

129<sup>th</sup> Bergedorf Round Table

**Frontiers and Horizons of the EU:  
The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova**

October 15<sup>th</sup>–17<sup>th</sup>, 2004, Lviv





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*Statue of Liberty: Museum of  
Ethnography and Crafts, Svoboda  
Prospect, Lviv*

*Europa (left page): Hotel George,  
Mickiewicz Square, Lviv.*

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## INITIATOR

**Dr. Kurt A. Körber**

## CHAIR

**Roger de Weck,**  
President, Graduate Institute of International Studies,  
Geneva

## SPEAKERS

**Ambassador Ian Boag,**  
Head of the European Commission' Delegation to  
Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus, Kiev  
**Ambassador Oleksandr O. Chaly,**  
Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the  
Ukraine, Kiev  
**Gernot Erler, MdB,**  
Deputy Chairman, SPD Parliamentary Group, Berlin  
**Professor Yaroslav Hrytsak,**  
University of Lviv  
**Professor Danuta Hübner,**  
Member of the European Commission, Brussels  
**Dr. Yevgenij M. Kozhokin,**  
Director, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow  
**Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, MdB,**  
Deputy Chairman for Foreign, Security, and European  
Policy, CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group  
**Jakub T. Wolski,**  
Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  
the Republic of Poland, Warsaw

## PARTICIPANTS

PARTICIPANTS  
**Rafał Antczak,**  
Senior Economist, Center for Social and Economic  
Research, Warsaw  
**Dumitru Braghis,**  
Chairman, Alliance Our Moldova, Chisinau  
**Nicolae Chirtoaca,**  
Director, European Institute for Political Studies of  
Moldova, Chisinau  
**Dr. Patrick Cohrs,**  
Research Fellow, Humboldt University, Berlin  
**Dr. Eckart Cuntz,**  
Director-General for European Affairs, German Federal  
Foreign Office, Berlin  
**Ambassador Toomas H. Ilves, MEP,**  
Member of the European Parliament, Brussels

**Professor Anatoli A. Mikhailov,**  
Rector, European Humanities University, Minsk  
**Dr. Thomas Paulsen,**  
Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Berlin  
**Inna Pidluska,**  
President, Europe XXI Foundation, Kiev  
**Alexander Rahr,**  
Program Director, Körber Center Russia/CIS,  
German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin  
**Ambassador Janusz Reiter,**  
Head, Center for International Relations, Warsaw  
**Professor Karl Schlögel,**  
European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder  
**Dr. Timothy D. Snyder,**  
Associate Professor, Yale University, New Haven  
**Carl-Andreas von Stenglin,**  
Office President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin  
**Ambassador Dietmar Stüdemann,**  
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to  
Ukraine, Kiev  
**Stefan Wagstyl,**  
Central and East Europe Editor, Financial Times,  
London  
**Dr. Klaus Wehmeier,**  
Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board,  
Körber Foundation, Hamburg  
**Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker,**  
Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany,  
Berlin  
**Christian Wriedt,**  
Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation,  
Hamburg  
**Andrei Yeudachenka,**  
Ambassador at Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to  
the Republic of Belarus, Minsk

## Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" and the EU's Neighborhood Policy

An overview of the 129<sup>th</sup> Bergedorf Round Table by Alexander Rahr

The Ukrainian revolution of November 2004 constituted a turning point in the history of Europe since the collapse of Communism. Through peaceful demonstrations, a nation that had practically vanished from international attention forced a regime change after the "establishment party" tried to fraudulently prevent the election of reformist Viktor Yushchenko as president. Is the Orange Revolution the continuation of the wave of political upheaval that began in Central and Eastern Europe 15 years ago? What are the West's policy options?

The 129<sup>th</sup> Bergedorf Protocol before you analyzes the geopolitical situation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, and the options these countries face between Russia and the EU. Shortly before the dramatic events unfolded in Kiev and other cities, the Bergedorf Round Table gathered in Lviv from October 15 to 17 to attempt a purposely long-term view of the condition and future of the European Union's eastern neighbors.

The discussion documented here examines fundamental issues and stances on Ukraine that have been thrown into sharp relief by recent developments: Can the West—meaning the EU and the United States—muster the energy to help "upgrade" Ukraine into a modern democracy while integrating it with Western structures? Can the EU, which has yet to digest its recent enlargement from 15 to 25 member states, offer Ukraine anything more than a "10 point plan" within the framework of a "privileged partnership"? What form could and should Russia's role be, and what does Ukrainian society want?

Before the Orange Revolution, the European Union, having completed its enlargement in May 2004, seemed ready to settle into an extended pause in its process of expansion. Romania and Bulgaria would still be allowed to slip into the EU, while the Western Balkan states and former Soviet republics have received different offers from Brussels. Together with North African and Middle Eastern States, these countries would be integrated into a "ring of friendly states" that, according to the respective country's willingness and cooperation, would result in "strategic," "privileged," or "pragmatic" partnerships, but not institutional incorporation within the EU.

Two years ago, the EU still regarded the Balkans and the western part of the old Tsarist empire as "wider Europe." This kind of terminology opened up for the countries there a prospect of becoming integrated into a "common European home" should they espouse Western democratic values. In 2003, however, the EU suddenly struck the concept of a "wider Europe" from its vocabulary and confronted its neighbors to the east and south with the idea of "EU neighborhood"

instead. An exception was made only in the case of Turkey; Ukraine lost all hope of accession.

Russia, the resurgent power to the east, for its part offered the former Soviet republics an integration model called the “Single Economic Space.” At the time, the Kremlin said it was creating an “east EU” to be based on the same rules as the EU and which could, at some point, unify with it. To outside observers, however, Russia seemed to be more interested in reestablishing its lost superpower status. When Moscow, without having consulted the West, offered Moldova a confederation in which the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Transnistria would have gained veto rights over all state affairs, the EU intervened vigorously and thwarted the project.

Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had called on Belarus to quickly reunite with Russia, whereupon relations between Moscow and Minsk cooled substantially. In 2004, Ukraine became the focus of reintegration efforts in the post-Soviet region. After relations between then-president Leonid Kuchma and the EU had reached a new low point and Ukraine officially gave up its goal of integrating with NATO and the EU, Russia managed to draw the second-largest successor republic of the former Soviet Union into its orbit, both economically and in security policy. Unification was to be sealed after the election of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich as Kuchma’s successor.

Yet Russia’s overt interference in the election campaign on behalf of Yanukovich, the falsification of the balloting results and media manipulation by the “establishment party,” Yushchenko’s mysterious illness—all these factors increased the potential for conflict in Ukraine. Putin attempted to offer Ukraine the Russian model of “directed democracy.” In 1999, many Russians were sympathetic to the idea of curtailing democracy and civil rights to reestablish state order and improve living conditions. Yet the people of Ukraine wanted to shake off the oligarchic system. They regarded the Western model as far more attractive than the idea of an authoritarian state.

At a stroke, Ukraine has again altered Europe’s political landscape, opened up new historic chances, but also thrown up dangers. In the midst of the euphoria over the triumph of democracy in Ukraine, one thing cannot be forgotten: Many in the country’s east and south preferred different policies and a different candidate. Ukraine, therefore, remains divided, its inner structure fragile. Only a minority of its people really wants membership in NATO; in the east, a recent opinion poll revealed that the majority desires good relations with Russia above all. Economi-

cally, Ukraine will remain dependent on Russia as long as it is not accepted into the EU.

The revolution in Ukraine also began a new phase in the common EU foreign and security policy. Not too long ago, the EU was always careful not to offend Russian sensibilities in the post-Soviet region. That has changed. We can now assume that, should additional democratic upheavals take place, for example in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, or Belarus, the EU would not remain on the sidelines. In this sense the EU has become, together with the United States, a geopolitical rival of Russia's. In only a few years, the Black Sea could become an EU lake through the integration of Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia. The EU will play more than an observer's role in future solutions to the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the former Soviet region. Simultaneously, however, the EU will seek to integrate Russia in a pan-European solution. A new European order cannot be established against Russian opposition. Unless it closely cooperates with Russia in the fields of energy security, ecology, climate protection, and the fight against terrorism, Europe will never find stability.

The EU decided first of all to expand the Action Plan with Ukraine that had been put on ice during Kuchma's presidency. Meanwhile, the international community expects Yushchenko to introduce market-economic reforms and bolster civil society and the rule of law. The EU hopes that Ukraine will take up a foreign policy in harmony with EU interests, such as in the Transnistria problem in neighboring Moldova or in the transfer of democracy to Belarus. The EU and the US will grant Ukraine the status of a market economy as early as this year, a step that will eliminate some trade barriers. Negotiations for Ukraine to join the WTO could follow. Along this "road map," Ukraine may have taken a significant step within a year towards being granted an accession prospect to the EU, as it was offered to Turkey. Still, Ukraine would be well advised to seek out an influential country within the EU as an advocate. Germany and/or Poland could help Ukraine make its voice heard more clearly in Brussels.

## PROTOCOL

### Welcome

**von Weizsäcker**



Welcome to what may be the most culturally impressive conference room that the Bergedorf Round Table has ever had. Here, in the Royal Room of the Lviv Historical Museum, is where the Polish king John Sobieski grew up, and on the wall we see a German nobleman, Saxony's August the Strong, who, as Polish King in Dresden, ruled over this now Ukrainian city.

A few days ago, the European Commission delivered a report on Turkish accession, and we are on the threshold of elections in both Belarus and Ukraine. In the coming days, however, we will consciously be looking beyond these current events, to give both fundamental and long-term consideration of Europe's frontiers, the enlargement of the EU, and its relations with its neighbors, above all in the east. Roger de Weck has graciously agreed to lead our discussion.

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The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the oral contributions.

## I. Paths to Europe? Perspectives of the New Neighbors

Under the watchful gaze of the Polish kings and August the Strong, it is our common duty to conduct a significant discussion. I am especially glad that we could hold our talk in Lviv, which Joseph Roth called the “city of blurred borders.” Allow me to open our discussion of borders with a small anecdote. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan are facing God, and Schröder asks God, “Tell me, when will Turkey join the EU?” God thinks for a while and then says “not during my term in office.” Mr. Hrytsak, what are the prospects for Ukrainian accession?

**de Weck**

Let me start my presentation by stating that, personally, I do not have any doubts whether or not Ukraine will be a member of the European Union. I am confident that it will be. The only doubt that I have is whether this is going to happen during my lifetime.

**Hrytsak**  
presentation

Where does my confidence stem from? My confidence is based on my professional knowledge. I am a historian by profession, and as a historian, I see that Ukraine and Ukrainian lands have been tied to Europe in numerous ways. You may expect me to build my presentation upon the enumeration of these European-Ukrainian encounters from the times of Herodotus to the present. If this is what you expected I am afraid you will be disappointed. I will not walk this line, for two reasons. First, because I believe it is rather a pathetic exercise. As Ukrainian historian succinctly put it, statements about the European character of Ukraine may be factually true –as far as they go. Still, they smack of poor folk who like to boast of their wealthy relations.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, such arguments seem not to persuade wealthy relatives anyway. As Romano Prodi stated, the fact that many Ukrainians and Armenians feel European means nothing to him, since New Zealanders also feel European.<sup>2</sup>

Ukraine belongs to Europe

I would like to suggest different tactics. I would like to introduce another criterion for testing the European character of any nation. This is a strictly historical test. Historians know that “what men think is more important in history than the objective facts”.<sup>3</sup> By the same token, it is the intensity of discussions about Europe that provides sound evidence of this country’s European-ness.

Which countries are “European”?

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1 Ivan L.Rudnytsky, *Essays on modern Ukrainian history*, Edmonton: 1987, p. 3.

2 Quoted after: Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine, Europe, and ... Albania”, *Ukrainian Weekly*, March 9, 2003.

3 A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918*, Oxford/New York, 1991, p. 17.



Discussions about Europe in Ukraine

Russia has an undeniably European culture, and numerous encounters with the West. Still, despite their European culture, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians do not discuss much whether Russia has to join the European Union. Nor, by that token, are there so many discussions along these lines in New Zealand.

By contrast, in the Ukrainian case, such discussions have been going on ceaselessly since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. And since the collapse of Communism, they have grown in intensity—to the extent that nowadays they occupy the mainstream of current academic, literary and political discourse. Moreover, these are exactly the intensive historical encounters with Europe that are considered to be the essence of Ukrainian identity. Leading Ukrainian intellectuals and politicians believed, and continue to believe, that most of the national differences between Ukraine and Russia can be explained by the fact that until the 18<sup>th</sup> Century Ukraine, either directly or through Polish mediation, was linked to Western Europe. Therefore the main differences between Ukraine and Russia should not be sought either in language or in race, but in different political traditions, different relations between state and society, and different principles of organization.<sup>4</sup>

Ukraine's shortcomings and achievements

To be sure, for the West, Ukraine is a migraine; it looks and behaves like the “sick man of Europe.” Here we have an authoritarian and corrupt regime, where political rights are restricted and the media are repressed. In Ukraine, opposition leaders and leading journalists die under suspicious circumstances; people suffer from high unemployment, lack of social security, and miserable salaries. Given Ukraine's current state, the achievements are more amazing. First of all, Ukraine managed to avoid the outbreak of civil war and ethnic conflicts that were very likely, given the deep ethnic and political divisions within society and a long record of xenophobia. Let me remind you that 10 years ago, on the eve of the second Ukrainian presidential elections, the CIA forecast that Ukraine was heading toward a bloody civil war that would make the Yugoslav war look like a picnic.<sup>5</sup> Luckily, this prognosis proved to be false. There was no Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or Chechnya here. Secondly, in contrast to developments in Belarus and Russia, the Ukrainian state failed to subjugate society. Ukrainian society manages

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4 M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrani tvory*, Prague: 1937, 1:70; V.Lypynsky, *Lysty do bratv-khliborobiv*, Vienna: 1926, xxv. Both quoted in: Ivan L.Rudnytsky, *Op.cit.*, p.18.

5 D. Williams and R.J.Smith, “U.S. Intelligence Sees Economic Flight Leading to Breakup of Ukraine”, in: *Washington Post*, January 25, 1994.

The Ukrainian presidential campaign  
seems to be a nightmare,  
but “democracy is at work here”.

Hrytsak

to behave as an independent entity. Viktor Yushchenko, as the opposition’s new leader, has led the polls as the most popular political figure for two years in a row, and he still has a chance, despite pressure from the state, to win the coming presidential election. The Ukrainian presidential campaign seems to be a nightmare, and therefore is under scrutiny both at home and abroad. But, as the *Financial Times* wrote a few days ago in its report on the presidential elections in Ukraine: “despite it all, democracy is at work [here]”.<sup>6</sup> So, despite the numerous odds, in a strange, sometimes paradoxical and, therefore, quite often barely recognizable way, Ukraine behaves like a “normal” European country.

Ukraine is a normal European country but in a peculiar way. Ukraine—and in a broader context, Eastern Europe—is a normal but second-hand Europe.<sup>7</sup> Its second-handness is not a value judgment. It just reflects the fact that most of its modern political and cultural artifacts are not of local origin. Fascism, Nationalism, Liberalism, Socialism, the Enlightenment, Renaissance, Baroque period, Christianity—to name a few, in descending chronological order—were not originally produced here; they were brought here from outside and assimilated into a local cultural setting. Personally, I can think of only two major examples of East European imports—that is the Black Death in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century and Communism in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century; but in both cases, it is hardly something to boast about. Given its second-hand aspect, Ukraine is European, but in a different way than, say, France, England, or Germany. It is European like Greece, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkans. And within these “peripheral” European countries, Ukraine belongs to a specific circle of countries that share a mutual Byzantine tradition. If one were to make two separate lists of the “winners” and “losers” of the post-Communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, the dividing line would roughly coincide with a division between Western and Eastern Christianity. Much has been said about the differences between the Christian West and the Christian East, and probably even more has been speculated. I do not want to increase the general confusion by presenting my own ideas on this topic. I would just like to reiterate what some very seasoned historians have said before me: the problem with Eastern Europe is that social transformation implies fusing elements that

Eastern Europe is a second-hand Europe

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6 Chrystia Freeland, Stefan Wagstyl and Tom Warner, “East or west: Ukraine’s election could alter relations with Russia and Europe”, in: *Financial Times*, October 12, 2004

7 Gale Stokes, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, New York/Oxford: 1997.

Ukraine could not have  
joined the EU in 2004 ...

... but it belongs in the European Union

Ukraine will not have  
to wait another 70 years

have little or no natural affinity with one another, such as Western technological accomplishments with non-Western cultural and political patterns.

I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not claim a *Sonderweg* for Eastern Europe. What I claim is that different historical legacies should be given their due. Or, to paraphrase the path-dependency theory, “where you get to depends on where you came from”.<sup>8</sup> Knowing Ukrainian history, I did not expect Ukraine to become an EU member in the first 10–15 years after the collapse of Communism. I do not see how Ukraine could make it by 2004, as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Baltic republics made it. In my opinion, Ukraine, together with Belarus, Serbia, Romania, Moldova, and for that matter even Russia—if the latter wishes to become an EU member—should be kept in a purgatory, before they are welcomed into the European Union paradise.

What makes me so confident that Ukraine should and could be there? History gives many reasons. In 1981, not many people expected Communism would collapse in 10 years. But it happened. And, at the same time, the number of possibilities history offers is not unlimited. History imposes certain limitations on the range of what is possible. History made it possible that Communism would collapse both in Ukraine and Poland. But it excluded the possibility that their post-Communist transformations would follow similar trajectories. In terms of astronomical time, post-communist Poland and post-communist Ukraine function in the same age. Historically, however, they belong to different times. If one is to compare Ukraine after 15 years of independence, it should not be with contemporary Poland, but with Poland in 1934, 15 years after it got its own independence. Then you see the common predicaments of weak democracy that most young states share.

But then again, this does not mean that Ukraine has to wait for another 70 years to enter the European Union, as occurred in the Polish case. Because the times they are changing. And, unlike in 1934, in 2004 there is no real danger either of Nazism or Communism, both Germany and Russia have lost their desire to fight for Eastern Europe, the idea of a European federation is not a chimera anymore, and now it neighbors the Ukrainian borders. And, last but not least, globalization has compressed the time continuum to provide unprecedented scope, and now generational differences are measured not by the books we read and

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<sup>8</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton NJ: 1993, p. 179.



music we listen to, but by the computer programs kids are using. So, why wait another 70 years?

So my message is that there are such realities as historical geography, historical time, and historical legacy. They are not to be neglected. And each of them says, in one way or another, that Ukraine cannot escape Europe, and Europe cannot escape Ukraine. All these historical facts from the past cannot be upheld, however, in comparison with a simple fact of the present. Namely, the fact of an intensive, ongoing, two-way flood of people and ideas between Ukraine and the European Union. Since the collapse of the Communist system, Ukrainians are more and more visible in the West. There are about 5 million of them working abroad. They are now the largest minority in Portugal. Ukrainian, or Russians speaking Ukrainian, can be heard in Venice, Rome and Florence. As I travel a lot, I can testify to the large number of Ukrainian students at university campuses in Vienna, Rome, Munich, Cambridge, not to mention neighboring Warsaw and Budapest. As they say about Ukrainians in Portugal nowadays, they are ready-made Europeans. They are Europeans like tuna fish in a can—you just have to open it to consume it.

How could millions of Ukrainians exist without Europe when their living depends on being there? How could Europeans exist without Ukrainians when Europe is aging, and the rate between pensions of eligible and working persons there will be one to one? Now we get news that Scotland is thinking of “bringing in” Ukrainians to mitigate a lack of labor force in local agricultural farms. I do realize that this is a painful and embarrassing process, paved with many, probably too many personal tragedies. But few countries from the European periphery could do without it. I can refer here to millions of Italians, Turks and Poles. Nobody, neither Ukraine nor the European Union, could stop that flood, even if they wished to. More so now that Ukraine and the European Union have become neighbors.

I would like to say now something that is not very conventional, probably even heretical, but definitely something that will not please the ears of my compatriots from Western Ukraine: I do not believe that there will be a big difference in Ukrainian politics, no matter who wins the presidential election. Since 1991, Ukraine gained some momentum that no one could stop or change. It is a slow but sure shift toward democracy and the West. And more so since the European Union has become its closest neighbor. Ukraine will roam between West and East, shrouded in ambivalence—but with an undeniable tendency toward the West. I do not see how Yanukovych can stand it. The real difference between Yushchenko

Europe cannot escape Ukraine because more and more Ukrainians live in the West ...

... and an aging Europe needs Ukraine

Whatever the outcome of the election—  
Ukraine will turn to the West



Where are Ukraine's advocates in the West

and Yanukovych concerning the European integration of Ukraine is the time it will take and the price we will have to pay. Yushchenko endows European integration with a more reliable and human face and offers more efficient tactics.

And because I want it to happen in my lifetime, I would definitely vote for Yushchenko. What bothers me and makes me rather anxious is the frustrating silence with which Europe is approaching Ukraine in general and the Ukrainian elections particularly. It just so happened that, during the last month I spent in the US, I have had an opportunity to compare how much Ukrainian issues are discussed on different sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This comparison, unfortunately, does not favor Europe. It is not just the number of articles in leading newspapers that bothers me. Of more concern is a lack of strong and easily recognizable voices. Neither Jürgen Habermas nor Joschka Fischer raised a voice to say that Ukraine is important, in a way that it must be included, even though in a long term perspective.

It seems to me that most of the European intellectuals are spellbound by Russian splendor. And if Russia does not want to be in Europe, why then should Ukraine be? In the end, Ukraine is punished for what Russia has done, that is for its failure to make a European choice, in either geopolitical or political terms. And it is highly unfortunate. As I do believe that, despite its pragmatic foundations and bureaucratic considerations, the European Union is a daring vision built by many intellectuals. This is very much an intellectual project, so intellectuals have something important to say here. Otherwise, the future of the European integration of Ukraine will be left entirely in the hands of Brussels bureaucrats. If so, I will hardly see that integration during my lifetime, unless I have a remarkably long life.

**de Weck**

The historian Heinrich August Winkler recently published a history of Germany called "The Long Way Westward." Your presentation sketched out a similarly long path for Ukraine, against the backdrop of the West's frustrating silence. Mr. Chaly, how do you assess Ukraine's prospects?

**Chaly**  
presentation

Ukraine is European—but Europe  
is not identical with the EU

I am less optimistic than Mr. Hrytsak about Ukraine's chances to join the European Union. Ukraine is part of Europe—in some aspects it is more European than many members of the EU—and it will develop an even stronger European identity in the future. But we must draw a clear distinction between Europe and the EU, and between European integration as the transformation of societies according to European values and as membership in the EU. Countries like Norway or Switzerland

Expansion has turned Europe into a two bloc system with the EU and NATO on one side, and Russia and its Security Union on the other side.

Chaly

are thoroughly European without belonging to the EU. We must therefore define Ukraine's European choice not only in terms of EU membership.

What challenges does the enlargement of the EU and NATO create for our country? First, these enlargement processes provoked Putin's Russia—which has achieved a certain internal consolidation—to develop a vision of Russian enlargement and of the geopolitical place of Ukraine within Europe. The second and much more negative consequence of enlargement is that it has again turned Europe into a two bloc system with the EU and NATO on one side, and Russia and its Security Union comprising six former Soviet states on the other side. The idea of one united Europe developed during the Gorbachev era has vanished. Ukraine today finds itself between these two blocs, between “elephant and bear,” as Michael Emerson aptly put it.

While Russia offers us a vision of our future geopolitical position, the EU, and particularly Germany, fail to do so. Our sincere wish to be part of the Union is answered with a “no, yes, no,” which ultimately means “no.” In 2002, the EU promised us an associated member status if we fulfilled certain requirements, but failed to react after we did everything we had been told.

Today, the extended EU leaves us feeling uncertain and isolated, especially after the introduction of the new visa system. People in Lviv are experiencing the negative consequences of EU enlargement very concretely. Uncertainty is prevalent especially in the area of security. Our undefined political status as members neither of the EU nor of NATO nor of the Russian Security Union leaves us nothing but the United Nations umbrella of security. The war in Iraq proved that this is nothing you can count on. For Ukraine as a big nation which gave up nuclear weapons voluntarily and still has the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, insecurity is a new and not very desirable status.

The EU will probably fail to develop a clear strategy for Ukraine even if Yushchenko should win the elections or once the Union has decided on the accession of Turkey. Because what keeps the EU and especially Germany from offering the Ukraine a real perspective is the fear of violating Russian interests. The Franco-German-Russian triangle which developed during the Iraq conflict has even increased European consideration for Russia and thus exacerbated Ukraine's unfavorable situation.

As Ukrainian First Deputy Foreign Minister, I once asked the Foreign Minister of France why his country blocked even the most basic steps concerning Ukraine, such as a simplified visa system and a clear statement vis à vis Russia. Why does

Russia offers a geopolitical perspective ...

... while the EU leaves Ukraine out in the cold ...

... because the Union does not want to offend Russia

Ukraine could become the  
Switzerland of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Chaly



How can Ukraine achieve  
European integration?

EU membership is not a realistic option ...

... integration with Russia would  
cut our ties to the EU ...

... wavering between the East and the West  
creates nothing but mistrust ...

... therefore Ukraine should be independent:  
the Switzerland of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

the EU do so much more for the Western Balkans than for Ukraine even though the situation there is in some aspects considerably worse? His answer was very clear: We are responsible for the Western Balkans and they create problems for us. From that, I drew the conclusion that as long as the Ukraine does not create problems for the EU and the EU does not develop a feeling of responsibility for our country, there will be no clear EU accession strategy for Ukraine.

We have to analyze this reality very clearly and adapt to it, developing a new geopolitical strategy. Irrespective of the outcome of the elections, European integration is strongly supported by the population of the Ukraine and will remain the dominant strategy of our foreign policy. But in which form and through which tactical steps can we realize this European ideal? There are four options.

First, we could keep pursuing full EU membership. This would imply putting our relations with Russia at risk because we would have to develop our policies according to the EU's principles. We would, for example, probably have to close the border between Russia and Ukraine with a visa system, which would hinder the movement of people from the EU to Russia and vice versa. I do not think we should even consider doing that. It is stupid and dangerous to pursue a national goal which has no chance of realization even in the long term, because it can only disappoint the expectations of the population.

Though I believe it is unlikely to happen, it would be a present from God should the EU admit Ukraine as a candidate for membership in case Yushchenko wins the elections. In the Western Balkans, Constantinescu's victory made this possible for Romania, and Mečiar lost the elections in the Slovak Republic because of his anti-European stance and afterwards changed his course. People expect Yushchenko to open a membership perspective for Ukraine in the EU; if he fails, he will be under pressure. But Romania and the Slovak Republic were associated members, which we are not. Therefore I believe that full EU membership is not a realistic option.

Our second option is to reintegrate back into Russia. This would mean adapting to the norms of the Russian Union and would therefore be a strategic decision against developing closer ties to the EU.

Third, we may continue our present day strategy of taking one step towards the West and another step towards the East. This creates an attitude of mistrust and does not lead to anything. It is not a viable option also because it means following one set of norms one year and another the next year.

Our fourth option is to declare very clearly that we pursue integration into the European and maybe the Euro-Atlantic community, but do not insist on EU



membership. Instead, we could follow the example of countries like Switzerland or Norway and become a bridge between the enlarged EU and Russia: Ukraine could become the Switzerland of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. We would then not have to introduce a visa system with Russia, but could open up our borders and focus for example on developing transit and communication facilities.

Feeling ourselves caught between the elephant and the bear, we ask God that the Russian bear changes to become more liberal and that the European elephant does not change to become a closed society. The visa system and the rules governing the entry of our goods and services to your markets have become more rigid, and we can only hope that this is a temporary phenomenon.

I am very strongly oriented towards Europe and convinced that European integration is our destiny for the future. Let me therefore ask you for advice: Which Ukraine does Europe want to see? We have no use for general terms such as ‘democratic and stable,’ but need concrete statements about our membership in NATO and in the EU. If you want us in, tell us very clearly. If you do not, we then have to say that’s life—and develop a new geopolitical role for Ukraine as a bridge or center for communication. But this would also mean that we need new guarantees for our security.

My final point is this: While I am sure that Ukraine’s place at the moment is neither within the Russian, nor within the European bloc, I believe that Belarus has adopted a permanent position close to Russia. The future border between the EU and the rest of Europe—as long as we do not create one united Europe—will be the border between Belarus and the EU. Even a new democratic Belarusian government could not reverse the decision for forging a security, economic and customs union between Russia and Belarus. I am curious to hear from the Belarusian participants whether they think that a democratic Belarusian government could dissolve the union with Russia in the next 15 or 20 years.

The growing concern of Western democracies with regard to recent developments on the post-Soviet scene is not always accompanied by carefully devised strategies in their foreign policy. While euphoric expectations of the smooth democratization of totalitarian societies are slowly diminishing, in most cases we are still confronted with *post factum* descriptions of events taking place in various independent states of the former Soviet Union.

In this context Belarus presents a particularly challenging case, both for analysis and practical actions for the foreign policy of the West. Being more predisposed

The EU must state clearly whether it wants Ukraine in or not

**Mikhailov**

The West needs a strategy for Belarus

## Belarus: Time is running out.

Mikhailov



Belarus is struggling to overcome  
its totalitarian past ...

... and the EU must support the  
transformation with a reliable strategy

to social transformation at the beginning of the 90s than any other post-Soviet state, at present Belarus is drifting towards isolation from the world community and confrontation with the civilized world. Those who do not believe in this reality nowadays might be reminded that about 10 years ago nobody was able to predict such scenarios in the very geographical heart of Europe.

Of course, the main reason for such troublesome developments in Belarus, as in other states of the former Soviet Union, remains deeply rooted in the people's collective unconscious of the totalitarian past with its prejudices, their atrophied capacity to act on their own, fears of being independent, etc. In addition, intellectual and professional expertise in confronting difficult issues of the transformation period, having been concentrated in Moscow, proved absolutely inadequate in every country, and has resulted in wishful thinking and ideas borrowed from other historical and cultural traditions without considering the countries' own historical realities..

Our Western partners, for their part, were not always able to realize that civil society as such is the result of an interplay of various factors deeply rooted in centuries-old intellectual developments. In order to stimulate similar developments in different environments one has to understand the deepest challenge to the professionalism of those who are involved in this process. We have to acknowledge that in this case no *a priori* knowledge is available to be applied independently of the present reality. Unfortunately, in too many cases urgently needed assistance was substituted by general and abstract recommendations, and various conferences and seminars, which sometimes brought counterproductive results.

It remains to be seen whether, in the framework of the New Neighborhood Policy announced by the European Union, lessons from previous mistakes will be learned and a realistic long-term strategy derived from reality and not imposed on it can be formulated. Time is running out and it is highly possible that we might be confronted with an even more complicated situation very soon.

**de Weck**

Ambassador Yeudachenka, how do you view the situation from the perspective of the government in Minsk?

**Yeudachenka**  
Finding itself between Russia  
and the enlarged EU ...

Belarus, like Ukraine, has been in a very specific position since the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004. Behind the Belarusian cities of Brest and Ashmiany we no longer find Poland and Lithuania, but a giant European Union, which has become our immediate



neighbor. In the East, we have the Euro-Asian giant-Russia. Belarus finds itself in-between.

But in contrast to the opinion of our Ukrainian colleagues, we believe that Belarus has not become a buffer-state, and we do not find ourselves trapped. On the contrary, our history and geography give us a unique chance to further improve the well-being of our nation. Therefore, we welcome European integration, which brings a lot of positive change and experiences with it. The EU is not only of great interest to us because neighbors are always the top priority of our foreign policy, but also because 700,000 Belarusians are living in the ten new EU member states.

At the moment, our relations with the European Union are very restrained. The EU maintains its resolution of 1997, which harshly criticizes our country, has suspended the ratification of our partnership and cooperation agreement, and the putting into effect of the interim agreement on trade. Belarus stands for full scale and systematic cooperation, which would include political dialog, as well as cooperation on trade, economics, culture and education. As political dialog is limited at this point of time, economic relations are at the center of our interest.

Exports account for 55 percent of our GDP and affect 80 percent of our industrial products. In the period January–August 2004, 37 percent of our exports went to the EU, and 47 percent to Russia. 37 to 47 percent is much more balanced than the former ratio of 20 to 80 percent. To say that Russia is our only option from an economic point of view is simply not true. Furthermore, the European Union is an important source of investment, sophisticated machinery, and advanced technologies. We receive 95 percent of our financial resources from European credit and financial institutions. All in all, proximity to the enlarged European Union is of clear strategic importance for Belarus.

Initially, there was resentment against EU enlargement. But most of it has dissipated as we have rectified many problems in recent months. We re-concluded our economic agreements, maintained our trade and economic commissions and found agreements which are acceptable for us, Brussels, and our other neighbors. We made progress in the field of certification and standardization, in the textile industry, and with anti-dumping sanctions. Contrary to the enlargement of NATO, in which we were not consulted, EU enlargement has always been accompanied by regular and constructive discussions and negotiations. In the interest of transparent borders that should not be dividing lines, we appreciate the draft regulation of the European Union which allows for the creation of special checkpoints for the

... Belarus has a unique opportunity to prosper

As the EU has suspended political dialog ...

... economic relations with the Union form the core of Belarusian interests

Belarus adapted its economic framework to the needs of EU enlargement

local population. We are prepared to establish these checkpoints and encourage a network of them.

I deliberately went into detail to show that together with our Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian partners we have managed to make remarkable progress. Real life is going its own way, and because of our common European interests Belarus cannot be isolated. Where there is a will there is way!

These positive results in the practical sphere, though, are in sharp contrast with the EU's policy of virtual isolation of Belarus. This policy has nothing to do with reality. In this context we very much appreciate the EU's new approach toward its neighbors. We are especially satisfied that the Commission, in its recommendation to the European Council and the European Parliament, proposes involving Belarus in a process of step by step normalization and giving us a prospect of future integration into the neighborhood policy. I am convinced that today both Belarus and Europe need such a pragmatic and inclusive neighborhood policy.

We hope the EU will extend the functioning economic relationship to other areas

**de Weck**

To complete our panorama I would now like to call upon Mr. Chirtoaca to present the Moldovan view.

**Chirtoaca**

For Moldova to become a part of Europe, not an authoritarian Eastern society ...

For a small country like Moldova, which needs an adequate strategy for survival in a rapidly changing world, our new neighborhood to the EU is of the utmost importance. Without focusing as much on the geopolitical context as our Ukrainian colleague has done, I would therefore like to address the perspectives of European enlargement. To us, the crucial question is where the dividing line between Eastern societies with clear authoritarian tendencies and Europe will run and how the EU will deal with small neighboring countries. As a small nation of Christian and Latin origin, Moldova feels culturally very close to Europe and therefore aspires to re-join the community of European states from which it has been isolated for decades.

For a long time, the EU has failed to develop an active strategy towards its Eastern neighbors, based on a clear vision of the *finalité* of Europe. The United States has restricted its vision for the region to establishing control and creating strategic corridors for the war against terror, using NATO as its main tool. We in Moldova have therefore read the New Neighborhood Policy paper with much interest. Nevertheless, we ask ourselves whether it is offering more than technical assistance and goes beyond the TACIS program.

At this moment, our states are captured states.

Chirtoaca

What we need is help with the process of transition from Communism to a modern democratic society, which has failed up to now. At this moment, our states are captured states: the political groups in power associated with people from the nascent private sector are against completing the transition. The present state of well-controlled chaos gives them the possibility to make fortunes in a very short time. Other Central European countries like Romania or Bulgaria have been assisted much more efficiently. Why does the EU not offer us—and maybe also Southern Caucasian countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—comparable assistance for establishing effective democratic structures to ensure the establishment of stable democracies in the region? With the prospect of membership or at least associated membership the conditionalities would be very powerful.

The EU should also address the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia much more directly. The prevailing instability there is a major threat to European security. The OSCE, which is presently the main tool, lacks efficiency. While there is a wonderful strategy paper about the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU does not even want to open a permanent representation in Moldova. It seems hypocritical to me under these circumstances to conduct discussions about the need for instruments of an efficient policy in the Union's new neighborhood.

For the time being, Moldova has not got the strategic partners it desperately needs to assist us with our painful transition process. After fifteen years without qualitative change, Moldova needs to move towards a stable democratic system and Europe needs stability in its new neighborhood to ensure stable frontiers. Ultimately, the limits of Europe will be defined at the intersection of culture, security and geopolitics, not exclusively by geography or politics.

The EU's new neighbors are calling for a strategy and are displaying both will and desire for tough negotiations in place of empty words. Real problems along the new borders after eastward enlargement, such as movement of people and goods, are a major aspect of these protests, and I think we should keep them in mind as we continue.

At the Bergedorf Round Table in Warsaw on Europe's frontiers in 1995, we spoke about how and when to bring Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the EU. When I dared to say that Estonia might also have prospects in the Union, Günter



... the EU must help Moldova with its transition process ...

... but the Union is failing to develop an active strategy for Eastern Europe

**de Weck**

**Ilves**

I hope that we will not keep out  
Eastern Europe permanently by the fences  
we are building at our frontiers.

Ilves



Is the enlarged EU building  
a wall around its borders?

Burghardt from the European Commission on my right and Ambassador Robert Blackwill on my left looked at me like I was crazy. That was nine years ago—things can change and that makes me very optimistic.

But today, I fear that we are about to build a great wall around the EU after the enlargement. Even worse than dividing Eastern and Western Christianity, as Mr. Hrytsak said, this wall follows precisely the lines of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” thus turning a historical construct into a physical reality. Greece and Cyprus being in and Croatia being out are the only exceptions. The policies that make the EU a success—the internal market with its common trade policy and free movement of people, or Schengen—require strong borders. Fears of illegal immigration, drugs and criminality increase the desire to build high walls. But these walls will limit the possibilities of the new neighbors to come in. The only relationship we have with these countries right now is the very formalist Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Even worse, the EU decided to put Albania under the responsibility of the enlargement commissioner but Ukraine in the hands of the external relations department. It thus offers a prospect of EU membership to a country like Albania which has not taken any steps towards integration and lacks all discussion about a European calling, while leaving Ukraine out. We are standing at a crossroads in EU policy and I hope that we will not keep out Eastern Europe permanently by the fences we are building at our frontiers.

**Cuntz**  
Enlargement is not about building walls  
but about overcoming divides ...

It has been quite frightening to hear Mr. Chalv and Mr. Ilves dwell so much on the “negative” results of enlargement and the danger of a new wall. Eastward enlargement has fulfilled the old hope that Europe would grow beyond not only its original six member states, but transcend the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall as well. The enlargement is also thoroughly positive for the new neighbors because it has brought them friends in the EU. Poland and Estonia act on behalf of Eastern Europe in Brussels.

... and accession is not a question of  
“yes” or “no” but of pragmatic steps ...

Moldova and Ukraine want to know from the EU where they stand. The problems of a new wall can not be solved by a simple “yes” or “no.” I would like to propose a more pragmatic approach. First, we must accept that the Mediterranean states also belong to the neighborhood. Second, we should ask quite specifically how we should act toward which state, what each neighboring state could do to help avoid a new border wall, and what we should do vis-à-vis Ukraine. Like it or not, the Schengen system demands strong external borders. We can talk about



easing visa restrictions with countries such as Ukraine only once these countries have done a substantial amount of work. The same goes for economic ties, which have been flourishing and are just as positive for the new members as for the new neighbors.

One of the priorities of the Action Plan with Ukraine is establishing a constructive dialog on visa issues to pave the way for future negotiations on a visa facilitation arrangement. The plan for Moldova contains a similar formulation.

Taking into account that Ukraine has had a border with the EU only for 6 months while Russia has had one for 10 years, these offers seem fair to me. The discrepancy between the treatments of these countries is justified at this point of time and can be evened up in a very short period if our Eastern partners take the necessary steps.

Just a short observation on the visa issue: How can it be that citizens of many Latin American and Maghreb states, but not those of Ukraine and Russia, can enter the EU without a visa?

It would indeed be a smart move by the European Union to create a possibility for multiple-access visas at least for certain people from neighboring eastern countries. This might weaken the outside perception of a closed border and prevent cutting more links with the Union's neighbors than necessary. It would also allow the EU to exert more influence on its neighbors than it has in recent years.

But let me turn the argument around: Why doesn't Ukraine immediately abolish its own visa requirements for New Zealanders, Australians, Japanese, Americans, Canadians and Europeans? This would lead to a massive increase in tourism and many related economic improvements; and it would change radically the image of Ukraine for the better. It would especially help the development of western Ukraine, which despite its favorable geographical position is in many ways lagging behind economically. I know the Ukrainian answers to this proposal, which refer to issues such as pride and reciprocity. The same objections could have been raised by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and similar countries after 1989. Yet instead of appealing to such arguments, these countries got rid of their visa requirements, to their great benefit. That policy bore fruit even without reciprocation, and it would bear fruit for Ukraine now.

### **Boag**

The EU Action Plan offers many concrete steps, for example on the visa system

### **Rahr**

Simplifying the EU visa system ...

### **Snyder**

... for selected visitors from the East ...

... or opening the Ukrainian border for EU and US citizens could help

**Antczak**

The pictures of August III on the walls surrounding our table remind us that, although this Polish king was no intellectual heavyweight, he could bend metal rods with his bare hands. So he was called August the Strong. However, some of that simple strength based on transparent rules and basic principles shared by the European family of nations should govern the enlarged EU policy towards its neighbors and other countries as well.

The EU's foreign policy lacks long-term goals

One of the main problems the new member countries see in the new EU foreign policy is a lack of new long-term goals. Perhaps more time is needed for these new goals to be negotiated, precisely defined and unanimously accepted by all the EU countries. But in the meantime, and this could be years, it seems the new EU policy towards its Eastern neighbors, and especially Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, is a trade-off between law and order versus freedom and democracy. This quasi-policy may reflect a threat perceived by some EU national governments of potential conflict between Russia and the EU, meaning that these governments may accept a special role for Russia in the former Soviet countries or in Russia's "close foreign neighbors." This view can hardly be accepted by the new EU member countries, which still remember their decades under Communist rule. If we assume, for a moment, that Russia under President Putin is not particularly interested in cooperating with the Commission to influence the regimes of President Lukashenko in Belarus or the separatists' governments in Transnistria in Moldova, or Abkhazia in Georgia, we may conclude that such partnerships are completely impotent. When we build external relations on particularisms based not even on national, but on some governments' interests, the prospects for a common policy both towards the EU's new neighbors and other countries in the world look rather bleak. As long as this combination of universalisms and Realpolitik prevails at EU decision-making levels, all dictators can sleep easily when visiting Paris, Berlin, London or Rome.

How can the Union help ordinary people  
in the neighboring countries?

However, if fundamental decisions cannot be reached unanimously by the EU governments, we can still do simple things that matter a lot to ordinary people in the neighboring countries. Why doesn't the EU offer long-term multiple-entry visas to those who are welcome, especially young educated people, specialists or professionals, like the US does? As such regulations work at a national level, why not unify them on the European level? On the other hand, a discriminatory visa system is a powerful tool for exerting pressure on the representatives of regimes, from dictators, corrupt bureaucrats and deputies of powerful ministers, to oligarchs and shady businessmen—a tool the EU should use more. These regimes are not ruled by dictators themselves, but there is always a support group—a *nomen-*



*klatura* that, in exchange for financial privileges, supports criminal behavior and human rights abuses, not to mention the violation of other democratic principles. It hurts a lot for these people to be overwhelmingly powerful and wealthy in their country but unable to go shopping in Paris, educate their children in London, or get medical treatment in Berlin, and eventually all dictators get sick. This tool is even more effective if applied also to the families and children of the targeted persons. Such simple cost-benefit analysis which every *nomenklatura* member would be forced to make by the new EU visa system might eventually lead the regime to changing its domestic policy. The standard procedures of economic pressure like trade embargoes are usually too harsh for ordinary citizens, not for *nomenklatura*, and not very efficient when the last macro-political and -economic leverages on regimes are lost. Usually, as time passes or when humanitarian crises arise, trade embargoes become porous, which leads to their failure—recent examples include Cuba and North Korea. Another option, likewise hardly acceptable, is military conflict after sanctions have failed, with Iraq as the best recent example.

In a similar way, micro-political and -economic steering, including proactive visa systems, can be better targeted, and become more effective leverage for marginal changes in regime countries, but also bear a smaller political risk for the EU. Simplifying the visa system is something that makes the ordinary man in the street outside the EU feel closer to Europe, while isolating dictators and regimes that pose a constant threat to the world.

This picture follows an old pattern of thinking. Several years ago, the Ukrainian foreign minister in Warsaw used the metaphor of a new Berlin wall between Central and Eastern Europe. I think this metaphor is wrong and misleading. Its roots lie in an inaccurate perception of what the Schengen border really is.

The enlargement does not create a two-bloc Europe. As a matter of empirical fact, the Finnish-Russian border does not much resemble the Finnish-Soviet border, nor indeed are the relations between Europe and the US what they used to be in the 1980s. The European Union is not a geopolitical organisation but, as the US often complains, a kind of anti-geopolitical international agent. Interpreting European Union policies in geopolitical terms leads us down a blind alley.

Why do our Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Moldovan friends nevertheless see the EU as a state or a bloc? The creation and the policing of an external border, the Schengen border, are indeed classic functions of the Westphalian state. And even though Schengen is a great achievement insofar as it creates

## Snyder

There is neither a new Berlin Wall  
nor a two-bloc Europe ...

... but the Schengen border makes  
it appear this way to Eastern Europeans



internal mobility, from the outside it is seen as a border which keeps people out. This development of the EU is just an example of one of the trends of globalisation, which is to create regional areas where people can move freely surrounded by hard borders. We should be very aware of what impression this creates on the outside.

What eastern enlargement and Schengen actually do is reinforce the EU's foreign policy's basic tendency to concentrate on domestic politics. Should the European Union one day extend to Moldova or to Ukraine or Belarus, this will be the result of changes in the domestic political systems of these countries. Schengen, for example, demands that every future new member state can defend its external frontier. Turkey would thus have to defend its border with Iraq, Ukraine its border with Russia—which it is far far removed from at this moment.

**Hübner**

The EU is still far from having a common external border insofar as there is no common protection through joint forces. We are currently trying to financially involve all member states in the protection of our borders but not yet to establish a common force to police these borders. As long as there are no Germans or French at the Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Belarusian border, this border will not be publicly perceived as the border of the European Union.

**Rahr**

Eastern European countries are suspicious of the EU's know-it-all manner ...

Mr. Yeudachenka mentioned the moment of truth for many new neighbors, namely, their perspective on European history. For the states of East Central Europe, EU accession was a kind of reunification with the Europe that was lost in the mayhem of World War II, but things look different for the Slavic world. The new neighbors are striving less to be under the roof of a joint European historical house—western Ukraine possibly, but not eastern Ukraine. However, I do not regard the choice facing these countries as one between blocs. Instead of a two-bloc Europe, I prefer to speak in terms of an EU Europe and a non-EU Europe. This is also the basis for many eastern countries' fears. Some groups in the new neighbor countries fear that the West is trying to install a strict EU framework on the entire continent. The EU is no longer negotiating with Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev solely over economic questions, but increasingly over issues of politics and culture as well. The eastern partners are annoyed that, in these negotiations, small states like Estonia and Luxembourg have more weight through EU structures than they themselves do. Partnership-building institutions such as the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council are not functioning smoothly, the OSCE is trans-

Anybody walking through the streets of Lviv will hardly be able to comprehend why in 15 years, the eastern Anatolian villages should belong to the EU, but not Lviv.

Rahr

ferring democracy eastward on behalf of the West, and the Council of Europe is perceived as the West's inquisition tool.

Against this backdrop, Putin is trying to use the present pause in the EU's enlargement process to build up an EU-East that would give the Eurasian world additional institutional weight. Yet this EU-East is no bloc. It is not a security alliance and will never become one. The reunification of Russia with Belarus failed in 1995, and the economic union with Ukraine can exist only because of Kuchma's weakness towards the West. Only a few months ago, Ukraine and Russia were embroiled in a serious dispute over Tuzla Island, there was speculation about Ukraine joining NATO, and that NATO troops would be stationed along the Sea of Azov. The present Russian-Ukrainian peace is a fragile one.

The situation could change radically if Russia were to again develop imperial tendencies and give up its pro-Western stance that Putin has been continuing in the tradition of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Then, indeed, we would have, as Mr. Chaly said, a two-bloc Europe—a catastrophe for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, which would become a gray zone.

Still, I think the EU is currently taking strategically important steps to influence developments, and in contrast to Mr. Snyder, I very much see a geopolitical approach by the EU. Several EU strategy papers have identified Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as the EU's close foreign neighbors—countries that, from the Russian point of view, are also Russia's close foreign neighbors. Despite Moscow's huge interests to the contrary, it prevented a solution between Trans-Dniester and Moldova by undermining the plan of the deputy Kremlin chief, Dmitrii Kozak. The EU is strong enough to have accomplished this and, together with the United States, is gradually replacing Russia as the peacekeeping power in Georgia. The EU does not want to challenge Russia—its power would be insufficient even if it wanted to. However, the EU does want to prevent imperialist tendencies and instead integrate Russia into a pluralist security policy in Europe.

I would like to say one more thing in conclusion. Anyone walking through the streets of Lviv, a thoroughly European city, will hardly be able to comprehend why in 15 years, the eastern Anatolian villages should belong to the EU, but not Lviv!

I would contest that any of the supranational organizations Russia is a member of could be reasonably considered a bloc.

Russia is a member of some regional organizations, first and foremost the Commonwealth of Independent States. In its essence, CIS is a forum in which



... therefore the Russian "EU-East" is an attractive alternative

Today, the EU is developing a geopolitical strategy

### **Kozhokin**

None of Russia's alliances is a bloc

the national leaders of state-members discuss the most pressing and vital issues their countries face. We cannot even draw a parallel between CIS and the EU or NATO, as the first does not have those structures and mechanisms of implementation that the EU and NATO has. There is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation that includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; this is the only organisation which has an explicit military dimension, but as a military entity it's very specific. For example, Belarus is a neutral state and Belorussian authorities have no right to send Belorussian troops anywhere abroad. Belorussian soldiers don't participate even in peacekeeping operations. Along with the four Central Asian countries and China, Russia is a member of the Shanghai-Cooperation Organisation. This organisation could hardly be considered a military entity. It deals with the problems of fighting terrorism. The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation incorporates Russia and all Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan. Only this year Russia joined this organisation which is engaged in solving mostly economic and ecological issues.

### **Schlögel**

Europe is determined by the return of historic regions ...

I also think the image of a two-bloc Europe completely ignores reality. Since 1989, many more important things have taken place than the emergence of EU and non-EU regions. The remarkable point has been the return of large, historical regions with their own cohesion that are much older than the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. I'm thinking of the Baltic region, Central Europe and the Black Sea region. Polycentricity, not polarity, is the term that best expresses the tendency of developments in Europe.

Therefore, I think reminding ourselves of what Europe actually is is more important than producing strategy papers. If one can muster the courage to adopt this somewhat anti-political view, then one sees that Europe has come much farther than people often complain. On the level of mobility, cooperation, and border crossings in the millions, so much more has happened in the last 20 years than most mainstream political statements realize. Lviv, for example, which I saw for the first time 40 years ago, and 20 years ago for the first time consciously, was the end of the world back then, a capital of Europe's backwaters so to speak. Since then, the city has become integrated in a web of relationships that simply cannot be adequately described as being "inside" or "outside" the EU.

... and huge dynamic corridors

Besides the comeback of historical regions, the return of old corridors in the age of globalization also play a significant role. No matter how hollow the term "globalization" may be, in the last ten years, corridors have developed that are un-

doubtedly huge and dynamic and are fundamentally changing Europe, irrespective of national boundaries. Today, Moscow is a global city, not just a European city. From Berlin and Warsaw to Minsk and Moscow, metropolitan corridors have emerged that have their very own paces and lifestyles. We can place much more trust in the new network of regions and corridors than the strategy papers and action plans of politicians would have us believe. There is so unbelievably much more going on between Warsaw and Berlin and Minsk, between Petersburg and Helsinki, between Riga and Stockholm, between Odessa and Istanbul, than the talk about the European Union and nation states and other political organizations recognizes. Europe's transformation process is taking place in deeper strata.

Ambassador Boag, you have been in Kiev for six weeks, and therefore have a fresh view of the EU's relationship with Ukraine. What are the decisive transformations taking place?

At a meeting with Prime Minister Yanukovich and a group of ambassadors yesterday it became clear to me that Romano Prodi's declaration about a future membership of Ukraine has acquired a life of its own in national political discourse. But irrespective of what Mr. Prodi did or did not say, the treaties state that any European country can apply for membership and the Copenhagen criteria set out what applicants need to do.

The question of Ukrainian membership is a matter of broad political vision and has important geostrategic consequences. But throughout its history the EU has implemented its—very courageous—political vision through essentially commercial, economic and technical steps. That is why the recent expansion was accompanied not by declarations of political intent but by negotiations over the 80,000 pages of the *acquis communautaire*. That is also why the European Commission attaches far more importance to the action-plan recently negotiated under the neighborhood policy than to philosophical discussions about the European nature of Ukraine. This action plan is the key document that enables us to get from A to B in our aspirations to develop closer relations. Our Ukrainian partners may find it not a very sexy document because it does not offer geopolitical perspectives, but our future partners need to align themselves with our technological, bureaucratic and essentially domestic policy-oriented approach to integration.

If our Ukrainian partners—like, for example, Mr. Chaly—complain that the message from the EU is unclear, I would like to turn the argument around. The

**de Weck**

**Boag**

Whatever Prodi said, any European country can apply for EU membership

Ukraine needs to send a clear message that it wants to join the EU.

If it is anywhere,  
I see indecision in Ukraine itself.

Erler



Vice-President of the European Parliament yesterday reminded the speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament that Ukraine is wavering between the customs union within the Single Economic Space built up by Russia and membership of the European Union. Ultimately you will have to decide on one option. It may be good tactics to pursue both for a while, but this does not send a clear message either.

**Erler**

I agree with Mr. Boag. I was not convinced by the mantra of complaints over an indecisive EU that we heard from Mr. Hrytsak, Mr. Chaly, and Mr. Mikhaïlov. If it is anywhere, I see indecision in Ukraine itself.

Ukraine must stop wavering between the EU  
and Russia and reform its political system ...

It is simply not true that Yushchenko and Yanukovich are both Europe-oriented and fashion their policies accordingly. And I do not mean only technical questions or joining the Single Economic Space. To the present day, the Ukrainian president has been unable to clear himself of accusations of having been involved in a murder, remains part of a predatory oligarchic system, and wants to change the constitution because he cannot be sure of being elected a third time. Now, it is not the president who is supposed to have the most power, but the parliament, where Kuchma has a secure majority. The loser will surely denounce the election as fixed, and the sick and disfigured opposition leader accuses the government of trying to poison him. I see neither efforts to attain a European standard nor a stable pro-European consensus in Ukrainian politics.

... like Poland did during the 1990s

It was a completely different picture in Poland for the last twelve years. There, the government changed every four years through democratic elections. Each new government continued the country's pro-European policies and its efforts to fulfil the *acquis communautaire*, and was duly voted out of office every four years. Where is the willingness in Ukraine to enforce an unpopular reform policy with a consensus beyond party lines? There is no sign of any conditions for a *rap-prochement* with the EU, not only from the viewpoint of European policy, but also from the viewpoint of a European civil society. So against this backdrop, I think it is problematic to accuse the EU of lacking decisiveness while demanding solid offers from it.

As the Neighborhood Policy will be  
the EU's only offer for a long time ...

I also disagree with the claim that the EU has no strategy. How can one disqualify the "Wider Europe" concept and the New Neighborhood policy as "empty words" and thus reject the only strategy that exists? The New Neighborhood Concept might not be "especially sexy," to use Mr. Boag's words, but it has a long-term perspective and will remain the only offer for a long time to come.

It gives Ukraine very substantial opportunities if it would only decide to accept and use it.

Ukraine would also be well-advised to take advantage of the opportunities its neighboring country offers. For the last few years, Poland has been developing its own *Ostpolitik* because it knows Ukraine's importance and has many ties, particularly with the country's western part. The Poles are more than willing to share their own experiences with the integration process and take a leading role in implementing the New Neighborhood Policy. Ukraine should use the chances it is being offered and give Europe a clear signal instead of descending back into expressing grievances.

For years I have been urging my Ukrainians friends at discussions to stop seeing themselves solely as victims of geopolitical transformations. Like Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine has become a free and independent country for the first time. All three states should live up to their duty as independent agents. That includes a willingness to make commitments and reform their social and political systems. Because as long as there are no compatible structures and institutions in these countries, partnership will be possible only between individuals, which is always something subjective. The Ukrainian constitutional reform is a negative example. It redefines the balance of power yet ignores the question of checks on power, thereby not contributing at all to the development of a political system that corresponds to our structures.

The Ukrainians often complain that the EU uses different criteria regarding their country than Russia does. Of course we do, because Ukraine wants more than Russia, namely membership in Euro-Atlantic structures.

If Ukraine sees a danger of being crushed between two powerful blocs, my reply is that these blocs do not yet exist. They might be currently emerging, if only because we live in a changing world. Yet even if that is the case and Ukraine fears Russian imperialism, then it must do something against it. Instead, the government is permitting Russia to economically infiltrate the country and the Russian president to plainly express his preference in the presidential election. It is not the European Union that is abandoning Ukraine—the New Neighborhood Policy's Action Plan gives the country many concrete options for cooperation. Rather, the problem here is a lack of will to act independently. Instead of its constant power struggle, Ukraine needs clear political concepts and the will to implement them resolutely.

... Ukraine better accept it and make use of its opportunities

## Stüdemann

If Ukraine fears Russia, why does it allow Russia to infiltrate its economy?



**Chaly**

Your reactions to my presentation only show that we have reason to be upset about the EU's inconsistency and uncooperative attitude! I have the impression that the representatives from the EU member states simply do not want to hear us. You refuse to acknowledge that Ukraine as the first country in world history voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal and that it is the only former Soviet Republic whose political transformation took place without any bloodshed or use of force. You ignore the fact that, despite the negative consequences of Chernobyl, we have managed to achieve impressive economic growth. European businessmen who work here have a less ideologically distorted view of our country.

Because the EU Action Plan for  
Ukraine is a step backwards ...

The EU Action Plan you are so proud of is unbalanced, does not include any valuable commitments, and contradicts the valuable Common Strategy on Ukraine adopted by the European Council in 1999. And how can you justify putting Albania in the dossier of the enlargement commissioner, but not Ukraine? Refusing to give Moldova an accession prospect is especially dangerous. Once Romania becomes a member of the EU in 2007, the considerable number of Moldavians with double citizenship will permanently cross the border if Moldova is not given the prospect of integration. In 1989, this was how East Germany collapsed as a state.

... Ukraine must make its own way by  
becoming a bridge between East and West

Ukraine must now take its future into its own hands. While we work to find our role as bridge and communication center between the Eastern and the Western blocs, the EU does everything it can to reduce us to a buffer state. Your mentality only allows you to think in terms of EU versus non-EU, and you always have your external border rather than our common border in mind. And while you speak about openness, the EU uses its enormous power as an economic agent to divide Europe with its discriminatory trade policy.

The EU patronizes the Council of Europe

As former ambassador to the Council of Europe, I am also deeply skeptical about the European Union's strategy for this only real pan-European organization we have. Rather than strengthening the Council of Europe's human rights instruments, for example, the EU creates alternative jurisdictions through its constitution and treaties with provisions for legal help in criminal matters. And now that the EU has 25 seats, it controls the Council of Europe entirely. This prevents us from expressing our voice and influencing the Council's decisions.

I deliberately spoke about problems and challenges. Nevertheless, I am convinced that EU enlargement will in the long run have many more positive than negative effects. And I do still hope that, after a possible Yushchenko victory, the EU might reward this victory of democracy with a strong message and real commitments.

Not only Yushchenko, also Yanukovch would have to make European integration a priority.

Pidluska

Much of the opposition's criticism about the lack of organization and the violation of democratic principles in the Ukrainian elections is justified. Yet I am sure that after the elections the sun will rise again and we will decide to live with the outcome. The European Union will follow the OSCE in stating that there were violations of democratic standards but that they did not affect the results decisively.

It is therefore important that, as Mr. Chaly said, European integration is and remains Ukraine's strategic goal no matter who will be president. True, there are differing views among politicians and citizens on what integration means and which aspects of it are desirable. But not only Yushchenko, also Yanukovych would have to make European integration, in the sense of closer ties on a practical level, a priority. The economic interests of those who back him lie in the EU. These people want the shares of their enterprises to be traded in international markets, to expand their businesses and send their kids to study abroad. Therefore, they have no interest in being marginalized in the ghetto of Europe's last authoritarian regime.

Even though Ukraine must indeed solve its own problems, foreign agents could do a lot to change the deplorable state of our political landscape. But there is an overwhelming consensus of disinterest for Ukraine all over Western Europe. Let me illustrate that with a story about the media: At the beginning of the presidential campaign in early April, Adam Michnik, the director of Poland's leading newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, was approached by Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko asked him to help him gain access to the European newspapers, because otherwise the events in Ukraine would go unnoticed as nobody in Western Europe really cared about them. He suggested writing a letter together with Michnik and distributing it to leading newspapers. Michnik rightly called it a sad irony that the leading candidate for presidency in the largest Eastern European country needs the support of a newspaper editor to get a letter published. However, after the letter eventually appeared in "El Pais," neither "Le Monde" nor "Die Welt" approached Yushchenko to conduct an interview.

Even Mr. Erler, one of the most knowledgeable politicians with respect to Ukraine, with his request that Ukraine cooperate with Polish politicians, ignored the fact that we started to do that long ago. We have been engaged in dialog for more than 15 years, but outside of Poland nobody really knows or cares about that.

The lack of interest in Ukraine in large parts of EU Europe goes hand in hand with a lack of political vision. Our current ideas about Polish-Ukrainian coopera-

**Pidluska**

Yanukovych's backers favor European integration

**Hrytsak**

Nobody in Western Europe cares about Ukraine ...

... and there is no vision for the future of Eastern Europe

We need a patient dialog with  
the Belarusian administration.

Wolski

tion were developed largely by one single visionary, the Polish intellectual Jerzy Giedroyc. During his exile in Paris in the 1940s he articulated the idea that Poland and Ukraine should form a strategic partnership to reform Eastern Europe. What EU politician is able to develop a similar vision of an Eastern enlargement of the Union? The Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz recently drew an impressive picture of Polish foreign policy in the globalized post-9/11 world, aspiring to a special Polish role in transatlantic cooperation and strongly focusing on Ukraine. Adam Michnik is also a man capable of visions. But I can not see anybody in the EU or in the Western European media who cares enough for Eastern Europe and at the same time possesses the intellectual capacity to develop and fight for long term visions for Ukraine.

**Wolski**

The new member states promote a more  
active EU strategy for Eastern Europe

The EU certainly needs visions and long term strategies for Eastern Europe. Maybe this is more likely with the accession of the new member states, and particularly Poland. The enlarged European Union is only five months old. I would not dismiss the possibility that if we sit down with representatives from the 25 member states and work seriously, taking into consideration Poland's experiences, we might come up with something useful.

This holds true not only for Ukraine. Belarus is also a very important neighbor for Poland—for three reasons. First, about 600,000 Poles are Belarusian citizens. Second, we have a Belarusian minority in Poland, Polish citizens who preserve their Belarusian language and culture. Third, Poland is interested in a democratic and open society in Belarus, because democratic neighbors are friendly neighbors. That is why, a few weeks ago, the Polish parliament adopted a resolution which stressed the importance of fair elections in Belarus.

Poland's perspective on Belarus and Ukraine is of course different than that of our European partners in Lisbon or Athens, who lack the geographical proximity and close historical relations. Nevertheless, the EU can benefit from Poland's experiences and relations when devising its own strategy—a strategy that is urgently required and that needs to be developed by all 25 EU member states.

Poland proposes a dialog with  
the Belarusian administration ...

Let me mention three aspects of what an EU strategy for Belarus could include. First, education in the broader sense should be a priority. Through Belarusian universities, high schools and the media we must try to reach not only the elites but broader parts of society. Second, we must promote civil society in Belarus, which depends to a large degree on the Belarusian authorities. Finally, we therefore need a patient dialog with the Belarusian administration. Poland has gained experience



in this area and is ready to play its part in the comprehensive dialog between the EU and Belarus which Mr. Yeudachenka advocated.

Mr. Erler and Mr. Stüdemann demand that Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova completely adopt the EU's norms and standards as a precondition for talks. Mr. Wolski has now articulated an alternative position: rather than just wait and see whether our countries adopt these values, the EU could help us in the transition process. As our countries have different histories, it is only natural that we find ourselves at different periods of the development of democracy. Cooperating with us to assist in the transformation you deem necessary would be a more constructive approach for the EU than waiting until we have fulfilled all standards. Seven years of isolation have not helped a lot with Belarus, have they?

The EU's double standards disappoint Belarus as much as Ukraine. Belarus demolished more conventional weapons than most other European nations put together. Should we not be rewarded with a minimum of recognition for that?

A certain degree of cooperation would also be useful—maybe even indispensable—for the EU. If the EU wants to effectively protect nuclear power stations in Lithuania and Ukraine against terrorism, it needs to cooperate with Belarus. Investing huge political and financial resources in the closure of Ignalina and in the protection of the derelict reactor in Chernobyl is insufficient as long as Belarus is not involved, because both reactors are situated practically at the border. Belarus is also an essential partner for the EU's cooperation with Russia in the field of energy. 50 percent of Russian oil and 25 percent of Russian gas for Western Europe come through Belarusian territory. In these and other fields, an inclusive EU policy for Belarus would allow for practical improvements, while exclusion will postpone any steps forward for another dozen years.

Important as a sincere and open dialog might be, accusing each other of a lack of understanding and an inability to reform respectively will not bear any fruit. The real problem is at once more specific and more basic.

Belarus is struggling to overcome its totalitarian heritage. Mr. Stüdemann is therefore asking too much when he demands that we immediately start acting as fully fledged autonomous players in international politics. We are not yet able to play our new role properly. Particularly Germans should understand that, as after the Second World War, the Western powers did not leave Germany with the encouragement to "just do it yourself." The US invented and implemented the

### **Yeudachenka**

... which Belarus gladly welcomes ...

... and which could bear fruit for the EU, too

### **Mikhailov**

Belarus cannot overcome its totalitarian past on its own



Marshall Plan to help Germany overcome the consequences of its authoritarian regime.

Mr. Erler, I did not want to offend you when I called the New Neighborhood Policy empty words. But due to the radical situation in Belarus I must insist that the EU should not implement its old concepts unchanged. The Union must reformulate them together with new members like Lithuania and Poland who have a more profound understanding of the situation in Belarus. If the EU's concepts need no improvement, how can it be that the situation in Belarus is deteriorating at such a rapid pace?

### **Ilves**

Ukraine must make the first steps, for example in the area of visa freedom ...

12 years ago in my country we discussed whether the EU or Estonia should make the first move and I took the position Mr. Erler is advocating today. I was as convinced then as I am today that a country which does what is needed will be wanted in the European Union. No applicant that does not change the facts on the ground will be accepted just for political reasons or because it is owed something.

Visa freedom is a practical example. We had to work very hard to establish strong borders, but then we were rewarded with visa-free travel. There is no use in talking about our attitudes towards Ukraine before Ukraine starts to implement more concrete changes. Complaining about double standards is also a waste of time. Double standards do exist, and living with them is part of being an adult. No protest has ever changed that.

... while the EU should prepare appropriate reactions

On the side of the EU, the top priority should be to prepare for a possible Yushchenko victory. When Saakashvili became president of Georgia, I asked the Italian foreign minister Frattini in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament: Donald Rumsfeld just went to see Saakashvili, so when will a EU representative be there? Frattini answered: Only after we have spoken to our Russian friends. We should not follow that pattern in Ukraine.

Enlargement brought Eastern Europe many new friends in the EU ...

The good news is that there is light at the end of the tunnel because the new EU member states have other priorities. When the Director General for Enlargement, Eneko Landáburu, was asked two successive questions about Ukraine at the first meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he said: "I already mentioned Ukraine." That was the wrong answer to give, and so the next 17 questions came from Poles, Czechs and Hungarians and were about Ukraine. There is a much greater awareness about Ukraine and you now have many more friends in the EU than ever before. But still you have to achieve some progress on the ground before your friends can help you—we are, after all, politicians.

Moldova lost some of its markets—it would be good to restore at least the situation we had before the enlargement.

Braghis

My last proposal for the Eastern European countries is to think more about NATO than about EU membership, because the standards for democracy, corruption and similar issues are much lower in NATO. Remember that Turkey has been a member for quite a while. Maybe NATO could be a first step towards European integration.

Moldova is glad that enlargement brought countries like Poland, the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic, which have a very good understanding for our country, into the European Union. Enlargement has also brought almost all important political parties in Moldova to declare European integration as their strategic goal, even though on the part of the Communist Party, this might be empty rhetoric.

A less pleasant consequence is that Moldova lost some of its markets in Poland, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, and is facing the same in Romania and Bulgaria. We have received almost nothing in exchange, and the negotiations about different free trade agreements brought no results. Therefore, our dependence on the markets of the Commonwealth of Independent States has increased. It would be good for Moldova and probably also for the EU to restore at least the situation we had before the enlargement.

If the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus decisively reject the EU Neighborhood Policy, their decision could result in a reorientation of European integration. Perhaps Europe will stop integrating in an eastward direction in the manner that Mr. Schlögel portrayed so vividly. Instead, the EU might follow the course suggested by the United States, namely toward the Caucasus. There, the Neighborhood Strategy is already bearing fruit, not in the sense of a new value system, but in terms of security strategy.

For example, Georgia has been decisively transformed by its peaceful revolution, and we are seeing important geopolitical changes elsewhere in the Caucasus as well. Some South Caucasian states in the Council of Europe, for instance, have been criticizing Belarus for its democratic shortcomings. The European Union is considering a Caucasian Stability Pact and, given the ramifications for security policy, would almost certainly be willing to spend money on it.

Poland's policy for Ukraine lacked firmness in the past decade, at least in the field of economic transition. There was a window of opportunity in the second half of the 1990s for pushing through profound economic reforms in Ukraine. But the



**Braghis**

... but countries like Moldova lost markets in the new member states

**Rahr**

If Eastern Europe rejects the Neighborhood Policy, the EU might focus on the Caucasus

**Antczak**

Poland must use enlargement to push for reforms in Ukraine

I welcome competition in economies, but I would not welcome the return to spheres of interest among the EU's new neighbors.

Antczak



Polish politicians and the foreign ministry failed to exert the necessary pressure and instead chose to support Ukraine more or less unconditionally. The Giedroyc vision of the Polish-Ukrainian strategic partnership has bedevilled our policy makers' judgment. Instead of clinging to this emotionally compelling idea, they should have stuck to some basic principles in their actions by demanding genuine market reforms. The cost of dealing with difficult domestic reforms might serve as an excuse for Polish policies towards its Eastern neighbors. However, accession to the EU offers a new opportunity for Poland, as well as other new members, to complete transition and push harder for reforms in neighboring countries, especially Ukraine and Belarus. Once we establish and pursue these guidelines, instead of giving them up as soon as we encounter resistance, the question of who wins the elections in Ukraine becomes less significant.

Giedroyc's identification of the importance of a stable and prosperous Ukraine for Poland was supplemented by Brzezinski's definition of Ukraine as a "stabilizing" factor for expansionist Russian foreign policy in Europe. Both of these opinions still hold some truth, and Ukraine is too important to be put aside by an extended EU concentrating on deepening integration. The new EU policy should, sooner rather than later, define the prospect of membership for Ukraine, even if it is a long-term one as in the case of Turkey. This would also provide a guideline for other former Soviet countries if they wish to pursue integration with the EU. If not, particular interests of EU national governments or even EU political parties would compete in the EU's "close foreign neighbors" As an economist I welcome competition in economies, but as a Pole looking from a historical perspective, I would not welcome the return to spheres of interest among the EU's new neighbors.

**de Weck**

We have looked this morning at the EU's relationship with its new neighbors at various levels. We have, for example, confronted the historical level with the fully tangible and sometimes technocratic level of practical policy. The desire for strategies and visions came up against the experience of Europe's slow and arduous integration process, which has characterized the history of the EU. Our discussion incorporated the level of images—of each other, of what divides us and what holds us together. And we have seen how, in exploring integration, we face that geopolitical question that smacks of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century: should one go to the one side or the other? I think these levels made occasional contact, sometimes they lay parallel, and other times they ran opposite to each other. Viewing them together has opened perspectives unattainable from only one level.

## II. Aims and Instruments of the EU Neighbourhood Policy

In May 2004, the European Commission announced its “European Neighborhood Policy,” which is also enshrined in the draft European Constitution. This strategy constitutes the framework for the Union’s relations with its new neighboring states in the East as well as with southern neighbors such as Morocco. What, exactly, should this neighborhood policy include?

As Undersecretary in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jakub Wolski will first present the ideas of an important new member state; then Ian Boag, the European Commission’s new delegation leader in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, will add the view of the Commission. After a discussion of the neighborhood policy’s concrete instruments, Wolfgang Schäuble, the CDU’s most experienced foreign policy expert, will open up a fundamental investigation into the nature and direction of European integration.

As a new member of the European Union, Poland is fully aware that a further enlargement of the EU is a long term project and that the final limits of the Union remain an open question. Yet we are determined not to forget those of our neighbors who remain outside the family of the Union for the time being. We did not join the EU to distance ourselves from the Eastern European countries, but to promote their integration into the European Union. Fostering stability in its neighboring countries in the East through effective cooperation is also in the interest of the EU and the transatlantic community, who need allies in their fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime. We therefore think that the EU needs a clean and bold vision as well as effective concepts for practical cooperation with Eastern Europe.

In order to take an active and responsible role in the creation and implementation of an Eastern Dimension of the EU’s external policy, Poland presented a non-paper in July 2003 which outlines some basic objectives and guidelines:

The countries of Eastern Europe face similar challenges due to their common history and economic and political interdependence. The EU therefore needs a coherent and comprehensive policy framework specifically designed for its eastern neighbors. This “Eastern Dimension” of the EU would complement the Union’s Northern Dimension and make use of the experiences made in this context. To create synergies, the EU should coordinate its activities with other structures and organizations and facilitate the involvement of international financial institutions and private capital.

**de Weck**

**Wolski**

presentation

Poland joined the EU to promote the integration of Eastern European countries

The EU needs a comprehensive policy for Eastern Europe: an Eastern Dimension ...



... which aims at a common space of political and economic cooperation ...

The establishment of a common space of political and economic cooperation within Wider Europe would be the mid-term objective of this policy, without prejudicing the final form of integration. A prospect, not a promise, of EU membership could be an important incentive for political elites and societies in Ukraine and Moldova, and also for a changed Belarus, to promote democratic reforms.

... includes initiatives in the area of new media, self-government, education ...

We believe that to efficiently cooperate with its neighbors, the EU must differentiate its policies according to regions, to the countries' will to cooperate with the EU and their progress in the transformation process. A broad array of areas of action, instruments and institutions for cooperation is available.

... uses TACIS and establishes new funds and scholarship programs ...

First, fields of action: The European Union should promote initiatives in the areas of new media, local self-government, European education—especially people-to-people contacts for young leaders—and cross-border and regional cooperation.

Second, EU programs: The Union should use its TACIS program and its European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument to advance democratic and economic reforms and the development of civil society in Eastern Europe. Poland also proposes the creation of new EU instruments, namely a European Civil Society Fund for the promotion of democratic values and civil society in Eastern Europe. To provide agents in Eastern European countries with the know-how vital for the transition process, we recommend creating a European Scholarship and European Internship Program to facilitate peer-to-peer relations. The Union should strongly support the initiatives of NGOs in the region. They are very active in implementing civil society projects; they are experienced, flexible and free of political bias. Financial backing of national and European institutions allows them to broaden the scope of their work and provides an excellent opportunity for the EU to use its money efficiently.

... builds on bilateral and trilateral initiatives ...

Third, bilateral and trilateral initiatives: Together with its Russian and Lithuanian partners, Poland is preparing trilateral neighborhood programs for trans-border cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus for the years 2004–2006. We consider it of crucial importance that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently presented common proposals on the further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine to their EU colleagues.

... and uses cooperation and conditionality

Fourth, cooperation and conditionality: We opt for strengthening the political and security dialog between the EU and Ukraine, and also for promoting economic integration. The EU should make the first step by accepting Ukraine as a market

The Neighborhood Policy aims at preventing the EU's new borders from becoming new dividing lines.

Boag

economy, followed by negotiating and establishing a free trade area. While the possibility of integration into the EU is of crucial importance to provide a European prospect for Ukraine, integration must remain conditional on Ukraine's progress in reforms—for example on whether the forthcoming presidential elections are transparent and fair. This way, the dynamics of Ukraine's relations with the EU will depend on its internal political and economic reforms. The EU member states, including Poland, should offer assistance in this process, but it is primarily all the Ukrainian government's responsibility to pursue reforms and implement EU standards.

Reforms may require serious efforts and comprehensive information campaigns to convince the public, but these efforts pay off. Good governance, democracy, the rule of law, transparency and fairness in economic and political life are to the benefit of the state and the public. The implementation of European and international standards for products is expensive but also opens up new markets and possibilities for growth.

Integrating Ukraine into EU structures will not be an easy task. The negotiation of the EU-Ukrainian Action Plan and the circumstances of the forthcoming presidential elections will make the next months a crucial period for determining the course of our mutual relations. We believe that the Ukrainian authorities and major political parties should take ambitious decisions to bring Ukraine closer to Europe.

In the last decade, the EU's first foreign policy priority was enlargement, which we completed successfully on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004. Having achieved this, the EU and its Commission are now focussing on its neighbors in the broadest sense as their next priority. Romano Prodi, with his concept of a "Wider Europe," called for a "ring of friends" in Eastern Europe and subsequently also in the Caucasus and the countries south and east of the Mediterranean. The Neighborhood Policy implements this concept as it seeks to share the benefits of integration with our neighbors by strengthening stability, security and well-being. It aims at preventing the EU's new borders from becoming new dividing lines. This is particularly relevant in Eastern Europe, where our borders effectively shifted eastwards.

The criticism of the Neighborhood Policy raised in this discussion reminds me of what I heard as Head of the EU Delegation in Cairo last year. The Egyptians asked me practically the same questions as our Eastern European partners. First: Why add yet another initiative to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

Reforms will pay off for the public and for the economy

Ukraine's next steps will determine the country's future

## **Boag**

Presentation

Enlargement completed, neighborhood is the EU's next foreign policy priority

Why yet another initiative? The Neighborhood Policy offers closer relations ...

with its Free Trade Agreement, to the Greater Middle East initiative, and to the whole array of existing multilateral and bilateral initiatives. Second: What is new about the Neighborhood Policy and which additional benefits will it bring us? Let me try to answer these questions.

The Neighborhood Policy offers our neighbors a much closer relationship with the EU than hitherto. It allows for an enhanced political dialog and a greater stake in the European Union's internal market and is based on the notion of sharing the EU's fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, good governance, civil society, market economy and sustainable development.

... implemented through individual Action Plans ...

To implement the Neighborhood Policy, the EU negotiates Action Plans with each of its neighboring countries. The Action Plan for Ukraine, for example, sets out a whole series of projects for promoting democracy and human rights and specifically mentions the need to conduct this year's presidential elections and the parliamentary elections in 2006 in accordance with OSCE standards.

The Action Plan also sets out concrete steps for bringing Ukraine's—as well as Moldova's—economy closer to the EU. In the long run, the approximation of laws, industrial norms, sanitary regulations and other standards will enable Ukraine to participate fully in the internal market. This promises is considerable added value compared to a free-trade agreement, which we offer once Ukraine completes its WTO membership. Such an agreement is of no use if your products are stopped at the frontier because they do not qualify to enter the markets which you are targeting. If the Action Plan is implemented, by contrast, this guarantees access to the EU market. That makes the country much more interesting not only for trading companies but also for investors.

The Action Plan also offers specific steps for cross-border cooperation. It sets out an agenda of capacity building for regional government, facilitating border management and eventually easier movement across borders for those who live in the border areas.

... which use some of the instruments created for preparing accession

The methods of the Action Plans are very similar to those used to prepare the new member states for accession. One example is twinning, where administrations in partner countries work together with officials in member states to solve issues in accordance with EU practices. Here, the new member states can help a great deal in sharing their experiences of the last 10 years.

The Neighborhood Policy's added value lies in differentiating and focusing our approaches. First, differentiation: there is no 'one size fits all'-concept. The EU therefore conducts individual discussions with the neighboring countries in



Eastern Europe, in the Mediterranean or in the Caucasus. Policies are designed to fit the needs of the country concerned and not some grand design produced in Brussels.

Second, focusing our policies: the Neighborhood Policy brings together all the different EU instruments to focus on the same policy objectives. We can thus move from cooperation to a significant degree of integration, avoiding a sense of exclusion in the neighboring countries. The Cooperation Council meets regularly to discuss political matters and we have offered to further upgrade these contacts. If the Council follows our proposal, we will create a new financial instrument combining all existing instruments and funds to effectively promote the Neighborhood Policy. While the budget has not yet been passed, the Commission also plans to propose a significant increase in funds for the countries concerned. The Union also wants to offer greater participation in European Union programs, particularly in the sphere of culture, youth, education and technical and scientific cooperation, so that Ukrainians could soon participate in the Erasmus Mundi program. We might also soon conclude a new and more far-reaching cooperation agreement.

Basically, the Neighborhood Policy and the Action Plans are designed to put flesh on the bones of the existing contractual relationship. This is my answer to the question why we developed yet another initiative. My answer to the question “What is in it for us?” is as follows: There is a great deal in it for the partner countries, if they accept the offer. I would strongly recommend that our partners put the European Union and the European Commission to the test. Even though we are not able to specify what the end point of the journey of European integration will be, this is an opportunity to move a considerable step forward. And—leaving aside the question of whether we are talking about membership or neighborhood—integration is what everybody in Ukraine in the past six weeks told me they wanted.

The offer is on the table, as Mr. Boag has said, and I would suggest that we now discuss its advantages and drawbacks. Is the EU Neighborhood Policy, with its path from cooperation to integration, its differentiated approaches and vision of participation in a free exchange of capital, people, goods, and services, a fair deal? Or will the offer now on the table never really gain any meat on its bones, just like the Barcelona Process that Mr. Boag knows so well from Cairo?

The Neighborhood Policy brings together all EU instruments for the first time ...

... and offers great opportunities for the Eastern European countries—if they accept it

**de Weck**

Not everything that Germany and Poland want will meet with approval.

Cuntz



**Cuntz** The concrete content of the Neighborhood Policy depends on what the Commission negotiates with the individual parties in the Action Plans. As Mr. Boag rightly remarked, the Action Plan for Ukraine closely resembles the enlargement process—without, of course, providing the prospect of accession.

Still, the Council's member states have yet to approve the Commission's proposals. Not everything that Germany and Poland want, Mr. Wolski, will meet with the approval of all other EU member states. We will have to work on this if we want to reach our strategic goals in Europe.

**Chaly** As I negotiated the EU Action Plan on behalf of Ukraine until May 1<sup>st</sup>, I would like to tell you why this plan disappoints us. The Council of Ministers gave the Commission a very clear mandate: the Action Plan was to be a concrete document including mutual commitments and establishing benchmarks.

The Commission, however, presented us with an abstract document which includes neither benchmarks nor a basis for negotiations over the four freedoms. Clearly violating the mandate of the Council of Ministers, the document speaks in a very general way about the possibility of integration and postpones the discussion of concrete projects like a free-trade zone. At the same time, the EU has started to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Moldova because it is a member of the WTO. But the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine establishes no direct linkage between WTO membership and negotiations over a free-trade zone. Why should Ukraine still believe the EU's promises?

To sum up: the Action Plan provides no added value. In our relations with the EU's new member states, like Poland, it even means a step backwards. Last but not least, everybody, including EU representatives, knows that there are no financial resources to implement the Action Plan until at least 2007. The only mechanism for which the EU seems willing to provide funding—and which therefore is much more interesting to us—is the New Neighborhood Instrument.

The Commission should have taken the Polish, Hungarian, Austrian and Czech proposals into account when formulating its Neighborhood Policy. It failed to consult those who know best and thereby confirmed an old prejudice: the gap between Brussels and reality is indeed huge and Brussels is best at producing drafts.

**Reiter** I would like to urgently advise all potential candidates for EU membership against overly criticizing the European Commission, because if you seek any kind of sup-

The Action Plan remains abstract, provides no added value and lacks financial resources



port, it will most likely come from the Commission. It was an extremely important driving force behind the 2004 enlargement.

Ukraine is divided between those who are critical of the EU's Neighborhood Policy and those who do not even know that this policy exists. The political elite sees the Neighborhood Policy as a substitute for membership, which is at best a temporarily attractive situation. The idea of a "ring of friends," though, suggests that each link must remain in that ring forever because taking it out would leave a hole.

We were especially disappointed that the four freedoms are no longer part of the offer—as the concept of Wider Europe had initially suggested. We also miss a vision. Especially the Action Plan confines itself to a list of practical steps without indicating a final destination.

Ukrainian representatives always complain that they are being fed nothing but empty words. Yet even now, when the EU offers them real projects, fields of cooperation, and priorities—which is all the Action Plan is—they condemn it as insufficient.

Ukraine must indeed cast romantic visions of the EU aside, turn to realism and accept that the Neighborhood Policy and the Action Plans are here to stay. Our community of policy makers are quickly beginning to understand that we have to make the best of what the EU offers.

The Neighborhood Policy might indeed prove beneficial if it leads to concrete improvements in EU-Ukrainian relations. A top priority is the creation of infrastructure, of communication and transportation facilities, and the removal of obstacles at the borders and embassies. To understand how Ukrainians feel about the EU, join the queue in front of a European embassy. Changing these chaotic conditions would be a great step forward.

A very promising element of the Neighborhood Policy is the New Neighborhood Instrument. Ukraine and the EU have a real chance to create something of a new quality here if they manage to learn from their experience with previous instruments. TACIS, for example, is not criticized because of the amount of funds available but because of its procedures and focus. The New Neighbourhood Instrument must develop a new way of interaction between the recipients and the donor, taking into account the priorities of beneficiaries. It should also focus

### **Pidluska**

Ukraine criticizes the Action Plan because it does not offer much and lacks a vision ...

### **Stüdemann**

### **Pidluska**

... but Ukraine must accept the offer and try to use it for concrete improvements such as ...

... improving infrastructure ...

... creating a new financial instrument—the New Neighborhood Instrument—...

How to transform the weak states in Eastern Europe into stable democratic societies without the conditionality of EU membership?

Chirtoaca



... combining mechanisms such as twinning with institutional reform ...

more on investments, rather than just on deploying experts. At the same time, though, Ukrainian institutions need to be strengthened to increase their absorption capacity.

As for the twinning mechanism, it could be very effective, but only if institutional reforms precede any exchange of advisors on a large scale. As long as the institutions in our countries are incompatible, with whom should the EU experts be twinned?

The Action Plan, to my mind, should cover a period of no longer than four years and should be aimed at developing a new framework for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Our Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will expire at this time and is completely outdated in its current form. For the implementation of the Action Plan, cascading was applied successfully in the Polish case. This experience of negotiating with the EU and being pushed to meet deadlines and benchmarks could be very useful for Ukraine.

... and reviving the Euro Regions

Lastly, I think that reviving the Euro Regions could be a way of effectively promoting the Ukrainian-European partnership. Also, to articulate something closer to a vision: Maybe democracy is not and cannot be put on the agenda, but if we talk about good governance, transparency and greater inputs of civil society we might lay a basis for fruitful discussions which might eventually increase trust on both sides.

**de Weck**

Mr. Stüdemann, what do you have to say about the German embassies' practice of awarding visas?

**Stüdemann**

The crowds in front of our embassies are not only detrimental to our image; they are simply sad. I think we should have the courage to improve the permeability of the borders with Ukraine, both bilaterally and in a European context. People-smuggling trials affect a miniscule percentage of the people who emigrate using our visas. All others return home. I cannot understand why we have panic reactions after two or three trials. Of course we have to come up with a unified European procedure within the framework of Schengen. Yet with Russia, a German-Russian and French-Russian agreement making visas easier to receive was possible, why not with Ukraine as well?

**Chirtoaca**

At first sight, the EU's Neighborhood Policy looks like a mission impossible. How to transform the weak states in Eastern Europe into stable democratic societies

without the conditionality of EU membership? Stabilization is in the interest of the EU and of the Eastern European governments, but conditionality was the main mechanism of leverage for the new members of the EU.

Currently, we have stopped the process of transition midway. The old totalitarian structures no longer work, but neither have we managed to establish new, functioning institutions. The most promising aspect of the situation in Moldova—as in all Eastern European countries—is that the country is very open towards Europe. Large parts of the leadership in these countries do indeed trust Brussels, even the Communists in Moldova who presently form the governing majority. They sent a letter to the European Commission in which they applied for membership. They unfortunately have not fully understood yet that a precondition for membership is to transform the country in accordance with European values and norms—but they want to get closer to Europe.

So how should the EU proceed? I would advise against extending the TACIS program which provides technical assistance. To my mind, a program like PHARE which is tailored to fit the specific needs of each country and which aims at providing efficient assistance for restructuring the economy is more important. The new neighbors should be helped in their efforts to overcome the stagnation caused by unfinished democratic reforms. The macroeconomic stabilization in the majority of these countries must now be followed by an influx of private capital, which would bring a new management culture and create new markets. The EU must focus its programs on the weakest links and let the neighboring countries contribute their own visions. Otherwise misunderstandings instead of cooperation will determine our relations and the EU will have to deal with chronic instability at its borders for decades.

Mr. Boag rightly said that enlargement—as the EU's first foreign policy priority over the past ten years—has been completed successfully. The integration of the new member states will be the primary priority of domestic policy for the next ten years. Estonia, for example, may be a formal member of the EU competition policy, but neither we nor any of the other new members really know how policymaking in this area works. Finnish representatives told me that it took them five years to learn how to play the game—it may take us even longer.

As this digestion period will take time and disparities within the EU will continue to exist, even Bulgaria and Romania might not receive the support they need to join in 2007. Governments will find it difficult to explain to their socie-

Without being able to offer  
a prospect of membership ...

... the Neighborhood Policy must help to  
transform Eastern European societies ...

... to ensure stability at the EU's borders

## **Ilves**

Will the effort necessary for integrating  
the new member states ...

... allow the EU to devote resources to its  
neighborhood? The Union lacks money ...

ties why huge expenses should go towards programs in neighboring countries when large disparities continue to exist within the Union. Large member states want to reduce their payments, while new members want to catch up with their older counterparts. I therefore doubt the EU's will to devote serious financial resources to its neighbors until 2007 or 2012. Robert Cooper's advice to "speak softly and carry a big carrot" is theoretically very useful for integrating countries like Ukraine or Moldova. But in reality, the EU's carrot may not be that big in the next few years.

... but the EU has a competent staff that managed the accession ...

What the EU has at its disposal, though, is the huge and very competent staff that managed the previous round of enlargement. Some of these people will be engaged in the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, but the others should work with the new neighbors. They know which policies worked in which countries, and which people were responsible for that.

... and the expertise of the new member states at its disposal

In addition, as Mr. Boag said, we should use the considerable expertise and experience of the new members. While Germany's border police did a great job teaching Georgian policemen how to establish a border guard, the Germans were not prepared for some of the problems involved in building such a force from scratch because they have had border police for 150 years. The Estonian experience of having had border guards for only 10 years was very useful here. Apart from that, the new member states enjoy a certain credibility which exempts them from the complaint that "you people in the West do not understand our situation." People who want to transform a formally communist administration respect those who have already successfully transformed theirs.

Thus, a combination of DG enlargement staff, Commission staff and the new members' civil servants could be a very powerful tool that might make up for the lack of money to a certain extent.

**Kozhokin**

How will the EU deal with the non-citizens in its new member states?

Mr. Boag, how will the new Neighborhood Policy be correlated with the Northern Dimension Policy of the European Union? And how will the EU deal with the 480,000 individuals in Latvia and 160,000 in Estonia who do not enjoy the rights of citizens?

**Boag**

The Neighborhood Policy will certainly be related to the Northern Dimension, but at this stage I cannot tell you in what form.

The question of citizenship probably falls more into the domain of national governments than the EU. Many countries in the European Union have large popu-

The societies of eastern Ukraine, Russia,  
and Belarus want a modernizing partnership.

Rahr

lations of non-citizens. The Turks in Germany, for example, have to go through a much more difficult nationalization process than people in Estonia or Latvia. The question does not seem as pressing to me as you suggest. No human rights of the non-citizens are violated. They can even vote in local elections, which is more than the usual practice in many countries of the European Union.

Respect for minority rights has to be treated with care. The Russian minority, 17% of the country's population, is massively overrepresented in the media and many other areas. The entire Ukrainian book market, for example, is dominated by Russian books. Far more movies are available in Russian than in Ukrainian. The Russian minority in Ukraine is not a group whose mother tongue is threatened. It is a group whose mother tongue can be used anywhere in the country. There is another more creative way that one might consider minorities in this context.

The Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland, on the other hand, could provide a natural bridge between Brussels, Warsaw and Kyiv. Many of these people are cosmopolitan, well educated, and bi- or trilingual. Therefore, they constitute an important resource for linking the new neighbors to the countries within the Union.

As to the idea of opening EU educational institutions to people from the East, I would like to add that education has to run in both directions. Historical understanding could improve European solidarity and identity, which, as we heard, is lagging behind enlargement. The suffering of the Second World War is a European narrative which, in the course of EU integration, has been used as an antidote to war. It has not yet been understood, though, that the places which were most affected by this war were Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Once this east European experience moves into the center of the historical narrative of the European Union, societies within the EU will perceive their eastern neighbors as a part of Europe. Fostering this perception is a step which can be undertaken by the European Union regardless of which policies Belarus and Ukraine decide to pursue. It is a matter of the European Union educating itself about Europe.

Our discussion seems to be based on the wrong premises. The East European—or Eastern Slavic—states have witnessed substantial changes since the 1990s in how they perceive their relations with the EU. The ruling elites of eastern Ukraine, Russia and Belarus no longer want a democratizing partnership with the EU, but



**Snyder**

The Russian minority in Ukraine  
is in no need of protection ...

... while the Ukrainian and Belarusian  
minorities in Poland will serve as bridges

**Rahr**

Eastern European states no longer want a  
democratizing partnership with the EU



a modernizing partnership. They want a community of interests instead of a community of values; a purely pragmatic economic partnership instead of a dialog of civil societies. The elites oppose continued transfers of the democracy they regard as a dictation on the part of the West or the West's brand of missionary work. In the past few weeks, these countries practically tried to throw out the OSCE. The Neighborhood Strategy is regarded as a partition strategy which, with its key points of migration, border security, and international crime, is much more important for the West than for the East, which is interested in the opening of EU markets. Education is the sole area where both sides quickly find common ground, if at all.

The EU must recognize this development—despite all respect for democracy, human rights, and civil society—if it does not want to lose sight of its strategic interests. Eastern Europe and Russia will only grow in importance for our energy security, especially when the oil and gas of the Persian Gulf no longer flows as freely as it has done. We need the East's commodities, and not least, we need a security partnership in light of the terrorist threat.

A modernizing or economic partnership between the EU and Eastern Europe offers many chances for both sides

The conditions for an economic partnership are better than many people think. The eastern markets have opened up increasingly to western investment. In the Bundestag on September 25, 2001, President Putin even offered to strategically integrate the commodities potential of Siberia and the Far East with the technologically more advanced EU. Unfortunately, the EU has yet to reply to this offer.

Real perspectives are opened up by the WTO, for instance. In the medium term, neither Ukraine, Russia, nor Belarus will either want or be able to join the EU, but they all want WTO membership. Moldova is already a member and Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is a step towards pragmatic cooperation within the WTO. This will be the moment of truth, when the West will have to open up its markets and make up for its mistakes during the 1990s.

Moreover, I consider the EU's "Four Common Spaces" strategy with Russia—cooperation in economic matters, foreign policy, inner security, and culture—a milestone. I would suggest extending this Four Spaces Strategy within the Neighborhood Strategy to Ukraine or Belarus. It would open up a path of pragmatic cooperation and substantially improve relations.

**Schlögel**

I am ashamed to admit that I do not even know the EU's Action Plans. Still, I allow myself the liberty of thinking about Europe. I believe, for example, that

I deeply wish that Europe's movers and shakers in Brussels would come down from their plateau and finally make contact with the vibrant forces that are shaping Europe.

Schlögel



strategies and plans accomplish nothing if they are not supported by historical forces. I deeply wish that Europe's movers and shakers in Brussels would come down from their plateau and finally make contact with the vibrant forces that are shaping Europe.

Take for example the women who travel six times a month from Kaunas to Warsaw to sell their goods in the bazaar in the stadium there. They are the ones who have kept the economy going and maintained the stability of our continent for the last ten years: The hundreds of thousands and millions of people conducting their "biznes" in the bazaars of Sedmoi Kilometr in Odessa, in Tuzyn near Lodz, in Chernovci or in Luzhniki in Moscow. The pioneers of Europe's integration are the logistics workers of Eurolines with their bus network from Cadiz in Spain to the end of Finland and the airline entrepreneurs of Ryanair. The children of the new Europe are the students of Viadrina University. There is no "Cold War Europe" for them—some of them don't even know what Solidarnosc was—and they take for granted their freedom of movement in a Europe without the old borders.

Ukraine, too, is much more than the object of an EU Action Plan. It is itself a Europe in miniature, with all the extreme contrasts of this continent. To me it is a miracle that this country, with all its incredible breadth of cultural histories and neighborhoods, can withstand the contradictions between industrial Kharkov and Central European Lviv, between the Ottoman dimension of the Crimea's southern coast to Dnepropetrovsk. Somehow, this country has managed to make the transition since 1989 without allowing violence to gain the upper hand, as it did in the Balkans and in the Northern Caucasus. These are the truly important developments.

We do not have to worry about the conceptual weaknesses of the EU strategies we have discussed or the manifold difficulties in implementing them, because in reality there are much deeper forces at work here. On the other hand we cannot permit ourselves to rest on the hope that Brussels' Action Plans will shorten the span of historical processes of *longue durée*. A long time will pass before people in the West realize the extent to which the history of 20<sup>th</sup> Century Eastern Europe was one of violence with horrific human sacrifice, a history without normal and continual traditions. Directives cannot abbreviate a reorientation of the entire region's perception of history.

Politics always lags behind what the people want. The will of the people is something very alive, though, that can set free enormous potential for overcoming

Action Plans are less important than ...

... the traders from Kaunas and the logistics workers of Eurolines

We are unable to shorten the process of understanding

**Stüdemann**

Young people in Ukraine want to stay  
in their country and transform it

limitations and transcending problems. It is an almost subversive force. Like ants, they pour out, surmount all obstacles, and find their places once again.

Another level of development that we often forget during our technical discussions is the emotional stance of the people of Europe. We act as if the whole population of Ukraine were waiting for a chance to emigrate. That is in no way a reflection of reality. A huge number of young people here are convinced that their place is in Ukraine. These people return from abroad and want to change their country. They are inspired by an experience that we cannot understand because we have come to take it for granted: people learning to determine their own lives. We should all realize what that means in a country where the parents' generation, and in East Ukraine even that of the grandparents, could not freely choose their job nor where they lived nor their partner. One cannot extinguish this elementary experience among people, and therefore I do not see the danger of a relapse in Ukraine. The danger is that we do not take the changes and thirst for transformation in Ukraine seriously enough and therefore do too little to support them.

**Wagstyl**  
If business is allowed to invest,  
it promotes integration ...

Business plays an important role in the enlargement of the EU and in developing relations with the countries further east. Although the bringing down of the Berlin Wall was a political act, business embraced integration much faster in the mid 1990s than the politicians and diplomats who tried to postpone enlargement. By investing strongly in the countries which were to become the 10 new members of the EU, business helped overcome the partition of Europe. Similarly, it can help today with the EU's eastern neighbors. Business not only transfers technology and capital or creates products and markets. Large companies also tend to form powerful lobby groups for the furthering of relations and the creation of political and institutional structures in the countries in which they invest, including eventual EU membership.

... and enhances cultural understanding

Business can also enhance cultural understanding because tourism is an important economic factor. One reason why Turkey is so much discussed in Europe is because many people know the country because they have been on holiday there. Another example is the Czech Republic. Even though this is a rather unfamiliar country to the general public, everybody knows what Prague is: this lovely city in the middle of Europe and yes, of course, Prague should be in the European Union. A country's image has a crucial influence on public perceptions of what politics and diplomacy should do.

The Czech Republic is a rather unfamiliar country, but everybody knows what Prague is: this lovely city in the middle of Europe and yes, of course, Prague should be in the European Union.

Wagstyl

So how can business be developed? What could the role of the European Union be? It could encourage business in the east, for example, by developing business training. There are very good management schools in Poland and also in Slovenia which offer world-class management education at much cheaper prices than in Western countries. These schools will be instrumental in developing contacts between business people from Western and Eastern Europe.

But for the most part, the process depends on the EU's eastern partners. For Ukraine, the best way to make friends in Europe would be to attract a large investor. It was a terrible pity that even though two major international groups were bidding in the privatization of Kryvorizhstal, in the end a domestic investor got the deal for a much lower price. This decision symbolizes a decade of misguided policies and disappointed hopes. Business was extremely interested in Ukraine from 1997 to 1998 because conditions seemed very good—until the Russian crisis smashed economic growth. Another, smaller surge of interest was triggered by the reforms Mr. Yushchenko implemented as Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 and ended with his being sacked by the Ukrainian Parliament. The new neighbors could do a lot in terms of encouraging business, and the benefits would extend far beyond the economic sphere.

I would like to point to the Lviv Project as an example for the living forces that determine the unification of Europe beyond official diplomacy. German NGOs and German partners asked themselves at an early stage what would happen in this city so close to the Polish border on May 1, 2004, when all of a sudden the Schengen Regime separates these newly-integrating regions of East Poland and West Ukraine. These people all drew on experience of the German-French border in a project sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation called “Talking Borders” which brought together Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, and French people in Freiburg, Berlin, and Lviv. The European Commission gained significant impetus from these discussions for its concept of small-scale border traffic—it was an exemplary contribution of civil society.

Wolfgang Schäuble, the debates between the EU and its neighbors can hardly ignore technical details. Messrs. Schlögel, Stüdemann, and Wagstyl addressed a different, perhaps more profound level with their discussion of economic flows and migrations. Yet as a political construct, the EU must nonetheless reach beyond technical discussions and ask what integration really is and in what direction it



Ukraine needs foreign investors

**Erlor**

NGOs help to unify Europe beyond official diplomacy

**de Weck**

The European neighborhood is  
a process. We are not talking about  
a final settlement of borders.

Schäuble

should proceed. Your most recent book is entitled “Will the West Fail? Germany and the New World Order.” The West also faces a challenge in Eastern Europe. Is there a threat of failure or do you regard the developments optimistically?

**Schäuble**  
presentation  
Integration as well as neighborhood  
is not static

I consider European integration and therefore the European neighborhood as a process, both in terms of time and space. We are not talking about a final settlement of borders, but about transitions and developments, and, I hope, about progress. EU enlargement and neighborhood, therefore, should not be seen as strict alternatives because one can change into the other at any time.

As long as our discussion over the finality of the unification process fails to produce a consensus—including that between old and new member states—then the reference to an “ever closer union” will remain a guiding principle of our journey. If we are to make progress on this path and in the issue of the EU’s neighborhood, we must determine what the Union actually is. Because even if, as Mr. Schlögel said, Europe is more than the EU, the European Union still radiates a considerable attraction, and many hopes and expectations rest on it.

For me, the European Union means the establishment of a political entity to which the member states gradually transfer their sovereignty, piece by piece. The negotiation of the European Constitutional Treaty is a step in this direction. It brings to light the manifold objections to giving up sovereignty, especially when the issues at hand are majority decision-making and the abolition of veto powers for nation states.

European integration must be deepened ...

Against the backdrop of a globalized world, which is constantly growing more and more integrated and whose parts become increasingly interdependent, we must deepen European integration. Only when Europe speaks with a single voice will the European states be able to make sure their interests are heard, for instance in global developments such as in business or demography.

... and should not extend beyond  
Europe to all democratic states

The EU is a model for the integration of nation states in the age of globalization. Yet we cannot conclude therefore that the EU is per se open to all states. Fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen Criteria cannot constitute the sole basis for EU membership, because these criteria are global in nature. Democracy, the rule of law, protection for minorities, and the like are just as universal as human rights. They should not be fulfilled just to become a member of the EU, nor should we strive to guarantee them only within the EU zone. Only those countries should become EU members that go beyond the Copenhagen Criteria, that establish the prerequisites for being part of Europe. This is because people in the old and new



member states must have a sense of identity, of belonging to the EU. Only then will they agree that their countries should gradually hand over more and more of their sovereignty to the EU.

The original driving force behind integration was economic union, the success of which has been displayed, for instance, by the triumph of the Euro, which so many people regarded sceptically at first. In the coming years, an emerging European Common Foreign and Security Policy will be the chief wellspring of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Opinion polls in Germany several years ago indicated that two-thirds of the people would prefer a European army to a national one. After a century marked by nationalism, we have a good chance of transferring national sovereignty to an appropriately constructed Europe.

What, then, is exactly the relationship between deepening, enlargement, and neighborhood of the EU? I am convinced that the only thing that can safeguard the dynamics of the unification process is a strengthening of political integration, and that the threat of falling support among the people must be taken very seriously. I fear that, when we are caught up in the difficult day-to-day politics of Brussels, whether in the Commission or the Parliament, we sometimes underestimate this danger. When he was vice-president of the Commission years ago, my friend Martin Bangemann once told me that his job was much more satisfying than national politics. "I have a great deal to do, can concentrate on concepts, and do not constantly have to take part in some party- or parliamentary meeting." I answered that he was providing a wonderful basis for people to suspect that politics in Brussels has relatively little to do with reality. We need the people's acceptance, and for that we need to deepen integration.

By the way, 10 years ago Karl Lamers and I also understood our idea of a "core Europe" as an instrument of deeper integration. If the EU is to retain its dynamism, it needs to be led by a core that pushes integration forward instead of dividing Europe. In the current debate about the European Constitution it is therefore important that individual states' possibilities for exerting influence should not be fixed too precisely, so that we can keep the possibility open, especially after new members join us, of again changing the EU's decision-making mechanisms in a further step towards integration.

As important as deepening is, on the other hand I equally support Mr. Wolski's statement that European integration cannot become synonymous with moving and stiffening borders. With every enlargement, we must promote greater openness and stability, both with members and neighboring states.

The European Common Foreign and Security Policy is becoming more important

Integration must promote openness and stability with neighboring states, too

This year's EU enlargement was  
the last one to be historically justified.

Reiter



The EU must take Russia into  
consideration in the first place

For the eastward enlargement and the EU's eastern neighborhood, that mainly means taking Russia into consideration. We must strictly avoid giving the impression in Moscow that these processes are directed against Russian interests. This is no easy task, but a conflict between the expanded EU and the re-establishment of spheres of influence within the former Soviet Union would certainly produce a new confrontation.

The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Islamic world. We must make it clear that by pursuing integration, we are spreading openness and transparency. Our efforts to build bridges to the Islamic world and to support modernization, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the separation of church and state should never be perceived as an attempt to seize what we want while erecting new borders. Also, our neighborhood policies must consider the Mediterranean region just as much as they do Eastern Europe.

**Reiter**

The enlargement of 2004 was the last  
one to be historically justified

I think this year's EU enlargement was the last one to be historically justified. Because it was rooted in European history, hardly anyone could publicly deny its moral authority. The generation of politicians who enlarged the EU of 15 would never have called for referendums because they would have regarded such a move as violating the candidate countries' own legitimate accession wishes. All future enlargements will be carried out under different conditions.

While the EU takes up a new  
role as geopolitical actor ...

The EU's present situation is full of contradictions. On the one hand, the new EU is learning to think strategically with its New Neighborhood Policy. It is taking on responsibility for security in regions vital for international security, and is therefore consciously taking risks—which is completely the right decision. Taking up accession talks with Turkey is also being justified on strategic grounds. To stabilize a region important for European security, the EU is willing to experiment with integrating a predominantly Muslim country. The European alternative to the Iraq war, so to speak.

... the member states' policies are  
increasingly dominated by domestic politics

On the other hand, we are seeing the EU member states' Europe policies becoming dominated by domestic politics. The calls for referendums symbolizes how decision-making in European policy is becoming subservient to domestic constraints—with all their contradictions, tactical maneuvers, and fear-mongering. Politicians no longer have the courage to take steps in European policy that come up against resistance among the people. That applies to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus even more than to Turkey. Who, in the old EU countries, still has the brazenness to tell his or her compatriots that these three countries could one day

It is simply a fact that we know far less about Ukraine.

von Weizsäcker



be EU accession candidates—for fear of overtaxing the people and therefore of the EU's integrative powers?

Mr. Schäuble rightfully spoke of a European spirit of belonging as the central condition for the EU's integrative power. Yet this identity is no immovable mass. It is something we can and must actively shape. If the old EU countries had not consciously formed their sense of togetherness with the accession candidates, the ten new members would not be in the EU today. The EU enlargement of 2004 did not at all follow 1994's sense of belonging, and just as that sense has since changed and continued to grow, new members such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia can and should foster it with their neighbors Ukraine and Belarus, to then pass it on to their western partners.

I am not willing to simply accept that, in the wake of developments since World War II, many Western Europeans have—for understandable reasons—become closer to Turkey than Ukraine. This attitude is not objectively valid. It has emerged historically through certain influences since 1945 and can certainly change again under different circumstances.

First of all, I would like to thank you for having broached the subject of Turkey, an essential component of our discussion of Europe's future and expansion. During a conference focusing on the Weimar Triangle—France, Poland, and Germany—the Polish participants spoke in a similar vein about Turkey. They may have supported opening negotiations with Turkey and offering the country a prospect of accession, but only on the condition that Ukraine be treated the same way.

I ask for your understanding that a different opinion prevails in Germany. It is simply a fact that we know far less about Ukraine. When thinking about the EU's strategic tasks, we do not think primarily about Ukraine. We think of our relationship with Russia, for example, with Poland in the middle, not Ukraine. Whenever the Chancellor travels to Moscow, he pays his respects along the way in Warsaw.

The great interest in Turkey has less to do with the search for a European alternative to American policy in Iraq than with the fact that Germans deal with Turkish people day in, day out—but hardly at all with Ukrainians. We have, moreover, an essential interest in not leaving the crisis zone of the Middle East solely to US policymaking—and the path to an active role in this region leads through Turkey. And, to add a polemical remark, Leonid Kuchma is further way from Europe in his policies than Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Perhaps it this verdict that justifies the

We should not simply accept that Western Europeans feel closer to Turkey than to Ukraine

**von Weizsäcker**

German foreign policy hardly takes Ukraine into account when developing strategies ...

... and Germans simply know more about Turkey than about Ukraine

We feel that we risk missing  
our last chance to join Europe.

Hrytsak



knowledge deficits in respect of Ukraine among EU states, but, after all, we are here to keep learning. We hope that our Polish partners will be especially helpful in this respect.

**de Weck**

Mr. Mikhailov and Mr. Hrytsak, do you wish that the Europeans would start discussing Ukraine as passionately as they do Turkey? I would also be interested to know why the Turkish question awakens so much passion, while the discussion of the EU's Eastern neighbors is marked above all by caution.

**Mikhailov**

All I know is that we need a language powerful enough to give strength and vitality to the idea of European integration. This is the only way that we can succeed in psychologically putting the heavy burden of the past behind us and recognize democracy as the new normality. Yet only those politicians whose bravery goes beyond maintaining their own position of power will find this language.

**Hrytsak**

Only European integration would allow  
Eastern European societies to put  
their violent history behind themselves

There is certainly no lack of passion at least in the Eastern European countries. For us, Europe means certain democratic standards and values for which we have been striving for a long time. Right now, we feel that we risk missing our last chance to join Europe and thus to leave the violent history of the past century behind. In Eastern Europe from the beginning of World War I until the end of World War II, every other male and one woman in four died a violent death. As one historian put it, we had a mad history with short lucid intervals. Trying to escape this past, the risk of failure certainly does not leave us dispassionate. Maybe people in Western Europe are more interested in Turkey than in our countries because they do not know what Europe means to us or the past we are trying to overcome.

**Erlor**

Since the enlargement of 2004 completed the  
reconstitution of a European geography ...

We must indeed realize that a phase of the unification process has now irrevocably ended. The accession of the eight Central- and Eastern European states on May 1—besides Malta and Cyprus—completed the reconstitution of a European geography and history. All these states had historical points of contact that made the transcendent speed of their reform and accession processes possible, motivated by the incentive of joining quickly. This will no longer exist in the future. It is no coincidence that Romania and Bulgaria are lagging behind, because there are fewer historical points of contact with them.

After 2007, a completely new page will be turned. In the five states of the Western Balkans, with the exception of Croatia, the link between the prospect

... negotiations about possible accession will  
be conducted very differently in the future

of accession in the foreseeable future and a resulting rapid pace of reform has dissolved. Policies in these countries are contradictory, and there are also forces that are not working at full speed toward accession, but resist it. It is completely unforeseeable when they will reach the point at which they can enter into serious negotiations with clearly defined target dates.

In Turkey, the prospect of beginning negotiations has been incentive enough to forcibly move the country toward fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. But now we are beginning a very long phase of 14 or 15 years—Erdogan himself uses the date 2019—without a result that anyone can foresee. Who would have said in 1989, for example, that we would have a ten-country expansion in 2004? Back then we still had the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War.

The EU has made it abundantly clear that it will be pursuing a very different accession policy in the future. The three pillars suggested by the Commission present a new paradigm: negotiations are an open process that can be broken off; not only laws, but also their implementation, will be monitored; and the process can be suspended if reforms are insufficient.

The New Neighborhood Policy is far removed from our former means of bringing applicant countries closer. In practice, it resembles our policy towards all the other applicant countries. We have to make this much clearer, and above all, our new neighbors have to be more aware of it as well.

At the end of this very intense discussion, please permit me to make a personal remark. When Mr. Schlögel described Ukraine as a Europe in miniature, I was reminded of parallels to a land not completely unknown to me, namely Switzerland. Perhaps it is the fate of those countries that carry in themselves the entire European principle to be non-members of the European Union. And perhaps it is precisely the countries that encompass the most diverse traditions and cultures that have good diplomats, but weak foreign policies. The more heterogeneous a political entity is, the more difficult it becomes to devise a coherent, proactive, and dynamic foreign policy. Sooner or later, the European Union could face this threat. I hope we succeed in learning from the examples of countries such as Switzerland and Ukraine.

**de Weck**

### III. The Strategic Triangle: EU—New Neighbors—Russia

**de Weck**

Russia as a neighbor and a rival  
of the European Union

We will be talking today about Russia, a country with a twofold relationship to our topic of the “EU’s new neighbors.” On the one hand, Russia is itself a new neighbor that has its own, very individual characteristics. It is different from the other eastern neighbors in more ways than just its size. It has no interest, even in the medium term, in joining the EU. Russia’s enclave of Kaliningrad presents a special problem. Russia’s rejection of an action plan within the New Neighborhood Policy has already led Russia and the EU to conceive their cooperation on a different plane. Within the framework of a strategic partnership, four joint “spaces” are being constructed.

However, Russia is also relevant to EU neighborhood policy in another respect. It acts as a second center of gravity, besides the EU, for countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova—I need only mention the Single Economic Space, with which Russia is pursuing its own integration strategy.

Where are the lines of cooperation and confrontation in the Russia-EU-New Neighbors triangle? Is Russia a completely normal eastern neighbor or should it have a special status? Or, what kind of friction could develop with two overlapping spaces of integration, between the EU and Russia?

We will first analyze the EU’s relations with Russia, which, in turn, decisively influence the EU’s relations with its new neighbors. Perhaps you all know the joke about the new European Commission President Barroso’s first working visit to Russia’s President Putin. Barroso asks Putin, “In one word, how are relations between the EU and Russia? The Russian President answers “good.” The Commission President is glad to hear this, but becomes so suspicious of the positive verdict that he asks, “Tell me in two words, Mr. President: how are relations?” Putin answers ... “not good.” Evgenii Kozhokin, of Russia’s Institute of Strategic Studies, please tell us in more than two words, how are these relations really?

**Kozhokin**  
presentation

Russia no longer wants integration in  
the EU, but a strategic partnership

During the last decade we have witnessed changes in Russia’s attitude towards the European Union. Ongoing discussions concerning relations between the EU and Ukraine or Moldova remind us very much of those between Russia and the EU in the early 1990s. Then, a considerable part of the Russian political elite clamored for full integration. Today there is little left of those demands.

Cooperation in four areas

Nowadays Russia favors the concept of a strategic partnership with the EU. At the EU-Russian Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to intensify their strategic cooperation by working out four so-called common

Our political elite sees the EU as a partner we have to negotiate with on a pragmatic basis.

Kozhokin



spaces, these being the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security, research and education.

High-ranking politicians were nominated by the Russian President Vladimir Putin as coordinators of the process: the Prime Minister M. Fradkov is responsible for general coordination; the Minister of Energy and Industry V.Khristenko is responsible for economic cooperation, V. Ivanov, Assistant to the President, supervises the domain of justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov is responsible for the domain of security and S. Yastrzhembskiy, another Assistant to the President, for the field of science and culture. We have already achieved some positive results, but there is plenty left to be discussed and developed. A supplementary protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which extends the PCA to the new EU Member States is about to be ratified in the Russian Duma, and the EU-Russia Summit to be held on November 11 is expected to enable further progress to be made in developing these four spaces.

Today, our political elite considers the EU a partner we have to negotiate with on a pragmatic basis. We have accepted the conditions which the EU has set for Russia's accession to the WTO although the results for our economy will be dramatic, for example causing significant increase in gas prices.

The EU is thus a very important partner in the economic sphere, too. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement sets the goal of liberalizing trade on the basis of the most-favored-nation status and legislation harmonization.

Our business community is ready to undertake important steps to improve cooperation with the EU: The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs planned to open its office in Brussels. For this it was necessary to obtain legal status under the European Commission but the latter did not grant this status.

The Association of Financial Industrial Groups of Russia implements EU programs for the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises.

At the same time some serious problems have emerged, especially in the economic sphere, as a result of EU enlargement. Cargo transit to and from the Kaliningrad region has been hampered by lengthy bureaucratic procedures. Since the region's borders have become borders with the EU, the check-in procedure has become much more time-consuming, now taking 24 hours, and sometimes even up to five days. As to the transit of people, the EU should be flexible in handling the Schengen agreement to prevent the creation of new dividing lines in Europe. Russia has already signed visa agreements with Italy, France and Germany during

The EU is an important economic partner and supporter of Russia's accession to the WTO

New economic problems were created by enlargement

Migration into the EU is a humanitarian problem and an economic challenge

the last months and is now negotiating an agreement within the framework of Russian-EU cooperation.

Today, security is an important field of cooperation, and the EU seems to have understood at last how dangerous the threat of terrorism really is. Cooperation in the field of security lies within the jurisdiction of our security agencies and should be based on mutual trust. To my mind, the security agencies of the other CIS member countries should be incorporated into the process.

The problem of migration between the EU and its neighbors—Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova—is also becoming increasingly acute with the enlargement of the European Union. Migration is taking place at two levels. First, ordinary people from Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova leave their countries to work in Russia or the EU because salaries there are higher. This stream of people cannot be stemmed as long as standards of living differ significantly. Illegal immigrants are a problem not only in the EU, but also for Russia, which unfortunately has recently toughened conditions for acquiring Russian citizenship. Being human beings, we must find ways to stop this new form of slavery in the heart of Europe; in the century when human rights have a priority in almost all spheres of state life thousands of these “new white slaves” have no rights at all. The migration of elites is not so much a humanitarian problem. If the smartest, best educated and most active young people go to the European Union countries, they do it mostly in a legal way. But this kind of migration poses a serious political and economic problem for Russia and the Eastern European countries as they lose their most valuable scientists, engineers and businessmen. From the point of view of the EU, this brain drain has positive effects only in the short term. In the long run, the European Union should be interested in keeping qualified political and economic elites in its neighboring countries, because that is the only way to stabilize these regions.

Both the EU and Russia face a changing ethnic composition of their populations

Furthermore, the EU and Russia should openly start discussing a challenge which both societies face: the declining number of native citizens and the changing ethnic composition of the population. It goes without saying that Russia and the EU need dialog on different levels and in different formats and the fact that there is no anti-European feeling in Russia makes it easier.

Our political elites may have problems in understanding the rules of the bureaucratic game and the distribution of power in Brussels. But they are very willing to learn if the Europeans are prepared to share this knowledge.



For the new neighbors, good relations between the EU and Russia are vitally important. The neighbors often express their dissatisfaction at special treatment being given to Russia, in which one senses the old trauma of Russian-European collaboration and decisions being made over these countries' heads. However, only intact relations with Moscow will allow the Union to make its influence felt in the interest of the new neighbors—I need mention only EU intervention in problems concerning pipelines, payment of energy deliveries, or the Transnistria question.

European-Russian relations, however, are currently at a crossroads. I would like to demonstrate this using four examples: Russian traumas with the EU, the EU's interests toward Moscow, the perception of Russia in Brussels, and finally the consequences of the events in Beslan for relations between Russia and the EU. First, the trauma: Russia's political class has yet to overcome the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The fact that both the European Union and NATO have absorbed parts of this former empire is a permanent burden on relations. That ethnic Russians in the Baltics have become minorities in need of protection in EU states is something considered in Russia as a vile act of ingratitude. Russia is convinced it did a great deal during Soviet times for the development of the Baltic region.

The trauma of having lost former Soviet republics is, in turn, made worse by fears for the integrity of the Russian Federation. The weaknesses of the central government, the regions' centrifugal forces and, consequently, the fragility of the Federation are all thrown into sharp focus in the North Caucasus and by the Chechen problem.

Secondly, what interests does the EU have in Russia? First and foremost, the Union needs stability from its giant neighbor with so many of its own problems. The geographic proximity and economic importance of Russia, especially in the energy sector, are reason enough. Germany, for example, receives 30 percent of its oil and 40 percent of its gas from the Russian Federation. The wish for democratization is derived from this interest in stability. Europe knows that a functioning democracy and market economy have a stabilizing effect on countries. Yet when stability and democratization come into conflict, the interest in stability has priority.

Besides domestic Russian stability, the EU also has an interest in keeping Russia within the structures of international cooperation. In the NATO-Russia Council, the EU needs Moscow as a partner to help resolve the conflicts in the Balkans

## **Erler**

presentation

Only good relations with Russia allow the EU to intervene on behalf of its Eastern neighbors

But European-Russian relations are at a crossroads: EU enlargement exacerbates the Russian trauma of losing the Soviet empire

The EU is interested in keeping Russia stable ...

... and within the structures of international cooperation ...

The European Union's main task  
must be to keep open the channels  
of cooperation with Russia.

Erler



... while Russia has difficulties in  
dealing with the EU because the  
Union does not work bilaterally ...

... and feels abandoned after  
the terrorist attack of Beslan ...

... which creates the danger of  
Russian unilateralism and isolation

or in the so-called broader Middle East. Russia is also indispensable in helping find solutions to international problems—for example in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, after 9/11, Russia has become an essential partner of international antiterrorism policy.

Thirdly, Russia's perception of the EU: Putin's Russia has a difficult time with the EU as a neighbor because the EU contradicts the Russian principle of bilateral foreign policy. That is why Putin attempts to bilateralize relations with those EU states he considers most important: Germany, France, Britain, and occasionally Italy. When Putin discusses a topic with Chancellor Schröder, he assumes that the results of his talks will automatically become EU law. This problem will only become more acute when the integration of European policies, especially foreign and security policy, increase with the implementation of the European Constitution.

Fourth, the hostage taking in the school in Beslan in late August and early September turned into an acute danger for relations between the EU and Russia. In that crisis situation, Russia received harsh criticism instead of the support it expected, raising the possibility that Russia might isolate itself.

That week of terrorism plunged Russia into the deepest crisis of the Putin era. It demonstrated that Putin had failed in his strategy of Chechenizing the conflict by transferring authority to Chechens loyal to Moscow. Instead, the violence began overflowing from Chechnya into the rest of Russia, which now considers its situation comparable to that of the US after September 11, 2001, and expects comparable concern among other countries.

Yet in the wake of a short wave of solidarity after Beslan, all the suppressed criticism of Russia that Putin had very adroitly kept in check by his cooperative stance in the fight against international terrorism after 9/11 suddenly spewed forth. Now, all the objections to Russia's Chechnya policy that had been kept silent have come to the surface, as well as to the concentration of power in the president's hands, treatment of the opposition and lack of press freedom, and finally to the treatment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. This criticism from the EU, by the way, does not come so much from official channels as from voices in society in the EU member states, criticizing Russia, accusing the EU of weakness and vacillation towards Russia, and demanding clear statements against the state of affairs there.

This criticism, which Russians regard as completely unjustified, causes a very dangerous reaction there, namely, for Russians to bury their heads in the sand and make lonely decisions without consulting their partners such as the EU. The



European Union's main task, then, must be to keep open the channels of cooperation and to counteract the Russian tendency towards unilateralism.

I see a danger that “old” and “new” Europe could become as fractured over Russia as over Iraq. The new EU states have had plenty of experience with the USSR and the “Russian yoke.” They want the EU to respect these experiences and they are angry that Putin does not express any feelings of guilt towards them. They should, however, also take into account the German, French, and British experiences, namely the sensibilities of powers that have lost their empires.

Envisage the following, if you wish to understand the Russian soul: Once a superpower, Russia today has hardly any allies, and is becoming increasingly confrontational with China as well as the Islamic world. It is a country that has already experienced several economic catastrophes and was, until recently, in terribly deep debt. We Westerners see in Chechnya a colonial war, while the Russians are convinced they are fighting against foreign-bankrolled terrorists.

Against this backdrop, Russia is not experiencing the NATO eastward enlargement as the consolidation of Europe, but as the extension of a military alliance up to one's own borders. Meanwhile, NATO and by extension, the United States, is expanding its own bases in Central Asia in the war on terrorism.

The EU eastward enlargement robbed Russia of its Central-East European markets. It failed in its efforts to prevent the expansion of the EU-Russia partnership and cooperation accords to East Central Europe. Now, all its bilateral treaties with Central Europe have been voided. Russians can use the transportation arteries to and from Kaliningrad only if they have visas. The EU is active in Georgia; a Yushchenko victory in Ukraine would further enhance the Union's influence there, and a possible EU-Caucasus pact would not necessarily take the Russian national interests into consideration.

Russia fears being encircled. This is a phase in which Putin is attempting to build up a nation state, through highly centralized laws and governance, perhaps understandably, because the whole process is about power after an era of anarchy. We might have objections about the democratic foundations of his power, but firstly, the Russian parliament was elected by the people, and secondly, completely free and fair elections would have produced the same result. The liberals in Russia have failed, but the new center from which Putin gains his support is real. The power-political aspect that is at center stage today seems dangerous to most Europeans, which is why Russia must submit to a debate over values instead of simply

## Rahr

Will “old” and “new” Europe split over Russia as they did over Iraq?

Russia has lost its empire ...

... feels threatened by the enlargement of NATO ...

... and has been robbed of its European markets

Therefore Putin is trying to build up a strong nation state—we should try to understand that

Out of the ruins of the Soviet Union,  
Moscow and St. Petersburg have risen to become  
the most dynamic cities in Europe.

Schlögel

hoping to profit from the West's transfer of prosperity. I therefore appeal to the West to take seriously Russia's fear of encirclement. I hope that economic relations will promote a sensible and pragmatic relationship with Russia, and that the media will again begin reporting more positively. The worst case, of a new process of self-isolation by a Russia pervaded by mistrust, is a very real danger.

**Reiter** As a Pole, I would never claim to know the "Russian yoke" or the "Russian soul" better than a Western European. I hope that by now we have left behind this kind of cliché.

Yet I ask you, in view of all of Russia's indisputable problems, what "encirclement" are you talking about? Who is supposed to encircle Russia? Russia is being courted these days by everyone, particularly as a key player in the strategic game of raw materials.

**Schlögel** For me, Russia no longer exists as a single term. There is the planet Moscow, planet Petersburg, and a vast country that we hardly know. Out of the ruins of the Soviet Union, Moscow and St. Petersburg have risen to become the most dynamic cities in Europe—a great success story. The Berliners are simply wrong in calling their city Europe's biggest construction site—much more is being built in Moscow, and of course much is being torn down, even more than during Stalin's time.

I support Gernot Eler's description of the huge asymmetry in the perception of violence in Russia. We do not yet have in our heads the new map of Europe marked by the attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, Moscow, and Beslan. We often forget that the first decapitations filmed on video and then shown on television were from Chechnya, not Iraq.

**Schäuble**

Not only Putin seeks to bilateralize  
Russia's relations with the EU ...

Mr. Eler pointed out the central danger for the EU's relations with Russia when he mentioned bilateralization. Not only Putin prefers bilateral ties. The Americans are also reluctant to accept that the EU does not function bilaterally. Even the EU's own leaders sometimes succumb to the temptation of bilateral relations.

... member states are also tempted  
towards bilateralization

We must put up a concerted fight against the bilateralization of the EU's external relations, both in terms of Russia and our other neighbors. This Round Table has made it even clearer to me how much the member states along our border would like to see a proactive EU policy toward their respective neighbors. Spain and Italy are interested in a Mediterranean policy, while Poland takes a special responsibility for new neighbors in the east such as Ukraine. This cannot, however,



lead to these states placing more emphasis on bilateral relations. That is one reason why we must incorporate Poland much more strongly into the EU's leadership.

The unique feature of the European experiment is its replacement of bilateral relations with an integrated external policy. We must rein in those former global powers among us that Mr. Schlögel has described into integrated structures in this radically transformed, globalized world. Europe's integration and the neighborhood processes do not only transfer prosperity. They offer an answer to the instabilities and destructive, violent tendencies that determined the European continent's development for centuries. We cannot afford to stray from the path of this integration, both in respect of Russia and the new neighbors.

Bilateralization of EU foreign policy is especially dangerous in this post-Cold War era. The clear and rigid structures of the bipolar world were an effective barrier against the foreign policy mistakes of individual countries. Today, there is a scope for idiocies that people could hardly have imagined earlier. Therefore we need mechanisms that minimize the risk of bilateral foreign policy mistakes. And that is why it is so important to expand the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an effective and comprehensive instrument as quickly as possible.

I couldn't agree more on the dangers of bilateralism and the temptation for strong national leaders to articulate their own foreign policy. The EU has taken steps to further develop the supranational mechanism of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. One of these steps is to reform the external service under the mandate of the Council. The next big step will be the Union's Foreign Minister who will take office in 2007 if the Constitution is adopted by then. But even if the Constitution is not ratified, we will have to find a way to create the post of Foreign Minister. The Union can thus develop one single common mouth to force itself to speak with one single voice.

Russia does indeed not quite understand the genuinely multilateral nature of the European Union. This has its roots in the Soviet period, when the EU was wrongly perceived as a mere clearing system, as a capitalist version of COMECON. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained that attitude, even though the political integration of the EU deepened. This manifested itself when the Central European states began their accession negotiations with the EU in 1998. In a fundamental misunderstanding of how the European Union works, Russia

#### **Reiter**

#### **Hübner**

The EU tries to counter the danger of bilateralism with the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy

#### **Ilves**

Russia simply does not understand the multilateral nature of the EU

The new member's impact on EU foreign policy will manifest itself in pushing for a tougher stance against Russia.

Ilves



Putin has been quite successful in his attempts to bilateralize foreign relations to EU countries

approached all EU governments to demand trilateral accession negotiations for the six former Soviet countries. It became clear that the Russians had only failed to object to those countries' joining the EU—contrary to its stance on NATO enlargement—because they had misjudged the nature of the Union. Once they realized that the EU is a powerful political entity where Poland or Latvia can now influence decision-making, they tried to correct their mistake.

Russia has in fact been quite successful in trying to bilateralize relations with certain European Union countries. As George Bush Senior used to do, Putin establishes close relations to European leaders like Gerhard Schröder or Jacques Chirac to achieve his political goals. He found an even closer friend in Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi is so proud of getting along well with Putin that when Putin was asked about human rights violations in Chechnya at a press conference, he put his arm around him and said: "I will be your advocate for this," thus completely contradicting the position of the Commission and the Council.

Putin has achieved more than such symbolic successes. Were it not for the Commission, he might have succeeded several times in influencing European policies. He made Chirac and Berlusconi exert such pressure that the EU and Russia almost decided on a visa system between Lithuania, Russia and Kaliningrad without involving Lithuania—at that point an accession candidate—in the decision-making process. Fortunately, the Commission stopped that. Russia also tried to convince the EU to agree that Moldova be forced to turn into a federation—which would have meant to legitimize the criminal state called Transnistria. Fortunately, this effort also failed.

The Commission is the main champion against bilateralization ...

Russia is well aware that the Commission will be the main champion of the Union against bilateralization, defending the interests of all those against single countries. It therefore actively tries to stir up the feelings of single member states against Brussels. When the Commission criticized Russia last spring, an article by the influential Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov in the Western Press called upon "the Teutonic soul and Gallic reason to triumph over the bureaucrats who are trying to run things in Brussels."

... and the EU's new member states will push for a tougher stance against Russia

The new members' impact on EU foreign policy will manifest itself much more clearly in pushing for a tougher stance against Russia than in acting as Trojan horses for the USA. The EU no longer shares only the unpopulated Finnish border with Russia. Three Baltic and four Visegrad states border on Russia and have people living at these borders. The experience of the 75 million people inhabiting these countries of Russia and the Soviet Union is long and not very positive. Their

representatives will bring their expertise and critical attitude toward Russia to the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. They will help avoid concessions to Russia resulting from incompetence, and they will be partners in preventing deals between the EU and Russia from being made over the heads of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

Some bilateralist modes of thinking must indeed be overcome, both within the EU and in Russia, on the way towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, we must be very clear that the Commission still needs the support of the member states in its external policy negotiations, such as in regulating personal transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad.

We must resist with all our will Russian efforts to bilateralize foreign ties. Conducting the negotiations between Russia and the EU in a relationship of one to 25 would be absurd. We must nurture more strongly a single voice, instead of keeping a rotating presidency every six months, the Commission, and a series of other agents. If we have a European Foreign Minister before too long, and Mr. Boag becomes the ambassador not only of the Commission, but of the EU, we will be able to discuss common interests as well as problems with Russia much more constructively.

Especially the large EU members are indeed often very tempted towards bilateralism. Shortly before Putin was elected President for the first time, Tony Blair took it upon himself as Prime Minister to visit Yeltsin's nominated successor in St. Petersburg, and to go to the opera with him. Even though the Foreign Office justified the visit as a means to develop relations with a major political player in Russia, the real reason was to get close to the new President before the French and the Germans. There is a competition for the best bilateral relations with Russia among the major European states which leads statesmen like Berlusconi to set their own agenda based on what they think is their deeper understanding of Russia.

As we cannot simply factor out this competition, I suggest finding pragmatic political approaches to use it constructively. Why do we not create a forum for those countries who most value their special relations with Russia to coordinate their efforts?

Britain once believed it had a monopoly on access to the former Soviet Union. Margaret Thatcher said at the time, anyone who wanted to contact Mikhail Gor-

**Cuntz**

**Wagstyl**

Large member states of the Union are competing for the best bilateral relations with Russia

**von Weizsäcker**

I do not believe that anyone  
can really influence Russia.

Reiter

The large member states should  
coordinate their policy vis-à-vis Russia

bachev would have to do so through London. Blair's attempt to pick up where she left off was, happily, not a complete success. Bilateralizing relations with Russia is not a practicable option. It would be extremely counterproductive for Putin to think that, having spoken to Schröder, he had simultaneously reached an agreement with the EU. I believe that the path to eliminating bilateralism does not lie primarily in a joint foreign minister, a draft constitution, or other contractual agreements. We will have left bilateralism behind once the big EU powers recognize that cooperation is more useful to them than jealously vying for Mr. Putin's attention in the Bolshoi Theater. The path, then, leads through London, Paris, Warsaw, and Berlin. Once Britain, France, Poland, and Germany coordinate their policy toward Russia, they will also have established a durable foundation for a common EU foreign policy. This policy would benefit all members as well as enabling us to help our new neighbors much more effectively.

**Hübner**

The success of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy does indeed not only depend on institutions and on political will—which we will constantly have to fight for – but also on the capacity for consensus-building in the Union of 25. The old Franco-German nucleus does not work efficiently anymore, and we have not yet established a new mechanism. Building consensus within a nucleus of important member states—Wolfgang Schäuble's concept of a Core Europe—seems to me a promising way. It will not be easy, though, to really integrate Great Britain and avoid creating new dividing lines in the EU.

**Reiter**

Nobody can influence Russia's  
policy from outside ...

Mr. Erlar maintained that the EU must keep its means of influencing Putin by keeping up good relations with Russia. I do not believe that anyone can really influence Russia. The experience of the past 15 years has shown that the Kremlin makes its own decisions.

At a diplomatic and strategic level, one can reach agreements with Russia and calmly work together to help overcome both regional crises and global problems. The EU can react to Russian policy by cleverly articulating its own interests. Only then will it be recognized as a foreign policy partner to be taken seriously.

Any hope of a more profound influence with the goal of establishing a community of values with Russia through cooperation would prove illusory, however. It seems questionable to me whether it will ever be possible to bring Russia to accept Western rules of policymaking. After 9/11, the West stopped applying



pressure on Russia anyway. Washington's invitation to Russia to help fight international terrorism included a willingness to abandon the goal of a community of values. That signal was very well recognized in Moscow, which saw that the US had become less selective in its search for allies. Putin can now pursue his goal of a "controlled democracy," and by eliminating societal checks and balances, has gained scope for formulating foreign policy that goes far beyond that of Western governments.

I think we must tell Russia clearly that we cannot accept its current domestic political development. I do not think that would endanger cooperation on strategic and diplomatic levels.

I agree with Mr. Reiter that it is almost impossible to influence Russia's internal policy. The EU is able to influence it for the worse, but not for the better. The oversimplified criticism of Russia which the Western mass media expressed has not only failed to change Russian policy but has seriously damaged relations between Russia and the EU.

It is not true that we cannot influence Russia. Excessive criticism is detrimental, no doubt about that. But Russia's signing of the Kyoto Protocol shows that sustained diplomatic efforts can lead to success. The same applies to the modified CSCE Treaty. Europe has also achieved a number of things in the area of civil society and human rights policy, thanks to intensive exchanges. I do not mean just official politics, but also work done by foundations, for example. The Körber Foundation's history competition, for example, has motivated thousands of young Russians to critically confront their own history.

On the other hand, fundamental criticism, such as the open letter to the EU, signed by Janusz Reiter, that Russia is approaching dictatorship, seems to me utterly counterproductive. We must start with the positive points. On September 13, Putin announced seven responses to Beslan. These responses included more than claiming the right to act preventively against terrorism, as the United States has done. Putin also referred explicitly to the social origins of terrorism, and announced a regional initiative for the North Caucasus, for which purpose he has established a federal commission led by his important adviser Dmitri Kozak. German policy very rightly seeks to support these positive points instead of staging some kind of theatrical criticism.

#### **Kozhokin**

... except for the worse

#### **Erlor**

No! Russia's signing of the Kyoto Protocol is an example of successful, patient, external influence



**Stüdemann**

We must not overburden Putin during the present crisis situation, but neither can we afford to gain a reputation for only looking after our own interests and investment opportunities in Russia. The Ukrainians, incidentally, ask me as German ambassador more about our policy toward Russia than toward Ukraine, because they think our relations with Russia determine our relationship with Ukraine.

Russia needs a functioning network of institutions and a market economy

Maintaining efforts toward a community of modernization instead of values is a very useful approach in this respect. Modernization means simply installing a network of institutions and a market economy that correspond to our institutions sufficiently to enable us to cooperate. Currently, any reference to a Russian parliament is completely misleading, because the Duma is no such thing. The same applies to a Russian audit court or rule of law, neither of which really exists. Developing these kinds of institutions, and thereby gradually enclosing Russia within a common framework, would certainly bear fruit as far as our investment opportunities are concerned.

**Wagstyl**

We can use the Russian attraction to Western values and lifestyle as leverage

Russia certainly cannot be remade in our image and we are unable to change its policy directly, but there is some potential for leverage to influence Russian thinking in the long term. In contrast to China, Russia partly shares the European culture and history. Russians are therefore torn between European and other traditions and often express their will to adapt to European standards and to be judged by them. Many Russians want to visit Western Europe and have their children educated in Western European and American universities. Using this attraction to Western Europe gives us a possibility to change the Russian debate from the inside, of course not instantly but over a period of ten or twenty years.

**de Weck**

As a professor of economics, former Polish representative at the UN, and finally the country's minister for European affairs, Danuta Hübner brings a wealth of experience to her new office as European Commissioner for Regional Development. She represents Poland, a new EU member that shares both long borders and a long common history with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

All this equips her to expand the horizons of our discussion. After the EU's relations with Russia, we will now turn our attention to the EU-Russia-Ukraine/Belarus/Moldova triangle. Also, it is time to consider concrete strategies: What should the EU do, and what do its new neighbors expect?

Cooperation with its Eastern neighbors  
is the only way to protect the  
EU's competitiveness on a global scale.

Hübner

The European Neighborhood Policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is of paramount importance not only for the countries in Eastern Europe, but for the Union itself. Terrorism and similar threats to European security can be combated successfully only in close cooperation with the Eastern neighbors. People within Europe are afraid of the volatile political and economic developments in some of the neighboring countries and need to be shown that the EU has an instrument at its disposal which is capable of handling regional instability and steering political dynamics. Finally, the Union's absorbance capability, political weight and ultimately survival depends on its economic potential. Cooperation with its Eastern neighbors, turning these countries from dangerous competitors into assets, is the only way to protect or re-establish the EU's competitiveness on a global scale.

For this reason, the European Neighborhood Policy should not focus exclusively on abolishing as many barriers as possible, but pursue the broader goal of making use of the political and economic opportunities which the new neighborhood creates. This policy must take into account the complex and constantly changing relations and balance of power between the Russian giant and Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

The recent enlargement has significantly increased the weight, the nature and the responsibilities of the European Union as a foreign policy agent. It has also increased the diversity of players within the Union who bring in their individual attitudes towards, for example, the United States, Russia or Ukraine which are rooted in their history. This might not fundamentally change the style and substance of EU foreign policy, but subtle differences become decisive in moments of crisis. I think that the controversy over Iraq was the first step in a process of learning and adapting. 25 instead of 15 members do not only mean a change in quantity but also in quality.

Like all new members in the past, the 10 states which joined on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004, bring a new geographic dimension and a new policy focus to the European Union. The accession of Spain and Portugal led to the development of a Mediterranean and Latin American dimension and to the development of the cohesion policy. Sweden and Finland not only brought with them the Northern Dimension but also more democratic and transparent institutional structures for the Union.

The recent enlargement first of all increases the importance of the Russian dimension. It not only makes Russia an important neighbor but brings countries into the EU which formerly either depended very heavily on the Soviet Union or

**Hübner**

presentation

The EU needs Eastern Europe

The Union must learn to build consensus  
within the community of 25

The new member states bring new  
dimensions to the EU, such as ...

... a focus on relations with Russia ...



... and on the Euro-Atlantic  
and Eastern dimensions

were part of it. These new members will push for a more proactive policy concerning Russia.

The new members also strengthen the Euro-Atlantic dimension because of their historic connection to the US and because of the large expatriate groups in America. The common threats facing the EU and the Atlantic community, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, can only be mastered together with the EU's eastern neighbors. An important basis for cooperation in this area is the strengthening of economic ties.

Economic relations to the EU's Eastern  
neighbors are of paramount importance ...

Let me therefore go into more detail about the EU's economic relations with its Eastern neighbors. We have not yet understood the tremendous economic consequences of the enlargement and the new neighborhood.

... to compete successfully  
with economies like China

Enlargement has significantly changed the parameters of competition. France or Germany fear a flight of companies to Lithuania or Poland. We tend to forget the cheaper locations further east which are major competitors not only for the old but also for the new member states. Ukraine and Russia are important players not only in the field of energy. Their agricultural potential might bring tremendous change to the European economy not only in the long run but in the near future. Seen from a global perspective, though, these competitors may turn out to be major assets if we manage to establish a functioning method of economic cooperation. In a globalized world, the EU also faces competition from places as remote and as dynamic as China. Only if it uses the complementary potential of its immediate Eastern neighbors will the Union be up to these challenges.

Harmonizing regulatory standards  
is beneficial for both sides

I am convinced that regulatory convergence plays a crucial role in enabling us to benefit from the opportunities that our neighbors in Eastern Europe and Russia offer. The EU's Neighborhood Policy recognizes this, but it requires great effort on the part of our neighbors to harmonize regulatory standards and thus fulfill a basic precondition for the development of business opportunities. This will prove beneficial first of all to our neighbors. After Polish standards were brought into line with those of the EU, the influx of direct foreign investment rose significantly and boosted our economic development. It took five years, though, until this trend developed its full potential. Therefore, the neighbors should take steps immediately to start a development which will be of tremendous medium-term importance.

Strengthening common economic interests with our Eastern neighbors is not only important for maintaining competitiveness in a globalized world. The EU's history shows that economic cooperation is probably the most solid basis for

Europe cannot simply bow out politely while Russia massively expands its influence.

Reiter

the convergence of social and political security. Peace, stability and security are equally essential to business communities within and outside the Union. On the other hand, terrorism and crime are equally dangerous to all of them.

Successful cooperation with our Eastern neighbors can thus be based on pragmatic economic interests, as Alexander Rahr suggested. We should not forget, though, that shared values must form the core of our cooperation. The societies of our Eastern neighbors do indeed share many values with the European Union. Rather than using conditionality—the “carrot and stick” approach can be very humiliating—we should build on these shared values. Helping, for example, Russian society to further internalize our values would allow us to do away with hypocrisy and double standards. People in Eastern Europe do not have a psyche quite as different from ours as you suggest, Mr. Rahr. Mr. Hrytsak rightly pointed out that European values were imported so early that they have melted into the core of the identity of people in Russia and even more so in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. This is what we have to focus on.

I would like to discuss Russia’s role as a power center and initiator of integration policies. Russia’s influence radiates incomparably stronger in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova than in Germany, France, or even Poland. Recently, in the International Herald Tribune, Viktor Yushchenko warned of a division in Europe between a real center of power in Moscow and a symbolic center of power in Brussels. If they are not incorporated into Brussels’ structures, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova run the risk of becoming Russian satellites.

The new neighbors have weak political and economic structures and can therefore be easily and profoundly influenced. The European Union could gain influence if it decides to proceed as it did earlier toward Poland and the other new members. If the EU fails to do this, Russia will fill the gap and use its many ways of exerting influence. The state-owned energy corporation Gazprom, for example, is a gigantic instrument for wielding power. I am not accusing Putin of imperialist intentions, but merely pointing out that, in countries with weak structures, one can achieve much with very little effort. I wish that the EU would realize this and act on it.

Europe cannot simply bow out politely while Russia massively expands its influence. Without plunging into an all-out fight over Ukraine, we must recognize that the developments in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova are parts of a strategic game that will have consequences for the European order. It is not only in the

Economic cooperation must, be based on shared values

**Reiter**

Russia is conducting its own integration policy ...

... trying to influence the politically and economically weak Eastern European states

The EU must play the strategic game with Russia over Eastern Europe intelligently



interests of the EU and its eastern neighbors that Brussels plays this game intelligently. A determined response to Russia's external ambitions would, in the end, also contribute positively to the development of democracy in Russia.

**Cuntz**

EU-Russian cooperation in the  
Four Spaces can resolve the  
frozen conflicts of Eastern Europe

I indeed believe that the triangle of EU-Russia-New Neighbors presents many more opportunities than our discussion of blocs would suggest. If the EU and Russia put some effort into filling in those four spaces, it could very well be in our neighbors' interest. Cooperation over external security, for example, would open up possibilities for progress in the frozen conflicts in Georgia and Transnistria.

**Pidluska**

We exaggerate Russia's importance  
for EU-Ukrainian relations ...

We tend to exaggerate the role Russia plays for the relationship between the EU and its new neighbors. It is no doubt true that both the EU and Russia put greater emphasis on their mutual relations than at least the EU puts on its relations with the Eastern neighbors. The EU has not abandoned Ukraine to the mercy of Russia, as many Ukrainians say, but it certainly avoids violating Russian interests.

... because Ukraine will be free  
to change its course later on

This does not mean, however, that Ukraine will inevitably be drawn into complete integration in a Single Economic Space dominated by Russia and thus be lost to the EU because of Brussels' lack of resolve. First, I doubt that Russia at this point has the power to create a strong economic bloc. Second, it is hard to draw a country into an integrated structure if this country refuses. If there are forces in the Ukraine promoting the idea of a Single Economic Space, that is not the fault of the EU. We would of course like to receive stronger signals that the EU is interested in closer relations, in opening a dialog on other matters besides justice and home affairs, and in making as significant progress on visa issues and economic relations as with Russia. But if we remember Mr. Stüdemann's statement that Ukraine and the other new neighbors are players and not victims and should behave as such, the prospect of Ukraine being dragged into the Russian sphere of influence becomes less frightening. The next tactical moves by Ukraine should thus not be overestimated, the country can still change its course later on if it wants to. Nevertheless, we must state clearly what our strategic vision is: integration into the European Union. I am convinced that the majority of Ukrainians want that, and not integration into a Russian sphere of influence.

**Braghis**

The EU should not offer Russia  
special treatment ...

The EU must offer its Eastern neighbors equal treatment. If it is discussing visa issues with Russia, why does it not offer the same to Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus at the same time? Even worse, the EU's negotiations with Moldova for example

Transnistria is the real test for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy vis-à-vis Russia.

Chirtoaca

are quite often conducted only after consultations with Russia. Why are we not treated as equal partners?

On the other hand, giving Russia a say in negotiations between the EU and its Eastern European neighbors certainly makes sense insofar as Russia's fundamental interests are concerned and Russian cooperation is indispensable. Without Russia, we will for example never be able to find a solution for Transnistria.

The best way to improve the EU's relations to its neighbors is to define concrete common projects in the political and economic sphere. Solving the Transnistria conflict, improving security at the Ukrainian border, fighting corruption and organized crime and establishing economic projects would facilitate not only improved government-to-government cooperation, but also the inclusion of the private sector and civil society.

Instead of the Eastern and Western block of the Cold War, today we find ourselves within the dynamic interaction of Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia. Putin's Russia further complicates this already complex interplay because it is governed by contradictory trends in its domestic development. Authoritarian flaws in the political system and the role of oligarchs stand in the way of a stable and coherent domestic and foreign policy. The resulting lack of predictability is dangerous for Moldova. We want a democratic Russia which is integrated into the international community, shares the international community's values and respects the territorial and political integrity of its neighbors like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine.

The frozen conflict in Transnistria forms the core of our problematic relation with Russia. Transnistria's criminal regime, Igor Smirnov and his son, controls a paramilitary formation with a military potential almost equal to the power of Moldova's national army. A corridor for trafficking all kinds of illicit goods leads from the separatist region of South Ossetia in Georgia to Transnistria. All this is possible because Russia still has soldiers and vast amounts of ammunition in Transnistria and supports Smirnov, thus keeping our country divided for almost 15 years. We are the only country in Europe where foreign troops are stationed against the will of the people as expressed by the parliament and against the demands of important international forums like the NATO summit in Istanbul.

To my mind, Transnistria is the real test for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy vis à vis Russia. Is the European Union capable of producing more than words? Can it promote stability by forcing Russia to withdraw

... but give Russia a say where its fundamental interests are concerned

**Chirtoaca**

Moldova needs a democratic Russia with a reliable foreign policy

Transnistria is a main obstacle for Moldova's transformation to a stable democracy ...

... and constitutes a test for the EU's foreign policy vis à vis Russia



its troops and ammunition and by establishing a new peace-keeping format? Will the EU support President Voronin's course of fighting Russia's support for the separatist regime and solving the conflict with a stability and security pact which could be developed in an international conference for all countries involved?

**de Weck**

Our discussion began with the concern and resignation of the eastern neighbors over the EU's silence and empty words. We have heard the call for clarity, for an end to ambivalence. Antagonizing factors, such as human rights, were raised just as were unifying ones, including those that stem from economic interests.

Eastern Europe between Action Plans  
and transformation processes

The power of Eastern European history, steeped in violence, which is often stronger than any action plan, was compared and contrasted with the system of European unification, which is more of a process. This process includes convincing people of Europe's geographical borders, such as in the litmus test of Turkey. Yet changes within the European Union are also part of this process. Today, the Union must think more strategically once it has entered the field of international politics with its New Neighborhood Policy, for instance. We have heard the key-word complexity mentioned many times, both referring to the complex European Union and the complex relationships among the new neighbors, and especially with Russia.

Emphasis was placed on the key roles of the new member states, who bring with them their own experiences with Russia and with the process of transformation. The decisive players, however, are of course the new neighbors. Here the central idea was that Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova should act as subjects instead of seeing themselves as objects.

Neighborhood policy is peace policy

A word from Danuta Hübner encapsulated a central conclusion of our discussion: that neighborhood policy is, at its core, peace policy. Thank you very much.

**von Weizsäcker**

The Ukrainian city of Lviv  
is profoundly European

Our conference has been held in a place that epitomizes both the new neighbors' European traditions and the historical crossroads at which these countries now stand. I was impressed by more than the traces of the German-Polish-Jewish history of the profoundly European city of Lviv. Young, enterprising, and optimistic people dominate the street scene here and bear witness to the enormous potential the East European neighbors have, and the mutual enrichment that a convergence with the European Union could bring.

I believe that Yushchenko's young supporters represent most of Ukraine, that Europe can not forget them and that they will play a decisive part in their country's future.

von Weizsäcker

Finally, we are experiencing here the dramatic election campaign between the Europe-oriented Viktor Yushchenko and his more pro-Russian rival, Viktor Yanukovich. A controversial topic of our discussion was whether a Yushchenko victory really would open up a path to the EU, and whether Yanukovich really stands for a one-sided convergence with Russia. However, Yushchenko's young supporters campaign for their candidate with such ardor that one thing cannot be doubted. They see in Yushchenko perhaps their only chance to enter the free and democratic Europe that they feel they belong to. However the election turns out, I believe that these people represent most of Ukraine, that Europe cannot forget them, and that they will play a decisive part in their country's future.

People place their hope in Yushchenko to open a path to Europe

