feel that Germany should defend its political interests more strongly vis-à-vis China, even at the expense of German economic interests.

say Germany should continue practicing restraint when facing international crises.
say Germany should become more strongly involved.

55%

49%

49%

are in favour of German participation in naval missions to protect free navigation and trade routes.

perceive climate change as the greatest challenge for German foreign policy.

prefer German foreign policy continue being anchored in the "West".

say Trump being re-elected would harm US-German relations.

prefer the adoption of qualified majority voting in EU foreign policy.

would prefer a Franco-British nuclear umbrella to that of the US.

Involvement or Restraint?
A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber-Stiftung

THE BERLIN PULSE 2019/20

www.theberlinpulse.org www.koerber-stiftung.de
Involvement or Restraint?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Prefer German foreign policy continue being anchored in the “West”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>Perceive climate change as the greatest challenge for German foreign policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Would prefer a Franco-British nuclear umbrella to that of the US.</td>
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<tr>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Prefer the adoption of qualified majority voting in EU foreign policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>87%</td>
<td>Say Trump being re-elected would harm US-German relations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>49%</td>
<td>Say Germany should continue practicing restraint when facing international crises.</td>
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<td>43%</td>
<td>Say Germany should become more strongly involved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>49%</td>
<td>Feel that Germany should defend its political interests more strongly vis-à-vis China, even at the expense of German economic interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Are in favour of German participation in naval missions to protect free navigation and trade routes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A representative survey on German attitudes to foreign policy commissioned by Körber-Stiftung.
Dear Readers,

Welcome to the third edition of The Berlin Pulse!

The first edition, published in November 2017, was an experiment. Two years later, I am convinced that The Berlin Pulse has made a positive contribution to Germany’s foreign policy debate. Internationally, the past two editions have served as a valuable tool for explaining the forces underlying German foreign policy. I would like to start, therefore, by thanking all who have contributed to this project through comments and suggestions, their own contributions, or simply by reading.

The idea behind The Berlin Pulse remains the same: To identify potential gaps between German public opinion and international expectations of Berlin’s foreign policy. However, the results of this year’s survey once more underline a different gap, namely that between public opinion and government policy: To policy-makers in Berlin, the transatlantic alliance remains a pillar of German foreign policy. In contrast, a majority of the population (52 percent) believe that Germany should reconsider its alliance with Washington, even at the cost of more than doubling the country’s defence budget. However, despite efforts to strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities, Germany will continue to rely on the United States for its security for the foreseeable future. Clearly, its politicians need to become better at explaining to Germans why this is in the country’s interest.

As Germans and the world are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakdown of the Iron Curtain, dividing lines old and new are making (re-)appearances. Therefore, the present issue will focus on three particular challenges facing German policy-makers: Berlin’s role in the EU and the Union’s foreign policy; transatlantic relations under the Trump administration, and the question of what role Germany will be willing and able to play in Asia.

With Germany preparing for the presidency of the European Council and the US elections looming, 2020 is bound to be an eventful year. Amid continuing threats to multilateralism and the liberal international order, friends and competitors alike are closely watching the decisions taken (or not taken) by Berlin.

This year’s authors hail from a rich variety of backgrounds, and include Germany’s Federal Minister of Defence, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the Bulgarian intellectual Ivan Krastev, eminent Chinese diplomat, Madam Fu Ying, as well as public intellectual and journalist Walter Russell Mead, to name but a few.

Last but not least, allow me to thank our editor, Joshua Webb. It is in no small part thanks to his excellent work that I am confident the present issue of The Berlin Pulse will provide you with plenty of food for thought and discussion.

I wish you an insightful read.

Thomas Paulsen

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Back to Square One?

German foreign policy and public opinion in a changing international environment

Germany seems extremely comfortable with the status quo.” Walter Russell Mead’s assessment of German foreign policy is more than a little sobering. After all, it has been six years since the country’s president, foreign minister, and defence minister unanimously declared the time had come for Germany to “take on more responsibility”. The so-called “Munich Consensus” was welcomed by Germany’s partners, and met by appeals for a serious public debate on foreign policy at home. Looking ahead, what remains of Munich, and how has the debate in Germany evolved? Two trends emerge:

First, given a dramatically changing international environment, the question of taking on more responsibility has taken on a new meaning. Back in 2014, the idea had been for Germany to step up responsibility has taken on a new meaning. Back in 2014, the idea had been for Germany to “take on more responsibility”. The so-called “Munich Consensus” was welcomed by Germany’s partners, and met by appeals for a serious public debate on foreign policy at home. Looking ahead, what remains of Munich, and how has the debate in Germany evolved? Two trends emerge:

Second, 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’s international identity remains ambiguous. Its institutions – the Bundestag, the Chancellery, as well as the Foreign and Defence Ministries – are divided (Syria or Huawei, anybody?), while public opinion betrays a deep uncertainty, confusion even, over Germany’s place in the world, and the means by which it should fend for its interests.

European cohesion is a case in point: Despite the fact that 60 percent of the German public consider France their country’s most or second-most important international partner, the French Minister for European Affairs, Amelie de Montchalin, rightly points out that President Macron’s reform proposal have all but fallen on deaf ears in Berlin. A similar pattern emerges with respect to climate policy: Whereas Germans perceive environmental issues as the single most important foreign policy challenge (31 percent) and see Berlin at the vanguard of European climate policy, Dutch Member of the European Parliament Bas Eickhout laments the fact that Berlin has become an obstacle in the fight against global warming.

The transatlantic alliance is in even greater trouble: A majority of Germans across a whole range of divides – including East and West, male and female, young and old, less and well educated, rural and urban, and all parties – has a negative view of their country’s relationship with the United States. American military bases in Germany? Of negligible importance, according to 45 percent of the population. Forego the US nuclear shield? Why not, according to 31 percent. To be sure, such attitudes reflect Germans’ opinion of the current President, whose re-election 87 percent believe would negatively impact US-German relations. But consider this: While only 40 percent of Germans believe that Berlin should increase its defence spending, a majority of 52 percent would favour Germany more than doubling[] its defence spending if such a policy enabled Germany to adopt a more independent foreign and security policy.

But what might be the alternative? Well, not China, it would seem, which many Germans appear to view with increasing ambiguity. While a majority of the public (60 percent) favours greater cooperation with Beijing, only 9 percent perceive China’s growing international influence as positive. More than three quarters feel that Berlin should take a stronger stance in defending its political interests vis-à-vis the Middle Kingdom – even at the expense of damaging the economic relationship – yet 54 percent come out against a tougher trade policy.

What to make of this apparent confusion? In hindsight, the 2014 diagnosis was accurate: Germany does need to take on more responsibility. However, it seems clear that Germany will no longer be able to rely on its partnerships and alliances to the extent policymakers “had assumed” back in 2014. Nor does the public seem enthusiastic about the Western alliance, with a mere 55 percent in favour of a foreign policy anchored in the “West”, compared to 31 percent calling for neutrality. The question, therefore, is no longer limited to burden-sharing. Instead, Berlin faces the question of whether and how it wishes to protect and defend its interests around the world. In short, Germany appears to be back to square one, in urgent need of a public debate on foreign policy.

Without a doubt, 2020 will be an important year for German foreign policy. Heading into the second half of its two-year stint as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, from July to December 2020 Berlin will also assume the presidency of the European Council. However, four years into the Trump administration and six years into the “Munich Consensus”, Berlin is still shying away from clearly articulating its interests, let alone well-thought-out plans for action.


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What is your assessment of the international security situation facing Germany?

14 %
Very safe

62 %
Somewhat safe

18 %
Somewhat threatening

4 %
Very threatening

2019: don’t know 1 %, no answer 1 %
Since the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016, the future of the Atlantic alliance and the “liberal international order” has been in flux – several analysts like Wolfgang Streeck have described the current period as a Gramscian “interregnum” – what will Germany do?

Facing an Uncertain Future

Is Germany ready for a rethink?

Ten years ago, Germany’s place in the world seemed clear. At the time, the main debates about German foreign policy centred on its participation in NATO “out-of-area” operations. In the 1990s, Germany had seemed to be gradually moving towards “normality” in its attitude to the use of military force, culminating in its participation in the intervention against Serbia in 1999 and the deployment in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards. But in the 2000s, it became increasingly sceptical about the use of military force again, though as part of a backlash against military intervention across the West after the failure of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

However, since the euro crisis began in 2010, Germany’s future has become progressively more uncertain. The crisis prompted a renewed debate about German “hegemony” in Europe, which intensified following the refugee crisis in 2015. Since the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016, the future of the Atlantic alliance and the “liberal international order” is itself uncertain. So at a time when everything seemed to be in flux – several analysts like Wolfgang Streeck have described the current period as a Gramscian “interregnum” – what will Germany do?

Although the turmoil in the UK has led to a renewed rhetorical commitment to the European project, integration remains stalled. In the meantime, Germany remains in a problematic position of “semi-hegemony”. What this means in practice is that it is powerful enough to make the rules but not to enforce them. Meanwhile other member states are powerful enough to break the rules but not to change them.

The series of shocks the EU has faced since 2010 could have been an opportunity. In the euro crisis, southern member states accused Germany of failing to show enough “solidarity” with them. But in the refugee crisis, it was suddenly Germany that needed “solidarity” from other member states. This could have led to a grand bargain based on a shared understanding of rights and responsibilities between EU member states that are members of both the euro and Schengen areas – a de facto “core”.

But Germany sought to de-link, rather than link, the two sets of issues. As a result, Europe remains entrapped, as Claus Offe has put it. The election of Trump may turn out to have been the biggest strategic shock of all for Europe – and creates a particularly difficult dilemma for Berlin. Germany’s position of “semi-hegemony” within Europe was dependent on a particular configuration of the liberal international order in which it was able to “free ride”. In particular, the United States acted as a security provider – which made military power essentially irrelevant in relations between European countries – and a consumer of last resort. It is now less willing to do so and may abandon its hegemonic role altogether.

In the context of uncertainty about the US security guarantee, Germans simply do not feel threatened. Many will now see any increase in “responsibility” – especially a dramatic increase in defence spending – as a concession to Trump and what he stands for.

The future of Germany’s relationship with China is also connected to its role in Europe and its relationship with the United States. During the last decade, Germany has become increasingly dependent on China as an export market – particularly after demand from within Europe slowed after the euro crisis began. This in turn led to a close political relationship between Berlin and Beijing. The post-crisis divide between surplus and deficit countries cut across the West and aligned China and Germany.

As China bought up Mittelstand companies and took an authoritarian turn under Xi Jinping, Germany seemed to be becoming more sceptical of China and more open to a tougher approach to show enough “solidarity” with them. But in the
based on greater transatlantic coordination. However, the election of Trump has renewed the idea of Europe as a separate pole in a multipolar world that would triangulate between China and the United States – in particular, many see China as a more promising partner on climate change – and more recently the German government even seems to have become less enthusiastic about the tougher European approach that seemed to be emerging.

Behind these interlocking foreign policy challenges lies Germany’s unyielding commitment to its export-based economic model, which is widely seen as a success – even as its vulnerabilities have become apparent during the last decade. That economic model has made it harder to correct the macroeconomic imbalances within the Eurozone and to make the single currency sustainable. Furthermore, it has angered Americans and made Germany particularly vulnerable to Trump’s attacks, and so dependent on an authoritarian China.

Perhaps the greatest challenge Germany therefore faces is to rethink that economic model. That would be good not just for Germany’s NATO allies and EU partners, who would benefit from an increase in internal demand, but also for Germany itself. Germany’s obsession with “competitiveness” has led to an increase in inequality that is fuelling political volatility. Its infrastructure is crumbling and badly needs investment. But the consensus in the centre ground of politics around Germany’s identity as an Exportnation, or “export nation”, prevents such a rethink.

The question is whether Germany will be prepared to undertake such a rethink before it is too late. The United States is gradually withdrawing from the role as hegemon that it has played since the end of World War II. It seems increasingly reluctant to provide global public goods like security and economic demand as it once did – particularly for Europe, which it rightly thinks ought to be able to take care of itself. Yet as everything changes around them, Germans seem to think they can remain the same.

Many see this as an expression of Germany’s commitment to liberalism – and even of German “leadership” as the country is increasingly surrounded by “illiberal” forces. But this kind of binary thinking is a mistake. If Germany really wants to save the liberal international order, it must change its own role within it. In economic terms, that means increasing domestic demand and reducing its dependence on exports. In security terms, it means going much further in providing security for Europe – or, if it is unwilling to do so, asking itself what price it is willing to pay others to do so on its behalf.

Should Germany strive for greater independence from the United States in defence matters, even if this meant more than doubling defence spending?

In favour 52% Against 41%

2019: don’t know 5%, no answer 2%
Who bears the main responsibility for the present decline in EU cohesion?

37% Populist governments in member states
13% Other
9% Both the EU and populist governments

The EU itself

2019: don’t know 8%, no answer 2%

An Existential Challenge

The EU must defend multilateralism

A whole generation of scholars and practitioners presented the role of the European Union as a normative power and a rule-maker in the world. For decades, the academic and policy communities pointed to the difference in nature between the EU and other international actors: The Union being a soft or a civilian power diffusing its norms through its enlargement and neighbourhood policies, through its weight as a market power, and by championing international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in the multilateral system. Criticism essentially revolved around the EU’s shortcomings in practice: Not always did the Union live up to its normative ambitions, notably when more narrowly defined interests appeared to trump values.

The 2010s were marked by a serious pushback against this narrative. Europe had reentered a geopolitical age, with an assertive Russia challenging the European security order, the implosion of North Africa and the Middle East, an increasingly assertive China and, for the first time in history, a US administration seemingly viewing the EU more as an adversary than as a partner and ally. On top, the Union’s normative values were being challenged from the inside, with the UK’s decision to leave the EU, serious setbacks regarding democracy and the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, and the rise of nationalist-populism across the Union, including in founding member states such as Italy, and to a lesser extent France and Germany. Given this rude awakening, the EU, so the narrative went, could either toughen up or it would be relegated to the dustbin of history.

Indeed, the above trends caused a slow but steady movement towards the Union toughening up. From the first building blocks of a security and defence union to the emphasis on resilience both internally and in the Union’s surrounding regions, from the integrated approach to conflicts to a
What are the greatest challenges currently facing German foreign policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the US/Trump</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict in the Middle East</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the UK/Brexit</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate and Environment</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and Migration</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

multiple answers possible

greater readiness to engage in various multilateral formats, the EU has certainly become more realistic in its foreign policy in recent years. But it has not, and cannot, become more realist. A realpolitik European Union is a contradiction in terms. This is because whereas pragmatism has increasingly become the lens through which the EU views the world, principles continue to guide what the Union does within it. It is a difference between the “is” and the “ought” that cannot be eradicated from the DNA of the European project.

This is because of the EU’s own nature as a multilateral rules-based entity. The EU is not and will not become a nation-state, and as such remains the most radical experiment in a multilateral rules-based entity in the history of humankind. As such, it cannot exist in a broader global system in which multilateralism and rules are no longer defining features. Because of the unprecedented challenges to these principles, the Union increasingly feels a global responsibility to uphold, defend, and promote the multilateral rules-based system in a principled and pragmatic way. In a world in which Europe’s partner of choice – the US – has temporarily turned its back on multilateralism, in which China and Russia may speak multilaterally but act unilaterally, and in which the most pressing global challenges of our age in the fields of climate, digitalization and demography are by definition transnational in nature, the EU’s global role in the multilateral rules-based system has become existential.

This requires action along different work strands:

- building a security and defence union which enables Europeans to act autonomously, when possible with partners, beginning with a post-Brexit UK, and alone when necessary; moving towards carbon neutrality while retaining a global leadership on a progressive climate policy; swimming against the tide of protectionism by continuing to promote free trade, while increasingly ensuring that such trade is fair as well; defending the non-proliferation regime, first and foremost the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, when one of its signatories – the US – has seriously violated it, and is generating growing incentives for Iran itself to abandon the deal; crystallizing its global leadership in digital policy, notably on issues such as data protection and privacy; upholding while continuing to spur reform of the United Nations as the core of multilateralism, while increasingly developing more agile multilateral formats – contact groups – to tackle specific crises and challenges as they arise.

Whether the EU will succeed in this endeavour is unknown. But without the EU’s active, creative and even stubborn commitment, multilateralism is all but certain to perish. Equally certain is the fact that the EU would itself struggle to survive in a transactional world in which unilateralism and bilateralism are the norm. Succeeding in the defence of a strong rules-based multilateral order is an existential quest for the Union, and one which we cannot afford to fail.

Since I took office as French Minister for European Affairs in March this year, Europe has not stopped making the headlines. This seems natural in European election years, but never before has the European project been challenged so much. Despite regular skirmishes about sovereignty and finance, it was always clear that we Europeans want to build a common future. The 2005 referenda in several member states on the constitutional treaty sent a warning, but Europe moved on. However, the present rise of voices which are hostile to Europe is without precedent.

One cause lies in globalization, which benefited development and the fight against poverty, but also brought about massive distortions, pressure on individuals, social systems and the environment. Global competition has become fierce, assertive powers such as Russia and China are on the rise, certainties such as the transatlantic relationship, the UN system, multilateralism and international law are being questioned, and trade wars threaten growth and employment.

Europe itself lost parts of its credibility, both in the wake of the financial crisis and through the fact that core values such as the rule of law and human rights are being disrespected across the European continent. The migration crisis has brought to light solidarity, but also exposed the weakness in European policy-making. Right-wing populism has gained ground. Brexit has eaten up much of our diplomatic and administrative resources that could have been spent much better. As a consequence, we need to rebuild confidence in Europe. The time is now!

We already hold in our hands the means to do so. President Macron has made ambitious proposals for reshaping Europe in many policy areas from digital...
Which country is Germany’s most or second most important partner?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple answers possible

2019: a different country 16%, don’t know 13%, no answer 2%
2018: a different country 7%, don’t know 13%, no answer 2%

Which country is Germany’s most or second most important partner?

France

US
China
Russia
Britain

60% 61%
42% 35%
15% 12%
12% 15%
7% 6%
5% 3%

Which country is Germany’s most or second most important partner?

France

US
China
Russia
Britain

60% 61%
42% 35%
15% 12%
12% 15%
7% 6%
5% 3%

Squaring the Brexit Circle

On false assumptions on both sides of the English Channel

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: During the referendum campaign and after, the British debate on Brexit alternately cast Germany as saviour or hereditary enemy.

SIMMS: In the past, Germany played a central role in the British psyche, for obvious reasons to do with the two world wars. This had changed by the second decade of the twenty-first century: The British public generally did not share the widespread anti-German sentiment which spread in Greece and other countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis following the EU’s “austerity policies”.

The referendum debate did lead to a revival of certain resentments on both sides: It was the former deputy prime minister and arch-remainer, Michael Heseltine, for example, who suggested that for Britain to leave the EU would be tantamount to handing Germany the victory it failed to achieve in World War II. Leavers overestimated Germany’s desire to maintain good bilateral political and economic relations with the UK, and underestimated its commitment to “defend” the Single Market and the European project in general.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Germany has been among the strongest advocates within the EU-27 for an orderly Brexit. Given the red lines articulated by the UK, what should Berlin have done differently?

SIMMS: Germany, like the rest of Europe, has acted in a way as to make disorder likely because it assumed that any solution would have to be within the ordering system of the EU. In other words, Britain can leave, but will have to leave Northern Ireland in a then-separate ordering system. They insisted on “sequencing”, agreeing the “backstop” before getting to trade, whereas a good trade deal would make solving Northern Ireland much easier. At every stage, Germany and the EU were determined to show that they were in charge. Instead, they should have recognised Britain’s enormous contribution to Europe in military and political matters, and worked out a good deal without fears...
of “cherry-picking”, which, actually, the Europeans do on defence.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Many advocates of Brexit championed the vision of a “Global Britain”. Three years after the referendum, how will Brexit impact the UK’s influence around the world?

**SIMMS:** In the short to medium term, Britain’s influence will decline, buffeted by the economic and political headwinds of Brexit. The horizon may shrink, as Europe becomes the new “near abroad” for the UK – and vice versa, of course. What will happen in the long run is not clear. My guess is that within 20 years, the UK will be about as prosperous or more so than had it remained. But it will be a different place. For reasons to do with her economic strength, military power and other factors, the UK will remain an important global actor for the foreseeable future.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Looking back at three years of negotiations, are there lessons to be learned for the EU?

**SIMMS:** Because we do not know the outcome yet, that is a hard question to answer. I suspect future generations will wonder why, after 2016, the EU decided to add to its existing problems of a leaky border, a wobbling currency, and a resurgent Russia, a fundamental conflict with the UK. But who knows, maybe Brexit or a punitive Brexit deal will be celebrated as a great EU victory in future times.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** What makes you feel that the EU decided to add to its problems? From a European perspective, the current confrontation seems rooted largely in the Brexit camp failing to think through, for example, the incompatibility of the UK leaving the customs union and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA)?

**SIMMS:** The criticism of the Brexit camp is justified. That said, it was not the GFA which eliminated the need for customs infrastructure, but EU membership. The GFA would have happened if neither country had been in the EU. The EU needs to accept that a compromise solution on Northern Ireland must not violate the Act of Union by taking Belfast out of the UK customs union. Such a compromise is vital and indeed could be the basis for a more comprehensive deal with the UK. At the moment, Berlin and the EU are asserting an ordering claim over part of the UK. The analogy would be if Italy were leaving the EU, the Austrians demanded that South Tyrol must stay in the customs union, and the EU said Italians must accept this before trade talks even started.

**KÖRBER-STIFTUNG:** Whatever the eventual outcome, relations between the UK and continental Europe have been damaged significantly. What can both sides do to support a return to a more functional relationship?

**SIMMS:** If we assume that the UK emerges with sovereign control over its own territory, then we will need to find some sort of arrangement to stitch the UK and the EU back together for the management of the European system. There will need to be a larger European settlement involving a full political federation of the EU and confederation with the UK.

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**Great Expectations**

Poland and Germany in the European Union

T he past 30 years have been one of the best periods in over a thousand years of Polish-German relations. The Solidarity movement spearheaded change across our continent, brought about the demise of communism, and broke the division of Europe and Germany itself. As a result, a sovereign Poland and a reunited Germany were able to develop their relations in a free manner.

Today, Germany is Poland’s primary economic partner and its trade with Poland is bigger than with the UK or Russia. We work together in the field of culture and science. There are many partnerships between cities, towns, and regions, and intensive cooperation exists between non-governmental institutions and churches. We have vibrant youth exchanges. Joint anniversaries such as the seventy-fifth of the Warsaw Uprising and the eightieth of the outbreak of the Second World War show that we can overcome what has sometimes been a difficult common history.

Both countries work together at the UN Security Council. In April 2019, I took part in a meeting held by the German presidency on international humanitarian law, while Minister Heiko Maas attended the Polish presidency’s briefing on the same subject in August. Within the framework of the Berlin Process we support the pro-European aspirations of the Western Balkan countries.

We agree that the European Union is founded on such shared values as human dignity, democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. And we must not forget our European roots – Christian values.

We expect that Germany, aware of its status in Europe, will take account of other countries’ positions in their policies, particularly of those from Central and Eastern Europe. For our part, we declare
Three Questions to...

Maia Sandu, Moldovan Prime Minister

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Moldova has experienced a peaceful change from an oligarchic system to a new coalition government, composed of a pro-European and a pro-Russian party – a transition supported by Russia, the US and the EU. What are the next steps for Moldova’s development, and how could tensions between these unlikely coalition partners play out in the future?

SANU: The top priority of this government is the reform of the justice sector, which is essential to ensure the rule of law and restore people’s trust in their country. It is important to maintain this coalition to get this done. This will help set the stage for the country’s development, for preventing and fighting corruption, and for setting a level playing field for businesses and, thus, for economic growth. I hope that our coalition partners share this conviction, and that we can work together towards this goal.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Does Moldova’s peaceful settlement of a political crisis provide a positive example for cooperation between Russia and the West in the Eastern Neighbourhood? What can others learn from the way in which Moldova has managed a conflictual relationship with Russia?

SANU: The key driver for change was the desire of the Moldovan people to get rid of an oppressive regime which had rolled back democracy in Moldova and which benefited just a few people at the top. The EU practically froze its relations with the previous government. It was clear for both the West and Russia that the previous government was driving Moldova into a dead end, so they supported a peaceful – and legal – transition of power to a new government. Both would benefit from a more responsible partner in Chişinău, a government which would be representative and which would enjoy popular legitimacy. Moldova is focused on domestic reforms, and that should create a more stable state, which would be to the benefit of all key players involved. We are also working on restoring relations with Russia, especially economic relations, as Russia remains a key market for our producers, whose interests we must protect.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: 2019 marks the 10th anniversary of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. What is your vision for the future of the Eastern Partnership, and what are Moldova’s hopes and expectations of Germany’s upcoming EU Council Presidency?

SANU: Moldova has seen tremendous benefits from the opportunities provided by the Eastern Partnership over the course of these past 10 years. We would like to see this partnership thrive, and our association with the EU deepen. I hope that this deepening of relations could become a staple of the German Presidency of the EU Council. We are committed to doing everything possible to make this happen.

Should the EU maintain its current mode of foreign policy decisions requiring unanimity, or adopt qualified majority voting?

63% Prefer qualified majority voting
31% Prefer unanimity

2019: don’t know 5%, no answer 1%
From Inspirer to Laggard

Germany’s role in EU climate policy

Up until the beginning of this decade, Germany and its Energiewende, i.e. the country’s transition from fossil and nuclear energy to renewables, posed a beacon of hope for European climate policy. As we near the end of the decade, and at a crucial moment for our climate, Germany has stopped leading the way. In a number of key policies required to drive the European economy towards carbon neutrality, Germany is in fact weakening many of Brussels’ proposals. As EU member states closely follow developments in the continent’s leading economy, this is a devastating trend.

The Energiewende has been a game changer for the EU. Germany demonstrated to Europe that a large-scale shift to renewable energy is both possible and beneficial. The Energiewende kick-started the incredible decline in costs of renewable technologies, which made other countries more willing to go down the same road. Germany’s transition also ensured Berlin’s active participation whenever the EU was hammering out policies on renewable energy. Brussels’ 2020 Renewable Energy Directive enacted in 2009 represented the most ambitious package of EU climate policies in a long time. Germany, then ahead of the class, tended to be much more ambitious when it came to negotiating policies for reducing greenhouse gas at the European level.

Unfortunately, the direction of German climate policy has changed. Last year’s revised 2030 EU Renewable Energy Directive is much weaker than its predecessor. It no longer features binding national targets, partially down to low engagement from Berlin. By the same token, Germany has been conspicuously absent from current discussions on increasing the EU-wide 2030 greenhouse reduction target to the minimum level required according to science: An absolute minimum of 55% compared to 1990. What has caused this turnaround? The German energy transition is stuck on the coal phase-out. Vested German coal interests are holding back Germany’s transition, and, by extension, that of Europe.

Nonetheless, it is not the energy transition that worries me most: renewables are getting so competitive that the future direction is clear. Tackling climate change, however, goes much further. It will require a transition in finance, agriculture, transport, our infrastructure and industry. If we want to prevent global warming by more than 1.5°C, we will need to significantly cut emissions and spur new technologies within a very short time frame. In none of these areas do we have policies sufficiently strict to do so.

Meanwhile, Germany again appears busy with defending vested interests, as demonstrated by Berlin’s approach to efforts to reduce emissions from the transport sector, and automobiles in particular, which continue to rise.

In 2018 the EU passed legislation aiming to reduce automobiles’ carbon emissions by 2030. However, while a rapid shift to electrification would have required stricter emission targets, the European Council, led by Germany, put up an enormous fight with the European Parliament in order to weaken targets. Berlin literally figured as spokesperson for the German car industry, pushing for short-term gains at the cost of our climate and long-term economic benefits. While Germany was trying to stop meaningful legislation, European manufacturers were investing seven times more in electric cars in China than in the EU. No wonder perhaps, given Beijing’s strict legislation for automobiles.

With regards to efforts to create EU-wide standards for sustainable investments, even a relatively week proposal by the European Commission triggered Germany to pull the brake: Berlin wants self-regulation for the financial sector, and non-binding guidelines. It is as if we are listening to representatives from a German bank.

We are currently at a crossroads. Science agrees that we must drastically reduce our greenhouse gas emissions over the next ten years in order to stand a chance of limiting global warming to a relatively safe level. In other words, if we fail to establish effective policies right now to force significant emission cuts across all economic sectors, the consequences of our inaction will be felt by generations to come.

Germany’s size and strength confer upon it a responsibility to lead. Without Berlin at the forefront, the EU will neither reach the required reductions nor will it be able to lead by example. It is high time therefore for Germany to stop bowing to vested interests and, instead, to start inspiring the way it used to do.
The Atlantic is widening, at least in the eyes of the German population. Our survey shows that Germans doubt that their country and the US are “Wunderbar Together”. A slight uptick in numbers compared to 2018 cannot conceal that German public opinion on the transatlantic partnership remains lukewarm: About two thirds of respondents consider German-American relations to be in bad shape – quite unlike Americans, who overwhelmingly rate the relationship as good or very good. Notably, 35% of Germans would prefer less cooperation between Washington and Berlin.

Germans even appear to question the transatlantic security partnership – a long-term pillar of German and US foreign policy. On the one hand, 40% of Germans favour an increase of defence expenditures, seemingly accommodating American demands for Germany to fulfil its NATO pledges. On the other hand, increases to Germany’s defence budget may also render Berlin more independent from US foreign and security policy, which appears to be the overriding preference of the German public: 52% support Berlin becoming more independent from the US, even if this required Germany to more than double its defence budget of currently €43 billion – a remarkable result for pacifist German society. Even more striking, only 22% of Germans support the country’s reliance on America’s nuclear umbrella. Two out of five Germans would rather see their country seeking nuclear protection from France and the UK. Furthermore, 45% of Germans are not convinced that US military bases in Germany are important to its national security. Americans, once again, attach greater value to transatlantic security cooperation, with 85% of US respondents considering these bases as integral to US national security.

If the above is bad news to you, it might get worse: Only a narrow majority of Germans (55%, and only 47% of under-35-year-olds!) endorse their country’s integration into the “West”. These results raise important questions for the transatlantic partnership as much as the overall strategic direction of German foreign policy. Finding answers will require not only some deep thinking in foreign policy circles, but also greater engagement and dialogue with citizens about the future of transatlantic relations.
Germany in a Pinch
Why the Trump administration is right to pressure Berlin

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Mr Mead, the Trump administration has been far more critical towards Europe and Germany in particular than any administration in post-War memory. Is this criticism justified or rather a pretence for domestic consumption?

Mead: I think the Trump administration has been sincere in its criticism; it reflects its perspective. There is a real sense that Europe generally and Germany specifically is not doing enough about its own defence, that Berlin expects the United States to pay for much of Europe’s defence bill, and that it reserves for itself the right to criticize the way in which the US tries to provide for Europe’s defence.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: German policy-makers would argue that, since the 2014 Munich Consensus, Berlin has assumed greater responsibility, especially within NATO, but that it will not be able to shift gears overnight — for both technical and political reasons.

Mead: As long as this remains the case, it is probably good for the US to keep pressuring Germany. What Germany is teaching the United States is that, when pressured, the Germans move in the right direction. Without pressure, Berlin will simply sit there and enjoy the benefits of what others are doing.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Differences over defence spending aside, considering the fact that Germany and the US remain extremely close allies, there seems to be an enormous amount of frustration with Germany in Washington.

Mead: Both Republicans and Democrats feel that the Euro has been a terrible disaster for Europe, inflicting sustained and massive damage on some of the southern European countries, including Italy. There is a feeling that Germany has looked after its own interests at the expense of undermining the Western alliance and weakening Europe. Americans may not all think that this is the result of calculated policy, but Germany seems extremely comfortable with the status quo, which is dividing and weakening Europe.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Do you worry that these differences prevent us from seeing the bigger picture, such as coordinating a transatlantic approach to China?

Mead: One can certainly criticize the Trump administration for opening every question at once, rather than developing a strategy and then carefully sequencing its moves. But however angry and disappointed Europeans may be with the Trump administration, we all see that what China is doing is a threat to us all. This is the real strength of the West: We share a cultural, ethical, and in many cases religious outlook. More often than not, we will look at events in similar ways.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Nonetheless, many people today are worried that the institutions underpinning transatlantic relations are crumbling.

Mead: The instinct that international partnerships can only be strong if they are grounded in bureaucratic institutions may have been true in the 1940s and 1950s, when the international situation was more stable. Today, is Erdogan’s Turkey a NATO ally? Is Hungary really part of the European project? In the more fluid international environment of today, I think we may see a lot more stress on bureaucratic structures. We may find cooperation easier without bureaucratic structures. The EU may remain the most successful international venture of its kind in history, but it also seems to have more problems than it did five or ten years ago.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Where do you see the EU’s main problems?

Mead: If Europeans perceive a problem, they think the answer lies in creating a bureaucratic process to tackle it. In order to coordinate among different countries, there are certainly cases where there is no other way. However, you then end up with a multiplicity of bureaucratic entities struggling to coordinate. Add to that a population that does not follow bureaucratic intricacies, and inevitably you end up with a massive democratic deficit. The more perfect the bureaucratic machine becomes, the greater the potential gap between the machine and public opinion.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Many Europeans argue that it is precisely the bureaucracy, its laws and regulations, that enable the EU to function.

Mead: I would argue that the EU might become stronger if it found creative ways to loosen things. The Europeans may be able to all live in one house, but they cannot all sleep in one bed.

The Italians are going their own way already. The Turks, who were once headed toward Europe, are now heading away. These are not healthy changes. Europe’s problems are growing, and the capacity to address them seems to be decreasing. It is not a case of “Oh, there is a simple, obvious answer, and you just have to do it.” But somehow it feels like there is a gap between the gravity of the historical situation and the content of the political discussion.

How would you rate the current relationship between Germany and the US?

German respondents:
- Very good: 32%
- Somewhat good: 23%
- Somewhat bad: 21%
- Very bad: 10%

US respondents:
- Very good: 13%
- Somewhat good: 32%
- Somewhat bad: 32%
- Very bad: 13%

2019: don’t know/no answer 3%
2018: don’t know/no answer 4%

2019: don’t know/no answer 4%
2018: don’t know/no answer 6%
The developments which are weakening this order are well-known: Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea as well as its continued aggression in eastern Ukraine; the spread of the so-called Islamic State and its terrorist attacks, also in Europe; the “arc of crisis” stretching from Africa to the Middle East to Afghanistan, which has greatly contributed to the refugee crisis; and, on a global scale, the intensifying climate change.

It is incumbent upon those of us who carry responsibility in Germany to take a stand and develop new ideas. To this end, Germany’s security policy can draw on a proven system of coordinates, the pillars of which include European cohesion, the transatlantic alliance, and a responsible use of military force – always embedded in a broad political approach.

Germany has acted in accordance with these pillars. Our country has assumed a leading role in NATO in securing the borders of the alliance. Germany continues to be a driving force in the creation of the European Defence Union, which aims for more efficient and effective cooperation among the armed forces of EU member states. And the Bundeswehr has shouldered missions in countries such as Mali and Iraq, where we are training local security forces and strengthening bulwarks against terrorism.

A majority of Germans has supported these policies. Wherever required, prudent persuasion – the key task of democratic political leadership – made it possible for Berlin to make and implement the necessary decisions.

Regardless, there is an increasing number of voices suggesting that Germany’s momentum is waning or may have vanished entirely – while our challenges are increasing. Many doubt whether Germany is doing enough. And whether we are at all capable of mustering additional strength. Others fear that our approach – the pillars of German security policy – is no longer up-to-date. They fear that the United States is no longer as reliable as it once was and that cohesion in Europe is eroding, necessitating a new way of thinking.

I would like to see a broad public debate on these issues and I am grateful to Körber-Stiftung for creating the Berlin Forum to serve as a key platform in this regard.

I am certain that we are already doing what is necessary to strengthen security in Germany and Europe. We are moving in the right direction, but we will need to increase our speed, quality, and intensity in terms of both our strategic debate and concrete measures. I will make every effort to achieve this and in doing so will be guided by three ideas.

First: We Germans need to better internalize the fact that we have to deal with issues of international stability. Hence, we should have a more open and rigorous discussion on the aims and means of German security policy. Only by clearly articulating our interests can we provide orientation and room for common solutions. And our overarching interest in foreign and security policy is to strengthen and further develop the liberal rules-based order.

That may sound abstract, but it constitutes the guiding principle for all the concrete issues we face in international politics. No matter what individual case we are dealing with, our response will always aim to strengthen the principles of the existing political order. In order to demonstrate what it is that we stand for, we will need to point to this underlying idea, again and again.

Second: We need to increase our capacity to act in international security affairs. Germany has a wealth of instruments at its disposal to work toward a world that is peaceful, prosperous, and free. This is true above all in cooperation with our partners in the EU and our allies in NATO. But Germany’s
instruments must be in good condition and up to date in order to be effective.

For the Bundeswehr this has not been fully achieved yet, despite the turn-around of recent years. Some things simply need time – such as the development and procurement of major armaments – but we must get the basics right, and this will require reliable funding.

For this reason, the two percent commitment remains the right approach. We must seriously move toward a defence budget of this scale – in the interest of our security, but also because Germany has every reason to be proud that it shoulders its fair share of the burden in international institutions. That must remain the case, especially as two cents taken from every euro earned is not too great an investment in the state’s primary task – to guarantee the security of its citizens from external threats.

Third: We must spell out our policies in more concrete terms and, in doing so, tolerate ambivalence. Germans’ fondness for fundamental principles is valuable; it is a clear indication of the values we share, and the overarching ideas we pursue. However, sometimes it obscures the existence of a feasible, pragmatic solution in cooperation with our partners. For example, European security cooperation is an invaluable asset and is making real progress thanks to the PESCO projects and other innovations, such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). But we must invest even more energy to ensure that these measures yield tangible benefits.

This also means responding more resolutely to sudden crises: thinking in terms of possible courses of action, suggesting solutions, and not always waiting until asked. And accepting that a common European security policy also demands difficult trade-offs and compromises of us Germans – for example, with respect to weapons exports, participation in military missions, and the way we deal with uncomfortable allies and powerful political challengers such as China. These considerations are only possible if they are truly understood as strategic issues and not simply as an opportunity for the next tweet.

Promoting this strategic culture is a pressing task for us all. Let us address them together – within the scope of the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum and beyond.

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Thinking Like a Geopolitical Power

Germany and Europe in a world defined by US-China competition

In the summer of 2019 the European Council on Foreign Relations published a report that tried to answer “How Europe can regain the capacity to act” in a world of rising great power competition and eroding international institutions. According to the authors, in order “to prosper and maintain their independence in a world of geopolitical competition, Europeans must address the interlinked security and economic challenges other powerful states present – without withdrawing their support for a rules-based order”.

The report argued that the EU should learn to think like a geopolitical power. And it is my conviction that this can happen only if Germany learns to think as a geopolitical power and that Germany’s Presidency of the EU is the time for Berlin to show its capacity to do so. This of course will involve persuading the German public, 49% of which favour a continuation of German restraint in foreign policy according to the present survey for The Berlin Pulse. However, as Yogi Berri advises, “When you come to a fork in the road, take it.” This is exactly how Germany should approach its 2020 Presidency of the EU. It is not an easy choice, bearing in mind domestic problems, the prospect of a slowing economy, and growing tensions within the EU. But if Germany wants its presidency to make a real difference, Berlin should place the EU’s relations with the US and China as well as the adoption of a European strategy for dealing with a world defined by US-China competition on top of its agenda.

Germany is the EU member state best positioned to force the Union to come up with a comprehensive strategy at a time when most member states are looking inward in denial of Europe’s growing irrelevance in the world. At present both European policy elites and publics are choosing to ignore the critical impact of Sino-US tensions on almost all aspects of policy. Brussels’ current position is that of a retired power. Europeans may be outspoken on the eroding liberal order, but their actions are risk-averse and rarely strategic. A recent ECFR survey indicated that majorities in all of the 13 largest cities in Europe want their country to improve its standing in the world and to be taken more seriously by China and the US.

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German respondents:
Should Germany increase its defence spending?

- Increase spending: 40%
- Lower spending: 15%
- Maintain spending at the current level: 41%

US respondents:
Should Europe increase its defence spending?

- Increase spending: 35%
- Lower spending: 9%
- Maintain spending at the current level: 50%
member states preferred the EU to remain neutral in case of a conflict between the US and China or the US and Russia. What is less clear is the meaning of European neutrality. Could Europe remain neutral if forced to choose between the US and China, e.g. with regard to technology, trade, or defence? We should not mistake the hope that Europe would not be forced to make such a choice for a strategy.

This may be hard for Europeans to swallow, but the post-Trump world, should it arrive in 2020, will not resemble the pre-Trump world. Under Trump’s presidency, rivalry with China has become the organizing principle of American foreign policy, and virtually the only area of effective bipartisanship between Democrats and Republicans. Only a few lost souls in Washington continue to believe that China’s economic development will lead to a political opening. Instead, there is consensus that allowing China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 was a mistake, and that, should America fail to contain China’s geopolitical reach today, it may be impossible to do so tomorrow. America’s China anxiety recognizes the fact that China’s market-friendly, big-data authoritarianism poses a much more dangerous threat to liberal democracies than Soviet Communism ever did.

But even if Trump and Xi came to an agreement on trade, conceivably such a deal could increase US pressure on transatlantic trade. Regardless of who will win the White House in 2020, Europe stands to lose valuable time should it continue hoping to avoid a choice it will inevitably be pressured to make. But a strategy does not postulate siding with Washington against Beijing or, unlike,

Psychologists have found that street criminals tend to target those who behave like victims. Germany’s Presidency should prioritize convincing the EU not to behave like a victim.

1 Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro “Strategic sovereignty: How Europe can regain the capacity to act”, ECFR, June 2019
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/strategic_sovereignty_how_europe_can_regain_the_capacity_to_act

2 Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard & Susi Dennison, “What Europeans really want: Five myths debunked”, ECFR, April 2019
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/what_europeans_really_want_five_myths_debunked
German respondents:
Which country is currently Germany’s most or second most important partner?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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US respondents:
Which country is currently the most or second most important partner for the United States?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61% 42%

France US China Russia Britain

60% 61% 35%

Europe

Who bears the main responsibility for the present decline in EU cohesion?

- Other: 13%
- Populist governments in member states: 33%
- The EU itself: 9%
- Both the EU and populist governments: 33%

2019: don’t know 8%, no answer 2%

Who has done more for the future of the EU?

Angela Merkel: 56%
Emmanuel Macron: 17%

2019: don’t know 6%, no answer 2%

Should the EU maintain its current mode of foreign policy decisions requiring unanimity, or adopt qualified majority voting?

- Prefer unanimity: 31%
- Prefer qualified majority voting: 63%

2019: don’t know 5%, no answer 1%
Should the EU have been more accommodating during the Brexit negotiations?

- Definitely: 7%
- Probably: 8%
- Probably not: 7%
- Definitely not: 29%
- Don't know: 4%
- No answer: 1%

Concerning climate policy, do you see Germany as a forerunner or a laggard in the EU?

- 48% Forerunner
- 36% Laggard
- 5% Both
- 7% Neither

Transatlantic Relations

What would be the impact on German-US relations if President Trump were re-elected in 2020?

- Very positive: 1%
- Rather positive: 6%
- Rather negative: 1%
- Very negative: 6%
- Would make no difference: 4%

How would you rate the current relationship between Germany and the US?

- Very good: 13%
- Somewhat good: 32%
- 2019: don't know 2%, no answer 1%
- 2018: don't know 2%, no answer 1%
- Somewhat bad: 23%
- Very bad: 4%
- 2019: don't know 2%, no answer 1%
- 2018: don't know 2%, no answer 1%

Concerning how the US nuclear umbrella plays a crucial role for German security, should Germany...

- 31% Forego nuclear protection
- 7% Develop its own nuclear weapons
- 40% Seek nuclear protection from France and the UK
- 22% Continue to rely on the US

Should Europe increase its defence spending?

- Increase spending: 41%
- Lower spending: 15%
- Maintain spending at the current level: 40%
- 2019: don't know 3%, no answer 1%
- 2018: don't know 2%, no answer 1%

Should Germany increase its defence spending?

- Increase spending: 40%
- Lower spending: 15%
- Maintain spending at the current level: 40%
- 2019: don't know 3%, no answer 1%
- 2018: don't know 2%, no answer 1%
Should Germany strive for greater independence from the United States in defence matters, even if this meant more than doubling defence spending?

- 52% in favour
- 41% against

German respondents:
- 39% having close relations with the US
- 30% having close relations with Russia

US respondents:
- 38% having close relations with Germany
- 25% having close relations with Russia

Germany and the Asia-Pacific

What is your view of China’s growing influence?

- 46% positive
- 42% negative
- 46% neutral

2019: don’t know 2%, no answer 1% | 2018: don’t know 1%

How do you assess the Chinese model of state capitalism with strong economic growth and authoritarian rule?

- 44% rather negative
- 43% very negative

2019: don’t know 3%, no answer 1%

The United States currently operates several military bases in Germany with ~35,000 troops. How important are these for the national security of your country?

- 56% very important
- 29% somewhat important
- 24% not too important
- 8% not important at all

2019: don’t know 3%, no answer 2%

German respondents: What is more important for Germany …?

- 39% having close relations with the US
- 30% having close relations with China
- 25% having close relations with Russia

US respondents: What is more important for the United States …?

- 24% having close relations with China
- 18% having close relations with Russia
- 50% having close relations with the US

German respondents: Spontaneous response: equidistance

- 61% having close relations with Germany
- 8% having close relations with China
- 9% having close relations with Russia

US respondents: Spontaneous response: equidistance

- 44% having close relations with China
- 9% having close relations with Russia

Spontaneous response: equidistance
The US has adopted a tougher trade policy towards China. Should Germany and Europe follow suit?

- Yes: 54%
- No: 38%

2019: don't know 6%, no answer 2%

In dealing with China, should Germany defend its political interests more strongly, even if doing so might harm its economic interests?

- Yes: 76%
- No: 19%

2019: don't know 3%, no answer 2%

How likely is the possibility that the current Sino-US confrontation turns into a Cold War?

- Very unlikely: 48%
- Somewhat unlikely: 7%
- Somewhat likely: 35%
- Very likely: 8%

2019: don't know 2%

Should Germany take part in naval missions to protect freedom of navigation and maritime trade routes?

- Yes: 49%
- No: 43%

2019: don't know 6%, no answer 2%

This survey was commissioned by Körber-Stiftung and carried out by KANTAR PUBLIC Germany in September 2019. Telephone interviews conducted with a representative random sample of 1,000 participants. (Margin of error: <1.4 percent for unit values of 5 percent; <3.1 percent for unit values of 50 percent). All data and results available at www.theberlinpulse.org.

As ISIS rampaged through Iraq and Syria during the summer of 2014, Germany was among the first countries to pledge and provide military support and training to stem the tide. By the end of 2014, a Coalition of over 50 countries was working together to defeat ISIS and return displaced civilians to their homes. Germany became the leader in one of the most important aspects of our campaign: Stabilization in the wake of military operations. Without Germany, none of the Coalition’s important achievements in returning civilians to their homes – including over four million Iraqis – would have happened. Berlin contributed $1.7B in stabilization support for Iraq and later extended that support to Syria. Today, Germany remains actively engaged in efforts to win the peace, recognizing the campaign’s long-term strategy.

Unfortunately, the cooperation that led to success in the Counter-ISIS campaign has come under increasing strain. Germany and the United States now seem to be sniping at each other rather than listening to one another and working to combine our wisdom and power to protect our mutual interests. This benefits nobody; and in the Middle East, it risks jeopardizing a joint success built on years of cooperation and consultation.

Diverging assumptions underlying our respective Iran policies have become a prime source of irritation. Washington assumes that economic stran- 
gulation will ultimately lead to better Iranian behavior in the region and draw Tehran to the table for a more comprehensive deal on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and malign activities. Berlin assumes maximum American pressure will meet maximum Iranian resistance, thereby wors- 
ening Iranian behavior and significantly increasing
the risks of conflict. Differing policy assumptions are difficult to resolve. If Germany, based on its own experience and analysis, believes that Washington’s policy is more likely to result in conflict than stability, Washington should not expect Berlin to support this policy.

In August 2017, then Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis famously told American troops in Jordan to “hold the line until our country gets back to respecting one another.” The same can be asked of our allies: Hold the line and look for areas of convergence even where larger differences are unresolved. In the Middle East, there are at least three areas where Germany can fill gaps and help ensure that hard-fought gains are not lost.

First, Germany can continue to lead stabilization efforts in Iraq, where a new government faces multiple pressures. Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas recently expressed support for Iraq’s policy of balancing between the region’s multiple stakeholders. On Berlin’s part, recognizing the reality of Iraq’s geo-strategic position is sound policy. Against the background of mounting pressure from Iran, Berlin can continue supporting both Iraq’s stabilization and its ties to Europe and the Gulf.

Second, Germany can fill the diplomatic void left by America’s relative absence and increasing engagement by Russia and China. The West should seek to de-escalate the flashpoints of Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, all of which are complicated by malignant Iranian behavior and intra-region rivalry between Qatar and Turkey on one side, and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt on the other. Absent diplomatic engagement and maintenance, there is a real risk of the region suffering a new wave of instability that will eventually reach our shores.

Third, in northeast Syria, Berlin can continue to support stabilization activities even as the US recedes. This has become far more difficult in light of Trump’s sudden and impetuous decision to further remove American forces, but Berlin remains a leading voice on following through on military gains – and should loudly protest abandonment of partners that fought ISIS and helped maintain a stable peace. The west still has not determined what to do with thousands of foreign fighters, families, and children now held in northeast Syria. Berlin has unique convening authority and might consider an urgent meeting of Coalition stakeholders to recommend concrete action in this area.

Donald Trump’s foreign policy vacillates wildly between two camps within the Republican Party, one interventionist (with an ongoing belief in the use of unilateral American force), the other more isolationist, demanding an end to foreign wars and a renewed focus on domestic problems. While Trump himself tends towards the latter, his policies tend towards the former, leading to confusion, incoherence, and sudden jolts, as we have just seen in Syria. Public opinion polls show that most Americans rest between these positions, believing in multilateral problem-solving and restrained engagement in the world. We will likely return in time to such an equilibrium, and we can hope that our allies hold the line as we figure it out.

You Say Multilateralism, I Say…?

Why US liberals are sceptical of German rhetoric

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Mr Wright, is the Trump administration still interested in the idea of a transatlantic alliance?

WRIGHT: Unfortunately it is not a priority for President Trump or his administration. There is almost no one left in the administration who understands Europe. They focus on areas of disagreement – Iran, energy, and trade – but do not seem interested in building a common position on China, on technology and big data, on political interference or other major challenges.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Earlier this year the German Foreign Ministry initiated the hashtag “#MultilateralismMatters”, which stands almost diametrically opposed to the President’s slogan of “America first”. Is there such a thing as a Trumpian concept of multilateralism?

WRIGHT: The Trump administration appears more interested in bilateral relationships. John Bolton, the former national security advisor, was a staunch critic of multilateralism. He would argue that coalitions of the like-minded, such as the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative he helped to develop in the early 2000s, represent an effective form of multilateralism. The administration prefers such coalitions to be temporary and mission-oriented. It is deeply sceptical of institutions, which are important because they provide a long-term structure for cooperation.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Is this the right time then for Germany to launch its “Alliance for Multilateralism”?

WRIGHT: I think there are questions about what Germany means by multilateralism. It is striking that the “Alliance for Multilateralism” focuses on institutions like the Paris Agreement or the JCPOA, but not necessarily on mid-sized countries standing together against coercion. For example, China has put enormous pressure on Canada, including through the detention of former Canadian diplomat
Michael Kovrig. One would expect Germany to publicly stand with Canada to uphold the principle of multilateralism, but that has not happened. Liberal circles in America are somewhat sceptical therefore of what precisely Germany means: a values-based approach of the like-minded to uphold a certain idea of international order, or rather a convening project to bring everyone – including countries such as China and Russia – together. The latter approach does not actually address the underlying challenge to multilateralism.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Speaking of Beijing: How does the Trump administration see the role of Germany and Europe vis-à-vis China?

WRIGHT: There has been a major shift in Europe, particularly Western Europe, toward China. Germany, France and others have gone to the administration and asked to work together on China, particularly through the EU. However, in the words of the President, “the EU is worse than China”. Most senior officials realize they need to work with Europe, and are working to that end at lower levels. Even President Trump, though he does not want to work with the EU, is trying to engage NATO on China. The US and Europe really need to have a deep conversation about China.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: The debate on “decoupling” has added to signs that countries at some point may decide to have a deep economic partnership with China, or a deep security partnership with the US. How should Germany and others navigate this tension?

WRIGHT: China is a vital part of the global economy. Both Germany and the US will continue to engage China economically, but Germany needs to be smart about how it engages. Berlin needs to recognize that unconditional engagement, lacking any consideration of security and strategic issues, is unrealistic. The decision to entrust one provider or the other with Germany’s 5G network will reverberate for decades to come, and will be very difficult to revise. It is the US position therefore – and not just of the Trump administration – that this decision needs to be thought through very carefully. What if China’s intentions evolve in such a way that Huawei’s involvement would compromise their security systems, their security operations, and thus the integrity of the transatlantic alliance? There may be certain areas where security and strategic concerns require limits to engagement.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Are you worried about the future of the transatlantic alliance?

WRIGHT: I worry that we are overly focusing on the values of NATO and the EU. No doubt these are important, but what really matters is whether or not the alliance deals with the problems we are facing. What we really need is a positive agenda that deals with Chinese mercantilism, with technology and automation, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and questions about big data, and with issues such as corporate taxes. You have a whole variety of issues that directly pertain to people’s lives.

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KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Brussels and the US share a number of grievances vis-à-vis China, but disagree on the means. How do both parties see each other’s role and their respective relations with China?

TAUSSIG: The United States would like to have Europe on its side as it intensifies competition with China. There is no doubt that getting Europe on board with certain economic and technological measures would help the US to build greater leverage over China. However, European countries see the US approach toward China as too bellicose. For example, European countries have been unwilling to engage in the US-China trade war or to ban Chinese technology company Huawei from developing European 5G networks.

BENNER: It is slowly but surely dawning on Europeans that the rivalry between the US and China will be the defining geopolitical challenge of this century. Rather than becoming a chessboard for great power games, Europe must become a player in its own right, with its own strategy. As things stand, it is far from clear whether Europe has the will, the capacity, or the cohesion to do so.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What makes it so difficult for the US and the EU to cooperate strategically in facing China?

BENNER: President Trump is attacking all three institutional pillars of our foreign policy – the EU, NATO, and the WTO. For advocates of equidistance, this is a welcome excuse and further evidence that China may be the more rational actor. For European Transatlanticists, hedging remains the rational choice. Despite common interests, for Europeans to completely align themselves with President Trump’s America would be too risky. At any given moment, the President could turn on them.

TAUSSIG: Europe also lacks a unified position on China. Some capitals, including Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, are getting tougher on China. But many member states – Greece, Hungary, Portugal – are more hesitant to take any steps that may upset economic ties with China. Washington and Brussels also disagree on the best approach. The Trump

Thinking the Unthinkable

Is the transatlantic alliance prepared for a crisis in Asia?

What would be the impact on German-US relations if President Trump were re-elected in 2020?

Very positive
- 13%

Rather positive
- 6%

Would make no difference
- 4%

2019: don’t know 2%

Rather negative
46%

Very negative
41%
administration has recently emphasized the idea of “decoupling” the American and Chinese economies. This is an unrealistic goal, and one that European political and economic actors – especially German industry – will resist.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Imagine a scenario of military conflict between China and the US. What would Washington expect from Germany?

TAUSIG: I do not think Washington expects a strong military response from NATO or individual European states. NATO military commanders have questioned whether there would be a legal basis for NATO to engage in the South China Sea, should a conflict break out there. Either way, NATO would be extremely hesitant to engage in an out-of-area conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Germany, in contrast to France and the UK, does not have any military capabilities in the region.

BENNER: I agree. But for sure, Washington would expect political and economic support from Europe. The European response would depend on what triggered the confrontation and the broader state of transatlantic cooperation. If Chinese aggression (e.g. against Taiwan) caused the military confrontation, Europe would more likely support the US. But should the Atlantic alliance have further unravelled by then, this would undercut a joint response.

TAUSIG: If transatlantic relations were in a less dire state, perhaps there would be support for European sanctions: freezing assets and inhibiting travel for involved Chinese actors. The ability to take away access to the single market ranks one of Europe’s strongest tools. Militarily, US demands for Europeans to increase their defence budgets have been motivated in no small part by the need to free up US resources for the Asia-Pacific. In the event of a crisis, we would see US military assets rapidly move from Europe to Asia. In such a case Washington would certainly expect Europe to fill the resulting gap.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Do you think EU member states would be able to craft a joint response to a crisis in the Asia-Pacific?

BENNER: Quite unlikely. China holds significant influence over a number of smaller European states, which are already hesitant to criticize Beijing. And German companies are too dependent on business in China. Today Germany finds it hard to protect its security and economic interests and help craft a unified European stance on 5G and Huawei. That makes me pessimistic about the prospects for EU unity in case of a real crisis.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: In such a scenario, China of course would likely be quick to adopt countermeasures. How would Chinese sanctions on trade with Europe affect the economies of Germany and Europe more broadly?

TAUSIG: Both sides could enact lower-scale measures on a tit-for-tat basis, but a full-blown trade war would be disastrous for both China and the EU. Ironically, neither Germany nor Europe are particularly engaged in enhancing security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. And yet, such a scenario would entail dire consequences for Europe.

BENNER: Kinetic conflict between China and the US would be a game-changer. Germany would be forced to choose sides. I am struck that major German companies – Volkswagen, BASF – are doubling down on their dependence on China. I wonder whether they have factored such a scenario into their risk calculations. More broadly, German and European diplomacy is not sufficiently focused on preventing both Chinese hegemonic aspirations and conflict in the Asia-Pacific.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Returning to the real world: What is the potential for greater transatlantic cooperation under the Trump administration?

TAUSIG: There are several areas in which Europe needs to reduce its dependence on Chinese investment and technology. Screenings of investments from Chinese and other authoritarian societies are not strong enough across the EU. This is one area in which Europe should bolster its defences and ensure that it is not overleveraged to Chinese investments. Europeans and Americans should also provide alternative financing for countries in need of infrastructure and investment. China should not be the strongest player in the development space in Europe and its neighbourhood.

BENNER: I agree. Under the Trump administration, there is no solid basis for a joint agenda, but as Europeans, we must decide how we want to position ourselves on the Chinese party state. 42 percent of Germans perceive China’s growing international influence as neutral, which suggests to me that we are yet to have this debate. The European Commission simultaneously praises the EU’s strategic partnership with China and warns of Beijing being a systemic rival. This kind of schizophrenia cannot last. We need to decide which are the areas in which we need to cooperate with China, for example on climate and pandemics; which are the areas in which we oppose China; and how we want to structure our economic and technological (intra-)dependence.

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KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Returning to the real world: What is the potential for greater transatlantic cooperation under the Trump administration?

TAUSIG: We are unlikely to see closer cooperation under President Trump. If a new administration views China as a significant challenge, we may well see Washington extend an olive branch to Europe in the hope of getting European partners on board.

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Hong Kong. Huawei, the persecution of Xinjiang’s Uighurs – Beijing has dominated much of 2019’s headlines in international affairs. The heated debate on China clearly demonstrates that the question of how Europeans should square an indispensable economic partnership with increasing security concerns is becoming ever more urgent. But how much of this debate has reached the public so far?

With an increasing number (46 %) of Germans perceiving China’s growing influence as negative and 77 % rejecting the Chinese model of state capitalism and authoritarian rule, there is a palpable sense of unease: Three quarters of the population feel that Germany ought to defend its interests more assertively, even in the face of adverse economic consequences. On the other hand, 60 % are in favour of increasing cooperation with Beijing. As Thorsten Benner argues, the fact that 42 % of Germans perceive China’s growing clout as neutral is a clear signal that Germany is yet to have a serious debate on how to position itself.

Two is company, three is a party: The situation becomes even more complex when taking into account Washington’s increasingly confrontational China policy. Yes, Germans may feel uncomfortable with China, but they are likewise uneasy with aligning themselves with the US: Only 50 % feel that close relations with Washington are more important for Berlin than keeping close to Beijing, and a majority of 54 % is against Germany following the US example of adopting a tougher trade policy towards China.

But Europe is not an island, and much as Germans may wish, keeping aloof from the complex, challenging realities of foreign policy is not a sustainable option for Europe’s largest economy. As Germany’s partners both in Europe and across the Indo-Pacific region are calling on Berlin to engage more with the region, there are silver linings, too: 49 % of Germans believe that Berlin should take part in naval missions to protect freedom of navigation and maritime trade routes. Moreover, as Frances Adamson of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade points out, there are multiple ways beyond such operations for Germany to strengthen its position in the region, be it through advocacy or development assistance.

Either way, as François Godement points out, Germany must not pretend it is small and helpless – elsewise, within no more than a few decades, it just might come true.

The US has adopted a tougher trade policy towards China. Should Germany and Europe follow suit?
“China and the EU should work together to defend multilateralism”

70 years ago, the newly founded People’s Republic of China emerged from a period of foreign invasion and interference. From its very beginnings, China positioned itself against hegemony and power politics. However, international cooperation came to form a cornerstone of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy. In my career as a diplomat, I have followed China’s progress in making multilateralism the basis of its foreign policy — particularly after the Cold War, as globalization ushered in a new wave of multilateral momentum.

Today, while China is a fervent supporter of the existing multilateral system, it equally believes the latter is in need of modification and perfection.

While multilateralism may at times require countries to reach beyond their national interest for the greater good, it should not provide cover for major powers to thwart other countries’ aspirations. With respect to issues such as territorial sovereignty, greater emphasis should be given to sovereign rights. Parties directly involved in a given dispute should enrich them with our own insights and perspectives. Take the term of “globalization” for example: While China supports globalization and considers it to be an important and irreversible trend, Beijing will not accept the West’s “political globalization” which intends to impose the latter’s political system and values onto the world. Yes, there are certain advantages to the Western system. Beijing does not deny this and has been learning from the West in order to perfect its own system. But as a sovereign nation, China will need to find and pursue its own path, as it is its undeniable right.

While we value the existing structures, the international community should be open to modifying these to accommodate changes and to better meet new challenges. Artificial Intelligence is a case in point. On the one hand, AI will bring great benefits to humankind by improving our living and working conditions in previously unimaginable ways; on the other, AI comes with complex risks and challenges, and successful solutions will require humankind to think and act together.

President Xi Jinping’s idea of building “a community with a shared future” strongly reflects China’s belief in multilateralism. It can be seen as both an anticipation of better global governance as well as a way to solve our shared problems together.

The world is rapidly changing, as the past few years have demonstrated, partially due to China’s growth. However, the principle cause of uncertainty lies in the United States’ strategic readjustments and Washington’s emphasis on “America First”. It is not an exaggeration to say that the world once more finds itself at a crossroads. Its future depends on the path we choose. The choices we need to make are not simply about one country choosing between multilateralism or unilateralism, liberalism or conservatism. Instead, by choosing one and not the other, we are collectively changing the direction in which the world will go: Will we choose to maintain peace and development, or to slide into confrontation or even war? Are we to continue economic globalization and advocate inclusion and collaboration? Or do we want to regress to mutually hostile camps and zero-sum games?

China continues to hold on to its belief in peace and development, as well as in peaceful cooperation as the way to meet international challenges. An international order based on multilateralism can provide protection to this peaceful path and therefore demands our unwavering support.

Europe is a pioneer in the practice of multilateralism, with the European Union as living proof. European integration has greatly benefitted not only its countries and peoples, but has also contributed to the long-term peace and prosperity of the world at large. In recent years, many European leaders including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel have called for the world’s attention to focus on the challenges to multilateralism and its institutions. While admitting the need for improving the current multilateral institutions, European leaders believe that there is no better choice than multilateralism — a view China shares. This is the moment therefore for China and the EU as well as the European countries as such to work together to defend multilateralism while exploring how to reform and improve the latter in order to respond to the 21st century’s challenges – together.
Common Challenges, Joint Solutions?

Tokyo and Berlin are natural partners

Having lived in Germany for nine years, first as a diplomat’s child in the 1970s and then as a diplomat myself in the early 1990s, I consider Germany my second homeland. In the 1970s, Germany was still split between West and East.

I remember a family trip in 1973, during which my father took us from West to East Berlin. I was astonished by the yawning gap between the two Germanies in both material goods and in spirit. East German cars were utterly different from those of the West. Gun-toting soldiers and police officers were everywhere on the streets, watching the people. I was relatively sensitive and precocious, and I was shocked by the worry, distress, and discontent I saw behind the frowns of the people of East Berlin.

In 1989, I joined the Foreign Ministry, dreaming of becoming, perhaps in thirty years or so, the first Japanese ambassador to a united Germany. But history moved far more quickly than I imagined. The Berlin Wall fell in November ’89 while I was still in Tokyo. I was sent to Augsburg the following spring to university, and on October 2nd I travelled to Berlin, and tasted the euphoria of unification day for myself.

Today, Japan and Germany are vital partners, sharing the universal values of liberty, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.

More than any other country, Germany’s interests converge with those of Japan in fields such as the promotion of free trade, global problems including the environment and poverty, and active contributions to peace as non-nuclear states. The politicians and people of both nations have finally begun to notice this.

Until recently, when Germans thought of Asia, they thought of China – thanks in no small part to the car industry. For Japan on the other hand, post-War Europe first and foremost spilled the UK and France, followed by Germany. Following unification, Germany’s increased economic and political influence, and the democratization and accession to the EU of Eastern Europe, fundamentally changed Tokyo’s perceptions. Now, as the UK tries to leave the EU and France is beset by domestic issues, surely it is unnecessary to spell out how important Germany is in Europe for Japan.

The more the US, allied to both Japan and Germany, turns towards protectionism and away from climate action, the more Tokyo and Berlin must work together to persuade it to change course. To this end, they should continue to promote multilateral efforts such as the Paris Agreement and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement.

Further, China is pursuing an expansionist foreign policy, drawing neighbouring countries into its economic hegemony under its “Belt and Road Initiative”. It is important for Japan and Germany not to pretend that they do not see the mass human rights violations committed against the Uighurs and Tibetans, the persecution of Falun Gong, or the suppression of democratic protests in Hong Kong. We must actively intervene, with countries, such as the US, that share our values. This is equally true in our relations with Russia.

We hope that Germany will become more active in the Asia-Pacific, in free trade, security, and the construction of high-quality infrastructure. Similarly, Japan is a world leader in the development of fuel cells and the hydrogen society, but through collaborative research and development with Germany, we can make a real contribution to global decarbonisation and fighting climate change. Let us continue to move forward together in these and other fields.

During this time and in the future, I will continue to serve as a bridge between Japan and my second homeland, Germany.
23 Million People on a Canoe

Why Europe should care about Taiwan’s future

On the day when the opposition party announced its presidential candidate for the 2020 election, I was sitting at a lunch table in Taipei listening to my intellectual friends uttering their concerns about the future of Taiwan. The pessimists phrased their pessimism in the form of questions such as “How many years do you think Taiwan has left?” The optimists expressed their optimism with dark humour. “Thank God they will be too busy with Hong Kong and the US for a while.”

Like Germany, Taiwan operates a trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong, amounting to $81.1 billion in 2018. With 41% of Taiwan’s exports going to China, Taipei’s economy depends on trade with the mainland. However, given the increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) in particular has been worrying whether Taiwan will be able to sustain these figures. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party, on the other hand, is capitalizing on voters’ intense distrust of Beijing, stepping up measures to “contain” China’s influence. Taiwan recently drafted a national security law that would make it a punishable offense to spread “political propaganda” for China. "pro-China"; when China represents oppression and potential invasion, most Taiwanese are “anti-China”.

The problem is that China resembles both. The result is a deep division among Taiwanese extending far beyond the political and economic spheres.

Given the circumstances under which Taiwan emerged and evolved, its evolution into an authentic democracy represents an extraordinary achievement. It was without a revolution that the KMT, which had ruled Taiwan for more than 40 years, put an end to martial law and, whether convinced or compelled to act, opened the country’s political system to sharing power. Without bloodshed, dissidents who had once sat in jail became legislators and political leaders. Since the lifting of martial law 1987, power has changed hands fairly and orderly, following the results of each election.

Taiwan has been a quiet democracy for more than thirty years, nearly as long as the four decades during which it has been isolated by the international community. The US does not formally recognize Taiwan but, as with Germany, acts as the country’s security guarantor. While Washington has indicated that arms sales to Taiwan will become more of a routine, China has devised a routine of its own by holding long-range combat drills and ordering its fighter jets to cross the maritime line. However, the threat to Taiwanese democracy is twofold. The obvious one comes from China, and to a large extent lies beyond Taipei’s control. The less obvious threat is home-made, as the looming China threat tempts domestic politicians to mobilize the population’s collective fear to foment a tribal nationalism. Their success would pose a real danger to Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

Those who applaud Taiwanese democracy for the sole purpose of criticizing China make me nervous. Generations of Taiwanese fought and ultimately achieved a democracy – it is simply too precious for other people’s agendas, internal or external.

Germany has a unique history: its people have experienced first-hand how easily democratic institutions may fall apart when not meticulously guarded. Having received democracy as a gift following World War II and struggled to regain their freedom from Communist rule, Germans are in a unique position to understand both the predicament as well as the aspirations of the Taiwanese. Moral courage often comes from past sufferings. As a leading EU member state, Germany has a responsibility to maximize its own efforts as well as to influence others’ efforts for world peace.

But why should the world care about the future of Taiwan? First of all, save the Taiwan model, the world might have to accept the claim that democracy and Confucianism are incompatible, and that a communist China presents the only logical and inevitable path to modernity. Secondly, Taiwan deserves respect on its own merits. True, if China were an aircraft carrier, Taiwan would be a lone canoe. But standing on this canoe are 23 million people aspiring for a life with liberty and dignity. If it were an EU member, Taiwan would be the 7th largest of the Union’s 28 member-states (27 after Brexit), smaller than Poland but larger than the Netherlands or Belgium, with a developed economy ranking 22nd in the world by purchasing power parity. Do we really want to return to a world in which it is imaginable that countries such as Poland or the Netherlands should be deprived of their autonomy to determine their own way of life and political system?

In dealing with China, should Germany defend its political interests more strongly, even if doing so might harm its economic interests?

Yes: 76%  No: 19%  Don’t know: 3%
The surprise is Merkel. She initially had a very Kohl-like position: engagement focused on business goals, while leaving room for criticism – after all, Helmut Kohl had sacked a state secretary for the mistake of embracing then-Prime Minister Li Peng. Angela Merkel’s room for criticism has become wider – also depending on the political affiliation of any given foreign minister (were this France, one would have written “of her foreign minister”) and on the personality of the incumbent Federal President: none have ever spoken so strongly in China about human rights as Joachim Gauck in 2016.

Who would have predicted that Mrs Merkel might endorse turning away China, as happened with the EU’s refusal to grant Beijing market economy status, the EU’s new investment screening law, as well as new trade defence measures? This remains a real surprise to the French, who had become only too accustomed to being alone and singled out in this type of venture, and for the Chinese, who had decided to take German human rights criticism in their stride so long as business ran as usual.

The problem is that Mrs Merkel’s fine-grained policy ill-fits today’s world. China’s domestic politics are more repressive than at any time since the Cultural Revolution. It can make gifts to influential foreign companies, but if China is faced (as it may be before too long) with a choice between a free trading system and its party-driven and state-financed economy, it will choose the latter for the sake of Party survival. Being economically weaker, France may have a better feel for potential consequences.

In politics, France remains more hypocritical than Germany. France’s official expressions about human rights are absent or formal. In truth, neither Chancellor Merkel nor President Macron have said much about the indignities suffered by Xinjiang’s population – close to a crime against humanity. Both are very tepid about Hong Kong. But at least Mr Macron has forcefully expressed the need for a collective European China policy, including detailed propositions. Mrs Merkel will need to put her actual influence – which is still considerable – behind such a policy, ideally endorsing the latter at a European level.

Please, stop talking about Germany caught between the two giants, China and the US. Germany is not little, and with the present French team it is in an ideal position to create effective action in Europe.

Who has done more for the future of the EU?

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<th>German respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angela Merkel</td>
<td>56 %</td>
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<td>Emmanuel Macron</td>
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2019: don't know 6 %, no answer 2 %

Who should Germany/France co-operate with other nations to solve global challenges?

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<th>German respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Definitely</td>
<td>72 %</td>
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<td>Probably</td>
<td>24 %</td>
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<td>Probably not</td>
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<td>45 %</td>
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<td>Definitely not</td>
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2019: don’t know 1 %, don’t know 1 %

Only people answering yes to the first question were asked this question.
“European Countries Can Contribute to Stabilizing the Indo-Pacific”

FRANCES ADAMSON
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Secretary Adamson, from your point of view, which are the most important trends in the region and how will they affect Germany and Europe?

ADAMSON: The Indo-Pacific region’s economic and strategic weight has increased substantially. However, there is a heightened sense of competition: some rules are being challenged, and this should be of interest to Europeans, too. There is much debate, particularly in Germany, regarding the multilateral system and the international rules-based order. From Australia’s perspective, maintaining peace and stability in the region requires sovereign, independent states, willing and able to resist coercion but equally to collaborate in the pursuit of shared interests. If we fail to meet these challenges, there will be consequences not just in the Indo-Pacific, but across the globe.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Where do you see potential for deepening cooperation between Germany and Australia?

ADAMSON: Germany and Australia share a strong commitment to the rules-based international order, to free trade, and to policies that welcome investment. In recent years, both Chancellor Merkel and successive Australian prime ministers have committed to deepening our cooperation through a strategic partnership.

However, we also find ourselves as partners in multilateral institutions, where there are regular exchanges. We very much welcome the prospect of the incoming European Commission striving for deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and I know that Germany will be an enthusiastic participant in that.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: How can middle powers such as Germany and Australia navigate the increasing tensions between China and the US?

ADAMSON: Australia shares a longstanding alliance with the United States, with whom we share many values, and which are our largest economic partner. Simultaneously we have a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, our largest trading partner. We value both relationships, but are keen to ensure that those relationships are conducted in a respectful way and that we are able to protect Australia’s interests where they come under pressure, e.g. with respect to freedom of navigation. Amid changes within our region, these relationships are not without challenge, but also represent an enormous opportunity.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Are you afraid that smaller countries will be forced to choose between Washington and Beijing?

ADAMSON: We are already seeing smaller companies choosing to become part of a supply chain to one country rather than the other, but it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue to its logical conclusion.

Australia’s decision regarding 5G was based on principle: If a company bidding for a contract is liable to being subjected to extra-judicial direction from another government under foreign laws in ways that are contrary to Australia’s interests, then these companies are not welcome in Australia’s 5G infrastructure.

Free trade and investment regimes retain many supporters, including the World Trade Organisation in particular. There are legitimate concerns and grievances, and it falls to member states to actively address these.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: Is Germany contributing enough to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region?

ADAMSON: Australia and Germany are very strong upholders of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea. Simultaneously, I am asking colleagues across Europe to speak up, to advocate the rules-based system and for international law wherever it is challenged. Freedom of Navigation operations are part of this discussion, but there are many ways in which European countries – out of their own interests – can contribute to stabilizing the Indo-Pacific. The EU is contributing to building resilience in the region, including through greater connectivity. Germany has been quite active in terms of advocacy. Whether countries emphasize a diplomatic presence, defence measures or development assistance, each government must decide for itself.

KÖRBER-STIFTUNG: What lessons can we learn from Canberra’s debate on foreign interference?

ADAMSON: There is a difference between foreign influence, which, exercised transparently, we are comfortable with, and foreign interference, against which we need to protect ourselves. This is not about individual countries, but about sovereign, democratic governments protecting their institutions and their way of life. In Australia, we outlawed foreign political donations, and introduced the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. Community cohesion is a further factor. In multi-cultural societies such as ours, it is vitally important that all people are treated as, and perceive themselves to be, valued members of society. Australia has appointed a foreign interference coordinator, whose job it is to work on both foreign interference and on building trust and confidence in our communities. It is not possible to successfully tackle one without the other.
Don’t Stop Now

Why Germany must help lead the way in Afghanistan

Germany and Afghanistan have enjoyed a unique relationship. During the 19th and 20th centuries, when many countries were facing the threat of imperialism, our two countries enjoyed cordial ties. Following on from the 1926 Treaty of Friendship, during the 1960s and 1970s a variety of educational, cultural, and technical exchanges took place. Many Afghans studied in Germany, while German lecturers taught at Afghan universities. As a result, there is an established legacy of Afghan-German relations. Every Afghan, even those barely familiar with Europe, its peoples and geography, knows Germany, perhaps the country most trusted by Afghans.

Long before hosting the major Bonn Conference of 2001, which re-established a unified Afghan government, Germany was at the forefront of helping Afghans come together to find a peaceful solution. However, while Berlin’s contributions over the past 18 years have further consolidated the bonds of affinity and friendship between our countries, the peace process with the Taliban combined with a shifting geopolitical environment, pose questions for Germany’s future engagement with Kabul.

From a political point of view, Germany’s political engagement has been important in stabilizing Afghanistan and to the country’s peace process. Germany’s membership in the UN Security Council presents a unique opportunity for Afghanistan therefore, and we would urge Berlin to maximize its influence and to make its voice heard, from New York to Geneva and Kabul. However challenging our friends in Berlin may find the administration in Washington, I assure you that the challenges facing the Afghan people are even greater. We count on Berlin’s support therefore in persuading the United States to revive the peace talks with the Taliban, and to make the talks more inclusive. For the peace process to succeed, the negotiating team must be nationally representative, including both the government and civil society. Germany must also work with the major powers, regional countries, and our neighbours to create the necessary conditions for peace in Afghanistan. This effort should also include facilitating intra-Afghan dialogue and talks to advance a comprehensive settlement.

In security terms, Germany remains the second largest contributor of military support to Afghanistan, not only as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, but also through the German Police Project Team (GPPT), a bilateral capacity-building initiative. Following the attack in September 2019 on Kabul’s Green Village, a heavily secured compound housing several NGOs and other international entities, Germany unfortunately suspended this much-valued training programme. However, it is now more than ever that the Afghan people and their institutions need support, and we very much hope that Berlin will reconsider and continue its assistance to the Afghan police force.

Economically, Germany has proven to be among the most innovative economies in the world driving growth at home and abroad. Given the unstable security environment, it is unsurprising that potential foreign investors are hesitant to inject much-needed resources into Afghanistan’s troubled economy. However, economic and political engagement must go hand in hand: Afghanistan is rich in resources, both human and natural. In recent years, the country has been bleeding, with young and old seeking to start anew in neighbouring countries or, for those able to afford it, in Europe. As soon as the security environment allows, Germany should seek to kick-start the Afghan economy with targeted investments, not least to stop the country’s brain drain.

To conclude, it is clear to me that we are moving towards a multi-polar world order. As a leading power in Europe and a country respected around the world, Germany can and must play an active role in forging an order firmly anchored in cooperation, shared objectives for the good of all, non-interference, and equal participation and contribution of all in world prosperity.

Power does not lie in the use of military force or in imposing one particular view on the rest of the world. True power lies in recognition, collaboration and partnership in a world in which all nations live free, and in just societies where people have the right to determine their own destiny. Germany has the means to be among the few leading the way.
Principles or Pragmatism?
Can Germany and India take the next step?

The world is experiencing a fundamental transition in the global balance of power. In the West, the common values that have long formed the basis of the transatlantic alliance are eroding – a development that is going hand in hand with loosening security ties. But while economic interests are shifting towards the high-growth Eastern economies, the West appears fixated on China. To be sure, the latter’s perspective on China is changing: The US has identified Beijing as a strategic competitor and revisionist power, and even the famously cautious EU has characterized China as a “systemic rival”. Simultaneously, Germany and other European countries continue nurturing strategic partnerships with China. During her 14 years in office, Chancellor Merkel has visited China twelve times, compared to four visits to India. However, Europe may not be able to sustain this ambiguity much longer. The time has come at which, to play a constructive role in the emerging global order, Europe and India should be working together to regulate trade – but to do so, Indians would want its lackadaisical efforts were overtaken by events in the form of the attacks on Saudi oilfields. The ensuing US sanctions continue to negatively impact India’s oil trade with Iran and weapon purchases with Russia. Singed by the extra-territoriality of American sanctions and the resulting adverse effects on European corporations, the EU should increase its efforts to challenge the mistaken idea that the efficacy of sanctions will positively influence Iran’s, or any other country’s behaviour.

On trade, Germany, as the strongest economy in the EU, should support the granting of better access to the Single Market for developing countries, including India. Instead, a potential EU-India FTA has been held up for twelve years by the Europeans’ pressure on India to reduce its import tariffs on wine and cars. Germany’s disinterest in the asymmetry of current trade arrangements was encapsulated recently by Berlin’s ambassador to India, who was quoted by Indian media as follows: “We want to sell more cars here, and if you want to sell more saris in Germany, then go ahead.”1 As the Trump administration is undermining the World Trade Organization, Europe and India should be working together to regulate trade – but to do so, Indians would want to see Europe trying to salvage not only the WTO itself, but also, and more importantly from an Indian point of view, its principles.

In the changed global configuration, developing countries are becoming ever more conscious of their markets’ attractiveness. Germany, Europe, and the West should be aware that those who are inclined to use their newfound power coercively are not the only game in town. While differences in perceptions will remain, liberal Europe and a democratic India have much to contribute to an equitable, dynamic world order. Every decision taken or choice not made by Europe can nudge the world in a certain direction, be it towards democracy or autocracy.

1 https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-germany-chancellor-angela-merkel-visit-summit-meeting-1533462-20190421

We are always hearing and reading that the international order is crumbling. How should Germany react? Should Germany ...

Source: representative survey conducted for Körber-Stiftung by KANTAR PUBLIC Germany in April 2019. (1000 interviewees, eligible to vote and aged over 18). All results: www.koerber-stiftung.de/survey-multilateralism

2019: don’t know 3%, no answer 1%

57% Embrace international agreements and organisations more

25% Seek individual agreements with individual states

13% Withdraw from the international stage and concentrate more on itself

1% Spontaneous reply - continue to pursue the current path

13% Leave the EU and negotiate individually

Spontaneous reply: We are always hearing and reading that the international order is crumbling. How should Germany react? Should Germany...

1% didn’t understand

1% No answer

1% Withdraw from the international stage and concentrate more on itself

25% Seek individual agreements with individual states

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We are always hearing and reading that the international order is crumbling. How should Germany react? Should Germany ...
Berlin Foreign Policy Forum

The most important annual gathering on German foreign policy

“Never alone!” has been a core belief of German foreign policy since World War II, expressing a strong commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international order. As multilateral institutions are increasingly coming under attack, the 2019 Berlin Foreign Policy Forum discusses the future of multilateralism and its implications for German and European foreign policy. Since 2011, each year the Berlin Forum has brought together more than 250 high-ranking national and international politicians, government representatives, experts and journalists. Co-hosted by Körber-Stiftung and the Federal Foreign Office, the Berlin Forum is traditionally opened by the German Foreign Minister, and provides a unique platform to discuss the foreign policy challenges facing Germany and Europe. It connects established voices with next-generation leaders, and promotes international understanding – based on facts and in a setting that is non-partisan, diverse, and inclusive. In addition to serving as a platform for exchange among experts and policy-makers, the Berlin Forum seeks to engage a broader German and international public. To this end, all sessions are broadcast via livestream, and are attended by national and international media.

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Körber-Stiftung

Through its operational projects, in its networks and in conjunction with cooperation partners, the present focus of Körber-Stiftung is on three current social challenges: “Technology Needs Society”, “The Value of Europe” and “New Life in Exile”. Inaugurated in 1959 by the entrepreneur and initiator Kurt A. Körber, Körber-Stiftung is now nationally and internationally active from its sites in Hamburg and Berlin.

International Dialogue

Conflicts arise in situations that are fraught with misunderstandings and lack debate. Moreover, such conflicts are often grounded in the past. This is why we champion international dialogue and foster more profound understandings of history. We address political decision-makers as much as civil society representatives and emerging leaders from the younger generations. Our geographic focus lies on Europe, its eastern neighbours, the Middle East, and Asia, especially China. We strengthen discussions about history at the local level in a manner that stretches beyond national borders and encourage people to share their experiences of cultures of remembrance. Our foreign- and security-policy formats provide safe spaces for confidential talks built on trust. However, we also employ formats that involve the public, such as publications, competitions and networks, to provide impulses to the debate about common European values and inspire the further development of international cooperation.

Imprint

“THE BERLIN PULSE. German Foreign Policy in Perspective”, representative survey carried out by KANTAR PUBLIC Germany for Körber-Stiftung, September 2019

Publisher: Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg

Responsible in accordance with German press law:

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Conception, analysis and editing: Joshua Webb, Alisa Vogt

Design: Groothuis. Hamburg | groothuis.de

Litho: Frische Grafik | Hamburg

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