128th Bergedorf Round Table

Power and Rules: Elements of a “New World Order”

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SUMMARY

How can the international system be adapted to the challenges of the 21st century? Thirty-eight international experts, politicians, and journalists gathered in Wilton Park, England, to discuss “Power and Rules: Elements of a New World Order” at the 128th Bergedorf Round Table. Chaired by Richard von Weizsäcker and under the moderation of Christoph Bertram, the participants set out where the 124th Round Table on “Contours of a New World Order” left off. In that dialog, US defenders of unilateral pre-emption had engaged in heated disputes with European multilateralists. The Wilton Park session revealed that, with new security threats becoming apparent, the debate has moved onward to finding the right priorities, re-thinking alliances and new institutions, and expanding the regional focus of discourse beyond the transatlantic relationship.

The Round Table first analyzed the present situation. Are the threats posed by non-state actors and failed states fundamentally new? Are they and America’s hegemony overwhelming the traditional system of rules and institutions, based as it is on national sovereignty? Some participants regarded the US National Security Strategy as an appropriate response. Others maintained that 9/11 was not a turning point in history, and that existing rules and institutions remained fundamentally effective and the only way to achieve a peaceful international order. These voices said the US policy of pre-emption would entice other states to violate international law. Some participants considered poverty, disease, and environmental issues more urgent problems than terrorism.

The Round Table’s second part turned to the instruments of a “New World Order.” Can rules influence reality and bestow legitimacy on political actions, or are the strategies and actions themselves all that count? Is there a place for rules in a unipolar world? Substantive recommendations were put forward for reforming the UN, integrating the World Bank into UN decision-making structures, and the transatlantic relationship.

The third session addressed the contextual and geographical frontiers of a “New World Order.” It was agreed that, increasingly, national sovereignty was being encroached on throughout the world. Speakers asked whether effective models of intervention would crystallize, and how the international community could muster sufficient resources. The debate focused on convincing concepts for nation building and the proposals of Arab representatives for including the region in these efforts. Participants also laid out strategies for adapting the international system to the changing role of states like Russia and China.
I welcome you all to Wilton Park in the beautiful English countryside and thank you for having come here. Looking outside at the peaceful sheep and reading in today’s paper that foreign polo players are Britain’s main worry, one really gets the impression that the world is safe.

However, in what could be considered the first presentation of our conference, Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech yesterday presenting a different view. He spoke on threats to international security and the need to confront them. Mr. Blair’s speech put him in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson’s vow shortly before the end of World War I, to “make the world safe for democracy.” Then, as today, the question was how could political power safeguard security. A corollary question must be whether this power has the will and wisdom to define, implement, and respect basic rules.

Conferences in Wilton Park have, since 1945, worked to preserve and animate the intellectual power of democracy, and I hope that our conference on power and rules in the global order will set forth this noble tradition. Whether that succeeds or not depends in large part on Christoph Bertram, who has generously agreed to moderate our discussion.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.
I. Power and Cooperation

Thank you very much. We are grateful to be able to discuss a subject in Wilton Park which is even older than this building and which Paul Schroeder kindly accepted to introduce us to: power and rules—elements of a “New World Order.”

I would like to offer a historical perspective on the changes in the international system after the terror attacks of 9/11 and outline my understanding of the ground rules we need for global policy in the 21st century.

Important circles in the United States, including those in control of the present administration, assume that the “New World Order” hoped for at the end of the Cold War has proved an illusion. Recent history, so the argument goes, shows that a new world disorder marked by greater instability and danger has emerged instead. Failed states and rogue regimes give rise to escalating violence, ethnic cleansing and civil war. Persistent, dangerous conflicts between important states put international security at risk. Organized international terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction and secretly supported by rogue regimes pose new threats to international order.

The American government’s answer to this challenge has been the Bush doctrine. According to it, world security and order must rest on permanent, unchallengeable American military superiority. When deemed necessary, force can be used preventively to fight terrorism, stop weapons proliferation and promote democracy and free markets throughout the world. Initial actions under that doctrine have been taken in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I believe that the assumptions underlying the Bush doctrine are wrong and misleading and propose instead to go “back to the future.” I am convinced that the “New World Order” did not fail. Even though some hopes attached to it were unrealistic and bound to be disappointed, most of its important results have endured and its basic working principles are still valid. The threats that have supposedly wrecked it are not new and have been exaggerated. In any case, regardless of how grave we deem them to be, they can in the long term only be met through rules and strategies that are part of the old “New World Order.”

We need to examine which elements of this order still work and how they can be revived and applied to today’s challenges. The Bush doctrine, by contrast, has already shown that it cannot cope with even the existing threats to international security, much less those beginning to emerge. Its growing failure is already clear enough that the administration itself has started to retreat from it.
The failure of the Bush doctrine as a remedy for world disorder is best shown by the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan. The current signs of trouble there are too well known to need listing, but this appraisal would remain true even if these experiments in nation-building through armed conquest were somehow ultimately to succeed, or if the occupiers were to claim success while leaving. The Bush doctrine of using overwhelming military force to lay the basis for regime change, democratization and peace, even when implemented against two targets so ideal for the experiment in terms of their military weakness, political isolation, and general unpopularity as Iraq and Afghanistan, has already revealed such manifold risks and flaws that its further use to solve any serious problems is unthinkable. It simply does not meet a rational cost-benefit or risk-utility analysis for any of the numerous remaining trouble spots of the world.

At the same time, the threats of terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have not, in my opinion, rendered old security strategies ineffective. While history cannot tell us in absolute terms how dangerous these current threats really are, it does offer a useful basis for comparison. By that standard 9/11 was not, as so often claimed, a turning point in world history. 9/11 was a spectacular act of terrorism and a tragedy for its victims that also did considerable but temporary damage to American society and the world political and economic order. But it does not compare in concrete impact to any number of events (wars, natural disasters, civil and ethnic conflicts, etc.) in past decades and centuries, including historic terrorist activities. The nature of terrorism has also remained the same, a weapon of the weak and fragmented against enemies too powerful to attack directly.

9/11 could indeed become a historic turning point—but only if it were to be followed by many more similarly sensational acts or (more likely) through the reactions and responses of those attacked. Organized powerful governments are more able and likely to make acts like that of 9/11 historic turning points than organized terrorists can. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo was a far heavier blow to the Habsburg monarchy than 9/11 was to the United States. But only the reactions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and other countries made it a turning point in world history.

Another mistaken and dangerous assumption of the Bush administration is that the struggle against terrorism constitutes a war and places the United States and its allies in a state of war with it. It does not. The fight against terrorism is an international campaign against a certain kind of international criminal activity,
carried on mainly by governments at peace with each other and cooperating through national and international agencies. It thus fits within the framework and constraints of normal international relations. Military force plays a role, but cannot be the decisive weapon. In Afghanistan, military action was necessary and universally supported, but it is clearly not sufficient to root out terrorism. In Iraq, military action created a dangerous center of terrorism where none existed before. In most places military force cannot be the main weapon against terrorism because to use it would tear the fabric both of international relations in general and the struggle against terrorism in particular. Pakistan, for example, which for years has been a key player both in the support of terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cannot be either punished militarily for this or compelled to use its own military force in an all-out effort against terrorists because it is a sovereign state, the cooperation of its government in combating terrorism is essential, and such pressure might bring it down.

There are those who share my doubts about the Bush doctrine but may be skeptical that we can go back to the “New World Order” of the 1980s. Can this “old New World Order” fit a world so changed, violent and apparently chaotic as that of today?

I think that it can, because at the end of the Cold War the prospect of a more peaceful and cooperative world order really did emerge. This was not just a euphoria quickly dashed by grim reality. The concept of a “New World Order” reflected genuine, profound changes in international politics. Over the last five centuries of international politics the major powers always expected that some vital issues sooner or later would lead them to a major war with rival powers and saw war as an inevitable aspect of international relations.

This basic outlook and assumption has changed with the end of the Cold War, and that change has endured. As far as I can see, no major power today acts on the assumption that it is bound sooner or later to go to war with another major power. Even countries with serious ongoing conflicts like India and Pakistan no longer consider war as inevitable.

This new situation is due to profound changes in international relations that were underway for centuries and rapidly accelerated in recent times. First, the utility of major war as a tool of statecraft has declined and its risks and costs have risen. Second, growing trade makes the survival of states less dependent on military power than on economic success. Third, globalization has brought about an exponential increase in the volume, speed, intensity and interconnectedness of
transactions and communications all over the world. Fourth, the number and variety of international actors have increased dramatically, now including, along with states, international organizations, NGOs, multi-national corporations, pressure groups and the like. One might add as a fifth change the emergence of a wide consensus that liberal representative democracy and market economy are the only legitimate and beneficial models for organizing societies. Even the Bush doctrine rejects only the first of these arguments on the declining utility of war, while endorsing the others.

Some examples show that the “old New World Order” has successfully mastered concrete challenges. Thus, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq proves that conventional means such as international sanctions can work for purposes of deterrence and containment even against ugly regimes like Saddam Hussein’s. This issue was the crux of the divisions at the UN, on it the decision for war was taken. Today we have to admit that it would not have been necessary for purposes of effectively containing the military threat from Iraq to abandon conventional strategies of containment under international authority, that is, the strategies of the “old New World Order.”

A second main reason for invading Iraq was the American claim that overthrowing Saddam by military force would transform the whole region, spreading democracy and civil rights throughout the so-called Greater Middle East. Today even the American government has abandoned or drastically revised that sanguine promise and has evidently changed its tactics and methods for achieving the goal. It now seeks the help of its G8 partners in a new campaign to promote democracy and civil rights in the region which, according to the New York Times, is based loosely on the Helsinki Accords of 1975—a return to the early formative stages of the “New World Order.”

Another feature of the “old New World Order” I consider central for solving today’s problems is the vital role the principles of association and exclusion played in it. To be sure, the use of military force and international sanctions against overt aggression and ongoing ethnic cleansing was an option within this framework, as the first Gulf War and the NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrate. But the main methods used for changing state behavior were the carrot of rewarding cooperative regimes with association in international institutions and their attendant benefits and the stick of punishing uncooperative ones with exclusion. Never has this time-honored principle of international politics been applied as thoroughly, successfully and durably as in recent decades. It not only helped end the
Cold War, but proved successful in the expansion of NATO and the European Union and in meeting China’s quest for a most favored nation status and admission to the WTO. This “old New World Order” principle of association and exclusion is currently being used for dealing with conflicts in Cyprus and problems with Libya, Iran and North Korea. Even the USA is being drawn more or less willingly into these efforts.

I do not claim, of course, that simply returning to the 1980s to pick up there the needed rules for a “New World Order” will meet all threats to international security. My outlook on international politics is in fact skeptical rather than optimistic. But while being fully aware of the dangers of utopian idealism, I am even more convinced that utopian Machtpolitik, the belief that given enough power resolutely applied one can do almost anything and get away with almost anything, has been far more prevalent and dangerous over the course of history. This deepens my conviction that we need not and should not try to devise a “new New World Order” from scratch. Centuries of slow, uneven and incredibly costly developments have bequeathed us a working international system with a great body of rules, norms, conventions, institutions and shared practices for managing international problems. It still works badly and needs reform and development in many ways, not simply because it is out of date or because criminals attack it, but especially because those that most benefit from it skew, manipulate and exploit it. Yet it is the only system we have. Its destruction would have incalculable and horrendous consequences. We need to use, develop and reform it to have a viable present and future.

A final note of warning: Those who defend the Bush administration’s stand on world policy, which has been given a variety of names (“consultative unilateralism,” “instrumental multilateralism,” “internationalism à la carte,” etc.) may insist that it does not ignore or discard the prevailing international system and its rules, but simply recognizes that these do not meet all current problems and that the United States cannot sacrifice its vital interests to them. Some have even suggested that this international system will remain as a fall-back position for the United States should its unilateral ventures fail or should its current world dominance cease with the rise of new world powers such as China.

Let me put this starkly. It is sheer folly and naked hubris to suppose that if the United States by its unilateral actions repeatedly defies and effectively undermines the essential rules of the international system, that system will still remain in existence in a sort of limbo, as a resource the United States or other countries can
call upon in case of need. That particular error has been made many times in history, often with tragic consequences. Once a state has wrecked a prevailing system of rules, expectations, norms and practices for the sake of its particular ends; once the ethos and incentives structure behind that system have been rendered inoperative; then even the most powerful force and the cleverest policy may not be able to restore it and make it work again. Bismarck tried this. The “white revolutionary” of the 1860’s, once his goals had been achieved by power politics, tried to restore the sated pacific conservatism of the Vienna era. He was vastly more skillful and flexible than those in charge of policy in Washington or other capitals today, yet even he finally failed, ran out of expedients.

The current world international system has proved itself remarkably durable and resilient, but it is not indestructible. Once wrecked, it will prove at best difficult and terribly expensive to restore. Hence my advice is not merely, “Use it,” but “Use it—or lose it.”

Bertram

Thank you very much for this thoughtful and inspiring presentation running against the grain of most public and international discussion. While Tony Blair reminded us yesterday to relentlessly fight the mortal danger of a new kind of terrorism, you depicted a basically functioning international system providing, by and large, the necessary security. We are now looking forward to hearing Pauline Neville-Jones.

Neville-Jones

Our topic emphasizes the question whether the existing system of rules must be changed or reformed, thus assuming that rules are the key element in guiding international relations. While I agree that rules are helpful, some of them even essential, I think they can also get in the way of intelligent debate about what to actually do to master political challenges. I will therefore argue that two other concepts, legitimacy and policies, are at least as important for governing international politics and building a stable order. Let me start, though, with assessing the current state of affairs and the main challenges of our international system.

Paul Schroeder rightly pointed to the assumptions lying behind the ongoing discussion about a “New World Order.” First, 9/11 and the Iraq conflict changed the world and put some of the hitherto accepted precepts of international politics under challenge. Second, the order that prevailed before 9/11 was more desirable than the one we have today and we should return to it, if possible. And third, the framework now prevailing is inadequate and has to be changed. Mr. Schroeder
called into question two of these assumptions. Not a lot has changed, he said, since
the secular trend of eliminating war between states is untouched by 9/11. There-
fore, the precepts by which we have been guided since the 1990s are still adequate.
I go along with that to some extent, as the major powers today are indeed no
longer assuming they will sooner or later wage war against each other.

But my analysis differs from Mr. Schroeder’s in one central point. What we
have to deal with today is not conflicts between states. The Bush doctrine intro-
duces military force as a means of coping with quite a different threat, which is
the emergence of new international actors and asymmetric warfare. This kind of
terrorism is indeed a fundamentally new method of the weak to use against the
soft underbelly of the strong. Terrorism is not only a direct threat to the West, but
even more dangerous through the turmoil it might unleash in the Islamic world.
Ultimately, terrorism can make life in Western societies extremely uncomfortable,
but it will not bring us down. It certainly can, though, bring down regimes in the
Islamic world. Islamic fundamentalists are the people really engaged in regime
change, and it is they who are out to upset the existing world order. We ignore
this threat to stability and to our economic and political interests at our peril.
Particularly in the Gulf region, we are faced with a pre-revolutionary situation,
regimes there will go down if they are not helped. The fall of the House of Saud
will make the present state in Iran look like a ladies’ tea party, and it will have the
profoundest repercussions all around the world.

To deal with the challenge of terrorism, we have to go beyond the weapons
that have supposedly made the West strong. The Bush Doctrine seems to me right
in stating that combating those who challenge our authority may ultimately have
to entail a new definition of when to use force. I think we need to rethink the right
to self-defense and to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Adapting these norms
to the current situation will lead us to a new concept of sovereignty.

Going beyond the traditional understanding of sovereignty is already widely
accepted for interventions on humanitarian grounds. The intervention in Kosovo
was conducted without a UN resolution to back it. Our liberal conscience accepts
that human rights ultimately outweigh territorial sovereignty.

In a similar way, the concept of sovereignty must change in the face of asym-
metric warfare. The right of states to use force to defend themselves has always
been accepted and is embedded in Chapter 7, Article 51, of the UN Charter. But
nowadays, we need a new definition of self-defense. Before and during the Cold
War, visible threats to our homelands were launched by fully constituted author-

Asymmetrical warfare is a fundamentally new method of the weak to use against the soft underbelly of the strong.
Neville-Jones

Unprecedented challenge:
asymmetric threats by non-state actors

Today’s threats demand …
… new concepts of sovereignty …
… and a new definition of self-defense
ities. Today, terrorists operating from failed states, without formal territorial authority and without visible grievances to negotiate about, pose invisible, asymmetric threats. There are thus good arguments for a forward view of the right of self-defense. Territorial sovereignty has become a dogma in the case of failed states which cannot fulfil the obligation to offer their neighbours the necessary protection. Therefore, we have a right and a duty to intervene in their affairs. But even though the right to defend ourselves might be widely accepted, the difficulty is determining the moment to use force. This is one of the really serious issues dividing people of honest opinion and good faith. Personally, I am convinced that you cannot wait for disaster to come at you before you have a right to take pre-emptive action. To my mind, one of the central tasks is to think about and try to build a consensus on when exactly it is legitimate to use force.

All this does not mean, though, that we have to first rebuild our system of international rules. Rules can help us to decide on the necessary actions, but gaining legitimacy and developing viable policies is much more important. The quarrel about whether the rules were obeyed in the case of Iraq has lead to nothing except bedevilling of the transatlantic debate. Rules will not help, either, to convince other countries of the legitimacy of the West’s political projects.

Let me come to legitimacy first. Legitimacy, based on a consensus as broad as possible, is the basic precondition of acting efficiently in international politics. It is, though, essentially a political notion, certainly backed by rules but not only rule-based. The Kosovo intervention was my first example of how the international community agreed to changing the traditional concept of national sovereignty to protect human rights. The key to success was that the intervention was widely considered legitimate—even though it did not fit the whole panoply of international rules.

To acquire legitimacy, policies for concrete problems capable of commanding consent are instrumental. Let me therefore end with a few policies that might be useful to address some of today’s problems. First, we need to promote change, reform and modernization outside the Western camp as a means of preventing terrorism and revolutions provoked by dissident forces. To achieve that, we must no longer concentrate exclusively on sanctions. We need less punishment, and more seduction—let us have a bit of tough love. Keeping failed states or uncooperative states continuously out in the cold does not bring about reforms. Europe has realized very well recently that Libya is making some first steps to come in from the cold and has tried to encourage that.
The US sees matters differently, and it has a point, too. Encouraging reform, of course, is not enough as long as it is not based on the power and capacity to intervene militarily. I think Europeans need to recognize the necessity of military power as much as the Americans need to comprehend that power alone is not sufficient. Kofi Annan recently spoke about the potency of diplomacy backed by the threat of the use of force.

To coordinate the efforts of the Western camp, I suggest leaning on the mechanisms used to run the world during the Cold War. The classic steering mechanism of the West then was NATO, and within NATO the coordinated action of a few countries. Those mechanisms enabled the Western countries to stick together inside the UN Security Council. I do think we need these mechanisms as much as ever.

Therefore, I deeply regret that the arguments raging around the intervention in Iraq were essentially cross-Atlantic. They engaged the Western camp and caused a split among allies who had hitherto been responsible for the management of international affairs. The rest of the world remained interested observers taking sides if they wanted. We need to stop these quarrels inside the Western camp. As Mr. Schroeder said, the Bush administration is beginning to learn about the virtues of cooperation. But still, an effort by the US and by the Europeans will be necessary to rebuild the transatlantic relationship, which, to me, still is the basis for any successful management of international politics. I do not want to see the UK play the role of the bridge between the US and Europe, though. Bridges tend to become pontoons that sink. The British have a useful role to play in rebuilding the consensus, but they need to operate from a European base.

My last suggestion is to take up some of the steam behind the desire to reform the UN Charter. One of the Charter’s major drawbacks is its focus on the relationship between sovereign member states. Even though it deals extensively with the rights of sovereign states and conflicts between them, it neglects the question of how states should behave internally and how this can be made into a legal obligation vis-à-vis the international community. The UN Charter should therefore be amended to include the obligations of states to respect individual rights. What the Bush administration says about Helsinki contains a grain of truth in emphasizing the duties of states to their citizens and applying rewards and penalties to those states who fail to observe those duties. Reforming the UN Charter might help generate some international consensus about how to deal with them, eventually including the use of force.
I would like to focus on the changing role of sovereignty which Ms. Neville-Jones raised very appropriately. The principles and practices of sovereignty which our international system is based on have always been much more imperfect than people realized. But today we have come to recognize that in large parts of the world, domestic governance as a central aspect of sovereignty is not working and will not work anytime in the near future. It is a sad reality of the post-colonial era after World War II that only a minority of the states that gained sovereignty are able to govern effectively. During the last 30 years, the situation has deteriorated in much of sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Latin America and in parts of Asia.

I think the problem lies even deeper than the one Mrs. Neville-Jones described. Intrusion in nation states' domestic affairs to secure religious toleration and minority rights is not, as she supposed, a historically new phenomenon. It can be found in the Balkans in the 19th century or in the minority treaties that followed the First World War. Clemenceau in conveying the minority treaty to Poland after World War I, stated that it is a conventional practice of Europe to stipulate how minorities should be treated when territory changes hand. What is new today is that we have to build up governing structures in badly functioning polities, which will not be able to develop effective domestic governance on an indigenous basis.

I find it very difficult to disagree in theory with Mr. Schroeder's statement that our international system is the best system available to meet today's challenges. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I would therefore like to assess the performance of the UN, NATO and the EU in the past few years.

The UN clearly was not equal to the challenge of the Iraq crisis. Even though lack of political will can never be compensated by rules, I think that inadequate rules also play a part. The present UN structure, including the composition of the Security Council, can sometimes be a temptation to members to sit back and resign themselves, for procedural and other reasons, to inaction as the only option.

NATO has not done much better. After 9/11, it was very quick to invoke the collective self-defense provisions of Article 5, but then immediately went back to business as usual. As a forum for consultation between equal partners, it did not play a great role. It is not just a question of the US trying to use NATO as a tool box or replace it by coalitions of the willing. The transatlantic partners need to rethink the role of NATO and perhaps agree on a new Transatlantic Charter.
The European Union did not act very impressively, either. You can say whatever you want about the “Bush doctrine”, but at least the US had a doctrine - Europe did not. The EU is only now trying to formulate a strategy for dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and terrorism. To sum up, my analysis of the existing international system in terms of its performance is pretty bleak.

As a natural conciliator, I would like to bring together Paul Schroeder’s views with those of his opponents. Mr. Schroeder’s outstanding book “The Transformation of European Politics” describes how in a process of civilization international rules of warfare, diplomacy and cooperation are developed. I think that this secular development towards a “New World Order” is disrupted in irregular intervals by challenges to the legitimacy of the international system and by new techniques of warfare. Napoleon, the two World Wars and the totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century are examples for such ruptures. The crucial question is whether the process of civilizing international relations or the drama interrupting this process time and again will prevail in the end.

Today’s drama is that globalization produces its own counter-effects, leading those who feel excluded to adopt fundamentalism, and giving them access to weapons of mass destruction. The significance of 9/11 as a potential turning point of world history lies in hinting at this prospect, as did the Aum sect’s gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The progressive inclusion of Russia or China into the international system will intensify the feeling of exclusion of those still left out. Fundamentalist terrorism thus has an unprecedented potential of harming the process of civilizing international relations.

What emerges from what was said is that while international rules have made the world of states and relations between them today safer than ever, states control less and less of the space from which violence emanates.

I agree with Paul Schroeder that the biggest danger of 9/11 is to overreact because we think it demands a change much more fundamental than it actually does. The attacks, tragic as they were, were not a world-altering event. Nevertheless, Pierre Hassner rightly referred to their potential to become one. 9/11 was a warning shot indicating a fundamentally new threat to the international system. What if the terrorists had used weapons of mass destruction? Given the proliferation by Paki-
stan and North Korea that we know about, this is a very real danger that must be addressed urgently.

Failing states require us to adjust our concept of sovereignty. But I disagree with Stephen Krasner that we are facing a new phenomenon, in that many states have been failing to establish effective domestic governance for a long time. It is just because the spill-over effects affect us directly that we are now more worried about those states than we used to be.

I want to make a case for talking about rules instead of, as Pauline Neville-Jones suggested, policies. Our international system is unipolar, with the US as sole superpower. The balance of power theory, though, postulates that the checks and balances of a multipolar system would serve international security better than unipolarity. I think that we should consider seriously whether a system with different centers of power counterbalancing each other might not be an alternative which provides more stability. If so, we need to discuss which rules of the international system foster multipolarity, instead of developing policies for a unipolar system.

Paul Schroeder is right in emphasizing that we are not at a historical turning point where the international system’s basic rules are up for grabs. In the past, there were such moments, mostly after great wars had broken apart the old order. New rules for the interaction of great powers and for preventing war were devised then. Today, as Paul Schroeder said, great power relations are not the main problem, and war between great powers is no longer imminent. We have created an international order generating more physical security and more wealth than any other in history. Therefore, we should be conservative in the sense of identifying and preserving the core elements of a system which represents decades of innovations.

But I also think that we have to deal with the new phenomenon of the privatization of war. Small groups of intelligent, determined and resourceful people today can acquire violence capability of a magnitude that previously only a few states commanded. As Robert Cooper says in “The Breaking of Nations,” the 9/11 terrorists constitute 0.000001 percent of humanity. In the future, even smaller groups will acquire even greater violence capabilities. Donald Rumsfeld was right in directing our attention to the dangers he termed “unknown unknowns—things we don’t know we don’t know.” Terrorist groups, which we do not know about, could acquire weapons we do not think they could ever get access to, and attack...
us at a moment’s notice. All mature democratic societies really really need to worry about that.

Therefore I agree with Steve Krasner that we need to put more emphasis on building societies governed by the rule of law and accountable governments. It is from failed states that terrorists emerge. You may build stable societies by transforming failed states into functioning nation-states through ambitious collective efforts. But you may as well, as Niall Ferguson and Robert Rockberg have argued, conclude that the nation-state is an inappropriate institution for large parts of the world. Maybe, Woodrow Wilson’s vision that every people should have its nation-state is flawed. Instead, many societies would have to be governed by mandates and other kinds of supervisory mechanisms. In either way, we need to find new ways to create stability and establish the rule of law in failing states.

Are we not too fast in extrapolating 9/11 into the nuclear age? I doubt that terrorist groups can really threaten today’s very powerful nation states. As Gerald Chan said, the United States is the sole superpower, and it can crack all sorts of nuts very easily.

We lack appropriate language to analyze the current world situation. Our notions only describe parts of the reality. The term unipolarity, for example, catches the overwhelming military power of the US. But it does not adequately describe the distribution of power in the OECD-world, embodying the vision described in Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The OECD members who adopt the “Kantian triangle,” as Bruce Russett put it, of economic interdependence, strong institutions and liberal democracy, do not live in a unipolar world. Neither is there unipolarity in the world of failed states that Stephen Krasner described.

To describe the current state of the world more accurately, two German terms come to mind, Unübersichtlichkeit, complexity, and Ungleichzeitigkeit, non-simultaneity. The distribution of power is complex and varies across different fields. I would object to giving a uniform assessment.

An optimist thinks that he lives in the best of all possible worlds, and a pessimist is afraid that the optimist might be right. There are no more pessimists in Russia, because they all moved to the UK buying soccer clubs. Therefore I, as a Russian must be optimistic about the state of the international system. I am indeed, for several reasons.
Almost all centers of power have accepted globalization …

… and the US as sole super-power acts responsibly

A harmonious concert of powers on the global stage?

Never have there been fewer contradictions between the major centers of power. All of them have accepted the universal principles of globalization, with the possible exception of the world of Islam. Therefore, the probability of war between major powers is minimal, especially since these powers all have nuclear weapons.

I am optimistic also because the distribution of power is moving in the right direction. The US as sole super-power determines and tackles the major challenges quite adequately, but at the same time is not omnipotent, as Iraq shows. America probably does not even want to take on the whole responsibility for global governance, because it would then lose its freedom of action. Also, economic development will change the role of the US. According to all major forecasts, the fastest growing economies in the 21st century will be Brazil, Russia, India, and China. By the year 2050 the Chinese economy will be the largest in the world, America will be second, India third, Japan fourth, and Russia will compete with Brazil for the fifth place. Europe, united or divided, will also be one of the major centers of power.

Thus, a more balanced international system will emerge. Something akin to the European concert of powers of the 19th century will be played on the global stage, with one performer playing more solos than the others. This can turn into a harmonious symphony that I have nothing to object to. If Robert Kagan is right in saying that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, Russia sees itself on planet Earth. Our country cannot be integrated into transatlantic or European structures, because we are too big and too Russian. There is a growing understanding among Russian politicians that we are doomed to remain an independent center of power.

As much as I agree with Paul Schroeder that our international system is not broken, as much I agree with Pauline Neville-Jones, the transatlantic rift seriously hampers the system’s functioning and must thus be mended. It accounts for the failure of international institutions which Thomas Matussek spoke about. The UN as a collection of nation-states cannot possibly be effective when the states are not in agreement. We saw that during the entire period of the Cold War as well as during the Iraqi crisis. But as soon as there is a consensus, the UN can be very effective.

We need a transatlantic consensus because the US, apart from its military superiority, cannot go very far in any other direction alone. It can certainly not
deal with the area which we have been talking about and which Brzezinski calls the “global Balkans.” To deal with this source of terrorism and violence threatening our societies, we need not new rules, but a concerted transatlantic effort.

Like Pauline Neville-Jones, I tend to be rather skeptical of rules. As long as the transatlantic consensus was working, we did not argue over rules or legitimacy. Our rule was that we agreed about the values we stood for and the model of society we wanted to promote.

I am also skeptical about interpreting the Bush doctrine of pre-emption as a new system of rules. It was written very much with Iraq in mind. Now that Iraq is behind us, I doubt that the doctrine will have a very active and long life. We should be equally careful about making the doctrine of limited sovereignty a universal principle, even though it might fit some of our current problems. As every challenge is specific, there will never be a set of rules giving the right answers to all of them.

Paul Schroeder made a very elegant argument in favor of the “old New World Order,” pointing out that its structures are still suited for mastering today’s challenges. I would like to focus not so much on the structures of the system, but on why we perceive the old system as being different from what we have today.

We have had major transatlantic disputes for decades. I do not have to remind you how inimical these discussions, for example about installing middle range missiles in Europe, were during the early 1980s.

I think what makes us so uneasy about the current rift are three perceived changes. First, the end of the Cold War has made Europe feel less dependent on the United States in security matters. Second, 9/11 has not created a new strategic challenge, because no weapons of mass destruction were involved. Such threat scenarios that have been invoked as reasons to go to war against terrorism and states hosting terrorist organizations have, to date, proven wrong. But it has created an awareness that open societies are no longer challenged by states, but by asymmetric threats and, as Mr. Ikenberry said, the privatization of war. And we have not yet defined an adequate response to this new challenge. Third, the US is perceived by other governments and societies as having changed its ways. For many decades, America has defined and pursued its own interests. But today it seems that it has changed from a benevolent super-power into a rather paternalistic rule-maker. This, to my mind, is the psychological background to the transatlantic rift.

Schaefer

Today we perceive the international system as different …

… because of Europe’s independence, asymmetric threats, and US-unilateralism
Here, Pauline Neville-Jones' preference for policies over of rules comes into play. I think that there is no need for new legal frameworks. But we need to develop policies that guarantee legitimacy when moving within the context of the existing legal norms created over the past 50 years. For example, Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for individual or collective self-defense against immediate threats. We have to find a definition of immediacy suited to today's challenges to allow legitimate actions within the existing framework of norms.

Paul Schroeder is too optimistic in thinking that recent changes in US policy reflect changes of attitude on the part of key administration officials. If the situation turns better in Afghanistan or Iraq, they will continue to pursue their basic beliefs reflected in the National Security Strategy. Some people hope that after a possible Bush re-election, there will be a different team in key positions that will be more open to multilateralism. But almost certainly, Secretary of State Powell, who was a chief advocate of a more international policy, even though with at best limited success, will leave the administration.

Because a fundamental change in the US policy is unlikely, I think the European Union must establish real military power. The Rapid Reaction Force was scheduled to be operative in 2003. It is high time to implement this plan, because there will continue to be a need for intervention, whether in Haiti, Sierra Leone or Chad. As long as the Europeans can only deploy a headquarters and no effective forces, their role vis à vis the US in determining the course of action will remain marginal.

9/11 certainly was a wake-up call for the United States, but I agree with Paul Schroeder that we should hesitate to call it a turning point. I believe that the end of the Cold War started a transitional period which we are still in today. New rules of the game have not yet been set.

New rules will have to cope with two revolutions we have witnessed during the last two decades. The technological revolution will no doubt have an impact on the nature of war. In addition, television now influences decisions much more than before. Equally importantly, future conflicts will no longer occur between states but between organizations and states. The fact that these non-state actors are motivated by ideological and religious factors to an extent hitherto unknown makes it much harder to bring about an end to a war. Also, containment and deter-rents no longer provide sufficient answers to conflicts. This will not only require...
developing new policies, but also reforming the international system and interna-
tional law.

I am glad that Paul Schroeder convincingly put 9/11 in a historical context. What
must be put into context, too, are asymmetrical threats by non-state entities. Frankly, I think they are being exaggerated. Non-state entities have existed in the
developing world for centuries. They played a role in the Cold War, and, during
the past fifty years, affected American interests mainly in Latin America.

Al Qaeda, however, was an exceptional case, a historically unprecedented
phenomenon. It is the first non-state entity striving to rule the world and not only
fighting for national interests, or specific geographical gains. But its views are not
shared by the majority of Muslims and even some extremists see Al Qaeda as
something unusual and unacceptable. We should also remember within which
historical context Al Qaeda was created: it is a leftover of the Cold War, created in
Afghanistan and supported by the US, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. And even
if some say they did not create Al Qaeda, then, at least, they allowed it to be cre-
ated with their approval, to say the least. It has become a problem only once it
started to fight against the US. Let us not forget, though, that Al Qaeda and the
“returnees from Afghanistan” inflicted massive destruction in a major Arabic state,
namely Egypt, before attacking US goals.

Al Qaeda is not only exceptional in the sense that they are outsiders in the
Muslim world. I also think they are singular, because no non state-entity of similar
magnitude will emerge within the foreseeable future. There are many examples
from the region to support that.

During the Cold war, Al Qaeda was slowly taking over Somalia, Yemen and
Afghanistan and nobody did anything against it—on the contrary, the Western
world helped in the build-up of the organization. But now that the Soviet Union
has disappeared, Al Qaeda is deliberately enlarged into the first embodiment of a
structurally new threat because the US needs a new enemy. But Al Qaeda remains
an exception in the Arab world, as most people reject its principles. The United
States’ effort to combine the war against terrorism with the democratization of
the Middle East is in fact disrupting the few promising democratization processes
in the region, because the US entirely lacks credibility among the Arab peoples.

Could Al Qaeda not represent a trend? How can you be sure that today’s circum-
stances will not breed similar organizations again?
Alnajjar

Al Qaeda will not have any successors

Because only the support of the US and regional powers during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan allowed Bin Laden to create an organization of that magnitude. Other terrorist groups lack the facilities of Al Qaeda and its resources to go international. They will only acquire the power to inflict damage within the limits of individual countries.

Guttenberg

9/11 was a turning point

I quietly disagree with Paul Schroeder's argument that 9/11 was not a turning point in history. One can find differing interpretations both in the US and the so-called “Greater Middle East.” There mere fact that the Americans are devising reforms based on the concept of a “Greater Middle East” shows how profound the effects of the 9/11 attacks really were.

Secondly, we should pay more attention to threat perceptions in the various parts of the world. An abstractly perceived threat prompts completely different reactions than does the sense of vulnerability that follows a real attack. Europe and the United States, then, are perceiving the threat in very different ways, and therefore have almost no choice than to react differently.

We should recognize the varying interests as reality in a broader sense as well. After the fall of bipolarity, desirable as it might have been, interests and perceptions no longer have to be identical, especially in the transatlantic relationship. Germany and the Europeans are often much too bashful to speak about these differences—although France might be an exception in that regard. On the other hand, I think that the bridging role that Mrs. Neville-Jones mentioned earlier would be an attractive option both for the UK and Germany, and should be seriously considered.

Glees

Policy-makers should dare to use their power …

Our opening statements, interestingly, reflected the core opposition between “the philosopher’s approach” to this problem and “the approach of the king”—as described by the great philosopher Immanuel Kant. The philosopher's line has been put forward today by Paul Schroeder, that of the king—or the high policy-maker—by Pauline Neville-Jones. Both views were advocated brilliantly. Nevertheless, I tend to follow Kant in concluding that in the end, policy-makers should be people with power, who understand how to use it, rather than behave like academics, whose intellectual sensitivities cause them, in the end, to shy away from its possibilities.

Mr. Schroeder implicitly expressed the view that the world would be safer without Bush and Blair. I was amazed to hear this and I think he could not be more
wrong. Even if both have made mistakes, both have attempted to use their un- doubted power to impose peacefulness and democracy in the interests of making a better and safer world. 9/11 was an attack on an America which had withdrawn itself from acting in the world, the more bitter for having been unprovoked—and unimagined. But it was also an attack on the West in its European context, one which was so much at ease with itself that it made its people vulnerable to attack, and had lacked the courage to confront terrorism head on. Had Bush and Blair allowed UN resolutions to be overruled, Europe might have been content. But would the world, in the longer run, have become a safer place as a result? I doubt it. It is appalling that it should be so, but sometimes a show of resolve and armed power can generate a new beginning. Let us hope it will be so in Iraq.

Tony Blair decided in practice, if not in theory, to make Iraq’s alleged continued possession of weapons of mass destruction the main reason for fighting. It is certain that British intelligence but also that of other states believed there was a clear and present threat that Iraq possessed these weapons and would use them. But leaving this question to one side, intervention was important for other reasons. Professor Schroeder’s assertion that the sanctions against Iraq were “working” seems peculiar when seen through the lens of human rights. Those sanctions prevented thousands of Iraqi babies from being born or from growing into adulthood. The “oil for food” programs were benefiting the Iraqi leadership, not the Iraqi people. This failure was producing a humanitarian disaster but we in Europe never had a problem with these deaths. We liked to turn a blind eye to the terrible human rights abuses practiced in Iraq. Yet we were quick enough to protest against the armed intervention which stood a good chance of bringing them to an end. I fear that sanctions only managed to salve the conscience of those who were afraid to take their jackets off and get on with the work of removing a fascist dictator who would have liked nothing better than to carry on defying international wishes, giving way on details in order to protect his grand design for the whole Middle East.

Similarly, I object to the observation that, in theory, occupation can not achieve beneficial regime change. This is, I think, contradicted by historical examples. The success of the Federal Republic of Germany proves that occupation can lead to the establishment of liberal democratic regimes. It cannot be certain that this will happen in Iraq. But not to attempt it because the risk of failure is too great would be worse than attempting it and failing. To do nothing is always more dangerous than doing something, even if it is incomplete. The America of Bill Clinton
was, in essence, an isolationist America. The dangers that this would produce are far more severe than those that will inevitably accompany the interventionist America constructed by George W Bush. This is a harsh message and it required an attack on American soil, for the first time in almost two hundred years, for it to be heeded. If it is not made to work, at least partially, in Iraq, the future looks grim indeed. To have done nothing would have sent the enemies of the West the clearest message to date that we have stopped wanting to protect our values and our democracy. Europe must stay close to American aims, however difficult it may be to do so. The French and German position may, indeed, have made war more likely rather than less.

Hesse

Post-war Germany and Iraq cannot be compared

I very much doubt that post-war Germany can be compared to what is happening in Iraq right now in the way Mr. Glees suggested. Let me put it a bit sarcastically: Germany was a democratically organized, though perhaps “failing” state before the Nazi rule, and it became a democratic state after 1945 that could build on the traditions of democracy. Iraq was a horribly despotic—but certainly not a “failed” state—under Saddam’s rule; and it is pretty much a failing state now. Let us hope we can prevent that from getting out of hand.

But I want to focus on something else, a contradiction I see in Paul Schroeder’s presentation. While you have said that 9/11 was not a turning point in world history, your whole presentation is proof that it indeed was a turning point because it changed the agenda. The terrorist attacks might not have changed world history materially. Even privatized warfare and violence markets are not that new. A world map of conflicts including non-state actors, published in a magazine I edited in 1994, did not look much different from what it would now. But 9/11 was a turning point not only because it was the first historical event happening simultaneously on TV screens in every household from Burma to Illinois. More importantly, it changed our agenda: we do now have different approaches to the proliferation of weapons and to international hotspots.

The new doctrine of regime change, though, might turn out to be an incentive to the wrong sort of people. To put it provocatively, if I was a war lord, I would now challenge my government to make the US stage an intervention and put me in the place of the crooks hitherto in charge. Take Haiti as an example.

Another danger of the new agenda is that it continues to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction on a very superficial level. Singling out the haves and have-nots is not enough; guaranteeing access to “peaceful use of Atomic en-
nergy” seems to be a double-edged sword. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the international legal mechanisms which apparently are not working. The proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Quadeer Khan is the most prominent example, but others will follow soon. Here, the problems lie at the level of the state. I am sure that the connection was supported by the secret service and large parts of the government.

It is comparatively good news that we can address these problems at the state level, as governments and their agencies are easier to handle than non-state actors. But by dealing with this question only as a security issue, we reach some dubious conclusions. We should be very careful when prescribing these states how to behave internally. Apart from the fact that we may not have the right concepts, it strikes me as terribly arrogant to say: “Be like us or we will put a mandate on you.” Because this will produce more problems than it solves, we should rather follow the path of negotiating conflicts.

Another point I’d wish to make: We will always have the problem of applying double standards; for instance when dealing with despots which we need as partners or anchors of stability. We will apply them towards Pakistan because we do not want the country to implode. The same is true for Saudi Arabia. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it is fair to say that Western countries, and Germany especially, will always follow certain historical, moral and political obligations that might strike other actors as “unbalanced.” Here, the important thing is not to pretend you are following the path of “eternal righteousness,” but, yes, you are applying double standards for very clear reasons, and you are candid about it. That is what it takes for people to believe you. To implement a policy of double standards without loosening our partners in the world seems to me the major challenge for establishing a cooperative world order. Bill Clinton pointed to this shortly after 9/11 when postulating that the US must “make more partners and fewer terrorists.” I think at this point, the West is making less partners and that might lead to more terrorists.

I would like to follow up on Mr. Hesse’s remarks on the need for partners. The main obstacle to achieving a cooperative world order is the marginalization and exclusion of many peoples around the world. We assume that potentially dangerous non-state actors constitute a very small group which we can eliminate once we find the right military approach. But, as Christoph Bertram said, Al Qaeda will be followed by similar organizations as long as we do not tackle the underlying structural problems.
Most of the world, especially the South, feels excluded from the international decision-making processes. The US demands, for example, the assistance of Kenya or Tanzania in fighting Al Qaeda but it does not even give these countries a perspective of being integrated into international policy-making in return.

The problem lies not only with the West excluding developing countries from participation in key decision-making forums—i.e. the UN Security Council, the World Bank or the IMF—but also with the insistence on acceptance of Western concepts. Paul Schroeder suggested that the principle of liberal democracy is accepted throughout the world today. I am not sure whether this is true with regard to the Islamic world or elsewhere.

Robin Wright of the Washington Post, who for over two decades has covered conflicts in the Middle East, recently referred to Western decision-makers as living conceptually in “the green zone”, the “green zone” being the name of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s compound in Iraq which, according to Wright, key coalition leaders rarely leave. Thus, they do not see what is really happening in Baghdad city. In a similar way, she argued, Western leaders have restricted views of the Islamic world. They talk only to Islamic politicians who dress Western style and speak English. Those who do not speak English, wear traditional dress and are skeptical about Western political models are assumed to be enemies.

This is an important point. We have to engage these people in dialog too, rather than just expecting them to adopt the Western model. Among over a billion Muslims, many feel that they have been mistreated by the West, especially by the United States, and left behind by the forces of globalization. Apart from finding ways to engage these people in constructive discussion, we have to think about changing the structures of the international system. The debate about the enlargement of the UN Security Council is all about overcoming the profound perceptions of marginalization and exclusion.

If the West wants to enter into a dialog with the Muslim world, I suggest taking up Thomas Risse’s remarks about our lack of language. We do not only lack descriptive, but also normative language. Democracy or good governance are seen as globally valid and unambiguous concepts in Western discourses, but people in other parts of the world define these concepts differently. There is no consensus about the categories in which to express political ideals.

The West does not even want to integrate the Arab Islamic world. Western countries advocate the view that the Arab world puts itself outside the existing
normative and conceptual consensus. The West, though, does not do anything to integrate Arabs or Muslims in a discussion about a normative consensus, but simply ignores this part of the world. Western leaders present their model of democracy and offer us the choice to either follow it or be left out. As John Hirsch said, they talk only to the ruling, Westernized elites in the Islamic world, even though these elites play a very destructive role in their countries as the main obstacle to democratization.

Double standards are applied, as Mr. Hesse said, as soon as Realpolitik comes into play. Because the West does not want to put at risk the stability of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Egypt, it ignores its own stated norms and cooperates with regimes that have persistently obstructed democratic transformations for the last 20 years.

To find different partners in the region is seen as a difficult task by Westeners, because apart from the ruling elites, they tend to see only Al Qaeda. This is a distorted perception. Even among Islamic fundamentalists, there is a large and diversified spectrum in which, as Ghanim Alnajjar said, Al Qaeda plays only a marginal role. Moderate Islamists could, I think, even be strategic partners for democratization. In Egypt, apart from the ruling party, they are the only agents of political transformation I can imagine. These people do have an understanding of democracy, they are embedded in society and relatively open to change. We thus have to overcome our simplified picture and find a language to exchange arguments with them.

You focused on the important question of whether the main threats to world security can be localized or regionalized. Is the Middle East—however you want to define the region—a sort of cockpit in which the threats of social instability, despotic rule, lack of respect for human rights and availability of weapons to terrorists are combined? I think that we should come back to that later.

Great power relations are, as Paul Schroeder pointed out, no longer a problem insofar as threats to international security today no longer arise from great powers but from asymmetrical conflicts. Great power relations are a problem, however, insofar as these powers disagree on how to cope with these new asymmetrical threats. A strategic and—in this I agree with Amr Hamzawy—foremostly an inclusive dialog is needed. Not only must the transatlantic partners, Russia, China, and the Arab world, take part in the discussion, but also civil society. As long as
such a dialog is not established, initiatives like the Greater Middle East initiative lack the support they need and ultimately risk failure.

As far as power politics are concerned, I want to challenge a stereotype of EU-US relations implicit in Anthony Glees’ remarks. The EU is often depicted as the soft guy who relies on diplomacy and containment, while the US, as the tough guy, relies on military intervention. But this stereotype does not take recent developments into account. For example, Germany started to deploy troops to NATO’s out-of-area activities only after a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1994. Only six years ago the EU started to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Now it is considering establishing headquarters for its forces within NATO, and three EU countries are launching an initiative for “Battle Groups,” which are rapid reaction forces designed to intervene in crises within the UN context. The EU does not argue with the US over the need to use force, but over when to resort to force.

We have talked not so much about international order but about the transatlantic relationship. It is imperative, though, to think comprehensively about a “New World Order,” because Paul Schroeder’s sanguine picture of a functioning international system starts fraying as soon as you look beyond the Urals or beyond the Atlas mountains.

To develop new concepts we have got to stop gazing at our own navels, pretending that if only Bonn, Paris and Washington agree everything will be fine. We must also widen our scope regarding threat perceptions. Instead of assuming that only terrorism threatens world order, we must realize that many people, especially in the so-called global South, perceive globalization as the greatest danger. The view that the main agent of globalization and sole superpower, the United States, constitutes a major threat has many subscribers throughout the world, even in Western Europe.

Andrew Marshall, the head of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, has even suggested that climate change is a more dangerous future threat than terrorism. Maybe the most powerful countries are concentrating on the wrong issue?

Another problem is our overstated confidence in rules. Even though we have witnessed an explosion in rule-making during the past decades, material changes have undermined these new norms. For example, because of the revolution in
military technology, every military formation fighting a Western army must flout the rules of war to have any chance of success. Night vision equipment precludes guerrilla forces from operating under the cover of night. Therefore, they abolish the distinction between civilians and soldiers, which in terms of international law means perfidy. We can not moralize out of existence the fact that people engage in wars to win them. Nobody will accept Western military superiority and so to speak commit suicide on the battlefield. American constitutional lawyers like to point out that our constitution is not designed as a suicide pact—neither is international humanitarian law. This tension seems to me much more central for our debate about a “New World Order” than our discussion about transatlantic relations. Discussing the transatlantic partnership makes sense only if a Pax Americana supported by European auxiliaries is advocated, as by Niall Ferguson, as the basis of the “New World Order.”

I would like to come back to what Katja Wiesbrock has said about states not being able to find a common strategy against asymmetrical threats. We can distinguish functioning states, which obey international rules, from failed states and rogue states outside the system. We have to ask ourselves, though, which of the now functioning states will be able to sustain stability in the long run. Non-state actors are the third group, among which has emerged the new threat of networks of terrorists capable of obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Al Qaeda is constantly changing its structure, like a jellyfish able to sting even when broken. It is linked with cells inside Western societies and with regional movements as, for example, in Chechnya, thus tapping into the resources of separatists and other groups with longer term objectives, and I doubt very much whether Al Qaeda has been decisively weakened. Our problem is the lack of consensus among group one, the functioning states, about how to deal with failed states and non-state actors.

Contrary to David Rieff, I think that focusing on the transatlantic relationship is justified, because it has hitherto been and still remains a central instrument of world management. It is true, though, that when the US tackles threats by using military means, it tends to ignore issues of peace building. As Europeans realize, we also should palliate the grievances that give rise to support for or tolerance of terrorism.

As to 9/11, I object to Anthony Glees’ assessment that America was attacked, even though the Americans themselves characterized the events in such a way.
But what we witnessed was an attack on the international community on American soil. American leaders usually fail to mention it, but foreign nationals also died. It would have been cleverer politics to stress this aspect to increase worldwide solidarity. To me, the real importance of 9/11 was that it changed the international climate from optimism to a sense that our civilization faces a real threat. We have not yet agreed on what the consequences of these changes are.

The revolution of military affairs increases the temptation of those who are not powerful to use asymmetric means of warfare. As David Rieff said, they do not see another way to attack the powerful.

At the same time, it also increases the temptation of the powerful to reply with military means, because the new military technology provides methods of warfare which minimize the loss of life on the side of the attacker. One might even be tempted to consider military intervention before having applied the full spectrum of sanctions that often include a lot of suffering. This is, I think, one of the most important points of disagreement between the transatlantic partners. The hard cop/soft cop debate between the Europeans and the Americans should be less dogmatic, more dissected and adapted to the various threats in various places. In some situations, it would be preposterous to declare from the beginning that one will resort to military force only as a last resort. Starting a real discussion about criteria for the use of force adaptable to concrete challenges could transform the transatlantic quarrels into a constructive debate.

I would like to focus on the driving force behind the changes and dangers we perceive in international relations. Symptoms like the increase of asymmetric warfare and the decline of the classic nation-state are caused by decreasing social stability, which is in turn due to demographic changes. The central phenomenon from which these problems emerge is what we call globalization.

Globalization and the multitude of problems it creates overburdens our traditional international structures. The EU almost collapsed last year, the United Nations is a shadow of its past, and even single-issue organizations like NATO are having a hard time.

I fear that the new political environment will lead to the simple solution of retreating into the perceived safety of the nation-state. Take this example: All the talk of core Europe or of a Franco-German axis within the EU would have been unthinkable five years ago. This trend of resorting to the simple solutions of the nation-state structure and thus endangering the highly sophisticated tools of in-
ternational relations developed over the past decades is one of today’s greatest dangers.

I would like to ask a question to Mr. Hamzawy and Mr. Alnajjar in the spirit of David Rieff’s concern that we are ignoring the world outside the transatlantic relationship. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda surely are exceptions which will not be followed by a similar phenomenon in the near future. But polls in Jordan and the Palestinian territories showed that Bin Laden enjoys a huge popularity in these societies. He is admired for having forced the West to focus its attention on the Islamic world and for avenging those who feel oppressed by the USA. The longing for such a person by a significant part of mankind, even if that does not imply direct support for 9/11, out of an opposition to the West is a serious and lasting phenomenon.

To overcome this loathing, I would like to follow up on Mr. Hamzawy’s comment about our lack of normative consensus. You pointed out that moderate Islamists are the best agents for democratization and liberalization. Could you elaborate on that, because democratization and liberalization are Western terms which you said are hard to introduce as meaningful notions into the language of the Islamic world. Ironically, Paul Wolfowitz, who was once ambassador to Indonesia, is obsessed with looking for moderate Islamists to enforce democracy. His actions, though, tend to radicalize the Muslim world and thus undermine the position of moderate Islamists. How can we avoid this trap?

You are certainly right in depicting Bin Laden as a hero of the Islamic world. Contemporary Arab political culture is obsessed with the search for a hero who will free the Arabs from all sufferings. Bin Laden is perceived in Jordan or among the Palestinians as a hero because these people suffer so much and thus their longing for a hero is even more pronounced. You should also be aware that many Arab regimes are failed states in the sense that they are not functioning internally and not doing enough for their societies. Bin Laden, by contrast, is seen as somebody who does not only make promises, but delivers—at least he is doing something.

By lack of normative consensus, I mean that Westerners talk to Arabs about democracy or human rights, ignoring that these labels do have different local meanings. I would suggest less labelling and naming and more discussion about what we really mean, i.e. functioning political systems and improvements in political and civil rights. I do indeed think that moderate Islamists should be the

**Hassner**

What makes bin Laden so popular in the Islamic world?

**Hamzawy**

Bin Laden fulfils the Arab World’s longing for a hero

The ruling elites of the Arab world at best build democratic façades
target group of such a discursive effort. Be it in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco or Bahrain, the governments and ruling elites are agents of the status quo. Western pressure at best causes them to build a democratic façade. The only agents for change embedded in society are moderate Islamists who have their own understanding of democracy. We should therefore engage them in a dialog without prejudices and that does not rely on meaningless labels.

Bin Laden styles himself as a multi-millionaire who left his luxurious life to live in caves and fight for his principles. He has thus managed to become a symbol for many people, even though they disapprove of his killing civilians. The phenomenon is comparable to Che Guevara, also in that it is linked to the perception of the United States as a danger to the world.

I would like to offer a different perspective on what Pauline Neville-Jones said concerning the transatlantic partnership serving as the main tool for managing international relations. We should take into account that you could have a very similar discussion about the “New World Order” in Beijing today. Chinese international relations journals are discussing issues of sovereignty, transatlantic problems and post-9/11 or post-Iraq developments. At the same time, China’s activities on the international stage have increased considerably, not only in the United Nations, but also concerning North Korea and the political order in Southeast Asia. We should try to achieve as comprehensive a consensus as possible about international rules, listening to what China has to contribute to the discussion.

As to 9/11, I think it is too early to tell whether it was a turning point. I am sure, though, that in Southeast Asia it has provided a pretext for regimes interested in constraining human rights and suppressing dissident groups. Under the guise of combating terrorism, Malaysia, Thailand and certainly China have gratefully seized this opportunity.

September 11 changed our perception of reality, not reality itself. Given the ups and downs of international politics since the early 1990s, it is becoming apparent that we are having difficulties in defining what the “New World Order” consists of. One is tempted during this transitional period to accept Golo Mann’s statement that “history is chaos that lurches into chaos.” Indeed, we are experiencing the conflicting processes of integration and failure in very close proximity to each other. Incidentally, failure is also threatening Europe, in Moldova and Albania.
Some European states have been in a process of decay since the late 1980s. And examples including Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Haiti show us that this process can trigger positive developments.

Throughout history, transformations in governments have always affected the international system as a whole. Today we face the question of whether the foundations of our international law can be reconciled with today’s actual distribution of power. Stefan Kornelius already pointed this out in his elegant aside on the United Nations. That organization’s main weakness might be that it depends on the principle of sovereign member states. Rwanda and Srebrenica exposed the deficiencies of the UN’s system. The United Nations are, no doubt, far away from being a perfect system.

The domestication of power through law is an old dream. Yet perhaps foreign policy and international law have developed in increasingly different directions, despite the spread of international law during the past 50 years.

Our discussion about whether 9/11 is a turning point in history and whether asymmetrical warfare constitutes a new threat lacks, it seems to me, something of decisive importance: a cluster of criteria that allow us to validate or falsify this claim. I would like to analyze and discuss that—and I do think that we are dealing with new threats—on a systematic basis. I would be grateful for suggestions.

I cannot offer you a means of systematically analyzing the significance of 9/11, but I would like to share an anecdote about it. In the 1980s, the director of a Polish institute in New York was asked when the contemporary Polish archive material in storage there would be moved to Poland. He answered, “Never. History shows that Poland is an unsafe place. Leave these important documents in New York.” 9/11 shook the faith of this man and many others that nothing could happen in the United States. The collapse of this myth was a shock for many, an encouragement for America’s opponents.

On the rules and norms of international politics, I draw a parallel with religion. I grew up in a Catholic country and I learned much about the conflict between norms and reality in discussions between Catholics and Protestants. Protestants often agonize over the fact that norms and reality are often at odds. Catholics can accept this much more easily because they regard norms as guidelines that people can change through their own lives. I think that in global politics, we should adopt the Catholic, rather than the Protestant, approach.
Similarly, I think successfully solving real problems is the best way to help establish a durable order and dependable rules. Giving good examples is more useful than creating a global order in theory. Kosovo and Serbia have been encouraging steps, while the fates of Afghanistan and, even more so, Iraq, remain unsure. The story of Iraq can still be written to its conclusion by all participants. If it is a success story—and for that to happen, America and Europe will have to change their stripes and cooperate—then both countries will become attractive partners for other major countries. If China or Russia, for instance, are willing to discuss such approaches, then the foundation for a re-established or “New World Order” has indeed been laid.

One dramatic change caused by 9/11 and the reaction of the Bush administration is the shift in the role played by the US in international rule-making. America developed from an at least partially constructive into a destructive force in the advancement of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Elizabeth Economy rightly referred to opportunistic governments around the world ignoring international law in the name of combating terrorism. Pointing to the American model, these governments say: “Rules aside, we have a real security problem.” They use the opportunity to frame the problem in a completely different way, defining, for example, separatism as terrorism. Dealing with political or religious dissent is much easier under the chapeau of terrorism that allows for the discrimination and marginalization of dissenters. In Uzbekistan, for instance, independent Muslim groups have been a nuisance to the government for a long time. But only eight years ago, the US administration was willing to raise the issue of their rights vis-à-vis the government. Now, these groups are marginalized to an extent where some may take up arms and become a security threat. Labeling them terrorists becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The problem of governments using terrorism as a pretext leads me to the question of who might be our allies. Mr. Hesse quoted Bill Clinton’s appeal to find allies against terrorism. We need to clearly define whether those allies should be abusive governments or the people abused by these governments. I think we should not diminish our understanding for the plight of dissenting groups, and we should allow dissent to happen, whether we agree with it or not.

My last point is that while we are sitting here talking about terrorism, most people in the world would say: “This is not the challenge we are faced with. HIV/AIDS, Malaria and small arms are what we are dying from every day”. Therefore
it was so important what Mr. Hirsch said about the “green zone.” We can not now simply withdraw into our bunker mentality and solve problems we deem crucial, asking the world outside to just be patient. Neither the world nor its challenges will grant us such leisure.

I would like to stress the importance of seeing security issues as political issues, and of thinking about exclusion, alienation and about the views of other parts of the world.

Let me also present a historical caveat. No doubt, failed states and the privatization of warfare are important challenges and perhaps something new for the 20th and 21st century. However, similar problems were heavily debated in former times, too. For example, the Congo conference in 1884 debated the problems of failed states. Other conferences in the 19th century discussed the privatization of warfare, for example piracy. At the time, the West came up with an imperial solution. Today, it has a similarly dominant position in the global order, and I would advise to carefully analyze the parallels between the former discourses and those we have today. That might help us avoid today some of the problems the imperialist approach created in the past.

To my mind, today’s main challenge is to prevent a further corrosion of the international system built up prior to 9/11. Therefore we must think about whether we need a radically new approach to rules made up by the present hegemon or whether we can use and evolve the rules developed during the past decades and make them more inclusive. Otherwise, the dominating powers will make up their rules as they go.

Taking up what Nico Krisch said, I want to add a note of caution. There is a tendency in Western debates to consider post-modern imperialism as a potential model. The United States and European countries, in analogy to the 19th century, are supposed to take care of the rest of the world. This approach failed with dramatic consequences at the end of the 19th century. I do not think that any new version could provide a recipe for achieving a more inclusive and stable world order today.

The very fact that my presentation stimulated a lot of discussion is reassuring to me. I feel like having come off not unscathed but with acceptable collateral damage, and I agree with a great many of the points that you have made.
There is no question that asymmetric warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism and failed states, and a backlash from globalization are major problems. I certainly do not believe that the existing international system can master these challenges without being adapted to them. Some participants found my description of the international system too optimistic. Actually, the only optimism that I can entertain is that of Thornton Wilder’s “The Skin Of Our Teeth.” We can somehow survive, and the international system we have may not provide answers but resources for developing them.

One of these resources is the natural solidarity of states against terrorism, including some failed states that might be brought back into the international system. Historical experience shows that durable peace is achieved only through reaching a consensus among the actors that count. Today, there are more, and more complicated actors than in former periods.

Nevertheless, we need a consensus on a definition of peace which these actors are willing to live with and tolerate. I do not see how it could be possible to achieve this goal without using existing institutions and rules. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos show in their book “Global Business Regulation” how to reform and develop the international system and bring more people in. Especially small countries can use the system in order to achieve greater justice within it.

I do think that it is very important to keep on questioning whether September 11 is a turning point and if it presents as great a danger as most people say. I am as concerned as everybody else about the new phenomenon highlighted by September 11, which is the globalization of insecurity. But I am worried about the fact that large parts of the international debate deal only with the terrorist part of this phenomenon, and would like to see a more strategic approach to these issues.

Allow me one more observation: I have worked in the field of security policy now for more years than I can tell. But I have never lived in a period in which the analysis of security dangers has been as sloppy as it is today, even though we spend immense amounts of money on it. I learned in the Cold War that it is not enough to find out which scenarios are remotely possible but we also need to determine which are likely. Just to say: “We cannot exclude this or that” does not provide a basis for defining a sound security policy. It seems to me, though, that we are doing precisely that in our discussion on security. We need to be more precise and differentiate between different kinds of weapons and terririsms.
II. New Rules and Mechanisms

After our discussion about threat scenarios and about whether our international system is up to today’s challenges, we will now focus on possible new rules and mechanisms. Which are the appropriate instruments for coping with asymmetrical warfare, the current distribution of power and the danger that poverty and disease pose to the international community? It is a pleasure to have David Rieff and Heather Grabbe introduce our session.

Janusz Reiter earlier on advocated a “Catholic” approach to international politics that allows us to live with the contradictions between our norms and the realities we face. My views in this respect, by contrast, are those of an unreconstructed Protestant. The ever widening distance between norms and realities seems to me the key problem of the international system and a main reason for the threats endangering it today.

To close that gap, we have to acknowledge that norms alone seldom have the force to change the world. It is a mystification shared mainly by international relations specialists and utopian reformers that once you set up norms reality will migrate towards them. In the United States, this claim’s authority derives from the Civil Rights era, when unpopular norms were established and eventually realities followed. But as the legitimacy of international law is much inferior to the legitimacy of national law, UN resolutions and international conventions will never have the same impact.

Paul Schroeder and many others have argued that we have a large body of international rules that evolved over time and that can adapt to present circumstances. But are the UN system, international trade law and the laws of war still up to reality? War today is no longer what the laws of war were written to deal with. Our system of international law was devised to govern inter-state war. Today’s conflicts between states and non-state actors take place in an only partially regulated space, thus allowing for far-reaching interpretations. In Guantanamo, my own government has obliterated the distinction between crime and war by applying the term illegitimate combatant in a rather promiscuous way to detain people despite their unclear status.

Also, during my long stays in Iraq and Afghanistan, another change in the nature of war struck me as fundamental, namely a growing para-militarization of the CIA. It has been integrated into American military commands and has played a crucial role in the field. An American 2-star general in Iraq recently boasted to me about the “inter-operability” not only of CIA, Delta Force and regular forces,
but also of humanitarian relief work. In Afghanistan, American military government officials acted as relief workers, armed but in civilian clothes, thus putting all other humanitarian workers at risk. If war, counter-intelligence, espionage, anti-crime, and humanitarian relief work are blended, how can the laws of war survive unscathed?

To reform our system of rules seems to me utterly useless, because this system is too remote from reality to have any decisive impact, be it in its old or new form. I am, for example, deeply skeptical whether a reform of the UN would allow us to implement our norms more effectively. The UN today is clearly more useful for alleviating the negative results of peace and security operations than for influencing and steering these operations. Moreover, it is an institution under attack, not least by my own government.

Could new rules make the UN more powerful and efficient? I think that any comprehensive reform, for example of the Security Council, has a snowball’s chance in hell of being accepted. To talk about projects so utterly unreal seems to me a waste of time. Moreover, a Security Council reform, which would for reasons of justice have to bring a major Islamic state, India, Japan, and Lula’s Brazil in as permanent members, would not render the Council more efficient. An intervention like the one in Kosovo, for example, would not be any easier to authorize with Lula’s government, which has opposed all of these ventures as imperial wars.

Three major obstacles stand in the way of overcoming the atrophy of the international system’s normative regimes. First, the United States and Europe have diverging interests but are at the same time perceived by the Global South as a group of neocolonialist states with only marginally different views. As for the US and Europe, we may have a transatlantic consensus in this room. But the polling data from Western Europe suggests that a considerable minority of people for the first time since 1945 view the United States as a clear and present danger. I believe that holds true for many elite sectors outside of the political elite. Thierry Meysson’s book “L’Effroyable Imposture” which denies the attack on the Pentagon has ever taken place, sold 350,000 copies in France in a very short time.

Meanwhile, many governments in the developing world see no difference between the American and the European position. They see the Western consensus for military interventions on humanitarian grounds, not the differences on the modalities, as for example UN sanctions versus “with allies if possible, alone if necessary.” In the South, there is another consensus: that the so-called “humanitarian project” is in fact a project of re-colonization.
The second problem concerns the distribution of power. Who makes international rules and who will be bound by them? I think that an international system based on one power doing what it likes is a very real option. An old Texan expression, rather a definition of the Golden Rule, says: the man with the gold makes the rules. In international politics, the country with the gold and the 101st Airborne Division at its disposal makes the rules.

My government has been engaged in remaking rules over the last few years. In the context of the so-called “war on terrorism,” the Bush Administration has taken up and radicalized certain traditions of the Clinton era. It is thus not a ghastly anomaly, maybe ghastly, but not an anomaly. Some European and a number of East Asian governments have gone along with these changes, in the area of state repression, as Lotte Leicht has pointed out. Certain recent decisions about domestic spying in the Federal Republic of Germany for example would have been unthinkable before 9/11.

New rules for a unipolar world created by the sole remaining superpower will not be made to limit this power’s own freedom of action. They will not be rules for the weak and the strong alike, but will bind the strong back together. I do not see anything particularly valuable in that enterprise, except making people in chancelleries sleep more comfortably.

The third dilemma of international rules is whether they apply to the challenges we face today. Is it possible to make rules for crises occurring between states and non-state actors? Or will a change in rules basically focused on security matters do anything to tackle the HIV/AIDS crisis? One continent in our world is dying, which makes it slightly obscene to discuss only international security rules.

I want to present a European and thus much more rule-friendly perspective on how international order should be built. Rules are popular in Europe, because since 1945 integration through consensual rule-making has worked brilliantly for the European Union. Most recently, it has been successful in bringing post-communist Europe into the EU after the end of the Cold War. Currently, the Union is thinking about extending the concept even further with a neighborhood policy, which might reach all the way to the Caucasus. The closing of the EU’s next step of enlargement this year will not change this fondness for rules-based governance.

The deepest divisions in Europe are about powerful states moving outside the framework of rules. The recent spats about Iraq and about whether large countries...
within the EU should develop policies outside the framework of the Union’s treaties are recent examples for that.

Europe is not only rule-defined, but also very much in favor of multilateral institutions: even though we see a wide-spread dissatisfaction in Europe with old institutions, there is concern to preserve them. That might also be due to a lack of ideas for alternatives. In the debate on NATO, for example, Europeans are more conservative than many Americans.

This became clear when US Senator Richard Luger outlined different scenarios for NATO’s future role in Brussels two years ago. Europeans spoke out in favor of his first scenario, which was the traditional role of preserving European security. Luger’s own preference, which was to use NATO as the policeman for non-proliferation regimes, was widely rejected. Similarly, Germany and other European states are cautious about using NATO outside Europe, accepting the Afghanistan campaign, but objecting to an engagement in Iraq. They do not want NATO to be used mainly for cleaning-up operations, as a sort of international dish-rag.

Although conservative about international institutions, Europe is a rich source of experimentation with new mechanisms of building international order. Our primary method is the integration of states into legal frameworks and economic relationships. Robert Kagan eloquently criticized this approach in questioning its effectiveness outside Europe. Europe may enjoy perpetual peace, he said, but Americans are concerned with the Hobbesian jungle that surrounds Europe. Similarly, Robert Cooper emphasizes that rules-based international governance is right for the “post-modern” West. But he questions its usefulness in the “pre-modern” and “modern” areas beyond. There, force must be used to impose rules, and mandates of benign imperialism must be built to sustain them. The next 20 years will show whether EU methods work outside the traditional sphere, for example in North Africa. The first test will be the success of the Union’s “Wider Europe” concept—its neighborhood policy toward countries like Ukraine or Belarus.

There are good reasons to defend the European approach to the use of force. Opinion surveys show that Europeans deem military force useful only as a last resort to enforce rules. Again, Robert Kagan wittily ridiculed Europe’s position in turning around the hammer and nail analogy. While it is usually said that if the only instrument you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail, Kagan said Europeans pretend that nails do not exist because they do not have a hammer. He thereby missed the right metaphor for the way Europeans solve problems, which is the screwdriver. Screwdrivers work with rather modest force over longer peri-
ods of time and, through gentle coaxing, eventually get quite a good hold on their object. Screws tend not to come out again if pressure is applied, while nails need a huge amount of force to get in and then they can still fall out.

Let me present you a few of the screwdrivers that Europe has used to impose international order. First, the EU has successfully exported its economic and political models to Central and Eastern Europe, using economic integration to create political consensus and to encourage the convergence of political systems. The future will show whether this will work also for the Caucasus, North Africa or the Middle East, where no prospect of accession will be offered by the EU.

Our second mechanism to promote European political ideas is conditionality. We apply it more than we used to, even though our actions are neither very consistent nor sufficiently tough vis-à-vis Russia or North Africa. European institutions besides the EU use conditionality, too. The OSCE and the Council of Europe have applied conditionality after accepting countries as members. For example, the Council of Europe allowed the Ukraine in and then persuaded it to give up the death penalty. The OSCE, to a certain extent, tries to do the same with regard to Russia.

A final interesting “screwdriver” effect is the increasing interoperability between traditional military security means and policing forces. David Rieff criticized the integration of the CIA in the US Army because of the fuzzy boundaries and the lack of legitimacy. But Europeans are increasingly and successfully using civilian forces in their mandates. The Bosnian Police Mission or the policing mission in Kosovo are examples of how the EU builds local capacity and uses peacekeeping troops to allow countries to govern themselves better.

These mechanisms, though, are only useful for building international order in limited areas. First, they only work for countries where the rules do rule. Order through integration nowadays can only be applied to Europe’s immediate neighborhood, although in the long term this neighborhood could extend to Central Asia. Second, rules based on integration only work with cooperative states—those who want to come in from the cold. Europe has many carrots and very few sticks. Libya provides an example for how these carrots can be used effectively. When it declared its willingness to sign up to the EU’s Barcelona process, Libya implicitly accepted to recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist. This is an extraordinary success. Third, the EU’s attraction can help to sustain order during periods of regime change, as we might one day see in Belarus. What the EU is not very good at, though, is actually bringing about regime change.
The gravest restriction for the European “screwdriver” mechanisms is that they are hard to apply to non-state actors, like companies. This is a generic problem of a rules-based order, which relies on nation states. The EU tries to engage economic actors, for example, by offering Turkish companies trade concessions, thus engaging economic actors in a state which has not yet been given an accession perspective. What the EU still fails to do is to engage societies outside its immediate neighborhood. The lack of legitimacy which the Pew Global Attitudes Survey has shown not only for the UN and NATO, but for the European Union as well, is one of Europe’s central problems. It is a pressing problem, too, because the parts of the world where the EU does not enjoy legitimacy—those vast areas beyond its immediate neighborhood—are coming closer.

During the Cold War and before the globalization of media, people outside the Western sphere were less free to move and less aware of global inequalities. Now they can vote with their feet by coming to Europe, and with their arms in turning to terrorism. We do not even have a concept for really integrating the 12 million Muslims already living in the European Union, much less for dealing with the Islamic world outside Europe. I disagree with Stephen Krasner’s statement that we have more corrupt regimes or failing states today than before 1989, but today the frustrations of the non-Western world do affect us more directly. Therefore, Europe has to engage these people. We have to develop tools for those areas where order through integration does not work, because states either do not function or do not want to integrate. Our current strategy is to use our traditional mechanisms with those who want to cooperate, and to build high fences to keep out the rest. That is not going to work in the long run.

I want to talk about the hammer, not the screwdriver, because I think new rules are primarily needed to address the new reality of American unipolar power. Whether rules-based international order is possible in an era of unipolarity seems to me a central question of the 21st century, finding new rules that fit the new realities is the central task.

The current distribution of power is a historically unprecedented phenomenon. For the first time in the modern era, one state can operate on the global stage without being constrained by counter-balancing great powers. Today, we are watching a geo-political adjustment process after a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power. To my mind, the subtext not only of our discussion but of most global political debates during the last 2 years is the question of American...
power. What are the rules of the new era, if there are rules? What should the strategies of other great powers be, Blair’s binding closer to Washington by, for example, supporting the Iraq war, or rather Chirac’s counter-balancing?

Even more central is the question of whether the United States will use its power to disentangle itself from the outside world. Will it go down Undersecretary of State John Bolton’s pathway of reclaiming American sovereignty? I think there are two potential logics of unipolarity in play today. Either the US will choose a unipolarity with liberal characteristics, corresponding to Paul Schroeder’s vision of enveloping the new realities into the old infrastructure of international politics with its norms and institutions, thereby preserving the genius of the post-war order. The alternative is a unipolarity with imperial characteristics, which entails more US detachment, unilateral domination, and the US standing above the law.

Most discussions about US strategy have focused on George W. Bush and the National Security Strategy. Indeed, had several individuals not been appointed to the Bush Administration, the US would not have gone to war in Iraq. This war was very much contingent on personalities and specific circumstances. Nevertheless, personalities do not adequately explain the struggle over the future logic of US unipolarity, and the imperial temptation is not simply due to the Bush Administration. Structural changes are also responsible for that.

We are at a historical transition point, as the Westphalian Order operating for over 500 years is about to give way to something entirely different. The basic Westphalian concepts were the equilibrium of power among states and national sovereignty, and the national government’s monopoly on the use of force within its society. There was a strict division between domestic issues like police law enforcement and international politics, defined in terms of wars between national armies.

Today, the entire system is being flipped on its head. The US has a quasi-monopoly on the use of force at the international level; order is based on a single center of power instead of an equilibrium of powers. At the same time, sovereignty at the state level is more contingent than ever. Liberal internationalism, for example Eleanor Roosevelt and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, during the last 50-60 years has built obligations for states to obey within their societies or to come under scrutiny of the outside world. At the same time, a shift to popular sovereignty makes hard state sovereignty more problematic as well. Sovereignty is unbundling. Those double transitions are occurring at a moment when new threats of terrorism and the end of the Cold War leave the system much more ambiguous as to what the rules are.
The Bush Administration has grandly embraced this double transition. Its National Security Strategy Report is radically new in its vision of the Hobbesian problem bound to be solved by a US Leviathan. In his West Point speech in the summer of 2002, George W. Bush said that very explicitly. The US would maintain peace, he said, allowing no peer competitors but seeking the support of “coalitions of the willing” if possible. In return other states would accord the US exceptional status with regard to rules, for example in the International Criminal Court. Mohammed Ali’s favorite description of himself as a fighter was that he floated like a butterfly and stung like a bee. In some ways, that is Bush’s vision of US unipolarity, floating up there above the rules, coming down to save stability and order. This will entail a growing role of special bilateral relationships with countries like Israel, Britain, Japan, Australia and other cooperative partners in the war on terrorism. The US will shower these good lieutenants with trade pacts and security agreements, thus disaggregating the old system with its indivisibility of security and economic relations. To break up this system into bilateral hub and spoke relationships between the US and its partners allows the United States to use its power more effectively to reward and punish states. That is a very serious alternative to basing international order on rules.

I think our challenge is to re-imagine rules to make sense of and accommodate this double transition from multipolarity and national sovereignty to unipolarity and contingent sovereignty. We have to find shared rules that avoid a fundamental disaggregation and erosion of our system of rule-based international politics. To my mind, two specific types of new rules need to be imagined: We need rules about the use of force, because no stable world order is imaginable with a unipolar state enjoying an unbridled right to use force. We thus must develop legitimate international agreements about the use of force below the level of UN Security Council resolutions.

The second new set of rules should constitute a new bargain between the United States and its partners over the terms of unipolarity. We need to reinvent what was the great genius of the postwar era: rule order despite asymmetric power distribution. The US will have to re-negotiate giving up some of its autonomy in exchange for the cooperation of others.

Are you not describing a world that may have existed a year ago but no longer exists? Today, the United States needs the United Nations, adjusts its domestic legislation in order to please the EU and calls for the help of NATO. I have the
impression that you presented a rather pure form of the Cheney/Wolfowitz paper of 1992 as a description of the real world.

I think that the European instruments of inclusion, exclusion and conditionality described by Heather Grabbe are quite effective tools for influencing other states. They are also applicable at the global level, as the case of Libya shows. A lot of hypocrisy may be involved, but as Jean de La Bruyère said, “hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue.”

Nevertheless I want to concentrate on what John Ikenberry and David Rieff said about American power and its relation to rules. First, I would like to distinguish norms from rules and legitimacy from legality. Norms emerge from the interplay of morality, legality, social change and power. They are contested and they are constantly changing, as Coral Bell’s article “Normative Shift” demonstrates. Ward Thomas, in his book “The Ethics of Destruction,” impressively describes the changing attitudes towards strategic bombing and the assassination of foreign leaders.

I do think that David Rieff is wrong in denying that norms influence reality. They do so by exerting moral pressure. My first example for that is slavery, which used to be accepted as a norm and as a practice, for example, in Britain centuries ago. Now this norm has changed and while there still is slavery, no government around the world defends it any longer; it can no longer be legitimized. In a similar way, the banning of war as an instrument of national policy in the Briand/Kellogg-pact in 1928 did not end the use of war as an instrument of national policy. But no state any longer admits conducting a war of aggression, instead all aggressors claim to act in self-defense. Finally, the normative assumption that genocide is not an acceptable practice and that heads of states can be held responsible for the violation of individual rights has led to the intervention in Kosovo and has brought Milosevic to the Hague. It has been said that Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar were able to escape in Tora Bora because the US forces restricted their attacks to avoid civilian casualties. Thus, while the US Army’s technological means allow attacks of hitherto unknown precision—neither Baghdad nor Belgrade look like Dresden or Hiroshima did in 1945—, international law restricts its actions. Even the powerful who set the norms are restrained by the laws they have proclaimed. Thus, reality to a certain extent does gravitate towards the norms.

This leads me to John Ikenberry’s remarks about American power and legitimacy. Rousseau famously said: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always...
the master, unless he transforms his strength into right, and obedience into duty.” France’s making an invasion in Iraq dependent on a UN Security Council resolution and thus on the consent of partly tyrannical states was a doubtful strategy. But the present US position of resting legitimacy solely on the American constitution and the American people, denying accountability to anyone else, is no less problematic. Norms must be based to a certain extent on intersubjectivity. They are not objective entities, but neither are they something completely arbitrary depending on the will of the powerful.

The problem is which kind of dialog can be established between the US and the rest of the world about rules of the international system. I would submit that the US should not try to be an absolute monarch of world politics, but should introduce some elements of a constitutional monarchy. There has to be an element of consent, of giving other powers a stake, even if power ultimately rests with the United States. Western societies will not accept a new imperial rule, even if some people in the developing world may ask for it.

A dialog about international rules, as Hedley Bull’s English School pointed out, will have to be conducted with powers not in favor of Western values, because history is moving from Europe to America and then perhaps to Asia. We might thus have to negotiate normative compromises.

Also, the West and especially the US has to decide whether it should base its actions on reciprocity, restricting its own sphere of action only as much as others do. We might have to oblige ourselves not to do certain things even to people who would be happy to do them to us. Options like preemptive nuclear war might have to be banned not only on the basis of reciprocity, but for the sake of our own freedom and values.

Let me end by stressing the importance of domestic evolutions in the Western world. Coral Bell rightly said that we are not dealing with a clash of religions or civilizations. But domestic changes in the West, for example in the status of women or of the individual, which are spread by globalization, trigger violent reactions from other cultures. Whether we like it or not, our own domestic evolution is a revolutionary force in the rest of the world. It thus precludes us both from being indifferent to what happens in the outside world because these things will come to haunt us.

While Germany is crossing boundaries by sending troops abroad, the United States is currently rediscovering the limitations of what military dominance alone can
achieve. After drawing its power from hard and soft power alike for decades, it has relied solely on military dominance during the past years. This has weakened the attractiveness of the American political model, its values and culture throughout the world. US radio and television stations broadcasting in Arabic will not solve this problem, which lies in the area of policy, not communication.

The US has failed to acknowledge the benefits of adapting the international norm and rule system and international institutions to the challenges of today. Doing so would allow the US to preserve international legitimacy while tackling the new threats of terrorism. I disagree with David Rieff that international rules and institutions cannot be reformed effectively. On the contrary, the UN resolutions on Afghanistan created a new type of international law in stating an internal policy like harboring terrorists can legitimize an attack on a state. Similarly, invoking NATO’s Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks was an evolution of the international system—which the US did not take up.

I understand that the US acts outside the boundaries of international law when, in cases of imminent threats, it cannot wait for the law to evolve. But the present administration has followed a tendency of replacing the international system by American power. In Germany, we are fully aware that beside planet Venus, as the world of rule-based order, there is planet Mars, the world of fighting against those who do not play by the rules. Verrechtlichkeit, which means the increasing dominance of international law, exists at the same time as Vermachtung, the dominance of power. But the US is denying the very existence of international law outside of Europe, thereby saying that Mars, and only Mars, is here to stay forever.

The loss of American prestige caused by its emphasis on military power will be felt especially when trying to introduce democracy after regime changes. To build democracy in other regions of the world, the US, as every power, needs the support at least of its democratic partners. This will be impossible to achieve without a broad consensus on the evolution of international law and norms.

Although internationally agreed rules do not have a very good reputation in the United States, I will argue for more rules even more boldly than Karsten Voigt. To address the problems of international security, we have to think about rules not only for the use of military power, but also for governing globalization, global trade and development. As to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the first step must be to amend the Non Proliferation Treaty, which at this point is not...
working well enough. Improving the treaty would be more useful than incessantly discussing intervention against particular countries.

The most pressing task, though, is to define rules for the use of force, rules for intervention. As the use of force is practically forbidden by international law, except, of course, in self defense, we need to take a close look at our international standards and check if they are up to the challenges of today’s world. Driven by the best intentions, experts from Canada, Australia, Algeria and elsewhere have even called for “rules to break the rules” when necessary. For obvious reasons: Just discarding the existing rules, the way the U.S. did in Iraq, cannot be an option on which to build broad alliances for a more responsible world. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty headed by Gareth Evans has presented a booklet on where protection against ethnic cleansing, massive human rights violations and genocide requires intervention. Apparently, it will be close to impossible to adopt these kinds of rules as international law at the level of the United Nations in the near future. As David Rieff said, governments like Brazil would outrightly oppose ever legalizing the use of force. Nevertheless, as even Brazil might agree that force was necessary in the case of Rwanda, maybe in the long run the UN Charter could be amended to authorize the use of force to prevent large-scale loss of human life. In the meantime, this very refined set of definitions should be used as a binding “code of conduct” by anyone, NATO, EU or other, who chooses humanitarian intervention to protect human lives and dignity.

To develop new rules for intervention, I think what we need first is more conceptual precision. International consensus on how to use force against asymmetric threats will never emerge without exact definitions. What exactly is terrorism, what is a weapon of mass destruction? International legitimacy, which is a precondition to legality, will not be achieved without internationally acceptable definitions.

Will improving and extending the system of international rules do any good as long as the United States refuses to abide by the rules? You said yourself that rules have a bad reputation in the US.

To make progress, you have to go beyond just opposing what somebody else is doing. So, if Europe is not happy about the Americans refusing to play by the rules, we have to offer them an alternative and then let them buy into that. It may look hard now, but it is not impossible. There are many American partners and friends,

We need “rules to break the rules.”

Hesse
I cannot help wondering if you Europeans would still talk this way if you had a big army.

Krasner

also within the current administration, that are eager to develop our partnership. So, let’s go and be more self-confident in suggesting what we can do together. As one of my dear American friends has it: “Stop ordering from the childrens’ menu!”

Stephen Krasner, would you buy into that?

Americans and Europeans do have a fundamentally different perspective on rules and laws. Europeans see rules as embodiments of normative aspirations that can ultimately be reflected in reality. This has worked surprisingly well in Europe, where the European Union has been an extraordinary success, more than any political leader could reasonably have predicted in the early 1950s. Americans, by contrast, have generally regarded rules as agreements designed to achieve certain goals most of which have been material. To them, norms are based on interests, not on normative aspirations.

The WTO, for example, was very cleverly crafted to overcome domestic barriers against free trade. The WTO like the GATT is based on reciprocity. Moreover, the WTO introduced mandatory dispute settlement procedures. Neither the United States, nor any other advanced country can introduce trade barriers without having specific export industries targeted in retaliation. No longer does international protectionism provide specific benefits and impose diffuse costs on the whole population. Under the WTO, a state that engages in protection may secure benefits for specific industries but will also incur costs for specific export sectors. This makes protection less attractive than it has been in the past. For American presidents, who have generally favored openness, the WTO provides a set of rules that further a specific material objective. Obviously, Europeans also welcomed this approach to rule making in the case of trade.

Such a rationale for rules based on interests is easy to understand. The rules are self-enforcing because it is in the interests of actors to honor them. European discussions of rules and norms as if they imposed a direct constraint on the behavior of political leaders leaves me confused. I cannot help wondering if you Europeans would still talk this way if you had a big army. It strikes me as utterly unrealistic to think that we can invent rules of international law, somehow get them into the politicians’ heads and wait for them to follow the prescriptions. Do you believe that if you let the rulers of the world read Kant, they will start implementing the categorical imperative?

Bertram

Krasner

Americans agree upon rules in order to achieve material goals …

… as for instance the WTO system …

… but Europeans seek rules to impose a direct constraint on politicians
Nevertheless, I do think that international law can work in a powerful way. It has an indirect impact, because it influences domestic discourses, especially in Europe. The BBC’s comment on Prime Minister Blair’s speech yesterday focused on the question of whether American or British actions were legitimate under international law. This question matters for democratic electorates and thus matters for the government.

International norms used to shape the opinion of domestic publics can also improve governance in badly governed states in a way that transgresses the traditional borders of sovereignty. A golden opportunity for that presented itself when Exxon-Mobil considered developing an oil field in Chad in the mid-1990s. As the company feared accusations of violating human rights and harming the environment, it involved the World Bank as a partner in the project. As a condition for a loan the Bank asked the Chadian government to pass a law that would commit about 40% of the oil money for social welfare purposes. In initial planning there were proposals for an oversight committee including international as well as domestic representatives. This committee would not only have forced the Chadian government to abide by the rules, it would also have established norms of good governance for the Chadian population to refer to.

Reality came out differently, though. The African executive directors of the World Bank objected (so I have been told verbally by several people, although I have no written evidence). As a result of these objections, it was agreed that the oversight group would be drawn entirely from Chad, although with civil society representatives. If the Europeans and the Americans had backed the World Bank’s initial proposal, they could have exerted real pressure on the Chadian government by establishing a set of norms about good governance for the population of Chad. I think that this model of shared sovereignty could have a great future—if the US and Europe decide to pool their resources to promote it.

China is a striking counterexample for David Rieff’s notion that norms of the international community do not influence reality. The 1992 Rio conference was instrumental in bringing about the development of Chinese NGOs. Because China was embarrassed to have no such organizations at the conference, the first environmental NGO was founded in 1994. Similarly, international pressure made China include domestic NGOs in addressing the AIDS problem. Otherwise, there would have been no funding from the international community. Norms set up by...
the international community gave the existing domestic forces enough support to make remarkable progress. Steve Krasner mentioned that large projects of multinational corporations could provide the opportunity to promote development and good governance at the same time. Shell has done exactly that in its efforts to try to become involved in the West-East pipeline in China. It took great care to develop a board made up of international and domestic NGOs, and to think about how to redistribute the profits from the pipeline justly in order to give the local population a fair share of the profits.

Our discussion is moving to the heart of the current debate. I would like to reject Stephen Krasner’s insinuation that only the weak need rules as well as Reinhard Hesse’s case for more rules. What we need instead are mechanisms to create legitimacy and to allow us to act within the existing framework of rules.

Stephen Krasner suggested that if the Europeans had military power, they would and should stop thinking about laws. But the 20th century has proven the idea fundamentally wrong that power does not need rules. The European nation states had power and very strong armies, and the result could be seen in the ruins of European cities after World War II.

Reinhard Hesse, by contrast, called for new laws. But even though some new laws might be needed to deal with new challenges, shortage of laws is not our problem. Our problem is to find a legitimate course of action within the formal framework of international law, adapting our actions to the current challenges without resorting to unrestricted use of power.

In referring to legitimacy, John Ikenberry has pointed to the central question of international order. Let me give you some examples. First, the pre-emptive use of force, as laid down in the US National Security Strategy, is not a new idea. The United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, Article 39 allows exactly for that. That the Security Council has not decided to use force against an imminent threat from Iraq is not due to a lack of legal provisions. It is due to a lack of political will to use the UN mechanism on the part of the countries involved. The United States probably could have made a case acceptable to all, but it did not do all it could to create legitimacy by consensus.

In Kosovo legitimacy came about because a majority of countries accepted that a massive violation of human rights had to and, according to international law, could be stopped. We have to develop mechanisms to establish a broad consensus.
below the level of formal decision-making in the UN Security Council. This would allow circumventing the obstacle of veto, while creating legitimacy. The right of self-defense is always applicable at the end of the day, but building a body of legitimacy on a broad consensus including the regions concerned is by far preferable.

The question of how to operate within legal frameworks is also decisive in the case of Iran, which could turn out to be as divisive as Iraq for Europe and the US. The transatlantic partners share an identical analysis of the strategic threat posed by Iran’s nuclear military potential. But their approaches to addressing the problem differ fundamentally. The American government believes that using the hammer and bringing the issue of Iran before the Security Council will solve the problem. But I predict that the US will end up without a decision in the Security Council, while Iran will drop out of the non-proliferation treaty, leaving us without any control mechanisms at all.

The European approach, by contrast, tries to engage Iran. It establishes a number of preconditions and promises engagement in case Iran implements them. This course may entail risks in the second or third phase, but not at this point. I think that it is, even though difficult and lengthy, much more promising than consciously driving a country against the wall without any prospect of positive results. The European approach allows us to use the legal framework to reach a strategic objective.

Legal frameworks often prove useful after having been ignored for a while

It might be useful to establish or keep legal frameworks even if they are not used at the time, because the time may come when you want to use them. A good example for that is how the US is now trying to share the responsibility for Iraq with the United Nations.

Norms do influence reality because they create legitimacy

David Rieff was wrong to say that norms do not make reality follow. Rules and norms which are equally valid for the powerful and for the weak, do create legitimacy. As even the most powerful nation, the US, cannot do everything alone, it needs legitimacy in order to find partners. Governments in democratic societies also need legitimacy to make the case to the public, as the discussion in Britain over Tony Blair’s role in the Iraq war shows. Thus, accepted rules and norms are an important means of influencing reality.

As far as the UN Security Council is concerned, I would like to point out that often problems create their own fora in which to be dealt with. We have, for ex-
ample, the G7, G8 and the Middle East Quartet etc., each dealing with a different set of issues. It would be preferable to establish the Security Council firmly as the highest seat of legitimacy. But as long as it is not representative, this will not be possible.

When speaking about rules in international politics, David Rieff and Heather Grabbe presented two different worlds. Both worlds do exist, because they represent two contradicting trends taking place at the same time.

On the one hand, we live in the most legalized international system ever. The number of international treaties is rising constantly, as well as the number of states subscribing to these treaties. Modern statehood and being a good international citizen are to some extent defined as ratifying treaties in the area of human rights and the environment. We thus do not have a problem of rules or rule recognition. But we do have the problem of decreasing rule compliance, and this is where David Rieff’s world comes in. I am not sure, though, whether we really have good data on compliance. The increase of treaty partners and the decrease in compliance might just balance each other out. Also, the increasing number of recorded rule violations may be due to better reporting.

Christoph Bertram and Heather Grabbe pointed to another serious problem of the international rule system. We have to adapt the system, which is still based on the assumption that states are the main actors, to the fact that states cover less and less of the space where violence is happening. We Europeans have to recognize that the privatization of violence is a serious challenge to international law. We should not pretend, though, that the only non-state actors we have to deal with are terrorist networks. Multi-national corporations and NGOs also transgress the borders of the nation-state.

Even though non-state actors play an increasingly important role in international politics, states can still legislate the framework. This is something we have to keep in mind.

I can think of five possible institutions of global order: the United Nations, NATO, the United States, coalitions of the willing, and the G8. All of these institutions have their shortcomings, but they also have their specific problem-solving potential. I would like to present a Russian perspective on these issues.
The Russian government is prepared to discuss a UN Security Council reform, the expansion of the Council. Introducing new members may not increase the Security Council’s effectiveness, but definitely its representativeness. The UN system was invented by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in 1945 and should thus not be considered as a sacred cow. We should also keep in mind that it has never been very efficient. The Soviet Union and the United States violated international law regularly during the Cold War. The only time they used force in accordance with international law was during the Korean War, which was possible solely because Russia was absent at the decisive vote in the Security Council. Therefore, we should be open to changing the UN Charter. Amendments to allow for humanitarian intervention and the preemptive use of force, also against non-state actors, would be something Russia could agree to.

NATO as a global rule-setter is more problematic from our point of view, not only because its old mission has become obsolete, but simply because we do not belong to it. It is hard to like a military alliance which you will never be part of, not only for Russia but also for many other countries. Nevertheless, NATO is here to stay. The role it is starting to play in Afghanistan is probably indicative of what it will choose as its future mission.

An even more problematic global government would be the United States. The US claims freedom of action to defend its national security. What it does not do, though, is take responsibility for the rest of humankind. Coalitions of the willing will no doubt be an important instrument for solving international problems. Russia will probably participate in several of these coalitions. Nevertheless, this model of international order suffers from a lack of structure. Moreover, the unwilling will never regard the activities of the willing as legitimate.

Lastly, the G 8 might evolve into a serious international institution, especially if it expands to G 9 or G 11 and is institutionalized. I am quite sure this will happen. Those left out, though, will regard it as an oligarchy, not as a legitimate institution.

To my mind, in the near future a combination of these institutions will be used for governing international relations. This does not mean, though, that nation states will no longer play an important role. I dare to contradict Christoph Bertram’s observation that states and national governments control less and less space and loose their relevance. European nations might be giving up sovereignty...
to supranational structures, and failed states may create regions where national governments no longer exert control.

But I, for example, do represent a nation-state which emerged only in 1991, at the same time as 14 other countries, replacing the former Soviet Union. Those are not yet prepared to give up their sovereignty. Moreover, I am sure that during the 21st century the creation of nation-states will continue and accelerate outside of Europe. In 1945, there were only about 50 nation-states to become members of the UN. As of now, the United Nations has 190 member states, and there are 60 more countries outside the UN system. In 30 years, there will be 300 or 400 nation-states—a very complex international system which will require all available efficient institutions of global governance.

I want to warn against seeing the United States’ attitude toward a rule-based international order as a strict dichotomy. John Hirsch described the choice as being one between a liberal order and an imperial hegemony, suggesting that the US only after 9/11 decided against following the path of multilateralism. According to him, if we could go back to that intersection and follow our previous path of championing international law, we would recover our common ground with Europe.

But already under Clinton, the divergences not only between the US and the Global South, but also across the Atlantic increased. This is partly because Europe matured and no longer always followed its American protector, since it needed it less. But also, although Clinton certainly had better style than Bush, he seriously disagreed with the Europeans over Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and many other issues. There was more trouble beneath the surface than our discussion indicates.

Second, the erosion of liberal internationalism in the US is not just about Bush and Wolfowitz, but reflects deeper secular changes in American domestic politics. While the population of the North-East declines and the liberal establishment erodes, the power of the agrarian South and the mountainous West with their populist attitudes keeps growing. This new structural Republican majority has a much harder conception of sovereignty than the traditionally Democratic East-Coast liberals. Getting the US back to a liberal brand of internationalism more conducive to rules-based order thus faces serious obstacles in terms of domestic politics.

**Kupchan**

The US will not simply return to the virtuous path of multilateralism

Europe and the US have been drifting apart for a long time

Demographic changes in the US erode the political basis of liberal internationalism
I would like to suggest that we speak more specifically about possible reforms to the international system of rules and institutions. I think the usual proposals on the table for reforming the UN Security Council do not go far enough and do not solve the underlying problems. Adding new, permanent members would only exacerbate the Council’s present structural difficulties. We should think about more basic changes.

Today, more than half of humanity is suffering under conditions that cannot be solved militarily, and therefore never appear on the Council’s agenda. When it was founded, the UN was designed to prevent World War III. Its sole institution with clout, the Security Council, is therefore restricted to addressing security and military issues. Today, however, more than half of humanity is suffering under conditions that cannot be solved militarily, and therefore never appear on the Council’s agenda.

Could the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, or the World Bank not be incorporated into a more direct, obligatory relationship with the UN? Given the right concept, why should they not be integrated into the UN as tightly as, say, the Security Council is? These kinds of structural reforms would help many more people than recalibrating security policy institutions. Of course, they would be difficult to push through. Yet having the WTO, IMF, and World Bank merely provide occasional reports to United Nations institutions is clearly insufficient. Naturally it would still be important and legitimate to discuss the definition of self-defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter and, if needed, to adjust to new threats.

I doubt whether the issues of security and American power we discuss will still seem that crucial in a year’s time. Even if the American voters re-elect George W. Bush, the American taxpayers will probably object to funding an American empire. In contrast to previous colonial peoples, the Americans are not really very interested in the “white man’s burden” as far as taxation is concerned. Therefore the US shies away from full governance responsibility in occupied countries. As it will not govern all on its own the countries whose regimes it brought down, others will have to help.

However, as King George III learned and as King George W. will have to learn, there is no taxation without representation. Therefore, the Americans will have to be cooperative, return to consultations with their partners and introduce more multilateral aspects in their foreign policy. As American normalcy returns, the prospects of an American empire will wither away naturally.

Things will not be the same as they were previously, though, because the world has changed. Today, threat-based analyses govern our policies as they last.
did at the beginning of the Cold War, when the conflict had not yet become ritualized. For the first time in decades, we fear a threat whose nature we are not sure we understand. The situation today is as uncertain as during the 1950s and 60s, and much more complex.

Another change in international politics is that humanitarian and preemptive intervention will remain legitimate instruments of foreign policy. A central element of the Bush Doctrine will thus be preserved.

I think that there will be two main justifications for intervention. Let me illustrate that with two recent examples. Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo appealed to the Europeans, and to the political left. Such intervention on humanitarian grounds will remain an option of international politics.

Afghanistan, by contrast, is an example of extended self-defense. This intervention commanded a very broad consensus. While it had appropriate UN backing, its legitimacy derived from the shared perception that it was a necessary and proportionate response to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. It was widely accepted to invade the space called Afghanistan, which was actually a failed state, to deal with the terrorist threat. The United States’ detainee camp for alleged Al Qaeda fighters in Guantanamo Bay shows, however, how you can trip yourself up by acting in the name of freedom and then betraying your own values.

Iraq, by contrast, will prove the exception rather than being exemplary for future American interventions. It happened under particular circumstances which are not likely to be replicated in the foreseeable future.

Most interventions will not take the size of those in Afghanistan, Kosovo or Iraq. Intervention will go all the way from taking over a whole country through to small operations with special forces down to using an unmanned vehicle to destroy a car carrying terrorists. All these actions certainly must be legitimized, but surely they will not all be based on resolutions of the UN Security Council. The nature of the smaller operations, which will mostly be conducted by the US, does not allow for that.

We thus need not form a new rule base, but must develop a set of conventions about when such interventions are acceptable. We need a set of value-based, though not necessarily rule-based, policies, which command support.

An effective development of international law will not be helped by formulating laws in the abstract. Evolution will mostly happen by convention and practice. Afghanistan and Kosovo started a process of developing the right of intervention for humanitarian or security reasons. As international law is fed by concepts of

In contrast to previous colonial peoples, the Americans are not really very interested in the “white man's burden” as far as taxation is concerned.

Neville-Jones

Humanitarian and preemptive intervention will remain legitimate instruments of foreign policy

We need a set of legitimate political strategies
what is legitimate and proportionate action, law will develop to support that legitimacy. It keeps on coming back to the definition that what reasonable people think is reasonable. We thus need a broad consultation of international public opinion, the core of which must be the Western powers and the Security Council members.

Two sets of policies should complement or prevent intervention. First, developing economically and politically weak states to limit the appeal of terrorism. Second, where this has failed, rebuild authorities in these states and start a process of economic development. Economic development has been a major goal of the international community for a long time, but we have to put much more emphasis on good governance. We must consistently apply the insights gained during the last 20 years and find an international consensus about what good governance is. Taking the lead in that would be an appropriate task for the US. The democratization of the Middle East and even the countries beyond might thus gain new momentum.

To my mind, the question is who makes which rules, for whom and for what purpose? International rules are mainly made by those victorious in wartimes to control the defeated. During peace, rules are mainly made by the major powers, namely Europe and the USA. The Global South rarely plays a role.

On the other hand, to take up Thomas Risse’s allusion to rule compliance, who are the countries that have to comply with international norms? The poor countries in the South must comply to avoid being sanctioned through trade or other means. But how to make rich countries comply? This seems to me a central issue. I do not know what kind of mechanism could work—perhaps the UN system? Finding answers to that question would be a decisive step on the way to more justice in the international system.

The current quarrels about nuclear proliferation exemplify this problem. Who decides which country is supposed to possess nuclear weapons? Should only rich countries have them, or only democratic countries? Whence derives the authority for making rules, if not from a comprehensive consensus?

Gerald Chan gave a pretty bleak picture about who is making the rules. As far as the development of international human rights and humanitarian law is concerned, I see things more positively. Not the big and the powerful, but the
small and mid-sized countries are on the forefront in this area. The landmines treaty was pushed through by the victims, countries that are suffering from landmines, international and nations NGOs. Similarly, the International Criminal Court was brought about by a remarkable coalition of small and mid-sized countries and NGOs, thus contributing to two important recent achievements of international law.

Lotte Leicht talked about the increasing importance of smaller countries in setting up rules. Actually, already the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was put together mainly by Lebanon, Cuba, Chile and Panama, which did not range in the Super Power spectrum in 1945 any more than they do today. Nowadays, NGOs are playing a central role in promoting international law. They were, for example, much more important for setting up the International Criminal Court than nation states.

I would even go further: without NGO campaigns, there would not be a single human rights treaty today, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I have been struck by an undercurrent of this discussion, which is that Europeans have little influence on the United States. I think that is plainly wrong. There is a high degree of government to government cooperation across a whole range of policy matters which, of course, are not in the headlines. European governments, for example, cooperate successfully with the US in pursuit of Al Qaeda and other security threats.

The assistance or resistance of Europe has very serious impacts on what the US can do. Steel tariffs are a good example of how the EU reacts to pressure from the US by pushing back—and the United States accommodates itself to that. Or, if you allow me to get into alternate history scenarios: I wonder what would have happened in Kosovo if the intervention had been a unilateral American exercise. Without European support and the framing of NATO, would the US have stayed the course when facing much stiffer resistance than anticipated? In Iraq, the US acknowledged that it was not able to obtain as much legitimacy as it could have. I am aware that this is a contentious issue, but I am sure that insights like that do have an effect. Also, when the US refused to become a member of the ICC, it did not make a case in principle against an International Criminal Court. It raised specific concerns. If the European and American positions can be reconciled, the

NGOs and small countries play a big role for the development of international humanitarian law

The US and Europe are working together closely in many areas …

… and Europe does have a big influence on the US
result might be an ICC that is worth having, because it includes the United States.

Richard von Weizsäcker’s intervention notwithstanding, this discussion has been a meta-analysis of rules, a search for a rule for making rules. I think that a practical norm is of central importance here, the norm to seek agreement. The United States is more in favor of this norm than you might think. When it comes to specific rules, you will find the US open to suggestions. In many areas, most of them related to the new terrorist challenge, the American government is grappling and very willing to listen to constructive ideas. Rather than rehearsing a set of complaints about the United States, suggestions for improving the procedures and rules might be more useful and will probably meet more openness than is sometimes supposed.

To conclude, whether the United States is a hegemon or a unipolar power or a hyperpower: it is lonely and it likes friends.

I think that it is very important to recall that the Iraq conflict began as a problem of rules and the British and American approach to the fact that the Iraqis refused to stick by the rules. Our Prime Minister made it clear in his important speech yesterday that the problem is about rules. As we are following his suggestion to discuss rules, I think we all agree that rules and lawfulness lie at the heart of trying to make terror and rogue states less of a threat than they are today.

The big problem is, though, what to do when you cannot achieve a consensus on what to do. It is easy for our Round Table to stress the importance of an international or transatlantic consensus. But what if there is a consensus to do nothing? Tony Blair and George W. Bush perceived exactly that amongst many European Union states. There will always be circumstances in which big powerful states have to accept the responsibilities that go with power.

Nevertheless, lawfulness and sticking to rules also applies to our own government and, in particular, to the agencies working for our security. We had a debate in Great Britain recently about whether it was acceptable that the government at the behest of the CIA spied on our European partners. If this happened, and I believe that it did, it was a dangerous thing to do and reminds us that what our intelligence services do—and what they believe they find out can often be not what it seems. A failure on the part of the West to stick to the details in the rules of humanitarianism and human rights, as the Guantanamo Bay detentions illustrate, clearly undermines the general proposition which the West wants to up-
hold, namely that civic lawfulness and international lawfulness go hand in hand. We cannot seek to impose a law-based international order on states which are currently regarded as “rogue” if we do not adhere strictly to the laws of our own making, particularly in the field of human rights. Getting the Americans on board to accept this as the other side of the interventionist coin, would, though, be a far better way to foster lawfulness and the central importance of human rights than Bush-bashing.

I do not think that the international community’s consensus on Iraq was to do nothing. An overwhelming majority of states wanted to continue with the inspection regime. This majority had an opinion and presented a viable alternative on how to tackle the problem.

As a sort of legal fundamentalist, I agree that rules and international law are important. Nevertheless, we should talk more about enforcement mechanisms than about changing the rules, because the existing rules are not that bad. They even allow for non-state actors to be prosecuted for violating international humanitarian law.

As to human rights violations that have not yet mounted to a security threat, I see serious institutional short-comings. We should consider establishing a Permanent UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, where ambassadors discuss human rights violations and reports on a weekly basis. Such a permanent body would serve as an important “early warning” mechanism for the Security Council and it would indeed be more promising and effective than the repetitive effort in the current UN Human Rights commission session once a year, bringing about the same battles, the same resolutions and in the end, closing the shop to meet again next year. These problems must be tackled to bring about a real UN reform.

I was provoked during the first session by the suggestion that Iraq was a humanitarian intervention. My own organization, Human Rights Watch, and other humanitarian organizations have tried to define a threshold for humanitarian interventions to prevent humanitarian law from being hijacked for other purposes.

To begin with, we believe that the basic request, humanitarian intervention without the consent of the country concerned, is only justified in the face of ongoing or imminent genocide or comparable loss of life. If this threshold is met, at
least four additional conditions must be fulfilled for the use of force to be characterized as humanitarian. First, military action must be the last option after all other means are exhausted to halt or prevent slaughter. Second, the intervention must be guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose. Third, every effort must be made to ensure that the means used to intervene themselves do respect international humanitarian law. I refuse to subscribe to the view expressed by some, that certain abuses are legitimate if they stop other abuses. Fourth, it must be reasonably likely that the military action will do more good than harm. To add a procedural requirement, Security Council blessings should be there at least, or some kind of blessing by other legitimate international gatherings of countries.

If you apply those criteria to the Iraq intervention, you will come to understand why I profoundly disagree with the claim that it was a humanitarian intervention.

I would like to challenge David Rieff’s remarks on three points. First, if it is true that norms do not shape reality but can at best reflect reality, then why do we need norms at all?

Second, you have asked whether it is realistic to talk about rules when the main risks arise from non-state actors. In my opinion, the question should not be if there is a need for rules but rather what kind of rules are needed. There are international rules—supranational rules—that directly address citizens. For example, parts of humanitarian law directly address non-state actors. The ICC was built as an organ to implement this concept.

Third, I believe strongly that Security Council reform would be worthwhile because the Council in its current form lacks legitimacy, yet we urgently need a legitimate body. In Iraq, for example, insurgents refuse to talk to the occupying power but will speak to the UN envoy Brahimi. In a more abstract way, if humanitarian interventions take away sovereignty at the national level, this needs to be complemented by sovereignty at the international level. Therefore, we need a supranational body to which sovereignty can be transferred.

Finally, I would like to touch briefly on a question Richard von Weizsäcker has raised. Is there a need for more comprehensive UN reform? Should economic and environmental problems, diseases and overpopulation still be dealt with in the UN General Assembly or in ECOSOC? I see a tendency to shift competences from these institutions toward the Security Council, but I do not regard this as a positive development. The international community does not accept rules imposed by a
If humanitarian interventions take away sovereignty at the national level, this needs to be complemented by sovereignty at the international level.

Wiesbrock

body composed of 15, or maybe in the future, 25 states. We should consider other methods of creating international law on economic and environmental problems.

I propose first to optimize the cooperation among various UN organs, to let the President of the General Assembly and the President of ECOSOC talk in the Security Council and vice versa. This would create a linkage among the organs while keeping the topics in the appropriate organs.

This kind of discussion is just what I wanted to stimulate. What to do about the fact that the UN’s only powerful institution does not address questions of economic justice and the fight against poverty? How to give these major problems an appropriate forum in the international system? I did not intend to offer a perfect or detailed solution, but to encourage concrete proposals for new rules and institutions.

When defining abstract rules for humanitarian or pre-emptive interventions, we risk losing touch with reality. Legitimacy is a notion that can serve as an interface between policymaking and rulemaking. International law and rules tend to follow legitimate actions, not to precede them. Therefore I agree with Pauline Neville-Jones that gaining legitimacy by associating as many powers as possible must be the first step. The UN becomes active and effective as soon as the major powers agree. The “Neville-Jones rule” or “what reasonable people find reasonable is legitimate” is a very convincing definition in this respect. If the international community follows this guideline, rules will fall into place afterwards.

Once set up, though, norms can matter a great deal even if they cannot always be effectively enforced. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important example. Even though several countries have violated it and others have refused to sign up, it has manifested the idea of a world where countries do not try to acquire nuclear weapons. This was a decisive step, although the treaty’s severe practical shortcomings must be alleviated.

John Ikenberry rightly pointed out that our discussion is really about US power. During the run up to the Iraq war, we saw two different approaches by two major European powers. While the UK went along with the US, France and others opposed it. Neither of them was successful in influencing what America did. I think that with the end of the Cold War, not only the constraint of Soviet power but also the influence of Europe on the United States vanished. While I agree with Tod Lindberg that Europe still matters as a partner, Europe has ceased to be a

von Weizsäcker
Concrete proposals for adapting the UN’s structure

Bohlen
Legitimacy through comprehensive consensus

There is a widening gap between the US and Europe—for structural reasons
strategic preoccupation for the US and thus lost a lot of influence. The joint intervention in Kosovo, when interestingly Europe urged the US to act, merely masked this fundamental trend.

On the other hand, we must acknowledge that since 1945 the US frequently resorted to a unilateral use of force without causing comparable outrage. Grenada, Panama, or even Vietnam were not as important to Europe as Iraq is; therefore the US was more or less free to act on its own.

To clarify two important notions—as Christoph Bertram rightly reminded us—I would like to note that the US doctrine of pre-emption is in fact a doctrine of preventive war. International law allows for pre-emption in the face of an imminent threat, but the Bush Doctrine promotes preventive war against a suspected hostile intention.

Secondly, we have to clarify the term weapons of mass destruction. There is a world of difference between chemical or biological weapons and nuclear weapons. This would have been very important in the debate about whether Iraq was able to deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. I doubt that the issue would have been this contested and influential, had leaders been obliged to specify that they were talking about chemical, not nuclear weapons.

Notwithstanding the very understandable focus on Iraq, it might be useful to talk about the UN as the international system’s most important institution. I have spent the last five years at the International Peace Academy, an independent organization supporting the Secretary-General and the Security Council. From my perspective, the UN started important reforms and has already achieved a lot during this time.

First, as Lotte Leicht mentioned, the Landmines Convention is a major success of the UN. Second, the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC) will send an important message with its first case, prosecuting rebel forces responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are important steps toward establishing a culture of accountability. They demonstrate very clearly that the days of impunity for people who murder their own populations are over.

Third, the UN has been running transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor—who else would or could have done that? The role which the distin-
guished Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi played as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and as Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and now plays in Iraq shows the relevance of the UN in this area in a very concrete way.

Fourth, Richard von Weizsäcker’s proposal about integrating the World Bank and the IMF into the UN system and putting more emphasis on poverty reduction certainly makes sense. Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook a big effort with James Wolfensohn of the World Bank and with IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler to develop closer connections. Even though this has proven very difficult, the UN is not oblivious to the problem. Also, the UN itself is trying to build closer linkages between its social/economic and political/security departments. The focus of the UN’s work is to a significant extent shifting into post-conflict reconstruction these days. IPA’s program on “The Security-Development Nexus” aims at sustaining peace in countries emerging from protracted conflict. Once UN peacekeeping forces have left, there needs to be a strong focus on economic reconstruction, job creation and related areas.

The Security Council is and will remain the main forum for international security policy. Certainly, there has been forum shopping, when for example the G8 brokered the UN resolution on Kosovo. But this has not vitiated the Council’s centrality. Reforms should aim not at enlarging the Council per se (as this is a matter of considerable debate) but at enhancing its transparency and strengthening its consultative procedures. A lot has already been done about this. All these countries critical of the Security Council’s current composition and procedures nevertheless run for election on it. The Council can thus not be that useless, or illegitimate.

Finally, the report on “The Responsibility to Protect” by Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun mentioned by Reinhard Hesse gives proof of the UN’s activity in systematizing international norms. The report develops criteria not so much for legitimizing military intervention but for putting the responsibility on states and their leaders to protect their citizens. This important initiative follows on the debate which UN Secretary-General Annan opened up on Rwanda and Kosovo. I think the panorama I just sketched shows a broad array of important contributions of the United Nations to virtually all aspects of the international system.

In our discussion about a New World Order, the Middle East, which is my research focus, is of great significance. When applying to the region what we said about
norms and rules, it seems to me that we have to distinguish two different perspectives.

Rules can govern either what international actors should do or what they should not do. Norms for limiting actions, be it through institutions or through mechanisms of seeking consensus, are rather easy to find.

What the players should do, though, is a much more difficult question, transcending the realm of rules and touching the area of normativity. I see one major deficiency in the initiatives for promoting stability and democracy in the Middle East, be it the Greater Middle East initiative or the initiative that German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently proposed. These initiatives are based on the UNDP yearly reports and the Arab Development Report, which was praised for having been written by Arabs, even though its authors do not have any relevance in the region itself. Citing these reports not only does not help the region but excludes the people living there. You need to integrate regional perceptions and seek consensus within the region instead of developing Western solutions for people to either accept or have forced upon them.

The recent events in Haiti demonstrated that simply sticking to the rules is not enough to ensure legitimate interventions. On the one hand, there was a UN mandate for Haiti and everybody was happy with the outcome. On the other hand, Aristide complained that he was forced into exile by the US. We do in fact not know how he got on the plane that flew him out. In the end, it is not all about rules but also about politics.

Germans carry a certain obsession for rules in their blood. But even as a German, I understand the American concern that rules may be used as a pretext for refusing responsibility for political action. Reinhard Hesse said that rules for interventions are rules to break the rules. This seems to me a very European perspective. Americans would probably say: let us get rid of the rules preventing us action which we perceive as legitimate. It would not occur to them to ask for rules for making exemptions from these rules. Furthermore, in today’s unipolar world, the Gulliver US certainly does not have any practical interest in being bound by rules.

Lotte Leicht referred to the downside of rules. Their abstract and vague nature leads to very different interpretations and applications. Where does an intervention in the name of humanitarian rights promote these rights and where does it damage them? Thus, the game of rules is a tricky one. Consensus is a valid basis for action, but consensus is not the same as rules.
Heather Grabbe has vividly portrayed the impressive achievements of the EU with its high concentration of rules and norms. But the question remains of what these rules and instruments can contribute to a new global order. The EU’s successes lie in fields such as minority policy, in which the Union has replaced power through mutual rules. The size, power, and prestige of a state no longer play as big a part as was earlier the case in Europe and still is in much of the rest of the world. After all, the EU was built up as protection against the disintegrating forces of power politics. The dark side of this on the world stage is that its members are often content and eager to do nothing, perhaps because EU instruments are not directly applicable to global policy challenges. Still, they could provide valuable new ideas.

Karsten Voigt rightly demanded a convergence between rules and power. I think the organization predestined to make this convergence happen is NATO. Despite all its problems, including those caused by the US, it provides a framework through which re-negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty could be adapted to new circumstances. The Europeans would be mistaken to pursue their global ambitions outside the NATO framework. Not morally mistaken, but politically: it’s simply unrealistic. At the end of the day, success and only success decides how legitimate such approaches are.

We have been lingering for some time in a strange dichotomy between either having international law or none at all. Thereby, we have missed the real question: which international law? Even as the hegemon in a unipolar system, the US is active in all kinds of international law-making to complement its foreign policies, as most former empires have been. Hegemons tend to use international law as a tool, pushing toward more hierarchical mechanisms, instead of merely staying out of international law. Thus, the US pushes for action through the Security Council, through the World Bank or through the IMF, and in all of them it enjoys a dominant position. I think it would provide helpful insights to inquire which mechanisms of international law the US tends to foster. One could then think about which of them are also beneficial for integrating the superpower into the international system.

On the other hand, Europeans like to talk about international law as a sphere of the good and right, but in fact they also use it as a means for governing others. They are fond of treaties because many of the recent ones are very much in their interest, and the Security Council is so popular because it is a useful tool for
them—after all, Europeans are highly overrepresented in the Council. People in the Global South would probably contest that the US and Europe are very far apart on issues of international law, which indicates a major problem of legitimacy also for Europeans.

**Hamzawy**

I doubt whether reforming the Security Council is the most promising way to increase the international system’s efficiency. A much more important mechanism that can be reformed, are the special procedures of the UN system. The independent experts of these mechanisms are volunteers, they are not employed by the UN and can talk to most presidents of states without going through the bureaucratic procedures of the UN. Lately, they have been allowed to speak in the Security Council. The United Nations’ special procedures will enable it to play an important role in the future.

**Neville-Jones**

What the Security Council and the UN will do depends, I think, very much on how the Council interprets and enforces the UN Charter. For example, will the Charter be interpreted as permitting preventive war in certain circumstances? The US is not going to give up that particular bit of the Bush Doctrine.

Homeland security will also include preventive intervention in the future. As US homeland security policies develop, they will prove to be a very extended concept. In the end, they will result in a large “protected zone” including foreign countries on whose behalf the US acts and, if deemed necessary, intervenes.

Establishing a similar body beside the Security Council and thus two law-makers would lead to inconsistency and conflict. Activities beyond the competences of the Council are and should be covered by treaties establishing their own enforcement mechanisms. I consider the rise of the UN agencies beside the Security Council as a very promising development. These have a virtual monopoly on addressing crucial problems of international politics like humanitarian relief, refugees, reconstruction and policing. As far as I can see, they also have much better records on effectiveness and achieving international consensus than the Security Council.

I would propose taking up a model that worked successfully after the end of World War II: regional commissions under the auspices of the UN like the Economic Commission for Europe, UNECE, which was set up by ECOSOC in 1947. Reviving these and creating new ones for other parts of the world would give us a powerful instrument for including the inhabitants of the respective areas in the
solution of their problems. This could create a sense of responsibility and bring together economic assistance with issues of good governance.

While we have discussed the relation between rules and hard power at length, we have neglected the role of soft power. Both Europeans and Americans are currently having problems with soft power, at the heart of which lies legitimacy. Ultimately, only legitimacy can sustain power and give security to the powerful over a long period. General Marshall said after World War II: “A security policy is not the same as a war policy. We are not fighting individual countries but poverty and want, which make them our enemy.” During the last extended unipolar period in world history, the Roman Empire sustained power for nearly 4 centuries because it established rules backed by force. This combination of hard and soft power permitted Rome to build such a great single market and to get the populations of the conquered states to accept Roman rule.

Europeans therefore have good reasons to be horrified by how the US is overturning the institutions it so carefully nurtured, and indeed cajoled the Europeans to build after 1945. American soft power in Europe has suffered serious damage from that change in approach. The reputation of the US and of the European powers supporting it, like Britain, was damaged in the course of the Iraq intervention. First because they bypassed international law, second because they failed to achieve their stated war aims of making the world a safer place. There are serious doubts whether the war will reduce the threat of terrorism. Legitimacy, though, depends on whether policies actually serve their stated purposes. As opinion polls throughout the world show, the US lost a vast stock of its soft power.

Europe’s image problems have other roots. Europeans are bad at soft power because they rely too much on it. They are not tough enough about clearly defining good governance or democracy and then enforcing their goals. For example, the human rights clauses attached to every European agreement with any third country have never actually been used. Gross violations of human rights from Algeria to Zimbabwe have never made the EU suspend a single agreement. We also tend to let Russia off the hook. Only the transformative effect of the accession process on Central Eastern Europe is an example of the EU using soft power effectively.

Both Europeans and Americans have to think about what gives rules legitimacy. Lotte Leicht’s criteria for intervention and Amr Hamzawy’s demand to integrate those who are living in the region concerned show two important precondi-
tions for legitimacy. It is not enough for the Europeans and the Americans to agree about rules, when these rules lack consistency and consensus. Because the Arab street does actually notice hypocrisy. Every time you go to Libya or Syria, people ask you: "Why was there an intervention in Kuwait but none in Tibet?" Latin Americans asked me last week why the US helped remove the elected leader of Haiti. We have to act consistently enough to convince those who are affected and thus base our actions on a broad consensus.

To add to the lovely quotes cited hitherto, I would like to invoke Sigmund Freud's term “the narcissism of small differences.” Our discussion has shown that considerably less divides Europeans from Americans than what divides both of them from the rest of world. As long as the countries accustomed to doing the law-making refuse to let others take part in the process, all new sets of rules will fail to engender consent.

Our discussion about rules of a New World Order has been about how to cope with terrorism and rogue states. I think that is an important issue of national self-defense, and the dispute is not about its importance, but about modalities. Even my own dissent from the Bush Administration is about the threat posed by Iraq, not over whether my country has the right to defend itself. But responses to rogue states and terrorism cannot be the main building blocks of any world order, new or old. From the perspective of the Global South, terrorism and rogue states are not the principle threats. The basic problem of a “New World Order” is misery, all those people living on less than a dollar a day or dying from diseases like HIV/AIDS.
It is one of those days when Britain is at her most irresistible: Sunday morning, the sheep outside, the thinkers inside, and a captivating discussion ahead of us. Today we will focus on the practical consequences of our reflections about power, rules and the “New World Order.” Where will the international system with its new models of establishing order and enforcing rules be put to the test? Have lessons been learned from the Balkans, and have they been applied in Afghanistan or Iraq? Are we thus seeing the contours of a model for intervention emerge? Ghanim Alnajjar will start our session with an overview of recent interventions.

When optimists talk about an emerging “New World Order” and pessimists about a new world disorder, at least both of them agree implicitly that order is desirable. How to build that order, though, is one of the major questions of international politics. Sometimes small countries play an important role in that game. During the past decades, this in many cases led ultimately to interventions by the great powers.

Somalia, for example, has experienced interventions twice under very different circumstances. In 1977, Somalia’s invasion in Ethiopia to take over the Ogaden region almost started the Third World War, when the Soviet Union interfered to support the Ethiopians. The second intervention occurred after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. To be able to distribute food to the population, the UN asked for military assistance, and “Operation Restore Hope” was devised as a humanitarian intervention. It failed disastrously with the US withdrawing its soldiers in 1993. The Somalis did not perceive the intervention as a benign attempt to liberate the country in the interest of the people—other than, for example, the Kuwaitis when the US and its allies drove out the Iraqi occupiers in 1991.

Another left-over from the Cold War is Afghanistan. Here, the battle between the two super powers was fought. The US support for the resistance against the Soviet occupiers helped to bring about Al Qaeda and thus ultimately resulted in September 11. Today, the country has a constitution, which is not ratified yet and was developed on a tribal basis—it seems overly optimistic to me to talk about a functioning Afghan democracy.

I would now like to focus on the intervention in Iraq, because I spent a lot of time there since the fall of Saddam’s regime. Can the Iraqi experiment become a model for future interventions? There are reasons for doubt.

Most Iraqis were happy to get rid of Saddam Hussein. But the situation on the ground has been dominated by an incredible lack of planning since the coalition
forces took over. The Americans expected an influx of refugees and hundreds of oil wells going up in flames after the invasion. But in the end, there were no refugees and only twelve burning wells. Most of these were put out by Iraqi engineers, for $20,000 each, two of them by the Halliburton subsidiary KBR for $1,500,000 each, paid by the American tax payers. So the Iraqis see two new things in their country after the intervention: military and foreign business which is connected to the military. Plus, the United States is incapable of bringing the electricity system back to work; we were melting in the hotel rooms.

The handling of security matters was no better. Against all expectations, Iraq’s Baathists got a chance of reorganizing themselves after the allies’ victory. This was the first invasion I have ever seen that did not start with curfews, which allowed Baathists to meet undisturbedly. It was the Iraqi population that complained to the American and British military about these gatherings. Nobody listened until the attacks on the occupiers started. Things in Iraq are not as bad as they are depicted in the media, but it is a very fragile situation that could explode anytime. Iraqis turn to conspiracy theories because they cannot believe such incompetence. Many people think that this chain of mishaps is planned by the US because it wants things in Iraq to go wrong.

The plans of Western leaders to bring about a “New World Order” by the invasion of Iraq might be appealing in theory. But in reality, the experiment failed much too unambiguously for any planner in Washington to want to repeat it or to credibly threaten neighboring countries that they will be next. Also, getting support from other countries for that seems very improbable to me. Therefore, Iraq is only of limited value as a new model of intervention.

There were also positive experiences, though. While the international community, with its political battle in New York and in European capitals, forgot to help inside Iraq, international NGOs did a great job. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were the first to be there. They helped a lot, for example, in solving the prisoners of war issue. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been imprisoned. That was an absurd thing to do, after the allies had dropped all these leaflets asking the soldiers to surrender. After 3 months of tough negotiations, the NGOs convinced the military officials to start releasing them. Therefore, the idea of getting the whole world together to put Iraq back on its feet seems possible with the help of NGOs. They will also be instrumental in rebuilding civil society in a country that had no such thing for the last 35 years. This is something we can learn from Iraq and apply in future similar cases.
In the end, the success or failure of the Iraqi experiment from the view of the US and of Iraq will depend on which political system will be established. People in Iraq are working on that very seriously now, but it will take time. Thus, another experience from Iraq is the overwhelming importance of successfully building up a functioning state after bringing down the old regime.

You raised the question whether the invasion in Iraq could be a model for future interventions. When judging the occupation of Iraq, we should keep in mind that it is still at an early stage. The military campaign began not even a year ago. Also, I doubt whether we are free to allow Iraq to fail, concluding that the West should stick to its own business. Rather, I would like to turn the argument around: Iraq will have to be a success because similar actions will have to be taken elsewhere. Ed Luttwak’s argument about despots that “He may be a swine, but at least he is keeping everybody under control, so do not touch him” was as wrong for Saddam as it would be for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Nevertheless, in order to learn from current events in Iraq, a sober analysis of the mistakes made is indispensable. As far as I can see, the central problem was that planning for the occupation period was not properly undertaken. It should have been. The chaos of the early days seems likely to degenerate in worse disorder and possibly civil war. This should have been foreseen and understood before invasion was decided on. In May, 2003, I wrote in the “Times” that neither the Americans nor the British had contingency plans for taking over the documentation of Saddam Hussein’s regime. A fundamental step in building a new nation, though, is understanding the motives of the old nation. Another shortcoming of the American planning was their belief in “occupation ‘lite’.” True, you could topple Saddam’s regime with a relatively small force. But to provide security for ordinary Iraqis after victory, a much bigger force would have been needed. The occupation must succeed in making a free Iraq possible. At the same time, its occupiers must show they understand that their role is to liberate the Iraqis and end the abuses of human rights under Saddam. Anything less than this will not only add to the suffering of the Iraqis, it will give comfort to the European and American opponents of intervention and cause the West to be seen not as a friend, but as an enemy as cruel as the Baathists.

Having spent a large part of the last year in Iraq, I would like to come back to the question of what has been and what could be learned from the Balkans for the
Iraq war. I doubt that the situation in the Balkans and in Iraq is similar enough to allow for any learning effect.

Kosovo could be and was turned quite effectively into a protectorate over which the occupying forces, NATO, the EU, and the US, had comprehensive control. The so-called success in Kosovo might have its flaws. Washington and Brussels may have acted in some ways like US Senator George Aiken who wanted to end the Vietnam war by declaring victory and going home. But to a certain extent, control was established.

Iraq, though, is something entirely different. This time we are staying and declaring victory, but the victory is only partial, to put it charitably. Iraq cannot be turned into a protectorate like Kosovo, because it is too big, too well armed and its resistance is too well organized. In the Shiite South, American troops after the initial campaign simply stayed out of the Holy Cities and many villages. The British army backed off as well after losing six soldiers in an incident in a small city. They made no effort even to take any reprisal for the sensible reason that they knew it would have been a non-starter. The Sunni triangle is in no sense conquered and the US and other coalition forces in the South are proceeding very gingerly. That is often ascribed to the American wish to avoid casualties, but I think to some extent it is simply the reality of Iraq. Thus, the lessons of Kosovo and Bosnia could not be and were not applied to Iraq.

There is another major difference. What happened in the Balkans was rightly called humanitarian intervention. Applying it to Iraq is a fundamental, though widespread misuse of the term. In the proper sense, there was no humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Development issues and humanitarian needs were certainly on the agenda, as they are in any poor country in a war zone. But if you look at it from the perspective of Kinshasa or Freetown, there was no humanitarian crisis. The UN specialized agencies and humanitarian NGOs were used by the coalition. They were supposed to provide the prestige of humanitarian action to justify political decisions. One may well be in favor of the American invasion and still acknowledge that the concept of humanitarianism was abused in this context. The result is that the humanitarian movement finds itself in a crisis and that many NGOs, for example “Enfants de la Terre,” have withdrawn because they think their resources are better spent elsewhere. Also, they do not want to lose their independence and execute government policies.

Lastly, I would gently disagree with Ghanim Alnajjar’s assessment that there is no civil society in Iraq. The Shia councils survived Saddam Hussein’s rule much
better than either the proponents or the opponents of the invasion had expected. When the looting started right after the fall of Saddam, they made themselves felt in an extremely effective and coherent way. The West should not commit the common mistake of presuming that the occupiers will have to create civil society and recreate the state from scratch. Iraq has elements of a civil society, and even though Saddam’s regime was evil, it was not a failed state.

The question whether Iraq is a model for future interventions seems to me only of limited use. There is no “one size fits all” model in international politics. Neither the problems of the Balkans, nor Afghanistan, nor the Greater Middle East are the same as Iraq’s. Thus, I encourage everybody to abandon the search for one perfect set of rules for intervention and one infallible model for nation-building. We must accept that ad hoc approaches for individual cases are indispensable in international politics. This will give the international community freedom to act in the real world, diverse as it is.

Iraq and Afghanistan manifest several developments relevant for international order. It has become clear that interventions remain dependent on the UN; and the US is now trying to recruit as many countries as possible for building up Iraq. NATO is moving into a global role which it still has to digest. To what extent are the circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan specific, and to what extent is a model for international interventions emerging?

Michael Schaefer worked in the Balkans for the German Foreign Office for many years and, as Political Director, is now coordinating much of the policy towards Iraq. What, if any, lessons from the Balkans did the international community implement in Afghanistan? What experiences should we keep in mind for Iraq or for future similar cases?

I see Iraq as unique in so many aspects that it is difficult to even think about it as a model for future interventions. From the outset, the international community was more in disagreement about Iraq than it was or will be about any other issue I can think of in the recent past or near future. A similar constellation is not likely to arise again soon. Other cases, it seems to me, provide more insights and more reason for optimism for future challenges.

I do indeed think that lessons can be and have been learned in the Balkans—not so much for Iraq, but for Afghanistan. We went through different phases in
the Balkans, starting with Bosnia, then Kosovo and finally Macedonia. In every phase, we tapped into different resources of the international community. The experiences taken from the Balkans were then, to a certain extent, implemented in Afghanistan.

Let me first sketch out our learning process in the Balkans. Our first campaign, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was characterized by a mess of international organizations acting without any coordination. The Office of the High Representative had hardly any links with NATO or the UN, the OSCE and a plethora of other organizations. None of these actors was connected to any of the others. The structure improved in Kosovo with the establishment of UNMIK and the four-pillar approach. That was a lesson successfully learned from Bosnia, even though we are far from success in Kosovo and the most difficult political phase still lies ahead of us. The international community’s next sphere of activity in the Balkans, Macedonia, is an underestimated success story. We were on the ground early and acted in a coordinated fashion. The military’s role was restricted to stabilizing the political process, acknowledging that security forces cannot do nation-building but only provide a framework of relative stability. Nation-building from the bottom up, with the assistance of the international community, was undertaken successfully with the Ohrid process.

Afghanistan, of course, is a more difficult case. It is not only bigger than the Balkan countries, but also divided into several warlords’ and local governors’ spheres of dominance which are beyond the reach of the weak central government. Nevertheless, the international community’s approach to Afghanistan has successfully been based on lessons learned in the Balkans. Nation-building there is assisted through the international community but built mainly on Afghan initiative. We combine it with a small military security presence. The military is very helpful and successful in cooling off the situation and thus providing room to build security structures, even though the Southern area remains a problem area.

The international community’s biggest mistake was to concentrate the stabilization efforts on Kabul. We ought to have moved into the provinces earlier, as we have done belatedly during the last nine months with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. That might have at least contained some of the currently growing problems, especially the drug problem. Also, to successfully complete its task in Afghanistan, the international community must improve the generation of funds and civil assistance drastically. NATO, I think, should concentrate on Afghanistan as its first campaign in distant areas. Engaging additionally
in Iraq would overstretch NATO’s resources and thus jeopardize success in Afghanistan.

Michael Schaefer was right to characterize the international community’s approach in Afghanistan as a successful model—in theory. In practice the friction in certain areas is only too obvious. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, especially, have to greatly improve their coordination if we want such missions ever to become a success story to be applied in other international operations.

In this context, I’d like to return to the possibility of a new, more broadly-defined role for NATO. Calls for reformulating the NATO strategy of 1999 are rightfully growing louder. Without going into whether a term like “Harmel 2” was wisely chosen, it is in fact of paramount importance for the alliance to define its place between the European Security Strategy and the Americans’ National Security Strategy. Should NATO move toward a hinging function or should the key elements of both be integrated in a new, overarching strategy?

Above all, I believe we must urgently develop concepts for a global role for NATO without taking up the role of world policeman. How, for example, could NATO become more effective in the Greater Middle East? I use this geographic term, which I am very critical of, in a broad sense to encompass the region between Morocco and Pakistan. I think the idea of a “NATO-Plus,” meaning with associated states below the level of full membership, would be very productive in improving effectiveness and acceptance. Russia could participate like this, and so could, in other circumstances, China or India. Just as important, the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union has to be based on complementarity, not duplicity. NATO should definitely include fighting terrorism and preventing WMD proliferation much more explicitly as objectives and implement them with concrete strategies.

NATO’s central problem is now showing in Afghanistan. We should not allow the operation in Iraq to distract us from the situation in Afghanistan, which is the real test case for the Alliance and in which so much political capital has already been invested. NATO’s central problem is simply a question of resources. Does the Alliance have the capabilities to match its political aspirations?

Providing a security umbrella for nation-building in Afghanistan, as Michael Schaefer outlined, stretches NATO’s capability to the limits. These are extremely personnel-demanding operations in terms of sustainability, rotation, and in pro-
viding certain types of capability, particularly airlift. But the member states have thus far been extremely reluctant to recognize their commitments and to increase their contributions. For example, at the December Ministers of Defence meeting in Brussels, NATO’s Secretary General George Robertson allegedly had to almost blackmail the nations for new helicopters. Finally, he was promised seven - many fewer than he wanted. Even those seven have not yet been delivered. At least one member country even asked the United States to pay for the transport.

The number of useable NATO forces that are readily available for new operations is a story of scarcity, too, and, of course, for several key countries, Iraq is a drain on badly needed resources. There is no quick solution to this question of overstretch. Most Alliance countries are in the process of restructuring and reorganizing their armed forces—some have already done so—to provide capabilities more appropriate to the new security environment. But these changes take time - and even then, demand may continue to strain supply.

In the meantime, we will have to be as imaginative and flexible as possible in implementing peace support operations and in drawing in non-NATO contingents. Approaches to draw on other countries’ resources, as for example, New Zealand’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, should be encouraged. The success of these PRT’s and the difficulties they will face in Afghanistan remain an open question. However, there is no doubt that their ability to extend the influence of the central government beyond Kabul and provide reassurance to the local population will be crucial to providing long-term stability and security in Afghanistan. The model established in the Balkans in both SFOR and KFOR of including units from different countries, such as Morocco or Egypt, could also be reviewed. Whatever means or methods are considered, it will be crucial for NATO to prove in Afghanistan that it is able to commit the resources and deploy the forces needed to fulfil its goals.

Russia does not and will never belong to NATO, and this military alliance is approaching our borders despite our objections for decades. Therefore NATO is the least liked international organisation in Russia. Seen as a legacy of the Cold War still searching for its new mission, its raison d’être still remains entirely unclear to us. Our relations to NATO’s members are better than those with NATO. Will the NATO-Russia Council or “NATO at 20” change that? Certainly not in its present form. At the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Russian representatives get briefings, but no discussions and even less say in decision-making. Talking
about proliferation or terrorism with countries like Iceland and Denmark, and soon also with Estonia and Bulgaria, might be interesting and great fun. But any serious Russian politician would prefer to discuss these issues bilaterally in Washington or London.

As my predictions for the NATO-Russia Council are bleak, I think that Russia will remain in an isolationist mood. Our major problems are domestic. Therefore, Russia will try to avoid being involved in international campaigns like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. We do not see them as Russian problems, even though we would certainly not like the West to fail, because that would increase instability on our borders.

Let me give you an assessment of what could be China’s role in the emerging new international framework of institutions and alliances. China is becoming increasingly active within the United Nations and takes more responsibility for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, for example in bringing North Korea back from the nuclear brink. But we are still far from a “NATO plus China,” even though there have been some initial discussions. The idea of China becoming a force for building democracy is even more remote and brings with it a certain irony. At the moment, China has its own set of priorities within the UN. To preclude Taiwan from gaining international recognition, for example, it refuses to support peace-keeping missions in places that recognize Taiwan, most recently in Liberia.

Nevertheless, in terms of its domestic political and economic development, China is moving in the right direction. A confluence of international pressure and domestic developments may well lead to China playing an important role for international stability within 10 years. All these positive developments and good long term prospects for democratization in China will lead the country toward a more positive role in the international community. The path to this goal, though, will be a long and messy one.

Gerald Chan, NATO is active in Afghanistan, which is practically on the border of China; American forces are in Uzbekistan. It seems that China is suddenly surrounded by the military presence of the West. Does the country regard that with suspicion or with interest? I understand that recently a high NATO official has been invited to China to talk about possible contacts.
I think that two contradicting schools of thought are at work within China's foreign policy community. On the one hand, China is suspicious of encroachment by the USA or by NATO, advocating an almost royalist view of sovereignty that precludes any form of intervention in domestic affairs. This derives from its historical experiences of being repeatedly invaded or humiliated by foreign countries.

On the other hand, the Chinese are keen to develop better links with the outside world. They initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Council with six countries in the Central Asian region to promote regional cooperation on counter-terrorism, trade and other issues. To promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region, China has deepened its relationships with various countries within ASEAN. As a huge developing nation, China also strives to lead the Third World. At the WTO meeting in Cancun, it successfully rallied countries like Brazil against American and European farm subsidies. With some European powers, China is united in its desire to promote a multilateral international system to counter US unipolarity. The Chinese are closer to the French and the Germans in that than to the British. France even declared 2004 "the year of China" to deepen the relationship with China as a means of advancing a multipolar international system based on the balance of power. China has a checkered relationship with the USA. But even that has warmed up recently, because the Chinese realized that the US is instrumental in many of its fundamental foreign policies, for example toward Taiwan or North Korea.

China's tendency to open up and develop closer relationships with foreign powers will be limited by one restraint—among others—within the next years, though. The country still suffers from a lack of trained diplomats and of experience in international forums. But China is evolving and learning at a remarkable pace.

The American perspective on the New World Order is divided into at least two camps. There is a much more serious debate going on in the United States than one year ago, and which view will prevail in another year's time remains an open question.

The radical world view of the so-called neocons is known to have inspired the views of the Bush administration, even if they are not identical. It finds its most extreme expression in Richard Perle's and David Frum's book "An End to Evil." This unabashed argument for the US to use its power makes very entertaining reading: Force should be used to bring about regime change in Iran and North
Korea, while secessionists in Eastern Saudi Arabia are to be supported to secure the oil reserves if the House of Saud does not overcome its difficulties. Europeans will be forced to choose between France and the US, with dire penalties for those who make the wrong choice. On the positive side, establishing a democracy in Iraq will serve as a flagship for the democratization of the Middle East.

The opposing, more traditional, liberal internationalist approach was outlined by Paul Schroeder in his presentation. It bases international order on the reality of US power deployed in cooperation with its European allies, making extensive use of US soft power and the international organizations that the US helped create. The United States’ dominance is not taken for omnipotence, and legitimacy plays more of a role than in the first model.

Today, the Bush Administration takes a position between the two. Without a doubt, its heart still belongs to the “go-it-alone school.” It still justifies the Iraq war, if for other reasons than a year ago, stands by its right to unilateral preventive war and regime change and continues to advocate the “with us or against us” approach. Thus, at the level of ideology the transatlantic split still seems very wide.

But the situation on the ground has brought a more realistic outlook. The reality of the invasion of Iraq had the sobering effect to demonstrate the limits of military force. To date, the world’s most powerful military machine has been unable to put down an insurgency that does not even enjoy broad support within the Iraqi population. The US occupation has proven quite inept at dealing with post-war reconstruction, due to a really breathtaking lack of planning and complacency about the malleable nature of Iraqi society. Belatedly the Bush administration had to recognize that it could not go it alone or with just a coalition of the willing. It has thus turned to the UN to mediate the stalemate over elections and to confer legitimacy on the transfer of power. Despite the continuing resentment of France, there is a quiet effort to mend fences with the Europeans and to involve NATO in Iraq. Once sovereignty has been returned to the Iraqis, the US will certainly have to rely even more on others for resources.

The overwhelming difficulties and costs of the intervention in Iraq have also reduced the appetite for further pre-emptive wars. In any case, force was always the least attractive option for dealing with the other “axis of evil” countries, Iran and North Korea.

Today, both sides want to put the disputes of last year behind them, although no one has changed his or her mind about the war. But Schadenfreude from the European side is an unaffordable luxury, because we cannot risk letting Iraq and
We have to leave those quarrels unresolved and move ahead.

Bohlen

... because transatlantic cooperation is the basis of any viable international order

Structural differences between the US and Europe

What Europe has to contribute: concepts for the Greater Middle East Initiative ...

the surrounding region descend into chaos. The recognition is spreading in Europe that sitting back, criticizing American bellicosity, and resorting to inaction is not an option. The way ahead does not lie in trying to agree on lessons to be drawn from Iraq, because we would be condemned to argue for the next decade. We have to leave those quarrels unresolved and move ahead. The German/French/British protocol with Iran about its nuclear program is an encouraging sign, even though Washington does partly disagree with the approach. Also, all major European powers are willing to take part in the so-called “Proliferation Security Initiative” that allows interdiction on ships carrying prohibited materials, despite the lack of a clear basis in international law.

This cooperation is good news because there can be no viable international order that is not rooted in a US-European partnership. Of course, the US will continue to be the dominant partner, the unchallenged military power and main exporter of security, as it has been for the past 50 years. But it will have to rely again on the transatlantic partnership and associate with other powers like Russia, China, or India, and the more traditional partners like Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This mutual desire to move on despite much bitterness offers a reasonable prospect for resuming common action. There are many areas in which the dispute over Iraq never interrupted the war against terrorism and the endeavor to define a common agenda.

We should not delude ourselves, though, that this will be easy. Even without falling into Robert Kagan’s facile categories of “Mars and Venus,” one must recognize that the ready consensus of the Cold War—which had its moments of great division, too—is gone for good. Europe and the US have been drifting apart in many ways for the last 10 years, including our views on the use of force, the willingness to push Israel on the Palestinian issue, and our ongoing trade disputes. An increasing number of voices in the US question the value of a united Europe. The common European defense policy as well as the approach to Iran will remain troublesome issues. These differences are of a structural nature and will not fade away with the end of the Bush Administration.

But the costs of continued division are just too high and the common interests, from combating terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons to addressing the problems of the Greater Middle East, are too comprehensive to keep on quarreling. Everybody in the US agrees on how important the Middle East is, but America is in need of partners who contribute conceptual input. Our president’s Greater Middle East Initiative has many weak points. For example, it fails to offer viable con-
cepts for the Palestinian/Israeli problem. It also lacks ideas for democratizing the Middle East without de-stabilizing those regimes which used to be our friends and sources of stability, but which nowadays are the main obstacles to change.

We also have to join efforts to adapt existing institutions to new challenges. Simon Lunn is right in diagnosing that NATO’s capabilities are being stretched. But once we recognize that we need peace-keeping forces only for a limited number of places, whereas in most instances we face rather a demand for nation-building capabilities, a combination of NATO and OSCE might be able to master these tasks.

Last year, the preponderant perception was that the US could shape the world, or at least the US acting in accord with the Western powers. Today, not only the US is discovering the limitations of what it can do alone. We come to see that even if all major powers act together, there remain financial, political and psychological limitations, and there will always be resistance. If there are more problems than we can solve, we need a debate about priorities. In the context of the transatlantic relationship, that means a debate about strategy not only on the European but on a global scale.

We also need a transatlantic debate about the balance of power. The US Constitution balances a strong president with a strong congress and judiciary. Similarly, in an alliance of democratic nations it is a legitimate desire of the weaker powers to be able to balance the stronger power. During the last year, the US seemed to lose its traditional strength of being open toward outside influence. This increased the European desire to establish a multi-polar international system. If the two sides of the Atlantic do not renegotiate their relationship, we will not be able to establish a functioning global system that eventually includes even China or Russia. There will be no consensus in the UN, and common actions, for example with NATO in Iraq, will end in conflict unless a transatlantic strategy is defined. The negotiations of this strategy will have to take into account that not only the US is less dependant on Europe today, but Europe also depends less on the US. The relationship is not defined by one side becoming weaker and the other becoming stronger, but by a qualitative change on both sides.

First of all, to analyze our situation, the conflict over Iraq, which is both transatlantic and intra-European, has prompted a new discussion on the chances and limits of transatlantic cooperation.
Columnists such as Charles Krauthammer speak of “the end of NATO”; Atlanticists like Ivo Daalder of “the end of Atlanticism.” And two years ago, Robert Kagan topped them all when he wrote in his article “Power and Weakness” that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, and should finally stop acting as if Europe and America have any common ground.

And indeed, there are major structural differences between Europe and the United States. In our capabilities, in our perceptions, in our strategies. Yet have they not always existed? What is causing all this insecurity all of a sudden?

I believe three factors played a role: First, the end of the Cold War and the resulting decline of European feelings of dependence on the US. Second, what I call the trauma of 9/11. It made real the new quality of threats to security, which no longer emanate primarily from states, but as an asymmetrical terrorist threat, to which the international community has yet to find an adequate response. And thirdly, we see today an America that, in this time of global political realignment, no longer just defines its interests alone, as it used to do, but implements them alone or together with a handful of partners. The once-benevolent superpower has adopted a new, paternalistic understanding of order.

The present transatlantic crisis is therefore not based purely on Iraq. Its roots lie deeper. One thing, however, is certain. All their differences notwithstanding, Europe and America still constitute the largest zone of peace and prosperity the world has ever seen. Despite some divergent interests, we are still supported by a broad consensus of values that can be harnessed for longer-term policy.

However, the present disagreements cannot be just superficially patched up. They must be analyzed objectively and the mutual scope for adjustment defined more clearly to each side than it has been. A deeper transatlantic strategic dialog is essential for implementing needed reforms to the international system, upon which a new agenda of international cooperation could be erected.

I would like to discuss five key elements of this kind of global political agenda. First, the EU must develop its strategic dimension. The European Community was founded on the catastrophic experience of two world wars. It was built up pragmatically according to mainly economic interests, yet it had a historical dimension: reconciliation among wartime adversaries, especially Germany and France; Germany and Poland.

What should have been clear after 11/9/89 was comprehended only after 9/11/01: that the EU is on the threshold of a fundamental paradigm change. We realize that the days of a Europe occupied mainly with itself are over.
We stand before new tasks that will determine our 21st century. With our population of more than 420 million, we must help politically shape globalization. And we must prevail over asymmetrical threats. The EU has gained a strategic dimension, something which has profound consequences. We will master these only if the European Union manages to become an effective agent of security policy.

To do this, the EU must command the appropriate weight internationally. Concepts such as that of a “core Europe” cannot do justice to the new strategic dimension. New approaches toward enhanced cooperation may be helpful, but a “small European” solution would be the wrong response to the great challenges we face.

If this strategic dimension extends into European unification, then the EU’s acceptance of a Turkey that meets European standards takes on a completely new significance.

The evolution towards an EU with a strategic dimension can, however, succeed only with more integration and stronger institutions. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires new and resilient buttresses. With the European Security Strategy we have taken an important step in the right direction. It strengthens inner coherence and sends a powerful signal to others of Europe’s willingness to act. This must also be anchored in the EU’s structures. The European Constitution points the way toward greater effectiveness for the EU. It is flexible, dynamic, and has development capabilities. The intergovernmental conference was postponed, not broken off. I am confident that it will yet come to a positive conclusion.

In an EU of 25 we need more leadership. The European Foreign Minister, supported by a full diplomatic corps, will be key to a more effective Europe in foreign and security policy.

And last but not least, as important as European soft power is, the EU cannot do without significant improvements in its military capabilities. The widening role of the EU in security policy matters can be fulfilled only with the appropriate military capabilities that complement its civilian ones, not through wishful thinking. The French-German-British initiative to establish battle groups for missions under UN Security Council mandates is an example of improving operational capabilities.

My second thesis is that global security will require a new transatlantic partnership. The USA is the sole power with global reach. It will remain the leading Western power for many years to come.
A Europe that defines itself in opposition to America is doomed to fail. Multipolar European thinking directed against third parties leads into this dead end. Europe can gain effectiveness only as an actor in a global political system constructed around effective multilateralism.

Yet the external ring of transatlantic cohesion, the East-West conflict, no longer exists. The threats we now face have become more diffuse and are not as easy to pinpoint. The overcoming of the East-West conflict holds dangers, but also opportunities.

Firstly, there is the danger of unilateralism by the hegemon. The US is tempted to seek out partners to push through its national interests and use multilateral instruments à la carte. If it became the rule, this “tool box” approach would wind up destroying NATO and other multilateral organizations.

That is not in Europe’s interest and cannot be in America’s either. Postwar Iraq proves this. We have a much greater interest in a viable and effective alliance.

The ramifications of this are obvious: the old NATO has served its purpose, while the new NATO can be imagined only as a two-pillar model with the US as the senior power and the expanded EU as a fully-fledged partner, with a division of labor, complementary, but at the same level. First with a European caucus, later with the EU as a NATO member.

Encouraging this process means leading the EU more rapidly and effectively than in the past towards international conflict management. The operations Concordia and Artemis were the initial, successful steps. The replacement of SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the real acid test for the EU’s new viability in safeguarding security.

The European Security Strategy complements existing transatlantic security structures through a credible catalog of political action. It sends a clear signal of transatlantic solidarity and European willingness to shoulder responsibility. An effective EU takes pressure off the United States and strengthens the transatlantic partnership.

My third thesis is that the transatlantic relationship must be expanded by establishing a strategic partnership with Russia. Effective answers to the new threats are imaginable only through close cooperation with Russia. This is true especially for stability in and around Europe, but also for the critical zone of the Middle East.

Russia is presently going through a difficult transformation process. Domestic developments that some like to describe as “democtatorship,” the image of hu-
man rights displayed by the conflict in Chechnya, and hegemonic behavior in the post-Soviet zone all give cause for concern.

Yet this enormously complex and, in a country as huge as Russia, heterogeneous paradigm change demands patience and moderation. Both sides must be ready to discuss issues, including disputed ones, unconditionally, openly, and fairly. Chechnya and media freedom in Russia must be subjects of debate together with the treatment of ethnic minorities in the EU.

The goal must be to continually expand the foundation of our mutual convictions and values. That applies for direct relations between Russia and the EU as much as with, for example, the OSCE, where we both carry direct and mutual responsibility. Problems such as those in Moldova can be resolved only through incorporating all interests concerned and not through unilateral action.

Fourth, the Middle East can become the test case for a new global political cooperation. This crisis area, with the strategic threat of Jihad terrorism aimed at all open societies, constitutes the most serious challenge of the early 21st century. One central problem is to reconcile modernization and democratic participation so as to deprive fanatical nationalism of a fertile base. We can succeed in whittling down this threat only if we act on a global scale and harness all instruments we have available.

America and Europe must tackle these enormous challenges together with Russia, Japan, and other partners. The series of summit meetings this Spring—G 8, EU-USA, and NATO—gives us an opportunity to do so. This is the reason that Foreign Minister Fischer has put forward a suggestion for a “Transatlantic Initiative.”

Most importantly, this initiative cannot be allowed to become perceived as a paternalistic, top-down dictation. It must listen to the concerns of all affected countries in the region and develop solutions together with them. Analyses from the region, such as the UNDP’s Human Development Report, have already done valuable preliminary work.

This is not a matter of establishing institutions or structures, but of using the ones we have more effectively and achieving synergies through division of labor. Still, we must acknowledge that without significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in Iraq, Arab cooperation with the West will be tentative at best.

And finally my fifth thesis: Global political cooperation can be based only on the power of law, not on the law of the most powerful. The European Security Strategy states that the UN Charter constitutes the fundamental framework of international relations.
The treatment of the United Nations, and especially the role of the Security Council, has taught us two things: First, that even for the world’s sole remaining superpower, the UN remains the most important source of international legitimacy. And second, the UN must adapt to the new global challenges. What specifically does that mean?

This may be a banal statement by now, but the makeup of the Security Council reflects the power constellation of the postwar era. It can therefore not do justice to the new challenges of the 21st century. Regional powers that must shoulder responsibility—such as Japan, India, South Africa, Egypt, or Brazil—constantly have to be incorporated into the process of making and implementing decisions. This applies without a doubt for Germany as well. Without a broader basis of decision-making, the Security Council’s legitimacy will erode even further.

Just as decisive is the issue of the legitimacy of acting upon security policy. The discussion over the pre-emptive use of force, an important aspect of the US National Security Strategy, is an expression of widespread insecurity over the question of what instruments the international community can use in responding to terrorism or proliferation.

The basic question is: when does international law permit the use of force? This question is far less difficult to answer than some would believe. In any case there is no need for new international standards. Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains an exception-to-the-rule mechanism.

As long as the Security Council remains inactive, Article 51 governs the right of individual or collective self-defense. It is narrowly constructed and requires an imminent threat of attack to justify the use of force. In an age of advanced technologies, weapons of mass destruction, and very long range ballistic delivery systems, there must be an understanding of how to interpret what “imminent threat” of attack means.

The case regulated in Chapter VII is much more broadly defined. The Security Council can legitimize the use of force whenever it ascertains a “threat to world peace according to Art. 39.” The use of force, then, is always possible if the Security Council agrees that it is necessary, and without having to wait for an actual violation of the peace or an attack.

We can conclude, then, that it is not the Charter that is at fault, but the lack of political will to implement it. We therefore have to develop benchmarks for cases in which international commitments must be upheld. The issue of material application of the veto cannot remain a taboo.
We can hope that the blue ribbon commission appointed by Kofi Annan after the Iraq war will find concrete answers to these questions. Personally, I believe the United Nations and only the United Nations can be taken seriously as the basis for effective global political cooperation. Iraq was the best example for this. We are currently experiencing that the Iraq file is landing precisely where it was in the beginning: in the Security Council.

Mr. von Weizsäcker was right. The constitution of the Security Council no longer corresponds to the reality of today’s distribution of power, but that cannot be our sole driving force. In the future, the Security Council must be prompter in discussing the defense of international commitments. Violations of human rights, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and other cornerstones of international law must be tackled, and not only when there is no more alternative to deadly force. The Security Council must become more an instrument of preventive foreign policy.

As far as the strategic dialog is concerned, I see the problem less in the analysis than in the political will to implement what we think is right. I am quite pessimistic on this point. In the descent to the Iraq war, we pulled away from each other farther than we had to, and we carelessly damaged the institutions we depend on.

We must clearly acknowledge that there is no alternative to multilateralism, nor to the United Nations, nor to NATO. And we must act accordingly. I also wish to gently caution against trying to play off a “European caucus” within NATO against the American claim to hegemony. And the transatlantic division of labor means that it is not an alternative to partnership, and partnership can also mean taking on unpleasant tasks.

Mr. Schaefer may have been right when he described the experiences in the Balkans and how they were applied in Afghanistan. But the political lesson of the Balkans is that we Europeans could restore a lost peace only together with the US. These are precisely the premises that we violated in the lead up to the Iraq war, and in doing so did sustained damage to our relationship with the United States.

I was not arguing in favor of a European caucus within NATO acting against the United States. But the integrating EU with its new European Security and Defense Policy will, I am sure, develop a common voice. This will find its expression in the NATO structures.
It seems to me that we have been asking the wrong question in large parts of our discussion. We should not only think about how to use the UN or NATO, but about what to actually use them for. If there were no transatlantic rift, if we all agreed on Iraq and if we had all the resources we needed—would we know what to do? I do not think so. Even though the international community agreed on how to act in Haiti, the long-term outcome of this intervention might be no better than in Iraq.

To my mind, the main challenge today is to find models for effective nation-building. How can the international community improve domestic governance structures in poorly functioning states? Many interesting questions have been raised in our discussion: Has the EU, with its incredible success-story of nation building, a formula to offer? Which of its instruments can be applied in other parts of the world? How do things look from the perspective of the targets? What should be the role of non-state actors like NGOs or multinational corporations in changing governing structures? We know virtually nothing about this.

Nation building also requires viable alternative structures to conventional sovereignty. Even if we had enough resources and could get to act together, we should not try to reconstruct conventional sovereignty in all failing states. It is much more useful to think about, for example, the problems and opportunities of establishing de-facto or de-jure protectorates.

The international community must find a set of rules for nation-building and new models of sovereignty that the Americans and the Europeans can agree on as well as the Chinese, the Japanese, the Russians and the developing countries. All the major powers are interested in creating a more stable international environment by improving governance in weak states. Making progress in this area is more important than thinking about a more stable balance of power. Thus, our problem is not so much the input side and the institutional structure, but what to do if we had all the inputs that we can dream of.

Let me offer some observations about the challenges of post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-keeping. First, security on the ground must be improved. Therefore, demobilization and the disarmament of armed forces must be prepared much better and tackled much faster after an intervention than hitherto. In Afghanistan, troops of local warlords which had been disarmed were rearmed by operation “Enduring Freedom,” and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have added to the problem by ignoring it. That has frustrated many of ISAF’s operations.
International troops going into a country must make sure not to become part of the problem.

Leicht

and more generally the efforts to deal with security in Afghanistan. In Bosnia disarmament and demobilization were handled better, but in Liberia the problem is not being tackled at all. In Congo, demobilization started only to then be dropped and people were recruited again—now we see the conflict reemerge.

Second, as you can not oversee security in a country indefinitely, you have to train local police and security forces. In that context, we must put much more emphasis on vetting those we train. In Afghanistan, local warlords send their people for training to Kabul, and when they come back they engage with their warlords again. We could learn from Cambodia at least one thing: people sent by local masters were not sent back to them after training but somewhere else to take them out of their usual environment.

Third, intervention troops should let independent parties like the UN protect evidence. In Iraq, a lot of evidence has disappeared and the trust of the remaining evidence is extremely low because it has not been protected by an independent actor. In Kosovo, a lot of evidence was lost after the arrival of NATO troops because NATO was so absorbed with its own security. First-hand information about abuses of the Kosovo Liberation Army was not filed in a way that would allow investigators to use it. Investigation of crimes therefore risks becoming a pretty one-sided affair.

Fourth—and this is my main point—international troops going into a country must make sure not to become part of the problem. For example, trafficking in women rises whenever internationals arrive, be it Bosnia, Kosovo or Africa. We are now seeing Bosnian women trafficked into Iraq, because the demand there or in Afghanistan is so high that you need women from outside. Those running the brothels are entrepreneurs who know that the presence of internationals means a rising demand. In most of these countries, prostitution is illegal. Therefore, every soldier who visits a brothel adds to organized crime, which is a major obstacle for long-term development. There are very few internal accountability mechanisms, and often the worst that can happen to a soldier is to be shipped home during the night. You can not even prosecute the criminals because the witnesses/soldiers involved are gone. I have just attended a historical meeting on trafficking at NATO. NATO understands now that a “boys will be boys”-attitude means supporting organized crime. There is a willingness to tackle the problem, but much more remains to be done to establish internal safeguards in NATO and elsewhere.
I believe that the insistence on identifying a model, a single globally applicable approach to the problems the international community—and the West in particular—confronts is misguided. The idea of a mechanistic formula for bringing the major centers of the world (US, Europe, Russia, China, India) into a single paradigm is not fruitful. Nor is the demand for a single agenda (“what is this all leading to?”, as one participant asked.) By setting such arbitrary high parameters for “success,” we both denigrate how much has been achieved and circumvent the need for more careful case-by-case analysis of what needs to be done to build a safer world, e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are our current preoccupations—but also in much of the developing world.

The West has made great progress in bringing peaceful relations to a wider Europe, through the endorsement of NATO and the European Union and by drawing the Russian Federation into dialog, albeit incomplete and often frustrating, on the requirements for a more peaceful and stable world. The consensus at the United Nations on the condemnation of 9/11 and all terrorist acts and the mandatory obligation to enforce international conventions against terrorism (UNSC Resolution 1373) is also a big step forward—even if there is no agreed definition on the definition of terrorism (given the argument over wars of national liberations).

Therefore, we should not be quite so gloomy or pessimistic. That said, what we still profoundly lack is a way to empower those billions of people mainly in the Islamic world but also in the global South so that they also will have a sense of inclusion and a stake in building a more peaceful world. The West cannot win “the war on terror” by military means alone, or by the eradication of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. As long as their grievances and anger find wide resonance, more Al Qaedas will arise.

What about nation-building (or state-building), also known as post-war reconstruction? This is the major challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in the so-called failed states in Africa—Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) etc. We have gone through a process of trial and error in the 15 years of the post-Cold War era. Here again there is no single magical formula. But we can draw certain preliminary observations. People need hope; they need to believe that a better future for their children is possible; people need to have a sense of participation, not imposition by outsiders in rebuilding a destroyed country. The use of force, or the presence of peacekeepers, is often necessary to restore order and hold back or defeat warlords; but reconstruction cannot be done by soldiers.
The international community can help with financial and technical assistance, restoring infrastructure, training police, encouraging transparency in governance, and establishing parliaments and effective oversight mechanisms. All this requires money, time, patience—and knowledge of local values, traditions and leaders.

Here is where the United Nations becomes indispensable. It is the only body which can confer legitimacy on an international intervention. The experience of UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor as transitional administrations may be exceptional. In these two cases, the UN functioned as a de facto colonial administrator. More recently, in Afghanistan, the United Nations adopted a “light footprint” supporting the embryonic Karzai government. In Iraq, the UN is proving indispensable—needed by the U.S. to legitimize the transition from an unpopular occupation to a viable Iraqi political structure acceptable to the Iraqi public and its various community leaders. The UN should have an integral role in Iraq’s post-war reconstruction—but as advisor to a new Iraqi leadership.

In sum, the West should not seek to establish an impossible new single “global framework.” We need to accept more rather than less diversity of opinion (we are not yet at “the end of history”); to look beyond hard threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and hard power to the soft threats of population explosion, globalization, and the sense of exclusion. We need to harness the soft power of multilateral cooperation and dialogue to create broader prospects for the emerging arenas of peace and prosperity. Much can be done not at the level of grand ideas but by focusing on the patient, long-term reconstruction of countries and societies emerging from conflict, and giving people new hope of a better future for themselves and their children.

The problems of state-building indeed make some of our discussions about international organizations seem somewhat narcissistic. The debate about NATO’s role in Iraq is to some extent deceitful, because it is not so much about NATO as an instrument for state-building in Iraq, but about NATO’s future. Will a failure of NATO in Iraq jeopardize the possibility of NATO peace-keeping in Israel/Palestine, for example? Will involving NATO in Iraq, even though it has not been involved from the beginning, create more international legitimacy for countries like Poland who have domestic problems with their engagement in Iraq? Is it a promising way to bring in Germany and France? The debate is about what is good for NATO and the relations between the allies, not what is good for Iraq.
But the key issue is how to conduct successful state-building in Iraq. I avoid the term nation-building, because the nations in Iraq are there. The question is how to build institutions to keep Iraq from failing and make it a sustainable state. Except for the international community’s experiences in the Balkans, the European Union is the only international organization competent for state-building. It has successfully built states in the course of its expansion process. If Iraq could conceivably be a member of the Union in the future, the EU could use its tools for building states, particularly in building administrative capacity. Since Iraq is no potential candidate for EU membership, we have got to think about a comprehensive program of state-building. It is not enough to deliver a constitution, prepare for elections and then say: Bye bye!

To my mind, such an ambitious agenda of state-building carries a certain danger. One of the issues circulating beneath the surface of our discussion is whether the transatlantic relationship is an end in itself or a tool to achieve common objectives. I think that it should at least not be jeopardized without good reasons.

Therefore, I am worried that the agenda of state building might endanger the preservation of the transatlantic relationship. It is dangerous to predicate its future on common efforts in state-building. Bringing peace to Iraq, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia and bringing pluralism to the Islamic world are very elusive objectives. If we reach out for them we should also ensure that the Atlantic system remains intact. We ought to be sober and realistic about how difficult the tasks of state building are.

Michael Schaefer mentioned an important point about state-building: Our approach to the crisis regions of the world is all too often top-down, imposing solutions without listening to what those concerned have to say. As we have to address the problems reaching beyond the transatlantic agenda, we have to learn modesty. We can use the tools we developed, but to unleash change in the world’s instable regions, one must mobilize the societies.

In that regard, I see a growing gap in the transatlantic relationship, because the European approach to state-building differs fundamentally from the American approach. One of these approaches is very top-down, the other probably a little bit too much bottom-up. When I recently visited Kosovo, American helicopters took us to the German troops. While the Americans soldiers were geared up to full battle, with metal jackets and loaded weapons, in the German camp you
could see officers with berets and rolled up sleeves, talking to local citizens about separating waste into reusable and disposable waste.

I am very glad that you want to listen to the people in the regions where you want to continue state-building. Yet during the discussion I have heard mostly that the Europeans and Americans are dependent on each other and should deal with each other as equal partners. What does that have to do with us, in the other regions of this world? When you lay down rules and norms, who are you trying to convince? You want to grant the UN a bigger role? I must tell you that, within the Arab world, the UN has no great credibility. You proudly note that the reclusive and frail Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has requested talks with the UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. Yet the opposite is true. Brahimi must seek out Sistani, whose influence among Shiites is so great that he is, simply, indispensable.

When we do include the region in our discussion of a New World Order, it will look like this: First, numerous representatives of the US, Europe, China, and Russia will lay out their views. Only afterwards, and our discussion has been no exception, are two Arabs permitted to say something on behalf of the “Greater Middle East.” This term suggests a geostrategic entity that has no relation to reality. Morocco and Indonesia are completely different, but you include them in one region, give this region your Western plans to solve its problems and ask about the opinion of the “Greater Middle East.” Besides the fact that this conduct is as much of a problem as the term itself, it is clear that no one identifies with this artificially spawned region. I consider myself a part of the Middle East, or the Arab world, but certainly not the “Greater Middle East.”

Similarly, in regard to institutions that might help resolve regional issues, we have heard participants refer to the old NATO, the new NATO, relations between the EU and NATO or the US and NATO, but not about the region’s own structures. We have not mentioned the Arab League at all. I would be eager to hear how Michael Schaefer assesses its role. I would also like to know what you think of the region’s increasing need to build up regional structures that are mainly economic. The politicized agenda and hot-button words devised by the transatlantic partners, like “democratization,” are far less popular among this region’s governments and civil societies. The EU also started out as an economic community, something that was a very wise decision.
Why don’t you use this kind of discussion as an opportunity to state the opinions of those on the receiving end?

That is exactly the problem. This Round Table is another example of the region being given merely the role of the receiver. The very choice of categories and institutions makes it impossible for us to get out of this.

Mr. Hamzawy, to my mind you are a representative of the region’s developing civil societies, meaning precisely the target group we want to reach. I consider hopelessly naive your statement that the transatlantic relationship is irrelevant for the region. One year ago, the big US elephant fundamentally questioned the region’s status quo and sent out signals that its support for the Saudi royal house was history. How can you say the transatlantic discourse does not interest you? I also think your attitude is dangerous not only because US conduct has major and potentially damaging consequences for the region, but also because the EU has been so unsuccessful with its Barcelona Process.

I did not mean that the transatlantic relationship was irrelevant! What I do think is that formulating a major normative-political, and socio-economic design cannot be based primarily on the transatlantic relationship. This is a matter of ownership. One cannot merely listen to the region’s voices on the sidelines or afterward. You must take them seriously as a primary dialog partner.

As Amr Hamzawy said, the UN does not play a central role in the Middle East. I, as an Israeli, do not see how it has contributed or will contribute to sorting out the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Israel is not very interested in getting the UN involved. I also agree that the vague term Greater Middle East, which is a geographical term and nothing else, does not help the West at all in conducting a dialog with the region. The EU plans to develop a concept for the Middle East in its upcoming three summits. I strongly recommend consulting those concerned extensively before coming up with an agenda and then asking the region to follow suit.

At least, Europeans and Americans recognize that the status quo in the Middle East is untenable. This is an important step away from the previous Western deterministic attitude to let the region remain like it is for the foreseeable future. For example, the US was quite reluctant to engage Saudi Arabia in any kind of critical or constructive dialog.
because of its interests in the country. Charles Kupchan is right in stating that we should be realistic in setting our goals, but I recommend setting ambitious goals and then pursuing them in a realistic and pragmatic fashion.

As to NATO, I do not think that it should be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this stage. The situation is very different from Iraq. In an attempt to stabilize the Mediterranean region, the EU has launched the Barcelona process to promote the modernization of the region. After nine years of failure, the Union should have learned that words must be followed by deeds to be of any use. Overall, in the Greater Middle East one has to find individual approaches and tailor-made solutions for each country.

If a Martian had listened to what Shimon Stein and Amr Hamzawy said, he would have the impression of a thoroughly imperialistic endeavor. People in the Middle East are at peace with each other and have the solutions for all their problems—but NATO and the Western powers ignore them and impose some foreign concept on them. That is nonsense. If the region had solved its problems at any time during the last 50 years, we would not be sitting here talking about the Greater Middle East.

To my mind, the Greater Middle East Initiative is a big step forward. Tony Blair’s or George Bush’s agenda of threat presented the region merely as a source of security dangers that must be eliminated by military means and top-down approaches. Now we have a comprehensive approach addressing the political, normative and socio-economic conditions and including civil society. People from the region have always asked us to follow this kind of approach. Now they reject the initiative even though it fulfills all their requirements. It is also too easy to declare the Barcelona process a European failure. I think it is the Middle East that needs Barcelona. The emergence of the Greater Middle East Initiative out of the Iraq conflict represents an enormous window of opportunity. But if people in the region prefer to shut this window immediately, I do not see Europe being able to slip through.

I am happy that somebody cares and thinks about the Middle East. But the first test for the Greater Middle East Initiative, to my mind, was a complete failure. When one of the region’s dictators recently visited the White House, there was no pressure exerted on him, but he was encouraged to keep on acting like he does. Any initiative will justly lack credibility as long as it is only put on paper but not
implemented. The West must bring forth some substantial actions to gain a reputation as credible source of change, after it has supported the status quo and corrupt governments for so long. Spending 2% of what is spent on defense on international dialog might also be a step forward.

**Schaefer**

You probably noticed that I did not use the term *Greater Middle East*, and I am not going to use it because I do not deem it very useful. I prefer to talk about the Middle East region. I must say, I do not see this as a merely transatlantic initiative. Europe has a substantial interest in stabilizing the Middle East because its conflicts threaten Europe in the first place.

Therefore, we are interested in a real partnership, not in a top-down approach by the G8 or by NATO in Istanbul. The Tunis summit of the Arab League will have major importance. We are working towards Tunis with the representatives of the Arab world. Hopefully, they will provide a first statement on how to go about this generational task of reforming their societies. The different initiatives on the Middle East, if combined in the right way, offer a roadmap for the next 10 to 20 years to tackle the greatest threat to our stability since the two World Wars.

**Bohlen**

I agree very much with Shimon Stein that we have to address the issue of the Middle East because the status quo is untenable. The problems that we have been dealing with since 9/11 and that the US thought it was dealing with in Iraq, emanate in part from this untenable status quo. The US relationship with Saudi Arabia, for example, is a source of much of our difficulties. Amr Hamzawy gave us a very important reality check not to use the Middle East for reconciling the transatlantic partners but to develop a concept that starts in the region.

**von Weizsäcker**

The term Greater Middle East probably really is more useful for transatlantic communication than as part of a solution for the region’s problems. As much as I support improving the transatlantic relationship, we cannot raise the impression that this itself would be a concept for a “New World Order.”

In his speech the day before yesterday, Tony Blair provided us with a transatlantic agenda. His agenda is called “threats.” We must reach a transatlantic agreement over present threats and then return to the old NATO concept of a defensive alliance against an external enemy. Of course, this is no solution to the Arab world’s problems. We can move forward in this area only if we examine the real problems point for point. That includes analyzing what we did wrong in Iraq.
Iraq’s neighbor Iran is evidence that a division of labor within NATO is not at all as problematic as Mr. Schlie said earlier. Iran, that isolated giant with endless problems, is not yet at the epicenter of global politics because we have to extinguish other fires. Yet accompanying this country step for step towards a global order is an extraordinarily urgent task. I think that the Americans have more reason to be grateful than to be angry at the Europeans’ work with Iran that Mr. Schaefer has discussed. The US is eager to bring the matter of Iran before the Security Council, much against Iranian wishes. Here, the Europeans could contribute something the Americans cannot, in full transatlantic loyalty. If one can come to terms, then a division of labor is both sensible and useful to NATO.

I am also very grateful for the contributions from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. I was once again deeply impressed by India during a recent visit. Domestic and external political developments there have been very encouraging, and there is close economic, technological, and academic cooperation. Yet India naturally has no intention of standing idly by should NATO move into the South Asia region as a kind of global policeman. The only reason there are no protests to be heard is that the Indians consider the idea completely implausible. In our abstract discussions on the future we should keep in mind that the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, base much of their relations with the West on the confidence that NATO will remain cautious with its plans in the “Greater Middle East.”

I would like to defend the idea of a unified West and urge the transatlantic partners to leave behind their narcissism of the small difference, as David Rieff quoted Freud. The West is perceived as an entity not only by its critics in the Global South, but also by regions and people who place their hopes in the West. Civil rights activists in Minsk or Rangoon, for example, are not interested in European and American quarrels, or their being two poles of a multi-polar world. They need a single point of reference and an ally in their struggle for freedom. We should not forget this.

The West still commands a lot of moral authority, and it still has a historical mission. It is not China that will come up with new ideas for humanitarian intervention in the UN. Nor is it Russia that will take the lead in international development aid. The West, even though it has to find a consensus with the other powers, is still the center of these activities.
I have been wrestling throughout this conference with whether to think big or small. Thinking big would mean re-conceptualizing international order around a new project like the Greater Middle East. Thinking small would mean to be conservative, to try to hold on to existing aspects of international order which you do not want to lose because without them the old order would fall apart. Richard Haass made an argument for thinking big. The great struggle to engage the Arab-Islamic world, he said, would reunify the West like the conflict with the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. I disagree, because it seems to me that we do not know how to deal with that part of the world. We ignore its complexities and end up alleviating the damage caused by our own mistakes. Also, to come to terms with the Arab-Islamic world requires not only deploying assets to the region, but rethinking the architecture of the nation-state itself. For me it is one of the most important points of this conference that we have to think about alternative political formations in large parts of the world.

At the same time, thinking small, in trying to keep intact or restore the Atlantic order, is virtuous. We often forget that the international order itself is anchored in this Atlantic order. If we find a transatlantic consensus on rule-based order and multilateralism, we can draw other parts of the world into that structure. The basic characteristic of the Western political system, its modernist norms, are attractive to non-Western powers. My travels to India and China gave me the impression that their vision of international order is integrating themselves into the Western order. They want to have seats at the table and be a part of this Western world, not to create new institutions of their own.

The Cold War was won by maintaining unity within the West. This Western world unified against the Eastern bloc was a container for the most expansive economy and politically stabilizing order in history. As a massive innovation machine for wealth and creativity, it was integrative and absorbent on the outside because countries wanted to join. Therefore, protecting the Atlantic order ultimately means to provide an anchor for the integration of a larger system into it.

It has turned out that we are still grappling with the extent to which our world has changed. Thinking in the old context, in terms of the resources that we have so far devoted to the issue, is no longer enough. We create a credibility gap between what we supposedly care about and what we do, a gap between words and deeds, as several of us have pointed out. If today’s challenges are as serious as we
around this table think—not just the security threats, but the interconnectedness of our globalized world in which things that happened elsewhere hit home—we have to think much more ambitiously. Extending organizations and making great declarations will no longer be enough. We will have to follow this up with serious sacrifices. It seems to me that we are still far from that.

May I add a few words of thanks to our moderator? Christoph Bertram has been very concentrated, strict and at the same time quite liberal. A discussion with so many learned persons is much harder to guide than a parliament’s plenary session. Thank you very much for always leading us back to the real subject.

Our Round Table has shown how much a possible New World Order is still evolving. Even though we agree that the threats and the distribution of power have changed, we differ in our assessment of how much they have done so. There is also a broad array of ideas about how to react to these changes. Which rules, policies and institutions should be used to address today’s challenges, and which should be reformed, abolished or reinvented to be up to that task? Our debate painted a comprehensive picture of the current positions and offered some very interesting new ways of thinking.

To my mind, there is no way around a courageous and fundamental reform of the UN system and its relations to other international actors. We tend to confine our thinking to petty reforms that seem politically feasible. This will not be sufficient to adapt the structures and rules of the international system to the challenges of the 21st century. I hope some of the bolder analyses and ideas developed during our discussion will find their way in the broader political debate. I look forward to meeting again in the future and seeing which elements of a New World Order have turned out to be the decisive ones.