agree that Germany and the EU are raising tariffs against the US believe the cohesion between EU member states has weakened say Germany should coordinate its refugee policy together with its European partners are in favour of sanctions for EU member states that violate fundamental EU values such as the rule of law

78% 77%

78% 77%

believe the UK should be treated like any non-EU member state

describe US-German relations today as somewhat bad or very bad

73% 78%

Involvement or Restraint?

A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber Foundation

Was EU enlargement in 2004 the right decision? Germans are divided

Yes: 47%

No: 46%

are in favour of Germany increasing its defence spending

43% 65%
Involvement or Restraint?

A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber Foundation

- **Was EU enlargement in 2004 the right decision? Germans are divided**
  - Yes: 47%
  - No: 46%
  - 77%

- **believe the cohesion between EU member states has weakened**

- **43%**
  - are in favour of Germany increasing its defence spending

- **65%**
  - believe the UK should be treated like any non-EU member state

- **73%**
  - describe US-German relations today as somewhat bad or very bad

- **78%**
  - say Germany should coordinate its refugee policy together with its European partners

- **74%**
  - are in favour of sanctions for EU member states that violate fundamental EU values such as the rule of law

- **78%**
  - agree that Germany and the EU are raising tariffs against the US
Dear Readers,

Welcome to the second edition of THE BERLIN PULSE! At times of turmoil, when the rules-based international order is put into question and traditional alliances become weaker, the majority of Germans still do not favour a more active stance in foreign policy: 55 percent of Germans prefer restraint rather than Germany engaging more strongly in international crises. Apparently, the demands by leading politicians and think tanks for Germany to take on greater international responsibility have not persuaded Germans to change their mind.

THE BERLIN PULSE guides policy-makers and experts along the fine line between domestic constraints and international expectations. Political leaders such as the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid express their hopes and expectations for German foreign policy in 2019. Their perspectives meet the attitudes of the German public – sometimes they overlap, sometimes they clash. This year’s issue brings together data, analysis and different perspectives on the most pressing challenges for German foreign policy today and in the years to come – including some trends and outliers that may surprise you.

With its new focus topic “The Value of Europe”, Körber Foundation is contributing to the debate on the past, present, and future of the European project and is paying special attention to the question of how a new split along the former “Iron Curtain” can be avoided. We are witnessing a growing internal division in the European Union: 77 percent of Germans believe the cohesion between EU member states has recently weakened. A striking 46 percent of Germans believe the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 was not the right decision.

At a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times, three out of four Germans describe US-German relations as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” and favour a more independent foreign policy from the US. However, this alienation is not mirrored in the US: even if they consider Germany not a very important partner, 70 percent of Americans believe the relationship between the US and Germany is somewhat good or very good. We thank our transatlantic partners from the Pew Research Center for fielding joint questions on the transatlantic relationship in the US together with us.

The results of the representative survey commissioned by Körber Foundation in September 2018 should enrich the conversation about German foreign policy during and beyond the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, which we are proud to host together with the German Federal Foreign Office. “Talk to each other rather than about each other” – the motto of our founder Kurt A. Körber continues to guide Körber Foundation’s activities today. I hope you enjoy reading.

Thomas Paulsen
November 2018
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Leaving the Comfort Zone?

While Germany prepares for the UN Security Council, the majority of Germans continue to prefer restraint in foreign policy

As Germany really done enough to end the war in Syria? Was EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision? And is China’s growing influence positive or negative? Half of the German population answers: “Yes!” The other half determinedly says: “No!” The results of Körber Foundation’s most recent representative survey on Germans’ foreign policy attitudes demonstrate that the German public is divided about certain foreign policy issues. At the same time, our numbers demonstrate that the majority of German citizens are strongly interested in foreign policy and want Germany to stand up for European values.

Even though almost two thirds of German citizens think that the European Union is not on the right track, Germans strongly believe in the value of Europe: preserving peace and securing freedom of expression, the rule of law and democracy is what the majority of Germans regard as the EU’s most important achievements. This might be one of the reasons why three quarters of them expect their country to work towards sanctioning EU member states that do not respect those fundamental values, for instance by cutting financial resources that these states receive from the EU budget.

Germany “has a certain tendency” to be a moraliser, as Polish researcher Marek Cichocki told THE BERLIN PULSE. However, the result could also be an encouraging sign that the majority of Germans are willing to defend a value-based system, especially at times when political polarisation is widening at home and abroad.

Since 2014, the “Munich Consensus” on Germany’s responsibility to take on a more active international role has defined the discourse and rhetoric of policy-makers and experts in Berlin. Four years later, however, the German public still does not seem to be convinced. Körber Foundation’s polls measure the German perspective on the question of involvement or restraint since 2014, and, over the years, our records do not display any change in mentality: while 41 percent of Germans believe their country should become more strongly involved in international crises (and 52 percent among 18- to 34-year-olds), 55 percent continue to prefer restraint (43 percent among 18- to 34-year-olds).

Considering the country’s past after the Second World War, it took Germany a long time to regain confidence in its international role. The question about involvement or restraint will hence stay with us. In an increasingly volatile international environment, the message that Europe needs to take its fate into its own hands (Angela Merkel) seems to have resonated at least in some regards: the number of Germans who think that Germany should increase its defence spending has grown from 32 percent in 2017 to 43 percent in 2018. This is a significant shift, also against the backdrop of the US’ continuous pressure on its NATO ally.

Despite tensions within the common alliance, two thirds of the German public have a “somewhat positive” or “very positive” view of NATO. At the same time, from the German perspective, the transatlantic relationship is in bad shape: taken together, 73 percent of Germans describe relations with the US as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” (compared to 56 percent in 2017), and almost half of the German population believes Germany should cooperate less with the US – a cold breeze is blowing over the Atlantic. In contrast, according to results of the Pew Research Center, seven out of ten Americans consider the relationship as somewhat / very good. Furthermore, only 38 percent of Germans think that having close relations with the US is more important than having a close relationship with Russia (32 percent).

Germany’s Foreign Minister told THE BERLIN PULSE that he stands ready to “defend multilateralism” and the rules-based international order. While Germany prepares for its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2019 / 2020, the majority of Germans do not seem ready to leave the comfort zone. Yet, Germany will be asked to react quickly to international crises and deliver on the promises it made to take on more international responsibility. For German policy-makers, the balancing act between international expectations and explaining its decisions on the ever-cautious home front will be an even greater challenge.
M
onths ahead of Brexit and the elections to the European Parliament, 63 percent of Germans do not think that the European Union is on the right track. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, on the contrary, argues, “the recent decisions in Brussels regarding internal and external security issues, economic and financial governance, and migration and border protection illustrate that we are on the right track”. Germans expect Eurosceptic parties to significantly increase their number of seats in the European Parliament, and Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš announces: The elections will show how migration is seen by a “silent majority”. Once the UK leaves the EU, the two partners will have to redefine their relationship, for example in the context of defence and security policy: “The UK – like the US – is likely to lose patience with Germany if additional defence spending increases are not forthcoming”, claim Alan Mendoza and James Rogers (both Henry Jackson Society). While uncertainty around the Brexit deal remains, internal divisions thrive within the EU: is there still a common understanding of what constitutes the value of Europe? Political scientist Yascha Mounk from Harvard University argues: “We need to show that we are willing to fight for the re-implementation of our values.” The French journalist Sylvie Kauffmann, the Polish researcher Marek Cichocki and the German politician Michael Link discuss the issue of whether there is an increasing East-West divide within Europe. While Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, expects Germany to think more about how to align developments in Central European countries with Western European levels, half of the German population thinks that EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 was the wrong decision.

The Value of Europe

The EU is often credited with the following achievements. Which is the most important to you?

- Preserving peace between the countries in Europe: 47%
- Securing values such as freedom of expression, the rule of law and democracy: 35%
- Increasing prosperity through the single market: 8%
- Personal benefits such as freedom of travel: 7%
- don’t know: 1%, no answer provided: 1%
“Our aim is to strengthen cohesion”

Interview with Heiko Maas, German Foreign Minister

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Foreign Minister, why do you think that “Europe United” is the answer to “America First”?

MAAS: “Europe United” is, to my mind, our best response to a dramatically changing strategic and geopolitical environment. The global order is falttering and old and new powers like China and Russia are challenging the foundations of the global and regional security architecture. Moreover, the US Government under President Trump is developing an approach that combines withdrawal from international agreements with a policy of maximum pressure vis-à-vis friends and foes alike. In this new strategic context, “Europe United” is and remains the overarching aim of our foreign policy. We want to build a strong, sovereign Europe based on the rule of law and respect for the weak, and in the firm belief that international cooperation is not a zero-sum game. Our influence on global issues like climate change, free and fair trade, migration, crisis management and the social impact of globalisation will increase significantly if we act with the combined forces of 500 million Europeans.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What are the main reasons behind the recent drop in approval ratings for the EU in many member states?

MAAS: Since 2008, the EU has been more or less in constant crisis mode, beginning with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 10 years ago, which led to a deep economic and financial crisis in Europe and beyond. The terrorist attacks that hit many European societies as well as the migration crisis in 2015/16 also gave rise to a general feeling of insecurity. This accumulation of crises together with the repercussions of globalisation and the rapid spread of digital technology resulted in an eroding of trust in political and economic elites within our societies. This happened at both the national and the EU level. I think that the EU and its member states should take these grievances very seriously. The recent decisions in Brussels regarding internal and external security issues, economic and financial governance, and migration and border protection illustrate that we are on the right track.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Certain governments in Europe no longer seem to share or even disregard fundamental EU values. Are sanctions a useful option in these cases? How could these partners be persuaded to return to European values?

MAAS: In the EU, some national governments have different interpretations of European norms and values due to their specific history and experiences. We have to manage these differences, but at the same time, we have to protect and preserve the core of our common values and convictions. I believe that our values are indeed an essential part of the European identity. But this is not an issue between Germany and the countries concerned. It is a European issue that is currently being discussed in a constructive manner – in the European Parliament as well as in the Commission and the Council. It is within these institutions that we should try to find European answers. We must not forget that the European idea was always the antithesis to totalitarian ideas. The European Communities helped to resurrect Europe after the Second World War, and the EU was a crucial factor behind reuniting the continent after 1990. The EU is attractive because it is not just an economic project. It is, first and foremost, about democracy, the rule of law and freedom.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: The German-Polish Barometer found that 39% of Poles – the largest group of respondents – considered Germany to be too dominant and not demonstrating enough willingness to compromise at the EU level. What is your response to this perception?

MAAS: I take it seriously. Germany would be well advised to take a close look at such criticism. Fortunately, the German-Polish Barometer also revealed that 64% of Poles consider relations with Germany to be good or very good, and 74% would favour even closer cooperation with Germany. Our aim is to strengthen cohesion within the Union. We are constantly seeking to consult and reach out to all our partners, such as with France and Poland bilaterally and in the Weimar Triangle. Furthermore, we consider our special dialogue formats with the Baltic and Nordic countries to be particularly valuable. My experience is that these exchanges help a great deal to prepare the ground for political compromises at the European level.
Should Germany cooperate less or more with each of these countries in the future?

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<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
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**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Within the EU, different ideas exist about how far and how swiftly European integration should progress.

**MAAS:** Competing concepts have existed from the outset of the European integration project. We are all European countries with our own idiosyncrasies and our own unique histories. At the same time, we have a common destiny, and it is our common responsibility to shape this future in the best possible way. This will not work with purely national positions or bureaucratic orthodoxy. We need to adopt a positive stance on Europe and we need courage and creativity. We are moving forward in many fields and have reached a consensus that internal and external security are areas in which the EU could deliver much more. In this regard, 25 countries have recently agreed on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which is an important step forward. The financial and social union should also be a priority. European citizens need to feel that the EU has a positive impact on their daily lives. However, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for all policy fields. In order to achieve and preserve unity, we have to find the right mix of inclusiveness and flexibility. Not all countries are part of the Eurozone or Schengen area. We also have to discuss the extent to which majority voting in some aspects of foreign and security policy will improve our capacity to act.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** How can the necessary level of European unity be achieved so that Europe can help shape the changing international order? Which political projects are paramount and what role does Germany play in this process?

**MAAS:** Multilateralism is part of the EU’s DNA. Therefore, we have a very strong interest in a rules-based international order. Europe has to be a strong pillar within the international system, not only to defend its interests, but also to stabilise this system. In this context, we will seize the opportunity of our membership of the UN Security Council in 2019/20 to strengthen Europe’s voice and its capacity to act within the UN. We will support the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to implement his ambitious reforms. Together with our European partners, we will work to put the security implications of climate change onto the Security Council agenda. Moreover, we will seek to strengthen the UN’s capacities in the field of crisis prevention. Beyond the EU and the UN, we have to do more to support and enhance the global multilateral order. We are therefore striving for a multilateral alliance, a network of partners who, like us, are committed to international cooperation and the rule of law. It is not enough just to complain. We have to defend and fight for multilateralism.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** According to the German-Polish barometer, the majority of both Germans and Poles want more European integration. Is there no East-West divide in Europe, after all?

**LINK:** I do not think the divisions depend on geography, but on differences in values and political views. This makes me hopeful, because it implies we can influence political debates and processes. That is also why it is so important which political family wins the European elections next year.

**KAUFFMANN:** I agree. We have grown accustomed to this schematic dividing line of “populists in Central Europe and liberal democracy in the West”, but today, populist and nationalist movements exist across the EU.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Mr Cichocki, most Germans think Poland contributes to an increase in tensions in Europe and is not a reliable partner.

**CICHOCKI:** Germans have had a critical attitude towards Poland for many years. Poles do not always agree with German policies, but they tend to view German society positively. However, I also think it is outdated to focus on an East-West divide. The main challenge for Europe are rising inequalities between regions and within societies. The biggest hope related to European integration was that it would reduce inequalities. Today, it rather seems as if socio-economic conditions or political views are growing further apart.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Ms Kauffmann, why do these different perceptions surface now?

**KAUFFMANN:** The big enlargement of 2004 is now 15 years old, so we are witnessing a crisis in the expansion of the EU. The migrant crisis has revealed...
that we underestimated the dimensions of enlargement. For instance, with regard to the relationship to the concept of the nation, the founding members wanted the EU to move beyond the nation-state due to our war-ridden history. Central European members states on the contrary aspired to reconnect with their national identity after 1989. How should we deal with this?

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Mr Link, will the Commission’s proposal to make EU funds conditional on the respect for the rule of law strengthen the adherence to fundamental values, or will it deepen divisions?

LINK: We should never question that Poland and other countries are entitled to these funds. On the other hand, we need to insist on the respect for fundamental European values. Maybe the actual disbursement of these funds could be withheld as long as there are pending fundamental rights cases with the European Commission. This would of course have to apply to every member instead of just one. Working in smaller groups should tend to strengthen cohesion between the EU member states recently ...

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Should France try harder to strengthen ties with countries like Poland?

KAUFFMANN: Of course! But what is Poland’s role in this region? For understandable reasons, Poland always had very close relations with Germany and Poland has always had a different approach to enlargement and to Central Europe. Therefore, the future of the triangle depends on the future of Polish-German relations. It also depends on whether the other countries acknowledge that Poland is not only a recipient of benefits from European integration, but also contributes to it, for example in terms of security at the Eastern border. This is often rejected because of our attitude to migration policy. We will not always do what others expect, but solidarity should imply that we recognize the contribution nonetheless.

KAUFFMANN: It is important to show that the Weimar Triangle can work as one of many formats within the EU. Working in smaller groups should tend to weaken this, it will be a showcase for paralysis.

LINK: Maybe we Germans and French also need to understand the concerns of non-Eurozone countries. On the other hand, Poland needs to accept that a multi-speed Europe already exists. We need a more united Europe, otherwise we will be even more vulnerable and exposed to increasingly authoritarian powers like China, Russia and others — especially during the tenure of an increasingly unpredictable US President.

The interview was conducted during the Bergedorf Round Table in June 2018 in Warsaw.
“I do not see the risk”

Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, explains why concerns about reforms in Poland are ungrounded

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Prime Minister Morawiecki, why do the Poles have a more favourable view of the EU than all other EU citizens?

MORAWIECKI: Poland was part of the Soviet sphere of influence, but Europe was our promised land. Therefore, we wanted to be a part of the European Union. Many Poles migrated to Western Europe during the darkest days of communism, which has left scars.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Does the past nourish the Poles’ pro-European attitudes more than the present?

MORAWIECKI: Both play a significant role. We are a part of Europe and we have always felt a part of it.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Why, of all member states, is Poland then the first-ever country to face an infringement procedure under Article 7 of the Treaty of EU?

MORAWIECKI: These are two different aspects. Europe is the symbol of our aspirations, but at the same time, we have to rebuild the post-communist society. We never underwent a deep vetting process of our judiciary system 1990, as happened in Germany for example. Berlin kept after very few of its judges and prosecutors. In Poland, the communist apparatchiks remained in charge for many years, and this should have been changed a long time ago. This is why I believe we will manage to explain to the European Commission that our reforms will not make our judicial system less independent or less objective.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Is the infringement procedure merely a misunderstanding between Poland and the EU Commission about the importance of Article 2?

MORAWIECKI: Fighting for democracy and freedom has been Poland’s motto for centuries. Therefore, we are aware of the importance of Article 2. Some people try to call our judicial reform a risk to the rule of law, but I do not see the risk. I am convinced that the reformed judiciary system will provide more justice, more objectivity, and more transparency.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Let us turn to the future of the EU. If the EU were perfect in 2030, what would it be like?

MORAWIECKI: The perfect EU would contain a fully implemented single market, where the freedom of movement applies not only to goods, people and capital, but also to services. There would be more convergence with respect to wealth and income across countries, and stronger cohesion. In other words, Central Europe would have caught up with Western Europe. And the perfect EU would be proud of a strong common defence system that is integrated into NATO.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: In one sentence: deeper integration in economic governance and defence?

MORAWIECKI: Absolutely.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Which fields should be less integrated?

MORAWIECKI: There are no particular fields where we would like to see less integration, as long as there is no intrusion into necessary domestic reforms. Can EU officials from Brussels properly judge what is best for the Polish judiciary system? I would look forward to more integration in 70% of the areas and less misunderstanding in 30% of the areas by 2030.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: In contrast, what is your dystopian vision for the EU?

MORAWIECKI: We still have a very dangerous Eastern neighbour. Russia is trying to disintegrate the EU by stirring uneasiness and anxieties in European societies. We must address this threat, for example by avoiding a divide of NATO. I would also be worried if we allowed a disintegration of the European single market, which has made our companies so much more efficient and effective.

Finally, I am also concerned about a future with increasing misunderstandings between European societies. We should try to understand each other better, Germans and Poles, the French, the British, the Spanish, and the Poles. We should rediscover our common roots and that is why our next attempts should be dedicated to bridging our differences and with unity.

Mateusz Morawiecki, Prime Minister of Poland

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Was EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision?

46% Yes

47% No

don’t know 6%, no answer provided 1%
**Körber-Stiftung**: What do you expect from Germany in order to realise your vision of the EU?

**Morawiecki**: I would envision that Germany thinks more about how to align development in the CEE countries with Western European levels. Secondly, I would expect Germany to take a leading role in solving the issue of global monopolies and tax havens. Tax havens can be challenged if strong countries, such as France and Germany, back the efforts. If we do not act, European societies will continuously be deprived of funds, which they deserve.

**Körber-Stiftung**: Are there aspects of German policy that contribute to a negative trajectory for the EU’s future?

**Morawiecki**: I think Germany plays a very positive role in terms of fiscal and financial discipline as well as the proliferation of policies that spread economic development evenly across various sectors. This should be continued and enhanced in the future. The interview was conducted in February 2018.

Let’s learn from Brexit what can happen if citizens are not being heard.

**Körber-Stiftung**: Is the increasing East-West divide part of a European dystopia?

**Morawiecki**: I’m not concerned by this Two-Speed-Europe vocabulary. There are so many different dimensions in which we need to work together. We need to find platforms for cooperation for each one of them. Poland, together with our European partners, for example managed to build PESCO. I would suggest looking towards the future, instead of focussing the discussion on things that divide us.
Political Earthquake Ahead

Yascha Mounk, author of “The People vs Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It”, about the rise of populism and authoritarianism in Europe

Second, European Parliament elections tend to have relatively low turnout, which means that people with more extreme political views and who are perhaps more motivated can outperform the fundamentals.

Since the European Parliament still has a lot less power than national governments, this is not the thing to be most worried about. For the future of Europe, it is much more concerning if populist forces should take over governments in a number of national capitals over the next year or two. Because what we have seen in countries like Poland and Hungary is that once the government is elected, it is able to corrupt the other state institutions so much that it becomes essentially impossible to replace it by democratic means.

The established parties need to show how we can radically reform some of the existing institutions while staying true to our values. This is not a matter of giving up on our values because somehow the populists have shown that they are inadequate. Our values are absolutely right; the reality does not conform to them as much as it could and we need to show that we are willing to fight for the re-implementation of our values.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Mr Mounk, are you concerned that the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 will be the next occasion for populist parties to score a major victory?

MOUNK: A political earthquake in those elections is possible. It is likely that populist parties will do very well. First, they are currently very strong in opinion polls at the national level across Europe.

Poland and Hungary are being criticised for violating fundamental EU values such as the rule of law. Should Germany work to ensure that such EU member states are sanctioned, for example, by cutting the financial resources they receive from the EU budget?

MOUNK: I do not think that there is anything the EU could have done to stop this. Although it could have made it harder for these aspiring dictators to make fun of Brussels by paying closer attention to those European commissioners that pretend to act seriously, while continuing to cash in vast amounts of structural funds that boost their national popularity. The EU has been feckless in the face of all of this and has failed its most fundamental values in a way for which the European Commission will be judged for decades to come.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: In the context of the Eurozone and debt crisis, populist parties argued that the EU was a tool of German dominance. Do you agree?

MOUNK: I don’t think that Germany takes any particular pleasure in dominating within Europe. Of course, a set of northern European countries were reluctant to bail out Greece in a more radical way. It was not just Germany. This is due to the underlying structure of the single currency zone. Without a major structural reform, which is not going to happen any time soon, the underlying dynamics are going to keep delivering the same results. This causes a lot of political resentment – not a sustainable state of affairs.
How Migration is Seen by the “silent majority”

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš about the future of the EU and its role in tackling migration

BABIŠ: Germany is Europe’s economic superpower and its role is essential. Together, we need to find funds in the EU budget to solve the problems associated with immigration. More than anything, we need a clear scheme to fight and stop people smugglers. The European operation “SOPHIA”, which targets networks of people smugglers, is great as a project, but it remains limited. The main problem is Libya.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What is the worst possible scenario for the EU and the Czech Republic in 2030?

BABIŠ: The worst scenario is that more countries than just Britain will leave the EU. I am very disappointed about Brexit. It is crucial that we defend our beliefs. Our people are concerned about multi-cultural societies. The opinion on migration is shifting across Europe. The European elections next year will demonstrate how migration is seen by the “silent majority”.

The elections to the European Parliament will take place in May 2019. Do you think that Eurosceptic parties will make significant gains at the elections?

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In Different Leagues

EU-UK defence relations: how the UK strives to maintain a balance of power in Europe after Brexit, and what Germany can do

When comparing the UK and EU as strategic actors, the two powers sit very much in different leagues. One is a nuclear-armed state, which is rapidly regenerating its naval strike capability in the form of two vast aircraft carriers, armed with fifth-generation stealth combat jets. The other is an international organisation, without any recourse to military instruments of its own.

Indeed, the UK is by some margin the leading military power in Europe. It has the largest military budget in NATO after the US; a navy with a gross tonnage that exceeds the navies of France and Germany combined; intelligence-gathering capabilities unmatched in Europe; and a strategic culture unfavoured by any European country, with the partial exception of France. Its military bases in Gibraltar and Cyprus, and its military presence in Germany by 2020. Given Russia’s revisionist aggression, this decision has now been reversed: British troops will remain in Germany, less with the exception of the US. Also, unlike France, which is not part of NATO’s nuclear planning group, the UK devotes its nuclear deterrent to cover the whole of NATO ‘in all instances’.

Consequently, for the UK, NATO remains sacrosanct as the underwriter of European geopolitics, and the general European peace. As such, the EU remains secondary in a wider Atlantic order created and underpinned by British and American strategic power. Many European countries seem convinced that they should develop EU “sovereignty” or “autonomy”, through what has been described by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as “defence union”. However, without really substantial increases in European defence spending, this aim seems unrealisable.

In supporting this, the UK has maintained an unbroken military presence on the continent since the end of the Second World War. With 5,000 troops in Germany, 650 in Estonia, 150 in Poland and RAF jet fighters periodically deployed to Romania, Lithuania and Iceland, it has more troops deployed in other NATO countries than any other ally, with the exception of the US. Also, unlike France, which is not part of NATO’s nuclear planning group, the UK devotes its nuclear deterrent to cover the whole of NATO in all instances.

Consequently, for the UK, NATO remains sacrosanct as the underwriter of European geopolitics, and the general European peace. As such, the EU remains secondary in a wider Atlantic order created and underpinned by British and American strategic power. Many European countries seem convinced that they should develop EU “sovereignty” or “autonomy”, through what has been described by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as “defence union”. However, without really substantial increases in European defence spending, this aim seems unrealisable.

After many years of military cuts, France lacks the resources – its defence budget is comparable to Germany’s, despite operating nuclear weapons – and Germany lacks the full spectrum of military capabilities, as well as the political will to use them either actively (intervention) or passively (dissuasion). This means Europeans will need to cooperate more with the UK if they are to retain existing military assets, let alone generate new ones. But British concerns about the direction of the “defence union” potentially undermining NATO may make such partnerships difficult.

Consequently, structures external to the EU but encompassing EU states may prove to be more fruitful avenues for UK-European defence cooperation, such as the French President Emmanuel Macron’s Intervention Initiative and the UK-French Combined Expeditionary Force. Some countries in these initiatives are closer to sharing Britain’s more active strategic culture, which the EU lacks collectively.

In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK decided to withdraw the remainder of its military presence in Germany by 2020. Given Russia’s revisionist aggression, this decision has now been reversed: British troops will remain in Germany. This renewed British strategic commitment forms the basis for potential cooperation between London and Berlin, particularly in relation to shared interests in keeping Russia at bay along the eastern flank of NATO.

However, the UK – like the US – is likely to lose patience with Germany if additional defence spending increases are not forthcoming, not least because Berlin has previously committed to raising its defence spending levels towards 2% of GDP by 2024. A dim view will be taken if Europe’s economic powerhouse does not pull its weight, particularly when poorer European allies – like the Baltic states, Romania and Poland – have already managed to contribute at the agreed level.

Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that, in the event of antagonism between the EU and UK, the UK may grow increasingly hostile to any form of European strategic cooperation. This is an issue that the EU and European states must consider carefully. For Europeans, this issue may become increasingly important if the US grows tired of the unwillingness of many European countries to pull their weight, or chooses to focus more on East Asia. Old friends may therefore yet prove to be the best friends.

The challenges raised by Brexit have brought home to everyone the importance and benefits of the EU, particularly the Single Market – our ‘Heimatmarkt’. Given today’s uncertain, changing world, it has shown us – once again – just how important it is to stick together, rather than to go off on our own.
The Mediterranean closely connects Europe with Northern Africa and the Middle East. Issues around migration and security in these regions have triggered internal division within the EU, and put the EU under pressure to find solutions with its partners in the neighbourhood. For 30 percent of Germans, questions around how to deal with refugees belong to the most important foreign policy challenges for Germany. At the same time, Germans are divided whether their country has done enough to end the conflict in Syria. While Staffan de Mistura, UN Special Envoy for Syria, explains the complexity of the conflict, Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group proposes four ideas on how the EU can buy its way back into Syria.

Turkey has developed into a game-changing actor in the Syria conflict and is of utmost importance for the EU in terms of migration. While the Turkish Foreign Minister urges the EU to deliver on its promises, the relationship between Germany and Turkey remains in bad shape: 61 percent of Germans believe Germany should seek distance from Turkey.

Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, argues that Germany has played an important role in the development of the Global Compact for Migration and provides an important model globally. German policy has shifted its focus towards looking at the root causes of migration, which is why we invited Tochi Eni-Kalu of Eurasia Group to identify key political developments to look out for on the African continent in 2019. Hanna Tetteh, former foreign minister of Ghana, argues the dismissive attitude towards Africa is the problem.

What are the greatest challenges currently facing German foreign policy?
The Most Complex Conflict

Interview with Staffan de Mistura,
UN Special Envoy for Syria, about different actors in the conflict

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Mr de Mistura, is the conflict in Syria unlike something you have ever witnessed before, in terms of complexity, brutality and difficulty in finding a solution?

DE MISTURA: Yes. I have been in 22 conflicts so far, from Sudan to former Yugoslavia; Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. However, the Syrian conflict is definitely the most complex and complicated one – for many reasons. Firstly, there is a high number of players, at least eleven countries are involved in one form or another: militarily, politically, or economically, but clearly through proxy support. Secondly, the conflict has three dimensions. It is a local conflict, or better to say: a local insurrection and civil war, combined with regional and international involvement, including Russia, the United States and Europe, just to mention a few. In addition, there are three other components: the first is the vast number of refugees and displaced people that have had a huge impact on policies and politics in Europe. The second is that this conflict has seen the first major Russian military intervention outside its own territory since the Georgia war in 2008. The third element is a new component called Daesh/ISIS/ISIL: this group has been thriving, taking advantage, and moving forward on the ruins of this conflict. All that makes it incredibly complex and complicated.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Would you say that the conflict in Syria exemplifies a new global order?

DE MISTURA: Well, it is too early to say. What this has clearly produced is the return of Russia as a prominent player in the Middle East, acting as a game changer. The Syrian conflict has seen major shifts: at certain times, we have seen a lower involvement of the United States compared to other conflicts in the region such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then, we have seen periods of intense engagement by Washington, for instance the personal involvement of John Kerry in the search for a national ceasefire, and the current renewed and proactive support by Secretary Pompeo to the UN-led political process.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Many took Germany’s reluctance to engage in limited military action as another expression of the country’s failure to assume international responsibility.

DE MISTURA: Germany is playing three major roles in this conflict. The first is through provision of humanitarian support to refugees outside Syria. As a member of the EU, Germany has been a major supporter of displaced people inside Syria. The second major role, which I have witnessed personally, is the high-level political engagement in supporting a Syrian-owned, but UN-facilitated, political solution. The third major role is Germany’s bilateral capacity to interact with Russia and other major players in the conflict, including Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. I feel that the engagement of the German government has been substantial, except for the fact that they did not get involved militarily. Nevertheless, they added their own leverage and have been perceived as an honest broker and a genuine supporter of a credible political process. Germany will be in a good position to act on these levers when it becomes a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2019.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Is money for reconstruction the last lever of the EU?

DE MISTURA: Regarding reconstruction, the EU has been very open and clear. In order to justify the use of tax payers’ money beyond humanitarian aid once the conflict is over, an explanation and reassurances from the UN are required that a credible, irreversible, strong political process is under way, which will avoid a return to civil war or political or military unrest. The EU has reinforced its position on various occasions including the G7 and at Security Council meetings. The UN has taken note of this and has regularly reminded everyone concerned, including the Syrian government and its supporters, that major European countries will only provide significant funds for reconstruction once European citizens have been reassured that the political process is credible and moving forward.

The interview was conducted in October 2018.
The EU should deliver on its promises

Interview with Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey, about Turkey’s role in migration and security in the Middle East

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Foreign Minister, the EU regards the refugee deal with Turkey as a model for cooperation in the field of migration. Under which preconditions will Turkey remain committed to the deal?

ÇAVUŞOĞLU: The EU should deliver on its promises. It is high time for visa-free travel of Turkish citizens in the Schengen Area. Also, the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme, in other words, the EU members’ voluntary reception of Syrian refugees, needs to be fully implemented. Third, financial assistance is insufficient. Although three billion euros have already been promised under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, only 1.317 billion euros were actually spent. Finally, both Turkey and the EU have an interest in upgrading the Customs Union, thus artificial political considerations should not block this process. Those who think that not starting negotiations on this issue is a punishment to Turkey are actually punishing themselves.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What are Turkey’s long-term goals in Syria, and what role do you see for the EU?

ÇAVUŞOĞLU: Turkey’s main aim is to ensure security and stability and to help find a political solution to the crisis in Syria. We want our neighbour to be a stable, peaceful, prosperous and democratic country preserving its political unity and territorial integrity. We have always been a vocal and staunch supporter of the Syrian people who aspired to this vision. To this end, we supported the political process in Geneva and engaged with Russia and Iran in Astana to encourage the regime to sit at the negotiating table. We would like the EU to actively take part in ending the crisis in Syria. The EU should use its economic and political ties with the guarantors of the regime, since once those supporting the Syrian people become as vocal as those supporting the regime, the regime will not be able to continue military tactics, and lasting peace could be achieved in Syria.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Does Turkey consider Russia as an increasingly important partner in the Middle East?

ÇAVUŞOĞLU: Russia is our immediate neighbour. Our countries are confronted by the same threats and challenges in the Middle East. Thus, developments in our region demand close coordination and in many cases harmonised approaches. Russia’s and Turkey’s interests align on many issues. We both believe that an independent, sovereign and contiguous Palestine within the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital is the only way to make peace. Both Turkey and Russia have significant relations with the Gulf countries and aim at security and stability in the Gulf region. Both Turkey and Russia support an inclusive negotiated political settlement in Yemen. We believe that Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, can play a meaningful role in solving all the mentioned conflicts. Finally, with its military presence on the ground and influence over the regime, Russia is an indispensable actor and guarantor in the Syrian conflict. However, we believe a larger concerted effort involving all major actors is necessary to end the conflict. Turkey, as a NATO ally, an Astana guarantor and a country with direct influence on the ground, can help establish links between the West and the supporters of the regime.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: How does Turkey view its role within NATO?

ÇAVUŞOĞLU: Threats emanating from beyond NATO’s southeast border, such as terrorist attacks or refugee flows, directly challenge the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Turkey has long played a critical role at the Alliance’s southern flank, for example by fighting terrorist groups or hosting one of the greatest numbers of refugees. That is why we would like to see more support from our allies, in particular in the fight against terrorist groups such as DAESH, PKK, PYD/YPG, FETO and others. First, our allies should display political solidarity. Turning a blind eye on the activities of PYD/YPG or condoning the presence of FETO and its supporters on their territory is in contradiction with the fundamental principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of security. We welcome the fact that our allies reaffirmed their determination to fight against terrorism in all its forms at the recent NATO Summit in Brussels. Now it is time to translate words into action. As the NATO Secretary-General has reiterated on numerous occasions, Turkey is a valued member of NATO, and NATO is important for Turkey.

Recently, there have been repeated tensions between Germany and Turkey. How should Germany shape its relationship with Turkey in the future? Should Germany ...

61% maintain its distance from Turkey

33% seek rapprochement with Turkey

neither nor 1%, don’t know 2%, no answer provided 1%
Can the EU Buy its Way Back into Syria?

The EU could use funds for reconstruction as a lever in Syria, but Russia and the Syrian regime will try to limit its room for manoeuvre.

1. The EU has a vested interest in a durable peace in Syria, but has found itself with limited influence in shaping events to that end. Its principal lever is its promise to fund reconstruction – and its threat to withhold such funding. The EU will “be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria now, not after a political transition. It wants like the EU to invest in Syria’s reconstruction but such a peace may be “good enough”, if it means the Syrian regime will try to limit its room for manoeuvre.

2. Russia has indicated repeatedly that it would like the EU to invest in Syria’s reconstruction now, not after a political transition. It wants the EU’s money as a means of ensuring longer-term stability and reducing its own burden, but not at the price of transforming a regime in whose perpetuation it has invested so much. On the contrary, Moscow considers unconditional reconstruction assistance as an instrument for recognising the regime’s legitimacy.

3. To this end, the regime is playing the refugee card – together with Russia – to pressure the EU to alter its position. So the EU faces the following dilemma: Damascus and Moscow are in effect telling it that, should it withhold aid, then refugees currently living in countries neighbouring Syria will be less likely to return and could over time seek to migrate to Europe; refugees currently in Europe won’t go home; and Syrians still in Syria may try to leave for Europe as well. In other words, their message is: it’s in your interest to help Assad.

4. The current standstill could last. Syria and Russia might refuse the sequence demanded by the EU and the EU could stick to its position. For Russia, that outcome would be sub-optimal, but such a peace may be “good enough”, if it means leaving the regime in place – its key goal and achievement since sending its forces into Syria three years ago.

5. The EU has few levers in Syria. Among its challenges will be maintaining a common line with the US toward Syria and finding a common position across its 28 member states. It could try to nudge Russia and Iran toward a meaningful political transition, emphasising their inherent interest in a stable Syria rather than in the chronically unstable situation the current political set-up would imply – though there is little evidence to date that such arguments have much purchase.
**German respondents:**

Which country is Germany’s most or second most important partner?

2018: a different country 7%, don’t know 13%, no answer provided 2%

2017: a different country 10%, don’t know 31%, no answer provided 21%

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**US respondents:**

Which country is currently America’s most or second most important partner?

2018: a different country 18%, don’t know/no answer provided 25%

2017: a different country 26%, don’t know/no answer provided 37%

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**German respondents:**

Should Germany cooperate less or more with each of these countries in the future?

Cooperate less | Cooperate more
--- | ---
France | 6% 82%
3% | 90%
Russia | 23% 69%
16% | 78%
China | 19% 67%
22% | 69%
Britain | 34% 55%
30% | 61%
US | 47% 41%
34% | 56%

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**US respondents:**

Should the United States cooperate less or more with each of these countries in the future?

Cooperate less | Cooperate more
--- | ---
Russia | 19% 73%
10% | 65%
China | 44% 35%
9% | 35%
France | 33% 59%
12% | 59%
Italy | 15% 78%
15% | 78%
Spain | 21% 70%
21% | 70%

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**What is your opinion of NATO?**

- Very positive: German respondents, 61%; US respondents, 30%
- Somewhat positive: German respondents, 35%; US respondents, 34%
- Somewhat negative: German respondents, 23%; US respondents, 14%
- Very negative: German respondents, 7%; US respondents, 9%
- Don’t know: German respondents, 6%; US respondents, 14%

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**German respondents:**

Should Germany increase its defence spending?

- Maintain spending at the current level: 51%
- Increase spending: 40%
- Lower spending: 9%

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**US respondents:**

Should Europe increase its defence spending?

- Maintain spending at the current level: 46%
- Increase spending: 39%
- Lower spending: 11%

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**German respondents:**

Which country is Germany’s most or second most important partner?

- France: 61%
- US: 35%
- Russia: 12%
- China: 12%
- Austria: 7%
- Italy: 7%
- Spain: 6%
- 2018: a different country 7%, don’t know 13%, no answer provided 2%
- 2017: a different country 10%, don’t know 31%, no answer provided 21%

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**US respondents:**

Which country is currently America’s most or second most important partner?

- Britain: 37%
- China: 33%
- Canada: 24%
- Israel: 25%
- Mexico: 10%
- Russia: 10%
- Germany: 9%
- France: 8%
- 2018: a different country 18%, don’t know/no answer provided 25%
- 2017: a different country 26%, don’t know/no answer provided 37%
The Value of Europe

The EU is often credited with the following achievements. Which is the most important to you?

- Preserving peace between the countries in Europe: 47%
- Securing values such as freedom of expression, the rule of law and democracy: 35%
- Increasing prosperity through the single market: 8%
- Personal benefits such as freedom of travel: 7%

Has cohesion between the EU member states recently ...

- Tended to strengthen: 77%
- Tended to weaken: 16%
- Basically remained the same: 5%

The elections to the European Parliament will take place in May 2019. Do you think that Eurosceptic parties will make significant gains at the elections?

- Yes: 71%
- No: 24%

Is the EU on the right track?

- Yes: 63%
- No: 32%

Was EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 the right decision?

- Yes: 46%
- No: 47%

How should the EU shape its future relationship with Britain after Brexit?

- Britain should remain a privileged and special partner of the EU: 31%
- Britain should be treated no differently from any other non-EU member state: 65%

Poland and Hungary are being criticised for violating fundamental EU values such as the rule of law. Should Germany work to ensure that such EU member states are sanctioned, for example, by cutting the financial resources they receive from the EU budget?

- Yes: 74%
- No: 22%
Recently, there have been repeated tensions between Germany and Turkey. How should Germany shape its relationship with Turkey in the future? Should Germany...?
Is Germany doing enough to compete internationally in this area?

Hanna Tetteh, former foreign minister of Ghana, explains how Europe could effectively reduce migration from Africa.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Ms Tetteh, if you had two minutes with Angela Merkel on cooperation with African countries, what would you urge her to do?

TETTEH: Invest in improving African countries’ trade performance. Trade is the driver of development, and this will ultimately solve your problem with migration. Second, now that Germany and the EU have come up with so many plans and policies, implement them! Focus on the private sector, create financial instruments that support investment in Africa especially in infrastructure. The economic benefits of these actions are in our mutual interest.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Are the recent initiatives on migration cooperation, such as the Rabat Process, the Valetta process or the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, a step in the right direction?

TETTEH: Most of these processes have a one-dimensional focus on returning illegal migrants, but the patterns of migration are more complex. For example, instead of trying to reach Europe, many Central and Western African migrants stopped in Libya before the overthrow of President Gaddafi because it was stable and there were jobs. This is not the case today.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What could improve European policies on migration?

TETTEH: You should look beyond limiting the number of migrants. Why is migration a problem? Because Africans are considered to be poor, and therefore to be a burden for your societies. The current approach to migration has a very one-sided focus on getting migrants out as soon as possible.

Artificial intelligence is a key future technology. Is Germany doing enough to compete internationally in this area?

The Future of Multilateralism

What is your view of China’s growing influence?

German respondents:

22% more disadvantages

53% more advantages

Neutral 34%

US respondents:

26% more disadvantages

68% more advantages

Neutral 11%

51% 2018

2017: don’t know 1%, no answer provided 1%

Does free trade tend to provide you with more advantages or disadvantages?

German respondents:

22% more disadvantages

53% more advantages

Neutral 34%

US respondents:

26% more disadvantages

68% more advantages

Neutral 11%

51% 2018

2017: don’t know 1%, no answer provided 1%

The representative survey was commissioned by Körber Foundation and carried out by KANTAR PUBLIC Germany in September 2018. The results are representative: a representative random sample technique was used for the selection of respondents. 1,002 people were interviewed via phone. You can access all data and results on www.theberlinpulse.org.
and making countries take people back. The dismissive attitude towards Africa is the problem. Africans could be your consumers, but Europe does not apply the same seriousness to trade and economic cooperation as to migration. If you want to deal with the root causes, you should support African countries with developing infrastructure, growing their private sector and integrating it into global value chains.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Are there too many initiatives, and too little impact?

**TETTEH:** I think the problem is rather a lack of coordination. However well-intentioned these initiatives may be, we need clarity. You do not just need to show that you are busy. The busyness should achieve something. Sometimes when I look back from the perspective of someone who has been in office and discussed so many of these different programmes with so many different people, I wish that there had been better coordination. It would make the process more effective.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** You emphasised that development comes through enabling the private sector. How could the German initiatives provide meaningful support for this?

**TETTEH:** They should facilitate trade in general, and this has several dimensions. Take an African producer who wants to export agricultural products, like baobab or shea butter, for the European food or cosmetics industry. Making the necessary investments in order to meet European health and sanitary requirements is often beyond African suppliers’ means. Therefore, the German initiatives should help African producers to invest in improving quality control systems. Second, this also means providing finance. When there is no capital available for investments, how can African businesses possibly participate in the global market? Third, they should support investment in infrastructure. If we lack the key supporting logistics in Africa, we are not going be competitive. I think Germany, a world leader in logistics, understands this very well.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Do you see a special role for Germany in improving cooperation with African states?

**TETTEH:** Germany without doubt is one of the leaders in the EU. A German-led initiative is therefore more likely to shape the EU’s approaches to certain issues. This is a positive thing, because there are EU members that have not achieved the same level of development as Germany, France or the Netherlands, and want to catch up. I can understand that development in Africa is not their first priority. It is therefore helpful to have an influential country like Germany advocating for the inclusion of initiatives with Africa within the EU’s development agenda.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** European countries often feel they are losing out strategically in Africa due to a strong competitor: China. What does China do better than the Europeans?

**TETTEH:** Not too long ago, China was in the position that many African countries are in now. Therefore, they do not consider our constraints to be obstacles. They understand what our priorities are, for example in terms of infrastructure. China is acting in a much more focused way than the Europeans. Of course, it is right to address issues like human rights, good governance and the values that constitute strong democracies also in Africa. But when we are talking about purely business transactions, like developing infrastructure to improve people’s economic opportunities and living conditions, those issues are not the focus of discussions.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Finally, you have lived in Berlin for a few months, what is your reaction to the public discourse on migration?

**TETTEH:** Germany still seems to be in the process of leveling the living standards between the East and West. In this context, I understand that foreigners looking for economic opportunity in the same space cause resentments. However, what Germans and Europeans do not realise is that most Africans migrate within our continent, only a fraction comes to Europe. This shows the one-sided portrayal of Africa in the rest of the world, although our continent is so huge and diverse.

The interview was conducted in May 2018.

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**Körber PULSE:** Waiting for “grand peace” in the Middle East

- A Westphalian Peace for the Middle East? 400 years after the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, which destroyed large parts of Europe, policymakers and experts see themselves reminded of the European catastrophe when looking at the ongoing war in Syria. Although any sort of “grand peace” such as the Peace of Westphalia seems far away and there are still diverging interests and visions for the future of the war-torn country, 2019 could finally bring an end to the war in Syria.

- However, winning the war does not mean winning the peace. As Syrian President Assad aims to turn military success into postwar reconstruction, it is unclear whether Europe and the West will play along with this particular Syria endgame and in what way they will be involved in reconstruction efforts.

- Plan B or no plan at all? Having left the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), the US has set out on “Plan B” for dealing with Iran, which includes re-imposing sanctions and increasing economic pressure on the Islamic Republic. While Washington has urged Europe to comply with this approach, the ultimate goal of “Plan B” is still unclear. It remains to be seen whether Europe will be able to operationalise ideas to keep open economic channels in the short and medium term following renewed US sanctions.
African Countries in Transition

Important elections and countries navigating life after leadership changes will be among the most important developments in Africa in 2019. Here are the countries to watch:

Nigeria

Slow economic growth in Africa’s largest economy and security challenges will set the stage for the elections in 2019. President Muhammadu Buhari will have the slight edge against an opposition emboldened by high profile defections from the ruling party. The Boko Haram threat will likely remain restricted to northeastern Nigeria while a slow government response will prolong a conflict between farmers and nomadic Fulani herdsmen, which has killed thousands in recent years. Meanwhile, a long-running militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta, currently at an ebb due to government conciliation efforts, could experience a post-election resurgence. In case attacks on oil infrastructure resume, they will dent petroleum exports to the EU, Nigeria’s top trading partner, from which 93 percent of export revenue is oil related.

South Africa

President Cyril Ramaphosa is likely to win a fresh mandate in the May 2019 polls, but pressure from the opposition and the need to quell intra-party squabbles will necessitate the adoption of populist policies to pacify dissenting voices. His reformist, pro-business policies will boost economic growth and improve trade prospects, although a proposed constitutional amendment to allow land expropriation without compensation could spook foreign investors and may temporarily put a drag on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Europe, especially from Germany.

Ethiopia

Conciliatory moves undertaken by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will create political space to pursue a reform agenda that will positively impact the economy and investment climate, but opposition from within the ruling coalition will slow reforms and raise the risk of renewed unrest. Abiy’s achievements, including making peace with longtime foe Eritrea, have helped stabilise the country. Despite his intention to press ahead with key infrastructure and economic policy plans, a promised opening of the economy will remain limited. Abiy’s approach makes sweeping political and legal reforms less likely in the medium term, risking a rekindling of anti-government protests in the country’s restive Oromia region, where hundreds of protesters have died in the past three years.

Zimbabwe

After presidential elections marred by irregularities and violence against opposition protesters, sanctions relief will hinge on the implementation of structural and economic reforms. Internal rifts within the ruling Zanu-PF will slow progress. President Emmerson Mnangagwa will ultimately seek an IMF bailout, requiring painful economic reforms. Factions within the ruling party will strongly resist these efforts. In response, Mnangagwa will likely use an anti-corruption drive to sideline adversaries within Zanu-PF and solicit the support of the opposition MDC. Further moves to silence the opposition will dampen investor interest and complicate attempts to normalise relations with the EU and the international community.

Germany as a Model?

As the number of arrivals in Europe decreases, Filippo Grandi says it is high-time to share responsibility for migrants and refugees worldwide.
KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: A Europe-wide approach seems to narrow down to increasing border protection and outsourcing the processing of asylum requests to other countries. How do you view this development?

GRANDI: Despite the political rhetoric around refugee and migrant flows, Europe is by no means in the centre of a migration or refugee ‘crisis’. Around 60,000 people have crossed the Mediterranean to Europe between January and July this year – around half the number for the same period last year, and far short of the million who arrived by land and sea in Europe in 2015. Therefore, this is the moment to find predictable structures and systems for sharing responsibility and avoid the pressure being put on just a few states. Closing borders and ports, weakening rescue at sea, and blocking access to asylum in Europe, cannot be the answer.

Despite the falling numbers, the rate at which people are dying at sea is on the rise. Recent incidents in which some states have refused disembarkation of people rescued by NGO vessels are deeply worrying. Together with the International Organisation for Migration, we have recently proposed a new collaborative approach to make search and rescue and disembarkation arrangements more predictable and manageable, so that people rescued in international waters can be quickly brought ashore in safe locations around the Mediterranean basin. Notwithstanding this, the right to seek asylum in Europe needs to be absolutely preserved, as one of the foundational elements of the system of human rights so carefully developed over decades.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: According to the UNHCR, since the end of the Second World War there have never been as many people fleeing crises and violent conflict as in 2017. Why has the international community become less and less able to solve conflicts?

GRANDI: The rising number of those displaced around the world by conflict, persecution and violence – now standing at some 68.5 million people worldwide – is an indicator of a system of international cooperation in crisis. Current weaknesses in the multilateral system, and in the ability to prevent and resolve conflicts, mean that new conflicts emerge at the same time as existing ones drag on. From Afghanistan, to Myanmar, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, the human consequences of political failures are evident.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: How can Germany and the EU engage more in finding solutions to conflicts in their neighbourhood?

GRANDI: Germany is an important contributor to humanitarian and development action globally, and one of UNHCR’s strongest partners. Together with other states, it has a key role to play in preventing and responding to displacement, and securing solutions for the millions of people uprooted around the world, so that they are able to return home and rebuild their lives.

In the meantime, it is crucial to recognise the enormous contributions of the countries in developing regions next to conflict zones that receive and support the vast majority of the world’s refugees. They keep their borders open despite huge pressures on their own resources, delivering a global public good, and contributing to regional and international stability.

Europe’s response must encompass this broader dimension. More support is needed to countries of origin and transit, along with investments in resolving conflict and addressing the root causes of displacement, and an expansion of resettlement and other legal pathways for refugees to alleviate the pressure on first countries of asylum and provide protection for the most vulnerable.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Why will the planned Global Compact on Refugees encourage states to do more for refugees?

GRANDI: The new Global Compact on Refugees recognises that states cannot be left to shoulder the burden of hosting large numbers of refugees alone, and puts in place practical measures to translate the principle of shared responsibility for refugees into reality.

It aims to rapidly galvanise support whenever countries experience a sudden, large-scale influx, as well as sustaining attention on protracted crises. It brings together governments, humanitarian and development actors, the private sector, and civil society, with a focus on fostering refugee inclusion in national systems and building their resilience and self-reliance, as well as strengthening the communities hosting them. And it also includes measures to increase the admission of refugees to third countries – including through traditional resettlement and expanding the range of pathways for legal admission.

Germany has played a prominent role in the development of the compact, drawing on its decades of experience in receiving and hosting refugees and strong engagement in international cooperation. Its strong leadership on international refugee protection both – within and beyond Europe – continues to provide an important model globally.

© UNHCR / Bassam Diab
Filippo Grandi on a visit to Aleppo, February 2017
Volatility is probably the most adequate word to describe the current state of international politics. The rules-based international order is under attack: states are dropping out of agreements and turning their backs on international organisations. “Multilateralism is in crisis”, says Justin Vaïsse, president of the Paris Peace Forum. While traditional alliances become more brittle, and new powerful actors emerge in the international arena, a great majority of the Germans evaluate the state of the US-German relationship negatively. What’s more: three quarters of Germans say that Germany should be more independent from the US in its foreign policy.

Tensions between states continue to threaten the multilateral order and the international free trade regime. In 2018, we have become used to hot debates about rising tariffs and even trade wars. In two contrasting perspectives, Ryan Hass (Brookings Institution) states that the Trump administration is determined to slow China’s rise, while Jianzhang Luan (Communist Party of China) argues that highly developed countries are now scared of competition. He sees Germany and China as “stabilising agents” for the multilateral order, but 42% of Germans perceive China’s influence worldwide in negative terms. While more than half of Germans are convinced of the benefits of free trade, 78 percent welcome the fact that Germany and the EU have also increased tariffs on goods from the US. Christine Lagarde, head of the International Montary Fund, makes the case for reforms in the global trade system: she argues that the future of trade is the future of data and describes how to benefit from trade in the digital era. Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia, describes how her country has become a digital frontrunner and embraces artificial intelligence.

What is your view of China’s growing influence?

- 2018: don’t know 1% | 2017: don’t know 1%, no answer provided 1%

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Who Will Be Better Off?

Two perspectives about the role of the US, China and the EU in the global trade system

Will China become a more important partner for Germany in preserving a rules-based global order and free trade in the future?

China and Germany are both beneficiaries and guardians of the multilateral trading system. In the fifth round of the China-Germany intergovernmental consultation, we sent out positive signals to support multilateralism and free trade. When trade protectionism and unilateralism are on the rise, it is imperative for China and Germany to strengthen cooperation and act as stabilising agents in the world.

Is the US still Germany’s most important partner for preserving a rules-based global order and free trade, or might China attempt to take this place?

Rhetorically, Beijing may seek to strike similar notes with Berlin. Words are important, but actions are more so. US-German relations will oscillate due to the leaders involved. When it comes to substance, they will remain aligned in wanting to lower barriers to trade, improve market access, protect intellectual property, and ensure a level playing field for economic competition.

What can the EU and China/the EU and the US do together to improve the global trade system?

First, China and the EU should work together for positive outcomes at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. Second, we should better coordinate improvements to the multilateral trading system. Third, we should deepen economic cooperation, for instance, through facilitating the alignment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s development strategy in order to inject new vigour into global trade. We are committed to complying with WTO rules, and to cooperating on the reform of the WTO.

Do you expect tensions between China and the US to escalate or de-escalate?

It depends on how much sincerity the relevant parties are willing to show. China does not want a trade war and has done its utmost to avoid one. Certain countries have put their own interest first and jeopardized the interests of their trading partners. They have even gone back on their own words in negotiations and showed no sincerity in resolving problems. We should not allow trade frictions to escalate or transform into political issues. In the long term, I am optimistic. The majority of countries are resolutely safeguarding the existing multilateral trade regime. We should reform the system, together with all parties.

I expect US-China trade tensions to remain at an elevated level for at least the next year. President Trump’s trade representative believes China is hollowing out American competitiveness. Beijing increasingly believes Trump is determined to slow China’s rise. If China takes a case against the US in the WTO, and the WTO rules in favour of China, there is risk that the US would withdraw from the WTO. Key advisors in the Trump administration would welcome a justification for withdrawing from the WTO, so that the US could be less constrained in exercising its power unilaterally.

First, they should revive the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, alongside the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If the US and the EU could reach agreement on standards for trade and investment, pressure would mount on Beijing to lift its standards to remain competitive. Second, they should work together to update WTO rules. It may not be optimal to advance such efforts now given the current political environment, but the absence of immediate progress should not obscure planning for such steps.

... a third rejoices? China’s relations with Europe will be equally interesting to watch. While many European leaders perceived Washington’s unilateral imposition of tariffs as crude, they share many of the underlying grievances. China’s new-found enthusiasm for multilateralism will fall on deaf ears in Europe unless its leaders become convinced there is potential for an actual “win-win situation”. To be sure, the debate on the trade-off between political costs and economic opportunity of engaging China has just begun.
Transatlantic Vox Pop

Since 2017, Körber Foundation has fielded joint questions on the transatlantic relationship in the US and Germany in cooperation with the Pew Research Center.

The idea is to catch the “voice of the people”: together, we poll the state of US-German relations on both sides of the Atlantic. A comparison of the results from this and the previous years’ representative surveys reveals: for Germans, the transatlantic relationship is on a clear downward trajectory. “Somewhat bad” or “very bad” is how a majority of Germans describes the current state of US-German relations. Over the past year, the US image has deteriorated significantly in Germany: the number of Germans who describe relations with the US as bad grew from 56 to 73 percent over the previous year.

While 70 percent of Americans believe the US should cooperate more with Germany, almost half of Germans, on the contrary, believe Germany should cooperate less with the US. In 2017, 56 percent were in favour of more cooperation between Germany and the US. What is more: three out of four Germans think Germany should develop its foreign policy more independently of the US in the future. Two thirds of Americans, on the other side, think that relations with Europe should stay as close as they have been in the past. The negative US image in Germany goes along with low ratings for US President Trump: only one-in-ten Germans stated confidence in US President Trump, according to a recent Pew Research Center poll. At the midpoint of the Trump presidency, Germans feel increasingly alienated from their historically most important ally outside of Europe.

Believing in public opinion does not mean believing in populism. We are not saying our polls provide all the answers. Rather, they inform policymaking, and have improved in some ways while also facing challenges. They allow us to touch upon the underlying anxieties of populations and put the public voice forward. They allow us to understand where populations are unified or divided.

To me it is clear that the transatlantic partnership has not lost its importance. We face so many global challenges that a reliable partnership is indispensable. However, the toxic forces of nationalism and populism have been putting pressure on our community of values. More than ever we need to invest in sustainable transatlantic relations.
Creating a Better Global Trade System

What states should do to benefit from trade in the digital era

Recent news on global trade has tended to focus on protectionist measures and diplomatic tensions, raising concerns over growth and jobs across the world. Yet, looking past current disputes and towards the future, what is often lost in the current discussions is that we are entering a new era of trade—an era in which data flows are becoming more important than physical trade.

In many ways, the future of trade is the future of data. While the traditional global trade in goods and services is no longer growing as fast as at the turn of the century, digital flows have been booming in recent years. According to Cisco, the amount of cross-border bandwidth used grew 90-fold between 2005 and 2016, and is expected to grow an additional 13-fold by 2023.

This is not just about video streaming, Skype calls, and social media posts. Data flows boost other economic activities, especially by making services more tradable—from engineering, to communications, to transportation.

This is a huge opportunity for policymakers to build new economic bridges between countries, and to create a better global trade system. Let me highlight four building blocks of better trade.

The first is about enabling more trade in services. Global trade in services has been growing relatively fast and now accounts for one-fifth of global exports. According to some estimates, half of the global trade in services is already driven by digital technology. However, studies show that this is an area where trade barriers are still extremely high, equivalent to tariffs of some 30 to 50 percent.

By reducing these barriers and making trade more digital, services could become the main driver of global trade. I even believe that we can build the Wealth of Nations in the 21st century on trade in services.

Who will gain from more digital trade? Advanced economies, which are globally competitive in many service sectors, especially financial, legal, and consulting, could certainly benefit from new opportunities. But also developing economies such as Colombia, Ghana, and the Philippines, which are promoting growth in tradable services such as communications and business services, could prosper. Finally, digital tools could enable millions of small businesses and individuals to leverage their expertise in the global marketplace.

The second building block for improving the global trade system and increasing wealth in the 21st century is to make trade more productive. How? By encouraging a further shift in the composition of trade flows—from “physical” to more data-driven trade. For example, increasing automation is making it easier for companies to repatriate their operations. This could help rejuvenate manufacturing industries in many advanced economies and maintain domestically-based factories with higher-paying jobs. 3D printing could for instance prompt companies to move production closer to their customers. One large shoe brand is already bringing bespoke shoemaking to the mass-market by printing customized soles in their high-street shops. If these trends were to continue, many supply chains would become shorter, more productive, and less carbon-intensive.

At the same time, digitalization will intensify competition in global trade. Pushing companies to boost their investment in new technologies and more efficient business practices. New IMF analysis shows that greater competition accelerates the diffusion of technology across countries and even the rate of innovation itself. This, in turn, helps lower prices for companies and consumers.

The US has recently raised tariffs on goods from Germany and the EU. In response, Germany and the EU have also increased tariffs on goods from the US. Do you agree or disagree with Germany and the EU raising tariffs against the US?

Gains like that show the enormous benefits of building economic bridges between countries. And yet, too many people have continued to live in the shadow of these bridges. The digital revolution in trade will bring its own challenges, putting further pressure on those workers who are less well-equipped to compete.

That is why, as a third building block for a better global trade system, we need greater inclusiveness. Consider the benefits of scaling up investment in training and social safety nets, so that workers can upgrade their skills and transition to higher-quality jobs. Even for an advanced economy like Germany, this means more investments are needed in digital infrastructure to ensure that the German economy is well-equipped to compete in a world of high-speed data. It also means investing in people...
to ensure they have the right skills to work with new technologies and in new industries.

In short, we at the IMF believe that for trade to improve, it needs to be more services-based, more productive, and more inclusive – so that everyone can benefit. We want to help countries gear up for the new era of trade, for example by working with all our 189 members on policies to help remove trade and investment barriers.

However, in order to truly adapt to the new era, global trade ultimately also needs to be more internationally cooperative. Over the past 70 years, countries have already worked together to create a multilateral trade system that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, while boosting incomes and living standards in all countries.

Today, this system needs improvement to reflect the changes in the global economy. For example, many governments are struggling with major issues with regard to the new characteristics of trade that do not fall squarely within WTO rules. These include various state subsidies, restrictions on data flows, and the protection of intellectual property.

To address these issues, we could use “ plurilateral” trade agreements – that is, deals among like-minded countries that agree to work within the WTO framework. There is also room to negotiate new WTO agreements on e-commerce and digital services. Setting a good example, the Trans Pacific Partnership is the first broader trade agreement that encompasses the free flow of data across borders for service suppliers and investors.

Now is the time to push for further trade reforms in a multilateral setting where rules are respected, where countries work in partnership, and where everyone is committed to fairness.

I believe that by building new economic bridges, by shaping a new era of trade, we can foster more prosperous and more peaceful communities across the world.

This article was originally published on the IMF Blog.
Artificial intelligence is a key future technology. Is Germany doing enough to compete internationally in this area?

22% Yes
62% No
don’t know 12%, no answer provided 4%

The Estonian example shows how the public sector can effectively mimic technological change without noteworthy time lag and without falling behind the expectations people have on service quality and accessibility. Estonia is often described as a genuine digital society – for a good reason. Over 95% of all tax declarations are made online, which means that the state only pays about 0.40 euro to collect 100 euros of tax revenue. The digital authentication and signature system, used by the whole population, has been estimated to save up to two percent of GDP annually.

The underlying driver for this transformation has not been the use of the newest technical solutions, nor any “special” or unique character of the Estonian people – but rather the creation of a permissive legal environment. This – along with the common data exchange layer called X-Road – enabled us to move to the digital space as it does in whatever kind of physical form of governance.

Countries can increase trust in digital services by raising awareness about the little-understood fact that e-services and databanks are much more secure than paper analogues. The digital format provides much more control over personal data than the paper format, provided that the legal space prescribes clear rules on data assembly, storage and use. Estonian people know that meddling in public databases cannot go unnoticed and the officials know that it is a criminal offence to nose around – and this creates additional trust between citizens, state and e-services.

Similarly, with e-voting, when people can check-in to the system, vote, receive a confirmation e-mail and therefore be sure that their vote was counted, is much safer than voting by post. Yes, there are risks in the digital sphere, but overall it is easier to monitor and control than the risks associated with the paper system.

The same basic principles of creating the necessary permissive legal environment also apply to the question of how to tackle artificial intelligence. A permissive legal environment, which explains clearly the rights and obligations of all parties, facilitates the quick transfer of innovative technologies throughout society, be it for commercial or public use. As we have witnessed, without such legal space, innovation can run into deep trouble, even if it does not break any rule. In Estonia, internet safety has been guaranteed for and by digital signature users since the beginning of the century, and we are looking forward to excelling once again in the AI context.

The Estonian digital infrastructure offers unique opportunities at the state level to use AI in an enabling manner – but only if we find innovative ways to support its development by creating the necessary rules as well. Of course, AI does not exist and may actually never materialize, but if we regulate for AI systems, all automated and autonomous systems will be covered as well. Of course, to be successful through all stages of AI development, we need to regulate in a technology-neutral way, for human-algorithm interactions, and to do this in full compliance of human rights, democratic freedoms and the rule of law, including EU law.

Europe has been a global standards setter in this field, defining what is necessary permissive legal environment also apply to the question of how to tackle artificial intelligence. A permissive legal environment, which explains clearly the rights and obligations of all parties, facilitates the quick transfer of innovative technologies throughout society, be it for commercial or public use. As we have witnessed, without such legal space, innovation can run into deep trouble, even if it does not break any rule. In Estonia, internet safety has been guaranteed for and by digital signature users since the beginning of the century, and we are looking forward to excelling once again in the AI context.

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Europe has been a global standards setter in terms of protecting personal data and we should continue being so. The latest example comes from the General Data Protection Regulation, where we have set the global standard for digital privacy. The same should happen with AI – whatever the political order in a particular country, the understanding of reasonable use of AI should stem from the European benchmark. With a cross-sectoral view in mind, we will assess whether there is any specific need to regulate, or whether an added interpretation of existing regulations, for instance, could help to solve the questions raised by new technologies. The approach will be about common dominants rather than regulating AI by sectors. Afterwards, it is up to the people to decide what is appropriate for their country.

Estonia is in the process of drafting a national AI strategy and searching for best-use cases in the public sector. The flexibility of the public sector and regulations is important, as the full potential of the evolving technologies is not yet clear. Our government has formed a special inter-ministerial working group with a more general view to AI and other algorithms of this type.

First, we will take a cross-sectoral approach and come up with a strategy on how to address AI and robotics in the public and private sector across the economy.

Secondly, we aim to raise public awareness of the possibilities of AI, robotics and other new technologies to endorse take-up.

Thirdly, with a cross-sectoral view in mind, we will assess whether there is any specific need to regulate or to adapt existing regulations in order to address the questions raised by new technologies.

The most important component of the puzzle we focus on is human understanding and transparency. Otherwise, the interaction between machines and humanity will play out like in Douglas Adams’s “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” where the “Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything”, calculated by an enormous supercomputer, was the number 42. Nobody was happy. We have gladly incorporated the digital sphere into our commercial and public lives. Now we are seeking to achieve the same success for society with any existing or future algorithm for the benefit of our democratic, transparent and efficient society.
Multilateralism in Crisis

Justin Vaïsse, President of the Paris Peace Forum, answers four questions about multilateralism

Mr Vaïsse, the international order is navigating through turbulent times, with increasingly unilateral US policies, an assertive China and Russia. Is multilateralism in crisis?

There can be no doubt it is in crisis indeed. Not that there ever has been a golden age of multilateralism, but after the Cold War, for a decade or two, countries seemed to define their national interest within the general framework of norms and institutions that had been created after World War II. They negotiated new collective treaties and organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and were careful not to ignore the United Nations (UN) even when they bypassed it, e.g. the US concerning Iraq in 2003.

That is less and less the case today: norms are being violated (Syria), international law is being disregarded (Crimea), and institutions are being undermined (WTO). US President Trump opposes multilateral institutions in principle and his new national security adviser used his first substantive public speech to attack the ICC. President Putin has used Russia’s veto no less than 16 times since 2011, at the UN Security Council, versus six for China and three for the US (none for France or the UK). And Chinese President Xi sets up new multilateral bodies with a separate legal order, as is the case with the Belt and Road Initiative.

What are the root causes of the current volatility of the international order?

There is a misleading tendency to blame US President Trump for all of this. He does represent a pointed challenge to the multilateral order, and his attacks on the WTO and the launching of trade wars pose notable and obvious dangers. But troubles started long before he came in. The changing repartition in the global balance of power is key here. America is no longer dominant, emerging powers are not necessarily supportive of institutions created before they had a say, and some countries frontally challenge the rules and mechanisms of this US-led world. In other words, multipolarity makes multilateralism more difficult and more necessary at the same time. This is compounded by the backlash against globalisation in the West, with populist movements reluctant to abide by international rules and pretending to put sovereignty first.

The German Foreign Minister has started forming an “alliance of multilateralists”. Who should be part of this alliance?

Take a look at the list of countries ranked by nominal GDP. Get passed the first two, the US and China, and you see up to 12 countries that are liberal democracies with a strong interest in maintaining a rules-based order, a world of free trade and cooperative action on climate and other global challenges: Japan, Germany, UK, India, France, Brazil, Italy, Canada, South Korea, Australia, Spain and Mexico – I omitted Russia, which is number 11. Together, these countries should form the core of any alliance for multilateralism, which, of course, should be open to any country with the same objectives.

Can the existing international institutions, such as the UN and the G summits, be reformed to fit a new international order, or are they outdated?

It is extraordinarily difficult to reform existing institutions because of entrenched interests, but I do not think that it is impossible. More importantly, I do not see any replacement for the UN, which plays a central and unique role. So we should keep the reformist agenda very much alive at the UN. The G summits are different: they are less institutionalized, and can be changed according to needs, like the G20, which was (re-)created to address the financial crisis of 2008. Lastly, I do think we should do more to involve non-state actors, like we do at the Paris Peace Forum: how do you solve global warming or internet governance without foundations? And, above all, we should not forget the citizens who will rebel against global governance if ignored or bypassed.
So German …

Last, but not least, we look at German foreign policy in a different way: four foreign policy moments that are “typically German”

As an Indian, I have a lasting memory of the quirky Bollywood style video made by the former German Ambassador Steiner and his wife as they bid adieu to India a few years ago. The clip received a mixed reception in Germany, but was appreciated a lot in India. We do enjoy a bit of masala! While the video might not have been entirely ‘German’ in nature, it embodied a very crucial element of diplomacy: personal contact and connection between civilizations and cultures. In my years of working with the German foreign policy establishment in different countries, I have experienced this aspect of diplomacy in many positive ways and have come to greatly appreciate this side of what I consider so German.

Worn out from a busy schedule and days of heat and traffic in Riad and Tehran, a group of participants from the Bergedorf Round Table had just passed security at Imam Khomeini Airport. Our female colleagues and those with an Iranian background were particularly anxious about whether we would be able to pass security with ease and return to our lives since so many people in the past have not been able to. In the midst of all this exhaustion, tension and finally relief, and whilst waiting for airport personnel to accompany us to our gates, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Secretary General of NATO, and Christian Wulff, former Federal President of Germany, chose to engage in a deep conversation about Germany’s role in the world. Towering over them was a gold-framed portrait of no other than Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. And people think Germans aren’t funny. That was perfectly-timed comic relief.

Many accuse Germans of being solipsistic and treating German problems as European ones. I must have gone to 20 events last year where politicians said it was time Germany responded to Macron’s speech – without providing any answers themselves. A German friend said to me: ‘That’s so German!’ But I think Germans are among the least inward-looking Europeans. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier gave a speech opening ECFR’s new Berlin office this year. Rather than talking about glory or rayonnement, he talked about the importance of challenging Berlin’s own perspectives and thinking of the perspectives of other Europeans. Can you imagine the Queen or even Emmanuel Macron telling their foreign policy people they should think less British or French?

Before I had any interactions with Germans, I had always imagined them to be quite strict, not very outgoing, and always in business-mode. After being chosen as a Munich Young Leader in 2013, I stand corrected! My favourite memory of a ‘German’ foreign policy moment was the time my German colleagues took us to one of the famous beer halls in Munich, followed by dancing at a salsa club. The Germans were the most energetic of the group – whether discussing the German approach to the EU at dinner, or showing off their moves in a bit of ‘dance diplomacy.’ Now when I witness someone who can ‘do it all’ – have a laugh and still be ready to lead discussions first thing in the morning with energy and thoughtfulness – I think, ‘That’s so German!’
While Europe is facing growing internal division and the rules-based international order is under pressure, Germany needs to take a strategic look ahead on foreign policy challenges. The Berlin Foreign Policy Forum creates this momentum by gathering leaders in Berlin to discuss those challenges. Since 2011, it has been bringing together around 250 high-ranking national and international politicians, government representatives, experts and journalists. Traditionally, the German Foreign Minister opens the Forum. Co-hosted by Körber Foundation and the German Federal Foreign Office, the Forum provides a unique platform to discuss the foreign policy challenges ahead for Germany and Europe. It joins established voices with next generation leaders, and promotes international understanding – based on facts and in a non-partisan, diverse and inclusive setting. Beyond the exchange among policymakers and experts, the forum aims to engage a broader German and international public through livestream broadcast and media coverage of all discussions.

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Körber-Stiftung

Through its operational projects, in its networks and in conjunction with cooperation partners, the present focus of the Körber Foundation is on three current social challenges: “Digital Literacy”, “The Value of Europe” and “New Life in Exile”. Inaugurated in 1959 by the entrepreneur and initiator Kurt A. Körber, the foundation is now nationally and internationally active from its sites in Hamburg and Berlin.

International Dialogue

Conflicts arise in situations that are fraught with misunderstandings and lack debate. Moreover, such conflicts are often grounded in the past. This is why we champion international dialogue and foster more profound understandings of history. We address political decision-makers as much as civil society representatives and emerging leaders from the younger generations. Our geographic focus lies on Europe, its eastern neighbours, the Middle East, and Asia, especially China. We strengthen discussions about history at the local level in a manner that stretches beyond national borders and encourage people to share their experiences of cultures of remembrance. Our foreign- and security-policy formats provide safe spaces for confidential talks built on trust. However, we also employ formats that involve the public, such as publications, competitions and networks, to provide impulses to the debate about common European values and inspire the further development of international cooperation.

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