

Berlin Foreign Policy Forum

“What Role for Germany and Europe in a New World Order?”

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The Berlin Foreign Policy Forum was organised jointly with the Federal Foreign Office.

SUMMARY

“There can’t be a crisis next week. My schedule is already full.” Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, Vice chairman of the Executive Board of the Körber Foundation, opened the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum with a witty remark by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But, he went on, even if people’s schedules are full, the world with all its hot spots will continue to rotate around its axis. Answers were needed for the European sovereign debt crisis, the upheavals in the Arab world, the conflict spawned by the Iranian nuclear programme, and for that matter for the new U.S. assertions of power in the Pacific. Wehmeier wanted to know what kind of role German and European foreign policy would play in the changing world order. With the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum the Körber Foundation is hoping to create a venue that will enable experts and young Europeans to discuss numerous aspects of foreign policy issues in public. The **60th anniversary of the re-establishment of the Federal Foreign Office** had been an appropriate occasion on which to initiate this forum. Wehmeier cited Kurt A. Körber, the founder of the foundation, who once said that it was always better to talk to people than about people, and added “After all, diplomats also believe in the power of dialogue.”

“The EU is our life insurance policy.” Germany’s foreign policy seen from a European perspective

In the first discussion session two young Europeans, a Briton, Mathew Shearman and a Norwegian, Ingvild Lindgren Skarpeid, who are both editors of the online magazine “Europe & Me,” confronted the foreign ministers of Poland, Greece and Germany with a set of questions from the younger generation. 6,500 young Europeans from 23 countries filled out a survey by the magazine on the subject of EU foreign policy. Although they tried hard to find out what it was all about, many of them failed to understand how European foreign policy was formulated. They believed that the media were partly to blame. On the other hand, it was also difficult to get politicians to explain what was going on.

Dr. Guido Westerwelle, the German Foreign Minister, replied that there were 27 foreign ministers, and that was the reason why it was not always easy to reach a consensus. **European foreign policy was still in its infancy**, and back home national politicians were more famous than Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign minister. Despite this the EU has repeatedly made known its posi-

tion, for example on the subject of the “Middle East.” And Greek foreign minister Stavros Dimas and his Polish counterpart Radosław Sikorski pointed out that when it came to European foreign policy, one was dealing with complex decision-making processes. Sikorski said that above all it was important to create an atmosphere of trust. And in this area some progress had certainly been made.

Westerwelle emphasized that many young Europeans are already making use of what European integration has to offer, e.g. travel, educational opportunities, and the common currency. It was now important to get them to understand that this is not necessarily the norm. He always became concerned whenever **the spirit of renationalization** reared its ugly head. He had been surprised when a neighbouring country, Denmark, had suddenly reintroduced border controls. Sikorski was of the opinion that in the past European integration had had a lot to do with the **creation of peace and stability**. Today the advantages of trade and the single market tended to be emphasized, but in future the question of power would also be of importance in the global context. The individual European countries were very small when compared to the rest of the world, and Europe was also losing ground with regard to its share of the global population. It was now a question of **joining forces to protect the eurozone**, and at the same time to make it possible to govern the EU in a democratic manner. Dimas added that Europe could only make an impact if it was united and spoke with one voice.

Westerwelle talked about **Europe’s position in the world**, where “wholly new centres of power” were in the process of emerging. Moreover, young and very dynamic societies were evolving in China and India. At the same time the nature of global complexity was leading to a growing fear of complicated structures, and this in turn was lending support to renationalization tendencies. This was something that had to be prevented, for **the EU “is our life insurance policy.”**

Sikorski spoke of “dramatic moments” in the history of Europe, which was confronted with a debt crisis and a crisis of confidence. Here political will can make a difference, and nothing else. The President of the European Council should confer with the President of the European Commission and submit proposals for a pan-European list which includes sanctions, budgetary reviews and rescue packages.

Westerwelle called for **structural reforms** that included an improved surveillance and management system. It was important to correct and modify the system where it had failed to function properly, and this meant that **the treaty would have to be amended**. For example, it might become possible to deal with infringements in an automatic manner. In the past every new chapter in the integration process had been a response to a crisis. For this reason the current crisis should also be interpreted as an opportunity waiting to be seized.

The young Europeans who were able to take part in the online debate wanted to know whether this implied the ability and the will to provide **political leadership**, and whether European politicians actually thought in a sufficiently radical manner. Dimas emphasized that crises were always the result of a lack of political leadership, and Sikorski pointed out that recently he had quite deliberately called on **Germany to take a leadership role** with regard to the impending reforms. Countries often reacted much too slowly. But in a system in which efficiency was the result of a consensus, it was also **necessary to make unpopular decisions**. The idea that the President of the EU Commission should receive a direct mandate was a step in the right direc-

tion. This person would be empowered to act without delay. But as Westerwelle pointed out, political leadership also means that not everything is going to be discussed in public. Ongoing public debates about worst-case scenarios were detrimental as far as confidence-building was concerned.

Sikorski said that, whilst in the current European system no country was entitled to be predominant, in Brussels politicians far too often continued to act as **champions of national interests**. It was important to tell people how Brussels actually functioned. When it came to competitiveness, the participants were unable to perceive a balance between the EU countries. Sikorski pointed out that competitiveness was also a question of how much in the final analysis one could afford with regard to the welfare state. When it came to the subject of social security people had simply gone over the top in many parts of the EU.

The discussion concluded by focusing on the **question of security**. In view of the fact that the US intended in future to concentrate more on the Pacific, and would no longer reinforce **Europe's defence capabilities**, which it had done in the past, the EU will be confronted with new challenges when it comes to foreign missions. Westerwelle said that the fact that Germany had not taken part in the **Libya** mission had not been detrimental to its image in the world. On numerous occasions it had shown a willingness to support the international community. However, Ingvild Lindgren Skarpeid pointed out that the Europe & Me survey showed that 40 percent of the young Europeans were of the opinion that here the **EU had not met its responsibilities**. They had expected an intervention, for the Europeans had a duty to protect the civilian population.

Westerwelle agreed, but pointed out that the requisite instruments and tools had to fit the bill. Moreover, in such conflicts he preferred political solutions. Dimas ended by saying that in the EU many fundamental problems were still waiting to be resolved. For example, the question of whom one had to ring up in a crisis had still not been sorted out. As a young European Mathew Shearman at the end was no more than cautiously optimistic. He was certainly full of hope, but he remained to be convinced.

“We need to become more open.” How Europe can help the democrats in the Arab world

The Arab Spring faces an uncertain future. However, Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, Vice chairman of the Executive Board of the Körber Foundation, was certain that it had reached the **point of no return**. Prof. Dr. Volker Perthes, director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, moderated the panel discussion on the shape of things to come, and on how Europe can help the democrats in the Arab world. The panel consisted of Slim Amamou, a Tunisian blogger and former Secretary of State for Sport and Youth; Dr. Iman Bughaigis, former spokeswoman of the National Transitional Council of Libya; Dr. Werner Hoyer, Minister of State at the German Federal Foreign Office; Ayman Mohyeldin, the NBC correspondent in Egypt (who took part from Cairo via Skype), and Jürgen Trittin, chairman of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Parliamentary Group.

Perthes started the debate by saying that, whilst it was true that the Arab revolution was only a year old, in this country many people were getting impatient with the way things were going. The media were already talking about the Arab autumn and winter, and were probably blissfully unaware of the fact that the **transformation leading to democracy** would certainly take a decade, and perhaps even longer. Europe hoped that the transformation would be a success, for countries with better governance were also better neighbours. Perthes asked Iman Bughaigis to describe how Libyans actually perceived the European debate about the Arab revolution.

Bughaigis replied that before the revolution there was a negative perception of the extent to which the West was interested in their affairs. But now the situation had changed dramatically. People were more prepared to listen when it was about receiving support from the West. We are well aware of the fact that **“we cannot go it alone in Libya.”** The country had to move ahead by promoting the establishment of administrative bodies, civil society and the cultural sphere. “Here there are great expectations.”

Perthes asked Slim Amamou to explain what **Tunisia** expected from Europe. After all, it was the country in which the transformation process had made greater progress than anywhere else. Amamou said that there was now a Constituent Assembly. Its first task was to draw up a constitution and to elect or appoint a government. Europe could assist its work by providing know-how and explaining what it had experienced with regard to the organization of democratic processes. The Assembly that was now hard at work had to act in a transparent manner, for otherwise the public would lose interest and politicians would once again do whatever they liked.

Hoyer believed that in the past Europe, when it looked at what was happening in North Africa, had adhered to an outdated notion of a static kind of stability. It was now important **“to reconsider our attitudes and strategies.”** If the revolution made it possible to live in dignity and prosperity, North Africa would become a great partner who could be taken seriously. One would be only too happy to provide support for such a process. Moreover, the general evolution of a peaceful North Africa was more important than access to resources.

Trittin pointed out that when it came to **values and realpolitik**, the recent political strategy pertaining to North Africa had been a complete failure. It had taken a full three months to impose a simple oil embargo on Syria. Moreover, supplying two hundred battle tanks to Saudi Arabia seemed to be at variance with the idea of supporting the democratic movements in the region. “I do not see a coherent strategy here.” There was at one and the same time an interest in resources and in a border that refugees could not cross. As far as he was concerned it was now a question of whether one could learn anything from the **transformation process in eastern Europe**. Here economic cooperation had also been important, but it was something that simply did not work if one built a wall.

In the light of what was happening in North Africa Ayman Mohyeldin preferred to speak of the **“awakening” of the Arab states**. Whilst it is true that the elections in **Egypt** are important, the process as such is even more important. The fact is that in the eyes of the military council the elections create a kind of legitimacy that reflects the will of the Egyptian people. Moyheldin added that when it came to the West, the Arab world had had enough of its **hypocritical notions of morality**. Amamou pointed out that not only Europe had been a failure at the time of the Arab revolution. The same could be said of the US, which for a long time had lent its support to the

Tunisian regime. But now there was an opportunity to do something “for the people” without having to consult the various governments.

Perthes wanted to know whether **economic questions** played a role in the transformation process. Iman Bughaigis replied that as far as Libya was concerned, economic questions were important, though not in the normal sense, for money was not in short supply. Libya needed institutions “before we start making use of the money.” There was as yet no new infrastructure. After all, there had been “a total systemic collapse.” So when one talks about the economy, it is first a matter of setting up structures and institutions.

Perthes also wanted to know how important it was to **open the borders**. Amamou emphasized that exporting labour was a significant issue. A large number of Tunisians had gone to Europe, where they were treated as refugees. But in fact many only wanted to find work and to be free. Back home they would have been thrown into prison. Currently it would be a loss for our country to let these people go. However, “free will is not negotiable.” But if they go, they should make some kind of contribution to the land of their birth. Mohyeldin believed that the West needed to demonstrate a greater interest in the **promotion of civil society**. One of the issues was support for journalists and the media in their capacity as observers of the Egyptian elections.

When asked about the lessons that had been learnt from the integration of eastern Europe, Trittin said that in the final analysis there had been an all-party consensus and a coherent strategy. People had accepted the **need for greater openness** with regard to democratic processes and economic development. But when it came to our North African neighbours, there was no such thing as a coherent European policy. There was still a need for complementary strategies, for example, when it came to providing assistance for the establishment of institutions. However, if a wall is going to be set up in order to keep out people from Africa, that will not work. One should not see people as a threat, but as partners.

Hoyer also suggested improving the possibility of **access to Europe** for the population of North Africa, and combining this with less complicated **trade regulations**, for “otherwise we will be a failure and will have to bear the responsibility for our actions.” Europe ought to concentrate on creating a proactive and constructive kind of **migration policy**. This was an opportunity that would not recur in this form. Hoyer made a point of saying that “when we are talking about migration, we should not allow ourselves be governed by fear.” Trittin said that the consensus in the EU had been broader in the process of opening its doors to its eastern neighbours than it is in the case of its North African and Arab neighbours. This might be bitter and unpalatable, but it was the truth.

When asked to name the political instruments that Europe might deploy to its advantage, Mohyeldin replied that he was against imposing a specific policy. One had to **win over people’s hearts and minds**, and then there could be a mutual exchange. Iman Bughaigis said that since Libya was starting from scratch, it needed assistance on practically every level ranging from the establishment of transparent institutions to academic degrees and school partnerships. Trittin believed that the security of Europe was closely linked with the idea of having neighbours who live in democratic states governed by the rule of law. Helping to promote this kind of security by opening up whole societies is the message “which we have got to get across.”

Bughaigis explained the fact that people expected a great deal from Europe by pointing out that the European approach was more familiar to the countries concerned than the American way of thinking. The Europeans were more interested in them than the US.

Amamou believed that at the end of the day opening the borders would once again turn the **Mediterranean** into a **free region**. After all, in cultural terms this is what it was for long periods of time in the past. The value of such interaction was totally impossible to predict.

“Europe is no longer the centre of the world.” The BRIC states and the new coordinates of globalization

In trying to find an answer to the question of whether the BRIC states within the new coordinates of globalization are strangers to or friends of the EU, Dr. Thomas Paulsen, Executive Director of International Affairs at the Körber Foundation, first wanted to clarify some basic issues. What are the BRIC states? What do they have in common? What is their agenda? What are their policies trying to achieve, and are these policies compatible with European foreign policy?

His partners on the panel were Chen Liming, President of BP China, Viktor Elbling, Director-General for Economic Affairs and Sustainable Development at the German Federal Foreign Office, Prof. Rajendra K. Jain, who holds the Jean Monnet Chair at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, Ambassador-at-Large Vadim B. Lukov, sous-sherpa in G8 and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Coordinator for G20 and BRIC Affairs, and Prof. João Pontes Nogueira, director of the BRICS Policy Center and of the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro.

When asked to **explain the agenda of the BRIC states**, Lukov first of all noted that one of the most important topics at the recent BRICS summit had been the question of how it might be possible to assist the eurozone. Another item on the joint agenda was the issue of reforming financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which it was thought ought to reflect the new balance of power in the global economy. The BRIC states, which had 45 percent of the world population, were already contributing 25 percent of the gross world product. It was simply not right that Belgium had a larger quota in the IMF than China. Moreover, the BRIC states agreed that there was a need to strengthen international law. China, Russia, India and Brazil did not accept the policy of one-sided interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Paulsen wanted to know whether the BRIC states also shared **common values**. Pontes Nogueira said that a **common identity** was still emerging. There had been a number of summits and conferences, and talks with other states were in progress. However, the BRIC states had originally been brought together by a purely economic agenda. But in the meantime a more pronounced identity had emerged when it came to a common development strategy and the adoption of common political positions on the international level. When asked about the possibility of more institutionalized **cooperation between the BRIC states**, Pontes Nogueira said that a consensus on the subject had not emerged, although proposals to this effect had been made by Russia, for example. The current type of cooperation made it possible to be very flexible. This was a great

advantage, for in many respects India, China and Russia had different priorities and ways of doing things.

Lukov pointed out that in addition to the annual summits there were already eleven different kinds of ongoing cooperation. For example in the area of science and technology and of agriculture, where the BRIC states were all confronted with gigantic challenges. Another example of pragmatic cooperation was the attempt to enable almost two billion people to obtain affordable medicines. There were many issues on which it was very difficult to reach agreement. In this connection the energy specialist Chen Liming pointed to the negotiations between China and Russia concerning cooperation in the area of energy security.

Paulsen pointed out that there has often been criticism of the fact that the BRIC countries were unwilling to **shoulder international responsibility**. Thus the BRIC states have rejected stronger sanctions against Iran and Syria, and have also come out against binding agreements on climate change. **“Are the BRIC states a group of naysayers?”**

Jain emphasized that the BRIC states offered alternatives in a changing world. Two of the countries were members of the Security Council, which gave an added “edge” to their concerns. Jain thought that the **Europeans should show greater openness** towards the BRIC states. The two groups were still separated by competing views and interests, and reformist and revisionist agendas. For the former European colonial powers trade with China was still not as significant as trade within the EU. In the past this had often been used as an instrument of control. Perhaps the BRIC states could now provide a kind of countervailing power.

Viktor Elbling also emphasized that the BRIC states would have to assume **more responsibility**. The global problems could not be resolved solely by the US and Europe. Contributions were needed from everyone in order to attain the common goals relating to climate change and to secure supplies of foodstuffs and water. For example, when it came to the question of **climate change**, Europe did not want to lay down the law. That was certainly not the case. Nor was one trying to defend old territorial claims. Elbling put it as follows: “With our partners we want to participate in shaping the world.” He greeted the fact that the BRIC states were beginning to work together.

Paulsen asked whether, from the vantage point of the BRIC states, it seemed as if the Europeans were to all intents and purposes clinging to their agenda and expecting other countries to agree with them? Jain replied that this was certainly the case. The BRIC states had also decided to go in a different direction on the subject of climate change. In socio-economic terms the emerging countries were simply at a completely different stage of their development. However, the Europeans were not prepared to listen to their anxieties. There had not been a change of heart on the European level, and cooperation continued to be a challenge.

Paulsen wanted to know what the BRIC states actually expected Europe to do with regard to **climate change**. João Pontes Nogueira declared that Brazil expected Europe to assume responsibility for the carbon emissions that had built up in the atmosphere over the years, and to make a distinction between developing and industrialized countries. Elbling pointed out that the EU was responsible for only about 15 percent of global emissions. Nevertheless it had sent out various signals and so far was the only entity which had stated quite clearly what it was prepared to do. Moreover, funding had already been made available. That in itself was a very cooperative kind of

approach. It was now time to overcome outworn ways of conducting a discussion. Elbling added that when it came to formulating foreign policy strategies, each country had to decide what it wanted to do. In the final analysis the risk of a military mission in **Libya** had been too high from a German point of view.

Paulsen pointed out that Russia had taken NATO to task on account of its policy of de facto regime change in Libya, and was generally rather hesitant when it was asked to exert political, economic or military pressure on other states. “What is the reason for this?” Lukov was of the opinion that the position of the BRIC states was based on the principle of respect for international law and the decisions of the UN Security Council. They had refused to support Resolution 1973 and had in fact abstained because they were afraid that there might be civilian casualties and that a great deal of infrastructure would be destroyed, which is what actually happened. For this reason the BRIC states did not want a repeat performance of the Libyan scenario in **Syria**, and were in favour of negotiations. It was important to maintain a balance. If the Western position were to gain the upper hand, it could lead to a civil war in Syria, a country which was the nerve centre of the Middle East. Pontes Nogueira pointed out that in Brazil opinions on Syria were divided. As far as the BRIC states were concerned, “non-intervention” was a value that they proposed to defend. After what happened in Libya other countries are no doubt reconsidering the use of force.

Paulsen wanted to know whether the BRIC states can help to **resolve the crisis in Europe**. Chen Liming said that China would not be able to save Europe, since it had its own problems to cope with. However, Rajendra K. Jain pointed out that for India the EU was important, since it was its largest trading partner. The EU was an important technological centre and a source of foreign direct investment. But apart from trade and commerce the EU was of no great importance in Asia. João Pontes Nogueira said that observers in Brazil were also concerned about the **declining influence of Europe**. For this reason the current crisis should lead not only to a review of the internal problems of Europe, but should also make people look at the things which do not work on the level of the global architecture as a whole, and in areas where the BRIC states are important partners. The West had to jettison the idea that it was at the centre of the new world order.

Lukov said that the BRIC states were watching the crisis in the eurozone very carefully, for they had a **vital interest in the recovery of the European economy**. German exports to the BRIC states were greater than those to the US. 50 percent of foreign direct investment was going to go to the BRIC states from now until 2015. There was thus going to be a significant and indeed increasing level of economic interdependence. Elbling made the point that people were not cooperating for charitable reasons. For this reason it was important to define common win-win situations, and this was something which was getting better all the time.

When discussing the issue with the audience, it was subsequently stated that economic interchange with the EU was conducted largely on a bilateral basis, and that individual states were not able to act effectively when it came to implementing sanctions. Moreover, the old system of norm-related “regulatory imperialism” in which the West in general and the US in particular devised procedures that were not in the interests of the emerging countries needed to be reviewed. It was time to stop thinking in terms of blocs. At any rate, the BRIC states did not think of them-

selves as a bloc. A participant from China said that it was important for the EU and its partners that in a multipolar world the EU spoke with **one voice**.

“A country like any other country.”

What German soldiers are doing around the globe

As he greeted his interview guest, Dr. Thomas de Maizière, German Minister of Defence, Georg Mascolo, the editor-in-chief of “Der Spiegel,” remarked that he was known as someone who spoke clearly and to the point. Mascolo pointed out that the opinion polls in Germany showed that there had always been and continued to be **stable majorities against military missions**. At the same time 7,904 German soldiers were currently deployed around the globe, and this was a remarkable state of affairs in a country in which pacifism had been an educational goal after the Second World War. Was it possible to say that Germany, when it came to military missions, was just like any other country? “Yes,” de Maizière answered tersely. And after a short pause he added, “and that is something we have still got to get used to.”

De Maizière added that in surveys people made a distinction between “good” and “bad” missions. According to another survey the Somalia mission was supported by 63 percent of the respondents. But one could not put these things in different categories. Even a purely peace-keeping mission could turn out differently. When all was said and done, if military missions were on a higher level of moral legitimacy, people were more willing to support them. However, it was **wrong to make morality the main issue**. One had to consider the advantages and disadvantages in a completely sober manner.

Mascolo pointed out that for a whole year now war had finally been referred to as “war” in Germany. De Maizière replied that the cautious use of this word was understandable, since in German it had different connotations than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, the use of this word in the past would have prevented life insurers from paying out benefits in the case of soldiers who died in combat. And in terms of international law “war” designates a conflict between states. However, in Afghanistan one was dealing with asymmetrical threats. Mascolo wanted to know the goals for which the Minister of Defence was prepared to send German soldiers into combat. The **mission of the German armed forces** was primarily to defend the nation, but defending the nation also meant defending the alliance. Until 1990 NATO’s collective defence clause was largely to the benefit of Germany. It now applied to all of its partners equally. It is our “bounden duty” to look unflinchingly at Article 5. Germany had to shoulder its **international responsibilities** in the same way as every other state. This included the whole spectrum from peace observers to peace enforcement.

Even if de Maizière did not want to say any more about the decision on Libya, Mascolo asked him to explain the parameters that would in future apply to military missions. De Maizière replied by saying that the use of **military force was always going to be unpredictable**. There could not be such a thing as a path that led automatically to the use of military force. Moreover, the mission had to be a legitimate one, with or without a mandate from the United Nations, and had to serve the goal of “protecting freedom” and of “securing peace and stability.”

Mascolo referred to recent statements by de Maizière, who had said that in global terms **German interests** were those of a trading power, and wanted to know how the German armed forces fitted into this scenario. De Maizière said that it was above all a matter of how one defined security and interests. **Security** depended on more than missiles and soldiers. For example, demographics was a central aspect of security. The Arab Spring had made us aware of the fact that people under thirty who had no work were a political factor. Furthermore, water and the lack of it, refugees, the amount of CO₂ and trade routes had all had something to do with security. However, in the anti-piracy missions, which were generally seen in a positive light, the soldiers did not become willing tools serving the economic interests of specific companies. The **legal frameworks for missions** of this kind are extremely complicated. Since the mandate does not enable the soldiers to operate on land, the inflatable boats in which the pirates were sent ashore were subsequently sunk. The soldiers should not have to deal with this problem on their own. “We are not here to engage in state-building in Somalia and to ensure that there is justice in the world.” Much of the post-mission work has still not been done.

Mascolo said that after ten years of war in **Afghanistan** the idea that the country would become a democracy was probably no longer on the cards. What was the lesson in all this? De Maizière thought that the lesson was that one should not raise unrealistic hopes. One needed to have realistic expectations, to develop an exit strategy beforehand, and to spell out the cost in terms of blood and money. In fact Germany did not want to withdraw completely in 2014. It wanted to hand over responsibility on a step-by-step basis. It was now important to design a strategy for the time after 2014, for one did not want to leave the country in the lurch. As soon as there was some kind of confidence that the Afghan government could guarantee security without outside help, Germany could remain in a different capacity.

What will happen to the German armed forces, Mascolo asked, if young people experience war at first hand and old people do not? The Minister of Defence replied that in **future missions** there would be greater fairness and more burden-sharing. The editor-in-chief of “Der Spiegel” concluded his questions with a remark made by Chancellor Angela Merkel on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Körper Foundation’s Bergedorf Round Table. “If one recoils from getting involved in a conflict oneself, then as a rule it is not enough to direct words of encouragement to other countries. One must help states that are prepared to get involved to do what has to be done. And that includes **arms exports**.”

De Maizière said that this had to be done in a circumspect manner, and that it was essential to observe the restrictions. However, arms exports could also help to stabilize a situation. Was this a reversal of the policy previously pursued by the German government? No, it was not. It was simply a more honest way of describing what previous German governments had always done. It was not a new policy.

Imprint

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