the federal cultural foundation grow: to create space, production conditions, and opportunities for these various stories to be told.

Concerning the debate about European history initiated by Madame Ahrweiler, I would like to recommend Norman Davis’ book “The History of the Isles.” This book is very important for those of us who are Celts and who reject the equation of Great Britain with England. As you know, the French, Belgian, Dutch and German media always refer to Great Britain as “Angleterre,” thereby ignoring the existence of other regions. The regions in Europe display an incredible dynamism, as the example of Hamburg illustrates, but they usually play only a hidden part in
the processes that are at play at the European level. In Brussels, the regions are now represented by 163 offices or delegations, which create networks and partnerships among them. We should not ignore this hidden civil society contribution in the cultural sphere.

I would like to concentrate on the paradoxes and dangers of two parallel processes now happening at the European level: the discussions at the so-called spring summits, addressing the Lisbon agenda, and the developments at the European Convention.

First to the spring summits and the Lisbon agenda: This refers to a commitment made in 2000 by the heads of state that by the year 2010 the European Union should develop the best knowledge-based economy in the world. It was a huge commitment addressed with massive energy. At its heart was the development of a coordinated employment strategy, partly as a result of the period of severe unemployment scarring many parts of Europe. The strategy identified four priorities. First, creating a greater capacity for entrepreneurship. Second, furthering the capacity to adapt to change and innovation during working life, i.e. promoting the concept of life long learning from early childhood to continued training in small- and medium sized companies. Third, ensuring the employability of the individual, which addresses mainly the more than 20% who currently leave school without any type of qualification. And fourth, creating equal opportunities, not only between women and men, but also for the disabled and ethnic communities.

These four areas can only be addressed adequately if Europe develops integrated policies for education, training, research and culture. The legal bases for that were first created in the Maastricht treaty and complemented in the Amsterdam treaty, which introduced a commitment to develop a skilled present and future workforce. The Lisbon strategy is so crucial, because it attempts to strike a better balance between economic and social policy. Investment in people, education, innovation and development constitutes the key bridge between these two policy areas. And here, the European Union’s social fund, which should really be called a fund for education and training, plays a central role. It is the third biggest structural fund besides the Common Agricultural Policy and the Regional Development Fund and it is rapidly becoming more significant. Ireland is the best example for the potential of these funds. It decided to invest 37% of all the money received from the European Union in the transformation of its education and training systems at all levels. As a result, it became in the last decade the biggest economic success story in Europe and maybe in the entire world. The method used
to promote the Lisbon agenda is open coordination. This means that countries use benchmarking and peer reviews to identify good practices. It is thus about networking, sharing experience and innovative projects. This new method of cooperation does not involve legislation and is proving to be increasingly effective, especially as it is coupled with massive resources available through the European Research and Development Program. This program emphasizes for the first time investment in socio-educational developments.

The second process occurring next to the spring summits and the Lisbon agenda is the European Convention. While there are some positive developments in that context, such as a focus-debate on “social Europe” and on the role of the regions taking place from February 2003, I am extremely worried by some other signals now emerging both informally and formally from the Convention. Let me start with the good news. There appears to be a majority in the Convention in favor of adopting the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of locating it in the first part of the treaty as an expression of the shared values underpinning the very purpose of the European Union. The Convention also appears to support the European Union’s accession to the European Convention of Human Rights. This double commitment will enable citizens throughout Europe to identify on the eve of enlargement with those shared values.

Now to the bad news: First, the question of the re-nationalization of education and culture and maybe other policies is back on the agenda. One year ago some German Länder began to raise that question in a slightly ambiguous way, but now it seems to be back on the agenda even at the highest level. This constitutes a danger, even if I am not pessimistic enough to think that the Convention will ultimately eliminate the references to education and culture from the treaty or undermine the results of the Maastricht treaty. The second danger lies in the debate about subsidiarity, which could produce damaging results. Next to the limited number of exclusive competencies of the EU and the more numerous shared competencies, a working group in the Convention has proposed including a collection of so-called supporting additional measures into the draft, for which the EU should have no legislative capacity. While the Convention at first reacted very critically to this proposal, it now seems that it has been integrated into the latest draft of the constitutional treaty. This is an extremely dangerous development.

Let us look in more detail at the provisions of the Maastricht treaty. Its Article 150 deals with education. It was included in the treaty mainly due to the
dynamism and success of the Erasmus program, which generated popular support not only within academia, but also among industrial leaders. Thus, while Jacques Delors had predicted difficulties, this article was adopted unanimously and with very little controversy. Key to this success was the inclusion into the article of a reference to subsidiarity, which states explicitly what the European Union cannot do. As a result the EU cannot harmonize systems, structures and curricula. The same method was used for Article 151, which deals with culture, and incidentally also for the new article on public health. As each of those three cases clearly defines the exclusions, they provide a non-threatening legal basis for action. Creating a legal basis is so crucial in the European Union as this is the precondition for any action involving financial support.

With respect to the results achieved in the cultural sector on the basis of Article 151, I agree with the previous speakers here who described it as very poor. This is not only a question of money, but also of not having the right ideas, or the right policies that would create positive incentives. At the same time good programs such as Erasmus have been created and we must therefore be careful not to eliminate its legal basis in the Convention. For this would mean that even the Erasmus program would die without a proper legal basis.

Erasmus raised the initial rate of mobility and exchange within the European Union of 0.5% considerably. It also expanded to include not only France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but all European countries, most of which had no prior experience with exchange programs. Key to the success of Erasmus was its voluntary approach, which led to a bottom-up, rather than top-down implementation. Universities and higher education institutions themselves take all decisions concerning the cooperation. This opened the program to all disciplines, not just foreign languages, and enabled the period of study abroad to be recognized in the final degree and diploma. A bottom-up approach thus managed to crack the very difficult question of the mutual recognition of academic qualifications. But more importantly, it gave young people the opportunity to live and study abroad and experience precisely what Mr. de Vries called for: to develop friendships and eliminate stereotypes of other people and other cultures. Joshua Fishman, a famous expert on socio-linguistics, articulated the same idea in the following way: “We all need to try on another pair of glasses to broaden our exposure to other views and other approaches, to see ourselves as others see us. To attend to any drummers but our own. Mankind is not all of one cloth and reality is not entirely according to the seemingly ubiquitous home-finished mold.”
To promote these ideas, we should make proposals to the Convention and we have to make them in the very near future and express them with clarity. Let me suggest four points and conclude with a fifth question, joining forces again with Mr. de Vries. First, we all should speak strongly in favor of the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the opening part of the new treaty. The preamble of the treaty should also contain a reference to building closer relations between the peoples—not just the countries—of the European Union, thus creating a commitment to develop education and cultural cooperation. Second, we should all argue very strongly and convincingly that the two existing articles on education and culture provide sufficient safeguards for subsidiarity. Because the exclusions to common policies are all defined, people should not fear these provisions. Third, the European Union, its member states, and civil society should be strongly encouraged to discuss again what is being done on the basis of these two articles. This goes beyond the terms of reference of the Convention, but it was set up to help connect the European Union more effectively with its citizens. The discussions about a double presidency or other aspects of the institutional machinery might be fascinating and politically important, but they are not going to achieve this connection. Fourth, it is absolutely essential when we expand from fifteen to twenty-five member states that the principle of qualified majority voting be applied to the cultural article. Finally, it is crucial that we develop a more ambitious concept of European citizenship. Debates about our sense of identity will not lead anywhere. We probably all have multiple levels of allegiance, just as I am a Swansea Valley boy, a passionate Welshman, relatively happy to be British, delighted to be European and a globetrotter. The Convention should be encouraged to formulate a definition of citizenship that goes beyond the issue of voting rights and leaves us unthreatened and creative.

Our three introductory statements have put three great problems up for discussion. The first is the possibility of internal and external European cultural policy; the second the problem of a European citizenry as part of a cultural and political development; and thirdly, the concrete authority of the European Union, which climaxes in the discussions in the Convention over social and cultural actions that have progressed further than most people realize. We are very grateful to Hywel Jones for having offered us a glimpse of the Convention from an insider’s perspective.

von der Gablentz
Many people today define themselves more through the routes they have traveled than their roots.

David

My comments will try to connect our debate on the history and reality of European culture with the discussion on the means of cultural policy.

First on the reality of Europe: When I open my eyes in Europe, I see that—for better or for worse—things are already much more advanced than it has been described here. When you live in Paris it is obvious that a French Republican Islam exists. That fact is beyond doubt and discussion. The large number of French Muslims are so established and living normally and adhering to republican values that it seems inconceivable to me to go back to a situation where you could discuss whether Islam should be part of European reality or not. At the moment, the real problems stem from bad living conditions or from extremists that exist by no means only in Islam. The difference is that other extremisms are less systematically commented about. Mohammed Arkoun, a distinguished professor who is very knowledgeable about European and Muslim culture, sharply remarked that Christians or Jews are never asked to justify themselves, whereas this is always demanded of young French people who also happen to be Muslim. This discrepancy is very questionable and I sometimes find it intolerable.

Then on identity: I am afraid that our discussion about identity has not taken us very far. We should be aware that sometimes when we speak about identity, we talk about a phantasm of origin and that we could win a lot by distancing ourselves from some elements of it. We have a very beautiful and meaningful French word “se déprendre,” which means accepting to lose or to distance oneself from certain parts of the past. This does not imply nostalgia or bitterness, but it puts you in a position with more porosity and openness and makes you more conscious about the pleasures and dangers of encountering strong alternatives. I find it more appropriate to speak about processes of identification, because many people today define themselves more through the routes they have traveled than their roots. We have much to learn from these new cultural heritages, built by the very complex routes taken by people who did not necessarily choose to go this way. We should also be very careful about how we use words and try to avoid confounding exile and migration. The experiences of emigrants of belonging neither to the society they left nor to the new one into which they are trying to “integrate” have been described in the remarkable book “La Double Absence” by the Franco-Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad.

In my daily work with artists I experience a much higher degree of openness and a much more diverse approach than many cultural reviews might suggest. From this it seems clear to me that a properly understood Europeanism has to
be open to the world, it has to be connected to what we call in French *mondialité*. We differentiate between *mondialité* and globalization—*mondialisation*—which has to do with economic exchange and the circulation of information and capital. *Mondialité* by contrast has more to do with a consciousness of the world, our position in it and our relations to other human beings around the globe. This way of thinking should prevent us from adopting an overly narrow definition of Europeanism.

Concerning the way others view us as Europeans, I am often surprised and sometimes upset at the opinions I encounter on my travels. These tend to be either exaggerated in their expectations or in their disappointment. It happened to me several times in the Middle East that people told me I was not European, which first disturbed me a little, but left me not so dissatisfied after a while. What are the political implications of this understanding? If we want to be consistent Europeans, we cannot anymore mention Srebrenica without mentioning Rwanda and Chechnia. We already spoke about the Dutch role in Srebrenica and I think that there are equally few reasons to be proud of the French position in Rwanda. This tragedy should be closer to us then it seems to be. Too many people died and the double standards in our reactions explain part of why people are more and more upset and sad about Europeans. Applying this to recent events, we cannot be credible with our daily reports about Saddam Hussein and his eventual weapons of mass destruction if we do not at the same time condemn the fact that Mr. Vladimir Putin uses forbidden gas against his own population. We have to avoid these double standards; otherwise we are guilty of duplicity, which ends in schizophrenia and sometimes in very tragic situations. Some people define the frontiers of Europe as that behind which barbarism begins. Let us not forget that in Europe today the airport police can suffocate people to death. This incident is not just an accident or bad luck, but is due to dangerous and undemocratic attitudes within our society. Therefore we have to focus our debates on this phenomenon and not take things for granted.

It is not enough for Europe to be just a big market and a series of states ruled by emergency decrees or *états d’exception*, as Giorgio Agamben put it a recent text describing not the 1940s, but today. This text has been criticized for being very Foucauldian, but I think that it is very valuable for being precise and critical and making us consider more seriously for example what is going on in Italy at the moment. I am shocked to see that many of my colleagues don’t take the case of Italy seriously. They see it as a kind of commedia dell’arte and take lightly the fact
that the state is about to be dismantled and that most of the public sphere in Italy has been dramatically restricted. To be European these days is not a luxury, and it cannot go without a minimum of radicalism, precision and exigency unless we only take culture as an adorning extra.

von der Gablentz

Thank you very much for that important reminder that in order to be credible Europeans we also have to be credible citizens of the world who feel responsible for what happens elsewhere on the globe.

Cuzin

I was intending to discuss the work of the Convention but Ms. Griefahn has already done this so comprehensively and emphatically that I will simply endorse everything she has said.

Permit me instead to offer some thoughts on the subsidiarity principle. We have raised the subject of the European Union’s responsibility in making cultural policy and I would like to emphasize at this juncture the responsibility that all public institutions share in the European project. The authority over cultural policy among Germany’s federal states is a significant case in point. In our discussions over funding and the legitimacy of joint action, we often fail to understand European policymaking as a joint policy of all institutions. For example, the European Commission is not the sole responsible party for programs such as Culture 2000, Media+ and Media-Training. Municipalities, states and nations share in this responsibility. Even after 40 years of European integration we have not accepted that every policy should keep the European factor at its core and that policy at a European level complements regional or national policy.

Cultural matters are the first place that both levels should work together at. In addition to the “communalization” of cultural policy in the spirit of the Clause on Cultural Cohesion in Article 151 of the EUT, we need all levels to play a greater role in implementing this policy. This also means taking into account the social changes of the last 50 years. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty there was quite a bit written and said about how parts of German and French society have drifted apart during the last four decades, as the Franco-German relationship has come to be taken for granted. Now, this relationship suddenly took on a good deal of momentum when President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made their emphatic stand regarding Iraq. This illustrated how vital the two societies’ shared values are and that it is necessary to stand up for these values both internally and externally.
The people of Europe are searching for ways of fostering a sense of togetherness beyond cultural exchanges. Britney Spears and Coca-Cola will not give us this sense. And instead of determining what European culture precisely is, maybe we should pay more attention to defining a European way of life. There is, for example, a European culture of landscapes, of building codes, and other material elements that characterize our tangible environment. Some of these architectural elements, in addition to social values, are distinctly European and must take their place in Europe’s future constitution.

I do not want to sound alarming, but there is a great danger that we will let slip the opportunity of the coming three months that the Convention has afforded us. Some, but not all, representatives at the Convention have recognized this danger. I must therefore plead with all my heart that we do everything in our power in the coming months to ensure that the constitution’s preamble refers to cultural and linguistic diversity, and thus reinforce Article 151 and its sustained validity. Without improving cultural cohesion of European policies, we run the risk of becoming strangers in our own land.

Mr. Cuzin has brought forth an important consideration, that of the complementarity of various levels of policymaking. Politics at the national, regional and local levels has to become Europe-friendly, because the EU has restricted executive powers. Added to this is the cultural cohesion of other EU political fields, such as agricultural policy, structural policy, etc., codified in Article 151.4.

I have shared the European cultural experience for 34 years now and I want to speak to the issue of identity from the perspective of a “participant observer” who has come originally from elsewhere. It is good that Catherine David has introduced the trope of “routes,” made familiar by James Clifford’s book of the same name, and has reminded us of the distinction between older notions of identity based on roots and the newer notions based on routes. As Stuart Hall has pointed out, we need to situate the debates about identity within the developments and practices, which have disturbed the relatively “settled” character of many populations and cultures, as a result of globalization and the migration flows. Thus, although they seem to invoke an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond, actually identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not “who we are” or “where we came from,” so much as what we might become,
building a European identity seems impossible without political federation

from an artist’s perspective, EU-citizenship does not mean much

how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves.

Mr. de Vries’ contribution then translated this insight into a practical agenda: indeed, if Europe wants to build an “identity,” it is crucial to focus on the process of representation and of how one wants to be perceived. We have to bear in mind that when political entities, as opposed to life-styles or ethnic communities, want to build an identity, it is inevitably a constructed, an “imagined” community with an invented tradition. In order to achieve this, all our nation states have forged images, symbols, and a repertoire of ambitions and inspirations. It is difficult, then, to see how this could ever be possible in Europe, unless it does build itself into a full-fledged federation.

Finally, I want to agree with Madame Ahrweiler about the danger of using this process of cultural identity construction to compensate for failure in other areas. That is why I believe that the aim of building a European identity should be secondary to the goal of building European routes, connections, and to creating opportunities for mutual learning.

von der Gablentz

Mr. Isar, you poured a bit of water into the wine of those who are trying to construct a European identity. It is notable that we have not really spoken much about the word identity, a term of which I am very doubtful, because it suggests an exclusivity of allegiance. As Hywel Jones emphasized, however, it is much more typical for modern societies to develop multiple allegiances. We should take seriously the warning against artificially constructing identities which are not there.

Echerer

I would like to add some remarks from an artist’s perspective. First a small suggestion for the Körber-Foundation: I wish there were more artists within this gathering. I know that you invited writers who unfortunately declined. But there are other kinds of artists, musicians, graphic artists, film people, Internet artists and many more.

I cannot speak for Europe’s community of artists, which is exceedingly heterogeneous, but only for myself. As an artist, I do not feel particularly addressed when we speak of a European Union citizenship. My own background—I am half-Hungarian and therefore what we in Vienna call a Monarchie-Kindl—makes me feel like a part of Europe, but not as an artist. This is simply because we have not done our homework in cultural policy at the local, national, or at the European level. Our efforts in the European Parliament and the potential of Articles 151 and 150
are all well and good, but they do not solve the problem. Artists have always been mobile. During the time of the Dutch Masters, for instance, it was important to keep abreast of what was going on in Italy, and for their part, the Italians sent “spies” to the Netherlands to find out the newest Dutch techniques. Within the European Union, on the other hand, traveling is becoming increasingly difficult for artists. This has to do with many fields of politics, which is why a really profound cultural policy would not only have to incorporate other policy-areas, but also be at the same level as competition- and common market policies.

One example is copyright law, an instrument actually established for writers and artists. Cultural policymakers could certainly have had some input into its making, but all the relevant decisions were taken by justice ministers, who regard the subject from a completely different angle. In a similar vein, we have not done enough in Europe and at home concerning other fields of politics, in which decisions do not respect the interests of artists sufficiently. At the European level, for example, one could support making artists’ networks more professional and European, making use of European cultural foundations. This would be a problem, however, because legislative committees and the common market, instead of cultural policymakers, dictate what is to be voted on. The primary objective of these people is not to accomplish something on behalf of the artistic community.

My three years of working in the European Parliament showed me the importance of networks. Economic and industrial associations (almost) always promptly make their views known on relevant directives before these are passed. Artists have no comparable lobby. Despite the existence of a European Council of Artists, a European Parliament of Authors, and many more institutions, no networks exist that could communicate with one another and take action when needed. One of the main reasons for this situation is the limited economic power of artists. The example of copyright law illustrates this vividly. It should be the politicians’ job to find a balance among the interests of business, consumers and artists, one that takes into account all aspects. But politics is increasingly becoming pure interest representation in which politicians do not dare take a stand against the business community or future voters, meaning consumers. And the so-called right holder coalitions taking part in the negotiations are not associations representing the artists, but major producers and publishers. This was how the European directive on copyright law was created…

Not that I have anything against these interests, indeed, I acknowledge their great importance. However, they act at the European level so forcibly that they
exchanges presuppose local investments in culture

rob artists of their autonomy and ability to speak for themselves. The highest responsibility of cultural policy is to make sure that niche specialties can be found on a par with mass-produced goods in the supermarket of culture. We cannot fulfill this objective as long as cultural policymakers remain political lightweights, do not help determine budgets, or are kept at arm’s length when tax policies are devised. The level of social respect for cultural policymakers also plays an important role. Currently, public attention rarely goes past gallery openings, which might have to do with the fact that there is a distinct lack of visionaries among cultural policymakers.

When trying to implement a European cultural policy, there are legitimate concerns that this might reduce diversity. When creating a “Euro-mash,” authenticity is sacrificed. This is especially apparent in filmmaking. Twenty years ago, producers joined forces for international co-productions when they thought it made sense from an artistic standpoint. Today they do it to share costs and to gain access to European subsidies, also because the funding is insufficient “at home.”

Now to cultural exchanges: Their foundations have to be laid by investing in our own local and regional art. Yet budgets are being cut everywhere and tax incentives for private investment and sponsoring are not being established. These are obvious instruments of cultural policy but they remain unused. The reason that we also have no joint external cultural policy, as Ms. Griefahn stated, is also because national governments do not take up the task. Therefore, we never get past soapbox speeches.

The GATS negotiations that Ms. Griefahn has referred to also belong here. Instead of submitting culture and the media to the international rules of GATS (which don’t include cultural or social considerations), we should create a binding international instrument to protect cultural diversity and that respects the dual nature of cultural products. These steps are not unattainable visions or dreams. The idea was born in Quebec. Various states support it and the EU could, if it wanted, be a crucial force in reaching that goal.

Permit me to offer two comments on this abundance of recommendations. First, some of them could be tabled at the Convention in the hope of finding a place for culture in the new constitution. This kind of foundation could then make room for further developments.

Secondly, I would like to emphasize something that Gottfried Wagner will certainly return to, namely, that various European cultural foundations already exist.
The European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam is one of the biggest and most comprehensive and it deserves our support.

My first comment is on the misappropriation of Europe that we have already heard about in Ms. Griefahn’s and Ms. Echerer’s presentations. The Germans have a remarkably positive attitude towards European integration for which we are also very grateful, because others profit from it as well. Still, I would appreciate a bit more realism regarding integration. To quote Otto von Bismarck roughly, “Anyone who speaks of Europe is wrong.” This means that many politicians who talk about Europe and use it as an argument are only doing so because they cannot express themselves on behalf of their nation. As intellectuals and artists, we have to ask the question of how easily the European project can be used for the wrong purposes and how we are being used. We do not sufficiently acknowledge that Europe has nearly always been instrumentalized and tied to some purpose, i.e. that it was and is more a means than a goal in itself. Europe served and still serves not least to legitimize forms of rule. One fascinating aspect of this is that this legitimization has been transformed. If Alan S. Milward is right, European integration served initially to reform the image of nation states and legitimize modern Western governments. Today, however, the question is of the European Union’s own legitimacy. Thus instrumentalization and legitimation gain a new dimension and dynamics.

My second remark concerns expanding Europe’s frontiers. I find it surprising that this conference refers over and over to the pre-1914 period without looking more closely at the Habsburg Monarchy. This very state could be an instructive example for us, a case study of the positive and negative aspects of EU enlargement, because Central and Eastern Europe today have many of the same problems that the Habsburgs did in their time. Helmut Rumpler describes in his book “Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa—Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburger Monarchie” the loyalty and cohesive energy this remarkable construct of Austria-Hungary was able to command. The Habsburg Empire was not a dungeon of nations but a confederation of nations with a common legal framework, a labor market that was better integrated than it is today, and a modern transportation infrastructure. As the dynasty, army, Church, and aristocracy declined, the state withdrew somewhat in a relatively peaceful process. Yet the half-hearted democratization, delayed modernization, and underdeveloped cultural autonomy led finally to ethnocentric and nationalist tendencies. The process confirmed Franz Gehler:

- Europe is often instrumentalized
- the Habsburg Monarchy as a case study for European enlargement
Grillparzer’s dictum that degeneration leads from humanity through nationality to bestiality. Moreover, the state was unable to withstand pressures coming from the outside.

In this context I would like to mention Graz, European Capital of Culture for 2003. The arguments for Graz were first that the city constitutes an interface of European cultures with Romanesque, Slavic, Magyar and German-Alpine influences. Second, it has a role of mediating among various cultures, located as it is at the edge of the Balkans conflict zone. Because of its proximity to Hungary and Italy, Graz was the closest West European city, an initial bridgehead looking West for many creative artists from Eastern Europe during the Cold War. We should not forget that the Habsburg Monarchy’s demise originated in the Balkans, while the EU, despite condemnations and approbation regarding its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, has mastered this problem, which in my opinion has been a great political achievement. Third, Graz is a city of international dialog; it offers a dialog-platform for peace. The argument for peace has hardly been mentioned in the discussion of art and culture, even though it is of central importance. Peace in Southeast Europe is an essential concern of the EU and mayoral Europe, to use Mr. Schlögel’s phrase, could be of great help in this respect. Augsburg is the city of the religious accords, Osnabrück and Münster the cities of the Westphalian peace treaty. Finally, Graz is a place of concrete cultural projects, such as its partnership with Dubrovnik in Croatia, a cultural workshop in the center of Europe, a space for art and new media within the Schlossberg in Graz, a new art and exhibition hall, and reconstruction of the synagogue that was destroyed in 1938 and a mosque, both of which will function as multicultural centers.

The idea of European Capitals of Culture was a joint project of the Council of Europe and European Union. It is an example of cultural policy that has been working for years within the greatly restricted authority of the EU.

Let me start with some comments on the question of copyright that Ms. Echerer raised. This is not only a technical matter of concern to people in full knowledge of law. Rather, it is both in reality and in symbolical terms an extremely relevant aspect of how one defines cultural policy in the future. The English term “copyright” is based on a different historical tradition than the German “Urheberrecht” or the French “droit d’auteur.” In Britain, copyright was a result of a battle in the 17th and 18th centuries about the right of printers to publish books. Copyright
therefore refers to the rights of printers, not to the rights of authors or individual artists as it does in French and German. I had a conflict with the owners of the liberal newspaper that I was editing over exactly this difference. The owners held copyright to be the right of a company, not an individual right. As this conflicts with the liberal idea of individual rights, I took this dispute as one of the reasons for leaving my position some four years ago.

But the point goes much deeper and connects to why I believe we should have a cultural policy at all. In his essay “Zumutungen der Kulturpolitik”, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger applied the concept of biodiversity, which promotes multiplicity in an ecological sense, to the field of culture. Accordingly, it should be the aim of any definition of cultural policy to create a great variety of choice and to have as many individual statements as possible in any given circumstance. Cultural policy should not be a question of establishing a collective culture. Collective culture is only interesting in so far as it grows out of individual statements.

This is closely connected to freedom of expression, which forms part of the political space that Mr. de Vries mentioned. Freedom of expression does not only relate to factual statements or political positions, but also to artistic creativity. The right of any individual to make an aesthetic statement is just as important as the right to make a political statement. And that aspect is much underrated among politicians. They generally don’t understand that writing fiction literally means telling a lie, it is not factual. It is telling the truth in a different manner, in a symbolic sense. Including that right in the definition of freedom of expression is a late achievement. National Socialism for example had aesthetic values at the core of its system of values and that included how people should look. That Jews tended to look different than the blue-eyed and blond Aryans was part of that aesthetic conception. And in the Soviet empire, it was not just a coincidence that movements of liberation like Charter 77 were made up by many artists and writers. They knew that the individual right to create a work of art could be defined as the core of the revolution. As Western Europeans we need to rediscover this aspect against defining culture in collective terms. The danger on the European level is to view European cultural policy as identity-building cultural creativity, which is the opposite of freedom. At the national level, we are already witnessing a fallback with populist parties promoting collective versions of cultural rights.

I would like to end with a comment that relates to the very useful distinction between routes and roots that was introduced earlier: the right to behave as an

Cultural policy should not be a question of establishing a collective culture.

Ruth
outsider in creative terms. But creativity here should not just be understood in elitist terms, as it is often done in Europe, but include the American way of creating art. In Sweden for example, young immigrants are now using hip-hop and rap music. These styles of music are imported from outside of Europe, but they are used to create art in Europe. In my definition, European art is art created in Europe, not art with a necessary reference to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe or Ludwig van Beethoven. European art can use any conception of aesthetic creativity relevant to today’s situation. It’s not just coincidence that young immigrants from Iran, Somalia, and South Africa etc. employ the rap idiom from the United States, or use their own modern idiom like salsa for Latin Americans or rai for North Africans. These styles are the definition of an outsider’s aesthetic and that is something we need more than ever on this continent.

I would like to add only one comment. We must confront the misunderstanding that cultural policy can produce culture. Cultural policy can merely provide for the creation of a framework for a community’s political values that enable cultural production to be as broad and diverse as possible. Of course, we cannot and do not want to return to policies that would manufacture a collective culture. This is out of the question in Europe and, happily, in a world in which our values, as codified in the Copenhagen Criteria, determine political action.

I would like to return to Mr. Jones’ argument that we cannot regard the concept of identity as exclusive, and that each one of us harbors multiple identities. This remark is highly truthful and applies to me as well. It is much easier for me to say that I am from Turin, which implies an emotional attachment to my city but no political significance, than to say I am Italian. My identification with my city is therefore problematic because it is political as well as cultural. The viewpoint of Europe can be useful as protection against provincialism for the great diversity of identities. We regard diversity and differences mostly from the first person perspective, meaning something is different because it is different than I. If we were to incorporate the European viewpoint, however, we have a perspective that enables us to recognize an even greater diversity. Europe can help us to see differences not only as a problem, which they undoubtedly are, but also as an opportunity.

I would like to illustrate this with a small anecdote from my time in Turin’s cultural administration. We wanted to found a European museum to show how
rich in variety Europe is. The visitor was supposed to experience these differences instead of just thinking about them. They were also supposed to view these differences from a European perspective and not only by comparing Italians to others or Turiners to others, as often happens during travel. And, what happened to our idea? Who was interested in it? Nobody! Even the European Commission replied that it would be overstepping its authority and could not act directly through policy. This is a big problem, because museums influence consciousness. During the period of Italy’s unification, many museums were founded that concentrated on the country’s unity. What we do not have are museums or other cultural institutions that present this European perspective. We need competent authorities that could initiate or support something of the like.

Adding to these practical suggestions, I would like to point out that an initiative has been working for years in Brussels to establish a “Museum Europe” in the European Parliament’s new building.

Let me add to the story of the European Museum in Brussels, which is an old project. Its first director was the former Israeli Ambassador to France, Mr. Eli Bar-Navie, and it was a very contested project, mainly among Greeks, because in this museum Europe began with Charlemagne. They left out anything about ancient Greece and Rome. When I refused to hold a lecture there, they underlined that Byzantium, like Islam, was against Europe. As a Greek Orthodox myself I must point out that Constantinople was the first capital of Europe, which was Christian, Greek and Roman, thus combining Valéry’s three elements I mentioned in the beginning.

But let me return to what I had originally intended to say. The fears that have been expressed concerning the European Convention and the future constitution are very real. The proposals currently on the table violate not only Art. 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty, but also the European Parliament’s resolution of September 5th, 2001, which defined culture as the necessary basis for the consolidation of a feeling of European citizenship and for a future European constitution. Consider for instance the importance of the Erasmus exchange program. The importance of Erasmus does not lie in the number of students we exchange, but in its symbolic significance. Now, each university has made money available for exchanges with European countries. These initiatives are much more important in terms of quantity than Erasmus. Therefore our most important project has become the

von der Gablentz

Ahrweiler

include education and culture in the preamble of the European constitution
exchange of credits in education so that they can be recognized in the diplomas of other universities, which we call the Bologna and Prague processes. Nevertheless, the symbolic value of Erasmus is important and I agree with the calls for including education and culture into the preamble of the new constitution.

Let me address another general problem that no one wants to speak about openly: the problem of migration in Europe (which is especially acute in megacities, one of Europe’s security concerns) and the problems this presents for schools. In people’s minds a threshold seems to exist, where classes are seen as really problematic when they contain more immigrants than natives. While nobody wants to speak about this openly, attempts are made, also by politicians, not to cross that threshold. We are also faced with a problem of terminology. We usually speak about “integration,” but integration only works through strong institutions, such as the army, perhaps the churches, education, trade unions and the like. But today, these institutions have lost much of their strength. Another expression is “assimilation,” but if you employ this term, you are taken for a Fascist who wishes to impose European civilization on others. A much more appropriate word is “acculturation.” By this, I mean going to the culture of others and mutually exchange experiences in the process. This way, each can recognize another, common form of civilization. This term embodies one of our most important tasks: to respect others—and not only foreigners are others. Integrating different social classes belonging to the same community in our educational system is already a large challenge. Given that these divisions within society are so crucial, we have to teach respect for others and that begins by learning foreign languages. Our ambition should be to encourage younger people not only to travel through Europe, but to be at home in Europe, *inshallah*.

**von der Gablentz**

It is interesting that we are trying to redefine the words integration, identity and assimilation that all suggest some exclusive identity, a monopoly of belonging somewhere. We should really try to avoid this notion, as we are living in a comparatively open society. I am therefore grateful for your suggestion of using the word acculturation.

**de Vries**

Let me briefly touch upon a few points that were made partly in response to my own introduction. I would like to thank Mr. Jones for reminding us of the importance of including a reference to culture into the preamble of the European Constitution. This is politically and symbolically important and creates the
legitimacy of the European Union to act in the cultural domain. This does not mean that the European Union needs to harmonize culture, which nobody wants and which, incidentally, no serious politicians or practitioners have proposed. Rather, supportive measures should be taken and for that the Union needs to be able to act.

I also agree with Ms. Griefahn that Article 151 of the treaty should be subjected to qualified majority voting. It is absurd to retain a rule of unanimity in a Union of 25 countries for this would make decision-making almost impossible. Without majority voting, we should have the courage to leave culture out of the treaty altogether. If we are not willing to have decisions that work it is best not to give the EU any competence in that particular area. What should the Union do? Mr. Cuzin pointed out that, notwithstanding decades of Franco-German cooperation, it is still not clear whether the average Frenchman and the average German have drawn much closer together. Even if his assessment might have been a little too pessimistic, it should teach us two things: first, we should be realistic and modest in expecting changes in allegiances and friendships. These things take decades and have to be tried anew in each generation. Secondly, it should install a sense of ambition in us to bring people closer together by making them understand each other’s history, each other’s way of looking at things and each other’s way of life. This can only be achieved if people can engage in the routes and the connections mentioned here. The ambition is not to build a uniform European culture, but to link the different elements of the mosaic together. For that, we need instruments that facilitate the crossing of borders, mainly exchange programs. In this respect, the European Union, its member states and regions should be more ambitious. At the very minimum, we should not only exchange students, but also opinion leaders such as artists or journalists.

Ms. Echerer mentioned another crucial instrument: networks. To create a sense of belonging, people must be allowed and encouraged to work together in networks of NGOs. Again, the Union should be more ambitious in supporting the establishment of these networks, which should by no means be limited to the fifteen or twenty-five EU countries. As our ideal is to be an open society in Karl Raimund Popper’s terms, we should bring in outsiders as well. Foundations can be instrumental in providing the organizational and financial support for these networks and I was delighted to hear Ms. Vöckers stress the importance of a new German Federal Cultural Foundation. I hope that her foundation and the foundations of the Länder can work together in stimulating and supporting these networks. One comment on the question of education in history mentioned by Ms. Ahr-

strengthening exchanges...
weiler: In the battle over the composition of curricula, educational experts are often vying and competing for whether math or languages should be given priority. We must be careful not to see history pushed to the sidelines.

Finally I want to comment on the notion of identity, which is of course a plural concept. Identity is not simply based on history, but it is something we can create today. Referring to the creation of national identities, Benedict Anderson coined the wonderful term of “imagined communities” to express this idea. We can decide what aspects of our identity we want to strengthen. A key question, also for intellectuals and artists should therefore be what kind of Europe we want—not in terms of institutions but in terms of our behavior and the values we embody.

We often hear that cultural pluralism is one of Europe’s strong points. This is only true, however, when the pluralism incorporates dialog because a live-and-let-live attitude among ghettos would not be especially productive. This is why all forms of communication are so important. That the peoples of Europe are taking so little note of each other’s literature is a disconcerting fact in this context. Above all the smaller literary languages in Europe are hardly ever translated. We are given a thoroughly distorted image of the literary reality in smaller countries through the handful of authors that are actually translated. Since publishing houses are usually unable to foot these additional translation costs, translation needs outside support. The existing funding at the national level is completely inadequate and mostly tied to exports of books and culture. This is a field where concrete action by the European Union is required.

As for the copyright dispute, I agree with Mr. Ruth that copyright and “Urheberrecht” stem from two completely different traditions. Economic thinking is widespread within the European Commission, so there is a danger that the Anglo-Saxon tradition could take precedence over the continental European one. From an economic point of view, the creator is unimportant, because value appreciation begins where value is realized on the market. This attitude can easily meld with the British definition of copyright, in which the producers and not the actual creators are decisive. Securing cultural pluralism requires that we come to the defense of the other European tradition, that of “Urheberrecht.”

I am delighted that Mr. de Vries has taken such an unequivocal position and we have come a certain distance already if the Convention has taken notice of it. Yet we are not out of the woods yet and I would like to give three reasons why.
First, it is extremely difficult to mediate between politics and the arts, even at the national level. On the one hand, artists are irreplaceable for their ability to foresee conflicts. On the other hand, they are often exceedingly difficult characters and occasionally so radical that societies often require a long time before accepting their message. Part of the European tradition is to accept the tension between art and politics. Still, it is very difficult for politicians to make policies for such an ungrateful constituency, even if they know in their hearts how important this is.

Second, the degree of complexity increases further at the European level. This gathering has already produced highly contradictory conceptualizations of Europe and identity, to use the contributions of Ms. David and Mr. Isar as just one example. Yet even if we were able to agree on a complex concept of identity here and within cultural policymaking, we would have enormous difficulties explaining it in Rotterdam, Upper Bavaria, or in the Tuxer Valley. I urge that we understand that people with varying social and educational backgrounds have varying needs for identity. These can be based on wishes for individual security, power and participation, in other words, out of a need for social security. This, however, has been partially lost in the ultra-free market capitalism of recent years. The identity discussion is also a compensation for the absence of discussion on social policy. Cultural policy must therefore take a greater account of social policy conditions without allowing itself to be hijacked. We cannot permit the debate over identities to become oversimplified, yet we likewise cannot abandon it because it is too complicated. We will have no choice but to endure these tensions in the coming years.

The third and most difficult point was raised by Mr. Schlögel when he warned that it is going to be terribly difficult going and that we have to avoid resorting to harmonization. A European integration behind the people’s backs would leave us with surpassingly difficult problems to fight with. I would like to offer two examples. The debate over enlargement in the Netherlands or Austria has already shown signs of how easily the problem can be taken advantage of. Politicians at the national and international levels use reasons like the search for political compromise to conceal the real costs of enlargement. If we add up the costs of German reunification, we already come up with sums greatly in excess of those that were presented at the time. Politics rarely manages to combine honesty and solidarity. The second example was brought into our debate by Ms. Ahrweiler, regarding the massive tension within our societies with immigrants and between North and South, which will further intensify as globalization progresses. Our different needs for identity depend on social conditions.
Establishing networks is not a task that could be organized by someone; either people do it or they don’t.

Schlögel

new instruments in cultural policy:
public-private partnerships

society will have to find answers to these problems in the coming years under very difficult conditions.

We should draw lessons from this for cultural policy. The Council of Europe plays hardly any operative role anymore and the Commission has scant legal foundations and marginal resources in cultural policy. We would require a far broader array of mechanisms, greater endurance, and sustainable cooperation. I would like to add one more instrument to those that have already been offered: public-private partnerships, for instance between European authorities and foundations. Institutions like the European Cultural Foundation might not be able to fill the vacuum, but they can advance the agenda by acting as a mediator and catalyst, through lobbying and providing examples of best practice.

Schlögel

I did not know about the plans for a European Museum in Brussels. It’s interesting because it is tied to the question of whether there exists something that could be called a museum narrative for Europe. In other words, what is our image of European history?

The discussion over networks irritated me somewhat. My own conception of a network is simple. As borders fell, spaces were opened up in Europe within which we can move freely, in spite of all our other difficulties. Instead of engaging in endless discussions we should take this chance, get moving, and make contact. Just as before 1989 anyone who was interested in contacting the people of Charter 77 went to Prague, anyone can reach out and work together today as well. Nobody has to spend much time or energy in building up a network. On the contrary, anyone can take the initiative, get moving and do what he or she thinks is important. I am terrified by networks that are set up basically to decide on distributing money. People like Diaghilev wouldn’t have had a chance in a Europe where networks are constructed and financed. He created his Salons Russes with his own energy and initiative by using contacts. As we all know, public financial means are dwindling, so we should keep people from getting the illusion that they could expect support from elsewhere. Indeed, the people have to shoulder the burden themselves. Establishing networks is not a task that could be organized by someone; either people do it or they don’t.

We also heard the necessity here of providing a political space, meaning an opportunity for political discourse. In my opinion, Europe needs a space for a cultural discourse, so that we find out what the possibilities really are. These would include the exhibitions organized by the Council of Europe that travel to many cities.
In conclusion I have a comment on European Capitals of Culture. I am naturally delighted that Graz is European Capital of Culture for 2003, but I am also unhappy that this honor did not go to St. Petersburg. The city is celebrating its 300th anniversary this year and, as a city, has found its way back to Europe. Bestowing upon St. Petersburg the prestige, funding and initiative that this choice brings with it should have been a pan-European matter. Basically, the failure to do so was an example of EU provincialism. I find it disturbing that there are no political or cultural forums were these kinds of matters can be discussed and decided publicly.

I am alarmed by the debate about the re-nationalization of culture and education policies, especially when future Eastern European member-states are used as arguments for it. Let me ask those involved in the discussion on cultural policy in Europe a simple question: what do you know about cultural policy in Poland? I myself don’t know anything about the cultural policy of my closest neighbors in Slovakia or Hungary. Do those who advocate “national” policies realize that in Poland we have had 16 Ministers of Culture since 1990? If you remove Article 151 from the European Treaties, what will be left for us to rely on or to refer to? Our ministers of culture change every 8 or 9 months and they take ad-hoc decisions that frequently serve political purposes. There is no national cultural policy and no instruments for its implementation. Project supporting grants are occasionally given but criteria for giving them do not exist. Please use these arguments when you speak again to those who are for a re-nationalization of culture and education. For culture carries ideas and ideology and it is not too long ago that the socialist systems in Europe made ample use of this link. Therefore I warn everybody against using culture for political purposes.

First a word on the European Capitals of Culture. I agree with Mr. Schlögel when he says that St. Petersburg would have been a better choice than Graz. But if you knew how they are chosen, you would be ashamed that they exist at all. The Council of Ministers has determined the Capitals of Culture until 2019 and has not included even one city from the new member states, neither Budapest, Prague, Krakow, nor Tallinn! Our protests in Parliament against this manner of decision-making were simply brushed aside. This was none of our concern, we were told. Now we are supposed to decide on the next city. It is Greece’s turn and the only candidate is Patras, without any other choice. We recommended that Greece should at least suggest Patras in tandem with another city from the accession can-

St. Petersburg should have become European Capital of Culture

Glondys
Eastern European countries rely on European cultural policies

Pack
the politics behind European Capitals of Culture
don’t abolish European cultural policy because it has been badly implemented!
didate states, but the minister’s presentation before the committee last week was anything but satisfactory.

As for the article on culture, I would like to say that it contains precisely what Mr. Strasser has demanded, namely a pluralism based on dialog. Initiatives should seek to make neighbors learn about each other’s cultures. But the Commission is doing a miserable job of implementing this. Therefore I am hardly surprised—and fully back Mr. Jones on this—when some of these politicians withdraw their support as soon as they get the chance. Yet in the process we are risking throwing out the baby with the bath water. If we abolish the program with its somewhat token 160 million euros of funding because the Commission isn’t making the best use of it, we simultaneously lose support for all the Parliament’s good projects in the cultural field. We would have no more legal basis for the European Youth Orchestra, the choirs, as well as the Ariane Program to support translation of literatures in smaller languages. Because of this dilemma we must hold onto the cultural program, regardless of how inadequately it may have been administered until now.

As for the topic of education, the Erasmus Program was in existence long before education was enshrined in the Treaty in 1992. This happened because what was meant was not general education but job training. Because Europe has authority over economic matters, we could do something in the field of job training. In 1992, Erasmus led to Socrates and a whole series of other, really good things. By now about a million students have gone abroad in Europe to study, something which has prompted us in the Bologna Process to think about the credit transfer system. This is why I have no great fear that the education article could fail in the Convention, but the culture article is another story. To prevent this we should give our input to the Convention.
III. Europe’s Cultural Role in the World

I’d like to provide some introductory remarks to our third topic, “Europe’s Cultural Role in the World.”

In our first session, we examined various facets of the question “what is European culture?” from our perception of history to the leakage currents of rapid social change that clearly illustrate that European culture is not static. On the contrary, Europe’s cultural scene is being rapidly transformed as the European cultural zone is reconstructed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This transformation is mirrored in the enlargement of the European Union, and we agreed after the first session that European culture would be a chapter for the future of Europe’s reconstruction.

Turning to the subject of cultural policy, we were all aware that we have to secure a place for culture within Europe’s process of renewal. This is especially important because many special interests regard culture as the private domain of the national states. In terms of instruments for cultural policy, we spoke of the framework that European treaties and the debates within the Convention could help establish. Simultaneously, we reminded ourselves that communities of people extending beyond national borders were the actual key factor and we discussed how to support them. We also referred repeatedly to the decisive role of education. Gijs de Vries, in particular, emphasized the importance of culture in helping a political community emerge, a pan-European polis. We also agreed that civil society plays a decisive role in supporting culture, but that culture still remains the responsibility of the public sector.

In our third topic, on Europe’s cultural role in the world, the most recent contributions have already dropped several catchwords: Migration, acculturation, and the part played by the 12 to 15 million Muslims already living in Europe were one factor. We also placed importance on the dialog of cultures in a globalized world that is largely oriented towards European standards of values and culture. Simultaneously, however, we saw that globalization is changing the character of cultural development, so that cultural globalization is overtaking cultural Europeanization. This led to the issue of mechanisms for cultural policy, and whether it would be possible to develop an external European cultural policy that will help Europe present itself and maintain its influence in a globalized world.

To illustrate the confusion that reigns concerning Turkish identity and the role of Turkey in Europe, I will begin with a few anecdotes.

In 1959, when I was studying at the University of Manchester, I often used the

von der Gablentz

III. Europe’s Cultural Role in the World

Ergüder

Turkey’s multi-faceted identity-crisis:
Manchester City Central Public Library to do my reading and preparation for exams. In addition to good library facilities, you could also meet very interesting people there. One day, when I was having my coffee break, an intoxicated gentleman approached me and asked where I was from. When I answered “Turkey,” he said, “You must be Muslim.” I replied that my passport said so, but that I had never been in a mosque. To which he retorted, “Then you must be an atheist—I am an atheist too, but remember you are a Muslim atheist whereas I am an Anglican atheist.” To me, that was a very good summary of the role of religion in culture.

Then, last year during a conference on Greek-Turkish relations at the Fletcher School in Boston, a Greek lady made a good argument for Turkey’s membership in the European Union from the perspective of Greece. She argued that the Greek Orthodox Church was a religion of the East, not the West. According to her, the differences between Greek Orthodoxy and Christianity in Western Europe are so big, that Greece sometimes feels closer to Turkey due to cultural links to the Turkish version of Islam. This really unsettled my view of Christianity as a whole or as a homogenous culture.

Finally, on the “Völkertafel” that was passed around stylizing different European national characteristics, the Greeks and Turks were illustrated together and the illustration used was the figure of a Turkish guard. These anecdotes go to show the confusion on all sides with regard to Turkey’s identity. Turkey itself is going through a very important identity crisis that can be explained through a range of different factors.

Mr. Strasser mentioned that Turkey was included in the debate about European integration right from the beginning. Let me relate another anecdote on that point: In the early seventies the Bogazici (Bosphorus) University received many invitations to join the European Consortium for Political Research. At the time we did not have sufficient resources and therefore could not join. When I expressed our wish to join in 1982, the President of the Consortium replied that we could not join because Turkey geographically did not belong to Europe. After the intervention of an eloquent American academic, they conceded that our university could join, but only because it is situated by a few hundred meters on the European side of the Bosphorus. This time we did not join because we were a little taken aback.

Another element of our identity crisis is historical. Centuries ago, Turkey was “knocking at the gates of Vienna” and that has left an ambivalent legacy. On the one hand there is pride that we advanced all the way to the heart of Europe, but at the same time Turks perceive that the Europeans see this as an attack by the
infidels, the barbarians. Turks therefore suffer from an “infidel,” or if you will, “barbarian” complex and react very sensitively to European criticisms, even if they are well intended. Simultaneously, though, there is a lot of infatuation with Europe and we always tend to look westward. As just a small example, Turkish weather reports in the early days of Turkish TV only covered Western European countries; the Middle East and North Africa were left out despite our close ties to these regions.

More recently, the ethnic dimension to the Turkish identity crisis has become more important. During the Cold War, relations with the Turkic nations in Central Asia did not really pose a question as we clearly belonged to the Western camp and they were left deep behind the Soviet borders. With the breakdown of the Soviet empire a Pandora’s box opened for Turkey. The Turkic nations were now distracting Turkey’s focus away from Europe. Some in Turkey see Central Asia as an alternative. We also have become involved in the internal affairs of these states. This further adds to the important identity problems for Turkey.

The Arab dimension is another very problematic aspect for Turkey. Historically, the Arab states were parts of the Ottoman Empire. Some therefore harbor resentments (“anti-colonial,” or “anti-empire” syndrome) against Turkey, while Turks have a deeply ingrained attitude of looking down on Arabs as they felt betrayed during the First World War (the Lawrence of Arabia syndrome). One also must not forget that Turks are latecomers to Islam. Consequently, Arabs treat Turks not as true Muslims and that attitude has been reinforced through our attempt to establish a secular republic. Thus, for the Arabs, too, we are infidels. Islam may not serve to establish a strong bond, as some might assume, with the Arabic Middle East.

Let me now move to some of the current paradoxes of the relationship between Turkey and Europe. Regarding the “leakage currents” mentioned by Mr. Schlögel, there are today strong contacts among people in Europe and Turkey. Civil society associations, universities and other educational institutions are all increasing their contacts to Europe. My former university, like most others, initially had a very strong link to American universities. But that direct link included no stopover in Europe. During the last decade, however, we, at Bogazici University, strengthened our contacts with European universities and now for example participate actively in the European University Association.

Istanbul has developed into one of the metropolitan centers of modern Europe. It is an important center in terms of tourism and entertainment, where
Islamists are pro-European, secularists Euro-skeptics
dialog with Europe consolidates democracy and secularism

some have started to compare Istanbul to New York. Its cultural festivals like the Istanbul Classical Music Festival, the Istanbul Jazz Festival, the Istanbul Film Festival or the Istanbul Theatre Festival have a strong European focus. Tourism constitutes another very important link and Turkey has become much more involved in international sports such as football and basketball.

Globalization has an important, if ambivalent impact on Turkey. Parts of the elite have come to belong to the West, while others feel left out of the process. This creates tensions within the country. The most interesting of these tensions is the one between Islamists and Secularists. At present, we experience the internalization of secularism, which originally was a top-down process in Turkey. It is only through the victory of an Islamic party that we finally have a chance to internalize secularism. The AK Party (Justice and Development Party) government in power clearly has Islamic roots, but they have declared that Islam is a matter of personal conscience and stressed that they will not use religion for political purposes.

The paradox in Turkey is that some secularists are fundamentalist secularists, for whom secularism has taken the place of a religion. These secularists are deeply engrained in the power structures of Ankara. They are suspicious of Europe because its promotion of democracy, human rights and cultural pluralism could lead either to the dismemberment (Kurdish problem) or to the destruction (the threat of political Islam) of the secular Kemalist republic. Therefore the Kemalist ruling elite is very wary. They assume that democracy, human rights and values of cultural pluralism might serve the Islamists’ cause to establish a state based on religious law (Sharia). The Islamists on the other hand have become the “best” Europeanists in Turkey. Especially after September 11th, the moderate version of Islam of the AK Party has gained a lot of support, especially in Europe and America. Additionally, the party leadership has realized that the closer Turkey is to Europe, the more democratic values will be internalized in Turkey. A consolidated democracy in turn would provide the Islamists with a more secure political life. These differences at times lead to much polarization in the society as the secular Kemalist elite see a conspiracy to establish an Islamic state in the emphasis that AK Party leadership puts on democracy and Europe.

While Turkey is thus very committed to democracy, we still face a rocky road ahead. We are living through a stage of internalization of secularism. Becoming closer to Europe, even just being involved in a dialog with Europe, may help consolidate democracy and secularism by bridging the gap between the political Islam
and secular fundamentalism in Turkey. Europe played a very important role in the consolidation of Greek democracy. One may hope that Europe may have a similar impact on Turkish democracy even though the problems faced are far more complex than those of Greece. Many people in Turkey reacted to the outcome of the Copenhagen summit with gloom. I did not, because the dialog itself helps and because from the perspective of Europe, Turkey has problematic features.

We don't need to talk about culture or religion to see these problematic aspects; let me give you some demographic figures to illustrate that.

These figures show that Turkey has an extremely young population compared to the current members states of the European Union. Even the new candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe cannot solve the demographic problems of the European Union. Projections for 2025 see falling population growth rates in Turkey, but this will only have an impact after a considerable time lag. Demographic developments constitute a problem not only for Europe, but also for Turkey. Some nationalists claim that a young population is good no matter what. I do not agree. A young population that is well educated in schools and with respect to democratic values would be an asset both for Turkey and for Europe, for Turkey could be an important source of manpower. We, at the Istanbul Policy Center, recently submitted a research proposal to the Soros Foundation and other associations to study the question of how we should educate our youth to create the kind of citizen we want in 2025, especially with respect to democratic values. Therefore I agree with our earlier conclusion that education is a very important problem that we should face both in Turkey and in Europe.

I am very grateful for Mr. Ergüder’s contribution, first, because it is very difficult to be the single representative of “the rest of the world” in such a distinguished European assembly and I appreciate his moral support. Second, I have found that with respect to the vast range of possible responses to and expectations from Europe, the westernizing elites and middle classes throughout the world are—mutatis mutandis—living through some of the same paradoxes and dilemmas as they are in Turkey. Also, and that comes back to Mr. Schlögel’s comments on cultural interaction, the processes of people-to-people contact, civil society interaction and network dynamics are very similar internationally. While the difficulties might be greater and the ground conditions different, the same processes are leading Europeans and Asians, or Europeans and Africans, or Europeans and Latin Americans into different kinds of new relationships.
Globalization makes the search for global values necessary, and that search obviously has to be intercultural. So many issues and problems cut across all national or regional lines that ultimately we are all concerned. We can no longer establish boundaries determined by the places in which we live. Where the lines of cause and effect run across nation-states, so do the lines of moral responsibility. But culture can’t step in to compensate for the gaps between European principles and European practice. For example, the failure of free-trade globalism to help the developing world for the simple reason that its economic rules lock in the advantages the rich world enjoys and kicks away the ladder from the rest.²

Many years ago, Edgar Morin put it very neatly: “Europe has Europeanized the world and globalized Europeanism.” The colonization of the Americas and the subsequent creation of the United States of America was a very early part of that process. More recent are the globalization of the “four Ds,” mentioned by Madame Ahrweiler, and the creation of the United Nations. But today, Europe is no longer central culturally: it is neither where it was nor what it was, even if reluctant Eurocentrists such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger still imagine that there is European hegemony in world economy and culture. The Third World doesn’t want to become “Western,” if by that we mean “European.” If anything, the Third World wants to become and is in the process of becoming—but only in part—American. This means that the “European project” is just not appreciated for what it is. The rich debate we are having about that project and the relevance of our debate to other regions of the world are not well understood. Practically the only exception is France’s exception culturelle agenda, now spun out as diversité culturelle.

The rest of the world doesn’t quite believe that Europe has modified its old universalistic vision of “civilization” that places European high culture at the apex. It doesn’t quite believe that Europe is ready for meaningful intercultural dialogue. Western economic and geopolitical dominance make the face to face a very unequal one. It’s not easy for either side to treat the other as an equal. In his article “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History,”³ the Indian historian Dipesh

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² Cf. the recent book *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* by the economist Ha-Joon Chang, who borrows Friedrich List’s image of “kicking away the ladder” as practiced by all the 19th century industrializing nations.

³ In *Unpacking Europe*, a volume released together with the exhibition of the same name held at the Boijmans Van Beuningen Museum, Rotterdam, in 2001.
Chakrabarty pointed out that the main stumbling block to dialogue is the hold of the “master narrative” of European experience. The reigning narratives of modernity all point to Europe as the unique location of the modern. This equation is not the work of Europeans alone; third-world nationalisms, as modernizing ideologies par excellence, have been equally responsible for producing it. Third-world historians and intellectuals, for example, still need to refer to works and processes in European history, but Europeans feel no need to reciprocate. Even ignorance is asymmetric: Europe remains the sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories; including the ones we could call “Indian” or “Moroccan” or “Chinese.” Thus a historian from any one of these countries is condemned to knowing Europe as the original home of the modern. But the European historian does not share a comparable predicament with regard to the pasts of the majority of humankind. Hence the importance of a fresh effort on all sides to build intercultural dialogue as part of the process of what the Delors Commission, the International Commission on Education for the 21st Century, saw as “learning to live together,” a process that “by developing an understanding of others and their history, traditions and spiritual value and, on this basis, creating a new spirit which, guided by recognition of our growing interdependence and a common analysis of the risks and challenges of the future, would induce people to implement common projects or to manage the inevitable conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful way.”

I like to see this as an “intercultural deontology”: a process consciously willed by self-selected agents—thinkers, artists, politicians and decision-makers in other fields—who seek to build encounters between individuals and groups that oblige each of them to mobilize the basic characteristics, logical categories, symbols and myths of their respective cultures on a shared terrain that is new to each and belongs to none alone.

Intercultural encounters may occur in different frameworks. A preliminary typology of familiar “models” could be the following: A dignitary model, bringing together heads of state or government who tend to deliberate in terms of broad abstractions, such as the “dialogue among civilizations,” and adhere to diplomatic norms. An inter-religious dialogue model bringing together religious leaders and whose subject matter is self-evident. A representative intellectual figure model bring-

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involve the unconvinced into that dialoging together leading academicians, journalists, opinion-leaders from different cultures in encounters based on rational debate inspired by the liberal values of a shared commitment to an intercultural ethic. A transactional model in the business world based on the negotiation of diverging stakes against a backdrop of different cultural assumptions. An epistemic community model bringing together specialists in a shared field, e.g. scientists, artists, NGO activists, journalists, or a common age-set or category, e.g. young people, women.

Each of these approaches is valid. All, however, tend to be conversations among the already convinced. An increasingly urgent need is to reach out to the unconvinced, even those who do not necessarily subscribe to the basic principles of dialogue. This is a challenge of “outreach.” It means reaching those who do not believe in dialogue or do not already practice it. It means reaching beyond the usual actors and intermediaries so as to influence local representatives and community leaders, i.e. those who are the closest to populations on the ground. Across the world, there is a need to cultivate an improved quality of leadership at the local level as regards intercultural relations and understanding. This requires a rethinking of the challenge. Efforts must embrace governments and established national elites but also civil society organizations, the private sector and local media. In other words, the discourse and practice of intercultural dialogue must become far more inclusive.

European Commission President Romano Prodi has just established a “group of wise men” to explore how the European Union can develop such relationships. This commission is concerned with the immediate neighborhood of the European Union and is made up of Europeans and intellectual leaders from the South and the East of the Mediterranean—from Turkey through Israel to Morocco. It is co-chaired by the French journalist Jean Daniel and the distinguished Moroccan jurist Assia Bensalah Alaoui.

Another initiative still in gestation is the idea of the Indian government to set up an International Center for the Dialogue of Civilizations, and I have been giving some thought to what it might do. Such an intercultural center might carry out the following activities: organize an annual “Davos” event for intercultural dialog, high level scientific conferences and encounters on contentious themes such as democracy, human rights, gender equity, secularism and religious identity—issues that are sometimes more contentious within our societies than between them. It could also mount seminars and workshops for middle level personnel, especially local level practitioners and city managers, and workshops for
journalists to help them develop intercultural competencies. As regards content, such a center could look internationally or cross-culturally at themes that are really important for the dialog between civilizations, such as religious fundamentalism. You could have multicultural lexicons of basic value-concepts that are used in different cultures. Or case studies of dialog and co-operation between ethnic or cultural communities in order to publicize those initiatives that could be models for the rest.

As the last person presenting an introductory statement, I feel a little like a result only appearing on page 42 in a Google search—many of the points I think important to raise have already been mentioned. I can therefore promise two things: to be brief and not to mention any American politicians by name. I will also avoid questions of European centrality and globalization because I think that with the impressive collection of cultural interlocutors around this table we should not pre-occupy ourselves with this kind of general theoretical question.

Let us focus on the paths of cultural transmission. We should be careful not to operate with an insular view of European culture as a romantic historicized entity. To me, the interesting question is how culture is transmitted and how a European cultural self-consciousness can constitute itself in a context of globalization and global cultural interpenetration. Today, paths of transmission can contribute to the legitimacy of a cultural product. For example, relatively few were reading Carl Schmitt in Germany, when suddenly a handful of his books were being translated into English or French or Italian. Through the reception abroad they become an issue again in Germany. Likewise, Walter Benjamin’s Moscow Diary came to America, only after being published in France. The paths of transmission are not just accidental; a German artist goes to Brooklyn Heights, not because of the rent, which is more expensive than in Prenzlauer Berg, but because there is a community that confers status. We cultural interlocutors use it as a measure of expertise, of excellence and quality. Thereby it becomes a selection criterion for thinkers and artists.

Europe has a very different method of enabling and legitimating than the US. I remember the great disagreement we had when Americans and Germans together created a program for artists. The German sponsors wanted to pre-select artists through their networks and advisors, whereas the Americans insisted upon fairness on viewing all 112 applications over the course of a day at the Whitney. Many of these questions were not that compelling, but this comprehensive
approach also makes discoveries possible. Analogously, the Internet both enables and obscures discoveries through the quantity of information it makes available.

I have been asked to comment on Europe’s cultural role in the world from an American perspective and I would like to focus on the different views concerning questions of ethnicity and cosmopolitanism. As a scholar of early 20th Century German-Jewish cultural history I would recommend one review the debates of the eve of the First World War. One example is the infamous Kunstwart debate, which addressed doubts about what constituted German culture considering its transformation by a strong Jewish influence. A journalist writing of Kunstwart asked how Jews could be advocates of German culture while they are not accepted as being part of it. This letter led to a long and vociferous debate. The question is not whether we accept the interpenetration of European culture with American, Chinese, Latin American or any other culture. Interpenetration is a fact you cannot deny: just look at the best ten list in the Süddeutsche Zeitung every month to see the large number of translations it contains. Scholarship is therefore faced with the question of redefining European culture and determining what should be transmitted as such.

von der Gablentz

Thank you for this description in which Europe and America, despite all the difficulties, form one cultural area through the constant exchange of cultural elements.

Strasser

European culture should be characterized by irony

Our discussion has demonstrated that we have to be very careful in approaching the subject of European identity. Given the burden of the continent’s history, there can and should not be any contiguous identity the way people have imagined it in the past. Therefore it might be beneficial if European culture were characterized by irony. Perhaps we will succeed to combine irony with commitment and thus help define a role for Europeans in the world that will preserve us from taking up missionary attitudes. With this in mind I would like to mention five points on Europe’s role that seem important to me.

First, if the Europeans want to assume a creative global role, they will have to face up to their responsibility for Africa. No other major region would take Europe’s place if the Europeans refuse the task. The current disastrous situation in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa has shown how urgent this requirement has become.

Second, we Europeans will have to shoulder the task of mediating with regions farther east, beyond Europe’s geographical borders. In the long term, both
Turkey and Israel will have to be incorporated into the European Union. I think that Israel, for example, will be unable to exist in the longer term as an economic outpost of the United States, and will have to belong to Europe.

Third, this would lead directly to a mediator’s role with Islamic culture, which is one of the fundamental elements of European culture anyway. We would know nothing of Aristotle today had Muslim scholars not reminded us of our Greek heritage.

Fourth, the Europeans have to develop an alternative to the American model of globalization defined by economic considerations that is predominant today. I believe—and I refer here to comments made by the president of Georgetown University, an American Jesuit—that a new threat of totalitarianism exists that would elevate economic logic over all other considerations. In Europe, we have had terrible experiences with political forms of totalitarianism. Today, religious totalitarianism, i.e. fundamentalism, is mainly, but by no means only, a problem in the Islamic world. But we should also face the dangers emanating from the genuinely Western, the economic form of totalitarianism.

Finally, we have to come up with a European alternative to the current way peace is kept in the world. This alternative should distinguish itself clearly from the weapons-backed Pax Americana that is currently emerging.

I would first like to thank Mr. Isar for giving us the necessary reminder that the “rest of the world” does not necessarily aspire to become “European.” This type of reality check is very useful in our debates as an element for reflection but also as a basis for action. I was fascinated to learn about the planned International Center for Dialog Among Civilizations and would appreciate to hear more about it after the meeting.

Then, I would like to pose a question to Mr. Ergüder. Without overstressing one aspect in this multi-faceted debate, I would like to ask him about the role of the army in Turkish politics. While there are many good and bad arguments in the discussion about Turkish-European relations, we all share a fundamental commitment to democracy. And it seems to be self-evident that any country joining the European Union must leave the army where it belongs, in the barracks. As an aside: when Spain and Portugal joined the European Union in 1986, I asked my Spanish colleagues what the most important change was after joining the European Union. I had expected to hear foreign investment, employment or cultural exchange in reply. Instead he answered that the most important thing that
changed was that the army was back in the barracks in Spain. In Turkey it seems that the role of the army is closely linked to the perceived and possibly real non-performance of political parties. The weakness of political parties is even more pronounced in Turkey than, may I say, in the rest of Europe. My question therefore is: How do you explain the weakness of political parties, if you think that is a problem. Secondly, what could other European countries do, to the extent that they can do anything, to help address that question and to strengthen Turkish democracy on the way to an eventual membership in the European Union?

Could you just respond quickly because this question is only indirectly part of the cultural agenda we are dealing with.

Chairman, I take your point, but I only take half of it. Our attachment to parliamentary democracy is a small, yet fundamental part of the European cultural tradition.

I take the other half, so we are in full agreement.

The role of the army is a very touchy issue in Turkish politics. One could argue the case in defense of the role of the Turkish army as a modernizing agent. But that was in the past. The Turkish military used to act as a safeguard of secularism in Turkey, but as I argued before, we are passing that stage now. Consequently, we need a redefinition of the role of the army. In my writings, I have been very critical of the role of the army, especially because they weaken political parties. The military interventions in 1960, 1970, 1971 and 1983 wreaked havoc with the party system as parties were closed down and their leaders were politically disabled. Even though new parties came to political life later, their institutionalization was very difficult. In politics, you learn by doing. If military take-overs put inexperienced political leaders into power every decade, the cost to the country is very high.

Turkey moving closer to Europe, even falling short of full membership, would be a very important example for the world, because it is the only experiment in democratic reforms within an Islamic framework. And the closer Turkey comes to Europe, the stronger civil society organizations will become. This won’t make military coup d’êts entirely impossible, but it will make them highly unlikely.

I would like to remind everyone that we chose the subject of culture in Europe because Europe’s development will have fulfilled its purpose only when to evolves
into a Political Union over the longer term. Therefore we wanted to know whether culture could make a contribution towards this objective.

Since we have already brought up European external cultural policy, I would like to give you an example that I experienced myself. At a press conference in Gdansk with the presidents of Poland and France, we were discussing our three-way collaboration, known as the Weimar Triangle—which has so far perhaps not been as productive as it might have been because French interest has been rather lukewarm, very much in contrast to the time when Poland was still partitioned. While Mr. Lech Wałęsa expressed his frustration that Poland was still not a member of NATO, I tried to point out the advantages of the Weimar Triangle. Then François Mitterrand took the floor and said there was only one topic: He would instruct his government’s delegation at the Uruguay Round of trade liberalization talks to sign the final protocol only if it included a clause that would completely ban US-made software from the European continent. Of course, Mitterrand knew perfectly well that technically this could never be achieved. Yet his statement reminded us that the French understanding of the political importance of culture means a great deal for Political Union in Europe, even if other countries’ awareness of their culture is not as pronounced as that of the French. This people’s national pride has been expanded to have taken on a universal meaning, because French ideals have been interpreted as human ideals—making French history into a kind of fulfillment of a universal mission.

Anyone who thinks I mean the Americans is mistaken. I was referring exclusively to France. However, I would like to say a few words on America, since Gary Smith raised the subject of Europe’s insular mindset. If there is any real island in this world, it is the United States. Mr. Schlögel has already shed light on the region’s importance. America’s insular position, protected by two oceans and flanked by two utterly peaceful neighbors has been the country’s great geographical fortune. This also precisely why the 9/11 attacks had such an enormous impact, one that we Europeans have yet to comprehend. The islanders came to the realization that an anti-missile shield today could not even protect their position. We must take seriously this huge American trauma, whereby I do not agree with the argument that we Europeans are running the risk of developing an insular consciousness.

Then, on the issue of religion, a topic closely associated with culture, I would like to remind us that all monotheistic religions developed in the Middle East, not in Europe. However, Europe set a process in motion relatively early on that led to European culture continuing to play a significant part in the world.
substantial autonomy between politics and culture on the one hand, and religion and the centers of ecclesiastical power on the other. The Europeans, probably again with French leadership, developed something called secularism, which led to mutual tolerance within pluralistic societies and a blossoming of the arts and sciences. Europe’s leading exports to the world have not been primarily religions but philosophies and ideologies, including humanism, the Enlightenment, Marxism and capitalism. I do not need to mention that these have had both positive and negative effects, but there can be no doubt that European culture will continue to play a significant part in a globalized world.

Even if 37 kinds of cultural awareness have developed in Europe’s 37 states, there is still such a thing as a European cultural consciousness. That is because each culture in Europe defines itself not only by its differences, but also by its similarities with those of its neighbors. The diversity in European culture, therefore, is an expression of its cohesiveness. Furthermore, this cultural consciousness contains a force that both Jacques Delors and Mr. Isar have cited: culture is not reserved for the elite, but the field on which we learn to live together. This is why culture will play an essential part along the path to Political Union.

We need a Political Union first of all to make the English Channel narrower and bind the UK closer to Europe. Second, we need it if we are to become true partners with the United States. Until we have a really effective European Political Union, the partnership with the US will remain in danger of becoming a dependency, and dependency is no partnership. Developments in the wake of globalization mandate that we work together with the US. Yet we object to establishing a uni-polar world. Whether in China, India, Indonesia, Japan or Russia, everywhere one senses the desire for unity among Europeans, which would help bring about a multi-polar world. We have to set an example with culture and in this way support the establishment of a Political Union.

I would like to return to the question of Europe’s frontiers, which we always debate controversially, especially when discussing the example of Turkey. As a historian I would like to point out that the imprecision of boundaries has been a continuity in Europe’s history. In terms of geography, the question of where Europe begins and ends cannot be answered. Yet there are definite cultural frontier lines and part of the task facing artists and cultural historians is to make these clear. The cultural boundary is defined by democracy, freedom, gender equality, tolerance, human rights, and the respect for human dignity.
Take, in comparison, the four arguments that Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler brought up on the subject of Turkey. He said, first, that Turkish accession could not be financed and that the new member states would by themselves cost far too much. Second, he used the demographic argument, that within ten years Turkey would have a population of 100 million, and Fischler did not regard this forecast as positively as has Mr. Ergüder. Third, almost 50% of Turkey’s people live from agriculture, and fourth, he said that the EU was simply not unified on how to proceed with Turkey as a candidate country. Pure Eurocrat thinking is at the core of these arguments, a purely economic point of view, without any regard for cultural history and policy.

I would like to contrast this with an essay by Joachim Ritter from 1956 titled “Europäisierung als europäisches Problem” that refers to the example of Turkey, published in “Metaphysik und Politik—Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel” (1969, Frankfurt/Main). Ritter defines Europeanization as a process “in which non-European peoples break with their traditional ways of living and assume European forms of social production, education and state-social organization, and espouse these spontaneously and actively.” Ritter points out, as has Mr. Ergüder, that Turkey, with its promulgation of the 1928 law on the secular foundation of the state, purposely redirected the state’s development in a new direction and dissolved the new Turkish state’s ties with Islam. This was the turning point at which religion became a private matter, removed from the context of the state and its order. “This,” Ritter continues, “was the first time in the history of the Mohammedan world that Islam stopped being the foundation upon which all moral, legal and political orders were based.”

The central process in Europeanization is the dialectics between occidental origins and a future determined by modern civilization. In Turkey, both elements can be reconciled, and therefore Turkey will be the vehicle with which we will actually begin to comprehend and experience European identity. I think this is a big chance for us Europeans. Yet we cannot forget that it should be a give and take process, as it has been throughout European history. We always speak of Europeanizing Turkey, but never of Islamizing Europe. It seems to me that this question has never been discussed, let alone answered.

I also have a brief response to Johano Strasser’s provocation. I think that Africa and Israel are tasks that lie far in Europe’s future. We must remain aware that the Balkans is Europe’s number one region of responsibility. We have already been lucky that the European Union was able to tackle the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s,
The crisis did not disrupt or make the EU fail politically. However, it will be long before we Europeanize the Balkans region on our own responsibility and prepare those countries for accession.

Following Mr. von Weizsäcker, I would like to underline Fernand Braudel’s words: “If there is a European empire, it is an empire of culture and civilization.” Doing so, I would again urge you to differentiate between culture and civilization.

Then, I would like to focus away from the Euro-French-centrism that has been mentioned to the cultural dimensions of Europe in the relations to its more immediate neighbors. We have a north-south and an east-west axis in Europe. The east-west axis is now covered by enlargement. Along the north-south axis, we find the Mediterranean dimension of European culture, which includes the cradles of three monotheisms as Mr. von Weizsäcker reminded us. As we have heard little about this dimension, I would welcome more information about the Barcelona process. During a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Mediterranean countries I could observe that they all believed in a common economic, political and cultural future. The meeting, however, crucially lacked an Israeli participant and we should examine this problem anew with a specific focus on this omission.

I would suggest that we conduct the last section of our discussion without delving deeper into the problems of enlargement as manifested in the example of Turkey or Europe’s relationship to the United States. In America’s case, we already share a mutual cultural region and values that are also the basis for the process of globalization. The problem there is a political one, of how a partnership can be organized, rather than one that has to do with Europe’s cultural extension. Instead, we should concentrate on Europe’s cultural role in the world, paying particular attention to the issue of how European culture can hold its own—a question closely connected to the emergence of a political union. Second, I suggest that you devote some thought to whether a specifically European culture can develop further in a time of cultural globalization. Third, we should keep an eye on the subject of dialog between cultures, which Mr. Isar has already introduced.

I would like to add some thoughts on Europe’s development in the context of globalization. The present process of accelerated globalization has many parallels to similar developments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which were already then experiencing many of the phenomena we see today, meaning inter-
nationalism, cosmopolitanism, mixed societies, etc. This process was interrupted by the World Wars and the Cold War and has resumed today. Because the reinvention or new foundation of Europe takes place under conditions of globalization, it will be an extraordinarily painful process full of conflicts. European culture, which is one of the essential components of the European unity project, will only play a part in so far as it contributes to Europe’s self-assertion.

This brings me to the question of how Europe can be brought to rise from resting on its past triumphs and treasures. How can Europe be respected internationally and remain calm towards other centers of civilization, yet insist upon its abilities and on what it has to say? This status would be reached if European culture manages to shed any antagonisms toward America and work simultaneously toward reducing the asymmetry of the dialog that Mr. Isar has spoken of. This kind of assured yet level-headed Europeanism would not need any cheap polemics and could know how to handle both its achievements and defects.

In addition, the process of globalization in Europe will neither be idyllic nor without conflict. A process of fragmentation and growth of differences like those I mentioned earlier while discussing metropolitan corridors will accompany Europe’s new unity. Some regions, such as the so-called Blue Banana, will prosper, while other regions will fall further behind. To me, the big question is how European culture can come to terms with this new configuration and how it can be rejuvenated in the process. I do not think we can answer this question, but at least we can remain attentive toward these processes and give up the illusion that we are in the midst of a peaceful and plannable procedure of which we are the masters.

I would like to add something to the points made on the relationship between art and politics and of European culture’s global reach.

First of all, European culture has no global reach anymore. Cultural elites around the world will retain their great interest in European art and philosophy, which will thus be assured their continued central position in the canon. Yet this has to do only with historical culture and not with contemporary culture, which is much harder to define as European. The European tradition will, in this sense, continue to set the standard for educated international elites, but that is not something we would consider global reach for European culture. There are some occasional exceptions in a post-colonial context. The writer V. S. Naipaul comes from a colonial British context and found his calling in London. His orientation is also
our culture is backward-and inward-looking

a directly European one; Naipaul arrived at the literature and the cultural identity that he accepted and loved without going through America. On the other hand, the association is specifically English rather than European. With these kinds of older associations, which are also pronounced in Francophone regions, Europe maintains its global presence, yet remains restricted to elites.

Our mutual culture is very backward looking. During Mr. Ergüder’s presentation, for instance, a smile crossed the face of Ms. Glondys when he spoke of the Turks at the gates of Vienna, probably because she knew that a Polish king played a key role in repulsing this attack. This familiarity we have with one another is something we will never have with people from another continent. But that’s something for the family reunion rather than a real political story. In addition, the European in us is slightly inward looking. We discuss how we can come closer together, but not on how we project ourselves abroad. This is why outsiders often have difficulty understanding our discourse. I don’t think someone from Haiti or Ghana would have much use for what we have been discussing here.

It is Western, not European culture, that has a global reach. For the foreseeable future it will remain primarily American, even if it has strong European roots. This includes political institutions with global reach, including rule of law, private property, parliamentary democracy, and so on. As soon as we enter the political sphere in its literal sense, we find nothing anymore that is specifically European. The Copenhagen Criteria for accession to the European Union can be fulfilled by non-European democracies without any reference to cultural specifics. Therefore I do not think that we can learn much about political identity by reflecting on culture.

To conclude, I have one comment on the present European-American frictions. Strikingly, at a time of sweeping historical importance, a great deal of Europeans have been expressing the wish to separate from the Americans, just as the West resumed its existence as a unit with just one opponent, that being radical Islam. In the end, this confrontation leaves us all sitting in the same boat again, as during the Cold War. I think it is surprising that at this moment, both sides of the Atlantic are so concentrated on emphasizing the differences between us, which are relatively small compared to those opposing us.

I want to point your attention to a specific aspect of globalization. From a Western perspective, we define globalization in terms of economic interaction and neglect its human dimensions. We tend to forget that it will also affect the attitudes of people around the world, especially their willingness to move. If you consider
the message that Western media are spreading around the world of consumption and individual success, it is no wonder that young people from the poorer parts of the world want to move to the richer parts. And they will increasingly do so, whether we want it or not. In some way we will have to adapt to it.

In this context, culture can be used in a rather peculiar manner. Samuel P. Huntington's thesis about the clash of civilizations is much debated, but populist parties in Europe now tend to define separateness in cultural terms. I see this emphasis of cultural differences as a continuation of the racist definitions of separateness, which used to be legitimized in biological terms. One major reason why for instance the Danish Populist Party has become the dominant political factor in a progressive society like Denmark is that they define the differences between Danes and especially Muslim immigrants through culture. That this could happen has something to do with the failure of the Left in Europe to understand that the multi-culturalism it promoted was problematic. The concept of a multi-cultural society promoted by the Left in the 1970s was based on the idea that each minority group had the right to consider itself ethnically unique and entitled to write its own history. But accepting this non-universal perspective could lead to a situation in which the majority population defines itself in exactly the same manner and uses that in order to restrict the liberty of other groups.

When Professor Schlögel cautioned that we are facing something unpredictable and dangerous, I interpreted it as relating to this issue. One more time, Europe is faced with the question whether democracy will become a universalist effort or whether it will once again fall back into dividing societies into “us” and “them.” I fear that defining who belongs to society and who does not will become an increasingly dominant political parameter in Europe. The problems involving immigrants relate to the idea that individual rights constitute the basis of cultural creativity. Here, we encounter a fundamental difference between Europe and the United States. While racism certainly exists in the United States, the difference is that in the United States you are not defined as an immigrant forever. People come from so many different backgrounds and those are aspects of their identity, but they are not represented as immigrants.

As an example, Mr. Isar to me is not a non-European. He is a European whose background gives him other knowledge and perspectives than I have. But his so-called immigrant background does not indicate his political position to me. My own country Sweden by contrast defines immigrants as a separate entity into the 3rd generation. This matters particularly for “immigrants” who are artistically differentiating groups culturally is a continuation of racism in Europe, people are treated differently because they are “immigrants”
creative, because our view of progressivism tells us to include the immigrants on collective terms. This is a downward looking view because “we” give “them” the right to represent their backgrounds, whether or not they want to do so. The right to take a purely individual position belongs to everyone, regardless of background.

Another example was the Salman Rushdie affair. European politicians refused to meet him until Mary Robinson took the first step. Had established British authors like William Golding or Graham Greene faced a similar threat to their artistic liberty, politicians would have behaved differently. But Rushdie was classified as an immigrant and therefore Margaret Thatcher even half defended that he should be restricted in writing about Islam and in using Islamic symbols in fiction. This shows that Europe is hypocritical concerning the right of people with an immigrant background to freely choose their topics.

In conclusion, if the European project is based on cultural exclusivism rather than universal definitions of rights, I am not optimistic about its outcome.

Let me add four points to the debate. First, following up on Arne Ruth’s comments, people from outside Europe see the Europeans as either determinedly universalizing, but with the universal embodied in European values or differentials, arguing that cultures are essences that can never be modified by contact with others. Both are closed essentialist positions that can never meet. The ideologies of certain right-wing parties in Europe certainly fit in that dichotomy.

Secondly, the point about the Islamization of Europe made by Mr. Gehler: what is important is not only the sheer size of the Muslim population in Europe, but also the fact that diasporic flows have changed. In the past, one emigrated irrevocably, leaving the “old country” behind. Today, however, connections and interconnections with the countries of origin are maintained. Therefore the image of Europe abroad is going to be colored by the way you welcome the “new” immigrants to this continent.

Third, as regards the Barcelona process mentioned by Ms. Ahrweiler, the point is that a key rationale for the establishment of the high level commission on intercultural dialogue, which emphasizes “neighborhood” cultural issues, is partly to revive a process that has run into the ground.

Finally, on the issue of multi-polarity raised by Mr. von Weizsäcker. While the rest of the world would welcome a multi-polar world order, they may be looking at China or Japan as the source of this multi-polarity. In the eyes of some observers, Europe might not be up to this role politically and economically, but they
still recognize Europe’s cultural heritage. The paradox is that people would be ready to accept Europe as the fountainhead of culture while admitting that it is politically weak. But in this field, other parts of the world might learn something very important from Europe: how to create space for cultural diversity and how to manage it.

I’d like to say something about people’s desires for atavism in this context. We have had moments in this discussion that Sigmund Freud would have had a lot to say about, because some patterns of conduct are universal and threaten us constantly. As for myself, I notice that when discussing America I react emotionally and instinctively, and that some of my critical mechanisms stop functioning. I believe this all has to do with the phenomenon of complexity reduction.

At the moment we are seeing complexity reduction happening on such a scale on both sides of the Atlantic that I get the feeling we are at a turning point in history. We might either be—to reverse Francis Fukuyama’s thesis—at the beginning of history, in which Europe willingly enters into an age defined by new foreign enemies, thereby gaining “identity” and redefining globalization. Or, perhaps Europe will be able to bear the complexity, even under the government of Mr. X or Y, which of course is a fleeting thing. The role of culture and art is to uphold complexity and resist certain mass phenomena, or as Henrik Ibsen would have said, “against the compact majority.” For now that means not only maintaining the transatlantic dialog but intensifying it to avoid the atavism of complexity reduction. At the same time I must confess that in recent years I have not been emotionally affected by anything as much as by the drastic turns of US policy. This kind of behavior is why it is so important, and so dangerous, for Europe to take its own stand.

Finally, a few words on the instruments of cultural policy. Europe has nothing to respond as an entity to this intricate web of relations. Article 151 does provide for relations with third states, but in reality we continue to have a classic foreign cultural policy of bi-national ties, and it’s been a catastrophe. We urgently need instruments or forums to work on this, and so keep atavism at arm’s length. That is why I appeal to the men and women of the Convention to put more work into for example Article 32 of the draft constitution, which provides for “privileged relations with our European neighbors.” Who is distributing privileges here and who are our neighbors? Doesn’t the EU rather require a clear commitment to a differentiated cultural foreign policy, and aren’t the national cultural institutes important?
Europe is defined in a process of critical reflection. Europe is therefore a process and not a treaty among various parties.

I'd also like to raise a dimension of cultural policy that we might be insufficiently aware of. In a long process we have come to include many cultural products in our lives, like the Vienna coffee house or the Hungarian baths, which are both of Turkish origin. Beautiful things were quickly made our own. What we defend externally as European cultural heritage was, and still is, created by many different influences. In order to keep having such fruitful encounters, we should support exchange programs for artists and cultural good not just within Europe. The three most important key words in this context are: authenticity, diversity and exchange.

Finally, on to that big question: What is Europe's global role, and what could it be? I think a common responsibility for tomorrow, meaning sustainable policies in all fields, could unite the various aspects of a European role. We could also, as Mr. Isar has suggested, incorporate elements of the past to become stronger for the present. With our culture and science, we could continuously encourage sustainability. To be a motor for democracy, the rule of law, just environmental and social policies, pluralism and cultural diversity—I think that would be a wonderful vision for the role of Europe.

It seems to me that our discussion has progressed a little further. We have characterized European culture as a process in action and saw Europe as a possible guarantor and promoter of complexity. We have also recognized European values as values, which are at least not immediately and entirely economical. Without being satisfied, I think that we have come a little further along the way.

I would like to come back to a point raised by Mr. Isar and others. You have been speaking about the “clash of civilizations” and I must say that I am tired of Mr. Samuel P. Huntington. Mentioning him constantly, even if in a critical way,
you are contributing to the success of his theories. These theories encourage the most simplistic positions and of course it is easier to use Huntington than Charles Malamoud or others whose work on culture is more complex. When you talk about the clash of civilizations or even about the dialog of cultures, I am afraid you still espouse a very essentialist point of view. We have mentioned the problem of asymmetry, from which many problems were coming and will come in the future. But asymmetry of information has to do not only with content, but also with non-cultural values. Certain sets of information and certain ideas are promoted because they are connected to power or economic values, which are often estimated higher than other values. If you are working in the cultural field, you need to adopt a very modest technicity, i.e. you have to be precise and you have to take into account your immediate surroundings as well as what has happened in the recent past. In Europe, we often do not deal adequately with complex cultural phenomena.

By contrast, some very complex theories, dialogs and interpretations come for instance from the movimento antropofágico, the anthropophagic movement in Brazil, which was a very ambitious and polemical school of cultural criticism of the 1920s and 30s. This school of thought, in which Mario de Andrade was a leading thinker, dealt with the topic of cultural transformation and acculturation. It compared acculturation to the process of eating: in the end you cannot re-discover all the single elements you ate. It’s like alchemy; it produces another set of values, new articulations and so forth. I want to emphasize that thinkers like Mario de Andrade or Walter Mignolo and Enrique Dussel in South America, or Gitta Kapur in India provide us with better tools for thinking. This takes us back to the problem of the media. The thinkers I mentioned should be much more debated, diffused and promoted than just Mr. Huntington. And it links back to the questions of asymmetry and the non-simultaneous nature of many cultural phenomena. If you want to be Eurocentric and very conservative, you could define modernity as a one-way movement, one of invention and copy. But if you are more aware of what really happened, you will discover a very complex set of developments, which are not all super-imposable. In this vein, we cannot speak about the arrival of modernity in clearly defined temporal or geographical terms. We should better think of it as a many folded and complex phenomena it is now time to go on unfolding, thinking—and redistributing.
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European identity has to be inclusive

Many of you will have experienced the following already: You receive an E-mail informing you about a very dangerous virus and telling you to delete one of your files immediately. Of course, the letter itself is the virus, trying to make you erase something very important on your computer. The problem with globalism is similar because somehow globalism itself tells us to erase the idea of globalism as a bad one from our agendas. Instead, it tells us to define our identities in national or European terms, which are almost identical processes. This might be a very dangerous moment. I believe that you have to build a more global idea of Europe than the one embodied by our current globalism. You have to create an inclusive idea of European identity.

Mr. Isar has quoted some post-colonial theories and I think that we have to include these ideas more prominently into our discussion. It might not seem obvious as the situation in Europe involves no questions of race, but we do find ourselves in a post-colonial situation. It is a paradox that some countries believe they won the Cold War, but the other countries don’t think they lost it. For the latter, an important European experience is being completely denied and erased from European history. The chance was missed to include some values, ideas and cultural experiences into a common understanding of Europe. And the Soviet block had a lot to offer culturally, even if it failed economically. This is particularly true if we include the unofficial culture, which was also the product of socialism. In this post-colonial question, we often experience something very similar to what Mr. Ruth described with reference to immigrant artists. So often, Russian artists, just like immigrant artists, are pressed into representing Russia; Russian researchers can only talk about specifically Russian topics and Russian filmmakers are not encouraged to make films about international problems like love, death and life. Presumably, these topics are already treated by filmmakers from France or Germany and therefore we need something particularly Russian—something about your awful Russian life—to be welcome at an international film festival. These painful and subtle problems should be discussed, as they were already addressed in the American cultural discourse.

Let me tell you an anecdote to illustrate this problem of identity. A Soviet unofficial conceptual artist in the 1970s was well aware about developments in conceptual art in America and Europe, but felt absolutely isolated. He wrote a text in which he portrays himself as a member of an international geographic club. He used to be a well-known member of the club, but when he was sent to an expedition, he was forgotten. While he still sees himself as a member, he is no longer
Identity is a personal project, a personal choice and an artistic project.

Degot

going any mail from the organization. This anecdote holds three important points for our debate. First, the geographic club is open to anyone who wants to be a member and we should have a similar idea of European identity. Second, identity is a personal project, a personal choice and an artistic project. Finally, identity serves as an outsider’s identity. Being a member of an international geographical club enabled that person to say “No” to another identity, to say, “I am not Soviet. I am a member of this geographical club.” My personal identity works along the same lines. Being half-Russian and half-Jewish, I could always say, “Thank you, no Russian problems, I am Jewish.” Or “Thank you, no Jewish religious problems, I am Russian.” Now in America I sometimes say, “Thank you, I am European, I can’t drink your coffee.” And in Europe I like to say not that I am American, but that I am somehow trans-European.

First, I’d like to lend my support to Mr. Roß and his assertion that the role of European culture as seen internationally, i.e. from Latin America or Asia, long ago lost the status that many believe it still has. Knowledge about issues that we deem crucial is underdeveloped or non-existent in many of these places. It is surprising that even otherwise well-educated individuals know little about European culture.

I mentioned previously that cultural reporting in Germany enjoys a great deal of cultural magazine programs, but that the reports are becoming more and more attenuated, that many topics are covered increasingly superficially, and that some are now completely ignored. To prevent you from taking away such a negative impression, I would also like to draw your attention to a positive development that can be seen for example on the ZDF network for some years now. I am talking about the series “Hot Spot” and don’t want to hide the fact that I myself have authored some of these reports from Shanghai, Salvador, Dubai or Havana. But the fact that the ZDF network provides space for such detailed foreign cultural reports requires our hearty approval. These documentaries can open up entirely unexpected perspectives. We broaden our horizons when for example the pictures of Zwelethu Mthathwas teach us something about the township culture in South Africa that is unknown to most of us. When the Brazilian artist Marepe acquaints us with the candomblé cults of his home Bahia or when the Chinese composer Qu Xiao-song transmits a feeling for the musicality of pauses, then avenues for mutual understanding are created and tolerance is exercised unwittingly, yet maybe very effectively.

We should have more reports of this kind on our TV stations, also as a con-
Mr. Roß said Europeans are too preoccupied with themselves. I believe on the contrary that we don’t pay enough attention to ourselves. Only once we in Europe, with all our different cultures, really begin practicing unity in diversity, can we become an example for other regions, especially the Balkans.
Moving on to the dialog of cultures, which fortunately received UN support in 1999. We were particularly delighted that the initiator of his UN resolution was Iranian President Mohammed Chatami, because it opened up the Islamic world and created possibilities of supporting the forces of reform in these countries. Before the resolution, the Islamic world was always perceived as a homogeneous bloc that had no people worth supporting. 9/11 threw us backwards in these efforts. Even though I hate to disagree with Mr. von der Gablentz, it also caused the basic values of Americans and Europeans to drift apart somewhat. In a certain sense the Americans will never be completely rid of the ghosts that they conjured after World War II. We in Europe have so internalized the idea of the Marshall Plan, of promoting civil society through economic growth that we would like to use it all over the world. Yet when we define 60 states as enemies to be fought whether they have reform movements or not, then I have my doubts that the dialog of cultures that we are putting such an effort into will actually produce any results.

That can be observed in the example of Iran. In 1999, the German Bundestag opened up cooperation and advised Iran on producing legislation for women, press freedoms, and the like. Now, the reformists in these countries are taking on a siege mentality because the process hasn't brought any apparent gains. This is a point at which consensus and common interests with the United States have been severed and I would like to find a way of repairing them. This is because the approach of promoting the building up of institutions and structures was very successful in Europe and we are now also trying to duplicate this in Afghanistan. Europe has a strong interest in strengthening cultural effectiveness in preventing violence and supporting nation-building, as well as again finding a common position with the United States on this issue.

I support Ms. Griefahn's statement that Europe has to become aware of its own diversity after the fall of communism. Western Europeans simply do not know how deeply European culture is rooted in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland. In our parliamentary group, we have made a point of traveling to and experiencing these countries. It has always been a positive experience, full of new insights. To strengthen our cultural diversity, the cultural article in the European treaties should be invoked.

Secondly, we discussed Europe’s cultural role in the world. We have not, mind you, spoken of the European Union’s role in the world, because that would lead to 9/11 we have to strengthen the dialog of cultures

Europe should use its resources to prevent violence and support nation-building

Pack

the EU has no external cultural policy

115 Griefahn | Pack
Europe’s weaknesses can add up to a strength. The European Union has no external cultural policy. That means the task of transmitting European culture is individual, national or regional. The EU Treaty and budget provide only minimal possibilities for cultural relations with third countries. In the Balkans, for example, we have done nothing in the field of culture, and our achievements in education were made possible only through outside financing. The European Commission and Council of Ministers occasionally have a receptive ear for these issues but would prefer to spend their money on other things, or sometimes the money simply evaporates.

Thirdly, I have a positive example of what we are still doing to display Europe’s diversity abroad. The new program “Erasmus World,” which we would like to rename “Erasmus Mundus,” gives students from around the world the chance of earning a diploma at European universities. This excellent program could become a kind of transmission belt within the EU, but for now we are unable to make this hope reality.

We have characterized Europe here by three elements. First, Europe’s political unity that has to be expanded further. Second, a cultural identity exists but must remain diverse and imprecisely defined. Since identity is a process, this weak definition is an advantage instead of a stumbling block. Thirdly, there are familial similarities among us. We have a mutual history that was very often one of conflict but now establishes similarities, even though these are difficult to identify precisely. This connection, too, is a relatively weak, but not unimportant one.

What is important is that these three weak points add up to a strength. To picture this, imagine a table whose stability depends on its number of legs: to hold up, it needs at least three, each leg on its own won’t be enough, but together they suffice. It would be a mistake to concentrate exclusively on cultural or political or historical parallels. Our chance is to keep all three aspects in mind and therefore assure more complexity. We cannot create and maintain complexity through strong theory. On the contrary, these three weak aspects could help us to master complexity.

As a final comment I would like to agree with Mr. Roß that the international reach of our culture is not very pronounced at present. This is also a question of power, and a deficit of political unity is hampering us greatly. Our effectiveness abroad will become significantly stronger only when we approach all three elements simultaneously.
I would like to briefly break out of the corner that I, as the sole attending American, have been forced into here. My mother immigrated to the US in 1939 from Germany through Cuba. I myself came to Germany to study critical theory and the Frankfurt School. Yet in Jürgen Habermas' colloquium for doctoral candidates, we read Willard van Orman Quine and Hilary Putnam. Therefore, I am just as linguistically and culturally confused as some others around this table.

I did not expect anything else from Johano Strasser than his ideologizing of the discussion, which tolerates no irony even when it demands the same. But I was disappointed by Gottfried Wagner's presentation, which has given a very one-sided picture of complexity reduction. Of course, complexity reduction is taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, but we often overlook that even European intellectuals often work with a comic-book image of America. Take, for example, the exchange among intellectuals before the Afghanistan conflict. A remarkable group of American intellectuals, from Michael Walzer on the left to Amitai Etzioni on the right side of the spectrum, conducted a discussion concerning the circumstances under which the use of force is morally justified. This debate has a tradition in America, over the Vietnam War, in Walzer's work, and much more. Yet the letter of this rather unstable group of European professors and intellectuals that was recently published does not go into these questions at all and contains only a generalized polemic against globalization. And that, Mr. Jones, is why a uni-polar world is a myth. Our references to globalization are far too general. The pure critique of globalization is wrong because the forces propelling globalization, among them Europe and America, do have certain steering mechanisms.

As for insularity, we should first take a very differentiated view of America's insular position, because America is a profoundly ethnically diverse and open land. I say this even though I have been living in Europe for the past seventeen years and have learned to understand America better through the work of Jean Baudrillard, a European. On the other hand I object to the notion of an insular or static European tradition. Turkey has shown that this tradition cannot be static.

Finally, I think it is a huge mistake to define European cultural or political priorities against America. Even if some influences, such as our infamous defense secretary or your clumsy chancellor, are counterproductive in this sense, Europe and America remain a mutual cultural and political space. A sovereign European position requires a vision that reflects its natural political, strategic and norma-
tive alliance with America. So I want to underscore everything that Jan Roß has said, and wish only to add that the United States will certainly abolish the death penalty, though not within the coming two years of George Bush’s remaining term.

**Jones**

Mr. Smith, thank you very much indeed for that last reassuring comment. I hope equally that on a future occasion you will be able to announce that the US has joined the International Criminal Court, which would be a fundamental contribution.

Towards the end of our meeting, I would like to join Ms. Pack in striking an optimistic note against the strands of pessimism and doubt I have sensed particularly in the early part of our discussion. Europe is on the move; it stands on the eve of a most remarkable process of further integration. The challenge to the European Convention is enormous and I want to comment on the cultural underpinnings of forging a Political Union, mentioned by Mr. von Weizsäcker.

Concerning the urgent question of how we can achieve this in the constitutional treaty that will be formulated this year, I have identified four elements for the opening part of the new treaty. First of all, we should not lose the concept of forging ever-closer relations between the peoples, not just the Member States, of the Union that exists already in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Secondly, we should include the idea of learning to live together, maybe live, study and work together that was mentioned in the report of Jacques Delors. Thirdly, the formulation to protect and promote the richness of the diversity of our cultures, should constitute not only a defensive safeguard, but be also proactive and dynamic. Fourthly, there should be a reference to the 5th freedom that Delors often talked about when we were developing Erasmus and the other programmes in the 1986/87 build-up to the internal market. The four existing freedoms to move capital, services, goods and people should be expanded to include the free movement of ideas. Coupled with the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the treaty, that could give us a strong basis.

To finish, I would like to express my warmest appreciation for the most remarkable quality of interpretation I have enjoyed here, which is a fantastic example of the importance of inter-cultural communication.

**Ergüder**

I want to add to a comment by Johano Strasser on the economic impact of globalization. The social impact of globalization is extremely important, but it is neg-
lected and Europe could offer a lot to remedy this situation. In the period after the Second World War, the Bretton Woods System was established in order to manage the international economic system. But this system is in need of reform as globalization creates many insecurities, inequalities and conflicts between the haves and the have-nots, the people who have been left behind. At the moment, I believe, the international system fails to manage this process socially and economically.

I already mentioned that Islam becomes a tool for articulating those grievances. Take as an example the 9/11 pilots and look at their personal histories. They were all educated, had European exposure and became very much aware of the problems and disruptions created by globalization. It is crucial that the international system attend to this problem by creating an international welfare system.

I would like to thank you all for a remarkably lively discussion. I was particularly delighted by the many affirmations that we could learn much from one another even if we fail to find solutions for the myriad problems we mentioned. We can take comfort in Mr. Perone's words that a lack of precision in the cultural field means strength, because in this way we can be capable of coming to terms with the endless complexity and uncertainty of future developments.

The result of our first section was our agreement that culture will be an important chapter in this larger and extended Europe. Europe cannot be held together merely by the acquis communautaire and 80,000 pages of regulations, and I am glad that the role of culture in the emergence of a real European constituency, a polis and a Europe of citizens, was repeatedly expressed.

Secondly, that means that we have to make sure, in our lives and work, to make a place for culture in the reconstruction of Europe. We also heard a series of practical suggestions that can be summarized in an appeal to the Convention to listen to the voice of civil society and have policymakers take up the matter of culture. Education will play an absolutely essential role in this context.

The third part of our discussion addressed the problem of how European culture can be maintained in a world undergoing globalization of cultural developments, how it can contribute to this development and who its relevant partners are.

To conclude, I would like to return to the topic of culture in the context of transatlantic relations. Jan Roß is completely right in saying it is wrong and dangerous to allow fissures to open between Europe and the United States because we are fac-

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Europe and the US need to cooperate against radical Islam. Still, we should not take too literally the parallels between the Cold War and our opposition to radical Islam. During the Cold War there was a clearly defined antagonist. Today that rival, even though we call it radical Islam, is difficult to define and defeat, which is certainly one of the present difficulties in the transatlantic discussion. In a war against Iraq we have the “advantage” of a clearly defined, surmountable foe, but this is not the case with radical Islam. Therefore it is all the more important for our conduct towards radical Islam that divisions do not emerge on either side of the Atlantic. We will not make any progress by making accusations against each other, yet we have to be clear on how prominent the disputes over this point have become.

Are there, then, no differences between European and American culture, and consequently no specifically European cultural message? It would be helpful here to not define culture too narrowly. Culture means learning to live together. In American society, culture as the art of living together is further developed in many more ways than in Europe. Yet in terms of globalization, I see a difference in the direction America has been heading in and the road that Europe should take, in my assessment, towards a Political Union.

Learning and organizing ways of living together in an international context is called global governance. The United States does not pay much direct attention to it, for credible reasons. We have America to thank for many of postwar global institutions, such as the United Nations or the Bretton Woods System. However, with the end of the Cold War, the steadily expanding gap in power, and the Europeans’ refusal to think of anything other than the peace dividend, a disparity has emerged that cannot be allowed to continue for long. Global governance means that we have to guarantee, beginning with the United Nations, the existence of effective international institutions and that the exercise of power is not limited to the Security Council, which thinks exclusively in terms of security policy.

Together we have to pave the way for closer cooperation between the WTO and the WHO to better tackle the threat of epidemics and disease in the world. American companies have been making outstanding achievements in the field of combating AIDS by helping provide affordable medicine for those countries hit hardest by the disease. I see the Europeans’ basic role here in working systematically towards global governance also in this field. The Americans might then accuse us of weakness because we think in terms of global organizations. America, in their view, is strong enough to do without Immanuel Kant’s eternal peace. That should not distract us, however, because we want to work towards a system
of global governance together with the Americans. Yet we Europeans have a cer-
tain advantage in this field, by which I do not mean primarily our rejection of the
death penalty or even membership in the International Criminal Court, but that
we take seriously global governance and its international institutions. Ultimately,
providing a means for people to live together is the actual core of what we call law.
Law, not art, is the core of culture. As wonderful as art is, we cannot regulate global
governance with Beethoven’s 9th Symphony alone.

I would like to thank first of all you, Mr. von der Gablentz, for having led us
through this difficult web of issues. Discussions exclusively among politicians are
liable to become hindered by the participants’ respective loyalties towards special
interests, and debates among intellectuals run the risk of regarding the world in
so many intellectual facets that reaching conclusions becomes impossible. Under
your direction, a mixed circle has taken up our topics for discussion in a highly
productive manner. The Körber-Foundation also deserves our gratitude for having
chosen a genuinely excellent topic and inviting us to this stimulating discussion
in the beautiful city of Hamburg.