

PROTOCOL

Welcome

Körper

Gentlemen of the Bergedorf Round Table:

Permit me to welcome you most cordially, and to thank in particular Professor Gollwitzer for consenting to speak to us today. We are all very happy that Professor Kogon is tonight's Moderator.

The Bergedorf Round Table meets today for the fourth time. The purpose of this Round Table is to furnish a forum in which discussion may be critical, free, provocative; where the most differentiated of opinions may obtain a hearing. In this connection I should like to quote the Preamble of our Round Table:

The free world is founded upon the steadfastness and the self-knowledge of its partner countries, on definite social institutions, on common convictions and modes of behavior, and on a basic stock of moral and social norms of consciousness. The free world is founded upon industrial societies in differing stadia of development.

The Bergedorf Round Table has set itself the task to apprehend the requisites of these foundations and, in joint work, through reports and discussions as well as publications, objectively to clarify and promote solutions of primary economic, technical, social and pedagogic problems of today's societies in Europe and overseas.

As you can see, we want to essay, by means of comprehensive discussions, to individualize the West's self-comprehension. In the Preamble we set forth the fact that it was especially urgent the central problems of industrial society in the spheres of economy, technology and sociology be clarified objectively. These discussions should not wear themselves out in intellectual analyses and endless debates, after all, they should bring forth practical suggestions, suited to give new impulses and to accelerate the processes of industrial society.

All of us, whether we be in business, industry or science, ask ourselves: Where do we stand today? Where does the opponent stand? Where, if at all, can we meet today in a world completely divided ideologically? Where is it possible to reach an accord; where not? In the encounter between East and West, where do possible areas of understanding appear, breaking away from the friend-enemy pattern? I believe, that these questions, so compelling for a formulation of our Western self-comprehension, can no longer be slighted. We definitely must know what is happening in this world in the spheres of social policies, educational policies, technology and economy; and what will be or must be of importance for the shaping of our new industrial society. Technology and economy are determinative for our world today, and from them it receives its most essential impulse.

Because of this general situation, we here at Bergedorf, by means of a Foundation, have sought to make our contribution toward the clarification of these vitally important questions of social policies, and to endeavor new solutions. In the course of our experience in industry we have gained a store of knowledge. Of it, one insight stands foremost: the problem of coordinating the worker with the processes of production. But this problem cannot be viewed by itself; it is, purely and simply, a problem of our society.

This evening we shall delve into the question of the possibilities for reaching an accord in our divided world, and, I believe, Professor Gollwitzer will be able to tell us something essential regarding this subject. I would be most happy, if we avoided ideological schisms, and instead attained to practical and practicable proposals. May I, in this spirit, ask you, Professor Gollwitzer, to begin your talk.

Gollwitzer

The question what issues the development of society in the East hold for us is one that continuously occupies every person in the West, the most primitive as well as the most informed; he continuously takes sides, knowingly or unknowingly, negatively or more positively. And whoever is caught up in the maelstrom of his thoughts on these issues is very happy to be able to discuss them in a forum like this Round Table; he confidently expects enrichment of his knowledge for the endeavor, renewed daily, to grope for answers to the questions posed by our topic. In any event, I speak as one who has not concluded, has not arrived at conclusive opinions, and has not done so perhaps for the reason he is impressed by a steady succession of change, in truth, therefore, a process in which evidently there are no fixed points and no completions. This lecture would have an entirely different aspect, if in my stead a sociologist or a political economist had been asked to present it. Why the theologian - the Christian, Protestant theologian - must concern himself with the problem, not only as a citizen and a member of human society and a contemporary, but especially in the course of his profession as a theologian, this I do not want to attempt to prove in an introductory remark; rather will it become evident in the course of the lecture, so that the admonition: "Cobbler, stick to your last!" will, I hope, prove not applicable. But, the fact that I speak as a theologian will naturally make my remarks subject to rectification and supplementation on hand of the better information, say, a sociologist can furnish. I do speak as someone who spent some years in the Soviet Union at the time of Stalin, but since then has not been back to Russia, has frequently been to the DDR (East Zone Puppet State) and to East Berlin, several times to Czechoslovakia - someone, who, in Berlin occupies himself continuously and daily in many ways with the problems of the people in the Eastern world.

Due to the fact that I - as mentioned - am speaking not as a sociologist, the word "social" must be understood in a very wide sense, that is, from the aspect of humanhood, from the aspect of the manifold relationships between human beings and between the individual and society, over there in the East. We must make a conscious effort - at least that is what I have to do - to maintain the point of observation I am now about to propose, especially at a time such as we have gone through in recent weeks, when a reaction of disgust is more natural, and there are reasons enough for such a reaction, but I do not want to enumerate them now. The whole matter is a question of confidence; I can only ask you to trust me, when I say that I speak to you as one whose reaction to what he sees daily in Berlin is not one whit different than that of probably any of us. This situation - and we must realize what this situation is, as evidenced today under the Soviet compulsion of the superbomb and in view of the Berlin Wall, which, per se, could be worse if it were not for the whole reign of terror taking place behind the Wall - this situation holds us spellbound, perhaps it touches us with fear, we find ourselves impelled to a concentration of our forces, with clenched teeth, impelled to draw clear-cut lines of battle. Thinking along such clear-cut lines of battle is understandable; there are phenomena in history at which we have to draw the line, and open-mindedness toward these phenomena would be considered problematical, and rightly so. I call to mind the reactions of many of us vis-a-vis National Socialism in that we refused - and looked with suspicion on those that did not refuse - to be impartial in distinguishing between good and evil motives, etc. There are situations, in which it is necessary to draw the line, a line simplifying the situation. I can understand that many today consider it necessary to draw the line at Communism because of its repulsive features. It appears to me that the process of thinking along clear-cut lines of battle, measuring everything with the same last, is justified in transitional phases. Anent such phases, the Preacher Solomon said: "Be not righteous over much; neither make thyself over wise."

But, whoever persists in thinking along clear-cut battle-lines after completion of transitional phases as was Stalinism, in my opinion, is in danger - so it appears to me - of thinking along purely defensive lines and of being unable to focus on the reality of the opposite side. In mentioning the drawing of the line at Hitler, I touched upon an issue I do not want to pursue further today: we block our path to an answer to the question regarding similarity and dissimilarity between National Socialism and Communism, if we work with the term "totalitarianism". It is a term that has had its day, I think. Not in an attempt to find allies do I here quote Walter Dirks, who some time ago, in the "Frankfurter Hefte" wrote, one should realize the need for differentiating between the accession to power of a few gangsters with purely negative results, such as was the case with National Socialism (we may not have known it in 1933 but definitely in 1945) and a phenomenon in world history, an impulse for development, as is Communism, after all. Such a differentiation I see endangered, if we are satisfied with the macerating word "totalitarianism". To me it would be the same as if a Christian theologian, in the clash with the religion of the Mohammedans, were satisfied, say, with the viewpoint that Mohammed was a very dubious character, enriched himself and, in any case, was one of the most

repulsive of religious founders in world history. All of us realize that in this wise we cannot cope with the great phenomenon which is Islam.

A mortally dangerous lack of communication exists between East and West today. The Wall in Berlin and through Germany has intensified this lack of communication. This is particularly obvious to someone directly affected, someone who can no longer cross over to the other side, and can no longer exchange opinions with the various people with whom he previously held discussions. Who, among you, has ever spoken to Communists, or is in direct contact with them? Which Communist - except diplomatic contact - is in direct communication with non-Communist persons? The lack of communication results in our merely talking about each other and in substituting images for realities. During the past years, in the course of the Berlin crisis, people in West Germany asked again and again, whether it is possible to conclude treaties with Communists and have them honored in a fairly normal way. Communists to whom I talked over there told me again and again - and they are persons in whose attitude we are interested, persons with whom one can talk that they had the same intense battle in their own circles, the circles of leading functionaries: that treaties could not be concluded with capitalists, monopolists, because monopolists had no ethical principles. I mention this merely as a small example of how engrossed we are with the mental image we have of each other and about each other. The lack of communication has its source in a mixture of fear, inferiority complexes, and pharisaism, equally in evidence on both sides. We are in a similar situation as the Christians and Jews for centuries past - although intermingling in daily life - a situation similar to the long cold war behind the Iron Curtain between the Occident and the Turks; as the Christians and the Moslems; and also as the Catholics and Protestants, who have co-existed side by side, i. e., each side in the self-evident consciousness that no sane person could belong to the other side, that membership on the other side could only be due to irrational indoctrination or to opportunism and hypocrisy. Lack of communication fosters lack of realization that the justice of our cause is relative. It is only when we sit down with our partner and talk to him in *propia persona* that things change in appearance.

For the nonce, Communism presents itself to us as the opposite side. Whoever has occupied himself a long time with Communism, has gone through periods in which he himself agreed in thought with those that doubt, whether the issues held by Communism are really genuine and worth considering. Did he not think that the whole thing is a rather antiquated tale stemming from the production of isms of the 19th Century which we - as the other development of society- have long ago transcended? Exemplifying the people who cannot simplify matters, who cannot evade the issues held by Communism, I should like to mention a group of people especially dear to me as I daily have to think for them - they are the Christians behind the Iron Curtain. Naturally, I chose this group and the conflicts in which they have been placed because, as mentioned, I have close ties with them; but also because I believe that each one of us, no matter what his personal attitude toward religion, can benefit from deliberating on their situation. The people in question are people who cannot become Communists - due to Communism itself and due, unlike National Socialism, to its unequivocal attitude: rejection of religion in any form, no matter what is meant by the word in individual cases. The people in question are a group in agreement with us regarding decisive value judgments, for whom we may presuppose this agreement. No matter what our personal attitude toward the Christian tradition and the Christian message, those who profess adherence to the free world will coincide in certain standards of value judgments which are conjoined - not exclusively but additionally - with the Christian faith: in the conviction of the worth of the individual; that the individual is to be valued more highly than the species - the conviction of the necessity of a dynamic relationship between the individual and the community; that, therefore, the individual must not be considered solely as a function of the community and must not lose himself completely in this function for the community - the conviction of the objectivity of justice, behind which perhaps hides in secularized form the memory of the Christian conviction that justice does not emanate from the people; that justice is not what subserves the people, but instead that God is Lord over justice, or, expressed non-religiously, that justice is something beyond the reach of our arbitrariness, something above us. Thus, there are some things - I hope I may presume so which we can from the very beginning assume that the Christians in the East, insofar as they are Christians, cannot but profess. These are, to say it in a plainer fashion, the ten commandments teaching respect for the life of your neighbor, as expressed in the commandments of the second table, the fourth to the tenth, and respect for that which is above us and beyond the influence of our arbitrariness, such as the commandments of the first table, the first to the third. This, therefore, makes the Christians over there persons related to us, on whom we may count to think in a similar manner as we, even though their surroundings appear more and more exotic to us. The Iron Curtain has descended behind these Christians. They no longer are given the choice of red or dead. As lean state from personal experience, they are horrified to hear remarks of common currency with us, among a people that, after all, lived twelve years in accordance with the slogan "better brown than

dead", (Catholics, Protestants, employers, officers, professors, etc.!). I shall read a few such remarks. Wilhelm Röpke (in an address "How To Deal with Bolshevism", held in 1960). He speaks of the Bolshevistic system, which has gained ascendancy over there and has destroyed the very foundations of the spiritual-moral existence of man, now threatening to complete this destruction throughout the world. "This danger, the destruction of the spiritual-moral preconditions of human existence in the whole world, is infinitely greater than the danger from nuclear weapons because the destruction of morals and the soul is incomparably more terrible than physical destruction, a destruction which, in the natural course of events, we have to look bravely in the eye, anyway." Or, to quote a Christian voice - Karl Thieme in his latest book "Biblical Religion". "The sudden atom death of millions together with all its concomitants would not be so gruesome, from a moral standpoint, as would the successive conforming to Marxism, through terror, of all, up to now, non-communist humanity. This murder of souls on a uniquely gigantic scale perforce makes the answer to the alternative "Kremlin or crematorium" in the end "crematorium". And at that, Karl Thieme has the courage to quote the Sermon on the Mount: "If thy eye offend thee, pluck it out". The Christians over there have decided not to choose suicide, just as many of our comrades did not choose suicide in 1945, and I speak of them with respect. They did so, not out of cowardice - perhaps cowardice plays a psychological role in individual cases - in any event, they also did so because they are Christians and are, therefore, purely and simply enjoined from choosing suicide.

My suggestion is the following - please do not interpret this as the doing of violence of a theologian that, with a little bit of imagination, I transpose myself into their existence over there. This appears to me to be of value in the cause of obtaining scientific knowledge. If we strive for an *emunctae naris*, i. e., rid ourselves of everything we have ever held against the society over there, have enumerated everything that is wrong with Marxism, everything we abhor; and do so until we have nothing more to say, until we are out of breath, then and only then shall we have reached the point at which those over there begin their day, the basis of their thinking and if we are to place ourselves in their position, it must also be the basis of our thinking. For those, who, like myself, find it difficult quietly to accept a division of our nation for a longer period of time, it might be a likely idea that, with this division, our nation has been given the task to take part in both halves of the world. Just as the Christian church exists in both halves of the world, the same is happening to us Germans. My excellent colleague, Professor Martin Fischer of Berlin, once made a remark which strikes near home: "Whoever cannot think politically for his opponent, cannot, in the present situation, think politically at all." For this reason I have transposed the topic of my address, "What Issues Does The Development of Society in The East Hold for Us", into two questions. 1. What issues does the development of society in their environment hold for the people in the East, those people to whom we feel related, as for instance, the Christians in the East? 2. What issues does the life of, not the Communists or the fellow-travellers, etc., but rather of these Christians as non-Communists above suspicion, by reason of their experiences and their unending conflict, hold for us in the West? Or, what is the hope in which the people over there exist? In replying, we must cast our eyes a little further than the DDR, in the hope that the regime there may have been surmounted in a few years or decades. We do well to look at the Soviet Union, and in doing so, I do not lecture empirically and can state how far the thinking of the Christians there has progressed. My remarks are supported by the tendencies I personally observed among them.

The above-mentioned question is not only put to them but also to every non-Communist person in the entire sphere over there. Many of them exist without hope. Their only hope is outlasting the regime; but as this hope steadily decreases with increasing stabilization of the Bolshevistic system, it is a hopeless existence. It might be, that the Christian, too, be thrust into such an existence. In such a case he will most likely be equipped to survive, for he has the hope of eternity, he looks beyond decades and centuries. For him, even the existence in a world in which he cannot hope for amelioration is not a hopeless one. But the instant he becomes active over there, he will have to ask, beyond his religious hope, whether there is hope of change within historical development. If I now speak of these hopes, I must first say I am not making prognoses. There is a difference between inquiring and looking for chances, and making prognoses. A prognosis would, at the least, mean: probably things will happen in such a way, or things can't develop in any other way. In my case, they would not be optimistic prognoses, for we have had enough experience always to include negative possibilities in our calculations. I shall formulate the negative possibilities right off: in the sentences quoted from Wilhelm Röpke, he indicates that, in his opinion, Communism is an irreversible doom. In his book about the atom bomb, Karl Jaspers goes into more detail to prove the alternative between nuclear suicide and mass murder, and the Bolshevistic murder of souls: unlike previous dictatorships, which humanity has always survived, a Communist dictatorship, due to its destruction of the soul, the transformation of men into puppets and termites, into a termite society, meant such an excision of all

motives innate in men leading to a development toward freedom, such as has step by step gained the ascendancy in the course of European history, that for an indefinite future time, a regeneration of humanity would be out of the question. Röpke, in the address quoted, barefacedly and without logic, contradicts at the end what he says at the beginning of his talk, in that in the closing sentences he finds himself impelled to say that it is our highest duty to offer resistance to totalitarianism "until red totalitarianism, too, shall have gone the way of all presumption, and until it again shall have been proven, that this totalitarianism cannot exterminate men either ("the human in humans"), until some day the tremendous tensions and antinomies of Communism become publicly evident, until things occur that have not been foreseen in the timetable of dialectical materialism, because only God knows, how everything will end." It is with such sentences, as those with which Röpke concludes, that the Christian would have to start thinking. In my opinion, it would be part of the Christian faith in the incarnation of God, a faith that here becomes massively and freshly important, to reject the possibility so paralyzingly predicted in the sentences quoted from Thieme and Röpke, namely, that it might be possible permanently to transform people into a termite state. The Utopian novels of various sorts bestowed upon us in recent years heighten this panic in us. But we here in the West should immediately remind ourselves self-critically, that no perfect and lasting realization of Orwell's "1984" has up to now been achieved. If one looks for such a realization, one will find it for a time in Stalin's Russia, but in like manner, if not more so, in Santo Domingo under Trujillo with the support of the Catholic Church and U. S. capital, i. e., in the very midst of the Western world, the more's the pity. We, therefore, ask ourselves - placing ourselves in the position of the people over there - what immanent factors within history can they include in their calculations in order to give their planned activity in the society over there not only an eschatological hope, i. e., a hope emanating from the final things of faith, but also a hope within history. The factors of liberalization in Soviet society have been discussed so often in literature that I should like not to go into detail here. Whoever left Russia in 1950, as I did, did not consider conceivable many of the changes that have since taken place, and my report on Russia ("And Carry Thee Whither Thou Wouldest Not") expressly considered this as inconceivable. I consider it an inadequacy of the otherwise very readable book of Wolfgang Leonhard: "Kremlin Without Stalin", that he did not differentiate more precisely between the terms "democratization" and "liberalization". For us in the West they are closely conjoined. We recognize a genuine liberalization only then when opposition parties, etc., are possible. During the Khrushchev era, no democratization took place - at least not in the Western sense of the world. The party succeeded, after a critical phase, to take the reins energetically and firmly into its hands. I met a smart Russian Christian, who, during a talk alone with me, asked me (after I had inquired, whether his hopes in a far-reaching democratization had not been disappointed, hopes such as had been harbored in 1955-1956): "What should I, as a Russian, hope for? In how far should I, as a Russian, regret the securing of the rule of the party? What I regret regarding this development is clear to you: that the tightening of the reins by the party also means that it is tightening the reins in its anti-religious position, in repressing scientific discussion, in repressing authors, and in curtailing the liberty of the church. But, as a Christian, I must, after all, think about my people. The party is the only factor for the maintenance of law and order in the far reaches of the Soviet Union. If the party disintegrates, then we shall find ourselves in a terrible chaos. That I cannot wish. Our path toward improvement of conditions, I say it as a Christian who rejects dialectical materialism, leads via the party and not via the disintegration of this party."

This brings me to a second question: Is a dissolution of the unity between Communism and atheism conceivable? This, too, is not alone a question of interest to the theologian as his hobby, namely, because the total rejection of Communism of the church - beginning with Marx and Engels - is an expression of its claim to absolutism, absolute in a twofold meaning, i. e., possessed of absolute truth and having an absolute objective. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world variously, what matters is changing it", - the famous Marx sentence, the eleventh Feuerbach thesis, in which "changing" (my interpretation, and it does not agree with that of some of the other Marx experts), means a real, total change of human society in the interpretation of the word by young Marx, that Communism is the solution of the enigma of man's history. It, thus, is the messianic claim of Communism, the veritable claim to salvation which forces it to apply terror and to take into its hand the control over the entire spiritual life. A dissolution of the union between Communism and atheism, thus, is extremely interesting, even for those who are atheists, because it is the clearest expression of the self-contingency of Communism, i. e., of the fact that Communism realizes the possibilities for change are limited; that in approaching the goal, the absolute vision has shrunken and become a relative vision, due to the sobering effect that the act of approaching a goal always has. Some time previous to the Wall, I had a talk with a friend from the PoW Camp, whom I esteem, and who is a highly placed functionary over there, in the DDR - son of a Catholic father. He told me, without knowing anything definite about my own ideas on the subject, that is, being uninfluenced by me, that he asks his tovarich colleagues (he, himself, is a Marxist atheist) what they meant by "militant atheism" - that's a

Lenin formula - as a task of the party? I must mention that previously about 100 persons were invited by the Lord Mayor of Karl Marx City (Chemnitz) to a discussion on the subject of "Relationship Between Church and State in the DDR", including members and officials of the church, members of the "labor intelligentsia" and of the government of the DDR. During the discussion, my friend, who is a deputy in the People's Chamber of Deputies, had claimed that Marxism did not at all pose the question regarding God. Whereupon we told him: "Then you are a Marxist such as we wish for the future, but you are not an up-to-date Marxist". And immediately he and a professional politician of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of the East Zone) locked horns, when the politician claimed that it was of the essence for Marxism to believe in the eradication of religion without, however, having to bring this about by administrative means. Well, to make a long story short, he told me afterwards, while driving home, that he asked his tovarich colleagues again and again: "Why do you harp on this militant atheism? You're no longer enemies of religion, religion is something that doesn't interest you in the least; you too are of the opinion that for the foreseeable future, there will be Christians and miscellaneous religions in the sphere of the Eastern bloc, and in your daily life as functionaries, you do try to find a modus vivendi for your relationship with these Christians. Your anti-religionism is an inherited ritual. Isn't it a question that no longer interests us in the least? We want to improve the relations and the conditions of men. If, however, there are people among us, who believe in a transcendental God, and they draw strength from such a belief, that's up to them."

A second example: the editors of "Nova Kultura", a Polish Communist periodical, in 1957 held an internal discussion on the question of religion. In the course of this discussion it was found that up to now, efforts to eliminate religion in Poland had essentially failed. How to do it better? Leszek Kolakowski, a well-known young Marxist philosopher, was among those present. All agreed, that as a matter of course, a Marxist had to reject religion, until someone asked the following thought-provoking question: He had the impression, all of them had failed to consider that the status of religion within society had changed completely. Religion and the church - as had been believed in Marxism up till then - had been deprived of their function in the transition to socialism, namely, the function of serving as a front for class rule. Wasn't it true, after all, that due to the loss of this function, religion and the church were to wither on the vine of socialist society; interest in religion and the church was to become dormant. But religion had not been deprived of its real function, rather had it been freed of a heavy burden. In socialist society, religion could no longer be exploited as a front for class society and as a justification for conditions resulting in class exploitation. Thereby, it had been freed of a burden and now, in a purer form, it could be what it actually should be. And for this reason Marxism could not overcome religion; yes, even the effort to commit oneself to this task was perhaps unworthy of a Marxist, then, namely, when historical materialism, in its nucleus, meant to give the future a chance to evolve something new. This, naturally, is a novel definition for an expert in historical materialism, but you, gentlemen, see what marginal possibilities appear. And, at that, I by no means want to suppress the fact that, at the moment in the Soviet Union - approximately for the past six months, and in the other Eastern states for the past two years, already - we note what looks more like a reverse trend in the strict anti-religious treatment accorded church groups.

Nevertheless, the question remains: is a dissolution conceivable? At this point, a very popular discussion concerning the constants of Marxism would start up among Marx experts, i. e., a discussion as to which characteristics are essential characteristics of Communism, so that, were they eliminated, one could no longer speak of Communism as Communism. When I wrote my report on Russia, I was convinced that the terror of a secret police constituted an essential characteristic of Communism. This, my conviction, has been shaken. Today I could not name an essential characteristic of Communism other than the socialization of the means of production. As long as this is given, we have the right to speak of Communism as Communism, and Communism has the right to call itself Communism. Everything else can change. In this connection, I should like to point out - I hope not to fatigue you overly much with philosophy - that the content of meaning of a thing, the differentiation between substance and accidentality - whether, thus, a quality is accidental and can be eliminated without detrimentally affecting the essence, or whether a quality is substantial and is part and parcel of the content of meaning of a thing - is Aristotelian. I have nothing against Aristoteles, but this differentiation is conceived without a time reference, not in a history reference. Does a Communism fulfill the content of meaning of Communism when there no longer is a secret police, no longer exercising terror, when Communism does not live in absolute opposition to a bourgeois world, renounces the dogmatization of atheism and does not permit historical and dialectical Marxism to weigh heavy upon all spiritual life as an inflexible, dogmatic world-view doctrine? That, in my opinion, is a nonsensical question from a Marxist standpoint because Marx thought in terms of history. If that is true, then there is no timeless substance plus accidentalisms that can be dropped, but rather a movement such as Communism

passes through history, and one cannot say which qualities in evidence during the growth and transitional phases will be retained during later periods.

The relationship between Communism and religion is a central problem of Communist policy. The dossier on this has not yet been closed. The self-imposed limitation of modern science (we all take part insofar as we pursue science), which inhibits modern science from furnishing a universal world image, will also react to undermine Communism's faith in science. The question can today be read in Soviet newspapers, what, after all, makes opposition to religion a requisite, now that the churches in the Soviet Union have sufficiently and convincingly proven their loyalty to the Soviet state during the Great Patriotic War and during the subsequent years of reconstruction. The answer, which is always forthcoming, is the reply of the unbridgeable chasm between science and religion. But they can't use this argument indefinitely.

Merely in passing I should like to mention a further factor of great importance and suited to dissolve the claim of absolutism of the party that anchors in the alleged possession of absolute truth. While we were still speaking of "the" Communism and thus doing the party the favor of viewing it as the monolithic structure which it would like to be and remain, various forms of Communism have evolved, differing among each other in the varying degree of personal liberty granted, of discussion allowed within and without the party, simultaneously in the differing degree of interest in that anchoring of the political-social program of change in a universal anti-religious world view. This process of differentiation, of which we are interested eye-witnesses, shows how a static conception of Communism can lead astray, whereas the inner, wordly hope of people under Communism is directed especially to this process, wherein, then, is based their own responsibility, too.

Then, and this brings me finally to the last factor, no prediction being possible about its magnitude of effect, but is the most important for the Christians themselves. It is the effect immanent in their own being as a Christian community within a Communist world. These Christian communities are still extant, Communism has by no means eradicated them, although their church management has, in a political reference, been conformed to Marxism, but the dissemination of the Christian message, the church services, the unity of the communities, the Christian witnessing in individual life, in the family, in the factory, on the collective farm, continues. Insofar as this witnessing is genuine, it is a continued contradiction of the Marxist religious theory, showing, as it does, that this faith does not wither in the transition to the socialist society; that its function in the life of man can by no means be circumscribed accurately by the image of opium; that this faith does not incapacitate for participating in the work and progress of science; the reverse is true, it liberates the mind for new knowledge, more so than the official party doctrine with its science cult.

Under this supposition, that liberalizing factors begin to function, that means: factors permitting room for freedom and deviation and independent thought, even in the stage in which the party still holds a tight rein; and under the further supposition that rejection of religion as obligatory dogma of the party, its members and its policies, is not the final word in the history of Communism, the people over there, whom I have chosen as an example, are perturbed over the question, whether possibly Communism, in spite of it all, has attained a better starting position in the law and order it admittedly has created for the solution of the social problems of the second half of the 20th Century and in the transition to the 21st Century. The very question indicates that there is a multiplicity of common problems they face over there, as we do here. Thus, a Russian diplomat, for example, told me some time ago: "The problem of the prosperous society will cause us trouble, too, in the foreseeable future". For this reason he was studying the exaggerations of the prosperous society in the West with special attention, i. e., not pharisaically, moralistically, as I had previously heard from Communists. Nota bene: I hope all of us realize that counter to what Wilhelm Röpke indicated in the address I quoted, Communism by no means constitutes the elimination of all moral order in human society, but rather is a highly moral system. What grates on the nerves over there is not the dissolution of morals of which in fact the prisoner of war could observe evidence (I surmise, the Soviet prisoner of war in Germany no less) but the penetrating moralism and idealism, the leading-strings type of kindergarden system, to which the entire population is subjected. In this connection, read the book of Nowack, recently published in the Scherz Verlag, Berne, "Tovarich, The Future Belongs to Us". The author probably is a Czech, who spent several years in the Soviet Union and reports on most interesting conversations, having more opportunities for such talks than a normal visitor or a diplomat in the Soviet Union. As a Western Slav or a Western man, he evidently then turned his back on this society, horrified. What plagued him was the moralism, behind which, of course, although not so much in evidence as formerly, stands the secret police as an additional intimidation.

And now, I just want to try to list the questions which are put to us from over there - repeatedly, the asking is completely insecure, groping, but frequently it is done with a considerable degree of certainty.

In the course of the years we observed (this is valid for the inhabitants of the DDR, too, although, of course, the collectivization campaign in agriculture in the Spring of 1960 constitutes a certain gap) that the attraction of the West has decreased. In making this statement I am not thinking so much of the young people who yearn for St. Pauli (The Vieux Carré in New Orleans would be comparable) because they do not have anything like it over there, precisely because of morality, instead I am thinking of the serious people, who render accounts to themselves, among the younger people, too, perhaps our Christian students - I talked with many of them. They returned to their homes in the East after visiting the West and came to the conclusion: "We'd rather be here!" If one delved deeper after reasons, the answers were in part very individual - perhaps that over there they had a fixed circle of persons, united by secret bonds, in which they were secure, or that they, as Christians, had a definite task over there, a task they expressly avowed in their daily contact with Marxists, as well as with churchgoers, etc. But, there were additional things - considerations that might lead us to the further question at which I should only like to hint: in how far we have really left socialism (in the broader meaning of the word) behind us. This conviction is actually widespread among us, including former socialists and Communists: the repudiation of socialism by Eastern socialism and the prosperity development in the West, the success in preventing major economic crises, etc., have caused socialism over here, in its various variations to become a matter for sects, further caused nonCommunist Marxists to dwindle to small groups, who fight with their backs against the wall - both inside and outside of the Socialist Party in West Germany forcing the Socialist Party in West Germany to become a socialist people's party because socialism has lost its sales appeal for the masses. Well, now, over there, while a prisoner of war, I noted a change in morals - and here I do not mean "morals" in the sense of absolute ethics, but rather convictions changing within the framework of history. If one of you were to return, say, from an expedition to Africa with a negro slave purchased there - Saudi Arabia allegedly still has a slave trade - then your priest or your pastor would call you to accounts and tell you, that you could not keep a slave. Having a slave is, for us, a moral disqualification, while at the time of Paul the Apostle, it was not so, even among Christians, as you know. The same negative moral reaction we experience as concerns slavery, the people in the East do - and widely so - regarding private capitalism. When I told a very interested and friendly Russian officer in the PoW Camp about the family of my wife, and mentioned that her brother, whom I had confirmed, was now starting to work in the factory of his uncle so that someday he could take it over, he showed surprise and then said: "What is your own attitude? Don't you consider it wrong, that someone you trained as a Christian will become an exploiter?" This is valid, not only for the workers in state-owned factories, who continue to complain but would strictly reject, so I am informed, a reprivatization of their state-owned factory; it is also valid for the attitude of the public in general. The difficulty of East and West understanding each other is that our attitude toward the great vision of socialism is different. For us - even those of us who are for it - it has become a very shaky and doubtful thing. Over there it is a self-explanatory moral quality, so to speak, which one views critically and wishes to improve, but does not want to eliminate.

Those non-Communist people over there, who should be taken seriously, already today are frequently of the opinion that they can, to a great extent, avow the basic lines of the system of order in the East because they consider it a better road to (1) the regulation of the relationship between production and consumption - banning the consumption whip, a much discussed problem of American society; (2) make man feel he spiritually "belongs" in the community. The community, of course, is a major problem in the Soviet Union, too. Stalin's tactics were, on the one hand to undermine natural communities, while, on the other - that was one of the inner contradictions of Stalin's time - fortify the family at the same time. Now, over there, co-responsibility in the plant and in individual activities of society, in the Komsomol, etc., is growing, as a communitybuilding factor, in the measure that strict supervision and distrust, which made men into wolves, cease in favor of a freer discussion. And (3) for mastering armaments and war. As I lack sufficient knowledge, I do not here dare to decide whether lack of willingness for genuine disarmament negotiations on the part of the West - I call to mind the articles of Theo Sommer in the "Zeit" of nine months ago - is due (as the Marxist would automatically say) to the armament industry or the money interests; whether these can so manipulate society as does, for instance, the totalitarian - I here use the term advisedly government of the East, let this remain a moot question, but in any event, as regards the problem of disarmament, over there foreign-political and armament-political considerations do not precede in the same measure economic-political and social-political considerations as is the case here in the Western system.

A further question is whether Marxism - i. e., the Marxist form of socialism - is really obsolete in its theory, its analysis, and its diagnosis of capitalism. It appears to us antiquated, when we consider the industrially progressive countries - the United States, the northern countries of Europe, the Federal Republic. The Marxist would reply, that his Marxism is still correct in the light of the world situation. In that case the prosperous white countries constitute the bourgeoisie of humanity, faced by the impoverished proletariat of humanity in the under-developed nations of the earth, these at the point of explosion. But also within the highly industrialized Western countries, the proletarian situation as analyzed by Marx - the Marxist would say - was still extant with the dehumanizing effects of class division which, by the way, also had a dehumanizing effect on the owner class pocketing the profits, for Marx states that not only the proletariat is dehumanized and alienated but equally so the capitalist, because he profits by reason of the class situation and for that very reason does not attain to real humanhood, as is possible only in a classless community, according to Marx's conviction. One cannot counter, as we do to a great extent in Western Marx criticism, that the theory of impoverishment has proven erroneous. The new textbook of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union underlines the fact that the theory of impoverishment is not a Marxist theory. Marx does not prophecy categorically that the proletarian misery will increase and increase and that the people will get less and less to eat, rather that a relative deterioration of labor's situation within the total society takes place, and in three directions; first, insofar as its share of total income decreases continuously, even if individually the standard of living rises; secondly, insofar as labor's influence on the shaping of society decreases, also as a result of the relative increase in the standard of living, because thereby labor can exert less and less pressure on the rest of society; and thirdly, insofar as through industrial development the work itself is dehumanized in an increased measure, and the pressure of work increased. In addition, the insecurity of proletarian existence was not eliminated. Whether, in a private economy society, it would be permanently possible to prevent crises, concerning this question a discussion is at present in progress among Soviet sociologists and national-economists, a very interesting discussion, and, in comparison with former times - with the "Varga Discussions" of 1946-47 - surprisingly liberal and undogmatic. For the present, the Marxists do not believe that we can permanently master the tendency to cyclical crises.

A further argument for the continued validity of Marxism: alienation had not been eliminated. What is meant is that man does not live in his work and must therefore use up his strength and a great part of his lifetime in order to live outside of his work, so that in his work he is an alienated person. We naturally point out immediately, how very much in evidence is alienation in Soviet society, just as it is a symptom of industrial labor in general. The answer we receive is: if forms of alienation in industrial work do appear (assembly line, automation, etc.) they are checked in the socialist system and equalized by the different position of workers in the plant. They admit that this has not satisfactorily been possible due to the effect of Lenin's decision, the plant has to be managed monarchically and not by a workers council. In the above respect, the most confident of all are the Yugoslav Marxists because through their workers councils, etc., they, in fact, have attained to a much stronger participation of the worker in the entire life of the plant.

This is followed by the question concerning the ability for reform of capitalism. 1. References to the socially progressive development in the main countries of the West are not so effective as we believe, due to the forms of alienation that have not been overcome. 2. The reference to the voluntary de-colonialization is immediately countered by the question in how far this de-colonialization is purely formal and goes hand in hand with the attempt to maintain the former economic dependence, camouflaged as much as possible, and for this, Katanga is an example that is always mentioned. A Russian diplomat, with whom I was able to talk after August 13, told me sarcastically: "What would have happened if Dag Hammarskjöld had been shot down over an Eastern country, or had crashed with the suspicion that he had been shot down? What proof would thereby have been rendered how disgusting communism is! Now, Dag Hammarskjöld, one of the irreplaceable people of the world, crashed in Katanga; the suspicion that he had been shot down was voiced; yet up to today, there is no real investigating commission! The tears for Dag Hammarskjöld have not made the reasons behind the entire Katanga problem any more evident than before." 3. Skepticism regarding the ability for reform of capitalism is heightened by the character of Christianity as facade, due to the lack of protests, say, on the part of missionary organization against colonial exploitation. Whoever knows how matters stand in Rhodesia and in the Central African Federation, and is a friend of the Christian missionary organization, is deeply grieved over the failure of many Christian groups. If one uses as an argument the socially progressive encyclicals of the Pope, the Catholic Christian is shamed by the counterquestion, where, in those countries in which the Catholic church has decisive influence, it became the prime mover for the realization of these social doctrines, in the same measure as the

communist party, when acceding to power, became the prime mover for the realization of its program.

Finally, the last question: Do we have a positive vision to offer for the society of the future? This is not identical with the question, whether the West has an idea; after all, this question is often asked over here, and it is recommended that the answer be: Thank goodness, no, - then, namely, if by "idea" is meant a monopolistically ruling ideology, such as the East has. But we live in a time of the spread of Western technical civilization over the entire earth, the advance into space, the time of the one boat in which all humanity sits, as well as the time of rapid social developments, and finally, of the population explosion. The question is, whether a guiding vision, of whatever sort it might be, not a dogmatic, tyrannical vision but a guiding vision for action, is possible and present over here. If I see correctly, then the vision which we face, with which we go on stage, is evolved out of our tradition: parliamentary democracy as a state order, a progressive private economy; which increases the standard of living of the masses; the right of the individual to security under law; and freedom from arbitrariness within the limits of the law (a law as liberal as possible). That is a tradition which all of us probably profess, but we find, that it does not have the same force of convincing people outside of our tradition. And this is due, if I see things correctly, not only to the sins which we ourselves continuously commit against this vision, but also that every Western system, when it finds itself in a tight spot, limits liberty, has recourse to Fascist methods, etc., just as the East does in the service of its revolutionary idea and in the interest of preservation of its system. In this regard, I am thinking more of the dissolution of binding norms for the entire society as a result of our individualism, accompanied by a nihilistic philosophy and literature (and "nihilism" is not a value judgment for me). This means an enormous spiritual ostracism of the individual. At our side, we have the Russian solution, in which - in my opinion - Communism had an auxiliary but not the sole function, and in which the transition through Western individualism was not completed. This very fact makes the idea, that we might have to live over there, so unpleasant for us Western people. But it would be no less unpleasant for us, if we were forced to live in a mediaeval city or with an African tribe. For the very thing, which is so dear to us, liberty of the individual, in our Western sense of the word, did not exist in the two other historical forms. It is a bitter realization for us that this, our liberty, is not in the same measure an inducement to people on the edge of starvation, and people with a different tradition. The propaganda advantage (but not in propaganda alone), which the East, much to our sorrow, today has among the "young nations", i. e., nations not yet industrialized, appears to me to lie in the Eastern offer to these nations that, in order to reach an existence worthy of man, they do not have to pass through the complicated forms of Western individualism, so dear to us but for them more likely repellent.

That is a short, by no means exhaustive, compilation of questions, but nevertheless it is already too long. In conclusion I should like to say merely this, that we bestow thought on all these things, in a situation, in which our nation takes part in the development in both blocs, and in which the people governing on both sides of our nation know nothing better to do than show our German youth that it is their duty, in an eventuality, to shoot at each other. In this gruesome situation of our nation, the thinking along clear-cut lines of battle appears to me the most fatal thing we can do as a nation, such thinking being understandable, as stressed by me at the beginning of the talk, and justifiable in certain phases, as I also mentioned. For this reason, I have made myself the mouthpiece for the questions put to us by the people in the East.

Kogon

Gentlemen, perhaps the manner in which Mr. Gollwitzer treated the topic of such burning interest for us all does not conform to the expectancy that brought you here. The most urgent interest probably has been devoted to the economic and political facets of the problem, a juxtaposition of practical conclusions that might be drawn, over here and over there - in such a way as to make possible an answer to Mr. Krushchev's oft repeated claim, that in peaceful competition of the systems, the Soviet system would undeniably and inevitably win. Our lecturer delved much more deeply into the subject: he began with the spiritually moral conditions of an existence worthy of man, and on hand of the example of the Eastern dilemma, in which faithful Christians find themselves vis-a-vis the Soviet system, he showed that it is the claim of Communism to salvation this side of the grave that brought forth the terroristic system, but that this system is gradually being dismantled in the measure in which economic-political-cultural life in the Communistic system is becoming differentiated. Mr. Gollwitzer is of the opinion that the progress of scientific investigation will inevitably also contribute to the gradual dissolution of the absolute and unconditional element in Communism. In the end, it might well be that merely the socialization of the means of production will remain as essential characteristic, a central situation in fact, however, which possibly might prove to be a better position for the spiritual-moral development of an existence worthy of man. The counter-question is asked, whether our Western

system can be so reformed in its nucleus that out of it would result an existence worthy of man, universally and permanently.

Rightly, it appears to me, has Mr. Gollwitzer put the problem comprehensively. Answers to current questions can only be rightly given if one investigates the basic issues: what is man? What position does he hold in the world, and what role is rightly his? How, finally, is the development of society completed in conformity with the above - in other words, history? Naturally, we do not want and we cannot here carry on a discussion on philosophical lines. But it does appear important to me that Communism gives a different answer for all three issues, an answer different from that of, at least, many, yes, most in the West. Communism interprets an existence worthy of man differently, furnishes a different world image, and explains the course of history differently. In this, can Communism change and thus surrender its revolutionary character? Contrariwise in the West: how far will evolution of society go, if the privileged positions comprising the nucleus of the capitalistic system are maintained, and, perhaps, even strengthened, without a revolution, which we, after all, do not want? In order to avoid the malevolence of a revolution, nay a permanent one, we in the West resign ourselves to certain terrible inequalities, which hardly can be eliminated merely through evolution, while the Communists, in order to eliminate all privileges in favor of a general, equal and just humanhood, pervert precisely this humanhood through the methods they apply. Presupposing the same humane purpose, we must decide between the purchase price of revolution and the purchase price of evolution.

If you agree, I propose the following line for discussion:

1. Is the Communist system changeable, and is it actually changing?
2. Does the capitalistic-democratic system require reform, and is it actually capable of further reform?
3. Is co-existence between the two systems possible, and if so, of what would co-existence consist?

Regarding the first, Mr. Gollwitzer gave us a series of important pointers. It appears to me to the purpose to comment on them. Regarding the second and third points, please permit me to give you some observations, perhaps thought provoking. Even disregarding the problem of co-existence of the two systems, it is surely of importance to investigate whether they are, in fact, completely antipodal, as it frequently enough appears; and further, it should be worthy of thought, if the opponent can teach us anything. If one wants to gain practical influence over the other system and above all prove our own superiority to them over there, it will nolens volens be necessary to carry through such a critical investigation. The central problem, if I see things correctly, is the problem of planning, and not only as a problem in economics but also, and more comprehensively so, as a political problem. It goes without saying that we in the West do not want the central-administrative and central-executive system; that, after all, constitutes one of the main differences in the divergence of the two systems. But isn't it at all possible that the substructure of political representation in the Soviet system teach us something in our own situation of not having any kind of substructure of political representation, to speak briefly of the political sphere. The parliamentary system of the Western world evidently does suffer from the fact that the contradictory real interests of the pluralistic society either are not recognized in time or sufficiently so to be "integrated", i.e., to be transformed into common good. We elect representatives again and again, at definite intervals, and of this consists our political liberty; well and good, but where is the guarantee that these representatives achieve in fact the sufficient regulation of the problems of society? Have there been no crises in our existence which could have been avoided, inclusive of wars? Wailing about the lobbies and the entire "nation of associations" is, so it appears to me, a superfluous thing if one does not see to it that a better system for timely clarification and suitable consideration of interests is brought about. The Soviet methods, i. e., to have political forces of integration stand the economic test under the control of a unity party, do not offer a universal guarantee; but our very general and formal system does not fulfill its task in view of the modern development of society. This development - the industrial-economic, internationalized development of mass populations in major areas concords in many points, over here and over there; perhaps it is a matter of some mutual problems of existence - and not limited to those I here mention briefly! Such reasoning, too, leads us to the discussion of the problem of co-existence.

It goes without saying that you do not, by any means, have to adhere to the line of discussion I proposed. You are completely at liberty. I shall merely attempt to gather the results of our exchange of opinions on my screen, if I may put it like that.

Seidel

It is not very easy, in the face of the fullness of problems and aspects touched upon by Mr. Gollwitzer, to start the discussion. First, I want to pick out only one question of central importance for the talk, the question of the ability of reform of the two systems, capitalism and Communism. I gained the impression that Mr. Gollwitzer evaluates the prospects for reform of Bolshevism quite positively. At the same time I could not help gaining the impression that the prospects for reform of "capitalism" were underestimated. This surprised me the more as it was, after all, so-called "capitalism" which for more than one and a half centuries has been undergoing surprising changes. In any case, the manifold changes of so-called capitalism in the past show that the West is not sterile as regards development. The development lying behind us was so far-reaching that I doubt whether it is correct to use the same term "capitalism" for industrialism of the time of the "Communist Manifesto" and, without differentiating, for the Western industrial society of the year AD 1961.

Also, the political ideals of the democratic-pluralistic Western societies - societies still developing in history - make the thought of a wide field of possibilities for "capitalistic" development thoroughly plausible. No one can deny that in the West we are actually in earnest when we speak of political ideals (dignity of man, liberty, protection of minorities, social security). Detriments are not passed over. The political transformations of Western society are actually so profound that political science today speaks of the phase of fundamental or full democratization which these societies are now passing through or have passed through.

To question or overlook the enormous development of the Russian Soviet system, I consider an impossibility. What transformation did the industrialization under Stalin accomplish - of course, at the cost of immense human sacrifices! And what transformation brought the post-war period, not only through destalinization, reform of the penal code, and a completely revised training of functionaries? Transformation will continue. Of course, experts are not in agreement whether this transformation is a liberalization in the Western sense of the word, and tending to a democratization, as Ruth Fischer believes. Or whether - as Wolfgang Leonhard believes - it is essentially a case of modernization. Be that as it may: there are germs for development toward improvement, and these we can only welcome.

But in one thing the East differs essentially from the West: development will probably be given scope for growth only insofar as it does not clash with the ideological timetable of a preconceived conception of history. This includes the conflict with the so-called capitalistic West, called for by the system. Naturally, much that opposes will wear off in that, in Russia, too, the requisite consequences of the development of industrial societies will make their appearance. But do not underestimate the ideological ties of a metaphysical system of history appealing to Marx as a witness. There is much wishful thinking about this here in the West. Does not Khrushchev say: "Sooner will you hear the shrimps in the ocean sing than we shall stop believing in the victory of socialism."

Kogon

Pardon me, Mr. Seidel, just a question to subserve the clarification of basic presuppositions. You spoke repeatedly of the "capitalistic" development as the "democratic" development. Does that mean you

consider "capitalism" as a comprehensive system in opposition to Communism; that is, capitalism includes democratic parliamentarianism and is not a purely economic system?

Seidel

I consider it, for the nonce, purely economic; after all, the speaker premised on the fact that if everything accidental were deleted from today's Communism, substantially only the socialization of the means of production would remain.

Gollwitzer

This is not a case of a purely economic system.

Kogon

Communism, without a doubt, is a comprehensive system, but capitalism is an economic system which, of course, stands in a definite historical relationship with a political system and with world-view premises. It is now a question of knowing how you, Mr. Seidel, would like to have the difference considered for purposes of our discussion.

Seidel

As a basis for our discussion, I would consider capitalism and Communism both as a comprehensive system, so that capitalism is synonymous with a developed industrial society of the Western democratic, i. e., pluralistic type. I agree with you, Mr. Kogon, that Communism is a comprehensive system and capitalism, in the real meaning of the word, only an economic system, but for reasons of semantics and to simplify the confrontation, the term "capitalism" is fungible in the meaning mentioned above. Whether political democracy is dependent upon capitalism as an economic system is a question that cannot be answered in a few sentences. In the past, both, to a great extent, have belonged together. Nevertheless, the economic system has been greatly modified through the process of democratization, this closely linked to democratic ideas, a process taking effect down to the foot of the social pyramid. For instance, social security or co-determination of labor, both are part of the process of material democratization, a process going far beyond the directly political. Democracy, then, is not only the charge to govern with a time limit in the sphere of the political order of government, but rather a way of life, approximating closely the conceptions of the égalité objectives.

Heer

The extraordinary capacity for development of our Western-capitalistic-comprehensive system is a fact that cannot be denied. One hundred and fifty years prove it. This development has been, in part, quiet, in part, enormously stormy. I believe we use the fact of our progress much too little. Karl Marx, in his time, did not himself by any means disparage the capacity for development of the capitalistic system. One need only recall what he said about the advantages of English parliamentary democracy, a political form of bourgeois society, as far as he was concerned.

Anweiler

I would challenge an interpretation of capitalism as a global concept as comprehensive in form as is Communism, an interpretation of the Communists themselves. If we go along, this interpretation gets us on the wrong track, scientifically, too.

I am of the opinion that a term could be used that has been increasingly employed in literature during the past two years, namely, the "totalitarian prosperity state", describing in different terms the total communism as interpreted by Krushchev. A totalitarian prosperity state would thus be a state in which political rule lay in the hands of a single party (a characteristic of totalitarianism) but in which, at the same time, the standard of living is so high that we can speak of a prosperous society; we would then be dealing with a new form, combining the industrial development in progress in the United States and Western Europe with a political system such as has reigned in Russia since 1917. On reading more carefully what Communism envisages during the coming twenty years - what is to be in Russia in the year 1980 - then it is a condition in many respects circumscribed by the term totalitarian prosperity state, a state in which nothing is done to shake the sole rule of the Communist Party. Within this party there might be certain tendencies to democratization. That the socialization of the means of production remains and is avowed, that also is beyond doubt. That simultaneously the standard of living is raised - not in the measure indicated by statistics - is also beyond doubt. The question is - and you said "yes", Professor Gollwitzer - whether the "liberalization" of the system is, as it were, an irreversible process.

Co-determination of labor denotes labor sharing in plant management usually in the form of labor representatives on the Board of Directors.

Gollwitzer

It is nowhere an irreversible process, Mr. Anweiler I would say.

Anweiler

Then I misunderstood your resume. I should like to voice a small reservation against it.

The question put by Professor Gollwitzer was: What is the essential characteristic of communism? And the answer: The claim to absolutism, rooted in the conviction that truth is solely to be found in historical and dialectical materialism, a claim seeking to pervade all social and private spheres of man. Now, the question is, whether this claim to absolutism can be renounced, in other words, whether the ideology can dissolve itself. If that were the case, we would not need to sit here, that would be co-existence in action. We would then be talking freely together.

(Interjection of Professor Kogon: The question then is, whether it can renounce the claim to absolutism.)

That really appears to be the cardinal question. Now it would be a matter of weighing which factors of experience speak for it and which against. Up to now, for the sphere of the Soviet Union, I see few possibilities for genuine co-existence, unless we consider the form Khrushchev professes, in which "we are in favor of peaceful co-existence" is followed immediately by "it is another form of the class struggle".

Uexküll

I think that in the question of Communist ideology, a question also mentioned by Professor Seidel when he spoke of its advantage vis-a-vis historical experience, in this question we must go a little deeper if we want to reach clarity concerning its real importance. The attempt to do so takes me back a moment to the indication by Professor Gollwitzer that between Communism and Fascism, between Stalinism and Hitlerism, he noted an essential difference, a difference one should not cover up by using the same term "totalitarianism" for both. What constitutes the difference? The essence of Hitlerism appears to me to be, after all, that it elevated antihumaneness openly to the status of a principle: the "weaker" have to submit to the rule of the (blond) "stronger", everything else was termed intemperance of humane feelings. For the first time, as I see it, we had to do in history with a system in which wicked end and wicked means formed an almost perfect unit. For Communism, however, dictatorship is a transitional phase. It was this by no means for Fascism but rather, as regards certain strata, a permanent situation. For Fascism, the totalitarian was essential. One cannot picture Fascism without it being totalitarian. This is not true of Communism. For Communism, dictatorship is not the final objective, quite the opposite, according to the unequivocal declaration of Communism and in accordance with our experience in history.

Altmann

How does experience in history tell us that? According to the Communists, the so-called transitional phase is by no means at an end. Whether the totalitarian form of Communism actually is a transitional phenomenon or not cannot, of course, be proven on hand of the Marxist-Leninist theses of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, there is no historical experience for it, as this condition of Bolshevistic society is by no means terminated. On the other hand, there are numerous examples for the fact that dictatorships have but few innate possibilities to develop into free forms of government. Mostly they perish in the attempt. The ice of totalitarian rule does not bear up well under the soft wind of freedom.

Whoever fancies that the Communist system of rule has possibilities for developing toward freedom, a development leading not to its collapse but to its increased stability, is propounding an ideologically sociological hypothesis. This is permissible and possible, but in doing so, one cannot call to witness "historical" experience.

Arlt

I, too, cannot agree with the view presented to us concerning the capacity of Communism for transforming itself. Let me put it harshly: with regard to the three categories emphasized by Professor Kogon for arriving at a judgment, existence worthy of man, world image and course of history - these are the issues in the conflict between East and West - is not totalitarianism innate in Communism? Does not its anthropology start from the collective instead of the individual? And the world image: monistic-materialistic! Its conception of history: determined by class struggle and messianically directed to social unity!

Kogon

Nevertheless, there is a considerable difference, Dr. Arlt, between the two totalitarian systems and as we are at the moment investigating the importance that ideology can have for the capacity or incapacity for transformation, the difference must be recognized. The world image of Fascism, especially of National Socialism, was absolutely social Darwinism, thoroughly deterministic: existence worthy of man only for the privileged, who appeared predestinated for it racially and who had to guard their privilege in the struggle against all the others. There might have been, purely factually, certain adjustments and changes but not in the principle and not in the intent. The Fascist system is, therefore, in deed, irrefutably totalitarian and permanently so. In Communism, on the other hand, the doctrine of the necessity of using force is paradoxical: due to the Communist conception of history, that the development of society is determined by the class struggle as long as private ownership of the means of production exists, Communism wants to eliminate the premise of the use of force through the final class struggle, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, i. e., through the partial and

temporary repeal of humanity, Communism wants to attain to the condition of true humanhood. Innate in the Communist system, therefore, is the intent toward selfchange, a rational and ethical element in contradistinction to Fascism. The Communist totalitarianism is, so to speak, not meant to be totalitarian permanently.

Altmann

The ideological self-comprehension of a system is one thing, the objective effect in history another!

Kogon

I agree completely: not only self-comprehension must be decisive for our judgment, the course of history must be still more so. As regards the two systems, it would, anyway, be necessary to note that during the twelve years of its rule, National Socialism did not improve but deteriorated to atrocity, i. e., it systematically became its true self, and this, in consequence brought about its destruction. In the case of Bolshevism, however, we note a series of changes, especially since Stalin's death, and the importance of these changes, we now want to clarify.

Cattepoel

Decisive for everything is the question, how man is viewed and treated in the individual systems. In Communism, man - in the final analysis - is nothing more than a function of society and this devaluates what is genuinely, human, i. e., the personality of man.

Gollwitzer

The self-comprehension of a system must be correctly evaluated in its entire extent. The Communists consider their own totalitarianism as a transitional phase. By avowing a non-totalitarian future in this way, they are susceptible to the de-totalitarianizing factors of history acting upon their system, more so than the Fascists, who would have had to consider such an influence as their own downfall.

Although the Communists are convulsively intent upon maintaining absolutism, in hoc signo they have undertaken the struggle, with their entire messianic promise of salvation, the system nevertheless is more strongly exposed to the influence of history since it has ceased to fight for its existence, and is exercising power in a large portion of the world. My intent observation of Communism, and evidently that of others, is directed to the following: how long will it succeed in remaining absolutely messianic? In what measure will the sobering process of reality win out? The greater the drudgery of attainment, the more evident will it be that Communism is not the solution of the enigma of history but will, at best, have solved some of the puzzles, will, at best, have brought about progress - limited progress. Today, everywhere, interest in the individual is coming to the fore, even among Stalinists, and not only in Poland. Today one suddenly sees that even in Communist society, once it is attained (Lenin indicated it long ago), the problems of man do not cease but begin anew. The statement of Georg Lukács: "Communism does know that individual life can be tragic, but not history" is a remark that circumspect Communists today no longer repeat with such emphasis, by far.

Meyer-Abich

Whoever is deeply versed in the life and the activity of ideas, especially in the purified form expressed in the history of philosophy, knows that every idea, when it is self-related; i. e., when it is deprived of its antitheses, will ultimately change into its opposite. This phenomenon, the "cunning of the idea", as Hegel termed it, is well known. One can also find it again in the history of Communism. The very term dialectical materialism expresses it. The word "dialectical" implies that it is not a common form of materialism but one in which idealism appears in camouflaged form as its antithesis. At the very moment that this, its dialectical antithesis, were to disappear, materialism would also have to disappear because there would be nothing left with which it could be opposed. In the relationship of Communism and religion, it appears to me, something similar happened. Religion today is no longer "opium for the people", as it was in classical Marxism, but a thoroughly recognized antithesis of the general atheism of the Communists. Through this antithesis, atheism itself becomes a type of religion. The same phenomenon appears everywhere in the spiritual life of dialectical materialism, for instance and to a marked degree, in Russian natural science. For example, in the geochemistry of Vernadsky, philosophical tendencies are in evidence which we over here would characterize without further ado as vitalistic. They themselves recognize these tendencies as dialectical antitheses of general materialism. Speaking in general terms, one can state that the "cunning of the idea" in all these cases consists in merely bringing the opponent into one's own line of thought. Truth of the matter is, however, that in

doing so, one merely confirms that no spiritual movement, and that includes the Communist movement, can live by one single philosophy.

In addition, and in the meanwhile, are added the real effects of the industrial-economic development. The question is only whether in the present system of Communism the logical conclusions are drawn regarding the social position of the working man; whether this is accomplished with sufficient speed and thoroughness and, what is more, whether it can take place at all under the influence of power-political exertions.

Paulsen

Permit me to tell you of an experience I had. When I was about to travel to Berlin a few days ago in order - as chairman of the Administrative Council of the Federal Office for Employment and Unemployment Insurance - to take part in arriving at relief measures for walled in Berlin, a short time before my departure I was visited by a man of whom I know that he formerly was a leading member of the Communist Party, a man who today still acknowledges that he is a Communist. He told me truthfully, he wanted to talk with me concerning questions, the solving of which was a purpose of my trip. I say truthfully that I felt little desire to talk about it with him, of all people. I thought I could draw that "clear-cut line" of which Professor Gollwitzer already spoke, that "clear-cut line" separating me and us from him, and I thought to draw it by pointing to the Wall of Shame in Berlin. I spoke of the penitentiaries, of the sentences meted out by East Zone courts, and of the lack of liberty of the people in the Zone. He listened to it all with a serious face and then told me that he - like I - regretted the erection of the wall now dividing Berlin into two parts. He also did not concur with every sentence passed by East Zone courts robbing men of liberty, and asked me to believe him. But he did not think that these were the accusations that really touched him. The only accusation I could rightly make was that they, the Communists, had not been sufficiently successful in eliminating the objects of my criticism. Everything I had mentioned were phenomena - and he too regretted the fact - which had to be accepted in order to reach the final and high goal of Communism.

I have no qualms in acknowledging that this man caused me embarrassment when he asked, whether I were in a position to describe that ultimate goal of the society in the West, the "capitalistic society", as he expressed himself, had set for itself. When Dr. Körber read the Preamble at the beginning of our discussion, in which the basic ideas of the Bergedorf Round Table are set down, I interpreted it as the expression of the goal we have in common. But I became a little uncertain when Dr. Körber gave us to understand that the contents required interpretation. We must therefore make efforts toward clarification.

I should like to say now that we differ from Communism, according to my conviction, in that we refuse to demand of men sacrifices which cannot be demanded if, at the same time, one not renounce respect for their dignity, and do so with an exculpatory reference to a high goal, which can only be reached in eternity. I believe that our conception of the position of man in society - we have also spoken of this in the course of our discussion separates us from Communists ineluctably.

But hasn't the position of man in Bolshevistic Russia changed in the course of the years, especially during the past years? Are we justified in hoping on the basis of our belief that we see indications of "liberalization" over there? We should not, I believe, deny that the standard of living in Russia has approached somewhat our Western concept, especially in recent years. The clothes of Russian women, not all Russian women, have become perhaps somewhat more "Parisienne". That is the tribute the leadership elite in government and economy claims for itself and its achievements. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it would be just to view this as an expression of the "transformation of Communism". I am convinced that all liberalizing tendencies which we at the moment believe we can recognize would be abruptly terminated if the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were of the opinion that these tendencies were an obstacle in reaching that final goal: the "termite state".

Gentlemen, we are talking about "Questions of Industrial Society" and thus - I believe I may couch it in these terms - concerning the image of order of our society. An essential characteristic of that order is that each individual be conscious of his function. In every system of order there is a "demanding" and a "serving", although the expressions might differ. I have gained the impression, the attempt is made in Russia to make serving easier by cudgeling the people into believing their serving is an important contribution toward the attainment of the final goal of Communism, which is painted in glowing colors over and over again.

In our clash with Communism our positions would be securer if we - at least in basic questions - knew each other united. Whoever wants to be secure in his decision must be in a position to orient himself

on hand of fixed standards. And these standards must be accessible to every individual. But I am afraid that in describing our "standards" we generalize so much that they are of real value for only a few. On the other hand, we are in danger of losing ourselves in everyday political clashes. The Communists, however, have the advantage of being able to use formulas which, they say, are the result of scientific work.

Uexküll

Under certain preconditions, formulas do have a delusive appeal but decisive are the concepts of value which can be satisfactorily explained. Freedom and order are always poles that man meets with in his search for a system of society suited to him, i. e., in conformance with his nature. Between the extremes, "the concentration-camp pole" of absolute order and the "chaos pole" of absolute freedom, man will have to settle in a temperate zone. The mode in which man undertakes to do so, however, is of decisive importance for success.

And this brings me, in conjunction with your remarks, Mr. Paulsen, to the differentiation which Professor Kogon stressed in his introduction to the discussion: evolution or revolution. In my opinion, the term evolution hides the concept of measure, hidden, it is true, but relatively easy to bring forth. If I attain something through evolution, that not only means that I reach my goal more slowly, it means I do it humanely, I reach my objective in an entirely different manner than I would, if I did through revolution, namely, by force. I believe, in this connection, that it is of the essence how we do something, no matter what we have in mind. We never know whether we shall reach our objectives. But the means we use in order to reach them, that is continuously within the sphere of our responsibility, our control.

Müller-Marein

I believe, one can proceed in a correlative manner conclude from the end to the means, from the means to the end. In that, I believe, we concur, that in Fascism the means were terrible, and the end terrible. What we know of Communism so far is that the means, so it appears to me, are very terrible. I do not yet understand, Professor Gollwitzer, how you can extract the end, the good end, from these bad means.

Kogon

But my dear Mr. Müller-Marein, in reality not even the Communists have succeeded in completely ruining the existence worthy of man. Dr. Altmann, if I recall correctly, made a very nice comparison, more or less as follows: the ice of totalitarian rule does not bear up well under the soft wind of freedom. Well, in order to eliminate the difficulty mentioned by you, I should like to reverse the simile: a certain soft wind of freedom thawed the ice of Stalinist rule immediately after the death of the dictator and timely enough that it could not bury completely every shade of the existence worthy of man.

Heer

What I am about to say will make the conflict of ideas easier and at the same time more difficult. Imagine, if you will, in this peaceful circle of nice gentlemen there suddenly appeared as many Soviet Russians, as happens again and again in various international conferences - dentists, agronomists, engineers, professors, students. They would have faces, shapes, weights, color of hair and forms of expression very much comparable to ours. Do you really believe, in such a case, that the remark of Mr. Röpke, quoted by Mr. Gollwitzer, the remark about the "murder of souls" retains its validity? Are these Soviet Russians actually "soulless robots", which they would have to be if the alleged precondition were to be true that the Communist system kills off all rational personal life? It is childish to attempt to claim such a thing. What I am aiming at is this: both the Western and the Eastern history, if one examines them accordingly, offer a ghostly show, in part gruesome, in part amusing; of course, ideologies play a role in this show, but it must not cause us to forget the reality of man which maintains itself, form itself, and wins through. We all know the friendly wishes of Mr. Krushchev about attaining world rule by his means; we have also known the just as friendly wishes of occidental inquisitors to rule the souls of all the world - and more than just the souls. Much evil has emanated and still emanates from such like, but intentions stand to human reality in a dialectical relationship, difficult to descry. It is not right, in every instance, to measure this reality with the same last. Who would not be indignant if someone, using a few election slogans, tried to make us believe that our differentiated society, capable of freedom, eyes on the present, with prospects for future achievement, that this our society is nothing but a miserable sweatshop?

So let us differentiate between the Communist wishes of Mr. Krushchev and things as they really are, actual possibilities. The social dialectic on both sides is reciprocal, a relationship one must not disregard. There are the large empires of the East in which the apparachiks of the leader intelligentsia, wishing to change the world, are intent upon getting the industrial macro-society into the red grip. And there is the Western society, having long ago left behind the hard processes of the initial industrial development, in which, for varied reasons, however, the rights of the individual, the security under law of the person to unfold his full personality, are threatened in many ways. American sociologists have for many years been investigating the structure relationship of American top-level management and Soviet Russian toplevel management and have worked out the fact how considerable is the consonance.

Our future will depend on whether we in our Western world are able to increase our dynamically ingenious vitality, which influences social processes in the other spheres of the world through its presence and its power, its real content and value. Vitality vs. vitality. I myself claim that all major world conflicts are without solution; the clash between Catholics and Protestants, for instance, and hundreds of others. That does not, however, mean that they are unconditionally total or must remain total clashes, it especially does not mean that conflicts must be solved by force. Ideas oppose ideas, ideologies oppose ideologies.

Now that in recent days a not unknown Indian received the peace prize of the German Booksellers Association, it is perhaps not uninteresting to point out that this significant Asiatic, together with hundreds of thousands of intellectuals in the AfroAsiatic nations, is convinced that the West consists of Sovietism and capitalistic democracy, so that the Russians and we belong to the same cultural reality, with internal differences of more or less hardness. Many, many in the world consider this difference a civil-war situation, a family squabble, so to speak, between red and black and yellow. This certainly does not make the matter easier for us, the more so as family conflicts can be the most terrible thing there is, but it is a reality. I should therefore like to warn both against inadmissible oversimplification and false absolutes.

Kogon

As a release from solely considering the Communist problematic, this comment by Friedrich Heer appears to me to be very useful, beyond the value of its contents. Of course, the question whether the possibilities for reform in the Soviet system are greater and more likely than in the pluralistic society has not been answered yet.

Anyway, it looks as if a certain accord were appearing in our discussion - under a latent contradiction in part; right, Dr. Altmann? - in that both the self-comprehension as also the reality of Soviet Communism in history offered and offer possibilities for reform as touching existence worthy of man. I should like to make that plainer, and do so on hand of the particulars of Soviet Russian society itself. With the help of Stalinism, industrial economy won out in the Soviet sphere. The process is not complete as yet, but by and large it is. That means that two courses of events were completed, absolutely essential for the industrial economy, namely, preparing the peasantry for the labor discipline required in an industrial economy: the peasants, at the beginning, constitute everywhere the only major reservoir of labor but come from a world of entirely different work rhythm and work methods; and secondly, the accumulation of national investment capital, which, at the beginning, is only possible by doing without consumer goods, unless one can borrow capital or obtain it as a gift. In our own history we went through the same processes, our forefathers worked hard and hungered, also not entirely - to express it mildly - of their free will, but in Russia under Stalin it took place through the most brutal of application of force, urging both processes to completion within the shortest possible time. The war then slowed down the development as a whole, speeded it up in certain segments. When it ended - the "Great Patriotic War", as it was called because it finally was won thanks in no small part to the help of the new industrial-economic potential - Stalin faced a society, which was not the same as before: with the events it had differentiated itself. He it was, who before the XIX Party Congress introduced, although still very cautiously, what Khrushchev later carried to completion. (You can read about it in the periodical "Der Kommunist" of October, 1952). Of course, it goes without saying that the Stalinist Stalin did not proceed immediately as the Khrushchevist Khrushchev was able to do. Also, the transition from the Stalinist to the new majority in the Central Committee under Khrushchev's leadership had its power-political repercussions until 1961. In comparison with the time prior to 1953, five essential changes took place: a certain decentralization; a revivification of the role of the party in order to be able to control the greater and smaller centers of power resulting from the granting of relative local administrative independence in the far reaches of the country; further, in the same context, upgrading of the role of the trade unions; then, the attempt to re-organize the agrarian sector

after it had essentially fulfilled the task of serving as labor reservoir for the industrial economy; finally, the progressive reform of justice subsequent to the terror signalized by the liquidation of Berya, corresponding with Stalinist objectives. Naturally, all this could not take place overnight and not without, in part, serious crises. The struggle between Stalinism and Khrushchevism has exerted its influence down to our immediate present. As the Communist Party of Red China, for a number of reasons that need not be discussed here, is intensely against Khrushchevism, this major conflict still continues. But no one can deny the changes.

As I said, the process of "de-Stalinization" was initiated by Stalin, himself. Next it was a question of the extent and the speed and of the exercise of control of the corresponding and far-reaching effects. This process surely was not permitted by Khrushchev and carried out because he personally thought it fun but rather because progressive social development required it and because in the minds of millions the consciousness of social processes and requirements - with corresponding wishes and possibilities of exerting influence - had changed. Whoever keeps current with the Soviet Russian reality and does so attentively, does not deny realities that are evident. The numerous changes compared with the Stalin era are not inventions of Communist propaganda but facts susceptible of proof. That historic transformation, of which was variously spoken in our discussion, is being completed: a gradual abrogation of the means which are inhuman and antihuman and would not permit the realization of the objective striven for. The tragedy of Communism is thus being gradually ameliorated, namely, the attempt to bring about true humanity by force, using inhuman means. I say, ameliorated, not eliminated or extirpated or removed from the face of the earth. But it appears to me, too, that it should be our humane interest, to know that this progress is being aided, and not to nail down the opponent on his inhumanity so that we, allegedly, can better combat him.

My question is, whether we can help aid the humanizing of Communism through a corresponding policy, perhaps of the Polish type.

Altmann

In my opinion, it would be best if we now discussed the question of the possibility of development, the capacity for development - I say capacity for development not possibility for reform - of the Western society.

Probably, this question cannot be answered through comparisons with the Bolshevistic system. Western society is on the verge of becoming a world society. It is an extremely difficult process, and it long ago lapped what the Russians want to do with their patriotically tinted Communism. What, after all, is worthy of our imitating in their system? Russian statesmen are planning - well and good; the judiciary is beginning to think more along lines of law, for the reason that a state with an independent judiciary is necessary for the functioning of a modern industrial state - again well and good; but, I am sorry to say, I have gained the impression a systematic emotional agitation is being carried out against the possibilities for development of Western society.

Furthermore, it is not at all a process of philosophy but a political question, a question of power. We are supposed to reform while facing an enemy. Professor Gollwitzer did not mention the problem of the power struggle in his lecture. On a highly political subject he held a lecture making the topic unpolitical. But we cannot shunt off the problem of power when posing the question as to further development. Power is the decisive precondition for the political possibilities we have, to win this major conflict. Bolshevism, for us, is an enemy, one can even say "the" enemy. Bolshevism considers itself that.

We should learn from Bolshevism that even when "liberalizing" itself, it considers co-existence a new form of the power struggle.

Thus, when Professor Heer disavows the "bad Röpkas" and asks for more understanding for the possibilities for development of Bolshevism, that means, in a political sense, that we must understand the enemy, and do so as a general must understand his opposite number, his tactical and strategic possibilities and plans, in order to win the battle. This understanding is not a loving embrace, it is not a renunciation of the power struggle. Neither can the enemy be understood by hating him blindly.

In this sense, the capacity for development of Bolshevism is to be understood as the capacity for development of the enemy. It is of greatest interest for us. This development by no means need make him "more evil", but it can make him stronger and more dangerous as an enemy. An example from world history might make this clear: When Russia, forced to do so by the attack of Hitler, joined the war coalition against Germany, it was apparent to Russia that this coalition could not long survive the war and the victory. By and large, Russia availed herself of all advantages offered her. During the war

itself, Soviet espionage in the United States reached an inconceivable scope. The Western powers, especially the United States, believed however that they were not dealing with an enemy of tomorrow, with an ideological opponent as ally, but with a friend, "good old Joe". It was exactly this euphoria of confidence that caused such unheard of tensions after 1945 and brought the world to the brink of a new war. If, then, they had realized that they were allied with an enemy - the Soviets knew it precisely - it would have been much easier to stabilize peace.

Heer

I believe this should be expressed more accurately. As regards us, the West, in my opinion, we do not suffer from an inferiority complex; all of us have a fairly healthy self-confidence; anyway, that is my impression. If that is the case, however, the first question is not concerning the capacity for development of the West, rather concerning its willingness to develop. That our system is capable of further development, I guess no one on our side doubts. But what about it, if we are called upon to pay greatly varying prices, in a vast differentiation, for the growth of our world, for the freedom of all not just our own? As I see it, it is not correct to view co-existence exclusively from the standpoint that it is a new form of the power struggle between the two systems, and in doing so disregard completely the question whether we, in the West, are ready actually to make use of the possibilities for reform doubtlessly innate in our system.

Kogon

I ask you not to take it amiss if I, as the moderator of this discussion, again personally take part in it. But, on the one hand, no one has requested the floor, on the other hand, when preparing this event, I was asked not to leave it at moderation of the discussion but to take active part in the inquiry - a double role is not always easy! - and now the critical remark of Professor Heer does require an answer.

The willingness of the West to develop naturally is to be viewed as dialectically as everything else in our pluralistic, richly contrasted society. Capitalistic management - in the following connection I view management as a unit, although it is not a unit in many other respects - desires development but, of course, its own kind of development; management is incapable of conceiving it in any other way: namely, reinforcing its own privileged position on which it believes is dependent the progress in the sphere of universal prosperity. Thus, management, viewing things from a purely economic standpoint (not politically, not juridically, although these too are part of it) considers it self-evident that it can divert to its own pockets a considerable portion of the increment in the gross national product. On the other hand, of course, management also considers an increasing participation of labor as desirable, only this participation should not be such as to change essentially the ratio of labor-management shares and most definitely not by reason of increased co-determination. Contrariwise, it might be that the leaders of organized labor only consider a social development on our side as assured, to keep Communism not only at bay but to make it ineffective permanently, if a supra-plant co-determination of labor, i. e., full democratization of the economic relationship between labor and management were realized. This basic opposition between labor and management will, under certain circumstances, prevent thorough-going, further reforms of the capitalistic system in the sense of a progressive democratization. In my introductory remarks I already pointed out: that would constitute our purchase price for progress - although only partial toward freedom, compared with the "costs" of a revolution, victorious at that.

However that may be - or expressed differently, a position professed generally: both labor and management desire a steady improvement of living conditions in a prosperous society, that, in my opinion, is true beyond a doubt. The only question in individual cases is how. I tend to the opinion that there is a general willingness to contribute considerable sums for the sake of the freedom of the world and to help the so-called underdeveloped nations - in any event so long as prosperity with full employment is maintained, and much speaks for the fact that under the international methods of controlling cycles developed since the world-wide crisis of 1929 to 1933, prosperity will actually be maintained. Furthermore, willingness to help the "third parties" in the world is solidly founded on the realization of experts that in our system of economy, if crises are to be prevented, capital cannot be accumulated at will, but rather that in part it has to be exported. Willingness for development thus receives an additional soil for growth among vested interests. Both together, willingness and necessity born of the system effect the contribution to relative progress, which I should like to presuppose, in addition to the dissolution of the old type of colonialism. In any event, in view of the collective, continued and large, donations of capital under the leadership of the United States, one cannot speak

of exploitation - as practiced originally - of the so-called young nations in the world of the "third parties" - to refer to the introductory remarks of Mr., Gollwitzer.

That all this is part of the power struggle between the major political-economic systems and their leading powers, who would or could deny it? But one should not - at least I find it so, Dr. Altmann represent matters as if the Soviet Union were the only power engaged in power politics, power politics which would, on the one hand hinder further development in the sense of improvement as regards humanization and, on the other, force us to reply in kind; while we unabashed philanthropists have had nothing more in mind, after all, and have nothing more in mind than universal prosperity and universal equality - of nations and of all individuals!

Pentzlin

I should believe that with the term development we have reached the decisive question (without my using the expressions "evolution" and "revolution"). It is obvious that the Soviet system is going through a process of development. But the question is: does this process of development automatically bring with it humanization?

Kogon

Did I say automatically?

Pentzlin

No, but that is how you pictured it. Did you not say that in the process now taking place over there lay a certain chance of humanization?

Kogon

Chance is something quite different from automatism.

Pentzlin

But that was how Professor Gollwitzer formulated it, when he said (in how far he was expressing his own opinion, in how far he was acting as mouthpiece may remain moot), that the chances for social development in the transition from the 20th to the 21st Century were perhaps or actually better in the Communist than in the capitalistic system. What we have witnessed up to now, however, is only a process of development changing economic conditions and these changed economic conditions in turn result in changes in the political and in other spheres of public life. What forms this development will assume over there in the East appears to me to be something completely undetermined. The decision will be a political one. Over there it is a question of power.

We here in the West see a similar process of development perhaps taking place at a faster pace; new economic conditions, new social data are established, forming a different image of society over here too. We like ourselves in the role of all too frequently seeing the negative in this social process - in self-criticism, necessary and to purpose in many cases but, perhaps after all, a little too one-sided. The decisive question again in this case will be: with which content - content in the direction of humanization - will it be possible to shape this social process?

The East has the advantage of a visionary image of history. Here, in the West, after experiencing the catastrophe of catastrophes of isms, we have become accustomed not to see any more such visions. Now, the question is: should we perhaps evolve such an image of history in order to be able to tell the people in the East something? That is something that has become extraordinarily difficult in the West due to the skepticism reigning here. Perhaps the social task we face is the overcoming of this skepticism without having recourse to old historic images, among which one should perhaps number Christianity.

Cattepoel

I have two questions. The first is this: What do we mean by true humanity? What the Communists claim humanity to be, I cannot see separated from inhuman means. My second question I put to Professor Gollwitzer: During your account of the positive attitude of many Christians regarding certain socialpolitical measures of Bolshevism, I was frequently reminded of the German Christians (Pro-Nazi sect during the Third Reich) at the time of National Socialism. They, too, believed that National Socialism had many good points, and thus it was a matter, as Christians, to have a positive attitude

toward National Socialism. We know that this was an error, and that between National Socialism and Christianity only an "either-or" was possible. Is not this what is happening on the other side of the Iron Curtain? Are not the alternatives here too: either-or, Christianity or Marxism?

Lange-Prollius

If you are in contact with Soviet Russians and you ask them about the possibility of Christians living over there, they answer: "Christians lead as free a life with us as do atheists with you!"

Kogon

The question, what possibilities are given Christians in the Communist sphere compared with conditions during the Third Reich, appears to me to be important and interesting, but it leads us away from the main line of discussion so far, doesn't it?

Gollwitzer

Then I shall merely answer the question put to me -by means of some interesting information and then the question can be dropped. It is a case, in viewing it more closely, not of ideological adaptations, despite the fact that this suspicion has always existed, but of very trustworthy persons, who from the very core of their Christian faith believe that they cannot possibly have only a negative attitude from the start toward the society of their environment and who, for this reason, have to probe continually. In so doing, the ethical content and impulse of communism become important, although both are questioned and rightly so, and frequently this ethical content and impulse are called upon to witness against Communist reality. But, at least, Communism does offer this possibility of appeal. The Christian people are therefore in duty bound to ask: what can be made of Communism, what points of inception does Communism offer?

Kogon

Permit me, after this answer of Professor Gollwitzer, to return to the problem of the possibilities of positive further development in the West. Whether we fulfill our task is surely not merely a question of power, but rather a question of an exemplary community of interest in the free, i. e., the pluralistic society. There is an unbelievable number of small groups and individuals everywhere, who try to live this community of interest. But in all seriousness it cannot be expected that this community of interest be disseminated merely through preaching "Be exemplary!" The point at issue are institutional reforms with changes in structure in all social spheres of reference in the West, beginning with conditions of production via distribution of income via contents of freedom, and manners of conduct improved correspondingly, standing in a reciprocal relationship thereto. A Round Table, such as the one here, thus analyzes the objective conditions of society as well as the subjective strata of consciousness of the segments of population of decisive importance for the positive or negative development, in order to find the right points of inception for immediate-concrete efforts - in the spirit of the introduction Dr. Körber gave us this evening.

Seidel

I do not believe that in its visionary image of history the East is very much ahead of the West. We saw that Bolshevism was not able to escape the influence of history. But, in the moment in which danger threatens, in which historical development takes a course differing from the timetable of Bolshevistic metaphysics of history, naked force is used. The influence of history is unquestionably present. But it only goes into effect in the measure it fits into the metaphysical pattern of history in accordance with which Communism believes itself predestined for a leading role in the world. This harbors dangerous foreign-policy moments of force.

Kogon

Don't you find, Mr. Seidel, that that is rather a question of the generation in power at the particular time - I mean, whether or not it erupts?

Seidel

No, that doesn't depend upon the generation, rather is it a case of an objective process. In order to remain Communists, the leading circles must attempt to force development into the previously evolved and determined pattern. Thus, the influence of history is, from the very start, limited.

Gollwitzer

How almighty do you take the "chieftains" over there to be, really?

Seidel

I do not take them to be capable of omnipotence in the long run. But the attempt is made to adapt reality to a preconceived pattern of history until the attempt can no longer be made with any chance of success. The proof that these chances of success are no longer given will be very bitter, and will, I believe result in a new revolutionary process in Soviet society.

Kogon

That, after all, is a prognosis, Mr. Seidel. You stabilize the system as a world view in order to be able to say that no generation will be capable of changing it.

Seidel

If it were to change decisively, Mr. Kogon, then we no longer would be dealing with Communism, the system would no longer be the system, and it would be an industrial society which would function merely with different conditions of property ownership than ours in Europe.

Kogon

The question at issue, Mr. Seidel, is, after all: can such a process take place or is it impossible due to the fact that the Communists, under all circumstances, have the strength to force history itself into a preconceived pattern - into what you called a "historic timetable"? In other words: are the Communists stronger than history or can historical reality win out over theories, systems and formulas, in spite of everything? I, for myself, claim, in any event, that historical reality and the consciousness of generations stand in a reciprocal situation of influence, and I claim it, as appears to me, in accord with numerous historical experiences, and that neither the one nor the other must remain stable. That is valid to a special degree for the pluralistic-democratic society but also, although to a limited degree, for the Communist society.

Seidel

I did not want to make prognoses, I only wanted to point out to Mr. Gollwitzer the limits of actual change of the Communist system, if it is still to be called a Communist system. The influence of history, under the given conditions - and probably for a long time to come - is to be given less value than the power of Soviet powers-that-be.

May I add something to this? I would like best to eliminate the terms democratization and liberalization from the discussion and disquisition concerning the reforms that have been completed within Bolshevism. Even experts on Russia are not decided on this process. If we say "modernization", if we say "certain chances", then it will be easier than committing ourselves from the very start to the Western form of "democratization", "liberalization". Of course, of the original measures of decentralization, many have, in the meanwhile, been repealed.

A final remark regarding the problem of the reforms, and again this remark is not to be considered a prognosis. I consider it impossible that Russia have a modern industrial society - as impossible as anywhere else in the world - and retain its totalitarian political methods. Due to the importance of the individual function of every single worker in an interdependent society, such a measure of self-confidence is evolved that it cannot be repressed without further ado, even politically. Finally, it is a fact that our Western democratization was not solely a humanitarian or philanthropic event. Furthermore, I believe that the Russian society cannot avoid the problem of social stratification, in the moment that it attains to a higher standard of living, no more so than was the case in the Western societies. That, in the long run, will lead to - I won't say identical - but presumably parallel characteristics of development.

Paulsen

Gentlemen, once again I should like to say that I am convinced, all issues held for us by the East require an early decision on our part. And if we do not try to find a common answer, perhaps someday it will be useless to think about the right answer. It would be wrong, at this present time, to think in terms of defense. We must have the courage to take the offensive. Let us not weaken our position by

thinking that we are not in duty bound to reach a decisive answer because, over there, "tendencies toward liberalization, tendencies toward democratization" may be recognized. Such phenomena, as interesting as they might appear at the moment, are only concessions to a class of functionaries, which the Soviet state needs in order to exist itself. I am convinced that no Communist permits principles of humanity to be decisive in his day-to-day political decisions, if he is convinced that such "concessions" make it impossible for Communism to approach its final goal.

Gollwitzer

What, then, is the final goal?

Paulsen

Professor, I do not believe it necessary to describe it to you. It is politically decisive that all true Communists, as you know, are able to evolve this goal for you.

Anweiler

I believe that the question regarding the image of order, which Mr. Paulsen indicated, can be clarified by means of the words spoken by Khrushchev at the XXII Party Congress of Communists, inasmuch as we spoke of the self-comprehension of the system. Khrushchev used an allegory which, till then, had not been used there before. He said, speaking to the delegates (I translate verbatim from the Russian text) "You are acquainted, tovarich, with the bees" great love of work. Every bee carries its drop of nectar into the common hive. If I am to state it allegorically, then the Soviet society appears to me to be a large Communist beehive. In our society each one is charged to increase the general national riches with his work, and he will then, in time, be able to meet his own needs. But just as in a swarm there are drones, which seek to drive away the bees and the beekeeper, in our Russian collective there are also such persons, who do not give society anything, but want to live at the expense of the society." Khrushchev carries the comparison still further. It struck me, that the concept of a bee state, used by us in a derogatory sense, is viewed in a positive fashion.

Heer

All right, let us remain a moment with the comparison. Our Western problem, after all, is to find out what we should do, in order not to become a bee state, but instead to attain to effective, voluntary cooperation, which, on the one hand, would make it impossible for people to exploit, suppress or even kill each other, and, on the other hand, justify the consciousness that honey is being produced; that all, in a just manner, participate in this result, and that to this end, without false heroics, sacrifices have to be made. After all, the image of the busy bee is popular over here, too - it is used by savings banks in the Federal Republic, Switzerland and Austria, for example. It is a question of who uses the image and for what purpose.

Cattepoel

The decisive question is, who determines whether one is called a drone, a queen or a worker bee, isn't it?

Kogon

I beg of you, don't comment any further on the Communist first-grade school-book comparison of Mr. Khrushchev! I know, Dr. Anweiler, that Aristoteles used the comparison two and one-half thousand years ago, but hadn't we better drop the subject?

Anweiler

I take the matter seriously because the question concerning the image of man, as a starting point, was asked. Marx used the expression "Perfect humanism is perfect naturalism". The Marxist view of man is therefore thoroughly of this earth. We must ask ourselves, mustn't we, if this does not include from the start the impossibility to attain to the true view of man. "All-round developed man" - what a glorious goal, that's Humboldt - but man isn't developed all-round and we should not permit ourselves to be fooled. Due to a well-founded spiritual and ethical tradition, we interpret this differently than do the Communists. Appropriation of a concept of ours by them does not per se create freedom. How much else of ours have they just merely appropriated.

I was under the impression that with all the observing of "tendencies of development", which of themselves should be welcomed, we were not stressing the basic fact sufficiently.

Kogon

Our debate, in my opinion, should not lead us to misconstrue Mr. Gollwitzer's basic position. Here, in the Federal Republic, it is customary, after all, to view the Communist opponent within a pattern, by no means differentiated. As this is so, Professor Gollwitzer undertook to pose a series of productive questions which might possibly lead us further along. That does not mean, by inversion, that the image of the objectives of Communism is overvalued in a humanistic sense.

Altmann

I want to revert to the capacity for development of Western society - I mean, at the same time, its willingness to develop. We should analyze it more closely. Such an analysis is perhaps more important than making prognoses about the capacity for transformation of Bolshevism. If we fearfully concentrate on the appearance of the Soviet system, we are very likely to find ourselves in a calamitous position, politically, too.

A word regarding the charge of "anti-Communism". Of course, it serves us little to commit ourselves to a course of mere anti-Communism. But, on the other hand, one must be sufficiently realistic to know that we must be in a position to paint the enemy on the wall, just as the Communists have made the figure of the bourgeois into a figure auguring evil in world history. We, too, need an image of the enemy in this major conflict, in which we are not engaging of our own free will. In so far, I stand on the same line as Mr. Röpke - even if I stand in danger of being shot ideologically!

More important, however, is, as I said, the question regarding our own capacity for developing. I even surmise that a primitive oversimplification, as unfortunately voiced at times among us, emanates from fear and incapacity to define our own position. That's probably what Mr. Paulsen meant, too.

How may the question be answered? During his exile, Lenin believed he had found the historically definitive thesis. It stated that imperialism was the last stage of capitalism. If imperialism and colonialism collapse, said Lenin, then the capitalist system itself will collapse. Imperialism actually did collapse. But despite all the crises - Fascism was perhaps the greatest and most violent - the Western system of society and economy has grown in an unprecedented manner.

For us Germans this process of necessity was connected with the destruction of the national state. The national economies and with them the states themselves are being led into new relationships while simultaneously their economic potential increases. Today, the point at issue is the formation of a new world economy, the formation of a new solidarity in that part of the world free from Soviet rule. This is the perspective of the great prospects of the West and I would not say that the Soviets are in any way more progressive than we. The fact that these prospects have not been developed with enough vitality is fateful, more fateful than not occupying ourselves with the capacity of development of Bolshevism. It affects our foreign policy directly, its lack of a far-ranging strategy, of global horizons. Old style historical thinking, such as reached its peak with Ranke, is passed, and if today we speak of "development", we should realize that we are not thinking "historically" in this old sense.

From our new progressive position we should attempt to comprehend, far into the future, the further possibilities of the highly developed industrial state, which in fact has reduced to a minimum the problem of poverty and social conflicts (I do not want to say eliminated but reduced to a minimum), and can maintain this reduction. That appears to me to be the decisive task. It is a task of both a philosophic and theoretical as well as practical import: because political possibilities can be derived directly therefrom. I see it as a fateful situation of the Federal Republic that this plays such a minor role with us.

I believe that in this respect Professor Gollwitzer is right.

Müller-Marein

I now feel impelled to couch a sentence I previously formulated somewhat vaguely in more precise terms. What I have heard at this Round Table has strengthened my thought: let us recognize the goodness of an end in the goodness of the means! That also has a pedagogic effect, which expresses itself especially, as I believe, in discussions with the other side, of which I am in favor and for which I should like to break a lance here. Naturally, the idea of the good means from which one recognizes a good end, can be problematic but it also, at times, simplifies matters. An example: when Raymond Cartier was in Moscow on the occasion of the space flight of Titov, the interview with the astronaut did

not impress him as much as a scene he observed in the streets of Moscow. The people suddenly ran toward a street corner and apparently something sensational was happening. But the only thing that happened, according to Cartier's report, who is sensitive about these things (the French are very sensitive about these things), was the hanging of a poster on which nothing was said about Titov, but on which could be read that Citizen Ivanovich so-and-so unfortunately had again beat his wife and that the Citizeness who lives around the corner, has again not cooked adequately for her children, and such like more. The means of denunciation in order to intensify still further the bee state appears to me to become very evident on hand of such minor incidents. I, myself, when asked concerning the situation of such things, always answer in such cases: "Surely, it is a matter of morals." And that brings us to a remarkable point. In the SS, I heard, it was prohibited for the SS-men to lock their lockers, while with the other troops it was prohibited to leave the locker unlocked. In one case it was stealing from a comrade and in the other lack of trust. Cervantes has described very nicely how Don Quijote fell among thieves. To his great surprise he found that among themselves they had a strict moral code, namely, the morals of the SS, or the denunciation morals of the Communists.

Certainly, one should always be ready to discuss matters with them, and I should like to stress what Professor Gollwitzer said: that in talking with a Communist it is possible to discover that the person talked to is a liberal (although talking with two Communists turns out to be a talk with two informers checking up on each other). But for dealing with these people there is a rule of thumb, which should be our point of inception, no matter how problematically the concepts of morals might have changed: the end may be recognized by the means. Apparently contradictory ways of acting can, in such a case, coincide: At the same moment Ernst Bloch remained in West Germany, Hans Mayer, who had been in West Germany, returned to Leipsic. In the case of Bloch, it was disappointment and the impossibility of having his future works published over there, a decisive matter for a person of his category, and in the case of Hans Mayer (whom I know well, we were boys together in the same city), it was his interest in the fate of his students in Leipsic, which impelled him to return.

Arlt

It is not so much the collective as the individual talks which can give us an insight into conditions over there, as concerns the role of man and his future. And that is the main theme, the anthropological theme, a theme to which attention at this Round Table has again and again turned. Surely, a comparison of the industrial structures and the possibilities inherent in them must be made; and is made, especially in the United States, but the soulless imitation of the model resulting from such a comparison should not be overvalued in its importance.

Kogon

Surely you agree when I say that the one cannot be understood and judged without the other.

Heer

May I attempt to clarify somewhat, with a few words for both systems jointly, what has just been called the role of man and his future - in the fullgrown industrial society, of course. There has been in Russia for over one-hundred years, in other words, long before the Bolsheviks, a line of thought aiming at the cosmocracy of man, his universal rule. This includes two major themes, as I see again and again when speaking with Russian, Polish or other students from the East. The first theme comprises the question: how does man find a spiritual home in his open cosmos, which today reaches far beyond the world already. The second theme is the question how we, i. e., humanity, can attain to morals, to a doctrine of life which affects conditions directly, which surpasses the higher standard of living so that not it, but morals, determine behavior, i.e., the development of civilization. That the higher standard of living made possible by the developed industrial society calls for something more than a television console and some other things, even intelligent Communists know today; and that the people must be offered something more than what a strata of newly-rich functionaries can purchase in the West.

It is possible that the two major political systems will clash as enemies and destroy each other in a general catastrophe. If one considers this as certain, then it is not necessary to cudgel one's brains over the question of the cosmocracy of man. But things might turn out differently: the systems wear each other out through attrition and collapse, or each system continues to try and surpass the forward movement of the other, which would pose problems of maximum extent. One should not picture it as simple, without false wishful thinking or false fearful thinking, what it would mean for us really to keep ahead of the Communists always! That requires that we not only know ourselves, that we use what we are familiar with, recommending it to others, making it available to them (and perhaps even forcing it

on them), but also that we embrace the problems of the whole world globally, including the wishes of the Communists and the rest of the world, which in turn means that we must comprehend and realize correspondingly the yearnings and expectations standing behind the formulas used by the peoples! A competitive co-existence of the two systems is under no circumstances merely a matter of power, and likewise just as little merely a question of the development of an industrial economy - most certainly not.

Kogon

As Professor Gollwitzer must leave early, I should now like to ask him to give us his concluding opinion.

Gollwitzer

If I heard correctly, this question pervaded the discussion: how far are they ahead of us or are they slowly catching up? If viewed under the latter aspect - and there is much in its favor - then they have done nothing more with their methods and their ideological smoke-screen that hides everything, than establish an industrial society in a shorter time than was the case with us, and at the cost of terrible sacrifices. With further development, they will then - that would be the meaning of what one could call liberalization or not - land approximately there where we are, too, namely, in a pluralistic society, vibrating like a pendulum between egotism and collectivism, as probably it can do no otherwise. In that case - and that is how I mostly look at it - we shall be ahead of them insofar as we already are the wiser. We have more history behind us, so to speak. The visionary with the great vision he would like to realize is younger than he, who knows that at best, man-made society offers not a real but a very relative spiritual home, that society cannot solve the problems of human existence. The most terrible thing a society can undertake is to attempt to reach the perfect solution of human problems. Society cannot offer more than a somewhat passable framework, in which we live our homespun life. Thus we - including me - as the wiser, with many hard knocks behind us and therefore the more sceptical, look upon these dogged revolutionaries, for whom, it's true, the light is feebly dawning, and who for this very reason try again and again with greater doggedness to force the victory of their cause. This it would be a relapse into Stalinism - could happen again and again.

What, then, is the final objective over there? I would not, Mr. Anweiler, commit myself in such a way as to preclude my saying "yes" to this final objective. I have often thought about whether the Christian must say "no" to the very formulation of the final objective they use over there. But perhaps - I have not finished thinking about it yet - the "no" can only refer to the belief, that this final objective is the result of a conscious, political, historical action. Whoever undertakes to believe that - you immature revolutionary - thinks that a social order can solve the enigma of human existence. If, despite of it, I asked whether they were ahead of us in any regard at all, then it was this the very point at which I was mouthpiece for the people over there.

I briefly must enlarge on this a little in order, again and again, to arouse in you a desire for this mental experiment. Originally, I had sketched several questions as a possible answer to my topic of today: Can the Communist undertaking succeed? To be sure, that would mean: realized here on earth, it cannot be anything else but a gruesome bee or termite state. The Utopian novels, with their nightmares, paint this picture for us. Is the Eastern world, perhaps the whole earth, steering toward such gruesome possibilities, the totally planned society? That is the first issue that Communism over there holds for us, a very serious issue. Can the experiment succeed? And what if it did succeed? Will we perhaps end up there too? Is it perhaps an image of our future? It actually is a fact - don't you feel the same way? that at the very moment we look toward the East, the image of our Western society is transfigured. As long as we gaze eastward, totalitarianism is over there and, after all, the free society over here. Certainly, we do have it here; I am the last one to doubt that we do have it. After all, I enjoy it every day. However, at the precise moment we forget to look eastward and gaze upon ourselves, we write such books as Freyer's "The Theory of the Present Age", i. e., we then discover of a sudden in our society an overly large quantity of totalitarian, dehumanizing features and are afraid that their number is steadily increasing. Isn't that true? In so far, the first question I sketched would have been: Will Communism in its totalitarian form succeed, and is the East, possibly, horribly, the image of our future?

The second question would then be the one I have elaborated upon: What counterforces are there in the East, so that Communism will not succeed in its messianic program, but will perhaps lead to something reasonable? The other questions I shall leave out.

As I live in Berlin and in my neighborhood, in my own and the next two streets, eight persons have moved away so far, so that I must conclude that no one will vouch that I won't wake up some fine day as member of a Communist society, I found it more interesting to show you how, under such circumstances, one will come to grips with the problem, if one is made a member of a Communist society. It is perfectly clear what we have against such a society. In innumerable lectures about Communism I, myself, have shown it. I transpose myself into the situation over there because of the lack of contact in which we find ourselves, don't we? (despite the talks in the news magazine "Zeit" - but those weren't talks, they were duels, in which one tried to checkmate the other!). But the people over there are in contact. People over there do not speak with a single Communist and then with two of them, who spy on each other, rather there are - that was what Mr. Heer meant - a great number of human relationships. People live together, they are together in the people's owned factory, in the collective farm, in the pub, etc. I, as a Christian, am together continually with Communists. I am perfectly aware of the things I cannot profess. But in my conversations I hear a lot of questions, and among them is the problem that caused me the greatest difficulty, namely: when it is realized that the final objective, should it be attained, is a monstrosity, or, if it should not be attained, what is likelier, if Communism in its claim to messiahship should suffer shipwreck as a matter of course, before even starting; despite of all this, Communism is nevertheless a steady labor of realization, of bringing things into concrete existence. These, then, are the forms of life for millions of people, for nations, who are in Communism as a unit and cannot, as do our East Germans, still hope that someday they will escape; rather, people who have no other choice, who cannot retreat a single step, not even back into our pluralistic society with its ownership status. They can only ask, if something can be done with what the Communist Party has brought into concrete existence, and if, in what the Communist Party has brought into concrete existence, they might have a starting point, a basis for overcoming the mutual problems of the 20th Century, perhaps more easily than we here in the West. This by no means implies, Mr. Altmann, that we here in the West must first create this basis. For us here, as we have little mind to pass through this Communist experiment, it would mean, how we, using our basis - that is the question posed by those over there - undertake to solve the same issues. This includes the overcoming of proletarian existence, as I called it in my talk. I find, the Western situation is painted too optimistically. The picture is correct in the Federal Republic but only for certain factories and certain branches of industry; not by far for all branches of industry, and it certainly does not apply, by far, outside of the Federal Republic. Extensive investigations have been carried out by us concerning labor-management relations and concerning the problem of the worker's pleasure in his work. In France, in Italy, etc., the problem of the proletariat is a very current problem, not to mention the world outside of Europe.

This brings me to the question which, after all, is of theological importance for me: the basic question of anthroponomics regarding the position of the individual. As a matter of course I should here have had to indicate a clash with Communism. One of the first points at issue would have been that at the point of inception Communism has missed the actuality of personality. But it must immediately be stated hereto - this too, I believe, Mr. Heer had in mind -: If the concept of person is an invention of Christian theology or of the Christian Occident, it would look bad for this concept as then it might fade away again. Actually, this concept of person expresses a reality which we recognize and which, in my opinion, has been made more accessible by Christianity. The individual as a reality is in the lists, over there too, and an amorphous unity of individual and community will never be brought about; of course, it does not exist now. Individuality demands its due and in all possible manners. The Christian is interested in individuality for God speaks to each one individually. This individual is active. Now, it is for us, I believe, of greatest and of solacing importance in view of possible totalitarian and de-personalizing influences over here, that it has been impossible to establish a termite state over there. It is solacing to note, how the individual is active over there, and it is the individual who is the reason for our interest in liberalizing tendencies. Our interest should be and here I again become the mouthpiece of those over there - not in the disintegration of Communism but in its humanization. Over there, the people, naturally feel that the difference between the present and previous, Stalinist, times is tremendous. Measured by our standards, there might not be a basic difference. But the people over there - and I speak not of the German in an advanced Soviet district but of the scars in the Soviet interior - do not use our liberty as a measuring rod, they are indifferent toward this liberty, are wise in being indifferent toward it, because our liberty, so difficult for us to master, could not at all be mastered by them at the present time. For this reason they do not measure on the basis of our liberty and do not yearn for it, rather do they measure by their previous Jack of liberty. If Krushchev, laying great stress on certain Stalinist phenomena, recently said: "Such things will not occur again", then this is of tremendous importance for every person in the Soviet Union. We must participate in this mentally, we can only be happy about it, in it we can see a confirmation of the force of life, in the name of man, against dogmas, which, in reality, have a dehumanizing effect. Only then, when we do not primarily

view the world over there as the enemy but as part of a world of the 20th Century without which we cannot live and in whose improvement we have the greatest interest, only then shall we have an interest in having something useful evolve from Communism. That really does not mean that we should accept Communism. I also am interested - pardon me, Mr. Kogon! - in that something useful evolve from Catholicism, as you, Mr. Kogon, are interested in something useful evolving from Protestantism, without our already seeing a possibility of falling into each others arms in the una sancta. For the moment we are interested in seeing whether the people over there can become a little more Christianized, just as we over here should become a little more Christianized.

I should not like to exclude completely the viewpoint of the enemy - to this extent my talk was really depoliticalized, but that was due to the standpoint I chose. I know that it is a power struggle and that they, over there, want to incorporate us, just as we want to incorporate them. But the justification of a power struggle is always that one wants to remain oneself; it is therefore a struggle for self-preservation. Now, I should think, it ought to be possible to find an affinity between self-preservation and the truth of the one boat, in which all of us sit today, so that we may look with positive interest on what is happening over there, on the opponent's side. I do not know if I am making myself entirely clear, but you, Mr. Altmann, placed the standpoint of the enemy so one-sidedly in the foreground that no possibility exists at all to formulate common interests, and none for fellowship with the positive developments for the people living under this system. Well understood: developments, stabilizing Communism as a political power; which, therefore, do not weaken it; which make it more dangerous in the power struggle! Simultaneously, thus, we have an interest in maintaining our stand in the face of Communism so that Krushchev will not, some fine day, be our master, and yet attain to a co-existence with Communism, which is more than an antagonistic existence, both sides armed to the teeth.

In the case of Communism, the inhumane means it uses, are in the foreground as far as we are concerned. In taking part in person-to-person conversations with Communists, one must not neglect to point out again and again that their idolatrous worship of power is one of the great sources of error of their system. That scores the qualms of decent Communists in the East Zone; that's where one has to counterattack. In the introduction to the new party program it is stated that Communism is not subject to exportation and that it cannot be forced on the people. The tragedy of Communism in the East Zone is that it sought to take advantage of the propitious hour of the Soviet bayonets to force Communism on the East Germans. That's where death is so much in evidence in the pot that, in my opinion, they have no chance to get him out in the near future. One could unendingly reproach them for their readiness to use inhuman means. But can we really do so without forgetting that inhuman means are not an idiosyncrasy of Communism? We should not leave it to them to impute the same thing to us. According to my historical observations, all systems flay inhumanly about themselves for two reasons. The conservative system, for instance, flays inhumanly about itself when it sees itself in danger; the revolutionary system flays blindly about itself as long as it tries to reach its objective by force.

Now that the misunderstanding has arisen that I am allegedly the one who thinks preconditions are better in Communism, I should very much like to know whether socialism is definitely passe as far as we are concerned. There is a formal collective concept "socialism", meaning more than a social attitude and a social state under law, but actually also: common ownership of the means of production, an egalitarian society, in which all work together and in which (expressed Marxistically) is removed the contradiction between collective production and individual appropriation. The point at issue is the vision that changes human relationships generally. And now, by reason of the questions put us from over there, it appears to me worth discussion - not that we should imitate their own particular socialism - whether the decisive step out of the present nonsocialist society, no matter how socialistic it might become, into socialism must still be taken by us; whether it remains to be taken; whether there are circumstances which urge this step, or not.

Kogon

It's true, isn't, gentlemen, that it isn't a question of each one of us declaring himself in agreement with everything Professor Gollwitzer has pointed out, but rather that in conjunction with his unusual questions - unusual because in our Federal Republic they are not the rule but the exception - be found the productive points of inception from which usable possibilities can be developed. With cheap ideological self-deception, no matter how much it is due to the conflict, the Western cause is not aided. That, anyway, is how I interpret the remark of Dr. Körber of the "practicable suggestions": presuppositions and correlations are to be clarified through discussions, so that then, i. e., in the wake of clarifying inquiries into complicated evidence, that is, in a form other than such talks can take, corresponding conclusions be worked out. Did not Dr. Körber also speak of the possibilities and impossibilities of an understanding between East and West that were to be investigated?

If you will permit me, I shall now undertake to stress a series of points of what has been said, complemented by some personal thoughts, points that appear to be essential for the purpose stated by Dr. Körber.

1. We all realize in common that we live in a situation of the "atomic deadlock". As concerns the balance of power, this probably is the central fact of importance. "Life with the bomb" is a life subject to the bomb, and that for all. The conflict between the ways of life, the systems, thus: the "American way of life" and the "Soviet humanhood", as they themselves call it, a conflict that permeates and co-determines all spheres of life, this conflict can no longer be resolved by war, or the world, at least that of the whites, would go to pot in collective suicide. That is the first point, which cannot be denied by anyone using rational arguments, whether he likes this situation or not.

Meyer-Abich

Do you consider a war with conventional weapons completely impossible?

Kogon

As a total clash, with the objective of bringing about the victory of one system over the other: yes, impossible. Neither one of the major powers would capitulate as long as it had the superweapons. Actually, today the threat of these gigantic instruments of mass destruction always stands at the beginning as intimidation, and not in the background. In so far I speak, in the existing general shadow of the "bomb", of "rational arguments". Naturally, irrationality can, at any time, unloose a clash of forces between the systems. In, at the most, twenty years, when there will be atom power plants, centers of power supply, a war cannot rationally be considered, not even limited to allegedly conventional weapons because the most conventional of grenades would cause contamination dangerous to life everywhere around these power plants through the destruction of the plant. But let us leave aside questions of detail - I am aware that in every point I note lies the possibility of extensive and intensive debate. I should merely like to contribute to the establishment of an interim platform, so to speak, for the possibility of comprehending communication.

2. The logical result of the "atomic deadlock" of the two leading powers - the two powers heading the two systems - is a next-to-each-other without war. This very state is co-existence, the first step, if one so desires. Only this is not a satisfactory solution in view of the comprehensive antitheses between the two systems. How does this next-to-each-other without war look in detail? Actually, the two systems of society and consciousness could exist independently of each other, each one in self-development within its own frontiers. But this conception is nothing more than a merely abstract construction, because both are driven by a global claim, for after all they both are expansive world views. It is therefore practically impossible that they not have concrete relationships with each other.

From this results firstly - and that is the next step in co-existence - as concerns the systems themselves: nolens volens a mutual de facto tolerance, i. e., the express recognition of the fact that the opposing system can no longer be overthrown by means of intervention from the outside.

The third step in this real-dialectical chain of events then is, as a basic and central relationship with which we have to do - always under the presupposition of the impossibility to decide the issue by means of war, and under the presupposition of a mutual global claim - competition, i. e., the effort to surpass the other system, an effort the prospects for which, over there and over here, intensively occupy us. On our side, this competition is generally termed "anti-Communism" and on the Soviet side it is called "international class struggle". One of the ineludible forms the conflict takes is the mutual reproach of instigating unrest and the mutual claim that one's own procedure is subserving peace. Real peace, as international order transcending national interests, is out of the question, although so much is spoken of it propagandistically.

I repeat, so that we may be completely in agreement: co-existence of the first step is a next-to-each-other without the possibility of appealing to war as the final resort. Co-existence of the second step is the practical recognition of the first step, i. e., political behavior springing from changed consciousness, in accord with the realities of the balance of power; the third step is global competition of the two systems without a unified, real order of world peace. The expression "step" please consider merely as an image of the logical chain of events of mental analysis; in reality there is no sequence but actually a next-to-each-other, with mutual and simultaneous effect on each other.

The third step, competition directed against each other, is influenced uninterruptedly by the first and second: the impossibility to permit that competition be allowed to end in war, and the compulsion to carry an a corresponding policy so that one is impelled, for this very reason, to carry on negotiations.

The "talks between the two opponents" without subjective motivation being decisive therefor, the talks merely being a political necessity immanent in the situation, can be called the fourth step of co-existence.

The first step then is a partial, more or less comprehensive cooperation in opposition, a positively directed collaboration, which does not, however, eliminate basic opposition. Please recall the cooperation within a number of UN organizations which, after all, are not all, without exception, blocked; or the efforts toward disarmament and the control of arms; or, to note an especially impressive case, the manifold, practical, completed negotiations "on a lower level" between the Federal Republic and the second German state of Soviet Communist monastic rule, experimentally radical, and not recognized, other than by name.

Co-existence, as may be seen, already has numerous forms in its very difficult initiatory stages while the cold war is in progress, coexistence as preliminary form of peace some day having to supplant the cold war, as preliminary form of war, that is, if it succeeds. "Some day" can be a long time hence, for it is a matter of most difficult, most protracted, historical transitions.

3. I was somewhat surprised that so many of you this evening here in our discussion tended to treat both systems basically as world views, and to view them extracted from the real historical process in which they came into being and in which they will continue to develop. This, naturally, gives them something static, which does make it easier to differentiate between them and viceversa, easier to combat - but this is not realistic; in this way, analysis receives an especially ideological character. Please understand, if I, as political sociologist, dealing not only with ideas, ideals and ideologies but with all the forces of the field of activity of society, and these forces are very many, very manifold, if I warn against a onesided viewpoint, like the one I indicated, which, furthermore, is extremely dangerous politically.

Which basic process of history is it, after all? I think, we can agree if we note that the point at issue is and was the improved position of man in civilization, the modern development of agrarian societies into industrial economies and, within this development, the "just" sharing of the gross national product. The past century accepted the economic form of capitalism and the political form of liberalism, i. e., pluralistic democracy starting in West and Central Europe, with beginnings reaching far back into our history. As Aspiration No. 1, to develop an industrial economy, took place capitalistically, Aspiration No. 2, to effect a completely just distribution of the gross national product, could not take place socialistically, neither nationally nor internationally. As a result, a large part of those initially affected detrimentally organized themselves anti-capitalistically, and of these, a part even anti-social-democratically, namely, communistically. This part professed the principle of revolution against the principle of evolution; the former, according to Marx-Lenin, is allegedly a mature product of highly developed, capitalistic, industrial economy. Instead, revolution became a reality not in the Western industrial societies but in the Eastern agrarian societies during a certain situation of general crisis. (Lenin once termed the historical division of "correct policy in Soviet Russia" and "correct theory in Germany" as tragic for the inception of world Communism.) The Bolshevistic professional revolutionaries extended the impulse of a twofold hope - to improve existence worthy of man through an industrial economy and establish the full equality under law of all workers (not at a later date but immediately) to a theory and practice from which finally evolved the Communist system with Soviet Russia as its leading power in world politics.

World view as ideology was and is an element of the struggle within this process. Some consider the ideology as complete and almost invariable, yes, they are convinced that as instrument for the maintenance and the dissemination of the dictatorial rule of Communist professional revolutionaries it can be maintained as is, stronger, that is, than the real social course of events in the Communist sphere itself, stronger, above all, than the influences from the pluralistic-democratic, partly capitalistic, partly free-socialistic world and stronger than the manymannered developments in the major areas that neither became Communistic nor oriented themselves Westward. Others are of the opinion - better founded in mighty reality, it appears to me, personally-that it is impossible, no matter what the ideology, to have it predominate unchanged, rigid, if it is in continuous, immediate relation with the social processes, is, therefore, in very fact, verifiable as to its historic truth.

4. What has happened here, i. e., emanating from Europe and going to the Western borders of the United States and to the Pacific coast of the Soviet empire, in a way, in a variously contradictory phase distortion: development of industrial economy under the sign of liberalism, more and more in a reciprocal interaction with parliamentary democracy; simultaneous formation of socialism as an evolutionary and revolutionary reform movement; progressive democratization of capitalism under the influence of reform forces, - partial victory of Communism and its spread in Eastern Europe; dictatorial

acceleration of the Soviet system; all this is now clashing simultaneously in the world of the "third parties", in the world of the so-called non-committed nations, the "unaligned", the "neutrals". In the less-developed countries, our "occidental" modern historical processes are flowing into each other. De-colonialization, which has become irresistible, and, in accordance with our past or present behavior, partly evolutionary, partly revolutionary, in the mastering of the colonial-proletarian situation; and the industrialization of these agrarian societies with their old cultures is being promoted by the two opposing systems competing against each other, a competition that the "young" nations and their leadership strata are taking advantage of.

The "third parties", however, do not without further ado accept the one or the other system as suitable for them, they seek their own methods and forms. That might succeed or not, in any event it reacts upon the competing systems, which now have to make allowances in many ways. Merely to indicate one example, the "West" cannot but define its slogan of freedom, and that not only in opposition to the battle cry of freedom of the Communists, but especially with a view to the idiosyncracies of the less-developed societies, as these, at the moment, do not interpret freedom as that of pluralistic democracy, but rather as anti-colonialism and national independence *visa-vis* the whites. The Communist slogans conform to this reality for the nonce a little more than our own pronouncements and promises which bear the heavy burden of our colonial history. If we reason this out correctly and master it in practice, the reaction will be rich in blessings for ourselves, and it will unavoidably influence the Communists also, insofar as they want to keep up with us, and that they do.

5. During this discussion this evening a certain complaint was again heard, as has so frequently happened and in so many places, that the "West could not compare with the "East" as regards formulas with sales appeal for adaption to the system, and that it would be necessary for us to have a "new idea". Many think we lack "an idea" in general. Even those of the Round Table, who attacked this view, who warn especially against too much self-criticism, were not able to indicate something positively new. This appears to me to be self-explanatory. What kind of new "vision" do we want to develop in view of the fact that everything that could be said about improving the lot of man has already been said in our history (even if not always by people of one and the same line of thought)? Who, if not us, nourished "personalization" in history and mightily set it in motion, in the modern meaning of the word, i. e., the possibilities of personal unfoldment. European rationalism of the 17th and 18th Century, itself the result of long processes reaching back to the 11th Century in the history of thought, brought forth liberalism, and liberalism freed the industrial society literally from the trammels of the old capitalistic order, developed parliamentary democracy in the bourgeois form - and did all this under the mighty slogan of the rights of man and civil liberties. Within less than two-hundred years the world has changed its appearance most thoroughly, in very many regards a very positive improvement, for instance, in the enormous process of the European-Occidental spread over the earth, establishing the premises for the two essential conditions of civilization, and did so in an unheard of productive manner: surplus production for free use over and above bare subsistence level, and taming despotism with justice so that the citizen can establish and maintain his order of life against barbarity.

Everyone knows that both processes are far from completed, that gigantic efforts are required in order to master the tasks that have now become global. But the vision of the personal dominion of man under optimum conditions, i. e., from a materially highly developed, assured order of life of self-determination and co-determination, deeply rooted in our traditions, this vision is an achievement of the West, no place else, and in no other civilization. The problem is to make further annunciation trustworthy by practicing correspondingly, today and everywhere!

6. I think, in this world situation we should arrive at joint agreement that we must practice an existence of exemplary solidarity in everything (instead of undertaking the search for formulas and slogans with "sales appeal"), a solidarity thoroughly personalistic in character (instead of talking and talking of the Humboldt ideal of personality). Such an existence realized in society would de-emphasize the current importance of all our historic sins of omission, as serious as they were in their consequences contiguous to our tremendous achievements, and would banish from the face of the earth the delusion that the Communist system could be superior to ours.

The central problem of development is the establishment of the continuing optimum conditions of society for personal productivity. In this we long ago surpassed the Communists, who, however, wherever leadership has failed in our Western meaning of the word - in wide spread, previously agrarian-feudalistic parts of the East of Europe - have made considerable progress as compared to the previous conditions. But is that a reason for considering Communism necessary for us? It would be grotesque to recommend a system to us as progress solely because this system, there where our system failed due to the lack of insight of the leading social strata, achieved in part what we,

everywhere we did not fail, achieved earlier and better and, and under far-reaching conditions of freedom, although with restrictions.

A personally conceived existence of exemplary solidarity means, naturally, voluntarily to carry on in all spheres the process of democratization, for which greatest sacrifices were made in our history - sometimes even revolutionary! - voluntary and involuntary sacrifices, in other words: to eliminate all inherited privilege and assure equal chances for comparable spiritual endowment. How this can be brought about, is not possible to place over a common denominator, in the pluralistic society there are always many and varied methods, which comprises our productive force, and if we understand self-discipline correctly, our original productive force. But could not the progressive liberals, the freedom-loving socialists and the open-minded Christians have at least a common goal in the sense of an optimal humanhood? Perfection need not be mentioned; this also differentiates us from the partly inhuman utopias of Communism. On the other hand, there surely is a "sufficient minimum" as a relative optimum in all spheres of life - everywhere, where it is up to us to regulate conditions, primarily, of course, at present, in our own spheres of society.

7. It should be evident that we cannot maintain the level of civilization already attained - expressed differently - the advantage our system has attained over the Soviet, if we do not master progressive growth by overcoming the weaknesses inherent in our system. That is not a demand rooted in the fear of Communism. It is a demand that is inherent in the logical sequence of the humane premises of our society - and always was! The only difference is that we today have to prove in practice, and not only in national and regional spheres but world wide, that of which we are positively capable. Differentiated in productive variations, our way of life, and the fullness of the organisational forms, institutions, which secure this way of life must be applicable world wide, in continuous adjustment to appearing necessities - not according to a fixed pattern, but adaptable.

The appeal which should go forth from our pluralistic system should make itself felt along the line of demarcation running around the northern hemisphere. This line of demarcation, in the train of an unpreventable co-existence policy, will become more and more stabilized as the status quo, and revision cannot be territorial but only in the form of co-existence influences. No longer can national self-determination bring the opposing system to power in the sphere of the other system, just as there are no interventions by force, with the exception of the one which would prevent the revision through self-determination. The expansion tendency of capitalistic democracy and of Communism has therefore assumed a different form, for both the only one possible: the practical-exemplary form, standing the test through the success of the system, and the form of ideological effectiveness. From what we tonight heard here, I feel this my analytical conclusion has been confirmed.

Then, the further conclusion appears to me to be justified, that our chances in the competition with the other system increase the more if, through a suitable policy, it is possible to aid certain changes in the Soviet system, as far as these are objectively determinable, instead of placing obstacles in their way through inflexibility rooted only in ideology. It is not a case of doing Mr. Khrushchev a favor, in this direction, but rather of doing the right thing in our own interest which, if we are in favor of full democratization in the meaning defined tonight, is identical with the interests of humanity.

Would you, Dr. Altmann, still agree with this. Not any more? Well, we shall talk about it later.

8. Concrete agreement, certain points in common, even of a fundamental type, between the enemy systems can already be proven. What cultural importance is theirs, can remain unanswered for the moment, I should merely like to enumerate them rapidly, after they were mentioned several times in the course of the discussion. The industrial-economic process is, essentially, the same on both sides, resting upon thorough division of labor and collective labor organization (which, on our side, does not stand under the dictum of political commissars of a unity party, as the capitalistic system has long ago been able to do without the coercive forms of former stages of development, but rather disposes of more humane possibilities to obtain reliable discipline). Concurrence, in regard to division of labor and labor organisation, will become greater insofar as on both sides the production principle will be retained: more and more - faster and faster better and better - cheaper and cheaper, and exactly this has to happen if the systems are to fulfill the tasks they have set themselves, and if they are able to withstand competition. The next point of concurrence, then, is, sooner or later probably sooner - affluent supply of goods and services on both sides. The shortening of working hours, the extension of free time as a result of standardization - up to automation in centrally important spheres of production - is already a not to be stopped tendency to be noted in both of the two systems; also the inroads of science in essential processes of such a type of society. From all this results the increase in planning - no matter in what form - on our side and the decrease of the central-administrative and central-executive economy on the other side and, in every instance, although the tendency first has an

opposite effect, for the same reason: because the mass society with its division of labor, labor collectives, wide territorial spheres, becomes more and more complicated, growing in numerous correlative elementary dependencies. The question no longer is whether there shall be planning, that is self-explanatory, but rather how, and by whom, and to what extent.

The sixth point of concurrence could be that the Communistic system, once the socialization of the means of production is so solidified in the consciousness of the people over there that it cannot be overthrown, can grant far-reaching cultural freedom in a limited Western sense of the word, freedom of science, of art, of literature, due to the fact that within fundamental, to a great extent unshakable agreements, a relative pluralistic freedom can no longer threaten the centrally existential facts.

A further point, finally, is the factual privatization of religion, i. e., its ineffectiveness, its lack of influence on most of the factors reacting on the character of society. I say "most" because moral influence, for example, on marriages can remain (and probably will remain), but it will not be the family which will determine the development of society - "the public life" - that is no longer the case ever since the guild economy of meeting demand had to make way for the capitalistic consumer economy. The considerable share which churches still have over here in public life should not hide the fact that religion little if at all influences the conventions raised to law of capitalistic-industrial-economic procedures practically as little as they can influence the Soviet system, which for its part, of course, officially and openly rejects religion or, for the moment, is even trying to suppress it, while the West leaves its ceremonial unmolested. But it is becoming more and more evident that the former slogan of liberalism and socialism, that religion is a private matter, has become the invisible designation over an actual industrialeconomic condition and a declared designation over consciously brought about condition of life over there. No crucifix, hung in any factory, placed over any undertaking, would, in practice, change anything in any procedure within the factory or the undertaking, as things have turned out, especially not in the banks, the stock exchanges and other institutions, which essentially help to determine our Western civilization and, although not many are aware of it, characterize our life in much. Contrariwise, it is easy to imagine, it is even probable, that the militant atheism in the Soviet system will be dismantled in the measure in which religion, without withering on the vine - counter to Soviet expectations - as a result of changes taking place, does not have to be viewed there as "opium for the people", and official attitude toward religion might become more or less the following: "Why shouldn't the people go to church, if they have a metaphysical need for it?"

I do not claim that this unity civilization of the northern hemisphere will come about, it is only that numerous indications point to the fact that the development in the northern hemisphere, all around the circumference of the globe, could take this course. The North American, the European, the Slavic, and the Chinese way of life would then be four variations of basically the same civilization, determined by industrial economy, and unless it comes to the catastrophe of collective suicide, that might well be the situation at the turn of the century already.

If that be the case, then it is all the more our task exemplarily to develop the personalistic culture we represent, i. e., not as a type of reservation to retreat to, not as a preserve in which the ivory towers of our subjectivism stand, but as the several times previously mentioned exemplary solidarity achieved. Outside of the northern hemisphere it must assume manifold forms, just think of India: for the whole world it can become co-decisive that there, with our specific collaboration, a system of society of their own pattern is winning out against the system of China, old schoolmaster of the world of the Far East, though its energetic, rapid and successful modernization exercises an extraordinary thought-force of attraction. One could also use Africa as an example. A development lasting generations, gradual even if stormy, is not possible to those who willy nilly became nations - and not by chance! - who are equal members of the United Nations and therefore co-determine the world situations; they should immediately receive the most modern things of our industrial-economic capabilities, without - mostly due to our fault disposing yet of the essential factors of modern influences: their own industrial potential, sufficient administrative intelligence of all types and degrees, trained teachers and trained military personnel - it is, after all, almost self-evident, that the difficulties are overly great, including extreme rivalries, corruption and opportunistic policies between Moscow and Washington. It is just as self-evident that with such a superstructure, central planning is irremissible - the more important it be based upon well-founded freedom, no matter how the future systems there may be constituted in individual cases.

There is no doubt in my mind, too, that the role of the Christian presence in all this, with us and more so out there, could be important, if Christians recognize the world historical hour that has struck.

Something similar, purely political, by the way, is valid in our limited sphere, for the Germans, too: through this land runs the line of demarcation - not only of force, but of the systems; we want to see

national unity re-established; well, now, that is only possible if co-existence leads to something! Therefore, it should be the Germans, foremost, who instigate painstaking investigations as to what co-existence is, what it means, where it can lead, and who can influence its possibilities - instead of just standing there and asking the rest of the world to solve the problem for the Germans.

Altmann

There are situations in which one at first agrees with the remarks being made, but on second thought becomes doubtful again. Thus, in the course of the presentation of the points of this resume, I became somewhat sceptical concerning all eight theses. The method appears to me too much like comparing the aerial photographs of Buenos Aires, New York, London and Paris and Rome with the photograph of Moscow - the aerial photograph, to be sure and then conclude: "They all look damned alike!" I find, in this case parallels were drawn overhastily.

Kogon

I pointed out to you that each point would have to be evolved in a lecture of its own. You should not take me for primitive, Dr. Altmann!

Altmann

No, no, I did not mean "primitive". It is true, as you said, that technical civilization everywhere is developing in a similar fashion, that is a rule which no one can escape - not the capitalists, not the Bolsheviks. I would say, the expression "co-existence" has a twofold meaning: for the Soviets it merely has the meaning of a tactical compromise. Probably they recognize the fact of an atomic deadlock. The West, however, looks for a compromise to stabilize the world.

Heer

May I add a sentence, Dr. Altmann? In your differentiation, the difficulty of interpreting the intentions behind words and slogans appears again, as it did previously in this discussion with other speakers. But that, my dear Sir, will remain that way all our lives. Intentions do not become manifest convincingly due to the duplicity, yes, the multicplicity of interpretation on all sides, i. e., through the complicated interrelation of merging realities, and through slogans, which are in part genuine, in part counterfeit in their effect. Ages ago, the Christians thus converted the entire antique world, and later the Germanic, too, and the latter then turned upon Christian thought. The Bolsheviks will take the last word from us, with or without co-existence, not only "peace", "freedom", "order" and "democracy". "You must not keep talking about peace", a Vienna prelate once told me, "after all, the Communists talk about that." Where will these methods get us, dear Dr. Altmann? As little must we permit ourselves to be led astray by false wishful thinking as we should not permit ourselves to be stampeded into false fearful thinking, I mentioned it previously this evening. Let us remain conscious of what we really are and what we can do - put better: could! Now, for instance, at the moment in which the Picasso peace dove has grown somewhat lame under the impression of the new Soviet Russian tests with hydrogen bombs doves can hardly fly in clouds of nuclear dust - our real peace offensive should take place - but not as a counterthrust but as a global action, comprising all the fears and all the worries of all the people, the Communists, too, so as to give them real hopes, and us too.

Altmann

An example for the opposite: in Belgrade the neutralists convened and it was expected - especially the Americans expected it, but we did too - the announcement that the Soviets had exploded a series of bombs would scare the neutrals, and as a result they would change over to the side of the West. It was thought, here is where the Soviets reveal their power politics. The neutrals, however, fearfully kept still. The attempt of the West to bear down upon the neutrals, in order, in this wise, to get them to collaborate, of necessity causes these groups, which want to remain independent between East and West, to move more and more eastward. It is, under certain circumstances, necessary for the West openly to carry on power politics, not merely in the sense of "neutrals get nothing from us!", but rather in the sense that we not disregard the powerpolitics element.

Of course, I also find, that it is not enough to consider the process of technical civilization by itself, which doubtlessly impels forward the monotony of a world civilization (and, in deed, it might come to that), and to concentrate on it; instead one should stress - that, after all, is a very serious problem which the West must pose itself - that deep spiritual forces are present. One surely cannot simply appeal to "the call to good will" and merely demand: "Let us do something!" If now we impel forward

these processes among the neutrals and thus destroy old cultures - we must see clearly - driving nations (frequently only tribes) into deepest conflicts, then, over and above the technical means of power we must have the spiritual force to master the situation. Otherwise, we shall get ourselves into a difficult position.

Müller-Marein

It appears to me that as far as Belgrade is concerned you are right. In a type of fear reaction, all of them were very quiet and very fearful. Now, that the Russians are using the fifty megaton bomb, now the opposite reaction is in evidence: what you, gentlemen, rightly missed in Belgrade, is now a fact. The Russians, too, make mistakes: what turned out well for them in Belgrade, is now turning sour. We now feel a world-wide indignation - even in their own ranks - against the superbomb.

Altmann

The process of development of the Western society must be investigated much more accurately, more concretely, in the sense of our possibilities to act. What you noted, Mr. Kogon, does not, at all, tell us what concrete possibilities for political action in the East there are. But these, precisely, are the points at issue.

Heer

Your example of Belgrade is very instructive as concerns the problem we are discussing. The neutrals are not only frightened at the brutality of the Soviet Union but also and at least as much over the vacuum in the West's actions, a vacuum that is mainly filled with protests and, as far as the possibilities for positive action for peace are concerned, at best with stuttering. Recall, if you will, the hopes that were conjoined to the inauguration of Kennedy as president! And what has been the result so far? For this, the causes lie not exclusively in the East!

Altmann

I should like to amplify the point: the further development of Western society. I shall take German society as an example. Let us disregard the technical civilization and let us take pluralism, evaluated so positively this evening. We see that our society has transformed itself during difficult social and cultural struggles into a certain modus vivendi, which we term democratic pluralism or the democracy of organized interests.

Seidel

With pluralism, we mean "prospects of future achievements".

Altmann

All right, that's a philosophy; but I mean concrete historical development only. The structure of society is determined in its nucleus through compromises, which evolve out of concrete situations. We live in a society formed by opposing groups that have relinquished their final objectives. Now, out of this structure of compromises, characterized by clashes and situations of conflict, a new system of communication has developed - at the same time, however, a system of mental inflexibility! The spiritual sterility in which we find ourselves - just observe the situation in the CDU (Christian Democratic Union, political party in Germany) - is due to the structures of associations that prevent further development because they want to maintain their position. While economy, technology and science are developing with extraordinary dynamism, politics is purely static. I take as example: the social relationship of compromise between management and labor has developed a power of attraction, so to speak: a whole series of complexes, for instance, cultural policy, too, and these complexes solidify more and more. Positions are guarded, which have been "frozen in parity", a condition of weakened agonizing lability, one could say. But a society, consisting of groups, all of which have relinquished their final objectives, cannot set a common goal for itself any more. That, so it appears to me, is the specific formulation of the leadership problem of such an industrial society. How can it escape from this condition? To solve the problem is simultaneously synonymous with giving back to Western society the capacity for development which it needs. Only then, when we develop the pluralistic system of communication, which it actually is - although not in the consciousness of the groups all maintaining their own position - into a functioning and convincing model, can we begin to adapt it for the nations which we want to help develop.

Kogon

Do you mean, we should and could wait in the world, until we are ready "at home"?

Altmann

Probably that has to take place simultaneously. But it does include - in German politics - we agree, for example in India, what is to be built up in the way of trade unions, in agricultural cooperatives, and what industries are to be aided. Our trade unions, too, will have to know which concrete capitalistic manner of production should be included in the model. Only then shall we be in a position to take a step forward. This is the concrete point, where, naturally, the appeal to good will is not enough. It is rather a task of sociology - but a task which should move us!

Lange-Prollius

I have listened to this discussion this evening with great interest without participating in it. Now, at the close, I should like to say something - not systematically but rather on various points which appear to me to be especially important. In the past five years, I have travelled in the East bloc states for my firm six months of every year. With the exception of Albania and North Korea, I have become thoroughly acquainted with all countries of the Eastern bloc, and more than just their capitals.

We occupy ourselves here with questions of industrial society and with the problems posed to us by the East. At the present time, a time in which the terrible wall in Berlin exists, it is very difficult to consider the problems of the Communist world, be they political, commercial or philosophical, with the necessary degree of scientific objectivity. In our country, we find both extremes. We meet openminded people, who occupy themselves intensively with the events in East and Southeast Europe, and we find representatives of our people, who are outstanding for their unbelievable arrogance and prejudice in the sphere of judgment and attitude. Let me mention an especially crass example. It concerns a letter to the editors of the "Passauer Presse", and the editors declared themselves in agreement with the contents. According to this letter, it is considered unbelievable that in some West German junior colleges, the Russian language has been included in the curriculum as an elective or even as a required subject. In the opinion of these gentlemen, this is a further act in the bolshevization of Germany, in that our children are being forced to learn the language of these "heathens". But in order to solve the problems of Communism, it is irremissible, to cross swords with the thinking of the opponent and to undertake the attempt to comprehend him. In my travels I experience again and again the terrible defeats of Western representatives in political discussions with their partners in trade. The lack of communication is to blame for the mutual prejudice, which leads to a total blindness, whereby wrong valorization, ignorance, arrogance and hatred complete the job - not to mention a past not mastered on either side.

First of all something from the various spheres of industrial society in the Eastern bloc. As concerns economics, the Soviet Union finds itself at present in a genuine crisis. Using an underdeveloped agrarian state, with a heavy industry grafted on it, the attempt is made to create an industrial economy thoroughly organized in its structure. We fail to recognize in the West that within the Soviet Union, that is, in its domestic economy, the transactions between plants have been carried on for thirty years with capitalistic methods, under the supervision of state planning, however, in order to degrade the director of a plant to the rank of a bookkeeper. Since Stalin's death, a further realization has opened the eyes of the functionaries: it is possible to establish heavy industry with a totally planned economy but a consumer economy with a first-class, efficient wholesale and retail trade cannot be thus created. One can produce good steel, but one is not capable of supplying a medium-sized town with vegetables.

After man in the Eastern bloc has gone through most difficult times and no longer sees himself faced with a daily life-and-death struggle for existence, he again begins to think about Marx and Communism. The Soviet citizen notices that the economic-political Leitmotiv of Marx: "Lord of this world is he, who possesses the means of production" is not true for the Soviet Russian reality of the 20th Century. The workers and employees note that on paper they are owners but that they do not possess the power of disposal - a fact we also note in industry in the West, in that a stockholder that does not dispose of a voting majority or a large block of shares has no influence over the processes of production and plant. Disregarding family or private plants, we find in the West exactly as in the East the characteristics of an age of the manager. Why are the Russians and the Chinese so extremely annoyed with the Yugoslavs? Because these - unfortunately they have only a rocky, poor soil - have shown them that Marx meant socialization and not state capitalism. If you ask someone in the Eastern bloc: "To whom does this plant belong?", he will answer: "The state" (. . . in reality the party). In Yugoslavia, the same question will be answered by: "To us". Thus, we there have the same situation

as at the Volkswagen factory prior to the re-privatization. The Soviet people try today - let us call it Khrushchevism - to reverse this fraud against themselves, the fraud against a revolution. That, in an economic regard, means de-Stalinization. The point at issue is therefore co-determination in the plants, such as, in many instances, has already been attained in the capitalistic West.

A few inner-political remarks. Marx demanded that in the Central Committee a dictatorship exist, but a democracy in public life. Our "gentlemen", so say the people in the Eastern bloc, govern us exactly in reverse. They have a voting democracy in the Central Committee - in which, naturally, the strong get their way, of course: think of the initial defeats of Khrushchev by the Molotov group, Khrushchev just missed by a hair landing in hell, and then proceeded to send his opponents there - and they have introduced a dictatorship in all spheres of public life.

The well-functioning economy of the West, the Federal Republic of Germany in the van, serves as an example to them: only the form of society of this industry goes against their grain. The experts of the West, in the past years, when the Communists saw themselves forced to compromise, could visit the plants in the Soviet Union, and in the other Eastern bloc states, and the directors of industry in the East had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with our industry, our trade and our administration. These directors now undertake to establish modern plants not only for heavy industry and large chemical plants, but also for medium and light industry; in other words, they are beginning to establish a consumer economy, and now they face the frightening fact that their plants of the first five-year plans are, to a major extent, antiquated.

Another problem, a mixed economic and political one, is the situation of agriculture in the East. Large stretches of the Soviet Union differ in nothing from the time of Czarist rule. It is a vital question for the Communist countries, finally to undertake the attempt, to remove the disparity between farm and town. Forty-six percent of the Soviet population works in agriculture and they manage, just barely, to feed the 220 million inhabitants of the Union. On the other hand, 9 % of the American population feeds 180 millions there, and they manage a whopping surplus for export.

And now in general. Without a knowledge of the economic-technical key statistics, which one has to know when talking to representatives of Communism, no discussion in the spheres of politics, economics, sociology and philosophy can be carried on. It is a mistake to believe, one is not able to discuss the most controversial subjects when talking with these people. For instance, to the question which Marxist principles justify the annexation of Northeast Prussia by the Soviet Union, one will either receive no answer at all or an imperialistic one. One time, during a debate on religion, I answered a high Soviet functionary, who asked if I could give him a single example what had remained of Christianity in the West, that whom he called American war criminals, bound by their Christian conscience, in the years 1948 to 1951, did not take unscrupulous advantage of their superiority of atom bombs either for political blackmail or by means of a preventive war against the Soviet Union.

Through the creation of the DDR, we face the phenomena of Communism and not only contemplatively. We should however, guard against transposing without reservation, in our present time, political objectives of Communism that have become antiquated in the meantime, although they have been declared valid for Germany, objectives mentioned in Communist literature at the beginning of the Century, and used in practice after the First World War. If it was the great objective and the hope of the revolutionaries of 1917 that Germany would plant the banner of revolution in Europe, because Germany had a genuine industrial proletariat, now, in the 1960's, the exact opposite is the case: the Bolshevization of all of Germany would relieve the Soviet Union as the avant garde of the socialist world revolution; the center of world revolution would, by itself, shift from Moscow to Berlin, if for no other reason due to the crass difference in the standard of living, and conditioned by the fanatical hatred of the so-called unity party members by the grace of Communism - believe me, that is the very last thing desired in East and Southeast Europe! I have seldom, despite the division of Germany, heard our fatherland described so often as a political unit by foreigners. That is also the source of the deep distrust held by Poles, Czechoslovaks, and the people of the Balkan countries against the Ulbricht regime. They are convinced that a communistically united Germany would permit itself to be swept into uncontrollable actions, actions now impossible due to the massive right of veto of the Soviet Union in the East and of the three Western powers here.

If we begin with the original forms of appearance of capitalism and Communism, then we note how unavoidable is a sequential expansion and increase, in the case of the former in the production of goods and turn-over, in the case of the latter in interference with the domestic and foreign policy of the neutral and bloc-aligned non-Communist countries. Khrushchev has bitten off a sizeable chunk. He would like to expand his country into a perfect prosperous society, he would like to lead the Communist ideology to victory in the entire world, and at the same time prevent a shooting war.

Whoever undertakes so much must be prepared to negotiate and to compromise with the opponent, without this it is impossible to reach a peaceful solution. If he wants war, he will get war, so or so, and we need not worry our heads; for if he wants war, we cannot prevent war. For both eventualities, our industrial society must be fully armed, not only in a military and economic regard but above all in a firm avowal of the immutable values of the basic laws of our democracy. If now we do not want to negotiate, when, then, will we want to do so?

Let us begin at long last to end the obnoxious strife between the religions. Let us begin at long last to recognize the partner in our talks, within and without, as a man, with equal rights and duties. Let us begin at long last to reconcile ourselves to the realities of the 20th Century and through this realization attain to logical thinking and acting! We must succeed in concluding peace in Europe and together - actually, that should be the concept of co-existence - help the people over whom we are far advanced, to reach a true world revolution of fraternity, equality and liberty, for every person on earth.

Uexküll

I am of the opinion that it actually should be possible to give something like a positive answer which can be considered an "exemplary contribution". For the moment I want to recall that Mr. Gollwitzer named a few concepts under the cue of "leadership mission of the West", which should be called to mind again briefly: existence worthy of human beings for all, liberty under law, human rights, basic rights, tolerance and respect for the opinions of others. To consider the Communist system as a challenge does not mean, of course, that we must give our answer along Communist lines of thinking; but if for our further development we need an incentive, why don't we think about the Eastern system in order to escape from our present rigidity? That, however, presupposes that we are not afraid, that for our part we do not face the opposing system as an enemy in the interpretation of Krushchev but in the meaning of a fruitful opposition, a meeting of minds from which we too can learn. I would say that basically this is the only method with which we in the West can obtain a "positive idea", demanded again and again. Overemphasizing, I should like to say, that active tolerance, closely related to the realization and practice of keeping to the middle-of-the-road, is one of the most effective virtues. The measure that makes revolution into evolution and the friend-enemy juxtaposition to a - perhaps extremely violent clash of minds, creates the consciousness that something bigger is there, that forces the opponents again and again, and should force them, not to overlook the unity that comprises them both: a better humanhood, wherein bases mutual responsibility.

Already today there are various forms of Communism; the Communists themselves can no longer deny this, so that the concept of Communism as a monolithic block no longer is applicable. It is thoroughly possible that Communism is going through the phase called "Americanization" of Bolshevism - what comes next, we do not know. But I am of the opinion that we can have a definite influence on what comes next, if we liberate ourselves from the friend-enemy conception, of the continuous fear of the other, and if we do not fear the clash of minds but welcome it. This includes being absolutely sure of our own position, also in a moral sense, so that we do not, for fear of the security of our position, commit ourselves to the couple of principles which - if seen from close up - are only appositions, exhausting themselves in the rejection of Communism. Very much the opposite should and could - Communism be the historic event which anew calls forth our strength, the strength which once previously directed itself to the attaining of the goal with such considerable success, to realize the society natural to man. Our renewed efforts would first of all have to be directed to our own situation, but for a certainty an important effect would radiate outwardly.

Kogon

The concluding remarks of Baron Uexküll include in a fortunate manner the pensive remark made by Dr. Altmann at the close of his own remarks!

I thank you, gentlemen, as moderator of the Round Table, that you have endured so long with our topic of such immediate interest, - at the same time for the patience with which you have borne my own numerous participations in the discussion.

Körber

Gentlemen, it is just past 2 a. m. and perhaps time to close our Round Table. I thank you sincerely for this intensive discussion. Perhaps this Fourth Round Table will contribute to master the problems which comprise the fate of our times. It was a critical but always sincere discussion, and now it is a matter of thinking quietly about what the "other" side has told us so quite differently. These questions we can ask ourselves the better when the Minutes of the Fourth Round Table have been printed.

During this Round Table, the problem of Western willingness to development became overly clear. It is the following: How far is modern Western capitalism capable and willing to develop under the conditions of our situation in history, and in which spheres? Beyond that, the basic question is asked: In how far is the free world, in all seriousness, prepared to extend the bases of its form of society, bases on which the clash with the East will take place? In this clash the problem of the formation of society in the industrial sphere will again be posed. May I call to mind the Opinion of the German Committee for Adult Training and say in complement.

Education is today the field in which will be decided whether man is capable of mastering science and technology created by him, and whether the society arising out of the second industrial revolution will master the problems it faces for the preservation of the free world. These questions go beyond the possibilities of an evening's Round Table discussion. The problems I sketched here are to appear in the "Bergedorf Studies", to be printed separately. It is further our goal, within a planned free academy, to have research done on specific topics on problems of our industrial society, for the diagnosis and healing of its weaknesses. All of you this evening have contributed to the new formation of our comprehensive society. Permit me to thank you for your help.

The Round Table was adjourned with the recommendation that the Fifth Round Table be invited for February 19, 1962, on the topic "The Questionableness of the Education Policy in Our Free Industrial Society", (Dr. Rüdiger Altmann as principal speaker and Josef Müller-Marein as moderator).