

PROTOCOL

Welcome

Körber

Gentlemen:

Permit me to welcome you most cordially to our Twelfth Bergedorf Forum. I am especially happy that so many gentlemen from other countries are taking part in this discussion. My special greeting to today's principal speakers, Mr. Kitzinger and Monsieur Delcour, and to our Moderator, Professor Kogon.

The topic of "Europe" poses a wealth of subjects for inquiry in our present political situation. A clear differentiation of phenomena were necessary to permit a fruitful discussion. A discourse on these questions appears so difficult for the reason present-day Europe has the most varied of content for the various strata of society; politically a different consciousness of ego is shown than culturally; politically other possibilities result than economically. Europe itself, in its life-and-death struggle against communism, is interpreted differently than it is in its bond with the United States.

Doubtlessly, the EEC forms the nucleus for European economic unification. The economic foundation of European integration appeared to the planners of the "Europe" idea to result in a political union. This optimism has been rendered uncertain by the official French attitude.

As economic measures cannot be effected in isolation from political processes, Europe at present finds itself in a stage of a dangerous stagnation. The decisive question after all poses itself today regarding the path the EEC will take from here on. This question has two aspects. First: Europe with or without Britain? Secondly: in the long run, is unification on a purely economic basis possible, or is it condemned to failure if a political federation does not ensue?

Gentlemen, I am convinced that here, in this international circle of experts on the problem of Europe, it will be possible, in open-minded discussion, to uncover the manifold possibilities of the future road of Europe, no matter what its form. In order to emerge from the stage of the present stagnation, a multiplicity of ideas is required which we - if necessary - should discuss disputatiously so that the bogged-down wheel of European unification can be set rolling again. Let us therefore not be awed by the multiplicity of viewpoints. Above all we must not evade the real questions even if and no matter how unpleasant for the one or the other of us. We must come to grips with the problems to be solved if we want to overcome them.

Gentlemen, let us carry on the discussion today in the spirit of a man who faced these questions of existence consistently to the last and whose tragic death deeply shocked us all. John F. Kennedy was the author of the sentence I should like to use as a motto for our discussion this evening. He said that he wanted to be sure that he knew all the facts, heard all the alternatives and listened to every criticism. In this spirit, may I ask you, Mr. Kitzinger, to begin your address.

Kitzinger

Gentlemen:

At the close of this year that brought the breaking off of negotiations between Britain and the EEC, a year in which occurred the death of Gaitskell, of the Pope and of John F. Kennedy, and a year that will still bring us very grave negotiations within the EEC, I should like to disengage myself somewhat from the general questions of day-to-day politics.

May I reflect a moment on what is really the essential character of the EEC, the goal toward which the EEC should steer or toward which it could be driven with - but I believe under circumstances also without - Britain.

Concerning the logical value of the theses I should like to propound this evening, there must be no illusions. Economists propound models which are not valid as a description of reality, but also not as a program for action; such models are nevertheless useful to evolve certain strategic factors of the complexity of the over-all image which, although of themselves not valid as solutions, can be counted nevertheless as tools for a comprehension of the nomenclature of political problems.

I start from the surely undisputed fact that the national state, to which Herder gave cultural identity and Rousseau juridical identity, constitutes an antiquated form of society today in the train of scientific and technological development. It is merely a question, how, in this situation, one can take measures against the dream of the 19th or even the 20th Century of independent national states living side by side.

Actually in the past years we have experienced four attempts to overcome the national state or to replace it.

The old ideal of a world government has never in any way become relevant politically.

Thus, as a second ideal in Europe, we have federalism as a very intense although geographically not very extensive attempt to by-pass the national state, and that precisely in its ancient homeland. This European federalism, derived from the democratic idea, unfortunately - as you, Dr. Körber have already stated - has bogged down somewhat today.

Thirdly: the still looser form of confederative cooperation which we started back in the 19th Century, was also attempted in Europe after the Second World War. But in this case, in addition to the question of democratic responsibility, the problem of the hegemony of some of the members of a confederative structure cropped up again and again. Again and again the question of the veto was posed, which has acted as an obstruction in organizations such as the OECD, despite the organizations good work.

Thus, the fourth attempt was then undertaken in Europe, which in contrast to European federalism I should like to characterize as the community method.

This method advances gradually, progressively - at times technocratically - without wanting to start with a constitution for the United States of Europe. Starting from very concrete actualities it seeks on the one hand to release forces and pressures leading to integration and on the other hand to remove ancient obstacles on the road to integration. The community method can in the long run steer toward a European federalism with a "dialectic of intensity" but in the present stage it differs completely from a federative solution. This "dialectic of intensity", which began with the Ruhr problem, led over the coal and steel community, the resolution of the Saar problem, to Euratom and the economic community, appears to me to have four characteristics, which I should like to stress.

The first characteristic is that diametrically opposed to a traditional treaty between states, precise, progressive and itemized commitments - that cannot be abrogated legally - were undertaken. The legal un-revocability is perhaps not radically different from a treaty, but the time progression, best expressed in the progressive lowering of customs, appears to me to be new.

The second much more important characteristic is, so to speak, the agreement to agree. From the very start it was said: if, for instance, we want to solve the farm problems in all details, we shall not do so in the way the British negotiators attempted at Brussels, namely, to set down everything in writing. Instead, we shall construct machinery to solve these problems in which the readiness to agree is juridically sanctioned by a progressive curtailment of the national veto. Therefore, the time dimension is deliverately included in the treaty - and that is much more important.

Concerning the third characteristic, the novelty of the supranational authorities and the so-called dialogue between them and the governments, I do not need to go into detail here.

But I think one is hoping for still a fourth important characteristic: namely, that with the inclusion of the time dimension in the Rome Treaty and with the time progression of the various operations, the attempt is

being made to shape in a positive form the balances between advantages and disadvantages for each partner at each moment the treaty is being realized, i. e., that at no moment in time, of one of the states a sacrifice is demanded that is not compensated by advantages or will be compensated very soon. Thus, the balance for each state will always be positive as long as it is a member - at least the balance, in case of withdrawal, would be negative at any time.

Of this EEC, this Euratom, this Coal and Steel Community, with the help of the "dialectic of intensity", which has already led us through thesis and antithesis from the Ruhr problem to the general economic community, seen theoretically, the Political Community can evolve. However, it appears to me that the process is often seen wrongly in that one presupposes that politics and economy are two concepts of equal importance. Certainly, in today's policies an entire series of matters are decided which are not economic in character but the greatest - at least a very great - part of economic decisions are both economic as well as political. For, to be political means to attack a problem in a certain way and thoroughly to discuss a question, be it economic, cultural or military in nature, until a joint decision is reached. In this sense, politics and economy, as terms, are not equal, or one subordinate or superior to the other. Rather, there are economic problems that are political, and such that are not. Precisely because the major economic problems, which previously were decided within the context of national states, are shunted off to Brussels, the EEC already is a political community and this by reason of the fact that it is an economic one.

If one views politics in this sense as a necessary process of reaching decisions in which joint matters have to be considered jointly, then the state, in this consideration, becomes an apparatus to satisfy joint human needs, and the moment it can no longer do so or do so only insufficiently, we have to look around for another apparatus, which can do this task better. Is a single major power or even a continent still in a position to do so? If we ask ourselves what services the form of society, the public organization, must perform today, then actually there are only two services, against which we have to measure

the form of organization of our society: first, against the contribution to the solution of the inequality above all economic-social between races; and secondly, against the contribution to the problem of East-West relations. The question concerning the internal organization of Western Europe or the Atlantic Alliance appears to me of importance only in so far as it contributes to the solution of the two other problems: the North-South and the East-West problem.

Indeed the "dialectic of intensity" I previously mentioned several times and which the "European" movement has unfolded during the past fifteen years, has released a "dialectic of extension" within the Community during the past three years. The six industrial states of the EEC, as far back as 1956, could not come to any agreement among themselves without including all their associated African countries in this process. The union of the Six in the heart of Europe has furthermore resulted in a complete re-orientation of the centuries old policy of England. The EFTA was built up as a reaction to the EEC. But when 2-3 years ago the English policy swung over to the EEC, this resulted in uncovering the changed relationship of the Commonwealth with Britain in such a way that, for instance, despite the collapse of negotiations between the EEC and Britain, East Africa and Nigeria established new, direct contacts for the purpose of associating with the EEC. Also the relation of India to the EEC has developed directly while by-passing London. At the same time, as counterpart of British reorientation, the American trade policy changed - thus resulted the Trade Expansion Act and the proposed "Kennedy Round". In the past, François Perroux once spoke of the EEC as "L'Europe sans Rivages". At the time, I considered the book as an opponent in our battle; but perhaps precisely in this title rests a very deep truth: The EEC has acted as a point of crystallization for many more than European changes of attitude and, as a pioneer form of new ideas of order, has attained to world-historical significance.

Nevertheless, if one measures our present form of organization by the two really important tasks of our generation, then, it appears to me, one cannot by any means say we have not gotten on decisively.

We all know that not only Europe but the entire Atlantic Alliance finds itself in a precarious situation at the moment. On the one hand, the economic powers of Europe and America have changed in their correlation; furthermore, the question poses itself in how far in a nuclear world an alliance is basically

possible, if at all. Starting precisely with dissatisfaction with the concept of an alliance in this new world, President Kennedy developed the idea of partnership. Perhaps this idea was not defined very accurately and up to now it was valid probably more oratorically than administratively, but now the very attempt to make it practical is problematical.

Partnership always presupposes two partners and it now does not look as if we could furnish one such partner with today's Europe, for this would require a grand European union, at least with the participation of Britain. On the other hand, the thought worries me that a partnership solution of the defense problem within the Atlantic Community will only make a limited contribution to prevent the atomic arming of a multiplicity of units in the world. Furthermore, the concept of the Atlantic partnership also, in the sphere of economics, leaves unanswered the question of trade rivalry of the two economic units and the question of a third power in foreign policies - questions one should preferably not see unanswered.

Under these circumstances, in the long run, we doubtlessly will have to worry less whether the EEC can be developed with or without Britain, rather we ought to be worried about the Atlantic Community in which one includes the New World, so to speak, in order to help overcome the divisions of the Old World. This Atlantic Community should have those four characteristics too which I defined for the European Community at the beginning of my talk. I can imagine that for a period of a few years such an Atlantic Community would make possible significant progress in defense and foreign policy as well as in space research and science. Gauged by these major problems, neither the EEC nor the Atlantic Alliance is sufficient. This becomes especially obvious in the North-South problem of the world. Precisely at the moment Britain solicited admittance to the EEC, a series of problems came to light that can only be approached on a geographically broader basis. Even when just considering industrial products, Japan, of the countries becoming industrialized, stands forth. Added to this are the problems of a market for products of the tropics as well as the reorganization of agricultures in the temperate zones. The problem of the world's currency system might just be managed to be solved on an Atlantic basis, but when it is a question of the basic problems of the developing countries, then it just appears to me that the Atlantic basis might enable us to do something for the developing countries, not however - what is really at stake politically in the long run - to do something together with them. I, therefore, believe we should take as a model the association treaty which the EEC newly concluded in 1963, more than we outside the EEC have done so up to now; we should think of bodies of equal representation, in which highly developed and developing countries jointly (in the above-defined meaning) attack these tasks.

Thus I now come to my general theory. For historical and technological reasons we have become accustomed to a form of organization in which unlimited authorities were restricted to a limited geographic area - a form of vertical organization, so to speak, in the sense that an authority within certain geographic borders had general jurisdiction. That, in an era of previous technological development - in an era in which culture was conditioned more linguistically than technically - was an entirely adequate form of organization. Today, as a pattern we should introduce a further dimension, the horizontal, if one may say so. Not unlimited authority in a limited geographical area, rather limited authority in an unlimited geographical area, or better: in a geographical area coincident with the geography of a problem. That would mean for instance that the pattern of the Coal and Steel Community, which has regionally earned in Europe some laurels, be extended to regionally less restricted areas. One should attempt - as we have already done to a certain extent in the Chicken War - to bring the fabric of the functional organizations of the United Nations into contact with the fabric of Europe's regional organizations in order to strengthen the functional organizations of the United Nations, for the time being too weak,

by means of the community method. On the other hand, the idea of the politically bogged down regional organizations of Europe should be used to broach the major problems of the world which today no longer center in Europe anyway. In the course of the discussion surely a series of questions will be broached on the lateral coordination of functional organizations, and it appears to me that the United Nations which already has to coordinate the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and other world-wide activities, would have an easier task doing this than coordinating Russia and the United States.

To bring it to a short conclusion: we should not insist on considering the EEC as a unit, but as a process; we should not only evaluate it as a regional but also as a functional organization. We should watch the dangers arising from regional blocs, dangers which in the long run could also be racial dangers. We should be mindful of the dangers brought about by blocs formed on the basis of ideologies. We should not only worry about how to drive vertical organizations to a still higher level and build up supranational organizations, but ask ourselves whether de-ideologized, trans-national

organizations are not at least equally as important at the moment. This, a pragmatic pattern, neither a greater-European, nor a small-European, neither a federalist nor one of French hegemony but a functional pattern of organization oriented on the problem at hand, this pragmatic pattern we should seriously consider at this critical time.

Kogon

Many thanks for the interesting ideas you put forward. Before considering details, may I request Mr. Delcour, the second speaker, to give us his address.

Delcour

I shall consider the question "Where is Europe drifting to" from the standpoint of a French journalist. I am a Frenchman and as a Frenchman I consider myself to a certain degree co-responsible for French policies. Of course, it is not always easy to work in present-day Germany as a French journalist. I am frequently invited to conferences and discussions (conferences have become a national sport in the Federal Republic). Not infrequently I speak in USIS libraries in Germany and again and again am heckled there about French policies. Therefore I state right off: I personally am not a Gaullist; what is more, since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, I have been on the side of the opposition.

Mozer

I think you sometimes are heckled in Germany because you are not a Gaullist.

Delcour

My newspaper, "Le Monde", is also in opposition to de Gaulle. But I shall try to remain objective and consider today's French policies as well as European development both from the standpoint of de Gaulle policies and also from the standpoint of the opposition.

Please let me first of all present a few statements of fact.

First, when de Gaulle took office, people in other countries and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany became apprehensive. It was feared that this decided anti-"Europe" statesman, opponent of the "Europe" policies of the Fourth Republic, of the EEC project, the Coal and Steel Community, would break with all the commitments of the Fourth Republic. But one has to be honest enough and note that this was not the case. To the contrary: the Fifth Republic always honored the commitments and the treaties of the Fourth Republic. Moreover, this Fifth Republic has made an essential contribution to the good development of "European" policies and especially of the EEC.

Permit me to call to your mind the first policy speeches of General de Gaulle himself and after that of M. Debré, the prime minister at that time, who, as far back as the close of 1958, both repeated that France would honor the Europe Treaties of the Fourth Republic with regard to the European territory.

A pre-condition had to be established first. After currency reform not only did the French balance of payments but also the balance of trade get out of the red so that France today disposes of almost 4.5 billion Francs in gold and foreign-exchange reserves, i.e., almost as much as the Federal Republic. This success proved to be a great contribution to "European" policies as, in spite of all their good will, the statesmen of the Fourth Republic at the beginning would not have been able to fulfill their promises and commitments of the Rome Treaty if the financial situation had continued downhill. That is, France was able to play its role as member of the EEC 100%. The Government of the Fifth Republic not only kept the promises of Rome but even increased the speed of developments, for instance, the reduction of custom barriers. All that has to be said.

Secondly, when the will of General de Gaulle to continue the "European" and also the domestic policies of the Fourth Republic became evident, this sometimes led to exaggerated optimism. In this connection, the specific attitude of de Gaulle toward the German Federal Republic played a major role. For instance, Chancellor Adenauer was the first to be invited to Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises. This carefully nurtured contact misled the German chancellor as well as many of his ministers and co-workers into optimism up to the day of the remarkable meeting at Rambouillet, where the project of General de Gaulle to create a "Europe of Fatherlands" with the right of veto and revocation became unmistakably manifest: the project of the so-called European Union according to the Fouchet Plan.

In the Federal Republic, too, this plan was received with greatest reserve from the very start. Nevertheless, most of the partners had agreed to the effect that this modest plan could be considered as a basis for further development. Then they met at Bad Godesberg in 1961. There too optimism still

reigned. A year later everything was finished, negotiations had finally and definitely failed. The limits of General de Gaulle's "European" policies were clearly evident. He did, as a matter of fact, want to continue and further develop the policy he inherited from the Fourth Republic, Franco-German reconciliation, however, for his own goals which had nothing in common with the goals of a Robert Schuman or a Jean Monnet.

A philosophy now came into play diametrically opposed to Robert Schuman's. In it, the nation stands in the foreground, the needfulness of the sovereignty of the state, the impossibility to renounce any part whatsoever of sovereignty - especially in the sphere of defense. This philosophy became evident for the first time due to the very failure of the union policy. Then there came a second Fouchet Plan, more modest than the first. It too failed.

Thus for General de Gaulle there were limits to the development of European integration and further it became evident that de Gaulle views this European structure quite differently than do his partners.

Thirdly, in the course of EEC negotiations in Brussels the General again imposed a limitation: "European" development should not include Britain. As far as de Gaulle is concerned a country disqualifies itself as member of the European Community, if it renounces part of its sovereignty in so important a sphere as defense. There is no doubt that at first many Europeans did not understand this decision. At the press conference of 14 January 1963, the General for the first time had dealt definitively with economics and tried to give as a reason for failure of negotiations with Britain, economic and "European" motivations. These, however, were not the real reasons. The real reason, in this case, was Britain's decision to continue a joint defense policy together with the Americans.

Now a fourth statement of fact. We now find ourselves in a situation which causes particularly many Germans to despair. It is believed the only chance lies in the disappearance of de Gaulle from the political scene. This, however, will not be the case for an indefinite period of time. Hence we must seek new ways or break completely with our policy of European unification. For a time this negative attitude even influenced German policies. One was tempted to a certain extent to sabotage "European" policy. You surely remember the episode when in 1963 the treaties with the African States, former French Colonies, were being negotiated; in this connection the idea cropped up in Germany and Holland to take a sort of revenge and simply refuse approval of these treaties, to show the French thereby that they could not establish European policies by themselves.

In Germany, that shock of Brussels has probably been overcome, and one has been able to view the situation more calmly. It now appears best to continue the development toward European unification in especial the extension of the EEC Commission and to do so, if possible, more effectively than heretofore. Lately, Minister Schröder has set up a theory of synchronization: the agrarian-economic treaties and regulations, to be concluded by the end of 1963 according to the working plan of May, 1963, should be considered as part of much more comprehensive economic trade agreements. That is, a type of "do ut des", seeking re-adjustments in various spheres. This is one of the possible ways to develop the EEC further, despite all difficulties.

Of course, there still is the problem of Britain. One can put it on ice for a certain time, the more so since Britain finds herself in the interim period prior to parliamentary elections. We do not know, however, whether the next British Government will wish to continue the application for admission to the EEC or whether this policy is to be considered as finished. However, as the question of defense is posed together with the question of European union, the political problems that do not include Britain, cannot be placed on ice. There is a "dead-line" that cannot be postponed.

The question of atomic defense is becoming more and more pressing. And into it plays the philosophy of de Gaulle. Perhaps the danger here is so much greater because the problem of atomic weapons is today a problem for Germany, too. The French conception, according to which each country should possess its own national atomic striking force and dependence for security should not be on the United States, has found supporters after all in Germany too. I experienced this just recently during a conference in Munich on defense policies.

There, German conference participants not only from the right wing of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Party and its Bavarian wing) but also moderate CDU party members, among them a member of the Defense Committee of the Federal Parliament, used many of the General's arguments, quoted him and asked the same question of the Americans. They, the Americans, must understand, it was said, that the Germans were only left the choice between atomic weapons or European or Atlantic Community -naturally also Atlantic and European Community. If the European Community and - in consequence -the Atlantic Community were not forthcoming, then some day the Germans would have to reach the same decision as General de Gaulle. Thus is raised a pressing

question which remains unanswered by the multilateral atomic fleet project of the Americans. Thereby, moreover, the problem rather becomes the more pressing.

Thus another deadline is established. If "European" policies make no progress in this sphere, disappointment will become greater and greater. Probably in such a case larger and larger groups in the various countries will come to the conclusion that the obstacle is not insurmountable and that a different approach must be sought. In the sphere of defense, security, atomic arming, the "European" solution is therefore rendered more necessary than ever in the past. There is hardly a sphere in which the principle of collective security - dream of the period prior to the Second World War - could better be realized.

It is the topic of many conferences what is to be done in the face of the fact that General de Gaulle does exist, after all, and will continue to be in evidence. I talked about this recently with Americans in Munich. Theirs is always the wishful thinking a change might occur in France nonetheless. One of the Americans asked me: "Why can't you rally around an opponent of de Gaulle, for example Gaston Déferre, Mayor of Marseille? That might perhaps be a chance for the opposition." Although I am an opponent of de Gaulle and a member of the opposition, I had to disappoint the American observer. The opposition in France has today no chance whatsoever in the political sphere, not because this opposition has nothing to offer, also not because the regime has no weakness, but because until de Gaulle retires, there will always be 60% of the French who will decide in his favor every time. They do not do so because de Gaulle has a good or a bad program, not because of his policies, but because he is a guarantee for relative law and order and the political truce in France; because many Frenchmen just simply fear a change.

Much is spoken about a fusion of executive European organs now existent. I personally do not expect much of it. But as a journalist I believe that public opinion in France and Germany as well as in the other European countries would see it as a practical step; although it might only result in a little saving in money and time, it would probably be very popular.

Much is also said about the possibility of strengthening the power of the European parliament. It is a dream of the poor deputies in Strasbourg that some day they will not be merely a symbol, mere representative figures but constitute a control authority, a real parliament. This idea, of course, is for the moment pure theory. On the other hand the plan for the fusion - as far as I am informed - has made considerable progress. A commission has occupied itself with it and, together with the French, has done good preparatory work. Up to now one is in "terra incognita" in regard to strengthening the powers of the European parliament. The only progress I see is that the parliament has given itself the new name of "Parlement Européen". But it has not received more authority. Hamburg's Senator Helmut Schmidt stated he was so disappointed in this institution, in which so much is talked without anything happening, that he did not want to travel to Strasbourg again.

A further possibility would be that of direct election. Mr. Spinelli and his Federalists have held test elections in numerous cities of Europe in order to obtain test results, even in Strasbourg itself. I am of the opinion that this idea should be launched once again.

Mozer

One should oppose the direct election of a parliament that, after all, is given no authority whatsoever!

Delcour

I see we are already in the midst of the discussion. Thank you for your kind attention.

Kogon

Gentlemen! The two speakers have introduced us to the set of problems in our field of inquiry. I am happy that my original fear we might immediately flounder into the present difficulties of farm policy and its complications was unfounded.

In both speeches, the problem of "Europe as partner" stood out clearly. If I were to draw a preliminary conclusion I would say the statements of Mr. Kitzinger have made plain that at least for some time to come he considers the attempt a failure to bring about a regional "Europe" as a separate political unit which would also be consolidated institutionally. In truth he has guided us into the policy of Atlantic union as a necessity. After his valuable four statements of fact Mr. Delcour, for his part, has, at the end, undertaken desperate attempts to find starting points anyplace at all leading out of the existing central antimony, namely, that de Gaulle would like to see "Europe" developed only as a de Gaulle Europe, as a modern basis for his conceptions.

I think, gentlemen, our discussion in the course of this evening should comprise all the strata of the problem: the economic policy, the military policy, the essential political concept of Europe with the role of Britain and de Gaulle therein, and not least with the role of the German Federal Republic too, which finds itself undoubtedly in a key position. Further, in that wide aspect opened for us by Mr. Kitzinger, we must ask ourselves whether the whole thing will ultimately contribute to relaxation of tensions and to coexistence, or vice versa.

You can start with any point, just as you like. We will indeed reach all the strata of the problem because they are all interconnected as in a spiral. Please consider our discussion as a conversation, as a continuity of interjections, so to speak. I would suggest that the attack be opened from the ranks of European federalists.

Chiti-Batelli

As member of the Italian senate I frequently have work to do at the European Parliament in Strasbourg and am therefore acquainted with its activity as also that of the European organizations. I am of the opinion that these Communities are only phantom structures and that in reality no elements whatsoever of supranationalism exist in them. This has already been proven from a juridical standpoint by many people. I name for example M. Héraud of France and Herr Jerusalem of Germany whose book "Die Montanunion" is perhaps not as well known as it deserves to be. I mention the contribution of Herr Jaenicke to the "Zeitschrift für das öffentliche internationale Recht" (Review of International Public Law). Further, the recently published book of M. Rosenstil of France, "Le Principe de la Supranationalité", makes an especially important contribution.

I share the opinion of these gentlemen that the European Communities practically leave all power to the governments. The economy is developing today on a European plane on which, however, there is no democratic jurisdiction. Thus power over the economy does remain theoretically and as a matter of form in the hands of the governments, but in practice the real decisions are made by economic powers that be. This is where criticism of leftist radicals sets in, not only of Italian communists and socialists, but also of other radical forces. Criticism in an Austrian publication "Wirtschaftswunder oder keines" (Economic miracle or not) - I forget the name of the author - is also correct in my opinion.

Now, is it possible to develop these Communities further? It is a political question whether a "European" government can really be established.

Kogon

And how does one go about doing that?

Chiti-Batelli

I shall try to tell you. Mr. Kitzinger pointed out correctly that today there should be limited authority in an unlimited area as for example the large sphere of Europe. Did the speaker have in mind a form such as perhaps that of the United Nations? The principal question, namely, is whether the solution is sought on a federalist basis. Fusion of executive offices and election of a European parliament, however, aim at wrong solutions because these existing institutions have no power to attack the real problems. Genuine decisions are only taken by the governments, i.e., the Council of Ministers, whose decision, however, no one can control.

Kogon

But the Commission in Brussels is more than that!

Chiti-Batelli

The Brussels Commission can only make suggestions. Please read the report of Mr. Furier concerning the situation of the parliamentary assembly which has now been re-named the "Europe Parliament". You know the Goethe verse, don't you: "Denn eben, wo Begriffe fehlen, da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein." (For, it's true, where concepts are lacking, a word happens along at just the right time.) Naturally, the concepts are not lacking here, lacking here is the political will.

As concerns the election of a parliament, I should like to call to mind that the time is past when the parliament was really a central power or could become so step by step, as this for instance was the case in the history of Great Britain. Today central power is embodied by government. If, however, one elects a parliament without a government as counterpart, such a solution is wrong because it does not

help toward progress but instead, to the contrary, can have an effect against the "European" and at the same time against the democratic idea. In that, I am more pessimistic than the two speakers.

General de Gaulle realized immediately that it was not in his interests to proceed against the "European" bodies so constituted but rather, to the contrary, that they could form the basis of his wish for hegemony over Europe. It is my conviction that the democratic forces in the European countries are national in character. The idea of a "European" government, an independent "European" force, conflicts with their interests. For in a new "European" state, new elites would form themselves, disposing also of power. That is why, in my opinion, it is practically impossible to create a "European" force through national governments and parties, not even with a policy such as my friend Spinelli proposes.

I believe - and this is the weak point of my contribution - that a genuine international federalist force should be formed. Up to now we have failed to do so, but I hope in future we shall have more luck.

Kogon

I should like to say: a tremendously genial execution of our Italian friend's harakiri.

Frisch

Please let me advocate an optimistic thesis. When immediately after the war we started in the different countries to concern ourselves with "Europe" and to wish for European unity, we were considered as Utopians. Today, with something already standing, many of those who then did not believe in "Europe" come and say "Not enough has been done". In spite of everything, much has been done. First off the internal differences between European countries were overcome. With the exception of British public opinion, fears of a hegemony no longer refer to Germany but France; that is considerable progress. For as a matter of principle, one would be angry only if the Germans harbored wishes for hegemony.

Of importance further is that youth has overcome the "national". Please pardon me, if I mention a personal example. I was recently requested to lecture before students on the problem of nation and fatherland. I was forced to note that these students did not understand at all what I was driving at, because they had left it far behind. Questions of the re-unification, the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary line - I say "acceptance" - European unity, all these had meaning for them - but the "nation"? For them the nation is just simply out-of-date.

By the way, I ask myself again and again whether de Gaulle does not misjudge his own people if he believes that the average Frenchman is especially nationalistic. There are practical examples for this. When France announced the decision to evacuate Biserta permanently, for no apparent reason a communique was issued simultaneously to the effect that France had an atomic fighting force. As to subject matter, this communique was superfluous, because meant were three prototypes, a few bombs, previously available. The communique was merely intended to indemnify public opinion for a national act of renunciation. Probably de Gaulle still considered it necessary. But it is a fact that the "nationalistic" does not evoke a reaction, not in France either. If this is not a "European" success, then I don't know about what else we should be glad.

Further, the Common Market exists, is just as large as the United States and almost as large as the Soviet Union, and it is German nonsense - please excuse the harsh language - to have invented the term "Small Europe". With it was injected today's pessimism into the "European" cause.

Furthermore, I do not understand static thinking. Again and again people believe things will not change. An enormous number of things change in the world: the Eastern bloc is on the verge of losing some of its tightness as there is, after all, a Sino-Russian conflict, even though we should not overestimate it. In addition, the relationship between Europe and the United States is changing. That President Kennedy went from alliance to partnership was no accident, rather a necessity, because a united Europe makes partnership indispensable.

The moment will also come when the United States must be prepared for atomic partnership. And when this moment comes, the Europeans for their part must be prepared for European unity.

On the other hand I cannot understand why we must always dispute about formulas: the supranational, the integration. M. Delcour said a little while ago that it was part of the philosophy of de Gaulle to maintain national sovereignty under all circumstances. During deliberations on the common farm policy - in the first stage in 1962 - the French Minister for Agriculture Pisani asked both de Gaulle as well as his Prime Minister Debré: "Do you realize that a common European farm-policy means

renunciation of national sovereignty in the sphere of agriculture?" He thereupon was given the answer of "yes". "And you still want me to insist on a common farm policy?" Answer: "Yes."

I am of the opinion, that the concept of sovereignty is manipulated as elastically as the concept of federalism. Incidentally, I consider it a misfortune that the concept of European federalism originated in two countries with no federalist tradition, namely, in France and Italy. If this federalism had come from Germany, then many a mistake could probably have been avoided.

A basic contradiction inherent in federalism, the federalists astonishingly will not accept, they will not occupy themselves with it: on the one hand federalism means decentralization and on the other a European concentration of power. We can make no progress unless we overcome these contradictions. Irrespective of this, we must first of all be clear in our minds what has been achieved in order then to find out what we are in a position to realistically accomplish in the future. That surely will not be little.

Kogon

Are you of the opinion, Mr. Frisch, that concrete problems - such as for example the antinomies in the farm policy - can be overcome with the means currently available and the conceptions held at the moment - perhaps those of General de Gaulle?

Frisch

Definitely!

Kroebe

Perhaps with the conceptions of de Gaulle, but not with the German conceptions.

Frisch

Please do not forget that the automatic of the Common Market not only leads to the political but impels to the political. The supranational can be on the level of government by way of a council of ministers composed of national representatives working together, and not only in the traditional form via a "European" authority or an elected parliament. The supranational could also consist of laying down a definite policy. I am thinking there of foreign-policy consultation. If there is an obligation to arrive at decisions jointly, unanimous decisions are entirely conceivable, which - as I see it - could also be considered a supranational solution.

The weakness of the Common Market is to be seen in the fact that everyone is looking for advantages and disadvantages - a balance is struck. We have drifted away from the community spirit and this perhaps due not least to sociological reasons. We are today a consumer society that does not know what to do with the community spirit. As I see it, it would be easier to reach the supranational if we still had the national. However, as the citizen no longer recognizes the nation and in doing so does not comprehend the first step of community spirit, he does not understand the second one either. Internationally, the result is that the EEC is countered by the world-wide; but the world-wide is not a community. The "European" idea, however calls for the community and I do not see why even on a world-wide scale, i. e., in the UN, in the FAO, etc., one should not work with communities, why we must remain loyal to micro-nationalisms. We can very well act on a world-wide scale without foregoing a European Community. We must only be prepared to form such communities everywhere and not lose ourselves - in the UN either - in the egocentric.

Kroebe

First of all I should like to premise on the fact that I do not share the view, that supranationality was not established by the European Community. It was by all means, and we do all feel it, we who have to deal with wage and social-security policies in preparing for the European Community. Today we cannot do without occupying ourselves closely with conditions in the neighboring country and without the necessity of adapting ourselves to these.

Kogon

"We" means "everybody"?

Kroebe

"We", in this case means the trade unions, but in the general context naturally "everybody." Just take the fact that today we can no longer influence the farm price-level as much as previously because, due to the mere existence of the Communities, other forces co-determine the price level. This is especially true of foreign trade, although - and here I must qualify my statement - it cannot be guided yet by a common institution, but can no longer be determined by the old national governments without, in the long run, considerably upsetting trade. Doubtlessly, the establishment of the customs union has dulled the edge of a number of national instruments of economic policy while in this field the Community is not yet capable of action. But possible solutions for it are conceivable - by means of supranationality. Merely the fact there is a common tariff establishes supranationality. Only he who sees the world in the light of simplified patterns of the economies of transportation and of central administration, and in doing so refuses to understand the manifold forms of a federal structure of economy and of the state, can deny the supranationality of the Community, building up gradually thanks to the EEC Treaty and thanks to actual developments. But I must say I view the Council of Ministers not as an agency of national governments but simultaneously of the Communities.

With all this I merely want to suggest that the road to a certain supranationality is palpable in the Community for him who has to prepare or shape the political. How, otherwise, could be explained the occasional stubborn resistance of a few national officials against the realization of common policy?

The question at what point one can speak of complete "supranationality", as a matter of fact leads too easily to a quarrel about terminology. I am of the opinion that we here should shunt this question off and instead acknowledge the elements of supranationality already at hand.

By the way, I do not mean that the present difficulties of integration make the major objectives of the Rome Treaty questionable. These objectives were and are realistic, because they can be attained insofar as and if they continue to be desired by all involved.

If, however, there are people who believe that it is not compatible with their dignity that some day they might not have as much to say as previously; or if one is of the opinion the entire political inception, the design, as found in the EEC, is wrong, proceeds from evil; and if one lives in the notion that the economical and the political are two different things and to mix them is equivalent to original sin, then one will also deny that one can build a political structure of Europe with this instrument.

Kogon

But, Mr. Kroebel, that is not the opinion of de Gaulle.

Kroebel

No! but of many a group in the Federal Republic. For this reason I am afraid that Gaullist circles in France and certain neo-liberals in the Federal Republic could agree between themselves in the face of the great difficulties - for instance, of the farm policy - to bring the entire political process more and more to a halt, so far as this is still possible.

Kogon

That means you want to indicate that the policy of retardation or halting could also emanate from the Federal Republic, from motivations you mentioned, and not only perhaps from de Gaulle alone?

Kroebel

I would say from both, and because of different motives.

Engel

I do not consider that possible. I am thoroughly optimistic concerning further development, because the Rome Treaty does not contain a cancellation clause. In the original treaty draft it was included but was deleted due to the massive intervention of Adenauer, who was Federal Chancellor at that time. During the Suez crisis, Adenauer flew to Paris and made very considerable concessions to the French Government in order to definitely eliminate the cancellation clause demanded by France. In return the Federal Republic conceded France the right to maintain special import taxes and export subsidies during a few transition years.

Thus the Rome Treaty can only be changed unanimously. An individual member state can never evade the commitments in the Rome Treaty by unilateral cancellation; it can only violate the Rome

Treaty. The possibility of a unanimous change can be considered as good as impossible because at least one state will always be interested in preventing an intended change.

The Rome Treaty not only aims at the realization of a customs union but beyond that to the creation of an economic union. While the customs union will be brought about automatically according to a timetable laid down in the treaty, the economic union can only be concluded unanimously until 1 January 1966, and after that date in the most important spheres by a qualified majority. Doubtlessly, individual states especially those of special

political weight such as France or the Federal Republic can only be defeated by a majority of votes as an exception.

At any rate inherent in the fact that each one of the six member states can be beaten by a majority of votes, is a definite renunciation of sovereignty, clearly showing the supranational character of the EEC and the Euratom. In the measure that the economic union is realized step by step, the Rome Treaty progressively "gobbels up" more and more areas of sovereignty of the individual member states. If a separation between general policies and practical economic policy is no longer possible due to the strong activity of the modern state in the sphere of economic policy, then the further realization and implementation of the EEC Treaty will inevitably have as its result the formation of a political union.

The present difficulties in negotiations concerning the future shaping of a common farm policy must not be overestimated for a constructive solution is by all means possible.

Delcour

Up to now de Gaulle has always confirmed that he would honor the treaties and commitments of the Fourth Republic. I am in complete agreement with you that it is the best policy for the Federal Republic to continue the building of the EEC within the given framework because we are not at a deadend yet. If, however, such a dead-end is reached someday due to the automatism cited tonight, then de Gaulle would be faced with an entirely new situation.

Mr. Frisch expressed the opinion that de Gaulle might very well renounce certain parts of sovereignty, as in the sphere of farm policy. But I believe that is only true because de Gaulle does not yet consider farm policy as the essential part of sovereignty; as far as he is concerned it only plays a secondary role.

Naturally, in the spheres of defence and foreign policy, no renunciation of sovereignty can be expected of him.

Frisch

A country cannot renounce carrying on its own economic policy and claim it has kept its sovereignty.

Kogon

You mean, these renunciations have consequences with reference to one's own sovereignty? Mr. Delcour said that already.

Frisch

I was assured officially that France would, without fail, accept the majority decisions in the third phase of the transition period.

Concerning defense policy I should like to recall that Mr. Pompidou told Nelson Rockefeller in a private talk in answer to an unequivocal question expressly: As soon as a European political authority shall exist, France will forego its own atomic fighting force.

Kogon

Mr. Pompidou, but not de Gaulle!

However, Mr. Frisch you agree with Mr. Delcour that de Gaulle would accept a whole series of consequences in the economic sphere.

Delcour

Because he is convinced that these limited renunciations of sovereignty can subserve, his purpose. For carrying on his policies he does not essentially need these components of sovereignty. At any rate, that is how he sees it.

Frisch

No! Because he knows that these renunciations in the sphere of economy must lead to the European Union. In addition he knows that he cannot effect his policy as a national power vis-a-vis the United States. For that he needs Europe.

Kogon

That we have to debate more thoroughly. For the present I note: there are certain automatisms arising from the treaties, and those who have contributed to this discussion are of the concurring opinion that de Gaulle will not oppose these first consequences, for example, in the farm policy. For the present, however, the reasons why he would act in such a way are controversial.

Kroebe

I must note by way of limitation: I consider it possible, that the establishment of the economic community as provided in the second part of the treaty, can be brought to a halt.

Engel

But only by violating the treaty.

Kroebe

No, one can also delay it, for instance, by endless negotiations.

Kogon

I, too, am of the opinion that a retardation is possible, Mr. Engel.

Engel

I would contradict for the following reasons:

31 December 1963 is set as a deadline. Tariffs are reduced automatically. And in addition there are majority decisions, which can decide essential matters. In every case a group would have to be formed capable of sabotaging a majority decision.

Stolze

I am of the opinion that it is decisive that within the EEC not much can be done without playing de Gaulle's card, aside from the automatism firmly established in the Treaty, against which even de Gaulle will surely not undertake anything. But one could erect a structure within the EEC which would make it appear advisable to de Gaulle to permit a little more supranationality than he is today willing to accept.

It was stated here with a certain justification that farm policy did not appear really decisive to de Gaulle. There are a couple of other questions of which I assume that they would not be so important politically to the general. De Gaulle will probably make concessions in the sphere of economic policy. There will come a day when he will be faced by a situation that he just won't be able to carry on defense policy without these spheres. That is why I would say: we should not be so afraid of French hegemony. Unlike French opposition I do hold de Gaulle to be mortal in the long run. The moment de Gaulle leaves, the structure of Europe must be such that only a "European" policy is possible.

I would have no qualms at all regarding farm policy although I appreciate the problems of the German farmers. But I believe our country is prosperous and can cushion the shock of social problems connected with a reorganization of the farm products market. If it cannot do it now, it will never be able to do it. Let's not bargain with the French over every mark and let us take this step forward by making a concession for once which we believe to be onesided. In the long run it will even itself out.

All fears we today hold regarding a French hegemony will not materialize if we accept de Gaulle's policy within the EEC. De Gaulle will not become the strong man of the EEC because inherent in the

structure of a community is the fact that there are counter-acting forces. I agree with Mr. Frisch that the French will not insist ad infinitum on a national atomic fighting force. After all, it is part of the community spirit to change one's own principles a little, and it would not fit the Germans too badly to be caught for once in the French snare. After all, we are not so dumb that in the long run we shall not be able to strike a bargain nevertheless.

Mr. Kitzinger showed us the prospect that European integration in which Britain - as we all hope - will at some time or other become a partner is basically already antiquated. It was not really the decisive question to form a political structure in Europe. Much more important was the influence exerted by this structure on the general problems of the world. I fear, however, that in this we simply have to proceed pragmatically, and believe that at the moment the active possibilities of German and "European" policy are not sufficient for more than the establishment of a European political and economic organization, a structure manifesting the European Community. At the moment we probably cannot take any other step but the one leading to European integration with de Gaulle - and despite de Gaulle's qualms, in the long run with Britain.

Kogon

But now we are bunching our problems too much: "Despite de Gaulle with England", that is becoming too complicated. Please let's separate them.

Aschinger

Couched somewhat in the nature of an ultimatum the demands of de Gaulle regarding farm policy permit raising the question whether he really is toying with the idea to blow the EEC skyhigh. I hope that this is not the case. France has a strong interest in the EEC politically and economically, insofar as the EEC has up to now considerably strengthened the economic and political position of France. De Gaulle could hardly afford thoughtlessly to blow the EEC skyhigh as public opinion in France would not understand it. Despite the presidential regime even de Gaulle cannot undertake anything that is openly directed against public opinion in France. His farm demands could therefore have hardly been meant as an ultimatum although they sounded like one.

Very fixed, however, is de Gaulle's position vis-a-vis the EEC in the question of supranationality. In all of his speeches he has again and again expressed clearly that basically he does not accept the supranational principle. To illustrate the attitude of de Gaulle in this respect, I should like to cite two quotations from his speeches. In the decisive press conference of 14 January 1963, for instance, he declared: "All decisions made within the EEC were made by the governments; for nowhere else is there either authority or responsibility." He also said, "that a form of integration, in which on important questions, decisions of a majority were made against the innermost will of a member state, is impracticable." This he declared repeatedly. Therefore, one must be clear in his mind that when the period of majority decisions is reached, a crucial test will begin for the EEC.

Incidentally, Lord Gladwyn, who recommended Great Britain join the EEC, once wrote in the "Observer" that all decisions reached by the EEC would surely not be made against the will of Whitehall or Westminster - here again an established fact.

Basically, however, the Rome Treaty is not based 100% on the principle of supranationality. Actually, the council of ministers in which the individual countries may be heard, has been left as a decisive element. As long as that is not changed, there can be no EEC Parliament, which could force a council of ministers to resign or otherwise influence this council which is not an agency within the meaning of supranationality.

But what does de Gaulle think about agriculture within the EEC? It is worthy of note that in all of his speeches about the EEC, agriculture is given precedence. Significantly enough, in his latest speech in Lyon he said: "We cannot and do not want to conceive a Common Market in which French agriculture did not find markets conforming to its production." That is a very categorical statement and shows how important the farm demands are for de Gaulle vis-a-vis the EEC.

Kogon

Therefore you are a little sceptical concerning de Gaulle's willingness to submit to the hard facts resulting from the treaties.

Aschinger

Certainly.

Delcour

May I inject a slight correction? De Gaulle actually has strongly placed the agricultural question in the foreground recently. In the last press conference he seems to even have given his demands the form of an ultimatum. But first off one must note that during the last meeting of Erhard and de Gaulle ...

Aschinger

I already said the demands sounded like an ultimatum and were not meant as such.

Delcour

Yes, that is just what I wanted to say. The last meeting in Paris is the best proof for it. At that time de Gaulle did not couch his demands in the form of an ultimatum but as far as I am informed both de Gaulle and Pompidou told the Germans, to the contrary, France naturally was not interested in arriving at a decision by 31 December 1963 as long as this was merely a question of time. However, France was as a matter of principle very much interested that this settlement be reached at all. However, with reference to the question of sovereignty in general, i. e., political sovereignty especially in the spheres of foreign and defense policies there can be no concessions. De Gaulle perhaps expressed ist most clearly in his speech at the Ecole de Guerre in 1959 when he outlined his theory of defense and atomic policies before the officers. He said at that time, it was completely unacceptable for France to depend on another state

for its security especially in the sphere of atomic weapons - even though it were the United States.

Kogon

You mentioned as the third statement of fact in your speech that the motive for de Gaulle's attitude regarding Britain had been that of military defense.

Engel

Are we not making the mistake that in the discussion we are moving completely away from the facts and theses of Mr. Kitzinger? He emphasized that there no longer is a dividing line between the political and the economic. Even Mr. de Gaulle could not establish such dividing lines. The discussion is developing as if Mr. de Gaulle could determine unilaterally the further development of the EEC. I am convinced that the EEC will now settle the rest of the farm-policy questions and reach the corresponding decisions. In the end the Federal Republic will agree, knowing that if the decisions are not reached, it will stand isolated in the Kennedy Round. It would be exposed there to an international pressure it could hardly withstand by itself. Because then the whole world will want to sell its surplus farm products on the German market.

It is also necessary to reach agreement on farm policy in order to find common ground for trade-policy with Eastern states. As today already about 50 % of farm markets are subject to common regulation, neither the Federal Republic nor Mr. de Gaulle is in a position to carry on an autonomous trade policy with the Eastern states.

Delcour

But not until the end, in 1970!

Niehans

I am under the curious impression as if, as a matter of fact, we were sitting in a seminar on the psychology of de Gaulle.

Kogon

Unfortunately it plays a major role, Mr. Niehans.

Niehans

Nevertheless I ask myself whether that is quite correct. In part we project things into the psychology of de Gaulle which are intrinsic in the problem and not in his brain, which, therefore, would continue to exist even if he were not present. We would then have to find the stumbling stones someplace else.

A further point: I believe somewhere in the rule of tactics there is a maxim that an attack that has failed should never be repeated again in the same form. If the attack failed, it is stated, a new idea had to be developed. It appears to me certain attacks have now failed on the "European" plane and we must not make the mistake to undertake them in the same way again; for example, hoping that de Gaulle now thinks a little differently. We should rather draw certain conclusions here. I would state it thus: The "Europe Utopians" - as I perhaps may call them - have developed a concept of Europe for the 21st Century. It rests on the idea that we can make the economic the pacesetter for the political, that we need only integrate economically with sufficient force in order to receive, as reward, a political union. That was the Utopian idea. It was tried out and made shipwreck on de Gaulle's veto.

But at the same time de Gaulle fell back into the 19th Century. He now plays a Bismarckian policy with all its "Cauchemar des Alliances". Within Europe he seeks to carry on a policy of alliances. That is 19th Century. It too has been tried out.

What we need today is a policy for our century, for the 20th Century, and from a constructive standpoint the question is raised on what concepts this policy can be based. In this regard Mr. Kitzinger made certain suggestions. He said we needed agencies with only limited authority in an unlimited area and he gave examples. I consider that as a concept that is not practicable for future constructive work. That would be a relapse into something like the feudal system. At that time a man had perhaps only jurisdiction for litigation over one-hundred small cities and villages, another only had the collection of tolls at bridges in a widely scattered area. But that was a time of political decline, an unparalleled political clearance sale, from which the national states had to be evolved in a difficult and bloody process.

A similar dissipation of the power of the state would be to drop behind the progress since achieved. We must not take this destructive road. It appears to me that too many negative things have been said today about the idea of a national state. This idea by no means has been tried out with nothing but negative results, at least not if we understand it correctly. After all it was never a case of the national states being able to decide fully according to their own discretion. There was always a system of interdependencies in which manifold conditions and limitations were imposed on all of these states. Think of today's currency policy. We have a far-reaching internationally integrated currency policy although on paper every central bank is completely sovereign. But naturally these banks are not so de facto, by any means.

I am under the impression we should draw the logical conclusion now, that with the economic pacesetter we shall not get a political union. Therefore, we should leave this political union with an economic pacesetter to one side and starting with today's national states, which are about as strong as ever, attempt now to solve the economic problems. We can do so much more objectively than just three years ago.

Kogon

Did you actually say just now: which are as strong as ever?

Niehans

What I wanted to say was that the national ideas and forces are de facto as strong today as they have always been, no matter what we might wish in a political seminar, and that precisely this elementary fact has again been placed in the foreground by de Gaulle. We, today, have the opportunity to again separate far-reachingly the political problems from the economic. After de Gaulle's veto we can again work on the economic problems for their own sake, and I do not doubt that we here are capable of developing pragmatic solutions which later will have a better chance to make permanent constructive contributions.

Spinelli

Mr. Kitzinger clearly showed how complex the Europe problem today is. On the one hand, it is a case of the process of unifying Europe, on the other, there are problems lying outside of Europe and for which there are no European solutions. To these also belongs the defense policy, which is today no longer a European but a world problem. They are especially the relations between Europe and the United States and the problem of the policy toward the East.

The unification of Europe itself must be viewed within this world framework. The goal can no longer be merely an independent United Europe, rather a Western Europe must be formed whose organization permits it both to solve its internal problems as well as help work on world problems in a positive way.

Which then are the instruments one has used up to now? The most important instrument are the Communities in their economic framework. Here I agree with Mr. Kitzinger, who said they were built up on the Community principle. This method was defined by its founders, Jean Monnet and Etienne Hirsch, as the method of the supranational dialogue. A group of states has accepted a common program, by means of a treaty. The execution of this program calls for continued presentation of suggestions, of plans for action. The preparation of these suggestions has been entrusted to a supranational authority, the Commission or the High Authority. The right of decision, however, remains in the hands of the states, that is the method of the three Corn-

munities. Although the Coal and Steel Community seemed somewhat different, actual operation soon showed that things were handled exactly in that way.

The three Communities work without friction as long as it is a case of executing what was expressly agreed and accepted. The historical accident in form of the economic boom naturally made everything easier too. The states have always shrank from violating treaties and have in practice accepted the suggestions. Only marginal changes were made. Then, first in the Coal and Steel Community, next in the Euratom and in the EEC the point was reached at which the development of the common economy went beyond the framework agreed upon and new decisions had to be made. Starting at this point, the three Communities no longer functioned so well. It is easy to push the blame for it on de Gaulle, but the first failure - namely that of the Coal and Steel Community - occurred prior to the time of de Gaulle.

The actual reason for present difficulties lies in the fact that the method has definite limits which are insurmountable. Keynes said: "Mankind is ruled by little else than by ideas." The construction of Europe has up to now been guided by the more or less clearly enunciated idea that by building up economic structures, little by little an independent political authority would be created. This is the reason Mr. Hallstein was able to say somewhat optimistically: "We are in politics." Thus one had an idea that by this method one could slowly reach a political union. In all three Communities, however, a point had now been reached at which this basic political idea inherent in these structures would have had to be made an actuality.

This moment of uncertainty and vacillating on the part of his partners was used by de Gaulle to reshape the sense and meaning of "Europe" in his image. He mixed a strange brew: first the concept of the primacy of France; then the thought of the usefulness of the Common Market for France; finally the conviction that the military independence of Europe had to begin in France. De Gaulle is no small-fry French nationalist. He is a European

nationalist, who is of the opinion that France can become the nucleus of Europe, the new world power.

Delcour

All the worse.

Spinelli

De Gaulle naturally is a danger. However, I should like to stress here, that this new European nationalism is not so much a whim of de Gaulle but rather lies deeply rooted in our traditions: our peoples very easily arise when they hear the words power, glory et cetera.

What should the opponents of de Gaulle do in this situation? I think that in this situation we need politicians and statesmen who counter the national European policy of de Gaulle with a genuine alternative policy and do not try alternative tricks. Like de Gaulle these must know that the goal cannot be reached immediately but that one must work hard at it. The opponents of de Gaulle must give the "Europe" policy a different, new aspect and create correspondingly new strategy and tactics in day-to-day policies. Leadership in the EEC has good intentions and basically makes good suggestions - which, it is true, can be criticized as to details. The sphere of action of leadership, however, is limited. Their suggestions refer to the technique of creating a European agriculture, an energy policy, and so on. But they do not contain any other idea, any new political standpoint for developing new tactics. This new "European" standpoint can only be the following: To form a "Europe" by way of democratic experience, a "Europe" that does not view itself as a new power in the world, rather as part of a worldwide, modern, democratic system with its worldwide responsibilities.

Thus it is a case of indicating a genuine alternative that has to be clear and meaningful and cannot limit itself to, say, petty details - such as for example the fusion of executive authorities - citing as an excuse the existence of de Gaulle and that therefore no more could be achieved. It would be just as wrong, because of anger over de Gaulle, who needs the Common Market, to boycott the Common Market now.

The most important component parts of this new "European" standpoint are the following. First, Europe should really have to carry on a common economic policy and not only be a customs union. Secondly, United Europe should also not become a new atomic power either but should share responsibility within the global strategy of the existing American atomic power. Thirdly, the new Europe should be capable of helping the developing countries together with the other democracies. To fulfill these three conditions, its executive body should have supranational, genuinely political authority.

To reach this point, elections for the European Parliament should be held and at the same time this Parliament should be given the mandate to reform the three Communities. I am sure that de Gaulle would say No at first. But he has shown that he can submit to strong pressure. If the Europeans really want something, he can yield as he has yielded at other times, in Algeria, for example, or to the miners of Lorraine. But he surely will not yield if a strong will is not manifested on the side of his opponents. Once one has such a genuine political alternative, then one can both act practically and also reach compromises with de Gaulle, for instance in the farm policy. If one does not have such a concept and one only thinks about technical problems, then step by step de Gaulle will realize his over-all plan.

Kogon

In other words, you are in favor of mobilizing the "European" will?

Spinelli

Yes, I am both in favor of mobilizing the will and especially in favor of mobilizing the creative power of Europe.

Chiti-Batelli

I am in complete agreement with Spinelli except for one point. He thinks the democratic national parties can be mobilized - I do not believe so.

Mozer

Without a doubt one of the great mistakes of "Europeans" at the moment is to read too much into de Gaulle and to stare at him like the rabbit at the snake.

But permit me to begin by reverting to the two main speakers. The definition of the state as given by Kitzinger, namely, only organism, only apparatus, for the solution of social problems - a de-ideologized set of instruments - is, so it appears to me, the sharpest antithesis to de Gaulle's concept of state. One has to start from the fact that every word of de Gaulle is an avowal against integration.

Where lies the degree of opposition? De Gaulle is less interested in economic than in defense questions. His opposition to the EEC, is therefore, less obvious and less marked than to other questions of integration. For still another reason: his political concept calls for an economic basis that is stronger than France itself can offer. If we start with that, we should not think at each step whether Mr. de Gaulle might not say No. Due to his interest in the EEC for his political concept a possible No regarding questions of the EEC can, therefore, be expected much later than in other spheres. It is, therefore, not absolutely necessary to cling to the state of paralysis in which one has found oneself for a year.

After 14 January 1963 the suggestion of synchronization made its appearance which Mr. Schröder advanced in the Council of Ministers at Brussels on 2 April 1963 after de Gaulle's veto. Practically, that means that the breach of confidence, resulting after 14 January 1963, was openly admitted on that day. Prior to that, one actually had reached decisions and expected one country to make sacrifices in the obvious assumption that on the next occasion the other partner would pull even. After 14 January this confidence was gone. On 9 May 1963 a working program was approved setting down everything that had to be finished by the end of the year. In my opinion this was a big mistake of the German and, by the way, also of the Dutch policy at Brussels. In this working program a synchronized parcel was tied up very one-sidedly. It contained five concrete solid points of farm policy, in which Mr. de Gaulle was very much interested. Do not believe for an instant that his Yes regarding the farm policy results from a lack of interest in this sphere. That is out of the question.

As compensation and counterweight there was the formulation that by the end of the year a mandate of the Community for the Kennedy Round had to be passed. That is very much out of balance; because a mandate can never be formulated in such a way that the success of the negotiations is assured in advance. That means a promise was given that for five solid points - including three new farm regulations which will become European law - a mandate be formulated for negotiations with an

uncertain outcome. I dare to say it - please do not take it wrong if it sounds a little strange - that the German Foreign Minister must have been conscious of the imbalance. Do not forget that this program was approved a few days prior to the ratification of the Franco-German Treaty. I would not be surprised if the hands of the German delegation had been tied as to further demands on France because the problem of the ratification of the Franco-German Treaty by the German parliament was a difficult one.

I should like to remark on the theoretical character of our discussion. Gentlemen, things do not happen theoretically. The Council of Ministers is a body with two faces. On the one hand it is a body of the Community and on the other a conference of national ministers. That tensions result continually, we experience in other countries with bodies of this type, as for instance in Switzerland. I refuse to draw the conclusion from the fact there are periods of hesitant progress or temporary halts, that this means the method to make headway at all has become impossible. It should be recognized - as Mr. Spinelli also said - that not one country or one man bears the responsibility in this case but that the difficulties emanate from various countries.

For instance it was said - and these are the special facets also to be considered - that in Germany and in Holland one did not want to ratify the treaty concerning the association of African territories as a sort of act of revenge. One must keep in mind, after all, that there was an entirely different, a very realistic cause for hesitation. After the rupture in negotiations with Britain due to the French veto, this question had to be answered by the community. You see, during the negotiations with Britain we had generally expected a declaration that the British territories belonging to the Commonwealth would also have the opportunity of associating if they wanted to. First off, we wanted to clarify whether Mr. de Gaulle would also annul this promise with his veto. That, after all, was a very realistic and justified question. It was only when de Gaulle had made a corresponding declaration in The Hague, that opposition was dropped. It was, therefore, not only a policy of revenge on the part of the Germans and the Dutch if they said No.

Kogon

At present we are only debating the continental organization and the relations of the continental states to de Gaulle with the psychological spell of which Mr. Niehans spoke. Should we not go beyond it?

Haffner

For the present period, the question of European federalism and the establishment of a really united European state with an authoritative government is dead. No government is striving for this goal any more. There, therefore, remain the national European states as basis - just as they have always been.

However, there is still the EEC, remaining, like an erratic block, from another period in history. It was created and exists, and we cannot get around that. The big question with which we are dealing uninterruptedly and which we are circumlocuting somewhat is - is it not? - who, after all, will be the stronger: the national states making the EEC in some form or

other an instrument of their own policy, pushing the EEC back and forth as it suits them - or the EEC itself? Is there inherent in the EEC an automatism which - as Mr. Engel said - will some day lead to a federal Europe after all, almost against the will of the national governments?

Mr. Mozer's statements are a strong practical argument for the former, from the "European" standpoint more pessimistic attitude. The six governments cooperating in the EEC use it as an instrument just as it suits them according to the particular circumstances. De Gaulle is a very good example for this. He avails himself of the EEC as an instrument, when it suits the interests of French agriculture, i.e., his domestic policy too. For the EEC can be very useful to French agriculture. However, de Gaulle treats the EEC rather contemptuously, if it does not suit him. Perhaps the Germans constitute an exception because as the only European government - we must not forget that by any means - they do not embody at the moment a nation as yet and cannot carry on a really national policy. They are still not a central government, only a provisional one.

Mozer

I do not agree with this interpretation. The Germans, in their declarations, were the best "Europeans" just as long as there was agreement and "European" policy meant increase of sovereignty to them, but for the others renunciation of sovereignty. Today all are on the same level and all are supposed to relinquish sovereignty. There now no longer is a difference in the attitude of the partners.

Haffner

I gladly want to accept this objection the more so since it even strengthens my main argument. Up to now I was still prepared to make an exception for the Germans.

If we are honest and view things soberly, we again at the moment have national states in Europe, just as we have always had them - with certain modifications in Germany. On the other hand we have the EEC as an established fact. How does this hang together? Which has history on its side, which is the stronger? Which pulls the other into its sphere, so to speak?

I believe the stronger arguments do speak for the fact that the EEC will become an instrument and, if you want, a forum for national policy - perhaps the way the United Nations are within a larger framework - but that it will not become a supranational power forcing other nations to join, to be incorporated in it. In some way or other Mr. Engel has, in this respect, overestimated the political force of juridical paragraphs. It sounds so conclusive: the treaty would have to be violated! It has again and again been experienced that treaties can be brought to wilt on the vine, to lose their political force, without being directly violated. One should not bet too much on patient paper.

If I view the problem from the standpoint of power politics, I must note the following: Surely the action of de Gaulle - a national event in France - is the first non-planned, not foreseen incident. And merely this incident has guided development into a different direction than planned. But it will not remain either the most important nor the only incident. I already foresee three other political events which could very strongly influence the EEC.

The one is the political opening to the left now taking place in Italy which, although it is not completed as yet, can change the Italian attitude towards Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the East-West relationship etc., once it shall have reached its logical conclusion. After all, we must not forget that the EEC is a purely Western European matter.

The second event I consider still more important. It is the Russo-American atom entente now coming into evidence, i.e., the agreement between the United States and Russia, influenced by Britain, to prevent as far as possible the extension of atomic weapons beyond the present set of owners. With it one touches on an essential motive for the European merger, namely, to become a real third power. At any event, the Europeans could get into a situation of conflict if they want to become a third force and do so by going at it in earnest and breaking with the United States and Russia.

The third problem that could completely break up the EEC is the question of German re-unification once it becomes ripe for decision. At the moment it is not included on the order of the day. But precisely during the past years it has been shown that despite all efforts this question cannot be pushed aside. It continues as a time-bomb that will explode some day. However, I do not see how a re-united Germany is to be integrated into the EEC. Because then we would be found not with the question of French but of German hegemony, which after all would evoke much greater resistance.

Frisch

Do you mean by that, that all we can do is to despair?

Haffner

No, I mean by that, the idea of European unity is no longer interesting.

Frisch

For our generation or for the next one too?

Haffner

As far ahead as we can see.

Frisch

We must not think - must we - as if those who today are between forty and sixty years old will determine the future.

Haffner

No! I am thinking far ahead.

Let me come back to two questions in Mr. Kitzinger's address. He said we all agreed that the age of the national state was passed. In that I do not agree with him at all. On the contrary, I think that the age of the national state has just dawned and is still approaching its apex. You can recognize that first, everywhere in Africa, Asia, etc., where the democratic and independence movement always shows itself simultaneously as national movement of liberation. Secondly, and surprisingly enough, you also see it in Europe. Here there was a federalist European movement, that had real strength as long as Europe lay prostrate. With Europe regaining strength, this movement became weak, and the nations in their way became strong again - not as powers but as creative identities in the political spheres - if I may speak so Teutonically.

Further Mr. Kitzinger said: the nations no longer corresponded with the technical development of the world. Have you ever reflected on the possibility whether it might not be an astute purpose of the spirit of the world to set in motion two completely opposed movements? A technical one that forces us to view the entire globe as a unit - not only "Europe" which somehow or other is already antiquated - and a political movement that is democratic and national.

I actually believe we might discover some day - Mr. Kitzinger said so already, at the close of his address, and I agree with him - that limited power over an unlimited area determines the image of the future - similar to the FAO, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and all the rest. We might recognize that a type of functional - not so much due to security policy - Union of Nations, actually might have a future with a greater promise than we thought in the period immediately after the war. In my opinion, the two statements contradict each other, Mr. Kitzinger.

Mozer

But then we are back again at the limitation of the national state. Then you begin again precisely where we began in 1947 with the "European" movement.

Kitzinger

I can see no contradiction, Mr. Haffner. My first thesis was normative, the second factual. To me the first thesis appears a logical consequence of the second. I am completely aware of the factual force of the national idea, the seed now being sown in the rest of the world, from Europe.

Haffner

But in Europe too it is still very strong. I believe in the possibility of a world order based on national states. I do not believe in the elimination of national states, in their amalgamation.

Kitzinger

I was just on the point of opposing the idea of making supranational states from national states, as in Europe. To the contrary the national state should be unravelled as to its functional importance.

Kogon

What does that mean: "unravel"? Would you please explain that?

Kitzinger

In the same way that in the European region, the strands of authority over coal and steel were "unravelled" from the authority of the national state, and then put together again anew in Luxemburg.

Kogon

That is, to extract limited authority and transfer it to other, to new agencies?

Kitzinger

Yes.

Kroebel

That is what Professor Niehans called a relapse.

Kitzinger

And there I did not quite understand his logic: because what one now proposes has a certain similarity with what already existed 300 years ago, it was wrong?

Niehans

On occasion it helps the clarity of a thought if one cites an example from history. That was the meaning of my statement, which surely was not illogical; and there is also something like experience in history that concerns things now being proposed.

Kogon

But the question is: can you do that?

Haffner

I would like to mediate. I am of the opinion that the national state does not have to be considered by any means as a neurotic monster. The saturated national state, feeling itself a nation without foreign or domestic irredenta is normally a peaceful being.

Niehans

If Mr. Kitzinger means that there are national states but they unite for a certain purpose - for example in an international monetary fund - I have nothing to say against it because they by no means lose their individual life as national states. But in the conception of national states dissolving themselves in these functional unlimited groupings, I saw a type of forced sale of the attainments of the past four-hundred years. There will be no such sale and there should not be!

Kitzinger

I wanted to introduce a second dimension as a pattern in the discussion. We have to view the United Nations two-dimensionally: once as mediator between the national states and further as mediator between jurisdictions, between functional Communities.

Frisch

But you were toying with a very dangerous idea when you said that language is no longer the carrier of culture, but technology.

Kitzinger

I did not put it quite that strongly.

Frisch

With it you revert to the thesis of Mr. Haffner, that I consider a suicide thesis.

In that case we can chuck everything.

Haffner

To the contrary, I wanted to say - now that I am being challenged - that the thesis of European federalists is a suicide thesis. If one takes it really seriously, it amounts to carrying on power politics again. One would like to have sufficient power again, to show the Russians where they belong.

Kogon

But Spinelli rejected that. He expressly stated: not power politics but a policy of law and order for the development of society.

Spinelli

In this German question must be said at long last and a little more explicitly: if today the co-existence between the bloc of communist and that of the democratic countries is a basic fact, then there is no longer room for the policy of reunification.

Altmann

I want to comment on that, Mr. Spinelli, but by way of a detour. I revert to the question: "Where is the EEC drifting to?"

In the present situation the question poses itself: will the EEC manage to take the step from customs union to economic union? This question is not only conjoined with the farm policy but with many other problems. Here lies the danger that the EEC will run aground on a sandbank. At any rate, many signs point to the fact that both the nationally colored as well as the economic conflicts of interests can only be overcome with difficulty if the political motives of the EEC are not renewed continually. I have no hope that the treaty clauses by themselves are able to prevent a crisis.

The difficult question which is also raised as it is in Germany is as follows: In how far can we introduce new political substances in the EEC? We cannot appeal only to the Treaty of Rome, for that its dynamics is too strong and its statics too weak. We must admit that German policy in the "European" question acted as though very partisan and enthusiastic but that little was undertaken by the Federal Republic to give the EEC a real foundation. Neither the personnel policy in Brussels nor other important questions were treated in a manner in any way satisfactory. German policy has made a much smaller contribution to European integration than it tries to tell itself. That is the reason for our topic this evening: Does the EEC still suffice today as expression of the all-European policy? For we not only want to ask about the chances of survival of the EEC, but also whether it is satisfactory as expression, as form, as instrument of the all-European policy. As far as Germany is concerned, we have not thought that through enough.

The thesis of Hallstein, a nucleus for a federal European state was here created, I consider wrong from a standpoint of constitutional law. From the point of view of terminology de Gaulle is right when he says, theoretically there is no supra-nationality. But that is no argument against the Treaty of Rome and it already has been expounded that this ideology of supranationality and the text of the Treaty of Rome are not identical.

I share in the opinion of Mr. Haffner that the political motives on which the EEC lives today, do not suffice as motor. The German question is only one of the many problems that cannot be solved satisfactorily by the Common Market - even in its further development. European policy no longer can be placed under the EEC as common denominator. The measuring rod of European unity is no longer deposited in Brussels. From this results what everyone in Bonn is asking himself now: What can be done to advance the matter?

We cannot in any event afford to abandon the EEC. We must strengthen it, we must drive it forward and must attempt to manage the step to the economic union. But I believe we will only succeed if we give the EEC a political backbone which cannot be conceived in Brussels. The bodies of the EEC - neither the Commission nor the Council of Ministers - appear to me today to be strong enough to solve this problem. That, therefore, would be an important problem for the Political Union.

Despite of it, the EEC cannot be the real substance of the Political Union. If I understood Mr. Delcour correctly, he meant that common defense could be the content of such a union. That, to me, is extremely doubtful, Mr. Delcour. Because for France it would be an inner contradiction, on the one hand to consider joint atomic weapons as incompatible with national sovereignty vis-a-vis the United States and then, on the other hand, to enter such a joint control with its European partners. If however, de Gaulle were to bring his "force de frappe" only as a national proviso clause into a Political Union, then the apprehension of the others of a possible French hegemony could hardly be eliminated.

As a matter of principle I believe: the essential feature of a Political Union of European states cannot be a supranational order, the constitution of a federal "European" nation. It also cannot be the role of a third power vis-a-vis the United States, not solidarity of atomic policy either. Something else is at stake: the relationship to Central Europe. This, as far as I am concerned, is where the principal problem is raised concerning the substance of the "European" policy. If we - as will be necessary - want to reach a differentiation between American and European policy - and for this de Gaulle's policy is only a symptom - then it will have to be in the area of Central Europe.

But here - I merely want to touch on it in conclusion - the Federal Republic constitutes a block for further development for "European" policy. Namely, it asks all friendly powers that this question just be not discussed but finished off with a formula that has become a mere formality. But a "European" policy will not be possible for us without solving the question of Central-European policy.

Kogon

Dr. Altmann, you say, the EEC is not sufficient as basis for further development of European unity. The Federal Republic, as concerned Central and Eastern Europe, was in a special situation to develop

a corresponding plan. But it did not do so, to the contrary it was an obstacle. I now ask: if the Federal Republic is in such a position, could not then the English collaborate on such a plan, the English who, including the Opposition, favor a policy of easing tensions.

Altmann

Without a doubt!

Kogon

In my opinion it should now be seriously considered what the two "powers", Britain and the Federal Republic, can mean in the over-all consideration concerning de Gaulle.

Layton

Britain always looks for negotiations with the East and - as Mr. Altmann said - Germany must do likewise. Why is there no progress? No one trusts anybody else and that shows that we will not progress without a common policy, without a Political Union. Since the atom agreement with Russia all English politicians naturally hope for further steps prior to the election. These steps are not forthcoming, because the Community and the Europeans do not trust us. The development of a joint Eastern policy between Britain and the Federal Republic could be the starting point for a Political Community.

We always strive to look for new ways of European cooperation. I also believe with Mr. Kitzinger that we must strive for new world-wide cooperation because history shows that with merely the International Monetary Fund, with the OECD and so on, we cannot go ahead. But the European Community must be the catalyst for such a process. If now we speak of world-wide agreements on raw-material prices, this can be traced to the Brussels negotiations and nothing else. We must seek to revitalize the nucleus of "Europe".

If in the past months we achieved so little, it is due to the fact that we must now turn to the political. That is where it becomes difficult, and Mr. Spinelli rightly says that we must summon up more courage. Instead of cooperating, we look apprehensively in de Gaulle's direction and do not know what to do.

It is not true that the English have fallen back into an insular attitude. To the contrary, Britain will some day be a member of the Common Market. But no one is doing anything to reach this goal. The problem, therefore, is to stimulate people to act, so that they become sufficiently interested and not perhaps believe that Britain will some day join the Common Market without anyone lifting a finger.

The big question is how public opinion can be influenced in such a way that current problems are really taken in hand, at first Europe and after that in partnership with the United States. Surely this is something close to the heart of every working man. But he does not know anything about it. And for the politician it is a very difficult problem. I am sure that a joint European policy - for instance, for defense and regarding the East-West problem - would be an important beginning.

One of the last trumps the British still have are their nuclear weapons. One could speak with de Gaulle about nuclear cooperation, although even that would be very dangerous. Formerly one thought it was bad to have a national atom force, that a "European" atomic force on the other hand was worth striving for. But is this really the case? For Europe, after all, it is a matter of a choice between a European or an Atlantic atomic force. Because the choice between the one and the other is so difficult, Macmillan did not have the courage in December, 1962, to go along with de Gaulle and then wait what the Americans would say. He told de Gaulle to hope for the future, and went along with the Americans.

If Europe wants to travel the road to a Political Union, it must express an opinion regarding this question. De Gaulle is right when he says, a Political Union without nuclear warhead is incomplete. Although Europe's development towards becoming a catalyst is a world-wide process, an atomic force of its own could mean - couldn't it - that a nationalistic element is again injected into world politics.

Bondy

If you term Macmillan's policies a decision for an Atlantic atomic policy, as antithesis of the national European atomic policy represented by Mr. de Gaulle, how do you explain Macmillan's statements to Parliament concerning the importance of an "independent British deterrent"? After all, these statements are almost word for word the same concerning Britain's national atomic force as de Gaulle made for France.

Layton

I admit, that was humbug.

Bondy

In other words, an Atlantic facade for a national British policy.

Layton

The Polaris rocket is not a British weapon and it hurts me that Macmillan did not have the courage to tell the truth when the Skybolt Project failed.

Delcour

Then de Gaulle was right, when he said Britain had renounced Europe.

Kogon

Are you of the opinion, Mr. Layton, that in the light of facts that have just now become clear the position of Great Britain with reference to de Gaulle and future European unity is stronger than the possible position of Germany within today's agencies? Can Great Britain, in your opinion, deal more successfully with de Gaulle on the basis of an agreement on nuclear policy and with the aid of Eastern policy than the Federal Republic, within tonight's meaning?

Layton

I would say yes if Great Britain had the will to do it, and if the Community cooperated. Britain, however, cannot manage it by itself, if France is unwilling and holds up Great Britain to its partners as the scapegoat.

Kogon

Great Britain, therefore, is a member of the Western European Union, however, it stands outside the European Economic Community. De Gaulle for the present does not desire to let Britain into the EEC. From this position outside of the EEC, Great Britain, therefore should be able to exercise a greater influence on de Gaulle both as to nuclear policy and also as to Eastern policy than the Federal Republic, if the latter at all wanted to or could, or if the Federal Republic had a conceived plan?

Layton

That depends on what de Gaulle says about it, supposing he wanted to at all.

Kogon

But no! The British are supposed to influence de Gaulle's will. In Britain you have two leading statesmen: Sir Douglas Home in office today, and Mr. Wilson who might head the government tomorrow. Perhaps he does not want it at all.

Altmann

If it could be managed to establish a Political Union with the objective of a common Central-European policy - at first without England - and to harmonize this objective with the United States for which I see no serious difficulties, then Britain joining such a policy would no longer be a problem, for Wilson either. Britain would have to join.

Kogon

Then your answer to my question is that the Federal Republic would have to take the first step in all events.

Spinelli

There are people in Britain who know that Britain as a matter of fact is no atomic power and that the Atlantic solution would perhaps be the right one. I think these Englishmen have the possibility to obtain a political influence in Europe because in Germany the Social Democrats stand on the same ground. In Italy the left-of-center, feared so unjustly, is also of the same opinion. Spaak too thinks that way.

Thus if one had sufficient political influence, one could develop a common "European" policy vis-a-vis the United States.

Kogon

In a pact with the United States?

Spinelli

Yes, in connection with the United States, namely, in preparation of Europe's participation in the strategic control of American atomic fighting forces.

A further alternative is the European atomic fighting force favored by de Gaulle. That then would be the constellation de Gaulle - Strauss with the right-oriented politicians of the other countries of Europe.

From Wilson's point of view, of which Mr. Layton spoke, the best possibility of a common "European" development with Britain becomes apparent. If at the same time we in the EEC make serious efforts, the moment might come when agreement would be possible.

Altmann

De Gaulle has a second face that is not called atomic, policy. He has given numerous indications which amount to the fact that France is prepared to agree to a reunification of Germany. In the case of such a réunification he would also furnish a guarantee to the Poles and the Czechs, our neighboring peoples, on the basis of the close ties between a reunited Germany and France. That, for a German, looks like the friendly rebirth of the Small Entente. For us, this solution would only be unpleasant if we view Germany as "revisionist" regarding its territories east of the Oder-Neisse. If we renounce, then for us there is no danger inherent in the de Gaulle plan.

Thus, I want to say that one should not nail down de Gaulle once and for all regarding a policy of the atomic third force, independent of the United States, rather that he definitely has a plan regarding the East, regarding Central Europe, a plan that would not be a bone of contention between Germany and France, perhaps for the first time in European history. With this, I should like to forestall too narrow an interpretation of the policy of de Gaulle.

Schumacher

Dr. Körber, at the very beginning, asked two questions. The first was: "Europe with or without Britain?" The second: "Is an economic union possible without a political consolidation?"

When something bogs down, two different frames of mind are always manifested among the observers. Some demand the matter be pushed forward with more pressure and force to get it rolling again. The others are not sure and ask whether perhaps something in the matter itself is wrong. Let us take as a typical example aid to developing countries. The more this aid appears to miss the mark, the louder do some call for greater and greater amounts of money while the others, among whom I count myself too, ask whether the precept is not wrong.

Well, this same question I should like to ask concerning the EEC. Mr. Kitzinger, it is true, said two things, that make what I intend to do more difficult. He considers it an "indisputable fact" that the national state is antiquated technologically and he further claims that it is not possible to separate in thought the economic and the political. I should like to counter-claim that a realistic interpretation of our problems depends decisively on a very exact differentiation at least between economic policy on the one hand and foreign and defense policy on the other.

First of all, economic policy. It perhaps struck you that Mr. Edward Heath, after toiling eighteen months to get Great Britain into the major economic sphere of the EEC, has today become among other things minister for regional economic development. But the meaning of the word "regional" in this context does not refer to a major sphere, rather to a minor one. It is a myth that the formation of major economic spheres and the so-called "surmounting" of national states is technologically prescribed for us. The period, in which it appeared to be a matter of creating greater and greater economic spheres, lies behind us long ago. The task of our "prosperous" society lies in exactly the opposite direction: through careful nursing and finicky attention to detail, to care for small economic areas. That is typically so in the United States where due to lack of this careful work there is more economic poverty in small areas than in Western Europe. That is typically so in Great Britain - thence the new task for Mr. Heath - where it is a case of caring for areas threatened by depression, such as Scotland and the Northeast. And that is typically so in Italy where the gigantic upswing in Northern Italy does not help

Southern Italians and Sicilians at all. That is also typically so in all developing countries. I have much to do with India. There the problem of development is doubtlessly manifested in the following question: How, without dismembering it politically, can India be divided into many small economic areas so that development does not concentrate itself solely in the already overly large municipal areas of Bombay and Calcutta?

I thus claim that the frantic striving for a major economic sphere in Europe is antiquated and not to the purpose. Whoever speaks of a "technological must" in this direction, finds it difficult to name even a single field of activity, other than space research, for which such "hypertrophy" is a prerequisite. For such exceptional purposes, however, one can create ad hoc combinations without difficulty.

For all normal economic activities the normal practices of foreign trade suffice to give even small countries, as for example Switzerland, world-wide economic possibilities. That certain world-wide bodies are needed to regulate questions of foreign trade, is disputed by no one.

I have no sympathy with the line of thought that dreams of having all cars of Europe built in one place because they would then be cheaper. That is an inhuman line of thought, ready at any time to sacrifice workers, craftsmen, farmers or miners to some cheap theory or other of economic religion. Especially in the prosperous society of Western Europe one should at long last let go the religion of economy and see to it that individual men as well as small organically formed groups of men be accorded justice.

But now to foreign policy and defense. While for economic policy it is today a case preponderantly of detail work in small areas, in foreign trade and defense - as matters stand - we unfortunately cannot avoid "hypertrophy". That in this connection Europe tries to get together in order to create an equivalent of power vis-a-vis other major powers has a good purpose, at any rate logically. In this connection, however, the EEC in my opinion is completely irrelevant. It would be a peculiarly Marxist concept of history to assume that political union can only result from the economic. I am not a partisan of this Marxist concept of history.

Mozer

The discussion is carried on today - on the part of Dr. Schumacher too - as if the EEC just dropped down from heaven without antecedents. Who after all was first to have a plan to integrate economically and thence develop the political? After all, we saw after the war that one first had a political project that ended in the facade of the Council of Europe. Then we took the step with the Coal and Steel Community and finally with the EDC, which had a political concept. When that too failed, one reached over to the economic and in doing so took a step forward precisely where a possibility offered itself. No one started by first creating the EEC and then saying, a joint political policy had to develop therefrom.

Schumacher

The question actually is whether a new possibility results from the economic, i.e., via the EEC. I do not hold that view.

At stake, to start with, was Franco-German rapprochement. To aid this, the Coal and Steel Community was created.

Mozer

But that already was an expedient.

Schumacher

But to assume that Franco-German rapprochement had resulted from the Coal and Steel Community - that would be falsifying history.

Mozer

But no one is claiming that.

Altmann

I do have to object, Mr. Schumacher, by stating that the EEC is trying extraordinarily hard to apply such a regional policy, for instance in the economic district of the Eifel, where three, four countries are very interested in common regional development.

Schumacher

That is not a counter-argument. It is a case of extraordinary efforts being made in the EEC to coordinate everything imaginable, to "harmonize". I look at that from the side of the practical, not as a journalist. When Britain's possible entry was being negotiated, we received at the National Coal Board a list of things to be harmonized, showing a veritable talent for inventing artificial problems in this life which is of itself already complicated, problems the solution of which would benefit no one; a talent for establishing a supranational bureaucracy with "power without responsibility", running counter to all proven principles. We would have had to send 300 officials to Luxembourg. What for, after all?

European cooperation in the sphere of coal - and as far as I know, also in the sphere of steel - functions excellently even without Luxembourg. Since failure of negotiations for Britain's entry, British exports to the EEC countries increased 30%. If we had joined, this development would undoubtedly have been claimed to be the result of our entry.

Spinelli

If, thus, such a regional development takes place in Britain, Dr. Schumacher, are you then of the opinion that the "National Coal Board" would have to be divided into many "Regional Coal Boards?"

Schumacher

Concerning the de-centralistic developments in the administration of the British coal industry, I could give you very precise information; but not this evening.

Let me get to the positive part of my contribution. As long as on the Continent one insists under all circumstances to harmonize the economy - including agriculture and public utilities - one will be endlessly disappointed. Because by and large there is no real necessity for it. To get to "Europe", this is the wrong starting point. Coordination that is really necessary can be obtained much more easily by means of the old methods of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the help of organizations already existing such as the OECD and so on. It is claimed, the methods did not function fast enough. Well, why must everything go so fast? Human values are lost if things are forced in this way.

Mozer

It not only did not go fast, it did not go at all any more.

Schumacher

For the past twelve months, development has bogged down in the EEC too.

Frisch

In the OEEC the agreements on the right of domicile had bogged down for ten years. This right is now being realized nevertheless.

Kogon

Dr. Schumacher, I believe you should reply a little to Mr. Mozer's statements. He said, viewed historically there was first a political project. That can be proved. Because this was not accepted in the first and the right stage, one finds it in later and other stages. In the end, in the private bills of Messina and the Rome Treaties, one landed entirely with the economic and a certain "vulgar Marxism", in the hope the political project would develop from it. Great idealists took part in these essays because there was nowhere else to turn. Without taking into consideration the EEC, do you see a chance really and actually to get back to the original conception and that with reference to de Gaulle who has very concrete ideas about a "European" policy?

Schumacher

Certainly! Because there are the real interests of foreign policy and defense, which we all have in common. But if we have this millstone about our necks, namely, that Britain cannot take part other than as member of the EEC, then there is nothing for it, the attempt will fail for this reason. Mr. Mozer's argument reminds me of the man - if I may be somewhat jovial - who sold anti-earthquake pills after the earthquake of Lisbon. When he was asked how that was supposed to help, he replied: "Do you have anything better?" The EEC is an anti-earthquake pill. To establish a political union is not possible on the first attempt. The right beginning would not be a pat solution but solid work on the

actual problems. It must be stressed again and again, that Europe cannot afford a military weakness and that it can be militarily safeguarded only by means of a political agreement. One does not become militarily stronger when the production of trouser buttons increases 20% thanks to economic harmonizing. The farm policy also does not make Europe militarily stronger. It is a matter of defense after all.

Kogon

You, therefore, are in favor for organizing on various levels - the economy in a different way than defense. Political institutions you do not consider necessary?

Schumacher

No political institutions that go beyond defense, no - naturally not.

Goriely

Would you be in favor of the sovereignty of these small-area organizations you suggest? For example in England, for the sovereignty of each county? Viewed logically, one would assume it.

Schumacher

You are trying to fit everything on a single last, a way of thinking that is not in my line. What does sovereignty actually mean? For economic problems, detail work is necessary, and for that we have the national states in Europe, which have thoroughly stood the test as to the economic. Some are perhaps too large, others too small. Perhaps your country is too small.

Great Britain with reference to the economy, is definitely too large. We could solve the Scotland problem if we could find a way to separate Scotland, so to speak, in the economic sector. Please, - that is to be taken seriously. The Italians understand it because they have the same problem in Sicily and in many provinces. France has it too.

Delcour

In France we cannot solve the problem at all by dismembering the country and dismemberment of European economy would set us back considerably. What you say is paradoxical.

Schumacher

European economy has always been dismembered. We have an economic miracle in Austria, one in Italy - we have economic miracles everywhere.

Kogon

Just a moment, gentlemen! Those, after all, are not absolute antitheses. You, of course, mean dismemberment in the case of certain interlacements. After all, you do not want them completely isolated. We, however, are interested in the degree of interlacement and the policy that is required to organize this necessary interlacement. That is the point.

Schumacher

Why then an organized interlacement at all?

Kogon

But coordination is organization too.

Schumacher

The most elegant coordinating is accomplished without organizations: in the world-wide foreign trade of national states. There we already have a net of organizations to work on the problems that present themselves - the Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the OECD, the various branches of the UN, and so on. Of course, the EEC can go right on existing too. But the salvation of Europe does not depend on the EEC. One does well to be very sceptical concerning the mushrooming of supranational bureaucracy. If it can be done without bureaucracy, it will be done better.

Mozer

I do not comprehend, Dr. Schumacher, that regional policy in the smallest framework is viewed as antithesis of our work. By means of our investment fund, by means of our social fund, we try to promote a regional policy which is based on the fact that development does not necessarily have to stop at the national border. That we are doing this detail work in the small areas is no reason for not doing the other things too.

Kogon

I now ask you a concrete question, Dr. Schumacher: What consequences result from your statements so far with reference to the continental "European" plus the British "Europe" policy?

Schumacher

For me there results the consequence that even if the EEC should stall it would not mean the end of the "Europe" idea. A thing that was attacked in a wrong way at its inception has come to its logical conclusion. In that way the EEC can continue to be used as an erratic block. It would, however, be the greatest misfortune for Europe to now couple the "European" idea with the EEC and perhaps to permit the German-French rapprochement as greatest post-war achievement to fail due to the break-up of the EEC. It would be a great misfortune to say Britain and all sorts of other countries must stay outside because they do not fit into the EEC. Constructive work on the "European" idea can today only suffer if one insists on the EEC or the Coal and Steel Community.

If one really follows Mr. Kitzinger in that the problem goes far beyond the Six, that it is not only a Western European, but beyond that a North-South and an East-West problem, then one must not insist upon on a further development of the EEC in direction of a political union but must start all over again. Perhaps one need not dismantle what has already been set up. But with the new start one must begin with a fresh view of the things that are really at stake. It really is not a matter of a few tariffs in a prosperous society, but very much of a sustentative agreement in matters of foreign policy and defense.

Werthern-Beichlingen

Not everything is finished already. If everything were finished then refusal of Britain's entry to the EEC would have lacked sense. It was not always a case of the British wanting to join. We Continental Europeans rather were of the opinion, entry of Britain had better be delayed as long as there was a chance of a European Union. We feared that if Britain were a member of the EEC, it would thwart the plan of a political federation, a Continental-European Federal State with its own executive authority.

Niehans

That is past and gone anyway.

Werthern-Beichlingen

It is not final. Anyway, Mr. Haffner said there are still national states as always. It is not final which forces tend to push the old-type national state back into the old position of power, and which forces show themselves in favor of integration in larger Communities. That is what is being fought over, that after all is the point of inception.

Haffner

No reasonable person wants to put back the European national states in the old position of power. It cannot be done anymore. The big question is, - isn't it - whether by means of a, say, artificial federation of European national states, an old-style position of power is to be set up or whether such a position is to be foregone.

Werthern-Beichlingen

Mr. Haffner, it is not a matter of the position of power. One cannot now forego an organization of Continental Europe because one of the two big tasks that have to be accomplished is military policy. It is not possible to solve it without a common executive authority. The other great task is foreign and trade policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Germany alone cannot do it. Our starting point was that de Gaulle, i.e., France, would always be prepared to relinquish rights of sovereignty but only in the

measure this was useful to its economic consolidation and in the measure France could strengthen and maintain its foreign-policy position. Could not France, nevertheless, be forced to relinquish more of its sovereignty in foreign-policy and military questions - in the same degree, namely, as the Federal Republic insists on it? Stated differently: how could France possibly continue its present policy without its five Continental neighbors?

Delcour

I actually believe that would be impossible, Mr. v. Werthern. Contrariwise, it is also impossible for the five partners to isolate France. The Federal Republic cannot cast off France and de Gaulle. The tie is too close. Perhaps the German-French Treaty was a piece of Gaullist politics. I am convinced, however, that this treaty will remain in force after de Gaulle's exit.

Werthern-Beichlingen

But you would concede that the Federal Republic could manage to obtain certain concessions from France or, in other words, that it could make de Gaulle more reasonable on certain points?

Delcour

That, yes.

Kogon

We must not forget the supporters of this policy. There is a reason why we again and again come under the spell of the special psychology of de Gaulle. In the case of the Federal Republic we are dealing with a parliament. There's a difference, isn't there, in the clarity of intent, the result of intent and in the establishment of objectives. After all, de Gaulle cares a - with your permission - fat lot about the parliamentarians of Europe.

Frisch

You are right, Mr. Kogon, there is a difference in the style of leading statesmen of the government. Recently Mr. Erhard travelled to Paris with Mr. Schröder and the French had expected both of them at long last to ask the question "What are you prepared to do in the "European" sphere?" The question was not asked although in Bonn one had thought about it. Evidently one purposely dispensed with a clarification of the irregularities in European progress.

Kogon

With that we return to what Mr. Altmann already said. The political intent of the Federal Republic - as far as it refers to the Continent and not to Britain - is not clear.

Stolze

We should force de Gaulle to reach a decision, to avow European integration. For economic reasons he is dependent upon the support of his partners; in the long run he cannot develop the "force de frappe" without the European Economic Community. Why don't we get down to asking him to pay a price for it? After all, up to now we have never forced him to stand and deliver.

Altmann

To make de Gaulle stand and deliver? Surely the other Europeans will not admit that they cannot think of anything new or that they are incapable of forcing de Gaulle in some way.

The problem is defined differently. De Gaulle, in my opinion, is right when he says, the EEC is in its design not yet the nucleus of a Federal European State. It is a mistake of Mr. Hallstein to have interpreted it as such. The EEC does not lead to a form of state, rather in the view of de Gaulle it is a technocracy, with its purpose and function, but it is not a beginning for political supranationality.

Kogon

In that case should not the governments in London and Bonn reach a precise agreement on joint action, in order, on such a level, to prevent the de Gaulle plan from succeeding? It is up to us, and the problem is whether the Federal Government has the strength to initiate it.

Spinelli

In asking whether the Federal Republic has the strength to initiate it, one should not make the parliamentary system responsible. Unfortunately there is no open and wide-spread discussion in Germany in regard to the great problems to be solved of reunification, agricultural reform and nuclear arming. The cause is the public's lack of political interest and political consciousness; and not a bad system.

Kogon

You opine, therefore, that the most important problems are openly mentioned and discussed neither in the parliaments nor among the public?

Spinelli

One has to start first with the public.

Bondy

I have learned very much, the most from Messrs. Kitzinger, Spinelli, Haffner and Schumacher. But I feel terribly at odds with all four gentlemen.

We all suffer from the fact that today in Europe there is no longer "European" enthusiasm. We all were enthusiastic Europeans and five of us here in this room already sat together twenty years ago in Hertenstein and founded the European Movement. This enthusiasm made its appearance when things were going badly for Europe. There was no prosperity, no security and the West Europeans threatened to draw further and further apart by fighting among each other, or even to make war on each other again. Today, there no longer is a point at issue between West Europeans. There is prosperity and we believe - rightly or wrongly - that our security is guaranteed to a certain extent. Things are going well for the younger generation and what Europe needs - unrestricted travel across all borders, full employment and so on - we have without political unity. A mass basis for "European" enthusiasm we therefore no longer have today, because we no longer have the mass basis of European suffering as we did just after the war.

But "European" readiness is something else, and I believe we still have it. All opinion polls confirm that the younger generation between twenty and thirty is not as enthusiastically interested in "Europe" as is the elder generation - but somewhat less. But readiness to bypass nations and states, to bypass nations and states, to bypass sovereignty and to fit completely into a new framework is so great that the responsibility of governments and their leeway for initiative are greater then ever.

If de Gaulle, with the patriarchal power he has, (because he ended the Algerian War and because he established law and order in the country) were to advocate "Europe" instead of nationalism, no one in France would rise up against it but they would, to the contrary, be very happy about it. The freedom of action of some men in top offices, for instance offices such as Erhard's and de Gaulle's, is so great that the responsibility for what these men do, must not be shifted onto the "masses", "history" or the like, by any means.

This evening the "European" idea has been declared dead several times already; but not only here. The same thing was said when the EDC was killed in the French Parliament. A man I greatly revere, namely, Professor Raymond Aron wrote at that time - and for this once he was not inspired by the breath of history - "From this point onwards we can say that these six states will never again undertake anything together." A year later we had the agreements of Messina.

Today we are again in the midst of a crisis, of which we do not know the outcome. If, however, the problems at hand are not solved, evidently one problem will remain, too big to be solved by the individual nations separately. One delimits this problem on all sides and always returns to it. All our British friends, whether conservative or liberal, told us years on end "Europe" is an abstraction and lacked meaning. When it then came into being as a "major economic sphere" and grew, it was the British, the Swiss and all the other people who originally did not want anything to do with this Europe, who now crowded the waiting-room - surely not only due to an ideological change of heart, but for very solid reasons of their own interests. Therefore, "Europe" exists and has a trans-national effect.

In Europe the nation is not something new and interesting as in Africa and Asia, where dozens of new states come into being and the people try subsequently to infuse these states with a national spirit. That is not quite easy because in Africa the tribes are not identical with the nations and concerning language they only have a choice between French and English while we here in Europe have a

language of our own for nearly every state. In other words, states are being created, which are then called "nations." Anyway, it is something new, the people there live in our 19th Century while we in Europe live in the 20th Century and the nation after all is nothing new to us.

But the most violent nationalists in Germany, France and Italy, who equate everything exclusively with "national fate", are no democrats, instead they think along authoritarian or totalitarian lines and would like to throttle democratic liberties. In the states forming the nucleus of "Europe" such as Germany, France and Italy, democracy and nationalism do not belong together as they did one hundred years ago. Examine who in Italy and who in France uses nationalistic rhetoric. France as the most strongly nationalistic state in Western Europe also has the most authoritarian features today. But a new German nationalism could have an entirely different face and in that Mr. de Gaulle would really agree with Mr. Haffner.

And now to the regions: in France the centralistic state excised entire regions from large supranational contexts, destroyed the individual life of regions, and created "Paris and the desert." But since the development toward "Europe", Alsace has flourished so greatly as a region that Dr. Schumacher should greatly joy over it. Other regions too, for example in Southern France, have awakened to new life with the regional line of thought of this "terrible bureaucracy" in Brussels. There is no such contradiction between regional self-administration and greater supranational planning. I cannot understand how such an outstanding bureaucrat as Dr. Schumacher can use the term bureaucracy in the sense in which he uses it. That reminds me of the discussion in the United States, when Roosevelt established the "terrible bureaucracy" of the Tennessee Valley Authority, awakening an entire region in the United States to new life; all American conservatives thought at that time, that that was a terrible bureaucracy, the most terrible thing in the world.

Brussels is one of the smallest bureaucracies in the world and can boast of greatest achievements. Naturally there is danger of developing mass society and centralism, of riding rough-shod over regions, of destroying individual regional life and regional economy. For this reason I find Dr. Schumacher's warning, despite my qualms, quite worthy of note seen in general; it does not - I believe - form an antithesis to the supranational organization.

We agree on the topic of economy and defense. Both go in different directions. Europe has become strong in its economy but not in defense. It can stand up to the United States as economic partner, demand equal status, and receive it too. Militarily, however, Europe is too weak. All the defense budgets of the European partners together are smaller than the nuclear defense expenditures of the United States. As long as it is a basic fact that the United States has military power and we, all together, in this sense almost none, I would not know what it is supposed to mean if we demand partnership and equal status. With such unequal efforts and achievements equal status in the power of control is simply unattainable. The question is, however, whether we Europeans can in the long run depend on it that the United States will guarantee our security for all time to come.

Spinelli

Yes!

Bondy

Are you so sure? I'm worried. It is, in any event, cause for worry if a man such as Senator Fulbright, such an anti-isolationist, who comes from a state in which chicken farming is important, declares that if they don't want our chickens, they won't get our soldiers. That means, doesn't it, that the economic and the military aspect cannot always be kept apart. The necessity for Europe to establish an economy that might annoy certain interest groups in the United States could result in conflicts in other areas too, where our common interests are clearly in evidence.

I would welcome every effort by which Europe as a unit participates in the Atlantic community as a power. That would be something quite different from the multilateral "farce" of financial participation in a defense which remains subject to an exclusively American decision. One can have different opinions about the means.

There are various ways of being a European. We cannot however deduce from European history that as of today every will to power in Europe is also the will to totalitarianism at home and expansion abroad. Power is also protection, is order and security; it can be connected with law too. If we renounce every single concept of European power, we would finally renounce a European community too, which will be self-contained and independent despite all necessary limitations. I would not go that far.

Kogon

Would you, however, by and large consider as right the de Gaulle concept for this defense, for such a partnership?

Bondy

De Gaulle is prepared to place his atomic force under the orders of a political power of Europe. However, he prevents the establishment of such a power. This contradiction also prevents me from understanding de Gaulle.

Delcour

Did I understand you correctly: you said that de Gaulle was prepared to place his national "force de frappe" under the orders of a common Political Union?

Bondy

A Union he does not want.

Delcour

Yes, exactly. It is a vicious circle from which we cannot escape.

Aschinger

Gentlemen, do not forget the development in history. At the time the EEC was founded, there existed in Europe as a result of the war a political bankruptcy-estate of states without national integration and they therefore sought integration on a supranational level. Today, however, Europe has again grown stronger and more self-confident. On this development is based Kennedy's offer of an Atlantic partnership: the United States wants to cede certain rights to Europe and considers the European partner as an equal.

The regaining of Europe's strength naturally expresses itself in nationalism in most EEC countries too. The supranational trees in Brussels must therefore not be permitted to grow too tall. Nationalism is a fact in history with upward trend. That is not only valid for France but also for the Federal Republic.

Since 14 January 1963 one has recognized in European integration that not everything can be placed on a single last. When in 1962 all these countries outside of the EEC wanted to become members of the EEC or become associated with it, this development actually was subject to the force of circumstances. If this plan had been carried out, a number of countries would probably have fallen victims. Although the brutal way of excluding the British from Brussels resulted everywhere in doubts and dismay, the development since 14 January brought forth a certain sigh of relief in various countries.

I recently, asked George Ball and Edward Heath how they judged the integration situation in Europe. Both said that for a long time we could not count on Britain joining the Community of Six as a member. In any event, we shall have to wait for years and as a matter of necessity will have to insert an interim phase in which we at least should prevent the European countries from drifting still further apart.

It appears to me today to be the most important thing to concentrate our efforts on helping to make the Kennedy Round a success. That for the present is the key to the solution of the European problem, as I see it.

But what would happen if the Kennedy Round were to end in failure? I would not be surprised if in that case fundamental principles of trade policy would then be jettisoned, such as the principle of the most-favored nation. After the Kennedy Round we shall have to ask, what solutions we can reach in Europe. A repetition of history, I believe, will not occur here either. I doubt whether the day will come that will see Britain joining the EEC as a full member, or even a European free-trade zone, unless the Federal Republic is able to push its standpoint more strongly within the EEC.

Niehans

But we must reach practical solutions. This includes overcoming tensions in the economic policy pragmatically - practically. One of the methods will be the Kennedy Round. If it leads to success, then much is already gained for further steps. I, therefore, believe it should be in the urgent interests of the EEC to get as much out of the Kennedy Round as possible. Otherwise one would have to come to the

conclusion that it will have to get worse before it gets better. After failure of this attempt, tensions would increase on all sides, until in a worsening of the situation to the point of a crisis a solution might nevertheless be found. I consider the Kennedy Round as a test case whether we shall reach a really constructive solution despite ideological differences.

Hunold

Mr. Bondy was right when he said that Switzerland once cooled its heels in the waiting room in Brussels in the Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée. But to us Swiss - perhaps with the exception of a few Lausanne professors - this was rather embarrassing. After all, we fought for our liberty at Morgarten and Sempach and now we should sacrifice it to a Professor in Brussels of all people?

We have to consider the question - and after the delightful contribution of Mr. Schumacher I do it all the more gladly - whether the design formula on

which the EEC is based is right. If one reaches the standpoint that it is a case of a misintegration, which with its supranational economic and administrative practice just plain steam-rollers everything that grows organically and which has led to a split instead of a united Europe, then there is nothing for it but in all honesty to seek a new and better solution. The belief that from specifically economic institutions will develop a political organization, automatically as it were, recalls primitive Marxist notions according to which the economic substructure produced the state's superstructure.

Delcour

Did not the Swiss in the past also start with the economy?

Hunold

To that I can only reply what Professor Röpke once said, that the Swiss Federation was not formed by means of the merger of the Cheese Associations of the 22 Kantons. The design of the EEC for shaping a European statehood is wrong and if that is the case, one has to drop back and take another run. I can tell you that I, too, am a European by conviction. But if you ask me where my home is, then I am first of all from Zurich, second in line from Switzerland, and only third in line from Europe. I believe it is important to protect and nurture the civic consciousness of the citizens of Europe and to breed a feeling of "Europe" patriotism that does not endanger the "multiplicity in unity". With it we, at the same time, erect a bulwark against the dangers from the East of which by way of surprise nothing at all was spoken today, although we meet hardly 18 miles from the Iron Curtain. The historical example of Switzerland shows that there can be no political union without certain basic elements of patriotism.

Mozer

No one in Brussels imagines that as a result of economic integration there will come into being, for example, a joint institution for foreign-affairs or defense policy. Professor Hallstein has said, and I consider it right, that one cannot carry on economic, agricultural, transportation and tax policies without at the same time dealing with the political. A conclusion such as has been drawn here tonight in order, then, to be able to reject it as Marxist, no one there drew. That is too cheap. It is not fair to make a caricature of something in order to fight it the more easily.

What has been said here about the Kennedy Round, I also do not agree with. Perhaps I may call to mind that the Kennedy Round in its original conception on the basis of the Trade Expansion Act was proposed not with the objective of the two economic blocs, the United States and the Community of Six making a few tariff concessions to each other, rather a joint solution for the foreign aid policy was to be found. Although I otherwise am against you, Dr. Schumacher, I also doubt whether there is any sense in sinking more money into aid to developing countries. Probably it is much more sensible - and that was what one wanted to achieve with the Kennedy Round - to stabilize raw material prices so that help can be given developing countries.

Namely, as a matter of fact, much more is being taken from them due to lack of price stabilization than what we give them with our so-called philanthropic aid.

Agriculture policy was also included in the Kennedy Round. That has its cause in the circumstance that organizations such as the FAO or the OECD do not suffice. We have learned, namely, that the difficulties at the borders are no longer the decisive difficulties in trade relations between the countries, instead that domestic measures are decisive. If we succeed in reducing these, we really shall have accomplished something. You yourself said, Dr. Schumacher, that a few tariffs do not play a role in the affluent society.

Niehans

I was in the States during the entire discussion. They wanted to incorporate the EEC in the Atlantic group

and the aspect of "developing countries" was never decisive. I, myself, heard when Herter in statu nas-cendi spoke about these ideas; foreign aid was not the driving force.

Mozer

May I remind you that the first point of the plan was, that it should be possible to extend the membership of the Community. Then it was said, that in all cases in which 80% of the trade in any merchandise was between the two blocs, zero tariffs should be reached. That for the major part were products which were to help only third countries not in these two groups. If the extension had taken place that would have been approximately 25 products. After membership of the EEC was not enlarged, perfume, jet planes and margarine were left. This is where the problem lies.

If one takes a look at the Trade Expansion Act then two thirds of the text contains attempts to solve difficulties that will result for certain industrialists in the United States. In my opinion the starting point was that the developing countries were to be given a chance. That is in every Kennedy speech in which he gave a reason for the matter. It was his starting point.

Niehans

Naturally, that was part of it.

Mozer

To help third countries was the intent...

Kogon

... and that in competition with the Soviet Union.

Mozer

Naturally, it was a plan to attain a solution of world problems without thinking of war.

Hunold

The bill for the Trade Expansion Act was written by a Texan, William Clayton, and that only in the interest of Americans who could not afford to lose still more exports.

Mozer

I do not comprehend this interjection or else I was not able to read a single Kennedy speech. Kennedy just managed to pull the Trade Expansion Act through the hearings, the Senate and the House. Also essential is the question if the multilateral clause should be recognized as valid; whether for certain countries a suspension should be created in order to give them a chance at all for developing.

If the aspect of the Kennedy Round on which I have placed special emphasis should disappear completely and the nucleus become customs parity, the importance of which I really do not underestimate, then one will fail even sooner than with a more far-reaching plan. But then Europe and the Atlantic partnership would have lost something which cannot be made up for a very long time.

Layton

As regards the prospects for the Kennedy Round: did not Britain attempt to join the EEC because it recognized the new power of the Common Market? The power situation in Europe has changed. When Britain offered to join, the possibility resulted that Europe could have become a major economic power, comparable to the United States. The United States too would have had to change its trade and economic policy. That would have been a change in the balance of power of the Western World. The British offer was rejected and now we do not have

the strong partner we had hoped for on this side of the Atlantic. That is one of the factors for the bad prospects for the Kennedy Round.

Speranza

May I make my statements in French?

Kogon

But gladly. Surely Mr. Bondy will be so kind to interpret insofar as that is necessary at all.

Speranza

Monsieur le Président,

Je m'excuse d'être le seul orateur ce soir qui ne parle pas allemand, mais je crois que mon allemand est pire que celui de Monsieur Chiti-Batelli et donc je préfère parler en français.

Je crois que la dernière intervention de Monsieur Mozer est arrivée un peu tard dans cette discussion ce soir parce que je crois que - si elle intervenait plus tôt - elle aurait balayé le terrain d'un certain nombre d'équivoques que j'ai vu planer sur la discussion tout à l'heure. Une thèse intéressante que j'ai entendue ce soir est la suivante: si l'intégration européenne est seulement une méthode ou bien une politique. Ceci était la question de fond qui était traitée dans le discours de Monsieur Kitzinger d'abord et par plusieurs orateurs ensuite.

J'essaierai de montrer, si possible, qu'elle est à la fois l'une et l'autre et je prendrai un exemple tout à fait actuel, l'exemple de la politique agricole commune. Vous savez que la Commission de la CEE a proposé récemment de réaliser d'un seul coup le rapprochement des prix des céréales; on a vu tout de suite que bien que la mesure ait été technique ses implications politiques étaient d'une importance extrême. En effet, l'établissement d'un prix de céréales unique en ce moment, nous permet tout d'abord

de négocier avec les autres partenaires du GATT, qui ont tous une politique des prix définie, dans le Kennedy Round. Le problème qui s'est posé jusqu'à ce moment réside dans le fait de savoir à quel niveau s'établirait le prix et donc le rapport entre la production communautaire et les importations. C'est une base de discussion surtout avec nos amis américains. Mais il n'existe pas seulement le problème des négociations GATT pour lequel une politique des prix est une condition préalable, mais aussi le problème de donner une bonne base à nos rapports avec les pays en voie de développement. En effet, au moment où de plusieurs côtés on nous dit que la politique agricole européenne risque d'être une politique protectionniste, nous avons répondu - et les chiffres nous donnaient raison - que nos importations de produits agricoles ont augmenté dans les six pays de la Communauté beaucoup plus que dans les autres organisations régionales dans le monde, beaucoup plus qu'aux Etats-Unis, beaucoup plus qu'en Union Soviétique, beaucoup plus qu'en Grande-Bretagne. Mais le problème de fond est de quel côté venaient ces importations.

On ne peut pas nier que ces importations - il faut bien le dire - sont avant tout un échange entre les pays plus industrialisés, c'est-à-dire que - malgré la guerre des poulets - ce sont les exportations et les importations entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe des Six. Cela signifie que, en termes plus clairs, nous n'avons pas du tout résolu le problème des exportations agricoles en provenance des pays en voie de développement. Cela signifie que nous risquons encore une fois de ne pas résoudre une partie essentielle du problème le plus urgent auquel l'Europe doit faire face après la décolonisation, c'est-à-dire celui de donner un visage, qui ne soit pas un visage communiste, au tiers monde. En effet, nous avons constaté que bien que les Etats occidentaux aient dépensé 40 milliards de dollars après la guerre pour les pays en voie de développement, les résultats politiques et économiques ont été - il faut bien le dire - pas très satisfaisants. Heureusement l'Union Soviétique n'a pas fait de politique meilleure et nous nous trouvons donc encore dans une position avantageuse. Nous avons constaté que si d'une part nous donnions beaucoup d'argent, les prix des matières premières baissaient continuellement et que, par conséquent, nous reprenions d'un côté ce que nous donnions de l'autre.

La méthode communautaire, pour commencer, a fait le premier pas concret pour résoudre ces problèmes, c'est-à-dire nous venons à la rencontre d'une solution réaliste des problèmes de notre agriculture en déterminant d'abord les prix à l'intérieur de la C.E.E., quel est le niveau de protection que nous attribuons à nos cultures. Dans les propositions agricoles de la Communauté au GATT il y a aussi cela d'important que nous voudrions déterminer et consolider tout de suite le montant de soutien dans toutes les agricultures, c'est-à-dire prendre en considération non seulement le problème douanier mais le véritable problème de la structure des économies agricoles. Par cette mesure préalable on pourra alors faire une politique sérieuse pour la stabilisation des prix agricoles et par là une bonne partie de la politique des prix des matières premières.

L'interprétation qu'est donnée au Kennedy Round par Messieurs Mozer et Bondy, qui me paraît être l'idée de la Commission de la C.E.E. et aussi l'idée de Kennedy, exprimée dans le discours de Philadelphie du 4 juillet 1963, est qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une négociation purement douanière mais qu'il s'agit d'un engrenage dans le plus grand dessein politique d'une partnership atlantique. En effet, dans le jargon communautaire quand on dit partnership atlantique on ne parle pas de Kennedy Round. Le Kennedy Round c'est la question commerciale que l'on traite à Genève. La partnership atlantique c'est beaucoup plus, c'est le fait que l'après-guerre est terminée, c'est le fait que les responsabilités entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe sont différentes de ce qu'elles étaient en 1950, c'est le fait que l'Europe doit donner une contribution plus valable et au problème de la défense et au problème des pays en voie de développement. La Communauté est certainement une méthode, susceptible d'être reprise dans l'ensemble des rapports internationaux, mais pas une méthode "en soi". D'autre part, je ne suis pas d'accord sur le fait que le but ultime que nous nous étions proposé en 1952 et puis en 1958 soit atteint, c'est-à-dire la création de l'Etat européen. Notre mécanisme est efficace mais neutre et on pourra bâtir l'Etat européen selon la logique

du monde actuel ou selon la logique du 19ème siècle: une machine électronique peut très bien programmer selon la logique ptolémaïque: cela dépend du "programmeur". Je crois que les buts de Monnet continuent à être valables et que sans eux tout ce que nous faisons dans le domaine économique deviendrait - je ne dirais pas inutile - mais insignifiant dans la grande stratégie mondiale.

Voilà, Monsieur le Président, mes quelques réflexions que je voulais vous soumettre. Je vous remercie de votre attention.

Bondy

I think I can limit myself to a faithful summary. Mr. Speranza regretted that the last contribution of Mr. Mozer came a little late in this discussion because it would have eliminated certain mistakes which have cropped up here. He reverted to the question of Mr. Kitzinger whether the EEC were a method or a policy and said that naturally it was both. As an example he mentioned agricultural policy and specifically the fact that the EEC already wants to expedite the establishment of a wheat price for the interim period. Although this was a purely technical measure it had great political significance because at stake was setting a minimum price level for the farmer.

Concerning the Kennedy Round Mr. Speranza thought that it was not only a case of a problem of European agriculture vis-a-vis the United States but in especial vis-a-vis the agriculture of developing countries. With reference to tariff protection the EEC could naturally counter at any time that it imports more farm products than any other state or community of states in the world. On scrutinizing more closely where these imports come from one notes, however, that the exchange of farm products between highly industrialized countries has increased very much, especially between the EEC and the United States - despite the much discussed chicken war - but that is not how matter stands with importing farm products from the developing countries into the EEC.

At the last counting 40 billion dollars had been collected for aid to developing countries and the West had invested it in underdeveloped territories. Mr. Speranza thought that the end result - insofar as it had a political objective - was negative. It was true that Russia had by no means achieved anything better so that we still had an advantage here.

He further reverted to the statements of Mr. Mozer, namely, that in the final analysis the developing countries had perhaps been hurt more than helped, due to the drop in raw material prices, despite all of the development aid.

Mozer

An example for that: the German representative at the Geneva negotiations stated in the presence of 60 ministers from developing countries that the tax on coffee in Germany could not be lowered because otherwise development aid could not be granted.

Bondy

Mr. Speranza then said that the Atlantic partnership was something entirely different from the Kennedy Round. It was much more. It expressed the fact that today responsibilities in all spheres, especially of defense and joint aid to developing countries, were distributed differently than in 1950.

Political objectives - Mr. Speranza concluded his remarks - were the godfathers of the Community of 1952 and 1958. They were in no way passé and finished. Although the European State which was to evolve therefrom should not be a state in the meaning of the 19th Century. But it should nevertheless

be a political idea and have a political form. If that were not so, then we did not know whether what we were doing in Brussels, purely in the economic sphere, could be called at all essential in the greater context of the world.

Aschinger

That means in the opinion of Mr. Speranza that the Atlantic partnership has nothing to do with the Kennedy Round. In this regard the Americans are of an entirely different opinion. They think that the Kennedy Round is the first and most important test of the partnership.

Kogon

I would say that the Americans regard it from the political-psychological side. Factually however, there is a connection which we do not want to deny and with which we should manage the best way possible.

As concerns the Federal Republic it can, after all, only make its contribution if in fact it has a plan worthy of partisanship in the so-called more rarified spheres, that go far beyond the Kennedy-Round namely, defense policy and foreign policy, all the way to Eastern Europe. It must develop the plan with de Gaulle and the British as allies.

In our printed minutes there will be some statements which are to have a definite effect on those bearing the responsibility and whose task it is to develop such a plan. Of course, the Federal Republic must negotiate first of all with its principal partner, who has a plan, namely with de Gaulle - and that not by reason of a psychological spell he has cast, but as partner. For this purpose there is a consultation treaty which, after all, is not a one-sided relationship of command in which de Gaulle occasionally tells us he has decided to do something and we can subsequently think about how we shall manage in the matter; that could not be called consultation. But there are common objections which make it appear worthwhile to us to take sacrifices upon us in order to achieve them, for instance, in the farm policy. Only the sacrifices must make sense, for our urban masses of consumers are not prepared to pay and pay; but they are prepared to do so if it makes sense for the whole.

Altmann

All the partners of the EEC are convinced that they have made sacrifices for the benefit of the others.

For us Germans the farm policy right now is a national problem. The EEC is the best excuse we ever had to solve our farm problem. We should be happy - whatever the price - that the EEC is paying for it. We should make it our business to reach a decision at long last.

Mozer

You are so right, Mr. Altmann! The proposal being discussed at present means the losses of German agriculture will be borne by the Community. According to the code, Germany pays 28%. In a country such as Belgium, where the farm price problem of itself is not an important matter because the prices remain about level, one will have to expect considerable resistance because the promise had been made, to earmark a billion Belgian francs for Belgian farmers. The promise has never been kept. And now Belgium is asked to contribute heavily to pull the farmer in Germany out of the red!

Kogon

I am asking myself desperately this evening who, after all, besides de Gaulle is in a position to work out practicable concepts.

Hunold

That means, therefore, Chancellor Erhard has no Europe program, while de Gaulle does. But we must take into consideration that there will be elections in 1965 and that Erhard wants to win the elections and must win them in the interest of a free order of economy and society. Therefore, he must neither antagonize de Gaulle nor annoy German farmers. This appears to be almost an insoluble problem, an ill office the so-called "common" farm policy of the EEC did him, and it calls for highest statesmanship to get out of this dilemma.

Kogon

Actually, four elections are coming up: in the United States, in England, in Germany, and right after that in France, too, as far as it can still be called an election there. It is a special situation, which calls for a time out. Only de Gaulle is in a position to act. All the others will not make major decisions, other than in the Kennedy Round, which requires such a decision.

Unfortunately all this is quite negative. Don't we have something positive to say too?

Frisch

Of essence in reference to the real conditions for a Europe politically united is willingness to assume world-political responsibility. France has it as a result of its position and by reason of the personality of de Gaulle. Germany - as a divided country in the heart of Europe - is forced to have it. The German foreign policy must first of all realize that there is no alternative for the Common Market. If this project fails, the Federal Republic faces a catastrophe.

Goriely

A catastrophe of what sort? An economic catastrophe or ... ?

Frisch

No, a foreign-policy catastrophe. Because the Federal Republic has no cards in its hand without Europe. It also is no secret that Germany's weight in the States is closely tied up with the German-French Treaty which can find its higher justification only in the European Community because in world politics even both countries together are not strong enough.

The aim of German policy should be to consider the establishing of a politically United Europe as a principal problem of the nation, not least because - as Adenauer recognized from the beginning - the road to reunification leads via "Europe". As long as there can be no independent German foreign policy be-

tween East and West, one must return again and again to this basic European concept. There is also no alternative "France or the United States" for the Federal Republic.

Schumacher

Europe's economy, despite a bogged down EEC, is flourishing and thoroughly the equal of the United States. It is strange that hereabouts all things that happened in the world for this or that reason, are attributed precisely to a pat solution. It is said, for example, that we can travel freely across borders. I travel a good deal and do not notice at all whether I am travelling in an EFTA or an EEC country. For that, one therefore does not need the EEC; to the contrary, one needs world-wide solutions. They used common sense and eased border crossing regulations.

I am shocked in two ways that it should mean a "catastrophe" if the EEC "failed". I do not speak of a failure of the EEC. Let it continue existing as a forum for negotiating all sorts of things pertaining to economic policy.

Frisch

And that exactly is failure.

Schumacher

Why should that be failure? If the EEC stays as such a forum without continuing to develop into all sorts of grand things, such as a political community and so on - in what direction should it develop? Maybe back to 1914, namely, to general free trade or to a general harmonization of all sorts of things which would work just as well unharmonized?

It is exactly this attitude, namely, overrating the economic in a society already prosperous, and the unrest connected with it, that I combat.

The basic question, after all, is defense and in connection therewith foreign policy. I would claim that the EEC has become an obstacle which one should at least devalue emotionally by not speaking of catastrophes and failure. Britain cannot join the EEC and if Britain is necessary for European defense, as cannot be disputed, then one should not insist upon its joining the EEC.

Now it is asked what the Federal Republic can do. In Germany one should work psychologically to separate the "European" idea and the EEC. What does the "European" idea have to do with harmonizing social and tax policies? One must start again and concentrate on the things at stake, and for which there are already starting points, for instance, the NATO or relations with the United States, too.

And if Britain, too, is to be given access to the defense community, then you should just continue the EEC without Britain; and it should not be claimed that someone not a member of the EEC suddenly does not belong to Europe any more.

I, therefore, plead for a softening of the conception that the Rome Treaty is identical with the "Europe" idea. What we need is new purposeful initiative in Europe, and much of it.

Spinelli

At the time, however, no one appears ready to make a start with a practicable policy, neither in Germany nor in other countries. One should now attempt to mobilize such a policy starting in Germany. The "Europe" policy of the Federal Government since the end of the war, has been characterized by the fact one had only to wait and follow in order to be on the winning side every time. All of Western Europe and the United States made suggestions and even if efforts to reach agreements failed - as in the case of the EDC - the Federal Republic nevertheless gained from it.

Today the Germans have to pay a price whatever "European" policy is carried on. Today the establishment of Europe demands toil and sacrifices from all participants.

The Germans could carry on a "European" policy if they realized that in Europe a new society, a new form of organization and order must be brought about. Anticommunism can no longer be the cement of this Europe policy. There is nothing in it for Germany if one keeps talking about East Germany or moves the possibility of the atom fighting force into the foreground. Either one has a general plan and can make proposals establishing and developing "European" institutions or one figures only in national advantages and disadvantages. In the latter case no practicable "European" policy will be effected".

Chiti-Batelli

Evidently I am the only one here who does not view the principal task of the Federalists as that of enabling the national states to survive; rather, starting immediately, plainly to be that of drafting the policy of European federation, advancing it energetically, and proving again and again that such a policy is impossible without a "European" state.

Mr. Spinelli rightly said on many occasions that there is a British version of the "Europe of Fatherlands" - a version in which the task of leadership devolved only on Great Britain and not on France. It should have to be the task of federalist Europeans to build a political Community. This Community could then negotiate with Great Britain and for a certainty bring about an agreement. Just as Great Britain demanded to become a member after establishment of the Common Market, it would also apply for membership in a political European federation.

The German question also cannot be solved from a national standpoint. The Europeans must have the courage to become nations retired from history, as the Swedes or Swiss did in the past.

If, namely, the German question is discussed from the standpoint of a European federation, then the Oder-Neisse problem represents itself the way the Polish author Mieroszewski once formulated it in his book "Is Germany Returning to the East?" He said: The Oder-Neisse Line reminded him of a person who lost a leg and still felt pain in the foot after two or three years, although he no longer had the leg.

Naturally, East Germany is a different problem. There are still Germans there. In this case it is not so much a question of reunification, rather it is the question of the liberty of people living there.

A "European" state could take up, above all, the problem of all satellites in the form of an ideological irredentism and not alone the question of German reunification. It would furthermore be unrealistic to assume that a federation of Europe would perhaps not ventilate the question of European atomic armament so much the more so as France and England are already going into the armament problem. In my opinion, however, a European federation could forego atomic armament if Russia gave assurances that all European countries - that means the Eastern satellites too - are granted liberty in the sense of Karl Jaspers. Professor Goriely has often and convincingly advocated the thesis that that is only possible if an East Federation is also established between the satellites of today.

Altmann

The Federal Republic, although it lost the Eastern part of Germany, is nevertheless heir of the Central-European tradition of Germany - despite the EEC and Western integration. Germany must try to live up to this role and I believe, too, that it is able to do so. I am convinced that the road to a political union can be taken if the Federal Republic is prepared to contribute a relinquishment of the territories on the other side of the Oder-Neisse Line. It is this renunciation that makes possible a Western European policy in direction of Central and East Europe at all because the prerequisite of any German East policy lies in the Western European policy of the Federal Republic.

Kogon

But that is a drawn-out process, you'll admit.

Mozer

Professor Kogon, I do not believe at that it would be a process of very long duration. It is, after all, not a case of renouncing reunification. The difficulty must rather be seen differently. As long as reunification is presented as only a German problem then no positive response to this policy can be evoked from anyone beyond the German borders. The three parties must know, after all, that reunification would not be accomplished under conditions today even if the Federal Republic were made into a second Ulbricht state. After all, Mr. Khrushchev does not want a Peking in the West too.

Altmann

One had hoped, Professor Kogon, that Mr. Erhard had travelled to Paris with the suggestion the question of political union be considered because the EEC cannot help us to progress in this regard. Otherwise, for example, we would have discussed at Brussels the experiment with trade delegations to the Slavic states, wouldn't we?

For this, the old tradition of the good relations of France with the Czechs and Poles, could help us along. Such a policy would have to forego maintaining a policy of tension in Central Europe as long as reunification is not effected. One would have to say, to the contrary, that the state structure of the DDR (German Democratic Republic) is the actual focus of tension in Central Europe because of its internal weakness. We must, therefore, try to isolate the so-called DDR in a new way, in order, with the help of our allies in Europe, to attain to a policy that makes possible a certain flexibility of action in Central Europe. This is important, and for the reason that here is the arena in which a differentiation between American and European policy appears possible.

Mozer

In that case the German argumentation in the reunification question would have to change. Based on it and because of it, German behaviour in the most important of contexts is contradictory, or at least foggy, at times ambiguous. In that way the Germans - even more than in the Oder-Neisse question - block the way to what they need.

Altmann

With that you rightly say, Mr. Mozer, that this state cannot keep up permanently a policy toward the East that is nationalistic, and toward the West intent upon total integration. We could still - even if not quite so strongly as in the farm policy - attempt to set our national field in order with the help of Western integration before a national wave threatens us.

If we could contribute the Central-European field to a sound European policy, we would achieve two things: first, a positive differentiation to the American policy and with it banning the danger that Germany be torn back and forth between increased and decreased tension without being able to move. Secondly, that we would view foreign policy toward the East not primarily from the standpoint of atomic weapons strategy. The latter, for Germany, is a great danger because in no event shall we dispose of atomic weapons.

In addition, the question of British policy would also be easier to solve. If it were possible to reach a really positive differentiation between the American and European policy, then Britain's place in the European policy would be completely self-evident. Many difficult and multi-strata questions would then be easier to solve.

Kogon

Dr. Altmann, I am very grateful to you for these suggestions - more we cannot achieve now.

It would really be well to talk things over with de Gaulle. That, too, would come within the framework of the Consultation Pact. De Gaulle would then receive a partner in those spheres which really interest him, without whom he cannot act in the long run anyway.

Gentlemen, permit me in conclusion to summarize the results of the discussion, adding perhaps a few complementary and supplementary remarks of my own.

First of all I thank you for the spirited participation in the talk, as well as for the patience you have shown.

The present road-block of efforts to bring about a solid and lasting supranational Political Union of European states overshadows progress towards unification made after one and one-half decades. The progress achieved is, nevertheless, noteworthy; it can, after all, no longer be reversed completely.

One or the other participant in this discussion is of the opinion that the EEC was a more or less wrong starting point for further development. It had diverted from things actually needed. It was incapable to effect a supranational union by itself.

The majority, however, is evidently of the opinion, that the interests of national economies and the major determinative groups of the population in them, insofar as they now oppose each other, can do so first and foremost because the principle of "Europe of the Fatherlands" proclaimed by de Gaulle has lastingly diminished the will to unity and the enthusiasm for unity.

The situation thus created can then be characterized as follows: the original federalist concept scheduling a closer political union on the continent and the association of Great Britain (as well as other interested states) - both federation and association within the extensive Atlantic Community - failed in the middle of 1954 with the ECD. The Messina talks of 1955 which led to the EEC in the Roman Treaties, resumed the initiative purely economically with the intention however, of getting back on the road to political union from there little by little: the policy of union was to be accomplished in and through the economy. It was hoped in such a way to effect the full participation of Great Britain, which actually expressed the wish to that effect in 1962.

General de Gaulle free to follow his own conception of foreign and defense policy, after cleaning up the Algerian problem, proclaimed his "Europe of the Fatherlands", that means, instead of the establishment of a supranational government authority, a Political Union directed only to closest cooperation of agencies, limited by the right of veto of member states, and beyond that, limited in territory to the Continent, for which the economic and the other Communities were to serve as a basis for power. The French proposal had as its purpose, therefore, in the long run, on a long-term basis, less than what is meant by the "Policy of Brussels" but more for the moment however, and this in speeded-up form, but excluding Great Britain, because de Gaulle views the possibility of a full and equal participation of the British in the work on the Continent as an illusion - an annoying democratic, i.e., retarding illusion for him, which in his opinion mistakes in especial the meaning of sovereign power (that in de Gaulle's view Great Britain had renounced in its relationship to the United States).

As a result the suspicion has gotten into and blocked the European will to unite, the suspicion that the French policy guided by de Gaulle strove for hegemony, a suspicion that appeared justified by other circumstances - above all by a reserve expressed clearly toward the United States and its claim to political world leadership.

In the general loss of direction that resulted from the "Europe" policy of de Gaulle, some advocated a policy of waiting to see how things might develop from now on. That, as a logical conclusion, would mean foregoing activity of one's own towards unification for the duration of the government of de Gaulle. The others desire continuing at least the efforts toward economic union, for which they would not like to see the prospects underestimated despite evident difficulties; according to their viewpoint, de Gaulle appreciates the wish that some further progress be brought about in the EEC. A third line of thought advocates the proposal to venture a limited Political Union as de Gaulle sees it, and with him; they expect more from an intensive cooperation than from an intentional abstention, which would only lead to a purely negative policy of reaction.

By reason of the French-German Consultation Treaty - and due to some other special circumstances - the Federal Republic sees itself placed in the position of playing a co-decisive role in reaching the decision, for the one or the other side. For this reason the Federal Republic, so it is argued, should develop a concrete plan. Naturally, it should not stand in complete opposition to the plan of de Gaulle.

If the Consultation Treaty results not only in first French steps toward Germany but also first steps in the other direction, it appears possible to influence de Gaulle with a view to bringing about what is necessary in history, practically leading beyond the sovereignty of the nation, and then even assuring the nation's existence in changed form.

For the Federal Republic especial cooperation with Great Britain appears advisable in order to get positive development moving again. The Erhard government with its anglophile tendency should not find this difficult. Britain and the Federal Republic are under the current pressure to find the link to the "Kennedy Round", that means, prevent that the EEC seal itself off from the rest of the world through its customs policy, even if only for a definite period of time; to the contrary, it must be accomplished that the prerequisites for world-wide cooperation in economic policy be established, especially between the United States and Europe. It is surely not a case to strive for perfect solutions but only to make it possible that a road useful to all be taken.

If the Federal Republic, in agreement with Great Britain, takes this road, it should be ready to make certain sacrifices itself. Some of you were of the opinion that such a willingness on the part of the Federal Republic to compromise should actually not be called sacrifice because the corresponding decisions were in the long-term interest of Germany, anyway, even in the sphere of farm policy; the EEC could render valuable aid in this regard. If, on the part of Bonn, one were to take the right first steps, then in the immediate future, development could become positive.

The political problems, all of them, that have to be solved, cannot be delimited to the sphere of EEC jurisdiction. In part they are in entirely different spheres; in part, although connected with the EEC, they go far beyond it. The opinion was not contradicted in our discussion that on the one hand one should not be spellbound by the problem or by the problems of European union, that on the other hand one should continue to orient oneself on the two principal problems of world policy: easing of tension between the opposing system and equalizing the conditions of existence between races and continents.

As concerns the non-belligere side-by-side and shoulder-to-shoulder, it includes possibilities of Central-European and Eastern-European policy, in which the Federal Republic must naturally be especially interested. I thought I could gather from the statements this evening that one is of the opinion some day to meet with a surprising appreciation of our standpoint on the part of de Gaulle in these connections.

A final summary statement is, therefore, surely not inappropriate that our discussion, at times somewhat roundabout and difficult, has brought to light some instructive aspects of the many-layered set of problems.

Körper

Gentlemen, it is almost two o'clock in the morning and after your comprehensive and discriminating summary, Professor Kogon, I should like to limit myself to a few sentences. I am happy that in this European debate we have kept to the political, economic and social realities and have not lapsed into Utopian ideas about possible goals of the EEC. Dealing with the question we were asked, "Where is the EEC Drifting?", it was clearly evolved that Europe has a comprehensive political responsibility, going beyond the profitability of the economy, not only for Europe's own sake but also for the sake of the world united with it. The Europe of the Six must, therefore, not result only because of economic judgment or social compulsion or for regional expediency. It was clearly expressed that the EEC cannot emerge from the present stage of stagnation despite all the economic progress made, if it permits itself to be guided by nothing but economic premises.

May the tasks of the Federal Republic and Great Britain, as emphasized and made clearly manifest in this discussion, going beyond former EEC objectives, be recognized and made use of by the offices responsible, in order that the EEC may make its contribution within a larger framework both towards easing tensions between East and West as well as towards the solution of the problem between North and South, in community with the countries affected. That this achievement calls - politically as also economically - for not only all creative and free forces of initiative, but also the principles of systematic planning is to be discussed in our next meeting of the Round Table, - with regard to the sphere of economic policy - and its topic "Planning in the Free Market Economy." Professor Salin, Basel, will hold the principal address. Under the direction of Professor Bombach, Basel, planning experts from various European countries will discuss it together.

I do believe that I can speak in your name if I cordially thank Mr. Kitzinger and Mr. Delcour for their addresses. I also want to thank our foreign guests for a precise exposition of the standpoints and

problems under the aspect of their countries. Not least I should like sincerely to congratulate our moderator today, Professor Kogon, for his disciplined leadership of the discussion.

The meeting was closed with the recommendation that the Thirteenth Round Table be invited for January 27, 1964, the topic to be "Planning in a Free Market Economy" (Principal Speaker: Professor Dr. Edgar Salin, Basel; Moderator: Professor Dr. Gottfried Bombach, Basel).